Chapter 7

totally irrespective of the principle on which that service was rendered; as is manifest from the fact that it is applied indiscriminately to tributaries, to domestics, to all the subjects of governments, to magistrates, to all governmental officers, to younger sons--defining their relation to the first born, who is called _lord_ and _ruler_--to prophets, to kings, and to the Messiah. To argue from the meaning of the word _ebedh_ as used in the Old Testament, that those to whom it was applied rendered service against their will, and without pay, does violence to the scripture use of the term, sets at nought all rules of interpretation, and outrages common sense. If _any_ inference as to the meaning of the term is to be drawn from the condition and relations of the various classes of persons, to whom it is applied, the only legitimate one would seem to be, that the term designates a person who renders service to another in return for something of value received from him. The same remark applies to the Hebrew verb _abadh_, to serve, answering to the noun _ebedh_ (servant). It is used in the Old Testament to describe the _serving_ of tributaries, of worshippers, of domestics, of Levites, of sons to a father, of younger brothers to the elder, of subjects to a ruler, of hirelings, of soldiers, of public officers to the government, of a host to his guests, &c. Of these it is used to describe the serving of _worshippers_ more than forty times, of _tributaries_, about thirty five, and of servants or domestics, about _ten_.

If the Israelites not only held slaves, but multitudes of them, if Abraham had thousands, and if they abounded under the Mosaic system, why had their language no word that _meant slave_? That language must be wofully poverty-stricken, which has no signs to represent the most common and familiar objects and conditions. To represent by the same word, and without figure, property, and the owner of that property, is a solecism. Ziba was an "_ebedh_," yet he "_owned_" (!) twenty _ebedhs_! In our language, we have both _servant_ and _slave_. Why? Because we have both the _things_, and need _signs_ for them. If the tongue had a sheath, as swords have scabbards, we should have some _name_ for it: but our dictionaries give us none. Why? Because there is no such _thing_. But the objector asks, "Would not the Israelites use their word _ebedh_ if they spoke of the slave of a heathen?" Answer. Their _national_ servants or tributaries, are spoken of frequently, but domestics servants so rarely, that no necessity existed, even if they were slaves, for coining a new word. Besides, the fact of their being domestics, under _heathen laws and usages_, proclaimed their liabilities; their _locality_ made a _specific_ term unnecessary. But if the Israelites had not only _servants_, but a multitude of _slaves_, a _word meaning slave_, would have been indispensible for every day convenience. Further, the laws of the Mosaic system were so many sentinels on the outposts to warn off foreign practices. The border ground of Canaan, was quarantine ground, enforcing the strictest non-intercourse in usages between the without and the within.

2. "BUY." The _buying_ of servants, is discussed at length. pp. 17-23. To that discussion the reader is referred. We will add in this place but a single consideration. This regulation requiring the Israelites to _"buy"_ servants of the heathen, prohibited their taking them without buying. _Buying_ supposes two parties: a _price_ demanded by one and paid by the other, and consequently, the _consent_ of both buyer and seller, to the transaction. Of course the command to the Israelites to _buy_ servants of the heathen, prohibited their getting them unless they first got _somebody's_ consent to the transaction, and paid to _somebody_ a fair equivalent. Now, who were these _somebodies_? This at least is plain, they were not _Israelites_, but heathen. "Of _them_ shall ye buy." Who then were these _somebodies_, whose right was so paramount, that _their_ consent must be got and the price paid must go into _their_ pockets? Were they the persons themselves who became servants, or some _other_ persons. "Some _other_ persons to be sure," says the objector, "the countrymen or the neighbors of those who become servants." Ah! this then is the import of the Divine command to the Israelites.

"When you go among the heathen round about to get a man to work for you, I straightly charge you to go first to his _neighbors_, get _their_ consent that you may have him, settle the terms with _them_, and pay to them a fair equivalent. If it is not _their_ choice to let him go, I charge you not to take him on your peril. If _they_ consent, and you pay _them_ the full value of his labor, then you may go and catch the man and drag him home with you, and make him work for you, and I will bless you in the work of your hands and you shall eat of the fat of the land. As to the man himself, his choice is nothing, and you need give him nothing for his work: but take care and pay his _neighbors_ well for him, and respect _their_ free choice in taking him, for to deprive a heathen man by force and without pay of the _use of himself_ is well pleasing in my sight, but to deprive his heathen neighbors of the use of him is that abominable thing which my soul hateth."

3. "FOREVER." This is quoted to prove that servants were to serve during their life time, and their posterity from generation to generation.[A] No such idea is contained in the passage. The word "forever," instead of defining the length of _individual_ service, proclaims the permanence of the regulation laid down in the two verses preceding, namely, that their _permanent domestics_ should be of the _Strangers_, and not of the Israelites; it declares the duration of that general provision. As if God had said, "You shall _always_ get your _permanent_ laborers from the nations round about you; your servants shall _always_ be of that class of persons." As it stands in the original, it is plain--"_Forever of them shall ye serve yourselves_." This is the literal rendering.

[Footnote A: One would think that the explicit testimony of our Lord should for ever forestall all cavil on this point. "_The servant abideth not in the house_ FOR EVER, but the Son, abideth ever." John viii. 35.]

That "_forever_" refers to the permanent relations of a _community_, rather than to the services of _individuals_, is a fair inference from the form of the expression, "Both thy bondmen, &c., shall be of the _heathen_. OF THEM shall ye buy." "They shall be your possession." "THEY shall be your bondmen forever." "But over your brethren the CHILDREN OF ISRAEL," &c. To say nothing of the uncertainty of _these individuals_ surviving those _after_ whom they are to live, the language used applies more naturally to a _body_ of people, than to _individual_ servants. Besides _perpetual_ service cannot be argued from the term _forever_. The ninth and tenth verses of the same chapter limit it absolutely by the jubilee. "Then thou shalt cause the trumpet of the jubilee to sound * * throughout ALL your land." "And ye shall proclaim liberty throughout all the land unto ALL the inhabitants thereof." It may be objected that "inhabitants" here means _Israelitish_ inhabitants alone. The command is, "Proclaim liberty throughout all the land unto ALL _the inhabitants thereof_." Besides, in the sixth verse, there is an enumeration of the different classes of the inhabitants, in which servants and Strangers are included; and in all the regulations of the jubilee, and the sabbatical year, the Strangers are included in the precepts, prohibitions, and promises. Again: the year of jubilee was ushered in by the day of atonement. What did these institutions show forth? The day of atonement prefigured the atonement of Christ, and the year of jubilee, the gospel jubilee. And did they prefigure an atonement and a jubilee to _Jews_ only? Were they types of sins remitted, and of salvation proclaimed to the nation of Israel alone? Is there no redemption for us Gentiles in these ends of the earth, and is our hope presumption and impiety? Did that old partition wall survive the shock that made earth quake, and hid the sun, burst graves and rocks, and rent the temple veil? and did the Gospel only rear it higher to thunder direr perdition from its frowning battlements on all without? No! The God of OUR salvation lives. "Good tidings of great joy shall be to ALL people." One shout shall swell from all the ransomed, "Thou hast redeemed us unto God by thy blood out of EVERY kindred, and tongue, and people, and nation."

To deny that the blessings of the jubilee extended to the servants from the _Gentiles_, makes Christianity _Judaism_.[A] It not only eclipses the glory of the Gospel, but strikes out its sun. The refusal to release servants at the jubilee falsified and disannulled a grand leading type of the atonement, and was a libel on the doctrine of Christ's redemption. But even if _forever_ did refer to _individual_ service, we have ample precedents for limiting the term by the jubilee. The same word defines the length of time which _Jewish_ servants served who did not go out at the end of their six years' term. And all admit that they went out at the jubilee. Ex. xxi. 2-6; Deut. xv. 12-17. The 23d verse of the same chapter is quoted to prove that "_forever_" in the 46th verse extends beyond the jubilee. "The land shall not be sold FOREVER, for the land is mine"--since it would hardly be used in different senses in the same general connection. As _forever_, in the 46th verse, respects the _general arrangement_, and not _individual service_ the objection does not touch the argument. Besides, in the 46th verse, the word used is _Olam_, meaning _throughout the period_, whatever that may be. Whereas in the 23d verse, it is _Tsemithuth_, meaning, a _cutting off_, or _to be cut off_; and the import of it is, that the owner of an inheritance shall not forfeit his _proprietorship_ of it; though it may for a time pass from his control into the hands of his creditors or others, yet the owner shall be permitted to _redeem_ it, and even if that be not done, it shall not be "_cut off_," but shall revert to him at the jubilee.

[Footnote A: So far from the Strangers not being released by the proclamation of liberty on the morning of the jubilee, they were the only persons who were, as a body, released by it. The rule regulating the service of Hebrew servants was, "Six years shall he serve, and in the seventh year he shall go out free." The _free holders_ who had "fallen into decay," and had in consequence mortgaged their inheritances to their more prosperous neighbors, and become in some sort their servants, were released by the jubilee, and again resumed their inheritances. This was the only class of Jewish servants (and it could not have been numerous,) which was released by the jubilee; all others went out at the close of their six years' term.]

3. "INHERITANCE AND POSSESSION." "Ye shall take them as an INHERITANCE for your children after you to inherit them for a POSSESSION. This, as has been already remarked refers to the _nations_, and not to the _individual_ servants procured from the senations. The holding of servants as a _possession_ is discussed at large pp. 47-64. To what is there advanced we here subjoin a few brief considerations. We have already shown, that servants could not he held as a _property_ possession, and inheritance; that they became such of their _own accord_, were paid wages, released from their regular labor nearly _half the days in each year_, thoroughly _instructed_ and _protected_ in all their personal, social, and religious rights, equally with their masters. All remaining, after these ample reservations, would be small temptation, either to the lust of power or of lucre; a profitable "possession" and "inheritance," truly! What if our American slaves were all placed in _just such a condition_! Alas, for that soft, melodious circumlocution, "OUR PECULIAR species of property!" Verily, emphasis would be cadence, and euphony and irony meet together! What eager snatches at mere words, and bald technics, irrespective of connection, principles of construction, Bible usages, or limitations of meaning by other passages--and all to eke out such a sense as sanctifies existing usages, thus making God pander for lust. The words _nahal_ and _nahala_, inherit and inheritance, by no means necessarily signify _articles of property_. "The people answered the king and said, "we have none _inheritance_ in the son of Jesse." 2 Chron. x. 16. Did they mean gravely to disclaim the holding of their king as an article of _property_? "Children are an _heritage_ (inheritance) of the Lord." Ps. cxxvii. 3. "Pardon our iniquity, and take us for thine _inheritance_." Ex. xxxiv. 9. When God pardons his enemies, and adopts them as children, does he make them _articles of property_? Are forgiveness, and chattel-making, synonymes? "_I_ am their _inheritance_." Ezek. xliv. 28. "I shall give thee the heathen for thine _inheritance_." Ps. ii. 18. See also Deut. iv. 20; Josh. xiii. 33; Ps. lxxxii. 8; lxxviii. 62, 71; Prov. xiv. 18.

The question whether the servants were a PROPERTY-"_possession_," has been already discussed, pp. 47-64, we need add in this place but a word. As an illustration of the condition of servants from the heathen that were the "possession" of Israelitish families, and of the way in which they became servants, the reader is referred to Isa. xiv. 1, 2. "For the Lord will have mercy on Jacob, and will yet choose Israel, and set them in their own land; and the strangers will be _joined_ with them, and _they shall CLEAVE to the house of Jacob_. And the people shall take them and bring them to their place, and the house of Israel shall _possess_ them in the land of the Lord for servants and handmaids; and they shall take them captives, whose captives they were; and they shall rule over the oppressors."

We learn from these verses, 1st. That these servants which were to be "_possessed_" by the Israelites, were to be "joined with them," i.e., become proselytes to their religion. 2d. That they should "CLEAVE to the house of Jacob," i.e., that they would forsake their own people voluntarily, attach themselves to the Israelites as servants, and of their own free choice leave home and friends, to accompany them on their return, and to take up their permanent abode with them, in the same manner that Ruth accompanied Naomi from Moab to the land of Israel, and that the "souls gotten" by Abraham in Padanaram, accompanied him when he left it and went to Canaan. "And the house of Israel shall _possess_ them for servants," i.e. shall _have_ them for servants.

In the passage under consideration, "they shall be your _possession_," the original word translated "possession" is _ahuzza_. The same word is used in Gen. xlvii. 11. "And Joseph placed his father and his brethren, and gave them a _possession_ in the land of Egypt." Gen. xlvii. 11. In what sense was Goshen the _possession_ of the Israelites? Answer, in the sense of _having it to live in_, not in the sense of having it as _owners_. In what sense were the Israelites to _possess_ these nations, and _take them_ as an _inheritance for their children_? Answer, they possessed them as a permanent source of supply for domestic or household servants. And this relation to these nations was to go down to posterity as a standing regulation, having the certainty and regularity of a descent by inheritance. The sense of the whole regulation may be given thus: "Thy permanent domestics, which thou shalt have, shall be of the nations that are round about you, of _them_ shall ye buy male and female domestics." "Moreover of the children of the foreigners that do sojourn among you, of _them_ shall ye buy, and of their families that are with you, which they begat in your land, and _they_ shall be your permanent resource." "And ye shall take them as a _perpetual_ source of supply to whom your children after you shall resort for servants. ALWAYS, _of them_ shall ye serve yourselves." The design of the passage is manifest from its structure. So far from being a permission to purchase slaves, it was a prohibition to employ Israelites for a certain term and in a certain grade of service, and to point out the _class_ of persons from which they were to get their supply of servants, and the _way_ in which they were to get them.[A]

[Footnote A: Rabbi Leeser, who translated from the German the work entitled "Instruction in the Mosaic Religion" by Professor Jholson of the Jewish seminary at Frankfort-on-the-Main, in his comment on these verses, says, "It must be observed that it was prohibited to SUBJECT _a Stranger to slavery_. The _buying_ of slaves _alone_ is permitted, but not stealing them."

Now whatever we call that condition in which servants were, whether servitude or slavery, and whatever we call the persons in that condition, whether servants or _slaves_, we have at all events, the testimony that the Israelites were prohibited to _subject_ a Stranger to that condition, or in other words, the free choice of the servant was not to be compelled. ]

OBJECTION IV. "_If thy brother that dwelleth by thee be waxen poor, and be sold unto thee, thou shalt not compel him to serve as a BOND-SERVANT but as an HIRED-SERVANT, and as a sojourner shall he be with thee, and shall serve thee unto the year of jubilee_." Lev. xxv. 39, 40.

As only _one_ class is called "_hired_," it is inferred that servants of the other class were _not paid_ for their labor. That God, while thundering anathemas against those who "used their neighbor's service without wages," granted a special indulgence to his chosen people to force others to work, and rob them of earnings, provided always, in selecting their victims, they spared "the gentlemen of property and standing," and pounced only upon the strangers and the common people. The inference that "_hired_" is synonymous with _paid_, and that those servants not _called_ "hired," were _not paid_ for their labor, is a mere assumption. The meaning of the English verb to _hire_, is to procure for a _temporary_ use at a certain price--to engage a person to temporary service for wages. That is also the meaning of the Hebrew word "_saukar_." It is not used when the procurement of _permanent_ service is spoken of. Now, we ask, would _permanent_ servants, those who constituted a stationary part of the family, have been designated by the same term that marks _temporary_ servants? The every-day distinctions in this matter, are familiar as table-talk. In many families the domestics perform only the _regular_ work. Whatever is occasional merely, as the washing of a family, is done by persons hired expressly for the purpose. The familiar distinction between the two classes, is "servants," and "hired help," (not _paid_ help.) _Both_ classes are _paid_. One is permanent, and the other occasional and temporary, and _therefore_ in this case called "hired."[A] A variety of particulars are recorded distinguishing, _hired_ from _bought_ servants. 1. Hired servants were paid daily at the close of their work. Lev. xix. 13; Deut. xxiv. 14, 15; Job. vii. 2; Matt. xx. 8. "_Bought_" servants were paid in advance, (a reason for their being called _bought_,) and those that went out at the seventh year received a _gratuity_. Deut. xv. 12, 13. 2. The "hired" were paid _in money_, the "bought" received their _gratuity_, at least, in grain, cattle, and the product of the vintage. Deut. xv. 14. 3. The "hired" _lived_ in their own families, the "bought" were a part of their masters' families. 4. The "hired" supported their families out of their wages; the "bought" and their families were supported by the master _beside_ their wages. 5. Hired servants were expected to work more _constantly_, and to have more _working hours_ in the day than the bought servants. This we infer from the fact, that "a hireling's day," was a sort of proverbial phrase, meaning a _full_ day. No subtraction of time being made from it. So _a hireling's year_ signifies an entire year without abatement. Job. vii. 1; xiv. 6; Isa. xvi. 14; xxi. 16.

[Footnote A: To suppose a servant robbed of his earnings because he is not called a _hired_ servant, is profound induction! If I employ a man at twelve dollars a month to work my farm, he is my "_hired_" man, but if _I give him such a portion of the crop_, or in other words, if he works my farm "_on shares_," every farmer knows that he is no longer called a "_hired_" man. Yet he works the same farm, in the same way, at the same times, and with the same teams and tools; and does the same amount of work in the year, and perhaps clears twenty dollars a month, instead of twelve. Now as he is no longer called "hired," and as he still works my farm, suppose my neighbors sagely infer, that since he is not my "_hired_" laborer, I _rob_ him of his earnings, and with all the gravity of owls, pronounce their oracular decision, and hoot it abroad. My neighbors are deep divers! like some theological professors, they go not only to the bottom but come up covered with the tokens.]

The "bought" servants, were, _as a class, superior to the hired_--were more trust-worthy, were held in higher estimation, had greater privileges, and occupied a more elevated station in society. 1. They were intimately incorporated with the family of the master, were guests at family festivals, and social solemnities, from which hired servants were excluded. Lev. xxii. 10, 11; Ex. xii. 43, 45. 2. Their interests were far more identified with those of their masters' family. They were often, actually or prospectively, heirs of their masters' estates, as in the case of Eliezer, of Ziba, and the sons of Bilhah, and Zilpah. When there were no sons, or when they were unworthy, bought servants were made heirs. Prov. xvii. 2. We find traces of this usage in the New Testament. "But when the husbandmen saw him, they reasoned among themselves saying, this is the _heir_, come let us kill him, _that the inheritance may be ours_." Luke xx. 14. In no instance does a _hired_ servant inherit his master's estate. 3. Marriages took place between servants and their master's daughters. "Sheshan had a _servant_, an Egyptian, whose name was Jarha. And Sheshan gave his daughter to Jarha his servant to wife." 1 Chron. ii. 34, 35. There is no instance of a _hired_ servant forming such an alliance. 4. Bought servants and their descendants were treated with the same affection and respect as the other members of the family.[A] The treatment of Abraham's servants. Gen. xxiv. and xviii. 1-7; the intercourse between Gideon and Phurah Judg. vii. 10, 11; Saul and his servant, 1 Sam. ix. 5, 22; Jonathan and his servant, 1 Sam. xiv. 1-14, and Elisha and Gehazi are illustrations. The tenderness exercised towards home-born servants or the children of _handmaids_, and the strength of the tie that bound them to the family, are employed by the Psalmist to illustrate the regard of God for him, his care over him, and his own endearing relation to him, when in the last extremity he prays, "Save the son of thy _handmaid_." Ps. lxxxvi. 16. So also in Ps. cxvi. 16. Oh Lord, truly I am thy servant; I am thy servant, and the son of thy _handmaid_. Also, Jer. ii. 14. Is Israel a servant? Is he a _home-born_?[B] WHY IS HE SPOILED? No such tie seems to have existed between _hired_ servants and their masters. Their untrustworthiness was proverbial. John x. 12, 13. They were reckoned at but half the value of bought servants. Deut. xv. 18. None but the _lowest class_ of the people engaged as hired servants, and the kinds of labor assigned to them required little knowledge and skill. No persons seem to have become hired servants except such as were forced to it from extreme poverty. The hired servant is called "poor and needy," and the reason assigned by God why he should be paid as soon as he had finished his work is, "For _he is poor_, and setteth his heart upon it." Deut. xxiv. 14, 15. See also, 1 Sam. ii. 5. Various passages show the low repute and trifling character of the class from which they were hired. Judg. ix. 4; 1 Sam. ii. 5. The superior condition of bought servants is manifest in the high trust confided to them, and in their dignity and authority in the household. In no instance is a _hired_ servant thus distinguished. The _bought_ servant is manifestly the master's representative in the family, sometimes with plenipotentiary powers over adult children, even negotiating marriage for them. Abraham adjured his servant, not to take a wife for Isaac of the daughters of the Canaanites. The servant himself selected the individual. Servants exercised discretionary power in the management of their masters' estates, "And the servant took ten camels of the camels of his master, _for all the goods of his master were in his hand_." Gen. xxiv. 10. The reason assigned is not that such was Abraham's direction, but that the servant had discretionary control. Servants had also discretionary power in the _disposal of property_. Gen. xxiv. 22, 30, 53. The condition of Ziba in the house of Mephibosheth, is a case in point. So is Prov. xvii. 2. Distinct traces of this estimation are to be found in the New Testament, Matt. xxiv. 45; Luke xii. 42, 44. So in the parable of the talents, the master seems to have set up each of his servants in trade with a large capital. The unjust steward had large _discretionary_ power, was "accused of wasting his master's goods," and manifestly regulated with his debtors the _terms_ of settlement. Luke xvi. 4-8. Such trusts were never reposed in _hired_ servants.

[Footnote A: "For the _purchased servant_ who is an Israelite, or proselyte, shall fare as his master. The master shall not eat fine bread, and his servant bread of bran. Nor yet drink old wine, and give his servant new: nor sleep on soft pillows, and bedding, and his servant on straw. I say unto you, that he that gets a _purchased_ servant does well to make him as his friend, or he will prove to his employer as if he got himself a master."--Maimonides, in Mishna Kiddushim. Chap. 1, Sec. 2.]

[Footnote B: Our translators in rendering it "Is he a home-born SLAVE," were wise beyond what is written.]

The inferior condition of _hired_ servants, is illustrated in the parable of the prodigal son. When he came to himself, the memory of his home, and of the abundance enjoyed by even the _lowest_ class of servants in his father's household, while he was perishing with hunger among the swine and husks, so filled him with anguish at the contrast, that he exclaimed, "How many _hired_ servants of my father, have bread enough and to spare, and I perish with hunger." His proud heart broke. "I will arise," he cried, "and go to my father;" and then to assure his father of the depth of his humility, resolved to add; "Make me as one of thy _hired_ servants." If _hired_ servants were the _superior_ class--to bespeak the situation, savored little of that sense of unworthiness that seeks the dust with hidden face, and cries "unclean." Unhumbled nature _climbs_; or if it falls, clings fast, where first it may. Humility sinks of its own weight, and in the lowest deep, digs lower. The design of the parable was to illustrate on the one hand, the joy of God, as he beholds afar off, the returning sinner "seeking an injured father's face," who runs to clasp and bless him with an unchiding welcome; and on the other, the contrition of the penitent, turning homeward with tears from his wanderings, his stricken spirit breaking with its ill-desert he sobs aloud, "The lowest place, _the lowest place_, I can abide no other." Or in those inimitable words, "Father I have sinned against Heaven, and in thy sight, and am no more worthy to be called thy son; make me as one of thy HIRED servants." The supposition that _hired_ servants were the _highest_ class, takes from the parable an element of winning beauty and pathos.

It is manifest to every careful student of the Bible, that _one_ class of servants, was on terms of equality with the children and other members of the family. Hence the force of Paul's declaration, Gal. iv. 1, "Now I say unto you, that the heir, so long as he is a child, DIFFERETH NOTHING FROM A SERVANT, though he be lord of all." If this were the _hired_ class, the prodigal was a sorry specimen of humility. Would our Lord have put such language upon the lips of one held up by himself, as a model of gospel humility, to illustrate its deep sense of all ill-desert? If this is _humility_, put it on stilts, and set it a strutting, while pride takes lessons, and blunders in aping it.

Israelites and Strangers belonged indiscriminately to _each_ class of the servants, the _bought_ and the _hired_. That those in the former class, whether Jews or Strangers, rose to honors and authority in the family circle, which were not conferred on _hired_ servants, has been shown. It should be added, however, that in the enjoyment of privileges, merely _political_, the hired servants from the _Israelites_, were more favored than even the bought servants from the _Strangers_. No one from the Strangers, however wealthy or highly endowed, was eligible to the highest office, nor could he own the soil. This last disability seems to have been one reason for the different periods of service required of the two classes of bought servants. The Israelite was to serve six years--the Stranger until the jubilee. As the Strangers could not own the soil, nor houses, except within walled towns, they would naturally attach themselves to Israelitish families. Those who were wealthy, or skilled in manufactures, instead of becoming servants would need servants for their own use, and as inducements for the Strangers to become servants to the Israelites, were greater than persons of their own nation could hold out to them, these wealthy Strangers would naturally procure the poorer Israelites for servants. Lev. xxv. 47. In a word, such was the political condition of the Strangers, that the Jewish polity offered a virtual bounty, to such as would become permanent servants, and thus secure those privileges already enumerated, and for their children in the second generation a permanent inheritance. Ezek. xlvii. 21-23. None but the monied aristocracy would be likely to decline such offers. On the other hand, the Israelites, owning all the soil, and an inheritance of land being a sacred possession, to hold it free of incumbrance was with every Israelite, a delicate point, both of family honor and personal character. 1 Kings xxi. 3. Hence, to forego the control of one's inheritance, after the division of the paternal domain, or to be kept out of it after having acceded to it, was a burden grievous to be borne. To mitigate as much as possible such a calamity, the law released the Israelitish servant at the end of six[A] years; as, during that time--if of the first class--the partition of the patrimonial land might have taken place or, if of the second, enough money might have been earned to disencumber his estate, and thus he might assume his station as a lord of the soil. If neither contingency had occurred, then after another six years the opportunity was again offered, and so on, until the jubilee. So while strong motives urged the Israelite to discontinue his service as soon as the exigency had passed which made him a servant, every consideration impelled the _Stranger_ to _prolong_ his term of service;[B] and the same kindness which dictated the law of six years' service for the Israelite, assigned as the general rule, a much longer period to the Gentile servant, who had every inducement to protract the term. It should be borne in mind, that adult Jews ordinarily became servants, only as a temporary expedient to relieve themselves from embarrassment, and ceased to be such when that object was effected. The poverty that forced them to it was a calamity, and their service was either a means of relief, or a measure of prevention; not pursued as a permanent business, but resorted to on emergencies--a sort of episode in the main scope of their lives. Whereas with the Stranger, it was a _permanent employment_, pursued both as a _means_ of bettering their own condition, and that of their posterity, and as an _end_ for its own sake, conferring on them privileges, and a social estimation not otherwise attainable.

