Part 4

In the following year, Qutayba, first making sure of the crossings at Āmul and Zamm, opened his campaigns in Bukhārā with an attack on Paykand. From the expressions of Narshakhī, on whose history of this period we may place more reliance since his details as a rule fit in with and supplement the other histories, it can be gathered that the principality of Bukhārā was weakened by civil war and invasion. During the minority of _T_ughshāda and the regency of Khātūn, the ambitious nobles had struggled between themselves for the chief power; most of the territories, including Bukhārā itself, had been seized by the prince of Wardāna and the remaining districts seem to have been brought under the rule of Khunuk Khudāh, a noble who assumed the title of Bukhār Khudāh[45]. Paykand was thus more or less isolated and, from Narshakhī’s account, seems to have been left to its fate. The battle with the _S_ughdians related in _T_abarī is an obvious anticipation from the events of the following year. After a siege of some two months the city came to terms with Qutayba, who left it under a small garrison and, according to _T_abarī’s version, began the return march to Merv. An émeute in Paykand, however, brought him back at once. It seems reasonable to assume that the citizens, imagining Qutayba’s attack to have been no more than an isolated raid, tried to expel the garrison as soon as he retired. The details given in Narshakhī, that on Qutayba’s advance towards Bukhārā a certain citizen, enraged by the insulting conduct of the governor, Warqāʾ b. Nasr al-Bāhili, attempted to murder him, are trivial and unconvincing. Whatever the cause of the revolt may have been, however, Qutayba took a terrible revenge. In accordance with mediaeval practice the renegade city was sacked, its fighting men put to death, and its women and children enslaved. The booty taken from this, the first of the great trading cities of Central Asia to be forcibly captured by the Arabs, furnished inexhaustible material for the exaggerated details of later tradition. The most important part of the spoil was an arsenal of weapons and armour, the excellence of which was such that the “forging of _S_ughd” appears in contemporary verse alongside the traditional “forging of David” for superlative craftsmanship[46]. With the consent of _H_ajjāj, these weapons were not included in the division of the booty but used to re-equip the army. The statement that there were only 350 suits of armour in the whole army before this is, however, of Bāhilite provenance and scarcely worthy of credence. The exemplary punishment thus meted out by Qutayba to Paykand at the beginning of his career was a stern warning to Nēzak and the Sogdians. Those who accepted Arab dominion would be humanely treated, but any attempt at rebellion would be inexorably crushed. Nevertheless the sentence on Paykand was somewhat mitigated in the sequel, as Narshakhī adds that the captives were ransomed by the merchants of Paykand on their return from the annual trading expedition to China, and the city, after lying in ruins for many years, was eventually rebuilt.