[Footnote A: Another reason for protracting the service until the seventh year, seems to have been the coincidence of that period with other arrangements, in the Jewish economy. Its pecuniary responsibilities, social relations, and general internal structure, were _graduated_ upon a septennial scale. Besides, as those Israelites who had become servants through poverty, would not sell themselves, till other expedients to recruit their finances had failed--(Lev. xxv. 35)--their _becoming servants_ proclaimed such a state of their affairs, as demanded the labor of a _course of years_ fully to reinstate them.]

[Footnote B: The Stranger had the same inducements to prefer a long term of service that those have who cannot own land, to prefer a long _lease_.]

We see from the foregoing, why servants purchased from the heathen, are called by way of distinction, _the_ servants, (not _bondmen_,) 1. They followed it as a _permanent business_. 2. Their term of service was _much longer_ than that of the other class. 3. As a class, they doubtless greatly outnumbered the Israelitish servants. 4. All the Strangers that dwelt in the land were _tributaries_, required to pay an annual tax to the government, either in money, or in public service, (called a _"tribute of bond-service;"_) in other words, all the Strangers were _national servants_, to the Israelites, and the same Hebrew word used to designate _individual_ servants, equally designates _national_ servants or tributaries. 2 Sam. viii. 2, 6, 14; 2 Chron. viii. 7-9; Deut, xx. 11; 2 Sam. x. 19; 1 Kings ix. 21, 22; 1 Kings iv. 21; Gen. xxvii. 29. The same word is applied to the Israelites, when they paid tribute to other nations. 2 Kings xvii. 3.; Judg. iii. 8, 14; Gen. xlix. 15. Another distinction between the Jewish and Gentile bought servants, was in their _kinds_ of service. The servants from the Strangers were properly the _domestics_, or household servants, employed in all family work, in offices of personal attendance, and in such mechanical labor, as was required by increasing wants and needed repairs. The Jewish bought servants seem almost exclusively _agricultural_. Besides being better fitted for it by previous habits, agriculture, and the tending of cattle, were regarded by the Israelites as the most honorable of all occupations. After Saul was elected king, and escorted to Gibeah, the next report of him is, "_And behold Saul came after the herd out of the field_." 1 Sam. xi. 5. Elisha "was plowing with twelve yoke of oxen." 1 Kings xix. 19. King Uzziah "loved husbandry." 2 Chron. xxvi. 10. Gideon _was "threshing wheat"_ when called to lead the host against the Midianites. Judg. vi. 11. The superior honorableness of agriculture is shown, in that it was protected and supported by the fundamental law of the theocracy--God indicating it as the chief prop of the government. The Israelites were like permanent fixtures on their soil, so did they cling to it. To be agriculturists on their own patrimonial inheritances, was with them the grand claim to honorable estimation. When Ahab proposed to Naboth that he should sell him his vineyard, king though he was, he might well have anticipated from an Israelitish freeholder, just such an indignant burst as that which his proposal drew forth, "And Naboth said to Ahab, the Lord forbid it me that I should give the inheritance of my fathers unto thee." 1 Kings xxi. 2, 3. Agriculture being pre-eminently a _Jewish_ employment, to assign a native Israelite to other employments as a business, was to break up his habits, do violence to cherished predilections, and put him to a kind of labor in which he had no skill, and which he deemed degrading.[C] In short, it was in the earlier ages of the Mosaic system, practically to _unjew_ him, a hardship and a rigor grievous to be borne, as it annihilated a visible distinction between the descendants of Abraham and the Strangers. _To guard this and another fundamental distinction_, God instituted the regulation, "If thy brother that dwelleth by thee be waxen poor, and be sold unto thee, thou shalt not compel him to serve as a bond-servant." In other words, thou shalt not put him to servant's work--to the business, and into the condition of domestics. In the Persian version it is translated, "Thou shalt not assign to him the work of _servitude_." In the Septuagint, "He shall not serve thee with the service of a _domestic_." In the Syriac, "Thou shalt not employ him after the manner of servants." In the Samaritan, "Thou shalt not require him to serve in the service of a servant." In the Targum of Onkelos, "He shall not serve thee with the service of a household servant." In the Targum of Jonathan, "Thou shalt not cause him to serve according to the usages of the servitude of servants."[D] The meaning of the passage is, _thou shalt not assign him to the same grade, nor put him to the same service, with permanent domestics._ The remainder of the regulation is--_"But as an hired servant and as a sojourner shall he be with thee."_ Hired servants were not incorporated into the families of their masters; they still retained their own family organization, without the surrender of any domestic privilege, honor, or authority; and this, even though they resided under the same roof with their master. The same substantially may be said of the sojourner though he was not the owner of the land which he cultivated, and of course had not the control of an inheritance, yet he was not in a condition that implied subjection to him whose land he tilled, or that demanded the surrender of any _right_, or exacted from him any homage, or stamped him with any inferiority; unless, it be supposed that a degree of inferiority would naturally attach to a state of _dependence_ however qualified. While bought servants were associated with their master's families at meals, at the Passover, and at other family festivals, hired servants and sojourners were not. Ex. xii. 44, 45; Lev. xxii. 10, 11. Hired servants were not subject to the authority of their masters in any such sense as the master's wife, children, and bought servants. Hence the only form of oppressing hired servants spoken of in the Scriptures as practicable to masters, is that of _keeping back their wages._ To have taken away such privileges in the case under consideration, would have been pre-eminent "_rigor_;" for it was not a servant born in the house of a master, nor a minor, whose minority had been sold by the father, neither was it one who had not yet acceded to his inheritance, nor finally, one who had received the _assignment_ of his inheritance, but was working off from it an incumbrance, before entering upon its possession and control. But it was that of _the head of a family_, who had known better days, now reduced to poverty, forced to relinquish the loved inheritance of his fathers, with the competence and respectful consideration its possession secured to him, and to be indebted to a neighbor for shelter, sustenance, and employment. So sad a reverse, might well claim sympathy; but one consolation cheers him in the house of his pilgrimage; he is an _Israelite--Abraham is his father_ and now in his calamity he clings closer than ever, to the distinction conferred by his birth-right. To rob him of this, were "the unkindest cut of all." To have assigned him to a grade of service filled only by those whose permanent business was serving, would have been to "rule over him with" peculiar "rigor." "Thou shalt not compel him to serve as a bond-servant," or literally, _thou shalt not serve thyself with him, with the service of a servant_, guaranties his political privileges, and a kind and grade of service comporting with his character and relations as an Israelite. And "as a _hired_ servant, and as a sojourner shall he be with thee," secures to him his family organization, the respect and authority due to its head, and the general consideration resulting from such a station. Being already in possession of his inheritance, and the head of a household, the law so arranged the conditions of his service as to _alleviate_ as much as possible the calamity which had reduced him from independence and authority, to penury and subjection. The import of the command which concludes this topic in the forty-third verse, ("Thou shalt not rule over him with rigor,") is manifestly this, you shall not disregard those differences in previous associations, station, authority, and political privileges, upon which this regulation is based; for to hold this class of servants _irrespective_ of these distinctions, and annihilating them, is to "rule with rigor." The same command is repeated in the forty-sixth verse, and applied to the distinction between servants of Jewish, and those of Gentile extraction, and forbids the overlooking of distinctive Jewish peculiarities, the disregard of which would be _rigorous_ in the extreme.[E] The construction commonly put upon the phrase "rule with rigor," and the inference drawn from it, have an air vastly oracular. It is interpreted to mean, "you shall not make him a chattel, and strip him of legal protection, nor force him to work without pay." The inference is like unto it, viz., since the command forbade such outrages upon the Israelites, it permitted and commissioned their infliction upon the Strangers. Such impious and shallow smattering captivates scoffers and libertines; its flippancy and blasphemy, and the strong scent of its loose-reined license works like a charm upon them. What boots it to reason against such rampant affinities! In Ex. i. 13, it is said that the Egyptians, "made the children of Israel to _serve_ with rigor." This rigor is affirmed of the _amount of labor_ extorted and the _mode_ of the exaction. The expression "serve with rigor," is never applied to the service of servants under the Mosaic system. The phrase, "thou shall not RULE over him with rigor," does not prohibit unreasonable exactions of labor, nor inflictions of cruelty. Such were provided against otherwise. But it forbids confounding the distinctions between a Jew and a Stranger, by assigning the former to the same grade of service, for the same term of time and under the same political disabilities as the latter.

[Footnote C: The Babylonish captivity seems to have greatly modified Jewish usage in this respect. Before that event, their cities were comparatively small, and few were engaged in mechanical or mercantile employments. Afterward their cities enlarged apace and trades multiplied.]

[Footnote D: Jarchi's comment on "Thou shalt not compel him to serve as a bond-servant" is, "The Hebrew servant is not to be required to do any thing which is accounted degrading--such as all offices of personal attendance, as loosing his master's shoe-latchet, bringing him water to wash his hands and feet, waiting on him at table, dressing him, carrying things to and from the bath. The Hebrew servant is to work with his master as a son or brother, in the business of his farm, or other labor, until his legal release."]

[Footnote E: The disabilities of the Strangers, which were distinctions, based on a different national descent, and important to the preservation of nation characteristics, and a national worship, did not at all affect their _social_ estimation. They were regarded according to their character and worth as _persons_, irrespective of their foreign origin, employments and political condition.]

We are now prepared to review at a glance, the condition of the different classes of servants, with the modifications peculiar to each.

In the possession of all fundamental rights, all classes of servants were on an absolute equality, all were equally protected by law in their persons, character, property and social relations; all were voluntary, all were compensated for their labor, and released from it nearly one half of the days in each year; all were furnished with stated instruction; none in either class were in any sense articles of property, all were regarded as _men_, with the rights, interests, hopes and destinies of _men_. In all these respects, _all_ classes of servants among the Israelites, formed but ONE CLASS. The _different_ classes, and the differences in _each_ class, were, 1. _Hired Servants_. This class consisted both of Israelites and Strangers. Their employments were different. The _Israelite_ was an agricultural servant. The Stranger was a _domestic_ and _personal_ servant, and in some instances _mechanical_; both were occasional and temporary. Both lived in their own families, their wages were _money_, and they were paid when their work was done. 2. _Bought Servants_, (including those "born in the house.") This class also, consisted of Israelites and Strangers, the same difference in their kinds of employment as noticed before. Both were paid in advance,[A] and neither was temporary. The Israelitish servant, with the exception of the _freeholder_, completed his term in six years. The Stranger was a permanent servant, continuing until the jubilee. A marked distinction obtained also between different classes of _Jewish_ bought servants. Ordinarily, they were merged in their master's family, and, like his wife and children, subject to his authority; (and, like them, protected by law from its abuse.) But the _freeholder_ was an exception; his family relations and authority remained unaffected, nor was he subjected as an inferior to the control of his master, though dependent on him for employment.

[Footnote A: The payment _in advance_, doubtless lessened the price of the purchase; the servant thus having the use of the money, and the master assuming all the risks of life, and health for labor; at the expiration of the six years' contract, the master having suffered no loss from the risk incurred at the making of it, was obliged by law to release the servant with a liberal gratuity. The reason assigned for this is, "he hath been worth a double hired servant unto thee in serving thee six years," as if it had been said, as you have experienced no loss from the risks of life, and ability to labor, incurred in the purchase, and which lessened the price, and as, by being your servant for six years, he has saved you the time and trouble of looking up and hiring laborers on emergencies, therefore, "thou shalt furnish him liberally," &c. This gratuity at the close of the service shews the _principle_ of the relation; _equivalent_ for value received. ]

It should be kept in mind, that _both_ classes of servants, the Israelite and the Stranger, not only enjoyed _equal, natural and religious rights_, but _all the civil and political privileges_ enjoyed by those of their own people who were _not_ servants. They also shared in common with them the political disabilities which appertained to all Strangers, whether servants of Jewish masters, or masters of Jewish servants. Further, the disabilities of the servants from the Strangers were exclusively _political_ and _national_. 1. They, in common with all Strangers, could not own the soil. 2. They were ineligible to civil offices. 3. They were assigned to employments less honorable than those in which Israelitish servants engaged; agriculture being regarded as fundamental to the existence of the state, other employments were in less repute, and deemed _unjewish_.

Finally, the Strangers, whether servants or masters, were all protected equally with the descendants of Abraham. In respect to political privileges, their condition was much like that of unnaturalized foreigners in the United States; whatever their wealth or intelligence, or moral principle, or love for our institutions, they can neither go to the ballot-box, nor own the soil, nor be eligible to office. Let a native American, be suddenly bereft of these privileges, and loaded with the disabilities of an alien, and what to the foreigner would be a light matter, to _him_, would be the severity of _rigor_. The recent condition of the Jews and Catholics in England, is another illustration. Rothschild, the late banker, though the richest private citizen in the world, and perhaps master of scores of English servants, who sued for the smallest crumbs of his favor, was, as a subject of the government, inferior to the lowest among them. Suppose an Englishman of the Established Church, were by law deprived of power to own the soil, of eligibility to office and of the electoral franchise, would Englishmen think it a misapplication of language, if it were said, the government "rules over him with rigor?" And yet his person, property, reputation, conscience, all his social relations, the disposal of his time, the right of locomotion at pleasure, and of natural liberty in all respects, are just as much protected by law as the Lord Chancellor's.

FINALLY.--As the Mosaic system was a great compound type, rife with meaning in doctrine and duty; the practical power of the whole, depended upon the exact observance of those distinctions and relations which constituted its significancy. Hence, the care to preserve inviolate the distinction between a _descendant of Abraham_ and a _Stranger_, even when the Stranger was a proselyte, had gone through the initiatory ordinances, entered the congregation, and become incorporated with the Israelites by family alliance. The regulation laid down in Ex. xxi. 2-6, is an illustration. In this case, the Israelitish servant, whose term expired in six years, married one of his master's _permanent female domestics_; but her marriage did not release her master from _his_ part of the contract for her whole term of service, nor from his legal obligation to support and educate her children. Neither did it do away that distinction, which marked her national descent by a specific _grade_ and _term_ of service, nor impair her obligation to fulfil _her_ part of the contract. Her relations as a permanent domestic grew out of a distinction guarded with great care throughout the Mosaic system. To render it void, would have been to divide the system against itself. This God would not tolerate. Nor, on the other hand, would he permit the master to throw off the responsibility of instructing her children, nor the care and expense of their helpless infancy and rearing. He was bound to support and educate them, and all her children born afterwards during her term of service. The whole arrangement beautifully illustrates that wise and tender regard for the interests of all the parties concerned, which arrays the Mosaic system in robes of glory, and causes it to shine as the sun in the kingdom of our Father.[B] By this law, the children had secured to them a mother's tender care. If the husband loved his wife and children, he could compel his master to keep him, whether he had any occasion for his services or not. If he did not love them, to be rid of him was a blessing; and in that case, the regulation would prove an act for the relief of an afflicted family. It is not by any means to be inferred, that the release of the servant in the seventh year, either absolved him from the obligations of marriage, or shut him out from the society of his family. He could doubtless procure a service at no great distance from them, and might often do it, to get higher wages, or a kind of employment better suited to his taste and skill. The great number of days on which the law released servants from regular labor, would enable him to spend much more time with his family, than can be spent by most of the agents of our benevolent societies with _their_ families, or by many merchants, editors, artists, &c., whose daily business is in New York, while their families reside from ten to one hundred miles in the country.

[Footnote B: Whoever profoundly studies the Mosaic Institutes with a teachable and reverential spirit, will feel the truth and power of that solemn appeal and interrogatory of God to his people Israel, when he had made an end of setting before them all his statutes and ordinances. "What nation is there so great, that hath statutes and judgments SO RIGHTEOUS, as _all_ this law which I set before you this day." Deut. iv. 8.]

We conclude this inquiry by touching upon an objection, which, though not formally stated, has been already set aside by the tenor of the foregoing argument. It is this,--"The slavery of the Canaanites by the Israelites, was appointed by God as a commutation of the punishment of death denounced against them for their sins."[A] If the absurdity of a sentence consigning persons to death, and at the same time to perpetual slavery, did not sufficiently laugh at itself; it would be small self-denial, in a case so tempting, to make up the deficiency by a general contribution. Only _one_ statute was ever given respecting the disposition to be made of the inhabitants of Canaan. If the sentence of death was pronounced against them, and afterwards _commuted_, when? where? by whom? and in what terms was the commutation, and where is it recorded? Grant, for argument's sake, that all the Canaanites were sentenced to unconditional extermination; how can a right to _enslave_ them, be drawn from such premises? The punishment of death is one of the highest recognitions of man's moral nature possible. It proclaims him rational, accountable, guilty, deserving death for having done his utmost to cheapen human life, when the proof of its priceless worth lived in his own nature. But to make him a _slave_, cheapens to nothing _universal human nature_, and instead of healing a wound, gives a death-stab. What! repair an injury to rational being in the robbery of one of its rights, not only by robbing it of all, but by annihilating their _foundation_, the everlasting distinction between persons and things? To make a man a chattel, is not the _punishment_, but the _annihilation_ of a _human_ being, and, so far as it goes, of _all_ human beings. This commutation of the punishment of death, into perpetual slavery, what a fortunate discovery! Alas! for the honor of Deity, if commentators had not manned the forlorn hope, and by a timely movement rescued the Divine character, at the very crisis of its fate, from the perilous position in which inspiration had carelessly left it! Here a question arises of sufficient importance for a separate dissertation; but must for the present be disposed of in a few paragraphs. WERE THE CANAANITES SENTENCED BY GOD TO INDIVIDUAL AND UNCONDITIONAL EXTERMINATION? As the limits of this inquiry forbid our giving all the grounds of dissent from commonly received opinions, the suggestions made, will be thrown out merely as QUERIES, rather than laid down as _doctrines_. The directions as to the disposal of the Canaanites, are mainly in the following passages, Ex. xxiii. 23-33; xxxiv. 11; Deut. vii. 16-24; ix. 3; xxxi. 3-5. In these verses, the Israelites are commanded to "destroy the Canaanites," to "drive out," "consume," "utterly overthrow," "put out," "dispossess them," &c. Did these commands enjoin the unconditional and universal destruction of the _individuals_, or merely of the _body politic_? The word _haram_, to destroy, signifies _national_, as well as individual destruction; the destruction of _political_ existence, equally with _personal_; of governmental organization, equally with the lives of the subjects. Besides, if we interpret the words destroy, consume, overthrow, &c., to mean _personal_ destruction, what meaning shall we give to the expressions, "drive out before thee," "cast out before thee," "expel," "put out," "dispossess," &c., which are used in the same and in parallel passages? In addition to those quoted above, see Josh. iii. 10; xvii. 18; xxiii. 5; xxiv. 18; Judg. i. 20, 29-35; vi. 9. "I will _destroy_ all the people to whom thou shalt come, and I will make all thine enemies _turn their backs unto thee_." Ex. xxiii. 27. Here "_all their enemies_" were to _turn their backs_, and "_all the people_" to be "_destroyed_." Does this mean that God would let all their _enemies_ escape, but kill their _friends_, or that he would _first_ kill "all the people" and THEN make them "turn their backs," an army of runaway corpses? In Josh. xxiv. 8, God says, speaking of the Amorites, "I _destroyed_ them from before you." In the 18th verse of the same chapter, it is said, "The Lord _drave out_ from before us all the people, even the Amorites which dwelt in the land." In Num. xxxii. 39, we are told that "the children of Machir the son of Manasseh, went to Gilead, and took it, and _dispossessed_ the Amorite which was in it." If these commands required the destruction of all the _individuals,_ the Mosaic law was at war with itself, for directions as to the treatment of native residents form a large part of it. See Lev. xix. 34; xxv. 35, 36; xxiv. 22.; Ex. xxiii. 9; xxii. 21; Deut. i. 16, 17; x. 17, 19; xxvii. 19. We find, also, that provision was made for them in the cities of refuge, Num. xxxv. 15,--the gleanings of the harvest and vintage were theirs, Lev. xix. 9, 10; xxiii. 22;--the blessings of the Sabbath, Ex. xx. 10;--the privilege of offering sacrifices secured, Lev. xxii. 18; and stated religious instruction provided for them. Deut. xxxi. 9, 12. Now does this same law require the _individual extermination_ of those whose lives and interests it thus protects? These laws were given to the Israelites, long _before_ they entered Canaan; and they must have inferred from them, that a multitude of the inhabitants of the land were to _continue in it_, under their government. Again Joshua was selected as the leader of Israel to execute God's threatenings upon Canaan. He had no discretionary power. God's commands were his official instructions. Going beyond them would have been usurpation; refusing to carry them out, rebellion and treason. Saul was rejected from being king for disobeying God's commands in a single instance. Now if God commanded the individual destruction of all the Canaanites Joshua disobeyed him in every instance. For at his death, the Israelites still "_dwelt among them_," and each nation is mentioned by name. Judg. i. 27-36, and yet we are told that Joshua "left nothing undone of all that the Lord commanded Moses;" and that he "took all that land." Josh. xi. 15-22. Also, that "there _stood not a man_ of _all_ their enemies before them." Josh. xxi. 44. How can this be if the command to destroy, destroy utterly, &c., enjoined _individual_ extermination, and the command to drive out, unconditional expulsion from the country, rather than their expulsion from the _possession_ or _ownership_ of it, as the lords of the soil? That the latter is the true sense to be attached to those terms, we argue, further from the fact that the same terms are employed by God to describe the punishment which he would inflict upon the Israelites if they served other Gods. "Ye shall utterly perish," "be utterly destroyed," "consumed," &c., are some of them.--See Deut. iv. 20; viii. 19, 20.[B] Josh. xxiii. 12, 13-16; 1. Sam. xii. 25. The Israelites _did_ serve other Gods, and Jehovah _did_ execute upon them his threatenings--and thus himself _interpreted_ these threatenings. He subverted their _government_, dispossessed them of their land, divested them of national power, and made them _tributaries_, but did not _exterminate_ them. He "destroyed them utterly" as an independent body politic, but not as individuals. Multitudes of the Canaanites were slain, but not a case can be found in which one was either killed or expelled who _acquiesced_ in the transfer of the territory, and its sovereignty, from the inhabitants of the land to the Israelites. Witness the case of Rahab and her kindred, and that of the Gibeonites.[C] The Canaanites knew of the miracles wrought for the Israelites; and that their land had been transferred to them as a judgment for their sins. Josh. ii. 9-11; ix. 9, 10, 24. Many of them were awed by these wonders, and made no resistance. Others defied God and came out to battle. These last occupied the fortified cities, were the most inveterate heathen--the aristocracy of idolatry, the kings, the nobility and gentry, the priests, with their crowds of satellites, and retainers that aided in idolatrous rites, and the military forces, with the chief profligates of both sexes. Many facts corroborate the general position. Witness that command (Deut. xxiii. 15, 16,) which, not only prohibited the surrender of the fugitive servant to his master, but required the Israelites to receive him with kindness, permit him to dwell where he pleased, and to protect and cherish him. Whenever any servant, even a Canaanite, fled from his master to the Israelites, Jehovah, so far from commanding them to _kill_ him, straitly charged them, "He shall dwell with thee, even among you, in that place which _he_ shall choose--in one of thy gates where it liketh _him_ best--thou shalt not oppress him." Deut. xxiii. 16. The Canaanitish servant by thus fleeing to the Israelites, submitted himself as a dutiful subject to their national government, and pledged his allegiance. Suppose _all_ the Canaanites had thus submitted themselves to the Jewish theocracy, and conformed to the requirements of the Mosaic institutes, would not _all_ have been spared upon the same principle that _one_ was? Again, look at the multitude of _tributaries_ in the midst of Israel, and that too, after they had "waxed strong," and the uttermost nations quaked at the terror of their name--the Canaanites, Philistines and others, who became proselytes--as the Nethenims, Uriah the Hittite--Rahab, who married one of the princes of Judah--Jether, an Ishmaelite, who married Abigail the sister of David and was the father of Amasa, the captain of the host of Israel. Comp. 1 Chron. ii. 17, with 2 Sam. xvii. 25.--Ittai--the six hundred Gittites, David's body guard. 2. Sam xv. 18, 21. Obededom the Gittite, adopted into the tribe of Levi. Comp. 2 Sam. vi. 10, 11, with 1 Chron. xv. 18, and xxvi. 4, 5--Jaziz, and Obil. 1 Chron, xxvii. 30, 31. Jephunneh the Kenezite, Josh. xiv. 6, and father of Caleb a ruler of the tribe of Judah. Numb. xiii. 2, 6--the Kenites registered in the genealogies of the tribe of Judah, Judg. i. 16; 1 Chron. ii. 55, and the one hundred and fifty thousand Canaanites, employed by Solomon in the building of the Temple.[D] Besides, the greatest miracle on record, was wrought to save a portion of those very Canaanites, and for the destruction of those who would exterminate them. Josh. x. 12-14. Further--the terms employed in the directions regulating the disposal of the Canaanites, such as "drive out," "put out," "cast out," "expel," "dispossess," &c., seem used interchangeably with "consume," "destroy," "overthrow," &c., and thus indicate the sense in which the latter words are used. As an illustration of the meaning generally attached to these and similar terms, we refer to the history of the Amalekites. "I will utterly put out the remembrance of Amalek from under heaven." Ex. xvii. 14. "Thou shalt blot out the remembrance of Amalek from under heaven; thou shalt not forget it." Deut. xxv. 19. "Smite Amalek and _utterly destroy_ all that they have, and spare them not, but slay both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep." 1 Sam. xv. 2, 3. "Saul smote the Amalekites, and he took Agag the king of the Amalekites, alive and UTTERLY DESTROYED ALL THE PEOPLE with the edge of the sword." Verses 7, 8. In verse 20, Saul says, "I have brought Agag, the king of Amalek, and have _utterly destroyed_ the Amalekites." In 1 Sam. xxx. 1, 2, we find the Amalekites marching an army into Israel, and sweeping everything before them--and this in about eighteen years after they had all been "UTTERLY DESTROYED!" In 1 Kings ii. 15-17, is another illustration. We are informed that Joab remained in Edom six months with all Israel, "until he had _cut off every male_" in Edom. In the next verse we learn that Hadad and "certain Edomites" were not slain. Deut. xx. 16, 17, will probably be quoted against the preceding view. We argue that the command in these verses, did not include all the individuals of the Canaanitish nations, but only the inhabitants of the _cities_, (and even those conditionally,) because, only the inhabitants of _cities_ are specified--"of the _cities_ of these people thou shalt save alive nothing that breatheth." Cities then, as now, were pest-houses of vice, they reeked with abominations little practised in the country. On this account, their influence would be far more perilous to the Israelites than that of the country. Besides, they were the centres of idolatry--there were the temples and altars, and idols, and priests, without number. Even their buildings, streets, and public walks were so many visibilities of idolatry. The reason assigned in the 18th verse for exterminating them, strengthens the idea--"that they teach you not to do after all the abominations which they have done unto their gods." This would be a reason for exterminating all the nations and individuals _around_ them, as all were idolaters; but God commanded them, in certain cases, to spare the inhabitants. Contact with _any_ of them would be perilous--with the inhabitants of the _cities_ peculiarly, and of the _Canaanitish_ cities pre-eminently so. The 10th and 11th verses contain the general rule prescribing the method in which cities were to be summoned to surrender. They were first to receive the offer of peace--if it was accepted, the inhabitants became _tributaries_--but if they came out against Israel in battle, the _men_ were to be killed, and the woman and little ones saved alive. The 15th verse restricts this lenient treatment to the inhabitants of the cities _afar off_. The 16th directs as to the disposal of the inhabitants of the Canaanitish cities. They were to save alive "nothing that breathed." The common mistake has been, in supposing that the command in the 15th verse refers to the _whole system of directions preceding,_ commencing with the 10th, whereas it manifestly refers only to the _inflictions_ specified in the 12th, 13th, and, 14th, making a distinction between those _Canaanitish_ cities that _fought_, and the cities _afar off_ that fought--in one case destroying the males and females, and in the other, the _males_ only. The offer of peace, and the _conditional preservation_, were as really guarantied to _Canaanitish_ cities as to others. Their inhabitants were not to be exterminated unless they came out against Israel in battle. Whatever be the import of the commands respecting the disposition to be made of the Canaanites, all admit the fact that the Israelites did _not_ utterly exterminate them. Now, if entire and unconditional extermination was the command of God, it was _never_ obeyed by the Israelites, consequently the truth of God stood pledged to consign _them_ to the same doom which he had pronounced upon the Canaanites, but which they had refused to visit upon them. "If ye will not drive out all the inhabitants of the land from before you, then it shall come to pass that * * _I shall do unto you as I thought to do unto them_." Num. xxxiii. 55, 56. As the Israelites were not exterminated, we infer that God did not pronounce _that_ doom upon them; and as he _did_ pronounce upon them the _same_ doom, whatever it was, which they should _refuse_ to visit upon the Canaanites, it follows that the doom of unconditional _extermination_ was _not_ pronounced against the Canaanites. But let us settle this question by the "law and the testimony." "There was not a city that made peace with the children of Israel save the Hivites, the inhabitants of Gibeon; all others they took in battle. For it was of the Lord to harden their hearts, that they should COME OUT AGAINST ISRAEL IN BATTLE, that he might destroy them utterly, and that they might have no favor, but that he might destroy them, as the Lord commanded Moses." Josh. xi. 19. 20. That is, if they had _not_ come out against Israel in battle, they would have had "favor" shown them, and would not have been "_destroyed utterly_." The great design was to _transfer the territory_ of the Canaanites to the Israelites, and along with it, _absolute sovereignty in every respect_; to annihilate their political organizations, civil polity, and jurisprudence, and their system of religion, with all its rights and appendages; and to substitute therefor, a pure theocracy, administered by Jehovah, with the Israelites as His representatives and agents. In a word the people were to be _denationalized,_ their political existence annihilated, their idol temples, altars, groves, images, pictures, and heathen rites destroyed, and themselves put under tribute. Those who resisted the execution of Jehovah's purpose were to be killed, while those who quietly submitted to it were to be spared. All had the choice of these alternatives, either free egress out of the land;[E] or acquiescence in the decree, with life and residence as tributaries, under the protection of the government; or resistance to the execution of the decree, with death. "_And it shall come to pass, if they will diligently learn the ways of my people, to swear by my name, the Lord liveth, as they taught my people to swear by Baal;_ THEN SHALL THEY BE BUILT IN THE MIDST OF MY PEOPLE."

[Footnote A: In the prophecy, Gen. ix. 25, the subjection of the Canaanites as a conquered people rendering tribute to other nations, is foretold by inspiration. The fulfilment of this prediction, seems to have commenced in the subjection of the Canaanites to the Israelites as tributaries. If the Israelites had exterminated them, as the objector asserts they were commanded to do; the prediction would have been _falsified_.]

[Footnote B: These two verses are so explicit we quote them entire--"And it shall be if thou do at all forget the Lord they God and walk after other Gods and serve them, and worship them, I testify against you this day that ye shall surely _perish_, as the nations which the Lord destroyed before your face, _so_ shall ye perish." The following passages are, if possible still more explicit--"The Lord shall send upon thee cursing, vexation and rebuke in all that thou settest thine hand unto for to do, until thou be _destroyed_, and until thou perish quickly." "The Lord shall make the pestilence cleave unto thee until he have _consumed_ thee." "They (the 'sword,' 'blasting,' &c.) shall pursue thee until thou _perish_." "From heaven shall it come down upon thee until thou be _destroyed_." "All these curses shall come upon thee till thou be _destroyed_." "He shall put a yoke of iron upon thy neck until he have _destroyed_ thee." "The Lord shall bring a nation against thee, a nation of fierce countenance, which shall not regard the person of the old, nor show favor to the young, * * until he have _destroyed_ thee." All these, with other similar threatenings of _destruction_, are contained in the twenty-eighth chapter of Deut. See verses 20-25, 45, 48, 51. In the _same_ chapter God declares that as a punishment for the same transgressions, the Israelites shall "be _removed_ into all the kingdoms of the earth," thus showing that the terms employed in the other verses, "destroy," "perish," "perish quickly," "consume," &c., instead of signifying utter, personal destruction doubtless meant their destruction as an independent nation. In Josh. xxiv. 8, 18, "destroyed" and "drave out," are used synonymously.]

[Footnote C: Perhaps it will be objected, that the preservation of the Gibeonites, and of Rahab and her kindred, was a violation of the command of God. We answer, if it had been, we might expect some such intimation. If God had straitly commanded them to _exterminate all the Canaanites_, their pledge to save them alive, was neither a repeal of the statute, nor absolution for the breach of it. If _unconditional destruction_ was the import of the command, would God have permitted such an act to pass without rebuke? Would he have established such a precedent when Israel had hardly passed the threshold of Canaan, and was then striking the first blow of a half century war? What if they _had_ passed their word to Rahab and the Gibeonites? Was that more binding than God's command? So Saul seems to have passed _his_ word to Agag; yet Samuel hewed him in pieces, because in saving his life, Saul had violated God's command. When Saul sought to slay the Gibeonites in "his zeal for the children of Israel and Judah," God sent upon Israel a three years' famine for it. When David inquired of them what atonement he should make, they say, "The man that devised against us, that we should be destroyed from _remaining in any of the coast of Israel_, let seven of his sons be delivered," &c. 2 Sam. xxi. 1-6.]

[Footnote D: If the Canaanites were devoted by God to unconditional extermination, to have employed them in the erection of the temple,--what was it but the climax of impiety? As well might they pollute its altars with swine's flesh or make their sons pass through the fire to Moloch.]

[Footnote E: Suppose all the Canaanitish nations had abandoned their territory at the tidings of Israel's approach, did God's command require the Israelites to chase them to ends of the earth, and hunt them out, until every Canaanite was destroyed? It is too preposterous for belief, and yet it follows legitimately from that construction, which interprets the terms "consume," "destroy," "destroy utterly," &c. to mean unconditional, individual extermination.]

[The original design of the preceding Inquiry embraced a much wider range of topics. It was soon found, however, that to fill up the outline would be to make a volume. Much of the foregoing has therefore been thrown into a mere series of _indices_, to trains of thought and classes of proof, which, however limited or imperfect, may perhaps, afford some facilities to those who have little leisure for protracted investigation.]

NO. 5.

THE

ANTI-SLAVERY EXAMINER.

THE

POWER OF CONGRESS

OVER THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

* * * * *

REPRINTED FROM THE NEW-YORK EVENING POST, WITH ADDITIONS BY THE AUTHOR.

* * * * *

NEW-YORK:

PUBLISHED BY THE AMERICAN ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY,

NO. 143 NASSAU-STREET.

1838.

* * * * *

This periodical contains 3 1/2 sheets.--Postage under 100 miles, 6 cts.; over 100, 10 cts.

POWER OF CONGRESS

OVER THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

A civilized community presupposes a government of law. If that government be a republic, its citizens are the sole _sources_, as well as the _subjects_ of its power. Its constitution is their bill of directions to their own agents--a grant authorizing the exercise of certain powers, and prohibiting that of others. In the Constitution of the United States, whatever else may be obscure, the clause granting power to Congress over the Federal District may well defy misconstruction. Art. 1, Sec. 6, Clause 18: "The Congress shall have power to exercise exclusive legislation, _in all cases whatsoever_, over such District." Congress may make laws for the District "in all _cases_," not of all _kinds_; not all _laws_ whatsoever, but laws "in all _cases_ whatsoever." The grant respects the _subjects_ of legislation, _not_ the moral nature of the laws. The law-making power every where is subject to _moral_ restrictions, whether limited by constitutions or not. No legislature can authorize murder, nor make honesty penal, nor virtue a crime, nor exact impossibilities. In these and similar respects, the power of Congress is held in check by principles, existing in the nature of things, not imposed by the Constitution, but presupposed and assumed by it. The power of Congress over the District is restricted only by those principles that limit ordinary legislation, and, in some respects, it has even wider scope.

In common with the legislatures of the States, Congress cannot constitutionally pass ex post facto laws in criminal cases, nor suspend the writ of habeas corpus, nor pass a bill of attainder, nor abridge the freedom of speech and of the press, nor invade the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, nor enact laws respecting an establishment of religion. These are general limitations. Congress cannot do these things _any where_. The exact import, therefore, of the clause "in all cases whatsoever," is, _on all subjects within the appropriate sphere of legislation_. Some legislatures are restrained by constitutions, from the exercise of powers strictly within the proper sphere of legislation. Congressional power over the District has no such restraint. It traverses the whole field of legitimate legislation. All the power which any legislature has within its own jurisdiction, Congress holds over the District of Columbia.

It has been objected that the clause in question respects merely police regulations, and that its sole design was to enable Congress to protect itself against popular tumults. But if the convention that framed the Constitution aimed to provide for a _single_ case only, why did they provide for "_all_ cases whatsoever?" Besides, this clause was opposed in many of the state conventions, because the grant of power was extended to "_all_ cases whatsoever," instead of being restricted to police regulations _alone_. In the Virginia Convention, George Mason, the father of the Virginia Constitution, Patrick Henry, Mr. Grayson, and others, assailed it on that ground. Mr. Mason said, "This clause gives an unlimited authority in every possible case within the District. He would willingly give them exclusive power as far as respected the police and good government of the place, but he would give them no more." Mr. Grayson exclaimed against so large a grant of power--said that control over the _police_ was all-sufficient, and "that the Continental Congress never had an idea of exclusive legislation in all cases." Patrick Henry said: "Shall we be told, when about to grant such illimitable authority, that it will never be exercised? Is it consistent with any principle of prudence or good policy, to grant _unlimited, unbounded authority_?" Mr. Madison said in reply: "I did conceive that the clause under consideration was one of those parts which would speak its own praise. I cannot comprehend that the power of legislation over a small District, will involve the dangers which he apprehends. When any power is given, it's delegation necessarily involves authority to make laws to execute it. * * * * The powers which are found necessary to be given, are therefore delegated _generally_, and particular and minute specification is left to the Legislature. * * * It is not within the limits of human capacity to delineate on paper all those particular cases and circumstances, in which legislation by the general legislature, would be necessary." Governor Randolph said: "Holland has no ten miles square, but she has the Hague where the deputies of the States assemble. But the influence which it has given the province of Holland, to have the seat of government within its territory, subject in some respects to its control, has been injurious to the other provinces. The wisdom of the convention is therefore manifest in granting to Congress exclusive jurisdiction over the place of their session." (_See debates in the Virginia Convention_, p. 320.) In the forty-third number of the "Federalist," Mr. Madison says: "The indispensable necessity of _complete_ authority at the seat of government, carries its own evidence with it."

Finally, that the grant in question is to be interpreted according to the obvious import of its _terms_, and not in such a way as to restrict it to _police_ regulations, is proved by the fact, that the State of Virginia proposed an amendment to the United States Constitution at the time of its adoption, providing that this clause "should be so construed as to give power only over the _police and good government_ of said District," _which amendment was rejected_. Fourteen other amendments, proposed at the same time by Virginia, were _adopted_.

The former part, of the clause under consideration, "Congress shall have power to exercise _exclusive_ legislation," gives sole jurisdiction, and the latter part, "in all cases whatsoever," defines the _extent_ of it. Since, then, Congress is the _sole_ legislature within the District, and since its power is limited only by the checks common to all legislatures, it follows that what the law-making power is intrinsically competent to do _any_ where, Congress is competent to do in the District of Columbia.

STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION AT ISSUE.

Having disposed of preliminaries, we proceed to argue the _real question_ at issue. Is the law-making power competent to abolish slavery when not restricted in that particular by constitutional provisions--or, _Is the abolition of slavery within the appropriate sphere of legislation?_

In every government, absolute sovereignty exists _somewhere_. In the United States it exists primarily with the _people_, and _ultimate_ sovereignty _always_ exists with them. In each of the States, the legislature possesses a _representative_ sovereignty, delegated by the people through the Constitution--the people thus committing to the legislature a portion of their sovereignty, and specifying in their constitutions the amount and the conditions of the grant. That the _people_ in any state where slavery exists, have the power to abolish it, none will deny. If the legislature have not the power, it is because _the people_ have reserved it to themselves. Had they lodged with the legislature "power to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever," they would have parted with their sovereignty over the legislation of the State, and so far forth the legislature would have become _the people_, clothed with all their functions, and as such competent, _during the continuance of the grant_, to do whatever the people might have done before the surrender of their power: consequently, they would have the power to abolish slavery. The sovereignty of the District of Columbia exists _somewhere_--where is it lodged? The citizens of the District have no legislature of their own, no representation in Congress, and no political power whatever. Maryland and Virginia have surrendered to the United States their "full and absolute right and entire sovereignty," and the people of the United States have committed to Congress by the Constitution, the power to "exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such District."

Thus, the sovereignty of the District of Columbia, is shown to reside solely in the Congress of the United States; and since the power of the people of a state to abolish slavery within their own limits, results from their entire sovereignty within the state, so the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District, results from its entire _sovereignty_ within the District. If it be objected that Congress can have no more power over the District, than was held by the legislatures of Maryland and Virginia, we ask what clause in the constitution graduates the power of Congress by the standard of a state legislature? Was the United States constitution worked into its present shape under the measuring line and square of Virginia and Maryland? and is its power to be bevelled down till it can run in the grooves of state legislation? There is a deal of prating about constitutional power over the District, as though Congress were indebted for it to Maryland and Virginia. The powers of those states, whether few or many, prodigies or nullities, have nothing to do with the question. As well thrust in the powers of the Grand Lama to join issue upon, or twist papal bulls into constitutional tether, with which to curb congressional action. The Constitution of the United States gives power to Congress, and takes it away, and _it alone_. Maryland and Virginia adopted the Constitution _before_ they ceded to the united States the territory of the District. By their acts of cession, they abdicated their own sovereignty over the District, and thus made room for that provided by the United States constitution, which sovereignty was to commence as soon as a cession of territory by states, and its acceptance by Congress furnished a sphere for its exercise.

That the abolition of slavery is within the sphere of legislation, I argue, _secondly_, from the fact, that _slavery as a legal system, is the creature of legislation_. The law by _creating_ slavery, not only affirmed its _existence_ to be within the sphere and under the control of legislation, but equally, the _conditions_ and _terms_ of its existence, and the _question_ whether or not it _should_ exist. Of course legislation would not travel _out_ of its sphere, in abolishing what is _within_ it, and what was recognised to be within it, by its own act. Cannot legislatures repeal their own laws? If law can take from a man his rights, it can give them back again. If it can say, "your body belongs to your neighbor," it can say, "it belongs to _yourself_, and I will sustain your right." If it can annul a man's right to himself, held by express grant from his Maker, and can create for another an artificial title to him, can it not annul the artificial title, and leave the original owner to hold himself by his original title?

3. _The abolition of slavery has always been considered within the appropriate sphere of legislation_. Almost every civilized nation has abolished slavery by law. The history of legislation since the revival of letters, is a record crowded with testimony to the universally admitted competency of the law-making power to abolish slavery. It is so manifestly an attribute not merely of absolute sovereignty, but even of ordinary legislation, that the competency of a legislature to exercise it, may well nigh be reckoned among the legal axioms of the civilized world. Even the night of the dark ages was not dark enough to make this invisible.

The Abolition decree of the great council of England was passed in 1102. The memorable Irish decree, "that all the English slaves in the whole of Ireland, be immediately emancipated and restored to their former liberty," was issued in 1171. Slavery in England was abolished by a general charter of emancipation in 1381. Passing over many instances of the abolition of slavery by law, both during the middle ages and since the reformation, we find them multiplying as we approach our own times. In 1776 slavery was abolished in Prussia by special edict. In St. Domingo, Cayenne, Guadaloupe and Martinique, in 1794, where more than 600,000 slaves were emancipated by the French government. In Java, 1811; in Ceylon, 1815; in Buenos Ayres, 1816; in St. Helena, 1819; in Colombia, 1821; by the Congress of Chili in 1821; in Cape Colony, 1823; in Malacca, 1825; in the southern provinces of Birmah, in 1826; in Bolivia, 1826; in Peru, Guatemala, and Monte Video, 1828, in Jamaica, Barbadoes, Bermudas, Bahamas, the Mauritius, St. Christopher's, Nevis, the Virgin Islands, Antigua, Montserrat, Dominica, St. Vincents, Grenada, Berbice, Tobago, St. Lucia, Trinidad, Honduras, Demarara, and the Cape of Good Hope, on the 1st of August, 1834. But waving details, suffice it to say, that England, France, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Prussia, and Germany, have all and often given their testimony to the competency of the law to abolish slavery. In our own country, the Legislature of Pennsylvania passed an act of abolition in 1780, Connecticut, in 1784; Rhode Island, 1784; New-York, 1799; New-Jersey, in 1804; Vermont, by Constitution, in 1777; Massachusetts, in 1780; and New Hampshire, in 1784.

When the competency of the law-making power to abolish slavery, has thus been recognised every where and for ages, when it has been embodied in the highest precedents, and celebrated in the thousand jubilees of regenerated liberty, is it forsooth an achievement of modern discovery, that such a power is a nullity?--that all these acts of abolition are void, and that the millions disenthralled by them, are, either themselves or their posterity, still legally in bondage?

4. _Legislative power has abolished slavery in its parts_. The law of South Carolina prohibits the working of slaves more than fifteen hours in the twenty-four. [_See__Brevard's Digest_, 253.] In other words, it takes from the slaveholder his power over nine hours of the slave's time daily; and if it can take nine hours it may take twenty-four--if two-fifths, then five-fifths. The laws of Georgia prohibit the working of slaves on the first day of the week; and if they can do it for the first, they can for the six following. Laws embodying the same principle have existed for ages in nearly all governments that have tolerated slavery.

The law of North Carolina prohibits the "immoderate" correction of slaves. If it has power to prohibit _immoderate_ correction, it can prohibit _moderate_ correction--_all_ correction, which would be virtual emancipation; for, take from the master the power to inflict pain, and he is master no longer. Cease to ply the slave with the stimulus of fear, and he is free. Laws similar to this exist in slaveholding governments generally.

The Constitution of Mississippi gives the General Assembly power to make laws "to oblige the owners of slaves to _treat them with humanity_." The Constitution of Missouri has the same clause, and an additional one making it the DUTY of the legislature to pass such laws as may be necessary to secure the _humane_ treatment of the slaves. This grant of power to those legislatures empowers them to decide what _is_ and what is _not_ "humane treatment." Otherwise it gives no "power"--the clause is mere waste paper, and flouts in the face of a mocked and befooled legislature. A clause giving power to require "humane treatment" covers all the _particulars_ of such treatment--gives power to exact it in all _respects--requiring_ certain acts, and _prohibiting_ others--maiming, branding, chaining together, allowing each but a quart of corn a day,[A] and but "one shirt and one pair of pantaloons" in six months[B]--separating families, destroying marriages, floggings for learning the alphabet and reading the Bible--robbing them of their oath, of jury trial, and of the right to worship God according to conscience--the legislature has power to specify each of these acts--declare that it is not "_humane_ treatment," and PROHIBIT it.--The legislature may also believe that driving men and women into the field, and forcing them to work without pay as long as they live, is not "humane treatment," and being constitutionally bound "to _oblige_" masters to practise "humane treatment"--they have the _power_ to _prohibit such_ treatment, and are bound to do it.

[Footnote A: Law of North Carolina, Haywood's Manual, 524-5.]

[Footnote B: Law of Louisiana, Martin's Digest, 610.]

The law of Louisiana makes slaves real estate, prohibiting the holder, if he be also a _land_ holder, to separate them from the soil.[C] If it has power to prohibit the sale _without_ the soil, it can prohibit the sale _with_ it; and if it can prohibit the _sale_ as property, it can prohibit the _holding_ as property. Similar laws exist in the French, Spanish, and Portuguese colonies.

[Footnote C: Virginia made slaves real estate by a law passed in 1705. (_Beverly's Hist. of Va._, p. 98.) I do not find the precise time when this law was repealed, probably when Virginia became the chief slave breeder for the cotton-growing and sugar-planting country, and made young men and women "from fifteen to twenty-five" the main staple production of the State.]

The law of Louisiana requires the master to give his slaves a certain amount of food and clothing, (_Martin's Digest_, 610.) If it can oblige the master to give the slave _one_ thing, it can oblige him to give him another: if food and clothing, then wages, liberty, his own body. Such laws exist in most slaveholding governments.

By the slave laws of Connecticut, under which slaves are now held, (for even Connecticut is still a slave State,) slaves might receive and hold property, and prosecute suits in their own name as plaintiffs: [This last was also the law of Virginia in 1795. See Tucker's "Dissertation on Slavery," p. 73.] There were also laws making marriage contracts legal, in certain contingencies, and punishing infringements of them, ["_Reeve's Law of Baron and Femme_," p. 310-1.] Each of the laws enumerated above, does, _in principle_, abolish slavery; and all of them together abolish it _in fact_. True, not as a _whole_, and at a _stroke_, nor all in one place; but in its _parts_, by piecemeal, at divers times and places; thus showing that the abolition of slavery is within the boundary of _legislation_.

5._The competency of the law-making power to abolish slavery has been recognized by all the slaveholding States, either directly or by implication_. Some States recognize it in their _Constitutions_, by giving the legislature power to emancipate such slaves as may "have rendered the state some distinguished service," and others by express prohibitory restrictions. The Constitutions of Mississippi, Arkansas, and other States, restrict the power of the legislature in this respect. Why this express prohibition, if the law-making power cannot abolish slavery? A stately farce, indeed, formally to construct a special clause, and with appropriate rites induct it into the Constitution, for the express purpose of restricting a nonentity!--to take from the lawmaking power what it _never had_, and what _cannot_ pertain to it! The legislatures of those States have no power to abolish slavery, simply because their Constitutions have expressly _taken away_ that power. The people of Arkansas, Mississippi, &c., well knew the competency of the law-making power to abolish slavery, and hence their zeal to _restrict_ it. The fact that these and other States have inhibited their legislatures from the exercise of this power, shows that the abolition of slavery is acknowledged to be a proper subject of legislation, when Constitutions impose no restrictions.

The slaveholding States have recognised this power in their _laws_. The Virginia Legislature passed a law in 1786 to prevent the further importation of Slaves, of which the following is an extract: "And be it further enacted that every slave imported into this commonwealth contrary to the true intent and meaning of this act, shall upon such importation become _free_." By a law of Virginia, passed Dec. 17, 1792, a slave brought into the state and kept _there a year_, was _free_. The Maryland Court of Appeals at the December term 1813 (see case of Stewart _vs._ Oakes,) decided that a slave owned in Maryland, and sent by his master into Virginia to work at different periods, making one year in the whole, became _free_, being _emancipated_ by the law of Virginia quoted above. North Carolina and Georgia in their acts of cession, transferring to the United States the territory now constituting the States of Tennessee, Alabama and Mississippi, made it a condition of the grant, that the provisions of the ordinance of '87, should be secured to the inhabitants _with the exception of the sixth article which prohibits slavery_; thus conceding, both the competency of law to abolish slavery, and the power of Congress to do it, within its jurisdiction. Besides, these acts show the prevalent belief at that time, in the slaveholding States, that the general government had adopted a line of policy aiming at the exclusion of slavery from the entire territory of the United States, not included within the original States, and that this policy would be pursued unless prevented by specific and formal stipulation.

Slaveholding states have asserted this power _in their judicial decisions._ In numerous cases their highest courts have decided that if the legal owner of slaves takes them into those States where slavery has been abolished either by law or by the constitution, such removal emancipates them, such law or constitution abolishing their slavery. This principle is asserted in the decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, in the case of Lunsford _vs._ Coquillon, 14 Martin's La. Reps. 401. Also by the Supreme Court of Virginia, in the case of Hunter _vs._ Fulcher, 1 Leigh's Reps. 172. The same doctrine was laid down by Judge Washington, of the United States Supreme Court, in the case of Butler _vs._ Hopper, Washington's Circuit Court Reps. 508. This principle was also decided by the Court of Appeals in Kentucky; case of Rankin _vs._ Lydia, 2 Marshall's Reps. 407; see also, Wilson _vs._ Isbell, 5 Call's Reps. 425, Spotts _vs._ Gillespie, 6 Randolph's Reps. 566. The State _vs._ Lasselle, 1 Blackford's Reps. 60, Marie Louise _vs._ Mariot, 8 La. Reps. 475. In this case, which was tried in 1836, the slave had been taken by her master to France and brought back; Judge Mathews, of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, decided that "residence for one moment" under the laws of France emancipated her.