The disaster at Paykand roused the princes and merchants of Transoxania to the danger of neglecting the invaders. The feud between Wardāna and Bukhārā was patched up; round Wardān Khudāh, the central figure and organiser of the struggle for independence, gathered the forces of all the nearer principalities. Thus when Qutayba, on renewing his expedition in 88/707, had taken the outlying town of Tūmushkath (not Nūmushkath, which was the earlier name of Bukhārā) and Rāmīthana (or Rāmtīn), he found his communications cut by the troops of Wardāna, Bukhārā, and _S_ughd. It is not, perhaps, impossible that the prince of Farghāna should have cooperated with the _S_ughdians, as stated in Madāʾinī’s account. On the other hand the Arabic narratives are far from explicit, and the _S_ughdians here referred to are much more probably those of Kish than of Samarqand, a suspicion which is confirmed by the famous punning order of _H_ajjāj: “Crush Kish, destroy Nasaf, and drive Wardān back.” Narshakhī and Yaʿqūbī give an account of the negotiations between _H_ayyān an-Naba_t_ī, representing Qutayba, and _T_arkhūn king of _S_ughd, which is certainly to be put, with _T_abarī, after the conquest of Bukhārā two years later. Throughout all these campaigns there is manifest a tendency, common to the early chronicles of all nations, to exaggerate the numbers and composition of the opposing forces. As usual the Bāhilite account carries this to the point of absurdity by introducing a Türgesh force of no less than 200,000 men, an obvious anachronism, influenced by the later Türgesh invasions. The connection is made clear by the mention of Kūr Maghānūn, whom we find nearly thirty years later (_T_ab. II. 1602. 2) as “one of the chiefs of the Türgesh.” The true account would seem to be that Qutayba did not attempt to fight a pitched battle, but by dilatory tactics wearied out the allies and gave time for their natural inclination towards disunion to operate, then evaded them by a rapid march through the Iron Gate and, except for a rearguard skirmish with the enemy’s cavalry, got his army clear across the river at Tirmidh. The appointment of ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān ibn Muslim to command the rearguard gives us the clue, as it was to this brother that Qutayba regularly entrusted all the most difficult commands. In the following year Qutayba was still unable to make headway against the united forces of Wardān Khudāh, Kish and Nasaf, and after protracted fighting (in spite of the double victory claimed by the Bāhilites) returned to Merv. For this weakness he was severely reprimanded by _H_ajjāj, who, with the aid of a map, drew up a plan of attack. The invasion of 90/709 seems to have taken Wardān Khudāh by surprise, as the Muslim army was able to advance at once to the siege of Bukhārā. There is some ground for the conjecture, however, that the death of Wardān Khudāh had occurred in the interval and that Qutayba was opposed only by the local forces[47]. This may also explain the hesitation of the forces of Samarqand to intervene. The battle before the walls of Bukhārā is described by _T_abarī in a long Tamīmite tradition reminiscent of the ancient “days,” but the actual capture of the city is left to be inferred. This siege is transferred to Wardāna by Vámbéry (_cf._ _Heart of Asia_ p. 52) probably on the authority of the Persian _T_abarī (Zotenberg IV. 165), but Narshakhī, _T_abarī and all other authorities quite definitely refer to Bukhārā. Abū ʿUbayda’s tradition (Bal. 420) of capture by treachery is at best a confusion with the capture of Samarqand. All the details given in Narshakhī relative to Qutayba’s organisation of Bukhārā do not refer to this year; most probably the only immediate measures taken were the imposition of a tribute of 200,000 dirhems and the occupation of the citadel by an Arab garrison.

A diplomatic success followed the victory at Bukhārā. _T_arkhūn, king of Samarqand, opened negotiations with Qutayba, who was represented by the commander of his Persian corps, _H_ayyān an-Naba_t_ī, and terms were agreed upon, probably on the basis of the old treaty made by Salm ibn Ziyād. _T_arkhūn gave hostages for the payment of tribute and Qutayba began the march back to Merv.

_Consolidation and Advance._

If the Arabs returned in the autumn of 90/709 elated with their success, they were soon given fresh cause for anxiety. Nēzak, finally realising that all hope of recovering independence must be extinguished if Arab rule was strengthened in Khurāsān, and perhaps putting down to weakness Qutayba’s willingness to gain his ends if possible by diplomacy, determined on a last effort to overthrow Muslim sovereignty in Lower _T_ukhāristān, at the moment when it was least to be expected. Having obtained permission to revisit his home, he left Qutayba at Āmul and made for Balkh, but escaped to _T_ukhāristān in order to avoid re-arrest. From here he corresponded with the rulers of Balkh, Merv Rūdh, _T_ālaqān, Fāryāb, and Jūzjān, urging them to undertake a concerted rising in the spring. The king of Chaghāniān seems to have refused to countenance the conspiracy, but the weak Jabghu of _T_ukhāristān was induced, possibly by force, to make common cause with Nēzak, who hoped doubtless by this means to unite all the subject princes in defence of their suzerain.

Qutayba’s army was already disbanded and the winter was setting in. All that he could do was to despatch the garrison at Merv, some 12,000 men, under ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān, with instructions to winter in Balkh, where they could counter any immediate move by Nēzak, and advance into _T_ukhāristān in the spring. This resolute action made Qutayba master of the situation and so intimidated the rebels that when, in the early spring, the Arabs marched through the disaffected districts, scarcely a blow was struck and the princes either submitted or fled. The inhabitants were granted a complete amnesty except at _T_alāqān, concerning which the traditions are hopelessly confused. According to one account, a band of robbers were there executed and crucified, but it is possible that it was selected for special severity because there alone the revolt had openly broken out[48]. There was probably also some reorganization of the administration of Lower _T_ukhāristān, in the direction of conferring fuller powers on the Arab governors installed in each district, though the native princes continued to exercise a nominal authority. From Balkh, Qutayba marched forward and rejoined ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān. With the assistance of the lesser princes they pursued and captured Nēzak, who was subsequently executed on direct orders from _H_ajjāj, in violation of Qutayba’s promise of pardon[49]. How little this action was condemned by the prevailing spirit of the age, however, is shown by the contemporary poems quoted by _T_abarī, lauding the “defender of the precincts of Islam” and comparing his action to the measures formerly adopted against the Jewish tribes of Madīna. Yet even at this time we find traces of the new spirit that was to make itself more felt in later years, and hear voices raised, like Thābit Qu_t_na’s, against the “treachery that calls itself resolution.” _T_abarī inserts at this point the narrative of the putting to death of the hostages of Jūzjān, in retaliation for the murder of the Arab hostage in Jūzjān, a much more excusable incident. Balādhurī puts it at the beginning of Qutayba’s career, however, as though it belonged to the first pacification of Lower _T_ukhāristān, so that its position in _T_abarī may possibly be due to its superficial similarity with the case of Nēzak. The results of this expedition were of the greatest importance: not only was Nēzak’s scheme crushed and Lower _T_ukhāristān henceforth incorporated in the Arab Empire, but also for the first time Arab authority was extended over the Jabghu and his immediate vassals in the Oxus basin. The former, exiled to Damascus, formed a valuable hostage against any attempt to regain independence, and it seems not improbable that the king of Chaghāniān was made regent for the young Jabghu (see above, p. 9), ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān was appointed governor of Balkh, in order to supervise the administration of the new province.

Qutayba had hardly returned to Merv before he was called to deal with yet another revolt. The king of Shūmān, taking advantage of the difficulties of the Arabs, or of their absence in the southern mountains, had re-asserted his independence in spite of the conciliatory offers of Sāli_h_ ibn Muslim. The full weight of Qutayba’s power was now employed to crush him. His stronghold was attacked with siege artillery, the king himself killed in a sortie and the garrison put to the sword. From this point Shūmān and Ākharūn gradually drop out of the Arabic narratives altogether. Qutayba then resumed his march through the Iron Gate, reduced the districts of Kish and Nasaf, and revisited Bukhārā. There seems to have been continual friction between the Arab garrison and the population[50] and it was felt that a drastic re-organisation was necessary. _T_ughshāda, though still a youth, was restored to the position of Bukhār-Khudāh, and the leaders of the hostile party (more probably that of Khunuk Khudāh than Wardān Khudāh) were put to death. By this means, Qutayba no doubt hoped to secure compliance and docility in the native administration. _T_ughshāda had been raised to the throne by the Arabs and it might be expected that he would side with them in consequence. A more solid guarantee for the permanence of the conquest, however, was the establishment of a military colony in Bukhārā. Following the precedent set in the colonization of Merv, Arabs were lodged in the houses of the inhabitants, and it is said that the latter were encouraged to attend the Friday prayer and behave as Muslims by the distribution of a small gratuity. The Kushan merchants left their homes and property rather than comply with these orders and founded a new city outside the walls, but it is evident that the Islamization of the city was not yet so thorough as the traditions assert[51]. The building of the Mosque and the organization of the Friday services are dated by Narshakhī in 94 A.H., which points to a further organization of the city after the capture of Samarqand. The organization of the new territories proceeded, in fact, _pari passu_ with the extension and consolidation of the conquests. So long as the Arab authority was insecure in Cisoxania, it was out of the question to establish either military colonies or an elaborate administration beyond the river. Consequently, it was only now that the failure of Nēzak’s revolt had definitely secured the Arab dominion in the former Ephthalite lands that it was possible to take the decisive step of settling an Arab garrison in Bukhārā. The regularity with which each step followed the last suggests that it was done according to a prearranged plan, or at least that some attention had been devoted to the question of the administration of the occupied territories in the event of the success of the military operations.