6. _Eminent statesmen, themselves slaveholders, have conceded this power_. Washington, in a letter to Robert Morris, dated April 12, 1786, says: "There is not a man living, who wishes more sincerely than I do, to see a plan adopted for the abolition of slavery; but there is only one proper and effectual mode by which it can be accomplished, and that is by _legislative_ authority." In a letter to Lafayette, dated May 10, 1786, he says: "It (the abolition of slavery) certainly might, and assuredly ought to be effected, and that too by _legislative_ authority." In a letter to John Fenton Mercer, dated Sept. 9, 1786, he says: "It is among my first wishes to see some plan adopted by which slavery in this country may be abolished by _law_." In a letter to Sir John Sinclair, he says: "There are in Pennsylvania, _laws_ for the gradual abolition of slavery, which neither Maryland nor Virginia have at present, but which nothing is more certain that that they _must have_, and at a period not remote." Speaking of movements in the Virginia Legislature in 1777, for the passage of a law emancipating the slaves, Mr. Jefferson says: "The principles of the amendment were agreed on, that is to say, the freedom of all born after a certain day; but it was found that the public mind would not bear the proposition, yet the day is not far distant, when _it must bear and adopt it_."--Jefferson's Memoirs, v. 1, p. 35. It is well known that Jefferson, Pendleton, Mason, Wythe and Lee, while acting as a committee of the Virginia House of Delegates to revise the State Laws, prepared a plan for the gradual emancipation of the slaves by law. These men were the great lights of Virginia. Mason, the author of the Virginia Constitution; Pendleton, the President of the memorable Virginia Convention in 1787, and President of the Virginia Court of Appeals; Wythe was the Blackstone of the Virginia bench, for a quarter of a century Chancellor of the State, the professor of law in the University of William and Mary, and the preceptor of Jefferson, Madison, and Chief Justice Marshall. He was author of the celebrated remonstrance to the English House of Commons on the subject of the stamp act. As to Jefferson, his _name_ is his biography.

Every slaveholding member of Congress from the States of Maryland, Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Georgia, voted for the celebrated ordinance of 1787, which _abolished_ the slavery then existing in the Northwest Territory. Patrick Henry, in his well known letter to Robert Pleasants, of Virginia, January 18, 1773, says: "I believe a time will come when an opportunity will be offered to _abolish_ this lamentable evil." William Pinkney, of Maryland, advocated the abolition of slavery by law, in the legislature of that State, in 1789. Luther Martin urged the same measure both in the Federal Convention, and in his report to the Legislature of Maryland. In 1796, St. George Tucker, professor of law in the University of William and Mary, and Judge of the General Court, published an elaborate dissertation on slavery, addressed to the General Assembly of the State, and urging upon them the abolition of slavery by _law_.

John Jay, while New-York was yet a slave State, and himself in law a slaveholder, said in a letter from Spain, in 1786, "An excellent law might be made out of the Pennsylvania one, for the gradual abolition of slavery. Were I in your legislature, I would present a bill for the purpose, drawn up with great care, and I would never cease moving it till it became a law, or I ceased to be a member."

Daniel D. Tompkins, in a message to the Legislature of New-York, January 8, 1812, said: "To devise the means for the gradual and ultimate _extermination_ from amongst us of slavery, is work worthy the representatives of a polished and enlightened nation."

The Virginia Legislature asserted this power in 1832. At the close of a month's debate, the following proceedings were had. I extract from an editorial article of the Richmond Whig, of January 26, 1832.

"The report of the Select Committee, adverse to legislation on the subject of Abolition, was in these words: _Resolved_, as the opinion of this Committee, that it is INEXPEDIENT FOR THE PRESENT, to make any legislative enactments for the abolition of Slavery." This Report Mr. Preston moved to reverse, and thus to declare that it _was_ expedient, _now_ to make Legislative enactments for the abolition of slavery. This was meeting the question in its strongest form. It demanded action, and immediate action. On this proposition the vote was 58 to 73. Many of the most decided friends of abolition voted against the amendment; because they thought public opinion not sufficiently prepared for it, and that it might prejudice the cause to move too rapidly. The vote on Mr. Witcher's motion to postpone the whole subject indefinitely, indicates the true state of opinion in the House.--That was the test question, and was so intended and proclaimed by its mover. That motion was _negatived_, 71 to 60; showing a majority of 11, who by that vote, declared their belief that "at the proper time, and in the proper mode, Virginia ought to commence a system of gradual abolition."

8. _The Congress of the United States have asserted this power_. The ordinance of '87, declaring that there should be "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude," in the North Western territory, abolished the slavery then existing there. The Supreme Court of Mississippi, in its decision in the case of Harvey _vs._ Decker, Walker's Mi. Reps. 36, declared that the ordinance emancipated the slaves then held there. In this decision the question is argued ably and at great length. The Supreme Court of Louisiana made the same decision in the case of Forsyth _vs._ Nash, 4 Martin's La. Reps 385. The same doctrine was laid down by Judge Porter, (late United States Senator from Louisiana,) in his decision at the March term of the La. Supreme Court, 1830, in the case of Merry _vs._ Chexnaider, 20 Martin's Reps. 699.

That the ordinance abolished the slavery then existing, is also shown by the fact, that persons holding slaves in the territory petitioned for the repeal of the article abolishing slavery, assigning that as a reason. "The petition of the citizens of Randolph and St. Clair counties in the Illinois country, stating that they were in possession of slaves, and praying the repeal of that act (the 6th article of the ordinance of '87) and the passage of a law legalizing slavery there." [Am. State papers, Public Lands, v. 1. p. 69,] Congress passed this ordinance before the United States Constitution was adopted, when it derived all its authority from the articles of Confederation, which conferred powers of legislation far more restricted than those conferred on Congress over the District and Territories by the United States Constitution. Now, we ask, how does the Constitution _abridge_ the powers which Congress possessed under the articles of confederation?

The abolition of the slave trade by Congress, in 1808, is another illustration of the competency of legislative power to abolish slavery. The African slave trade has become such a mere _technic_, in common parlance, that the fact of its being _proper slavery_ is overlooked. The buying and selling, the transportation, and the horrors of the middle passage, were mere _incidents_ of the slavery in which the victims were held. Let things be called by their own names. When Congress abolished the African slave trade, it abolished SLAVERY--supreme slavery--power frantic with license, trampling a whole hemisphere scathed with its fires, and running down with blood. True, Congress did not, in the abolition of the slave trade, abolish _all_ the slavery within its jurisdiction, but it did abolish all the slavery in _one part_ of its jurisdiction. What has rifled it of power to abolish slavery in _another_ part of its jurisdiction, especially in that part where it has "exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever?"

9. _The Constitution of the United States recognizes this power by the most conclusive implication_. In Art. 1, sec. 3, clause 1, it prohibits the abolition of the slave trade previous to 1808: thus implying the power of Congress to do it at once, but for the restriction; and its power to do it _unconditionally_, when that restriction ceased. Again: In Art. 4, sec. 2, "No person held to service or labor in one state under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from said service or labor." This clause was inserted, as all admit, to prevent the runaway slave from being emancipated by the _laws_ of the free states. If these laws had _no power_ to emancipate, why this constitutional guard to prevent it?

The insertion of the clause, was the testimony of the eminent jurists that framed the Constitution, to the existence of the _power_, and their public proclamation, that the abolition of slavery was within the appropriate sphere of legislation. The right of the owner to that which is rightfully property, is founded on a principle of _universal law_, and is recognised and protected by all civilized nations; property in slaves is, by general consent, an _exception_; hence slaveholders insisted upon the insertion of this clause in the United States Constitution that they might secure by an _express provision_, that from which protection is withheld, by the acknowledged principles of universal law.[A] By demanding this provision, slaveholders consented that their slaves should not be recognised as property by the United States Constitution, and hence they found their claim, on the fact of their being "_persons_, and _held_ to service."

[Footnote A: The fact, that under the articles of Confederation, slaveholders, whose slaves had escaped into free states, had no legal power to force them back,--that _now_ they have no power to recover, by process of law, their slaves who escape to Canada, the South American States, or to Europe--the case already cited in which the Supreme Court of Louisiana decided, that residence "_for one moment_," under the laws of France emancipated an American slave--the case of Fulton, _vs._ Lewis, 3 Har. and John's Reps., 56, where the slave of a St. Domingo slaveholder, who brought him to Maryland in '93, was pronounced free by the Maryland Court of Appeals--these, with other facts and cases "too numerous to mention," are illustrations of the acknowledged truth here asserted, that by the consent of the civilized world, and on the principles of universal law, slaves are not "_property_," but _self-proprietors_, and that whenever held as property under _law_, it is only by _positive legislative acts_, forcibly setting aside the law of nature, the common law, and the principles of universal justice and right between man and man,--principles paramount to all law, and from which alone law derives its intrinsic authoritative sanction.]

But waiving all concessions, whether of constitutions, laws, judicial decisions, or common consent, I take the position that the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District, follows from the fact, that as the sole legislature there, it has unquestionable power _to adopt the Common Law, as the legal system within its exclusive jurisdiction_. This has been done, with certain restrictions, in most of the States, either by legislative acts or by constitutional implication. THE COMMON LAW KNOWS NO SLAVES. Its principles annihilate slavery wherever they touch it. It is a universal, unconditional, abolition act. Wherever slavery is a legal system, it is so only by _statute_ law, and in violation of common law. The declaration of Lord Chief Justice Holt, that "by the common law, no man can have property in another," is an acknowledged axiom, and based upon the well known common law definition of property. "The subjects of dominion or property are _things_, as contra-distinguished from _persons_." Let Congress adopt the common law in the District of Columbia, and slavery there is at once abolished. Congress may well be at home in common law legislation, for the common law is the grand element of the United States Constitution. All its _fundamental_ provisions are instinct with its spirit; and its existence, principles and paramount authority, are presupposed and assumed throughout the whole. The preamble of the Constitution plants the standard of the Common Law immovably in its foreground. "We, the people of the United States, in order to ESTABLISH JUSTICE, &c., do ordain and establish this Constitution;" thus proclaiming _devotion to justice_, as the controlling motive in the organization of the Government, and its secure establishment the chief object of its aims. By this most solemn recognition, the common law, that grand legal embodiment of "_justice_" and fundamental right was made the groundwork of the Constitution, and intrenched behind its strongest munitions. The second clause of Sec. 9, Art. 1; Sec. 4, Art. 2, and the last clause of Sec. 2, Art. 3, with Articles 7, 8, 9, and 13 of the Amendments, are also express recognitions of the common law as the presiding Genius of the Constitution.

By adopting the common law within its exclusive jurisdiction Congress would carry out the principles of our glorious Declaration, and follow the highest precedents in our national history and jurisprudence. It is a political maxim as old as civil legislation, that laws should be strictly homogeneous with the principles of the government whose will they express, embodying and carrying them out--being indeed the _principles themselves_, in preceptive form--representatives alike of the nature and the power of the Government--standing illustrations of its genius and spirit, while they proclaim and enforce its authority. Who needs be told that slavery is in antagonism to the principles of the Declaration, and the spirit of the Constitution, and that these and the principles of the common law gravitate toward each other with irrepressible affinities, and mingle into one? The common law came hither with our pilgrim fathers; it was their birthright, their panoply, their glory, and their song of rejoicing in the house of their pilgrimage. It covered them in the day of their calamity, and their trust was under the shadow of its wings. From the first settlement of the country, the genius of our institutions and our national spirit have claimed it as a common possession, and exulted in it with a common pride. A century ago, Governor Pownall, one of the most eminent constitutional jurists of colonial times, said of the common law, "In all the colonies the common law is received as the foundation and main body of their law." In the Declaration of Rights, made by the Continental Congress at its first session in '74, there was the following resolution: "Resolved, That the respective colonies are entitled to the common law of England, and especially to the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage according to the course of that law." Soon after the organization of the general government, Chief Justice Ellsworth, in one of his decisions on the bench of the United States Supreme Court, said: "The common law of this country remains the same as it was before the revolution." Chief Justice Marshall, in his decision in the case of Livingston _vs._ Jefferson, said: "When our ancestors migrated to America, they brought with them the common law of their native country, so far as it was applicable to their new situation and I do not conceive that the revolution in any degree changed the relations of man to man, or the law which regulates them. In breaking our political connection with the parent state, we did not break our connection with each other." [_See__Hall's Law Journal, new series._] Mr. Duponceau, in his "Dissertation on the Jurisdiction of Courts in the United States," says, "I consider the common law of England the _jus commune_ of the United States. I think I can lay it down as a correct principle, that the common law of England, as it was at the time of the declaration of Independence, still continues to be the national law of this country, so far as it is applicable to our present state, and subject to the modifications it has received here in the course of nearly half a century." Chief Justice Taylor of North Carolina, in his decision in the case of the State _vs._ Reed, in 1823, Hawkes' N.C. Reps. 454, says, "a law of _paramount obligation to the statute_ was violated by the offence--COMMON LAW, founded upon the law of nature, and confirmed by revelation." The legislation of the United States abounds in recognitions of the principles of the common law, asserting their paramount binding power. Sparing details, of which our national state papers are full, we illustrate by a single instance. It was made a condition of the admission of Louisiana into the Union, that the right of trial by jury should be secured to all her citizens,--the United States government thus employing its power to enlarge the jurisdiction of the common law in this its great representative.

Having shown that the abolition of slavery is within the competency of the law-making power, when unrestricted by constitutional provisions, and that the legislation of Congress over the District _is_ thus unrestricted, its power to abolish slavery there is established.

Besides this general ground, the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District may be based upon another equally tenable. We argue it from the fact, that slavery exists there _now_ by an act of Congress. In the act of 16th July, 1790, Congress accepted portions of territory offered by the states of Maryland and Virginia, and enacted that the laws, as they then were, should continue in force, "until Congress shall otherwise by law provide;" thus making the slave codes of Maryland and Virginia its own. Under these laws, adopted by Congress, and in effect re-enacted and made laws of the District, the slaves there are now held.

Is Congress so impotent in its own "exclusive jurisdiction" that it _cannot_ "otherwise by law provide?" If it can say, what _shall_ be considered property, it can say what shall _not_ be considered property. Suppose a legislature enacts, that marriage contracts shall be mere bills of sale, making a husband the proprietor of his wife, as his _bona fide_ property; and suppose husbands should herd their wives in droves for the market as beasts of burden, or for the brothel as victims of lust, and then prate about their inviolable legal property, and deny the power of the legislature, which stamped them property, to undo its own wrong, and secure to wives by law the rights of human beings. Would such cant about "legal rights" be heeded where reason and justice held sway, and where law, based upon fundamental morality, received homage? If a frantic legislature pronounces woman a chattel, has it no power, with returning reason, to take back the blasphemy? Is the impious edict irrepealable? Be it, that with legal forms it has stamped wives "wares." Can no legislation blot out the brand? Must the handwriting of Deity on human nature be expunged for ever? Has law no power to stay the erasing pen, and tear off the scrawled label that covers up the IMAGE OF GOD? We now proceed to show that

THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO ABOLISH SLAVERY IN THE DISTRICT HAS BEEN, TILL RECENTLY, UNIVERSALLY CONCEDED.

1. It has been assumed by Congress itself. The following record stands on the journals of the House of Representatives for 1804, p. 225: "On motion made and seconded that the House do come to the following resolution: 'Resolved, That from and after the 4th day of July, 1805, all blacks and people of color that shall be born within the District of Columbia, or whose mothers shall be the property of any person residing within said District, shall be free, the males at the age of ----, and the females at the age of ----. The main question being taken that the House do agree to said motion as originally proposed, it was negatived by a majority of 46.'" Though the motion was lost, it was on the ground of its alleged _inexpediency_ alone, and not because Congress lacked the constitutional power. In the debate which preceded the vote, the _power_ of Congress was conceded. In March, 1816, the House of Representatives passed the following resolution:--"Resolved, That a committee be appointed to inquire into the existence of an inhuman and illegal traffic in slaves, carried on in and through the District of Columbia, and to report whether any and what measures are necessary for _putting a stop to the same_."

On the 9th of January, 1829, the House of Representatives passed the following resolution by a vote of 114 to 66: "Resolved, That the Committee on the District of Columbia be instructed to inquire into the _expediency_ of providing by _law_ for the gradual abolition of slavery within the District, in such manner that the interests of no individual shall be injured thereby." Among those who voted in the affirmative were Messrs. Barney of Md., Armstrong of Va., A.H. Shepperd of N.C., Blair of Tenn., Chilton and Lyon of Ky., Johns of Delaware, and others from slave states.

2. It has been conceded directly, or impliedly, by all the committees on the District of Columbia that have reported on the subject. In a report of the committee on the District, Jan. 11, 1837, by their chairman, Mr. Powell of Virginia, there is the following declaration "The Congress of the United States, has by the constitution exclusive jurisdiction over the District, and has power upon this subject, (_slavery_) as upon all other subjects of legislation, to exercise _unlimited discretion_." Reps. of Comms. 2d Session, 19th Cong. v. I. No. 43. In February, 1829, the committee on the District, Mr. Alexander of Virginia, Chairman, in their report pursuant to Mr. Miner's resolutions, recognize a contingent abolition proceeding upon the consent of the people. In December, 1831, the committee on the District, Mr. Doddridge of Virginia, Chairman, reported, "That until the adjoining states act on the subject (slavery) it would be (not _unconstitutional_ but) unwise and impolitic, if not unjust, for Congress to interfere." In April, 1836, a special committee on abolition memorials reported the following resolutions by their Chairman, Mr. Pinckney of South Carolina: "Resolved, that Congress possesses no constitutional authority to interfere in any way with the institution of slavery in any of the states of this confederacy."

"Resolved, That Congress _ought not to interfere_ in any way with slavery in the District of Columbia." "Ought not to interfere," carefully avoiding the phraseology of the first resolution, and thus in effect conceding the constitutional power. In a widely circulated "Address to the electors of the Charleston District," Mr. Pinckney is thus denounced by his own constituents: "He has proposed a resolution which is received by the plain common sense of the whole country as a concession that Congress has authority to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia."

3. It has been conceded by the _citizens of the District_. A petition for the gradual abolition of slavery in the District, signed by nearly eleven hundred of its citizens, was presented to Congress, March 24, 1837. Among the signers to this petition, were Chief Justice Cranch, Judge Van Ness, Judge Morsel, Prof. J.M. Staughton, Rev. Dr. Balch, Rev. Dr. Keith, John M. Munroe, and a large number of the most influential inhabitants of the District. Mr. Dickson, of New York, asserted on the floor of Congress in 1835, that the signers of this petition owned more than half of the property in the District. The accuracy of this statement has never been questioned.

This power has been conceded by _grand juries of the District_. The grand jury of the county of Alexandria, at the March term 1802, presented the domestic slave trade as a grievance, and said, "We consider these grievances demanding _legislative_ redress." Jan. 19, 1829, Mr. Alexander, of Virginia, presented a representation of the grand jury in the city of Washington, remonstrating against "any measure for the abolition of slavery within said District, unless accompanied by measures for the removal of the emancipated from the same;" thus, not only conceding the power to emancipate slaves, but affirming an additional power, that of _excluding them when free_. See Journal H.R. 1828-9, p. 174.

4. This power has been conceded _by State Legislatures_. In 1828 the Legislature of Pennsylvania instructed their Senators in Congress "to procure, if practicable, the passage of a law to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia." Jan. 28, 1829, the House of Assembly of New York passed a resolution, that their "Senators in Congress be instructed to make every possible exertion to effect the passage of a law for the abolition of Slavery in the District of Columbia." In February, 1837, the Senate of Massachusetts "Resolved, That Congress having exclusive legislation in the District of Columbia, possess the right to abolish slavery and the slave trade therein, and that the early exercise of such right is demanded by the enlightened sentiment of the civilized world, by the principles of the revolution, and by humanity." The House of Representatives passed the following resolution at the same session: "Resolved, That Congress having exclusive legislation in the District of Columbia, possess the right to abolish slavery in said District, and that its exercise should only be restrained by a regard to the public good."

November 1, 1837, the Legislature of Vermont, "Resolved, that Congress have the full power by the constitution to abolish slavery and the slave trade in the District of Columbia, and in the territories." The Legislature of Vermont passed in substance the same resolution, at its session in 1836.

May 30, 1836, a committee of the Pennsylvania Legislature reported the following resolution: "Resolved, That Congress does possess the constitutional power, and it is expedient to abolish slavery and the slave trade within the District of Columbia."

In January, 1836, the Legislature of South Carolina "Resolved, That we should consider the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia as a violation of the rights of the citizens of that District derived from the _implied_ conditions on which that territory was ceded to the General Government." Instead of denying the constitutional power, they virtually admit its existence, by striving to smother it under an _implication_. In February, 1836, the Legislature of North Carolina "Resolved, That, although by the Constitution all legislative power over the District of Columbia is vested in the Congress of the United States, yet we would deprecate any legislative action on the part of that body towards liberating the slaves of that District, as a breach of faith towards those States by whom the territory was originally ceded, and will regard such interference as the first step towards a general emancipation of the slaves of the South." Here is a full concession of the _power_, February 2, 1836, the Virginia Legislature passed unanimously the following resolution: "Resolved, by the General Assembly of Virginia, that the following article be proposed to the several states of this Union, and to Congress, as an amendment of the Constitution of the United States: 'The powers of Congress shall not be so construed as to authorize the passage of any law for the emancipation of slaves in the District of Columbia, without the consent of the individual proprietors thereof, unless by the sanction of the Legislatures of Virginia and Maryland, and under such conditions as they shall by law prescribe.'"

Fifty years after the formation of the United States constitution the states are solemnly called upon by the Virginia Legislature, to amend that instrument by a clause asserting that, in the grant to Congress of "exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever" over the District, the "case" of slavery is not included!! What could have dictated such a resolution but the conviction that the power to abolish slavery is an irresistible interference from the constitution _as it is_. The fact that the same legislature passed afterward a resolution, though by no means unanimously, that Congress does not possess the power, abates not a tittle of the testimony in the first resolution. March 23d, 1824, "Mr. Brown presented the resolutions of the General Assembly of Ohio, recommending to Congress the consideration of a system for the gradual emancipation of persons of color held in servitude in the United States." On the same day, "Mr. Noble, of Indiana, communicated a resolution from the legislature of that state, respecting the gradual emancipation of slaves within the United States." Journal of the United States Senate, for 1824-5, p. 231.

The Ohio and Indiana resolutions, by taking for granted the _general_ power of Congress over the subject of slavery, do virtually assert its _special_ power within its _exclusive_ jurisdiction.

5. The power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District, has been conceded by bodies of citizens in the slave states. The petition of eleven hundred citizens of the District of Columbia, in 1827, has been already mentioned. "March 5, 1830, Mr. Washington presented a memorial of inhabitants of the county of Frederick, in the state of Maryland, praying that provision may be made for the gradual abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia." Journal H.R. 1829-30, p. 358.

March 30, 1828. Mr. A.H. Shepperd, of North Carolina, presented a memorial of citizens of that state, "praying Congress to take measures fur the entire abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia." Journal H.R. 1829-30, p. 379.

January 14, 1822. Mr. Rhea, of Tennessee, presented a memorial of citizens of that state, praying "that provision may be made, whereby all slaves which may hereafter be born in the District of Columbia, shall be free at a certain period of their lives." Journal H.R. 1821-22, p. 142.

December 13, 1824. Mr. Saunders of North Carolina, presented a memorial of citizens of that state, praying "that measures may be taken for the gradual abolition of slavery in the United States." Journal H.R. 1824-25, p. 27.

December 16, 1828. "Mr. Barnard presented the memorial of the American Convention for promoting the abolition of slavery, held in Baltimore, praying that slavery may be abolished in the District of Columbia." Journal U.S. Senate, 1828-29, p. 24.

6. Distinguished statesmen and jurists in the slaveholding states, have conceded the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District. The testimony of Messrs. Doddridge, Powell, and Alexander, of Virginia, Chief Justice Cranch, and Judges Morsell and Van Ness, of the District, has already been given. In the debate in Congress on the memorial of the Society of Friends, in 1790, Mr. Madison, in speaking of the territories of the United States, explicitly declared, from his own knowledge of the views of the members of the convention that framed the constitution, as well as from the obvious import of its terms, that in the territories "Congress have certainly the power to regulate the subject of slavery." Congress can have no more power over the territories than that of "exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever," consequently, according to Mr. Madison, "it has certainly the power to regulate the subject of slavery in the" _District_. In March, 1816, John Randolph introduced a resolution for putting a stop to the domestic slave trade within the District. December 12, 1827, Mr. Barney, of Maryland, presented a memorial for abolition in the District, and moved that it be printed. Mr. McDuffie, of South Carolina, objected to the printing, but "expressly admitted the right of Congress to grant to the people of the District any measures which they might deem necessary to free themselves from the deplorable evil."--(See letter of Mr. Claiborne, of Mississippi, to his constituents, published in the Washington Globe, May 9, 1836.) The sentiments of Henry Clay on the subject are well known. In a speech before the U.S. Senate, in 1836, he declared the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District "unquestionable." Messrs. Blair, of Tennessee, Chilton, Lyon, and Richard M. Johnson, of Kentucky, A.H. Shepperd, of North Carolina, Messrs. Armstrong and Smyth, of Virginia, Messrs. Dorsey, Archer, and Barney, of Maryland, and Johns, of Delaware, with numerous others from slave states, have asserted the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District. In the speech of Mr. Smyth, of Virginia, on the Missouri question, January 28, 1820, he says on this point: "If the future freedom of the blacks is your real object, and not a mere pretence, why do you not begin _here_? Within the ten miles square, you have _undoubted power_ to exercise exclusive legislation. _Produce a bill to emancipate the slaves in the District of Columbia_, or, if you prefer it, to emancipate those born hereafter."

To this may be added the testimony of the present Vice President of the United States, Hon. Richard M. Johnson, of Kentucky. In a speech before the United States' Senate, February 1, 1820, (National Intelligencer, April 29, 1820,) he says: "Congress has the express power stipulated by the Constitution, to exercise exclusive legislation over this District of ten miles square. Here slavery is sanctioned by law. In the District of Columbia, containing a population of 30,000 souls, and probably as many slaves as the whole territory of Missouri, THE POWER OF PROVIDING FOR THEIR EMANCIPATION RESTS WITH CONGRESS ALONE. Why, then, let me ask, Mr. President, why all this sensibility--this commiseration--this heart-rending sympathy for the slaves of Missouri, and this cold insensibility, this eternal apathy, towards the slaves in the District of Columbia?"