Qutayba’s reorganization was not confined to the civil government, however, but extended to the army as well. Hitherto the jealousy of the Arabs for their exclusive rights as a warrior caste had strictly limited the number of Persians in the armies, apart from the clients and camp followers. Thus we are told (_T_ab. 1290. 20) that the armies of Khurāsān at this period were composed as follows: from Ba_s_ra-Ahl al-ʿĀliya, 9,000; Bakr, 7,000; Tamīm, 10,000; ʿAbd al Qays, 4,000; Azd, 10,000: from Kūfa, 7,000: and alongside these 47,000 Arabs only 7,000 Mawālī, commanded by _H_ayyān-an-Naba_t_ī, who is called variously a Daylamite and a native of Khurāsān. Now, however, Qutayba imposed, first on Bukhārā, and later on each successive conquest, the obligation of providing an auxiliary corps of local troops, amounting usually to some ten or twenty thousand men, to serve with the Arab armies. It is possible, if the story be true, that this was suggested by the precedent set by Saʿīd b. ʿOthmān in the conquest of Samarqand, but more probable that it represents an entirely new departure in the East, though it had long been a practice in other spheres of the Arab conquests.

We are given no hint of the motives which led to the adoption of the new system, though it would seem that they must have been of some force. Possibly it was no more than a desire to keep the native armies occupied in the service of the Arabs rather than risk a revolt in their rear. _H_ajjāj and Qutayba perhaps realised too that the Arab forces by themselves, after taking four years to reduce Bukhārā alone, were insufficient to ensure success in the greater task of subduing Samarqand. Under the new system—which recalls Pan-chʿao’s famous aphorism “Use barbarians to attack barbarians”—each conquest in turn made the next more easy. The rapidity of Qutayba’s later conquests in contrast with the early period is thus explained. It is just possible that in this plan Qutayba had an ulterior motive as well: the formation of a Persian army, trained on the same lines as the Arab forces, but more devoted to the person of the governor and able to take his part against the Arabs. How very nearly this plan succeeded, even in Qutayba’s own case, the sequel was to show.

The practice of raising native levies, once started, appears to have become general in Khurāsān. We have no information as to when the local forces of Khurāsān and Lower _T_ukhāristān were incorporated in the army, nor in what proportions, but we have frequent evidence of their presence and increasing prestige in the wars of the next forty years[52]. On the other hand, though contingents from the towns of Sogdiana were used by later governors if they were available, as in 106 and 112 A.H., in view of the weaker hold of the Arabs on Transoxania Sogdian troops never formed a regular division of the Arab forces up to the end of the Umayyad period. This distinction between the two subject Iranian groups became, as will be seen, of some importance when the ʿAbbāsid propaganda began to tamper with the loyalty of the armies of Khurāsān.

While Qutayba was occupied with the new organization of Bukhārā, a detached force, sent under ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān from Kish to Samarqand to exact from _T_arkhūn the tribute agreed upon in the previous year, successfully accomplished its mission. ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān, after restoring the hostages to _T_arkhūn, rejoined his brother at Bukhārā, whence they returned to Merv for the winter.