It is quite unnecessary to add, that the most distinguished northern statesmen of both political parties, have always affirmed the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District. President Van Buren in his letter of March 6, 1836, to a committee of gentlemen in North Carolina, says, "I would not, from the light now before me, feel myself safe in pronouncing that Congress does not possess the power of abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia." This declaration of the President is consistent with his avowed sentiments touching the Missouri question, on which he coincided with such men as Daniel D. Tompkins, De Witt Clinton, and others, whose names are a host.[A] It is consistent also, with his recommendation in his late message on the 5th of last month, in which, speaking of the District, he strongly urges upon Congress "a thorough and careful revision of its local government," speaks of the "entire dependence" of the people of the District "upon Congress," recommends that a "uniform system of local government" be adopted, and adds, that "although it was selected as the seat of the General Government, the site of its public edifices, the depository of its archives, and the residence of officers intrusted with large amounts of public property, and the management of public business, yet it never has been subjected to, or received, that _special_ and _comprehensive_ legislation which these circumstances peculiarly demanded."

[Footnote A: Mr. Van Buren, when a member of the Senate of New-York, voted for the following preamble and resolutions, which passed unanimously:--Jan. 28th, 1820. "Whereas, the inhibiting the further extension of slavery in the United States, is a subject of deep concern to the people of this state: and whereas, we consider slavery as an evil much to be deplored, and that _every constitutional barrier should be interposed to prevent its further extension_: and that the constitution of the United States _clearly gives congress the right_ to require new states, not comprised within the original boundary of the United States, to _make the prohibition of slavery_ a condition of their admission into the Union: Therefore,

"Resolved, That our Senators be instructed, and our members of Congress be requested, to oppose the admission as a state into the Union, of any territory not comprised as aforesaid, without making _the prohibition of slavery_ therein an indispensable condition of admission." ]

The tenor of Senator Tallmadge's speech on the right of petition, in the last Congress, and of Mr. Webster's on the reception of abolition memorials, may be taken as universal exponents of the sentiments of northern statesmen as to the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia.

After presenting this array of evidence, _direct testimony_ to show that the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District, has always till recently been _universally conceded_, is perhaps quite superfluous. We subjoin; however, the following:

The Vice-President of the United States in his speech on the Missouri question, quoted above, after contending that the restriction of slavery in Missouri would be unconstitutional, adds, "But I am at a loss to conceive why gentlemen should arouse all their sympathies upon this occasion, when they permit them to lie dormant upon the same subject, in relation to other sections of country, in which THEIR POWER COULD NOT BE QUESTIONED." Then follows immediately the assertion of congressional power to abolish slavery in the District, as already quoted. In the speech of Mr. Smyth, of Va., also quoted above, he declares the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District to be "UNDOUBTED."

Mr. Sutherland, of Pennsylvania, in a speech in the House of Representatives, on the motion to print Mr. Pinckney's Report, is thus reported in the Washington Globe, of May 9th, '36. "He replied to the remark that the report conceded that Congress had a right to legislate upon the subject in the District of Columbia, and said that SUCH A RIGHT HAD NEVER BEEN, TILL RECENTLY, DENIED."

The American Quarterly Review, published at Philadelphia, with a large circulation and list of contributors in the slave states, holds the following language in the September No. 1833, p. 55: "Under this 'exclusive jurisdiction,' granted by the constitution, Congress has power to abolish slavery and the slave trade in the District of Columbia. It would hardly be necessary to state this as a distinct proposition, had it not been occasionally questioned. The truth of the assertion, however, is too obvious to admit of argument--and we believe HAS NEVER BEEN DISPUTED BY PERSONS WHO ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE CONSTITUTION."

Finally--an explicit, and unexpected admission, that an "_over-whelming majority_" of the _present_ Congress concede the power to abolish slavery in the District, has just been made by a member of Congress from South Carolina, in a letter published in the Charleston Mercury of Dec. 27, well known as the mouth-piece of Mr. Calhoun. The following is an extract:

"The time has arrived when we must have new guarantees under the constitution, or the union must be dissolved. _Our views of the constitution are not those of the majority. An overwhelming majority think that by the constitution, Congress may abolish slavery in the District of Columbia--may abolish the slave trade between the States; that is, it may prohibit their being carried out of the State in which they are--and prohibit it in all the territories, Florida among them. They think_, NOT WITHOUT STRONG REASONS, _that the power of Congress extends to all of these subjects_."

In another letter, the same correspondent says:

"_The fact is, it is vain to attempt_, AS THE CONSTITUTION IS NOW, _to keep the question of slavery out of the halls of Congress_,--until, by some decisive action, WE COMPEL SILENCE, or _alter the constitution_, agitation and insult is our eternal fate in the confederacy."

OBJECTIONS TO THE FOREGOING CONCLUSIONS CONSIDERED.

We now proceed to notice briefly the main arguments that have been employed in Congress and elsewhere against the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District. One of the most plausible, is that "the conditions on which Maryland and Virginia ceded the District to the United States, would be violated, if Congress should abolish slavery there." The reply to this is, that Congress had no power to _accept_ a cession coupled with conditions restricting the power given it by the constitution. Nothing short of a convention of the states, and an alteration of the constitution, abridging its grant of power, could have empowered Congress to accept a territory on any other conditions than that of exercising "exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever," over it.

To show the futility of the objection, here follow the acts of cession. The cession of Maryland was made in November, 1788, and is as follows: "An act to cede to Congress a district of ten miles square in this state for the seat of the government of the United States."

"Be it enacted, by the General Assembly of Maryland, that the representatives of this state in the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States, appointed to assemble at New-York, on the first Wednesday of March next, be, and they are hereby authorized and required on the behalf of this state, to cede to the Congress of the United States, any district in this state, not exceeding ten miles square, which the Congress may fix upon, and accept for the seat of government of the United States." Laws of Maryland, vol. 2, chap. 46.

The cession from Virginia was made by act of the Legislature of that State on the 3d of December, 1788, in the following words:

"Be it enacted by the General Assembly, That a tract of country, not exceeding ten miles square, or any lesser quantity, to be located within the limits of the State, and in any part thereof, as Congress may, by law, direct, shall be, and the same is hereby for ever ceded and relinquished to the Congress and Government of the United States, in full and absolute right, and exclusive jurisdiction, as well of soil, as of persons residing or to reside thereon, pursuant to the tenor and effect of the eighth section of the first article of the government of the constitution of the United States."

But were there no provisos to these acts? The Maryland act had _none_. That part of the District therefore, which includes the cities of Washington and Georgetown, can lay claim to nothing with which to ward off the power of Congress. The Virginia act had this proviso: "Sect. 2. Provided, that nothing herein contained, shall be construed to vest in the United States any right of property in the _soil_, or to affect the rights of individuals _therein_, otherwise than the same shall or may be transferred by such individuals to the United States."

This specification touching the soil was merely definitive and explanatory of that clause in the act of cession, "_full and absolute right._" Instead of restraining the power of Congress on _slavery_ and other subjects, it even gives it wider scope; for exceptions to _parts_ of a rule, give double confirmation to those parts not embraced in the exceptions. If it was the _design_ of the proviso to restrict congressional action on the subject of _slavery_, why is the _soil alone_ specified? As legal instruments are not paragons of economy in words, might not "John Doe," out of his abundance, and without spoiling his style, have afforded an additional word--at least a hint--that slavery was _meant_, though nothing was _said_ about it? The subject must have been too "delicate," even for the most distant allusion! The mystery of silence is solved!!

But again, Maryland and Virginia, in their acts of cession, declare them to be "in pursuance of" that clause of the constitution which gives to Congress "exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over" the ten miles square--thus, instead of _restricting_ that clause, both States gave an express and decided confirmation of it. Now, their acts of cession either accorded with that clause of the constitution, or they conflicted with it. If they conflicted with it, _accepting_ the cessions was a violation of the constitution. If they accorded, the objector has already had his answer. The fact that Congress accepted the cessions, proves that in its view their _terms_ did not conflict with the constitutional grant of "power to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such District." The inquiry whether these acts of cession were consistent or inconsistent with the United States constitution, is totally irrelevant to the question at issue. What saith the CONSTITUTION? That is the question. Not, what saith Virginia, or Maryland, or--equally to the point--John Bull! If Maryland and Virginia had been the authorized interpreters of the constitution for the Union, these acts of cession could hardly have been magnified more than they were by Messrs. Garland and Wise in the last Congress. A true understanding of the constitution can be had, forsooth, only by holding it up in the light of Maryland and Virginia legislation!

We are told, again, that those States would not have ceded the District if they had supposed the constitution gave Congress power to abolish slavery in it.

This comes with an ill grace from Maryland and Virginia. They _knew_ the constitution. They were parties to it. They had sifted it, clause by clause, in their State conventions. They had weighed its words in the balance--they had tested them as by fire; and finally, after long pondering, they _adopted_ the constitution. And _afterward_, self-moved, they ceded the ten miles square, and declared the cession made "in pursuance of" that oft-cited clause, "Congress shall have power to exercise exclusive legalisation in all cases whatsoever over such District," &c. And now verily "they would not have ceded if they had _supposed_!" &c. Cede it they _did_, and "in full and absolute right both of soil and persons." Congress accepted the cession--state power over the District ceased, and congressional power over it commenced--and now, the sole question to be settled is, _the amount of power over the District, lodged in Congress by the constitution_. The constitution--the CONSTITUTION--that is the point. Maryland and Virginia "suppositions" must be potent suppositions, to abrogate a clause in the United States Constitution! That clause either gives Congress power to abolish slavery in the District, or it does _not_--and that point is to be settled, not by state "suppositions," nor state usages, nor state legislation, but _by the terms of the clause themselves_.

Southern members of Congress, in the recent discussions, have conceded the power of a contingent abolition in the District, by suspending it upon the consent of the people. Such a doctrine from _declaimers_ like Messrs. Alford, of Georgia, and Walker, of Mississippi, would excite no surprise; but that it should be honored with the endorsement of such men as Mr. Rives and Mr. Calhoun, is quite unaccountable. Are attributes of _sovereignty_ mere creatures of _contingency_? Is delegated _authority_ mere conditional _permission_? Is a _constitutional power_ to be exercised by those who hold it, only by popular _sufferance_? Must it lie helpless at the pool of public sentiment, waiting the gracious troubling of its waters? Is it a lifeless corpse, save only when popular "consent" deigns to put breath into its nostrils? Besides, if the consent of the people of the District be necessary, the consent of the _whole_ people must be had--not that of a majority, however large. Majorities, to be authoritative, must be _legal_--and a legal majority without legislative power, right of representation, or even the electoral franchise, would be an anomaly. In the District of Columbia, such a thing as a majority in a legal sense is unknown to law. To talk of the power of a majority, or the will of a majority there, is mere mouthing. A majority? Then it has an authoritative will--and an organ to make it known--and an executive to carry it into effect--Where are they? We repeat it--if the consent of the people of the District be necessary, the consent of _every one_ is necessary--and _universal_ consent will come only with the Greek Kalends and a "perpetual motion." A single individual might thus perpetuate slavery in defiance of the expressed will of a whole people. The most common form of this fallacy is given by Mr. Wise, of Virginia, in his speech, February 16, 1835, in which he denied the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District, unless the inhabitants owning slaves petitioned for it!! Southern members of Congress at the present session ring changes almost daily upon the same fallacy. What! pray Congress _to use_ a power which it _has not_? "It is required of a man according to what he _hath_," saith the Scripture. I commend Mr. Wise to Paul for his ethics. Would that he had got his _logic_ of him! If Congress does not possess the power, why taunt it with its weakness, by asking its exercise? Why mock it by demanding impossibilities? Petitioning, according to Mr. Wise, is, in matters of legislation, omnipotence itself; the very source of all constitutional power; for, _asking_ Congress to do what it _cannot_ do, gives it the power--to pray the exercise of a power that is _not, creates_ it. A beautiful theory! Let us work it both ways. If to petition for the exercise of a power that is _not_, creates it--to petition against the exercise of a power that _is_, annihilates it. As southern gentlemen are partial to summary processes, pray, sirs, try the virtue of your own recipe on "exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever;" a better subject for experiment and test of the prescription could not be had. But if the petitions of the citizens of the District give Congress the _right_ to abolish slavery, they impose the _duty_; if they confer constitutional authority, they create constitutional obligation. If Congress _may_ abolish because of an expression of their will, it _must_ abolish at the bidding of that will. If the people of the District are a _source of power_ to Congress, their _expressed will_ has the force of a constitutional provision, and has the same binding power upon the National Legislature. To make Congress dependent on the District for authority, is to make it a _subject_ of its authority, restraining the exercise of its own discretion, and sinking it into a mere organ of the District's will. We proceed to another objection.

"The southern states would not have ratified the constitution, if they had supposed that it gave this power." It is a sufficient answer to this objection, that the northern states would not have ratified it, if they had supposed that it _withheld_ the power. If "suppositions" are to take the place of the constitution--coming from both sides, they neutralize each other. To argue a constitutional question by _guessing_ at the "suppositions" that might have been made by the parties to it, would find small favor in a court of law. But even a desperate shift is some easement when sorely pushed. If this question is to be settled by "suppositions," suppositions shall be forth coming, and that without stint.

First, then, I affirm that the North ratified the constitution, "supposing" that slavery had begun to wax old, and would speedily vanish away, and especially that the abolition of the slave trade, which by the constitution was to be surrendered to Congress after twenty years, would cast it headlong.

Would the North have adopted the constitution, giving three-fifths of the "slave property" a representation, if it has "supposed" that the slaves would have increased from half a million to two millions and a half by 1838--and that the census of 1840 would give to the slave states, 30 representatives of "slave property?"

If they had "supposed" that this representation would have controlled the legislation of the government, and carried against the North every question vital to its interests, would Alexander Hamilton, Benjamin Franklin, Roger Sherman, Elbridge Gerry, William Livingston, John Langdon, and Rufus King have been such madmen, as to sign the constitution, and the Northern States such suicides as to ratify it? Every self-preserving instinct would have shrieked at such an infatuate immolation. At the adoption of the United States constitution, slavery was regarded as a fast waning system. This conviction was universal. Washington, Jefferson, Patrick Henry, Grayson, St. George Tucker, Madison, Wythe, Pendleton, Lee, Blair, Mason, Page, Parker, Edmund Randolph, Iredell, Spaight, Ramsey, William Pinckney, Luther Martin, James McHenry, Samuel Chase, and nearly all the illustrious names south of the Potomac, proclaimed it before the sun, that the days of slavery were beginning to be numbered. A reason urged in the convention that formed the United States constitution, why the word slave should not be used in it, was, that _when slavery should cease_ there might remain upon the National Charter no record that it had even been. (See speech of Mr. Burrill, of R.I., on the Missouri question.)

I now proceed to show by testimony, that at the date of the United States constitution, and for several years before and after that period, slavery was rapidly on the wane; that the American Revolution with the great events preceding accompanying, and following it, had wrought an immense and almost universal change in the public sentiment of the nation of the subject, powerfully impelling it toward the entire abolition of the system--and that it was the _general belief_ that measures for its abolition throughout the Union, would be commenced by the individual States generally before the lapse of many years. A great mass of testimony establishing this position is at hand and might be presented, but narrow space, little time, the patience of readers, and the importance of speedy publication, counsel brevity. Let the following proofs suffice. First, a few dates as points of observation.

The first _general_ Congress met in 1774. The revolutionary war commenced in '75. Independence was declared in '76. The articles of confederacy were adopted by the thirteen states in '78. Independence acknowledged in '83. The convention for forming the U.S. constitution was held in '87, the state conventions for considering it in '87, and '88. The first Congress under the constitution in '89.

Dr. Rush, of Pennsylvania, one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, in a letter to the celebrated Granville Sharpe, May 1, 1773, says: "A spirit of humanity and religion begins to awaken in several of the colonies in favor of the poor negroes. The clergy begin to bear a public testimony against this violation of the laws of nature and christianity. Great events have been brought about by small beginnings. _Anthony Benezet stood alone a few years ago in opposing negro slavery in Philadelphia_, and NOW THREE-FOURTHS OF THE PROVINCE AS WELL AS OF THE CITY CRY OUT AGAINST IT."--(Stuart's Life of Sharpe, p. 21.)

In the preamble to the act prohibiting the importation of slaves into Rhode Island, June 1774, is the following: "Whereas, the inhabitants of America are generally engaged in the preservation of their own rights and liberties, among which that of personal freedom must be considered the greatest, and as those who are desirous of enjoying all the advantages of liberty themselves, _should be willing to extend personal liberty to others_, therefore," &c.

October 20, 1774, the Continental Congress passed the following: "We, for ourselves and the inhabitants of the several colonies whom we represent, _firmly agree and associate under the sacred ties of virtue, honor, and love of our country_, as follows:

"2d Article. _We will neither import nor purchase any slaves imported_ after the first day of December next, after which time we will _wholly discontinue_ the slave trade, and we will neither be concerned in it ourselves, nor will we hire our vessels, nor sell our commodities or manufactures to those who are concerned in it."

The Continental Congress, in 1775, setting forth the causes and the necessity for taking up arms, say: "_If it were possible_ for men who exercise their reason to believe that the Divine Author of our existence intended a part of the human race _to hold an absolute property in_, and _unbounded power over others_, marked out by infinite goodness and wisdom as objects of a legal domination, never rightfully resistible, however severe and oppressive, the inhabitants of these colonies might at least require from the Parliament of Great Britain some evidence that this dreadful authority over them has been granted to that body."

In 1776, the celebrated Dr. Hopkins, then at the head of New England divines, published a pamphlet entitled, "An Address to the owners of negro slaves in the American colonies," from which the following is an extract: "The conviction of the unjustifiableness of this practice (slavery) has been _increasing_, and _greatly spreading of late_, and _many_ who have had slaves, have found themselves so unable to justify their own conduct in holding them in bondage, as to be induced to _set them at liberty_. May this conviction soon reach every owner of slaves in _North America!_ Slavery is, _in every instance_, wrong, unrighteous, and oppressive--a very great and crying sin--_there being nothing of the kind equal to it on the face of the earth._"

The same year the American Congress issued a solemn MANIFESTO to the world. These were its first words: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that _all_ men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." _Once_, these were words of power; _now_, "a rhetorical flourish."

The celebrated Patrick Henry of Virginia, in a letter, of Jan. 18, 1773, to Robert Pleasants, afterwards president of the Virginia Abolition Society, says: "Believe me, I shall honor the Quakers for their noble efforts to abolish slavery. It is a debt we owe to the purity of our religion to show that it is at variance with that law that warrants slavery. I exhort you to persevere in so worthy a resolution."

In 1779, the Continental Congress ordered a pamphlet to be published, entitled, "Observations on the American Revolution," from which the following is an extract: "The great principle (of government) is and ever will remain in force, _that men are by nature free_; as accountable to him that made them, they must be so; and so long as we have any idea of divine _justice_, we must associate that of _human freedom_. Whether men can part with their liberty, is among the questions which have exercised the ablest writers; but it is _conceded on all hands, that the right to be free_ CAN NEVER BE ALIENATED--still less is it practicable for one generation to mortgage the privileges of another."

Extract from the Pennsylvania act for the Abolition of Slavery, passed March 1, 1780: * * * "We conceive that it is our duty, and we rejoice that it is in our power, to extend a portion of that freedom to others which has been extended to us. Weaned by a long course of experience from those narrow prejudices and partialities we have imbibed, we find our hearts enlarged with kindness and benevolence towards men of all conditions and nations: * * * Therefore be it enacted, that no child born hereafter be a slave," &c.

Jefferson, in his Notes on Virginia, written just before the close of the Revolutionary War, says: "I think a change already perceptible since the origin of the present revolution. The spirit of the master is abating, that of the slave is rising from the dust, his condition mollifying, _the way I hope preparing under the auspices of heaven_, FOR A TOTAL EMANCIPATION, and that this is disposed, in the order of events, to be with the consent of the masters, rather than by their extirpation."

In a letter to Dr. Price, of London, who had just published a pamphlet in favor of the abolition of slavery, Mr. Jefferson, then Minister at Paris, (August 7, 1785,) says: "From the mouth to the head of the Chesapeake, _the bulk of the people will approve of your pamphlet in theory_, and it will find a respectable minority ready to _adopt it in practice_--a minority which, for weight and worth of character, _preponderates against the greater number_." Speaking of Virginia, he says: "This is the next state to which we may turn our eyes for the interesting spectacle of justice in conflict with avarice and oppression,--a conflict in which THE SACRED SIDE IS GAINING DAILY RECRUITS. Be not, therefore discouraged--what you have written will do a _great deal of good_; and could you still trouble yourself with our welfare, no man is more able to give aid to the laboring side. The College of William and Mary, in Williamsburg, since the remodelling of its plan, is the place where are collected together all the young men of Virginia, under preparation for public life. They are there under the direction (most of them) of a Mr. Wythe, one of the most virtuous of characters, and _whose sentiments on the subject of slavery are unequivocal_. I am satisfied, if you could resolve to address an exhortation to those young men with all the eloquence of which you are master that _its influence on the future decision of this important question would be great, perhaps decisive_. Thus, you see, that so far from thinking you have cause to repent of what you have done, _I wish you to do more, and wish it on an assurance of its effect_."--Jefferson's Posthumous Works, vol. 1, p. 268.

In 1786, John jay, afterward Chief Justice of the United States, drafted and signed a petition to the Legislature of New York, on the subject of slavery, beginning with these words:

"Your memorialists being deeply affected by the situation of those, who, although FREE BY THE LAWS OF GOD, are held in slavery by the laws of the State," &c.

This memorial bore also the signature of the celebrated Alexander Hamilton; Robert R. Livingston, afterward Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the United States, and Chancellor of the State of New York; James Duane, Mayor of the City of New York, and many others of the most eminent individuals in the State.

In the preamble of an instrument, by which Mr. Jay emancipated a slave in 1784, is the following passage:

"Whereas, the children of men are by nature equally free, and cannot, without injustice, be either reduced to or HELD in slavery."

In his letter while Minister at Spain, in 1786, he says, speaking of the abolition of slavery: "Till America comes into this measure, her prayers to heaven will be IMPIOUS. This is a strong expression, but it is just. I believe God governs the world; and I believe it to be a maxim in his, as in our court, that those who ask for equity _ought to do it_."

In 1785, the New York Manumission Society was formed. John Jay was chosen its first President, and held the office five years. Alexander Hamilton was its second President, and after holding the office one year, resigned upon his removal to Philadelphia as Secretary of the United States' Treasury. In 1787, the Pennsylvania Abolition Society was formed. Benjamin Franklin, warm from the discussions of the convention that formed the United States constitution, was chosen President, and Benjamin Rush, Secretary--both signers of the Declaration of Independence. In 1789, the Maryland Abolition Society was formed. Among its officers were Samuel Chace, Judge of the United States Supreme Court, and Luther Martin, a member of the convention that formed the United States constitution. In 1790, the Connecticut Abolition Society was formed. The first President was Rev. Dr. Stiles, President of Yale College, and the Secretary, Simeon Baldwin, (the late Judge Baldwin of New Haven.) In 1791, this Society sent a memorial to Congress, from which the following is an extract:

"From a sober conviction of the unrighteousness of slavery, your petitioners have long beheld, with grief, our fellow men doomed to perpetual bondage, in a country which boasts of her freedom. Your petitioners are fully of opinion, that calm reflection will at last convince the world, that the whole system of African slavery is unjust in its nature--impolitic in its principles--and, in its consequences, ruinous to the industry and enterprise of the citizens of these States. From a conviction of these truths, your petitioners were led, by motives, we conceive, of general philanthropy, to associate ourselves for the protection and assistance of this unfortunate part of our fellow men; and, though this Society has been _lately_ established, it has now become _generally extensive_ through this state, and, we fully believe, _embraces, on this subject, the sentiments of a large majority of its citizens_."

The same year the Virginia Abolition Society was formed. This Society, and the Maryland Society, had auxiliaries in different parts of those States. Both societies sent up memorials to Congress. The memorial of the Virginia Society is headed--"The memorial of the _Virginia Society_, for promoting the Abolition of Slavery, &c." The following is an extract:

"Your memorialists, fully believing that 'righteousness exalteth a nation,' and that slavery is not only an odious degradation, but an _outrageous violation of one of the most essential rights of human nature, and utterly repugnant to the precepts of the gospel_, which breathes 'peace on earth, good will to men;' lament that a practice, so inconsistent with true policy and the inalienable rights of men, should subsist in so enlightened an age, and among a people professing, that all mankind are, by nature, equally entitled to freedom."

About the same time a Society was formed in New-Jersey. It had an acting committee of five members in each county in the State. The following is an extract from the preamble to its constitution:

"It is our boast, that we live under a government founded on principles of justice and reason, wherein _life, liberty_, and the _pursuit of happiness_, are recognised as the universal rights of men; and whilst we are anxious to preserve these rights to ourselves, and transmit them inviolate, to our posterity, we _abhor that inconsistent, illiberal, and interested policy, which withholds those rights, from an unfortunate and degraded class of our fellow creatures_."

Among other distinguished individuals who were efficient officers of these Abolition Societies, and delegates from their respective state societies, at the annual meetings of the American convention for promoting the abolition of slavery, were Hon. Uriah Tracy, United States' Senator, from Connecticut; Hon. Zephaniah Swift, Chief Justice of the same State; Hon. Cesar A. Rodney, Attorney General of the United States; Hon. James A. Bayard, United States Senator, from Delaware; Governor Bloomfield, of New Jersey; Hon. Wm. Rawle, the late venerable head of the Philadelphia bar; Dr. Casper Wistar, of Philadelphia; Messrs. Foster and Tillinghast, of Rhode Island; Messrs. Ridgeley, Buchanan, and Wilkinson, of Maryland; and Messrs. Pleasants, McLean, and Anthony, of Virginia.

In July, 1787, the old Congress passed the celebrated ordinance, abolishing slavery in the northwestern territory, and declaring that it should never thereafter exist there. This ordinance was passed while the convention that formed the United States constitution was in session. At the first session of Congress under the constitution, this ordinance was ratified by a special act. Washington, fresh from the discussions of the convention, in which _more than forty days had been spent in adjusting the question of slavery, gave it his approval._ The act passed with only one dissenting voice, (that of Mr. Yates, of New-York,) _the South equally with the North avowing the fitness and expediency of the measure of general considerations, and indicating thus early the line of national policy, to be pursued by the United States Government on the subject of slavery_.