One important vassal of _T_ukhāristān, who had long been a thorn in the side of _H_ajjāj, still remained unsubdued. This was Rutbīl or Zunbīl, the Turkish ruler of Zābulistān[53]. In 91, the viceroy united Sijistān to the province of Khurāsān, with instructions to Qutayba to undertake a campaign in person against Rutbīl. In the following year, therefore, the expeditions into Transoxania were interrupted, and the army again marched southwards. To Qutayba’s great relief (for he disliked to undertake a campaign against this formidable foe who had made Sijistān “an ill-omened frontier”) Rutbīl hastened to tender his submission, and at the same time sent an embassy to convey his homage to the Emperor of China[54]. Recognition of Arab suzerainty over Zābulistān involved of course only the payment of a fixed tribute, and no attempt was made at a permanent occupation.

Meanwhile a serious situation had arisen in _S_ughd. The merchants and nobles of Samarqand had resented the weakness of their king and the payment of tribute: in Qutayba’s absence the party for resistance _à outrance_ gained the upper hand, and _T_arkhūn, deposed on the ground of incapacity, committed suicide. The choice of the electors fell on Ghūrak[55], a prince of whom we would gladly have known more. Under the ever increasing difficulties with which he was confronted during his twenty-seven years of rule, his consummate handling of the most confused situations shows him to have been at once statesman and patriot, and preserved his kingdom from repeated disaster. The action of the _S_ughdian nobles, however, the Arabic account of which is confirmed by the Chinese records, constituted a challenge to Arab pretensions which Qutayba could not be slow in answering. These considerations clearly disprove the partial tradition of Abū ʿUbayda (Bal. 422), to the effect that Qutayba treacherously attacked Khwārizm and Samarqand in spite of the treaties of Saʿīd ibn ʿOthmān, and the argument based upon it by van Vloten in _La Domination Arabe_, must also, in consequence, be somewhat modified.

The winter of 93/711, therefore, was spent in preparations for an expedition against Samarqand, but before the opening of the campaigning season, Qutayba received a secret mission from the Khwārizm Shāh, who offered to become tributary if the Arabs would rid him of his rebellious brother Khurrazādh. Qutayba agreed, and after publicly announcing his intention of invading _S_ughd, suddenly appeared at Hazārasp. The followers of the Khwārizm Shāh were persuaded to offer no resistance for this year, at least, and accepted the terms, which included, in accordance with the new scheme, the provision of a corps of 10,000 ablebodied men as well as the usual tribute. Qutayba remained at the capital[56] until the army was collected, while ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān was employed, according to _T_abarī, in reducing the king of Khāmjird, who from the parallel account in Balādhurī is to be identified either with Khurrazādh, or at least with his party. The Persian _T_abarī adds a long and doubtless legendary narrative of his surrender. Four thousand prisoners were taken and butchered, probably by order of the Khwārizm Shāh.

The later history of Khwārizm under Qutayba’s rule is an unhappy one. His first governor Iyās b. ʿAbdullah, proved too weak for his post, and on Qutayba’s withdrawal the Khwārizmians rose in revolt and put to death the king who had betrayed them. Iyās was recalled in disgrace, together with the Persian _H_ayyān an-Naba_t_ī, who had been associated with him, and Qutayba’s brother ʿAbdullah (in Balādhurī ʿUbaydullah) was appointed as temporary regent until, after the capture of Samarqand, a strong force under al-Mughīra b. ʿAbdullah could be sent to effect a reconquest. Qutayba’s retribution on this occasion exceeded even the terror of Paykand and Shūmān. We are told by Al-Bīrūnī that the educated classes and more cultured elements in Khwārizm were slaughtered almost to extinction. He refers this by implication to the second expedition of Qutayba (though it does not appear that the governor led the expedition in person), which is borne out by what we know of Qutayba’s methods in similar cases, while there is no instance in his career of such an action on a first conquest. It was in all probability the educated classes (including no doubt the hierarchy) who led the revolt against the traitor king and thus met with the severest punishment. The dynasty, however, was maintained, and it is not improbable that the Arab colony of which we hear shortly afterwards was settled in Khwārizm at the same time[57].