In the debates in the North Carolina Convention, Mr. Iredell, afterward a Judge of the United States' Supreme Court, said, "_When the entire abolition of slavery takes place_, it will be an event which must be pleasing to every generous mind and every friend of human nature." Mr. Galloway said, "I wish to see this abominable trade put an end to. I apprehend the clause (touching the slave trade) means to _bring forward manumission."_ Luther Martin, of Md., a member of the convention that formed the United States constitution, said, "We ought to authorize the General Government to make such regulations as shall be thought most advantageous for _the gradual abolition of slavery,_ and the _emancipation of the slaves_ which are already in the States." Judge Wilson, of Pennsylvania, one of the framers of the constitution, said, in the Pennsylvania convention of '87, Deb. Pa. Con. p. 303, 156: "I consider this (the clause relative to the slave trade) as laying the foundation for _banishing slavery out of this country_. It will produce the same kind of gradual change which was produced in Pennsylvania; the new states which are to be formed will be under the control of Congress in this particular, and _slaves will never be introduced_ among them. It presents us with the pleasing prospect that the rights of mankind will be acknowledged and established _throughout the Union_. Yet the lapse of a few years, and Congress will have power to _exterminate slavery_ within our borders." In the Virginia convention of '87, Mr. Mason, author of the Virginia constitution, said, "The augmentation of slaves weakens the States, and such a trade is _diabolical_ in itself, and disgraceful to mankind. As much as I value a union of all the states, I would not admit the southern states, (i.e., South Carolina and Georgia,) into the union, _unless they agree to a discontinuance of this disgraceful trade._" Mr. Tyler opposed with great power the clause prohibiting the abolition of the slave trade till 1808, and said, "My earnest desire is, that it shall he handed down to posterity that I oppose this wicked clause." Mr. Johnson said, "The principle of emancipation _has begun since the revolution. Let us do what we will, it will come round._"--[_Deb. Va. Con._ p. 463.] Patrick Henry, arguing the power of Congress under the United States constitution to abolish slavery in the States, said, in the same convention, "Another thing will contribute to bring this event (the abolition of slavery) about. Slavery is _detested._ We feel its fatal effects; we deplore it with all the pity of humanity."--[_Deb. Va. Con._ p. 431.] In the Mass. Con. of '88, Judge Dawes said, "Although slavery is not smitten by an apoplexy, yet _it has received a mortal wound_, and will die of consumption."--[_Deb. Mass. Con._ p. 60.] General Heath said that, "Slavery was confined to the States _now existing, it could not be extended_. By their ordinance, Congress had declared that the new States should be republican States, and _have no slavery._"--p. 147.

In the debate in the first Congress, February 11th and 12th, 1789, on the petitions of the Society of Friends, and the Pennsylvania Abolition Society, Mr. Parker, of Virginia, said, "I hope, Mr. Speaker, the petition of these respectable people will be attended to _with all the readiness the importance of its object demands_; and I cannot help expressing the pleasure I feel in finding _so considerable a part_ of the community attending to matters of such a momentous concern to the _future prosperity_ and happiness of the people of America. I think it my duty, as a citizen of the Union, _to espouse their cause_."

Mr. Page, of Virginia, (afterward Governor)--"Was _in favor_ of the commitment; he hoped that the designs of the respectable memorialists would not be stopped at the threshold, in order to preclude a fair discussion of the prayer of the memorial. With respect to the alarm that was apprehended, he conjectured there was none; but there might be just cause, if the memorial was _not_ taken into consideration. He placed himself in the case of a slave, and said, that on hearing that Congress had refused to listen to the decent suggestions of a respectable part of the community, he should infer, that the general government, _from which was expected great good would result to_ EVERY CLASS _of citizens_, had shut their ears against the voice of humanity, and he should despair of any alleviation of the miseries he and his posterity had in prospect; if any thing could induce him to rebel, it must be a stroke like this, impressing on his mind all the horrors of despair. But if he was told, that application was made in his behalf, and that Congress were willing to hear what could be urged in favor of discouraging the practice of importing his fellow-wretches, he would trust in their justice and humanity, and _wait the decision patiently_."

Mr. Scott, of Pennsylvania: "I cannot, for my part, conceive how any person _can be said to acquire a property in another_; but enough of those who reduce men to the state of transferable goods, or use them like beasts of burden, who deliver them up as the property or patrimony of another man. Let us argue on principles countenanced by reason, and becoming humanity. _I do not know how far I might go, if I was one of the judges of the United States, and those people were to come before me and claim their emancipation, but I am sure I would go as far as I could_."

Mr. Burke, of South Carolina, said, "He _saw the disposition of the House_, and he feared it would be referred to a committee, maugre all their opposition."

Mr. Smith, of South Carolina, said, "That on entering into this government, they (South Carolina and Georgia) apprehended that the other states, not knowing the necessity the citizens of the Southern states were under to hold this species of property, _would, from motives of humanity and benevolence, be led to vote for a general emancipation_; and had they not seen, that the constitution provided against the effect of such a disposition, I may be bold to say, they never would have adopted it."

In the debate, at the same session, May 13th, 1789, on the petition of the Society of Friends respecting the slave trade, Mr. Parker, of Virginia, said, "He hoped Congress would do all that lay in their power to _restore to human nature its inherent privileges_, and if possible, wipe off the stigma, which America labored under. The inconsistency in our principles, with which we are justly charged _should be done away_, that we may show by our actions the pure beneficence of the doctrine we held out to the world in our Declaration of Independence."

Mr. Jackson of Georgia, said, "IT WAS THE FASHION OF THE DAY TO FAVOR THE LIBERTY OF THE SLAVES. * * * * * What is to be done for compensation? Will Virginia set all her negroes free? Will they give up the money they have cost them; and to whom? _When this practice comes to be tried, then the sound of liberty will lose those charms which make it grateful to the ravished ear_."

Mr. Madison of Virginia,--"The dictates of humanity, the principles of the people, the national safety and happiness, and prudent policy, require it of us. The constitution has particularly called our attention to it. * * * * * I conceive the constitution in this particular was formed in order that the Government, whilst it was restrained from having a total prohibition, might be able to _give some testimony of the sense of America_, with respect to the African trade. * * * * * It is to be hoped, that by expressing a national disapprobation of this trade, we may destroy it, and save ourselves from reproaches, AND OUR POSTERITY THE IMBECILITY EVER ATTENDANT ON A COUNTRY FILLED WITH SLAVES. I do not wish to say any thing harsh to the hearing of gentlemen who entertain different sentiments from me, or different sentiments from those I represent. But if there is any one point in which it is clearly the policy of this nation, so far as we constitutionally can, _to vary the practice_ obtaining under some of the state governments, it is this. But it is _certain_ a majority of the states are _opposed to this practice_."--[Cong. Reg. v. 1, p. 308-12.]

A writer in the "Gazette of the United States," Feb. 20th, 1790, (then the government paper,) who opposes the abolition of slavery, and avows himself a _slaveholder_, says, "I have seen in the papers accounts of _large associations_, and applications to Government for _the abolition of slavery_. Religion, humanity, and the generosity natural to a free people, are the _noble principles which dictate those measures_. SUCH MOTIVES COMMAND RESPECT, AND ARE ABOVE ANY EULOGIUM WORDS CAN BESTOW."

It is well known, that in the convention that formed the constitution of Kentucky in 1780, the effort to prohibit slavery was nearly successful. The writer has frequently heard it asserted in Kentucky, and has had it from some who were members of that convention, that a decided majority of that body would have voted for its exclusion but for the great efforts and influence of two large slaveholders--men of commanding talents and sway--Messrs. Breckenridge and Nicholas. The following extract from a speech made in that convention by a member of it, Mr. Rice, a native Virginian, is a specimen of the _free discussion_ that prevailed on that "delicate subject." Said Mr. Rice: "I do a man greater injury, when I deprive him of his liberty, than when I deprive him of his property. It is vain for me to plead that I have the sanction of law; for this makes the injury the greater--it arms the community against him, and makes his case desperate. The owners of such slaves then are _licensed robbers_, and not the just proprietors of what they claim. Freeing them is not depriving them of property, but _restoring it to the right owner_. In America, a slave is a standing monument of the tyranny and inconsistency of human governments. The master is the enemy of the slave; he _has made open war upon him_, AND IS DAILY CARRYING IT ON in unremitted efforts. Can any one imagine, then, that the slave is indebted to his master, and _bound to serve him_? Whence can the obligation arise? What is it founded upon? What is my duty to an enemy that is carrying on war against me? I do not deny, but in some circumstances, it is the duty of the slave to serve; but it is a duty he owes himself, and not his master."

President Edwards, the younger, said, in a sermon preached before the Connecticut Abolition Society, Sept. 15, 1791: "Thirty years ago, scarcely a man in this country thought either the slave trade or the slavery of negroes to be wrong; but now how many and able advocates in private life, in our legislatures, in Congress, have appeared, and have openly and irrefragably pleaded the rights of humanity in this as well as other instances? And if we judge of the future by the past, _within fifty years from this time, it will be as shameful for a man to hold a negro slave, as to be guilty of common robbery or theft_."

In 1794, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian church adopted its "Scripture proofs," notes, comments, &c. Among these was the following:

"1 Tim. i. 10. The law is made for manstealers. This crime among the Jews exposed the perpetrators of it to capital punishment. Exodus xxi. 16. And the apostle here classes them with _sinners of the first rank_. The word he uses, in its original import comprehends all who are concerned in bringing any of the human race into slavery, or in _retaining_ them in it. _Stealers of men_ are all those who bring off slaves or freemen, and _keep_, sell, or buy them."

In 1794, Dr. Rush declared: "Domestic slavery is repugnant to the principles of Christianity. It prostrates every benevolent and just principle of action in the human heart. It is rebellion against the authority of a common Father. It is a practical denial of the extent and efficacy of the death of a common Savior. It is an usurpation of the prerogative of the great Sovereign of the universe, who has solemnly claimed an exclusive property in the souls of men."

In 1795, Mr. Fiske, then an officer of Dartmouth College, afterward a Judge in Tennessee, said, in an oration published that year, speaking of slaves: "I steadfastly maintain, that we must bring them to _an equal standing, in point of privileges, with the whites_! They must enjoy all the rights belonging to human nature."

When the petition on the abolition of the slave trade was under discussion in the Congress of '89, Mr. Brown. of North Carolina, said, "The emancipation of the slaves _will be effected_ in time; it ought to be a gradual business, but he hoped that Congress would not _precipitate_ it to the great injury of the southern States." Mr. Hartley, of Pennsylvania said, in the sane debate, "_He was not a little surprised to hear the cause of slavery advocated in that house._" WASHINGTON, in a letter to Sir John Sinclair, says, "There are, in Pennsylvania, laws for the gradual abolition of slavery which neither Maryland nor Virginia have at present, but which _nothing is more certain_ than that they _must have_, and at a period NOT REMOTE." In 1782, Virginia passed her celebrated manumission act. Within nine years from that time nearly eleven thousand slaves were voluntarily emancipated by their masters. Judge Tucker's "Dissertation on Slavery," p. 72. In 1787, Maryland passed an act legalizing manumission. Mr. Dorsey, of Maryland, in a speech in Congress, December 27th, 1826, speaking of manumissions under that act, said, that "_The progress of emancipation was astonishing_, the State became crowded with a free black population."

The celebrated William Pinkney, in a speech before the Maryland House of Delegates, in 1789, on the emancipation of slaves, said, "Sir, by the eternal principles of natural justice, _no master in the state has a right to hold his slave in bondage for a single hour_. I would as soon believe the incoherent tale of a schoolboy, who should tell me he had been frightened by a ghost, as that the grant of this permission (to emancipate) ought in any degree to alarm us. Are we apprehensive that these men will become more dangerous by becoming freemen? Are we alarmed, lest by being admitted into the enjoyment of civil rights, they will be inspired with a deadly enmity against the rights of others? Strange, unaccountable paradox! How much more rational would it be, to argue that the natural enemy of the privileges of a freeman, is he who is robbed of them himself! Dishonorable to the species is the idea that they would ever prove injurious to our interests--released from the shackles of slavery, by the justice of government and the bounty of individuals--the want of fidelity and attachment would be next to impossible."

Hon. James Campbell, in an address before the Pennsylvania Society of the Cincinnati, July 4, 1787, said, "Our separation from Great Britain has extended the empire of _humanity_. The time _is not far distant_ when our sister states, in imitation of our example, _shall turn their vassals into freemen._" The Convention that formed the United States' constitution being then in session, attended at the delivery of this oration with General Washington at their head.

A Baltimore paper of September 8th, 1780, contains the following notice of Major General Gates: "A few days ago passed through this town the Hon. General Gates and lady. The General, previous to leaving Virginia, summoned his numerous family of slaves about him, and amidst their tears of affection and gratitude, gave them their FREEDOM."

In 1791 the university of William and Mary, in Virginia, conferred upon Granville Sharpe the degree of Doctor of Laws. Sharpe was at that time the acknowledged head of British abolitionists. His indefatigable exertions, prosecuted for years in the case of Somerset, procured that memorable decision in the Court of King's Bench, which settled the principle that no slave could be held in England. He was most uncompromising in his opposition to slavery, and for twenty years previous he had spoken, written, and accomplished more against it than any man living.

In the "Memoirs of the Revolutionary War in the Southern Department," by Gen. Lee, of Va., Commandant of the Partizan Legion, is the following: "The Constitution of the United States, adopted lately with so much difficulty, has effectually provided against this evil, (by importation) after a few years. It is much to be lamented that having done so much in this way, _a provision had not been made for the gradual abolition of slavery_."--p. 233, 4.

Mr. Tucker, of Virginia, Judge of the Supreme Court of that state, and professor of law in the University of William and Mary, addressed a letter to the General Assembly of that state, in 1796, urging the abolition of slavery; from which the following is an extract. Speaking of the slaves in Virginia, he says: "Should we not, at the time of the revolution, have loosed their chains and broken their fetters; or if the difficulties and dangers of such an experiment prohibited the attempt, during the convulsions of a revolution, is it not our duty, _to embrace the first moment_ of constitutional health and vigor to effectuate so desirable an object, and to remove from us a stigma with which our enemies will never fail to upbraid us, nor consciences to reproach us?"

Mr. Faulkner, in a speech before the Virginia Legislature, Jan. 20, 1832, said:--"The idea of a gradual emancipation and removal of the slaves from this commonwealth, is coeval with the declaration of our independence from the British yoke. It sprung into existence during the first session of the General Assembly, subsequent to the formation of your republican government. When Virginia stood sustained in her legislation by the pure and philosophic intellect of Pendleton--by the patriotism of Mason and Lee--by the searching vigor and sagacity of Wythe, and by the all-embracing, all-comprehensive genius of Thomas Jefferson! Sir, it was a committee composed of those five illustrious men, who, in 1777, submitted to the general assembly of this state, then in session, _a plan for the gradual emancipation of the slaves of this commonwealth_."

Hon. Benjamin Watkins Leigh, late United States' senator from Virginia, in his letters to the people of Virginia, in 1832, signed Appomattox, p. 43, says: "I thought, till very lately, that it was known to every body that during the Revolution, _and for many years after, the abolition of slavery was a favorite topic with many of our ablest statesmen_, who entertained, with respect, all the schemes which wisdom or ingenuity could suggest for accomplishing the object. Mr. Wythe, to the day of his death, _was for a simple abolition, considering the objection to color as founded in prejudice_. By degrees, all projects of the kind were abandoned. Mr. Jefferson _retained_ his opinion, and now we have these projects revived."

Governor Barbour, of Virginia, in his speech in the U.S. Senate, on the Missouri question, Jan. 1820, said:--"We are asked why has Virginia _changed her policy_ in reference to slavery? That the sentiments _of our most distinguished men_, for thirty years _entirely corresponded_ with the course which the friends of the restriction (of slavery in Missouri) now advocated; and that the Virginia delegation, one of which was the late President of the United Stance, voted for the restriction, (of slavery) in the northwestern territory, and that Mr. Jefferson has delineated a gloomy picture of the baneful effects of slavery. When it is recollected that the Notes of Mr. Jefferson were written during the progress of the revolution, it is no matter of surprise that the writer should have imbibed a large portion of that enthusiasm which such an occasion was so well calculated to produce. As to the consent of the Virginia delegation to the restriction in question, whether the result of a disposition to restrain the slave trade indirectly, or the influence of that _enthusiasm_ to which I have just alluded, * * * * it is not now important to decide. We have witnessed its effects. The liberality of Virginia, or, as the result may prove, her folly, which submitted to, or, if you will, PROPOSED _this measure_, (abolition of slavery in the N.W. territory) has eventuated in effects which speak a monitory lesson. _How is the representation from this quarter on the present question?_"

Mr. Imlay, in his early history of Kentucky, p. 185, says: "We have disgraced the fair face of humanity, and trampled upon the sacred privileges of man, at the very moment that we were exclaiming against the tyranny of your (the English) ministry. But in contending for the birthright of freedom, we have learned to feel _for the bondage of others_, and in the libations we offer to the goddess of liberty, we _contemplate an emancipation of the slaves of this country_, as honorable to themselves as it will be glorious to us."

In the debate in Congress, Jan. 20, 1806, on Mr. Sloan's motion to lay a tax on the importation of slaves, Mr. Clark of Va. said: "He was no advocate for a system of slavery." Mr. Marion, of S. Carolina, said: "He never had purchased, nor should he ever purchase a slave." Mr. Southard said: "Not revenue, but an expression of the _national sentiment_ is the principal object." Mr. Smilie--"I rejoice that the word (slave) is not in the Constitution; its not being there does honor to the worthies who would not suffer it to become a _part_ of it." Mr. Alston, of N. Carolina--"In two years we shall have the power to prohibit the trade altogether. Then this House will be UNANIMOUS. No one will object to our exercising our full constitutional powers." National Intelligencer, Jany. 24, 1806.

These witnesses need no vouchers to entitle them to credit--nor their testimony comments to make it intelligible--their _names_ are their _endorsers_ and their strong words their own interpreters. We wave all comments. Our readers are of age. Whosoever hath ears to _hear_, let him HEAR. And whosoever will not hear the fathers of the revolution, the founders of the government, its chief magistrates, judges, legislators and sages, who dared and periled all under the burdens, and in the heat of the day that tried men's souls--then "neither will he be persuaded though THEY rose from the dead."

Some of the points established by the testimony are--The universal expectation that the _moral_ influence of Congress, of state legislatures, of seminaries of learning, of churches, of the ministers of religion, and of public sentiment widely embodied in abolition societies, would be exerted against slavery, calling forth by argument and appeal the moral sense of the nation, and creating a power of opinion that would abolish the system throughout the union. In a word, that free speech and a free press would be wielded against slavery without ceasing and without restriction. Full well did the south know, not only that the national government would probably legislate against slavery wherever the constitution placed it within its reach, but she knew also that Congress had already marked out the line of national policy to be pursued on the subject--had committed itself before the world to a course of action against slavery, wherever she could move upon it without encountering a conflicting jurisdiction--that the nation had established by solemn ordinance memorable precedent for subsequent action, by abolishing slavery in the northwest territory, and by declaring that it should never thenceforward exist there; and this too, as soon as by cession of Virginia and other states, the territory came under Congressional control. The south knew also that the sixth article in the ordinance prohibiting slavery was first proposed by the largest slaveholding state in the confederacy--that the chairman of the committee that reported the ordinance was a slaveholder--that the ordinance was enacted by Congress during the session of the convention that formed the United States Constitution--that the provisions of the ordinance were, both while in prospect, and when under discussion, matters of universal notoriety and _approval_ with all parties, and when finally passed, received the vote _of every member of Congress from each of the slaveholding states_. The south also had every reason for believing that the first Congress under the constitution would _ratify_ that ordinance--as it _did_ unanimously.

A crowd of reflections, suggest by the preceding testimony, press for utterance. The right of petition ravished and trampled by its constitutional guardians, and insult and defiance hurled in the faces of the SOVEREIGN PEOPLE while calmly remonstrating _with their_ SERVANTS for violence committed on the nation's charter and their own dearest rights! Add to this "the right of peaceably assembling" violently wrested--the rights of minorities, _rights_ no longer--free speech struck dumb--free _men_ outlawed and murdered--free presses cast into the streets and their fragments strewed with shoutings, or flourished in triumph before the gaze of approving crowds as proud members of prostrate law!

The spirit and power of our fathers, where are they? Their deep homage always and every where rendered to FREE THOUGHT, with its _inseparable signs--free speech and a free press_--their reverence for justice, liberty, _rights_ and all-pervading law, where are they?

But we turn from these considerations--though the times on which we have fallen, and those towards which we are borne with headlong haste, call for their discussion as with the voices of departing life--and proceed to topics relevant to the argument before us.

The seventh article of the amendments to the constitution is alleged to withhold from Congress the power to abolish slavery in the District. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." All the slaves in the District have been "deprived of liberty" by legislative acts. Now, these legislative acts "depriving" them "of liberty," were either "due process of law," or they were _not_. If they _were_, then a legislative act, taking from the master that "property" which is the identical "liberty" previously taken from the slave, would be "due process of law" _also_, and of course a _constitutional_ act; but if the legislative acts "depriving" them of "liberty" were _not_ "due process of law," then the slaves were deprived of liberty _unconstitutionally_, and these acts are _void_. In that case the _constitution emancipates them_.

If the objector reply, by saying that the import of the phrase "due process of law," is _judicial_ process solely, it is granted, and that fact is our rejoinder; for no slave in the District _has_ been deprived of his liberty by "a judicial process," or, in other words, by "due process of law;" consequently, upon the objector's own admission, every slave in the District has been deprived of liberty _unconstitutionally_, and is therefore _free by the constitution_. This is asserted only of the slaves under the "exclusive legislation" of Congress.

The last clause of the article under consideration is quoted for the same purpose: "Nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." Each of the state constitutions has a clause of similar purport. The abolition of slavery in the District by Congress, would not, as we shall presently show, violate this clause either directly or by implication. Granting for argument's sake, that slaves are "private property," and that to emancipate them, would be to "take private property" for "public use," the objector admits the power of Congress to do _this_, provided it will do something _else_, that is, _pay_ for them. Thus, instead of denying _the power_, the objector not only admits, but _affirms_ it, as the ground of the inference that compensation must accompany it. So far from disproving the existence of _one_ power, the objector asserts the existence of _two_--one, the power to take the slaves from their masters, the other, the power to take the property of the United States to pay for them.

If Congress cannot constitutionally impair the right of private property, or take it without compensation, it cannot constitutionally, _legalize_ the perpetration of such acts, by _others_, nor _protect_ those who commit them. Does the power to rob a man of his earnings, rob the earner of his _right_ to them? Who has a better right to the _product_ than the producer?--to the _interest_, than the owner of the _principal_?--to the hands and arms, than he from whose shoulders they swing?--to the body and soul, than he whose they _are_? Congress not only impairs but annihilates the right of private property, while it withholds from the slaves of the District their title to _themselves_. What! Congress powerless to protect a man's right to _himself_, when it can make inviolable the right to a _dog_? But, waving this, I deny that the abolition of slavery in the District would violate this clause. What does the clause prohibit? The "taking" of "private property" for "public use." Suppose Congress should emancipate the slaves in the District, what would it "_take_?" Nothing. What would it _hold_? Nothing. What would it put to "public use?" Nothing. Instead of _taking_ "private property," Congress, by abolishing slavery, would say "private property shall not _be_ taken; and those who have been robbed of it already, shall be kept out of it no longer; and since every man's right to his own body is _paramount_, he shall be protected in it." True, Congress may not arbitrarily take property, _as_ property, from one man and give it to another--and in the abolition of slavery no such thing is done. A legislative act changes the _condition_ of the slave--makes him his own _proprietor_ instead of the property of another. It determines a question of _original right_ between two classes of persons--doing an act of justice to one, and restraining the other from acts of injustice; or, in other words, preventing one from robbing the other, by granting to the injured party the protection of just and equitable laws.

Congress, by an act of abolition, would change the condition of seven thousand "persons" in the District, but would "take" nothing. To construe this provision so as to enable the citizens of the District to hold as property, and in perpetuity, whatever they please, or to hold it as property in all circumstances--all necessity, public welfare, and the will and power of the government to the contrary notwithstanding--is a total perversion of its whole _intent_. The _design_ of the provision, was to throw up a barrier against Governmental aggrandizement. The right to "take property" for _State uses_ is one thing;--the right so to adjust the _tenures_ by which property is held, that _each may have his own secured to him_, is another thing, and clearly within the scope of legislation. Besides, if Congress were to "take" the slaves in the District, it would be _adopting_, not abolishing slavery--becoming a slaveholder itself, instead of requiring others to be such no longer. The clause in question, prohibits the "taking" of individual property for public uses, to be employed or disposed of _as_ property for governmental purposes. Congress, by abolishing slavery in the District, would do no such thing. It would merely change the _condition_ of that which has been recognised as a qualified property by congressional acts, though previously declared "persons" by the constitution. More than this is done continually by Congress and every other Legislature. Property the most absolute and unqualified, is annihilated by legislative acts. The embargo and non-intercourse act, prostrated at a stroke, a forest of shipping, and sank millions of capital. To say nothing of the power of Congress to take hundreds of millions from the people by direct taxation, who doubts its power to abolish at once the whole tariff system, change the seat of Government, arrest the progress of national works, prohibit any branch of commerce with the Indian tribes or with foreign nations, change the locality of forts, arsenals, magazines, dock yards, &c., to abolish the Post Office system, the privilege of patents and copyrights, &c. By such acts Congress might, in the exercise of its acknowledged powers, annihilate property to an incalculable amount, and that without becoming liable to claims for compensation.

Finally, this clause prohibits the taking for public use of "_property_." The constitution of the United States does not recognise slaves as "PROPERTY" any where, and it does not recognise them in _any sense_ in the District of Columbia. All allusions to them in the constitution recognise them as "persons." Every reference to them points _solely_ to the element of _personality_; and thus, by the strongest implication, declares that the constitution _knows_ them only as "persons," and _will_ not recognise them in any other light. If they escape into free States, the constitution authorizes their being taken back. But how? Not as the property of an "owner," but as "persons;" and the peculiarity of the expression is a marked recognition of their _personality_--a refusal to recognise them as chattels--"persons _held_ to service." Are _oxen "held_ to service?" That can be affirmed only of _persons_. Again, slaves give political power as "persons." The constitution, in settling the principle of representation, requires their enumeration in the census. How? As property? Then why not include race horses and game cocks? Slaves, like other inhabitants, are enumerated as "persons." So by the constitution, the government was pledged to non-interference with "the migration or importation of such _persons_" as the States might think proper to admit until 1808, and authorized the laying of a tax on each "person" so admitted. Further, slaves are recognized as "persons" by the exaction of their _allegiance_ to the government. For offences against the government slaves are tried as _persons_; as persons they are entitled to counsel for their defence, to the rules of evidence, and to "due process of the law," and as _persons_ they are punished. True, they are loaded with cruel disabilities in courts of law, such as greatly obstruct and often inevitably defeat the ends of justice, yet they are still recognised as _persons_. Even in the legislation of Congress, and in the diplomacy of the general government, notwithstanding the frequent and wide departures from the integrity of the constitution on this subject, slaves are not recognised as _property_ without qualification. Congress has always refused to grant compensation for slaves killed or taken by the enemy, even when these slaves had been impressed into the United States' service. In half a score of cases since the last war, Congress has rejected such applications for compensation. Besides, both in Congressional acts, and in our national diplomacy, slaves and property are not used as convertible terms. When mentioned in treaties and state papers it is in such a way as to distinguish them from mere property, and generally by a recognition of their _personality_. In the invariable recognition of slaves as _persons_, the United States' constitution caught the mantle of the glorious Declaration, and most worthily wears it.--It recognizes all human beings as "men," "persons," and thus as "equals." In the original draft of the Declaration, as it came from the head of Jefferson, it is alleged that Great Britain had "waged a cruel war against _human_ nature itself, violating its most sacred rights of life and liberty in the persons of a distant people, carrying them into slavery, * * determined to keep up a market where MEN should be bought and sold,"--thus disdaining to make the charter of freedom a warrant for the arrest of _men_, that they might be shorn both of liberty and humanity.

The celebrated Roger Sherman, one of the committee of five appointed to draft the Declaration of Independence, and also a member of the Convention that formed the United States' Constitution, said, in the first Congress after its adoption: "The constitution _does not consider these persons_, (slaves,) _as a species of property_."--[Lloyd's Cong. Reg. v. 1, p. 313.] That the United States' Constitution does not make slaves "property," is shown in the fact, that no person, either as a citizen of the United States, or by having his domicile within the United States' government, can hold slaves. He can hold them only by deriving his power from _state_ laws, or from the law of Congress, if he hold slaves within the District. But no person resident within the United States' jurisdiction, and _not_ within the District, nor within a state whose laws support slavery, nor "held to service" under the laws of such state or district, having escaped therefrom, _can be held as a slave_.

Men can hold _property_ under the United States' government though residing beyond the bounds of any state, district, or territory. An inhabitant of the Wisconsin Territory can hold property there under the laws of the United States, but he cannot hold _slaves_ there under the United States' laws, nor by virtue of the United States' Constitution, nor upon the ground of his United States citizenship, nor by having his domicile within the United States jurisdiction. The constitution no where recognizes the right to "slave property," _but merely the fact that the states have jurisdiction each in its own limits, and that there are certain "persons" within their jurisdictions "held to service" by their own laws_.

Finally, in the clause under consideration, "private property" is not to be taken "without _just_ compensation." "JUST!" If justice is to be appealed to in determining the amount of compensation, let her determine the _grounds_ also. If it be her province to say _how much_ compensation is "just," it is hers to say whether _any_ is "just,"--whether the slave is "just" property _at all_, rather than a "_person_." Then, if justice adjudges the slave to be "private property," it adjudges him to be _his own_ property, since the right to one's _self_ is the first right--the source of all others--the original stock by which they are accumulated--the principal, of which they are the interest. And since the slave's "private property" has been "taken," and since "compensation" is impossible--there being no _equivalent_ for one's self--the least that can be done is to restore to him his original private property.

Having shown that in abolishing slavery, "property" would not be "taken for public use," it may be added that, in those states where slavery has been abolished by law, no claim for compensation has been allowed. Indeed the manifest absurdity of demanding it, seems to have quite forestalled the _setting up_ of such a claim.

The abolition of slavery in the District, instead of being a legislative anomaly, would proceed upon the principles of every day legislation. It has been shown already, that the United States' Constitution does not recognize slaves as "property." Yet ordinary legislation is full of precedents, showing that even _absolute_ property is in many respects wholly subject to legislation. The repeal of the law of entailments--all those acts that control the alienation of property, its disposal by will, its passing to heirs by descent, with the question, who shall be heirs, and what shall be the rule of distribution among them, or whether property shall be transmitted at all by descent, rather than escheat to the state--these, with statutes of limitation, and various other classes of legislative acts, serve to illustrate the acknowledged scope of the law-making power, even where property _is in every sense absolute_. Persons whose property is thus affected by public laws, receive from the government no compensation for their losses, unless the state has been put into possession of the property taken from them.

The preamble of the United States' Constitution declares it to be a fundamental object of the organization of the government "to ESTABLISH JUSTICE." Has Congress _no power_ to do that for which it was made the _depository of power_? CANNOT the United States Government fulfil the purpose _for which it was brought into being_?

To abolish slavery, is to take from no rightful owner his property; but to "_establish justice_" between two parties. To emancipate the slave, is to "_establish justice_" between him and his master--to throw around the person, character, conscience, liberty, and domestic relations of the one, _the same law_ that secures and blesses the other. In other words, to prevent by _legal restraints_ one class of men from seizing upon another class, and robbing them at pleasure of their earnings, their time, their liberty, their kindred, and the very use and ownership of their own persons. Finally, to abolish slavery is to proclaim and _enact_ that innocence and helplessness--now _free plunder_--are entitled to _legal protection_; and that power, avarice, and lust, shall no longer gorge upon their spoils under the license, and by the ministrations of _law_! Congress, by possessing "exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever," has a _general protective power_ for ALL the inhabitants of the District. If it has no power to protect _one_ man, it has none to protect another--none to protect _any_--and if it _can_ protect _one_ man and is _bound_ to protect him, it _can_ protect _every_ man--all men--and is _bound_ to do it. All admit the power of Congress to protect the masters in the District against their slaves. What part of the constitution gives the power? The clause so often quoted,--"power of legislation in all cases whatsoever," equally in the "_case_" of defending the blacks against the whites, as in that of defending the whites against the blacks. The power is given also by Art. 1, Sec. 8, clause 15--"Congress shall have power to suppress insurrections"--a power to protect, as well blacks against whites, as whites against blacks. If the constitution gives power to protect _one_ class against the other, it gives power to protect _either_ against the other. Suppose the blacks in the District should seize the whites, drive them into the fields and kitchens, force them to work without pay, flog them, imprison them, and sell them at their pleasure, where would Congress find power to restrain such acts? Answer; a _general_ power in the clause so often cited, and an _express_ one in that cited above--"Congress shall have power, to suppress insurrections." So much for a _supposed_ case. Here follows a _real_ one. The whites in the District are _perpetrating these identical acts_ upon seven thousand blacks daily. That Congress has power to restrain these acts in one case, all assert, and in so doing they assert the power "in _all_ cases whatsoever." For the grant of power to suppress insurrections, is an _unconditional_ grant, not hampered by provisos as to the color, shape, size, sex, language, creed, or condition of the insurgents. Congress derives its power to suppress this _actual_ insurrection, from the same source whence it derived its power to suppress the _same_ acts in the case _supposed_. If one case is an insurrection, the other is. The _acts_ in both are the same; the _actors_ only are different. In the one case, ignorant and degraded--goaded by the memory of the past, stung by the present, and driven to desperation by the fearful looking for of wrongs for ever to come. In the other, enlightened into the nature of _rights_, the principles of justice, and the dictates of the law of love, unprovoked by wrongs, with cool deliberation, and by system, they perpetrate these acts upon those to whom they owe unnumbered obligations for _whole lives_ of unrequited service. On which side may palliation be pleaded, and which party may most reasonably claim an abatement of the rigors of law? If Congress has power to suppress such acts _at all_, it has power to suppress them _in_ all.

It has been shown already that _allegiance_ is exacted of the slave. Is the government of the United States unable to grant _protection_ where it exacts _allegiance_? It is an axiom of the civilized world, and a maxim even with savages, that allegiance and protection are reciprocal and correlative. Are principles powerless with us which exact homage of barbarians? _Protection is the_ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT _of every human being under the exclusive legislation of Congress who has not forfeited it by crime_.

In conclusion, I argue the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District, froth Art. 1, sec. 8, clause 1, of the constitution: "Congress shall have power to provide for the common defence and the general welfare of the United States." Has the government of the United States no power under this grant, to legislate within its own exclusive jurisdiction on subjects that vitally affect its interests? Suppose the slaves in the District should rise upon their masters, and the United States' government, in quelling the insurrection, should kill any number of them. Could their masters claim compensation of the government? Manifestly not; even though no proof existed that the particular slaves killed were insurgents. This was precisely the point at issue between those masters, whose slaves were killed by the State troops at the time of the Southampton insurrection, and the Virginia Legislature; no evidence was brought to show that the slaves killed by the troops were insurgents; yet the Virginia Legislature decided that their masters were _not entitled to compensation_. They proceeded on the sound principle, that a government may in self protection destroy the claim of its subjects even to that which has been recognised as property by its own acts. If in providing for the common defence the United States government, in the case supposed, would have power to destroy slaves both as _property and persons_, it surely might stop half-way, destroy them as _property_ while it legalized their existence as _persons_, and thus provided for the common defence by giving them a personal and powerful interest in the government, and securing their strength for its defence.

Like other Legislatures, Congress has power to abate nuisances--to remove or tear down unsafe buildings--to destroy infected cargoes--to lay injunctions upon manufactories injurious to the public health--and thus to "provide for the common defence and general welfare" by destroying individual property, when it puts in jeopardy the public weal.

Granting, for argument's sake, that slaves are "property" in the District of Columbia--if Congress has a right to annihilate property in the District when the public safety requires it, it may surely annihilate its existence _as_ property when public safety requires it, especially if it transform into a _protection_ and _defence_ that which as _property_ periled the public interests. In the District of Columbia there are, besides the United States' Capitol, the President's house, the national offices, &c. of the Departments of State, Treasury, War, and Navy, the General Post-office, and Patent Office. It is also the residence of the President, all the highest officers of the government, both houses of Congress, and all the foreign ambassadors. In this same District there are also _seven thousand slaves_. Jefferson, in his Notes on Va. p. 241, says of slavery, that "the State permitting one half of its citizens to trample on the rights of the other, _transforms them into enemies_;" and Richard Henry Lee, in the Va. House of Burgesses in 1758, declared that to those who held them, "_slaves must be natural enemies._" Is Congress so _impotent_ that it _cannot_ exercise that right pronounced both by municipal and national law, the most sacred and universal--the right of self-preservation and defence? Is it shut up to the _necessity_ of keeping seven thousand "enemies" in the heart of the nation's citadel? Does the iron fiat of the constitution doom it to such imbecility that it _cannot_ arrest the process that _made_ them "enemies," and still goads to deadlier hate by fiery trials, and day by day adds others to their number? Is _this_ providing for the common defence and general welfare? If to rob men of rights excites their hate, freely to restore them and make amends, will win their love.

By emancipating the slaves in the District, the government of the United States would disband an army of "enemies," and enlist "for the common defence and general welfare," a body guard of _friends_ seven thousand strong. In the last war, a handful of British soldiers sacked Washington city, burned the capitol, the President's house, and the national offices and archives; and no marvel, for thousands of the inhabitants of the District had been "TRANSFORMED INTO ENEMIES." Would _they_ beat back invasion? If the national government had exercised its constitutional "power to provide for the common defence and to promote the general welfare," by turning those "enemies" into friends, then, instead of a hostile ambush lurking in every thicket inviting assault, and secret foes in every house paralyzing defence, an army of allies would have rallied in the hour of her calamity, and shouted defiance from their munitions of rocks; whilst the banner of the republic, then trampled in dust, would have floated securely over FREEMEN exulting amidst bulwarks of strength.

To show that Congress can abolish slavery in the District, under the grant of power "to provide for the common defence and to promote the general welfare," I quote an extract from a speech of Mr. Madison, of Va., in the first Congress under the constitution, May 13, 1789. Speaking of the abolition of the slave trade, Mr. Madison says: "I should venture to say it is as much for the interests of Georgia and South Carolina, as of any state in the union. Every addition they receive to their number of slaves tends to _weaken_ them, and renders them less capable of self-defence. In case of hostilities with foreign nations, they will be the means of _inviting_ attack instead of repelling invasion. It is a necessary duty of the general government to protect every part of the empire against danger, as well _internal_ as external. _Every thing, therefore, which tends to increase this danger, though it may be a local affair, yet if it involves national expense or safety, it becomes of concern to every part of the union, and is a proper subject for the consideration of those charged with the general administration of the government._" See Cong. Reg. vol. 1, p. 310-11.

WYTHE.

POSTSCRIPT

My apology for adding a _postscript_, to a discussion already perhaps too protracted, is the fact that the preceding sheets were in the hands of the printer, and all but the concluding pages had gone through the press, before the passage of Mr. Calhoun's late resolutions in the Senate of the United States. A proceeding so extraordinary,--if indeed the time has not passed when _any_ acts of Congress in derogation of freedom and in deference to slavery, can be deemed extraordinary,--should not be suffered to pass in silence at such a crisis as the present; especially as the passage of one of the resolutions by a vote of 36 to 8, exhibits a shift of position on the part of the South, as sudden as it is unaccountable, being nothing less than the surrender of a fortress which until then they had defended with the pertinacity of a blind and almost infuriated fatuity. Upon the discussions during the pendency of the resolutions, and upon the vote, by which they were carried, I make no comment, save only to record my exultation in the fact there exhibited, that great emergencies are _true touchstones_, and that henceforward, until this question is settled, whoever holds a seat in Congress will find upon, and all around him, a pressure strong enough to TEST him--a focal blaze that will find its way through the carefully adjusted cloak of fair pretension, and the sevenfold brass of two-faced political intrigue, and _no_-faced _non-committalism_, piercing to the dividing asunder of joints and marrow. Be it known to every northern man who aspires to a seat in Congress, that hereafter it is the destiny of congressional action on this subject, to be a MIGHTY REVELATOR--making secret thoughts public property, and proclaiming on the house-tops what is whispered in the ear--smiting off masks, and bursting open sepulchres beautiful outwardly, and heaving up to the sun their dead men's bones. To such we say,--_Remember the Missouri Question, and the fate of those who then sold the North, and their own birthright!_

Passing by the resolutions generally without remark--the attention of the reader is specially solicited to Mr. Clay's substitute for Mr. Calhoun's fifth resolution.

"Resolved, That when the District of Columbia was ceded by the states of Virginia and Maryland to the United States, domestic slavery existed in both of these states, including the ceded territory, and that, as it still continues in both of them, it could not be abolished within the District without a violation of that good faith, which was implied in the cession and in the acceptance of the territory; nor, unless compensation were made to the proprietors of slaves, without a manifest infringement of an amendment to the constitution of the United States; nor without exciting a degree of just alarm and apprehension in the states recognising slavery, far transcending in mischievous tendency, any possible benefit which could be accomplished by the abolition."

By voting for this resolution, the south by a simultaneous movement, shifted its mode of defence, not so much by taking a position entirely new, as by attempting to refortify an old one--never much trusted in, and abandoned mainly long ago, as being unable to hold out against assault however unskilfully directed. In the debate on this resolution, though the southern members of Congress did not _professedly_ retreat from the ground hitherto maintained by them--that Congress has no power by the constitution to abolish slavery in the District--yet in the main they silently drew off from it.

The passage of this resolution--with the vote of every southern senator, forms a new era in the discussion of this question.

We cannot join in the lamentations of those who bewail it. We hail it, and rejoice in it. It was as we would have had it--offered by a southern senator, advocated by southern senators, and on the ground that it "was no compromise"--that it embodied the true southern principle--that "this resolution stood on as high ground as Mr. Calhoun's."--(Mr. Preston)--"that Mr. Clay's resolution was as strong as Mr. Calhoun's"--(Mr. Rives)--that "the resolution he (Mr. Calhoun) now refused to support, was as strong as his own, and that in supporting it, there was no abandonment of principle by the south."--(Mr. Walker, of Mi.)--further, that it was advocated by the southern senators generally as an expression of their views, and as setting the question of slavery in the District on its _true_ ground--that finally when the question was taken, every slaveholding senator, including Mr. Calhoun himself, voted for the resolution.

By passing this resolution, and with such avowals, the south has surrendered irrevocably the whole question at issue between them and the petitioners for abolition in the District. It has, unwittingly but explicitly, conceded the main question argued in the preceding pages.

The _only_ ground taken against the right of Congress to abolish slavery in the District is, that slavery existed in Maryland and Virginia when the cession was made, and "_as it still continues in both of them_, it could not be abolished without a violation of that good faith which was implied in the cession," &c. The _sole argument_ is _not_ that exclusive _sovereignty_ has no power to abolish slavery within its jurisdiction, _nor_ that the powers of even _ordinary legislation_ cannot do it,--nor that the clause granting Congress "exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such District," gives no power to do it; but that the _unexpressed expectation_ of one of the parties that the other would not "in _all_ cases" use the power which said party had consented _might be used "in all cases," prohibits_ the use of it. The only cardinal point in the discussion, is here not only _yielded_, but formally laid down by the South as the leading article in their creed on the question of Congressional jurisdiction over slavery in the District. The _sole reason_ given why Congress should not abolish, and the sole evidence that if it did, such abolition would be a violation of "good faith," is that "_slavery still continues in those states_,"--thus explicitly admitting, that if slavery did _not_ "still continue" in those States, Congress _could_ abolish it in the District. The same admission is made also in the _premises_, which state that slavery existed in those states _at the time of the cession_, &c. Admitting that if it had _not_ existed there then, but had grown up in the District under _United States' laws_, Congress might constitutionally abolish it. Or that if the ceded parts of those states had been the _only_ parts in which slaves were held under their laws, Congress might have abolished in such a contingency also. The cession in that case leaving no slaves in those states,--no "good faith," would be "implied" in it, nor any "violated," by an act of abolition. The principle of the resolution makes this further admission, that if Maryland and Virginia should at once abolish their slavery, Congress might at once abolish it in the District. The principle goes even further than this, and _requires_ Congress in such case to abolish slavery in the District "by the _good faith implied_ in the cession and acceptance of the territory." Since according to the spirit and scope of the resolution, this "implied good faith" of Maryland and Virginia in making the cession, was that Congress would do nothing within the District which should go to counteract the policy, or bring into disrepute the "institutions," or call in question the usages, or even in any way ruffle the prejudices of those states, or do what _they_ might think would unfavorably bear upon their interests; _themselves_ of course being the judges.

But let us dissect another limb of the resolution. What is to be understood by "that good faith which was IMPLIED?" It is of course an admission that such a condition was not _expressed_ in the acts of cession--that in their _terms_ there is nothing restricting the power of Congress on the subject of slavery in the District--not a _word_ alluding to it, nor one inserted with such an _intent_. This "implied faith," then, rests on no clause or word in the United States' Constitution, or in the acts of cession, or in the acts of Congress accepting the cession, nor does it rest on any declarations of the legislatures of Maryland and Virginia made at the time, or in that generation, nor on any _act_ of theirs, nor on any declaration of the _people_ of those states, nor on the testimony of the Washingtons, Jeffersons, Madisons, Chaces, Martins, and Jennifers, of those states and times. The assertion rests _on itself alone!_ Mr. Clay and the other senators who voted for the resolution, _guess_ that Maryland and Virginia _supposed_ that Congress would by no means _use_ the power given them by the constitution, except in such ways as would be well pleasing in the eyes of those states; especially as one of them was the "Ancient Dominion!" And now after the lapse of half a century, this _assumed expectation_ of Maryland and Virginia, the existence of which is mere matter of conjecture with the 36 senators, is conjured up and duly installed upon the judgment-seat of final appeal, before whose nod constitutions are to flee away, and with whom, solemn grants of power and explicit guaranties are when weighed in the balance, altogether lighter than vanity!

But let us survey it in another light. Why did Maryland and Virginia leave so much to be "_implied_?" Why did they not in some way _express_ what lay so near their hearts? Had their vocabulary run so low that a single word could not be eked out for the occasion? Or were those states so bashful of a sudden that they dare not speak out and tell what they wanted? Or did they take it for granted that Congress would always act in the premises according to their wishes, and that too, without their _making known_ their wishes? If, as honorable senators tell us, Maryland and Virginia did verily travail with such abounding _faith_, why brought they forth no _works_?

It is as true in _legislation_ as in religion, that the only _evidence_ of "faith" is _works_, and that "faith" _without_ works is _dead_, i.e. has no power. But here, forsooth, a blind implication with nothing _expressed_, an "implied" _faith_ without works, is _omnipotent_. Mr. Clay is lawyer enough to know that even a _senatorial hypothesis_ as to _what must have been the understanding_ of Maryland and Virginia about congressional exercise of constitutional power, _abrogates no grant_, and that to plead it in a court of law, would be of small service except to jostle "their honors'" gravity! He need not be told that the constitution gives Congress "power to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such District." Nor that the legislatures of Maryland and Virginia constructed their acts of cession with this clause _before their eyes_, and that both of them declared those acts made "in _pursuance_" of said clause. Those states were aware that the United States in their constitution had left nothing to be "_implied_" as to the power of Congress over the District;--an admonition quite sufficient one would think to put them on their guard, and induce them to eschew vague implications and resort to _stipulations_. Full well did they know also that these were times when, in matters of high import, _nothing_ was left to be "implied." The colonies were then panting from a twenty years' conflict with the mother country, about bills of rights, charters, treaties, constitutions, grants, limitations, and _acts of cession_. The severities of a long and terrible discipline had taught them to guard at all points _legislative grants_, that their exact import and limit might be self-evident--leaving no scope for a blind "faith," that _somehow_ in the lottery of chances there would be no blanks, but making all sure by the use of explicit terms, and wisely chosen words, and _just enough_ of them. The Constitution of the United States with its amendments, those of the individual states, the national treaties, the public documents of the general and state governments at that period, show the universal conviction of legislative bodies, that when great public interests were at stake, nothing should be left to be "implied."

Further: suppose Maryland and Virginia had expressed their "implied faith" in _words_, and embodied it in their acts of cession as a proviso, declaring that Congress should not "exercise exclusive legislation in _all_ cases whatsoever over the District," but that the "case" of _slavery_ should be an exception: who does not know that Congress, if it had accepted the cession on those terms, would have violated the Constitution; and who that has ever studied the free mood of those times in its bearings on slavery--proofs of which are given in scores on the preceding pages--can for an instant believe that the people of the United States would have altered their Constitution for the purpose of providing for slavery an inviolable sanctuary; that when driven in from its outposts, and everywhere retreating discomfited before the march of freedom, it might be received into everlasting habitations on the common homestead and hearth-stone of this free republic? Besides, who can believe that Virginia made such a condition, or cherished such a purpose, when at that very moment, Washington, Jefferson, Wythe, Patrick Henry St. George Tucker, and almost all her illustrious men, were advocating the abolition of slavery by law. When Washington had said, two years before, Maryland and Virginia "must have laws for the gradual abolition of slavery and at a period _not remote_;" and when Jefferson in his letter to Price, three years before the cession, had said, speaking of Virginia, "This is the next state to which we may turn our eyes for the interesting spectacle of justice in conflict with avarice and oppression--a conflict in which THE SACRED SIDE IS GAINING DAILY RECRUITS;" when voluntary emancipations on the soil were then progressing at the rate of between one and two thousand annually, (See Judge Tucker's "Dissertation on Slavery," p. 73;) when the public sentiment of Virginia had undergone, and was undergoing so mighty a revolution that the idea of the continuance of slavery as a permanent system could not be _tolerated_, though she then contained about half the slaves in the Union. Was this the time to stipulate for the _perpetuity_ of slavery under the exclusive legislation of Congress? and that too at the _same_ session of Congress when _every one_ of her delegation voted for the abolition of slavery in the North West Territory; a territory which she had herself ceded to Congress, and along with it had surrendered her jurisdiction over many of her citizens, inhabitants of that territory, who held slaves there--and whose slaves were emancipated by that act of Congress, in which all her delegation with one accord participated?

Now in view of the universal belief then prevalent, that slavery in this country was doomed to short life, and especially that in Maryland and Virginia it would be _speedily_ abolished--are we to be told that these states _designed_ to bind Congress _never_ to terminate it? Are we to adopt the monstrous conclusion that this was the _intent_ of the Ancient Dominion--thus to _bind_ the United States by an "implied faith," and that when the United States _accepted_ the cession, she did solemnly thus plight her troth, and that Virginia did then so _understand_ it? Verily one would think that honorable senators supposed themselves deputed to do our _thinking_ as well as our legislation, or rather, that they themselves were absolved from such drudgery by virtue of their office!

Another absurdity of this dogma about "implied faith" is, that where there was no power to exact an _express_ pledge, there was none to demand an _implied_ one, and where there was no power to _give_ the one, there was none to give the _other_. We have shown already that Congress could not have accepted the cession with such a condition. To have signed away a part of its constitutional grant of power would have been a _breach_ of the Constitution. Further, the Congress which accepted the cession was competent to pass a resolution pledging itself not to _use all_ the power over the District committed to it by the Constitution. But here its power ended. Its resolution would only bind _itself_. Could it bind the _next_ Congress by its authority? Could the members of one Congress say to the members of another, because we do not choose to exercise all the authority vested in us by the Constitution, therefore you _shall_ not? This would have been a prohibition to do what the Constitution gives power to do. Each successive Congress would still have gone to the Constitution for its power, brushing away in its course the cobwebs stretched across its path by the officiousness of an impertinent predecessor. Again, the legislatures of Virginia and Maryland, had no power to bind Congress, either by an express or an implied pledge, never to abolish slavery in the District. Those legislatures had no power to bind _themselves_ never to abolish slavery within their own territories--the ceded parts included. Where then would they get power to bind _another_ not to do what they had no power to bind themselves not to do? If a legislature could not in this respect control the successive legislatures of its own State, could it control the successive Congresses of the United States?

But perhaps we shall be told, that the "implied faith" in the acts of cession of Maryland and Virginia was _not_ that Congress should _never_ abolish slavery in the District, but that it should not do it until _they_ had done it within their bounds! Verily this "faith" comes little short of the faith of miracles! "A good rule that works both ways." First, Maryland and Virginia have "good faith" that Congress will _not_ abolish until _they_ do; and then just as "good faith" that Congress _will_ abolish _when_ they do! Excellently accommodated! Did those States suppose that Congress would legislate over the national domain, the common jurisdiction of _all_, for Maryland and Virginia alone? And who, did they suppose, would be judges in the matter?--themselves merely? or the whole Union?

This "good faith implied in the cession" is no longer of doubtful interpretation. The principle at the bottom of it, when fairly stated, is this:--That the Government of the United States are bound in "good faith" to do in the District of Columbia, without demurring, just what and when, Maryland and Virginia do in their own States. In short, that the general government is eased of all the burdens of legislation within its exclusive jurisdiction, save that of hiring a scrivener to copy off the acts of the Maryland and Virginia legislatures as fast as they are passed, and engross them, under the title of "Laws of the United States, for the District of Columbia!" A slight additional expense would also be incurred in keeping up an express between the capitols of those States and Washington city, bringing Congress from time to time its "_instructions_" from head quarters--instructions not to be disregarded without a violation of that, "good faith implied in the cession," &c.

This sets in strong light the advantages of "our glorious Union," if the doctrine of Mr. Clay and the thirty-six Senators be orthodox. The people of the United States have been permitted to set up at their own expense, and on their own territory, two great _sounding boards_ called "Senate Chamber" and "Representatives' Hall," for the purpose of sending abroad "by authority" _national echoes_ of _state_ legislation!--permitted also to keep in their pay a corps of pliant _national_ musicians, with peremptory instructions to sound on any line of the staff according as Virginia and Maryland may give the _sovereign_ key note!

Though this may have the seeming of mere raillery, yet an analysis of the resolution and of the discussions upon it, will convince every fair mind that it is but the legitimate carrying out of the _principle_ pervading both. They proceed virtually upon the hypothesis that the will and pleasure of Virginia and Maryland are _paramount_ to those of the _Union_. If the main design of setting apart a federal district had been originally the accommodation of Maryland, Virginia, and the south, with the United States as an _agent_ to consummate the object, there could hardly have been higher assumption or louder vaunting. The sole object of _having_ such a District was in effect totally perverted in the resolution of Mr. Clay, and in the discussions of the entire southern delegation, upon its passage. Instead of taking the ground, that the benefit of the whole Union was the sole _object_ of a federal district, that it was designed to guard and promote the interests of _all_ the states, and that it was to be legislated over _for this end_--the resolution proceeds upon an hypothesis _totally the reverse_. It takes a single point of _state_ policy, and exalts it above NATIONAL interests, utterly overshadowing them; abrogating national _rights_; making void a clause of the Constitution; humbling the general government into a subject--crouching for favors to a superior, and that too _on its own exclusive jurisdiction_. All the attributes of sovereignty vested in Congress by the Constitution it impales upon the point of an alleged _implication_. And this is Mr. Clay's peace-offering, to appease the lust of power and the ravenings of state encroachment! A "_compromise_," forsooth! that sinks the general government on _its own territory_ into a mere colony, with Virginia and Maryland for its "mother country!" It is refreshing to turn from these shallow, distorted constructions and servile cringings, to the high bearing of other southern men in other times; men, who in their character of legislators and lawyers, disdained to accommodate their interpretations of constitutions and charters to geographical lines, or to bend them to the purposes of a political canvass. In the celebrated case of Cohens vs. the State of Virginia, Hon. William Pinkney, late of Baltimore, and Hon. Walter Jones, of Washington city, with other eminent constitutional lawyers, prepared an elaborate written opinion, from which the following is an extract: "Nor is there any danger to be apprehended from allowing to Congressional legislation with regard to the District of Columbia, its FULLEST EFFECT. Congress is responsible to the States, and to the people for that legislation. It is in truth the legislation of the states over a district placed under their control for _their own benefit_, not for that of the District, except as the prosperity of the District is involved, and necessary to the _general advantage_."--[Life of Pinkney, p. 612.]

The profound legal opinion, from which this is an extract, was elaborated at great length many years since, by a number of the most distinguished lawyers in the United States, whose signatures are appended to it. It is specific and to the point. It asserts, 1st, that Congressional legislation over the District, is "the legislation of the _States_ and the _people_," (not of _two_ states, and a mere _fraction_ of the people.) 2d, "Over a District placed under _their_ control," i.e. under the control of the _whole_ of the States, not under the control of _two twenty-sixths_ of them. 3d, That it was thus put under their control "_for_ THEIR OWN _benefit_," the benefit of _all_ the States _equally_; not to secure special benefits to Maryland and Virginia, (or what it might be _conjectured_ they would regard as benefits.) 4th, It concludes by asserting that the design of this exclusive control of Congress over the District was "not for the benefit of the _District_," except as that is _connected_ with, and _a means of promoting_ the _general_ advantage. If this is the case with the _District_, which is _directly_ concerned, it is pre-eminently so with Maryland and Virginia, who are but _indirectly_ interested, and would be but remotely affected by it. The argument of Mr. Madison in the Congress of '89, an extract from which has been given on a preceding page, lays down the same principle; that though any matter "_may be a local affair, yet if it involves national_ EXPENSE OR SAFETY, _it becomes of concern to every part of the union, and is a proper subject for the consideration of those charged with the general administration of the government_." Cong. Reg. vol. 1. p. 310, 11.

But these are only the initiatory absurdities of this "good faith _implied_." The thirty-six senators aptly illustrate the principle, that error not only conflicts with truth, but is generally at issue with itself. For if it would be a violation of "good faith" to Maryland and Virginia, for Congress to abolish slavery in the District, it would be _equally_ a violation for Congress to do it _with the consent_, or even at the earnest and unanimous petition of the people of the District: yet for years it has been the southern doctrine, that if the people of the District demand of Congress relief in this respect, it has power, as their local legislature, to grant it, and by abolishing slavery there, carry out the will of the citizens. But now new light has broken in! The optics of the thirty-six have pierced the millstone with a deeper insight, and discoveries thicken faster than they can be telegraphed! Congress has no power, O no, not a modicum, to help the slaveholders of the District, however loudly they may clamor for it. The southern doctrine, that Congress is to the District a mere local Legislature to do its pleasure, is tumbled from the genitive into the vocative! Hard fate--and that too at the hands of those who begat it! The reasonings of Messrs. Pinckney, Wise, and Leigh, are now found to be wholly at fault, and the chanticleer rhetoric of Messrs. Glascock and Garland stalks featherless and crest-fallen. For, Mr. Clay's resolution sweeps by the board all those stereotyped common-places, as "Congress a local Legislature," "consent of the District," "bound to consult the wishes of the District," &c. &c., which for the last two sessions of Congress have served to eke out scanty supplies. It declares, that _as slavery existed in Maryland and Virginia at the time of the cession, and as it still continues in both those states, it could not be abolished in the District without a violation of 'that good faith'_, &c.

But let us see where this principle of the _thirty-six_ will lead us. If "implied faith" to Maryland and Virginia _restrains_ Congress from the abolition of slavery in the District, it _requires_ Congress to do in the District what those states have done within their bounds, i.e., restrain _others_ from abolishing it. Upon the same principle Congress is _bound_, by the doctrine of Mr. Clay's resolution, to _prohibit emancipation_ within the District. There is no _stopping place_ for this plighted "faith." Congress must not only refrain from laying violent hands on slavery, _itself_, and see to it that the slaveholders themselves do not, but it is bound to keep the system up to the Maryland and Virginia standard of vigor!

Again, if the good faith of Congress to Virginia and Maryland requires that slavery should exist in the District, while it exists in those states, it requires that it should exist there _as_ it exists in those states. If to abolish _every_ form of slavery in the District would violate good faith, to abolish _the_ form existing in those states, and to substitute a totally different one, would also violate it. The Congressional "good faith" is to be kept not only with _slavery_, but with the _Maryland and Virginia systems_ of slavery. The faith of those states not being in the preservation of _a_ system, but of _their_ system; otherwise Congress, instead of _sustaining_, would counteract their policy--principles would be brought into action there conflicting with their system, and thus the true spirit of the "implied" pledge would be violated. On this principle, so long as slaves are "chattels personal" in Virginia and Maryland, Congress could not make them _real estate_, inseparable from the soil, as in Louisiana; nor could it permit slaves to read, nor to worship God according to conscience; nor could it grant them trial by jury, nor legalize marriage; nor require the master to give sufficient food and clothing; nor prohibit the violent sundering of families--because such provisions would conflict with the existing slave laws of Virginia and Maryland, and thus violate the "good faith implied," &c. So the principle of the resolution binds Congress in all these particulars: 1st. Not to abolish slavery in the District _until_ Virginia and Maryland abolish. 2d. Not to abolish any _part_ of it that exists in those states. 3d. Not to abolish any _form_ or _appendage_ of it still existing in those states. 4th. _To abolish_ when they do. 5th. To increase or abate its rigor _when, how_, and _as_ the same are modified by those states. In a word, Congressional action in the District is to float passively in the wake of legislative action on the subject in those states.

But here comes a dilemma. Suppose the legislation of those states should steer different courses--then there would be _two_ wakes! Can Congress float in both? Yea, verily! Nothing is too hard for it! Its obsequiousness equals its "power of legislation in _all_ cases whatsoever." It can float _up_ on the Virginia tide, and ebb down on the Maryland at the same time. What Maryland does, Congress will do in the Maryland part. What Virginia does, Congress will do in the Virginia part. Though Congress might not always be able to run at the bidding of both _at once_, especially in different directions, yet if it obeyed orders cheerfully, and "kept in its place," according to its "good faith implied," impossibilities might not be rigidly exacted. True, we have the highest sanction for the maxim that no _man_ can serve two masters--but if "corporations have _no_ souls," analogy would absolve Congress on that score, or at most give it only _a very small soul_--not large enough to be at all in the way, as an _exception_ to the universal rule laid down to the maxim!

In following out the absurdities of this "_implied_ good faith," it will be seen at once that the doctrine of Mr. Clay's Resolution extends to _all the subjects_ of _legislation_ existing in Maryland and Virginia, which exist also within the District. Every system, "institution," law, and established usage there, is placed beyond Congressional control equally with slavery, and by the same "implied faith." The abolition of the lottery system in the District as an _immorality_, was a flagrant breach of this "good faith" to Maryland and Virginia, as the system "still continued in those states." So to abolish imprisonment for debt, and capital punishment, to remodel the bank system, the power of corporations, the militia law, laws of limitation, &c., in the District, _unless Virginia and Maryland took the lead_, would violate the "good faith implied in the cession," &c.

That in the acts of cession no such "good faith" was "implied by Virginia and Maryland" as is claimed in the Resolution, we argue from the fact, that in 1781 Virginia ceded to the United States all her northwest territory, with the special proviso that her citizens inhabiting that territory should "have their _possessions_ and _titles_ confirmed to them, and be _protected_ in the enjoyment of their _rights_ and liberties." (See Journals of Congress vol. 9, p. 63.) The cession was made in the form of a deed, and signed by Thomas Jefferson, Samuel Hardy, Arthur Lee, and James Monroe. Many of these inhabitants _held slaves_. Three years after the cession, the Virginia delegation in Congress _proposed_ the passage of an ordinance which should abolish slavery, in that territory, and declare that it should never thereafter exist there. All the members of Congress from Virginia and Maryland voted for this ordinance. Suppose some member of Congress had during the passage of the ordinance introduced the following resolution: "Resolved, That when the northwest territory was ceded by Virginia to the United States, domestic slavery existed in that State, including the ceded territory, and as it still continues in that State, it could not be abolished within the territory without a violation of that good faith, which was implied in the cession and in the acceptance of the territory." What would have been the indignant response of Grayson, Griffin, Madison, and the Lees, in the Congress of '87, to such a resolution, and of Carrington, Chairman of the Committee, who reported the ratification of the ordinance in the Congress of '89, and of Page and Parker, who with every other member of the Virginia delegation supported it?

But to enumerate all the absurdities into which the thirty-six Senators have plunged themselves, would be to make a quarto inventory. We decline the task; and in conclusion, merely add that Mr. Clay in presenting this resolution, and each of the thirty-six Senators who voted for it, entered on the records of the Senate, and proclaimed to the world, a most unworthy accusation against the MILLIONS of American citizens who have during nearly half a century petitioned the national legislature to abolish slavery in the District of Colombia,--charging them either with the ignorance or the impiety of praying the nation to violate its "PLIGHTED FAITH." The resolution virtually indicts at the bar of public opinion, and brands with odium, all the Manumission Societies, the _first_ petitioners for the abolition of slavery in the District, and for a long time the only ones, petitioning from year to year through evil report and good report, still petitioning, by individual societies and in their national conventions.

But as if it were not enough to table the charge against such men as Benjamin Rush, William Rawle, John Sergeant, Robert Vaux, Cadwallader Colden, and Peter A. Jay,--to whom we may add Rufus King, James Hillhouse, William Pinkney, Thomas Addis Emmett, Daniel D. Tompkins, De Witt Clinton, James Kent, and Daniel Webster, besides eleven hundred citizens of the District itself; headed by their Chief Justice and judges--even the sovereign States of Pennsylvania, New-York, Massachusetts, and Vermont, whose legislatures have either memorialized Congress to abolish slavery in the District, or instructed their Senators to move such a measure, must be gravely informed by Messrs. Clay, Norvell, Niles, Smith, Pierce, Benton, Black, Tipton, and other honorable Senators, either that their perception is so dull, they know not whereof they affirm, or that their moral sense is so blunted they can demand without compunction a violation of the nation's faith!

We have spoken already of the concessions unwittingly made in this resolution to the true doctrine of Congressional power over the District. For that concession, important as it is, we have small thanks to render. That such a resolution, passed with such an _intent_, and pressing at a thousand points on relations and interests vital to the free states, should be hailed, as it has been, by a portion of the northern press as a "compromise" originating in deference to northern interests, and to be received by us as a free-will offering of disinterested benevolence, demanding our gratitude to the mover,--may well cover us with shame. We deserve the humiliation and have well earned the mockery. Let it come!

If, after having been set up at auction in the public sales-room of the nation, and for thirty years, and by each of a score of "compromises," treacherously knocked off to the lowest bidder, and that without money and without price, the North, plundered and betrayed, _will not_, in this her accepted time, consider the things that belong to her peace before they are hidden from her eyes, then let her eat of the fruit of her own way, and be filled with her own devices! Let the shorn and blinded giant grind in the prison-house of the Philistines, till taught the folly of intrusting to Delilahs the secret and the custody of his strength.

Have the free States bound themselves by an oath never to profit by the lessons of experience? If lost to _reason_, are they dead to _instinct_ also? Can nothing rouse them to cast about for self preservation? And shall a life of tame surrenders be terminated by suicidal sacrifice?

A "COMPROMISE!" Bitter irony! Is the plucked and hood-winked North to be wheedled by the sorcery of another Missouri compromise? A compromise in which the South gained all, and the North lost all, and lost it for ever. A compromise which embargoed the free laborer of the North and West, and clutched at the staff he leaned upon, to turn it into a bludgeon and fell him with its stroke. A compromise which wrested from liberty her boundless birthright domain, stretching westward to the sunset, while it gave to slavery loose reins and a free course, from the Mississippi to the Pacific.

The resolution, as it finally passed, is here inserted. The original Resolution, as moved by Mr. Clay, was inserted at the head of this postscript with the impression that it was the _amended_ form. It will be seen however, that it underwent no material modification.

"Resolved, That the interference by the citizens of any of the states, with the view to the abolition of slavery in the District, is endangering the rights and security of the people of the District; and that any act or measure of Congress designed to abolish slavery in the District, would be a violation of the faith implied in the cessions by the states of Virginia and Maryland, a just cause of alarm to the people of the slaveholding states, and have a direct and inevitable tendency to disturb and endanger the Union."

The vote upon the Resolution stood as follows:

_Yeas_.--Messrs. Allen, Bayard, Benton, Black, Buchanan, Brown, Calhoun, Clay, of Alabama, Clay, of Kentucky, Clayton, Crittenden, Cuthbert, Fulton, Grundy, Hubbard, King, Lumpkin, Lyon, Nicholas, Niles, Norvell, Pierce, Preston, Rives, Roane, Robinson, Sevier, Smith, of Connecticut, Strange, Tallmadge, Tipton, Walker, White, Williams, Wright, Young.

_Nays_.--Messrs. DAVIS, KNIGHT, McKEAN, MORRIS, PRENTISS, RUGGLES, SMITH, of Indiana, SWIFT, WEBSTER.

THE

ANTI-SLAVERY EXAMINER

No. 5

* * * * *

THE

POWER OF CONGRESS

OVER THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

* * * * *

ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED IN THE NEW-YORK EVENING POST, UNDER THE SIGNATURE OF "WYTHE."

* * * * *

WITH ADDITIONS BY THE AUTHOR.

* * * * *

NEW-YORK:

PUBLISHED BY THE AMERICAN ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY

NO. 143 NASSAU-STREET.

1838.

* * * * *

This periodical contains 3-1/2 sheets--Postage under 100 miles, 6 cts., over 100, 10 cts.

POWER OF CONGRESS

OVER THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

A civilized community presupposes a government of law. If that government be a republic, its citizens are the sole _sources_, as well as the _subjects_ of its power. Its constitution is their bill of directions to their own agents--a grant authorizing the exercise of certain powers, and prohibiting that of others. In the Constitution of the United States, whatever else may be obscure, the clause granting power to Congress over the Federal District may well defy misconstruction. Art. 1, Sec. 8, Clause 18: "The Congress shall have power to exercise exclusive legislation, _in all cases whatsoever_, over such District." Congress may make laws for the District "in all _cases_," not of all _kinds_; not all _laws_ whatsoever, but laws "in all _cases_ whatsoever." The grant respects the _subjects_ of legislation, _not_ the moral nature of the laws. The law-making power every where is subject to _moral_ restrictions, whether limited by constitutions or not. No legislature can authorize murder, nor make honesty penal, nor virtue a crime, nor exact impossibilities. In these and similar respects, the power of Congress is held in check by principles, existing in the nature of things, not imposed by the Constitution, but presupposed and assumed by it. The power of Congress over the District is restricted only by those principles that limit ordinary legislation, and, in some respects, it has even wider scope.

In common with the legislatures of the States, Congress cannot constitutionally pass ex post facto laws in criminal cases, nor suspend the writ of habeas corpus, nor pass a bill of attainder, nor abridge the freedom of speech and of the press, nor invade the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, nor enact laws respecting an establishment of religion. These are general limitations. Congress cannot do these things _any where_. The exact import, therefore, of the clause "in all cases whatsoever," is, _on all subjects within the appropriate sphere of legislation_. Some legislatures are restrained by constitutions, from the exercise of powers strictly within the proper sphere of legislation. Congressional power over the District has no such restraint. It traverses the whole field of legitimate legislation. All the power which any legislature has within its own jurisdiction, Congress holds over the District of Columbia.

It has been objected that the clause in question respects merely police regulations, and that its sole design was to enable Congress to protect itself against popular tumults. But if the convention that framed the Constitution aimed to provide for a _single_ case only, why did they provide for "_all_ cases whatsoever?" Besides, this clause was opposed in many of the state conventions, because the grant of power was not restricted to police regulations _alone_. In the Virginia Convention, George Mason, the father of the Virginia Constitution, Patrick Henry, Mr. Grayson, and others, assailed it on that ground. Mr. Mason said, "This clause gives an unlimited authority in every possible case within the District. He would willingly give them exclusive power as far as respected the police and good government of the place, but he would give them no more." Mr. Grayson said, that control over the _police_ was all-sufficient, and "that the Continental Congress never had an idea of exclusive legislation in all cases." Patrick Henry said, "Is it consistent with any principle of prudence or good policy, to grant _unlimited, unbounded authority?_" Mr. Madison said in reply: "I did conceive that the clause under consideration was one of those parts which would speak its own praise. When any power is given, its delegation necessarily involves authority to make laws to execute it.... The powers which are found necessary to be given, are therefore delegated _generally_, and particular and minute specification is left to the Legislature.... It is not within the limits of human capacity to delineate on paper all those particular cases and circumstances, in which legislation by the general legislature, would be necessary." Governor Randolph said: "Holland has no ten miles square, but she has the Hague where the deputies of the States assemble. But the influence which it has given the province of Holland, to have the seat of government within its territory, subject in some respects to its control, has been injurious to the other provinces." The wisdom of the convention is therefore manifest in granting to Congress exclusive jurisdiction over the place of their session. [_Deb. Va. Con._, p. 320.] In the forty-third number of the "Federalist," Mr. Madison says: "The indispensable necessity of _complete_ authority at the seat of government, carries its own evidence with it."

Finally, that the grant in question is to be interpreted according to the obvious import of its _terms_, is proved by the fact, that Virginia proposed an amendment to the United States' Constitution at the time of its adoption, providing that this clause "should be so construed as to give power only over the _police and good government_ of said District," _which amendment was rejected._

The former part of the clause under consideration, "Congress shall have power to exercise _exclusive_ legislation," gives _sole_ jurisdiction, and the latter part, "in all cases whatsoever," defines the _extent_ of it. Since, then, Congress is the _sole_ legislature within the District, and since its power is limited only by the checks common to all legislatures, it follows that what the law-making power is intrinsically competent to do _any_ where, Congress is competent to do in the District of Columbia. Having disposed of preliminaries, we proceed to state and argue the _real question_ at issue.

IS THE LAW-MAKING POWER COMPETENT TO ABOLISH SLAVERY WHEN NOT RESTRICTED IN THAT PARTICULAR BY CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS--or, IS THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY WITHIN THE APPROPRIATE SPHERE OF LEGISLATION?

In every government, absolute sovereignty exists _somewhere_. In the United States it exists primarily with the _people_, and _ultimate_ sovereignty _always_ exists with them. In each of the States, the legislature possesses a _representative_ sovereignty, delegated by the people through the Constitution--the people thus committing to the legislature a portion of their sovereignty, and specifying in their constitutions the amount and the conditions of the grant. That the _people_ in any state where slavery exists, have the power to abolish it, none will deny. If the legislature have not the power, it is because _the people_ have reserved it to themselves. Had they lodged with the legislature "power to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever," they would have parted with their sovereignty over the legislation of the State, and so far forth the legislature would have become _the people_, clothed with all their functions, and as such competent, _during the continuance of the grant_, to do whatever the people might have done before the surrender of their power: consequently, they would have the power to abolish slavery. The sovereignty of the District of Columbia exists _somewhere_--where is it lodged? The citizens of the District have no legislature of their own, no representation in Congress, and no political power whatever. Maryland and Virginia have surrendered to the United States their "full and absolute right and entire sovereignty," and the people of the United States have committed to Congress by the Constitution, the power to "exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such District."

Thus, the sovereignty of the District of Columbia, is shown to reside solely in the Congress of the United States; and since the power of the people of a state to abolish slavery within their own limits, results from their entire sovereignty within that state, so the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District, results from its entire _sovereignty_ within the District. If it be objected that Congress can have no more power over the District, than was held by the legislatures of Maryland and Virginia, we ask what clause in the constitution graduates the power of Congress by the standard of a state legislature? Was the United States' constitution worked into its present shape under the measuring line and square of Virginia and Maryland? and is its power to be bevelled down till it can run in the grooves of state legislation? There is a deal of prating about constitutional power over the District, as though Congress were indebted for it to Maryland and Virginia. The powers of those states, whether few or many, prodigies or nullities, have nothing to do with the question. As well thrust in the powers of the Grand Lama to join issue upon, or twist papal bulls into constitutional tether, with which to curb congressional action. The Constitution of the United States gives power to Congress, and takes it away, and _it alone_. Maryland and Virginia adopted the Constitution _before_ they ceded to the United States the territory of the District. By their acts of cession, they abdicated their own sovereignty over the District, and thus made room for that provided by the United States' constitution, which sovereignty was to commence as soon as a cession of territory by states, and its acceptance by Congress, furnished a sphere for its exercise. That the abolition of slavery is within the sphere of legislation, I argue,

2. FROM THE FACT, THAT SLAVERY, AS A LEGAL SYSTEM, IS THE CREATURE OF LEGISLATION. The law, by _creating_ slavery, not only affirmed its _existence_ to be within the sphere and under the control of legislation, but equally, the _conditions_ and _terms_ of its existence, and the _question_ whether or not it _should_ exist. Of course legislation would not travel _out_ of its sphere, in abolishing what is _within_ it, and what was recognised to be within it, by its own act. Cannot legislatures repeal their own laws? If law can take from a man his rights, it can give them back again. If it can say, "your body belongs to your neighbor," it can say, "it belongs to _yourself_." If it can annul a man's right to himself, held by express grant from his Maker, and can create for another an _artificial_ title to him, can it not annul the artificial title, and leave the original owner to hold himself by his original title?

3. THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY HAS ALWAYS BEEN CONSIDERED WITHIN THE APPROPRIATE SPHERE OF LEGISLATION. Almost every civilized nation has abolished slavery by law. The history of legislation since the revival of letters, is a record crowded with testimony to the universally admitted competency of the law-making power to abolish slavery. It is so manifestly an attribute not merely of absolute sovereignty, but even of ordinary legislation, that the competency of a legislature to exercise it, may well nigh be reckoned among the legal axioms of the civilized world. Even the night of the dark ages was not dark enough to make this invisible.

The Abolition decree of the great council of England was passed in 1102. The memorable Irish decree, "that all the English slaves in the whole of Ireland, be immediately emancipated and restored to their former liberty," was issued in 1171. Slavery in England was abolished by a general charter of emancipation in 1381. Passing over many instances of the abolition of slavery by law, both during the middle ages and since the reformation, we find them multiplying as we approach our own times. In 1776 slavery was abolished in Prussia by special edict. In St. Domingo, Cayenne, Guadeloupe, and Martinique, in 1794, where more than 690,000 slaves were emancipated by the French government. In Java, 1811; in Ceylon, 1815; in Buenos Ayres, 1816; in St. Helena, 1819; in Colombia, 1821; by the Congress of Chili in 1821; in Cape Colony, 1823; in Malacca, 1825; in the southern provinces of Birmah, 1826; in Bolivia, 1826; in Peru, Guatemala, and Monte Video, 1828, in Jamaica, Barbadoes, Bermudas, Bahamas, the Mauritius, St. Christophers, Nevis, the Virgin Islands, Antigua, Montserrat, Dominica, St. Vincents, Grenada, Berbice, Tobago, St. Lucia, Trinidad, Honduras, Demarara, and the Cape of Good Hope, on the 1st of August, 1834. But waving details, suffice it to say, that England, France, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Prussia, and Germany, have all and often given their testimony to the competency of the legislative power to abolish slavery. In our own country, the Legislature of Pennsylvania passed an act of abolition in 1780, Connecticut, in 1784; Rhode Island, 1784; New-York, 1799; New-Jersey, in 1804; Vermont, by Constitution, in 1777; Massachusetts, in 1780; and New Hampshire, in 1784.

When the competency of the law-making power to abolish slavery, has thus been recognised every where and for ages, when it has been embodied in the highest precedents, and celebrated in the thousand jubilees of regenerated liberty, is it an achievement of modern discovery, that such a power is a nullity?--that all these acts of abolition are void, and that the millions disenthralled by them, are, either themselves or their posterity, still legally in bondage?

4. LEGISLATIVE POWER HAS ABOLISHED SLAVERY IN ITS PARTS. The law of South Carolina prohibits the working of slaves more than fifteen hours in the twenty-four. In other words, it takes from the slaveholder his power over nine hours of the slave's time daily; and if it can take nine hours it may take twenty-four. The laws of Georgia prohibit the working of slaves on the first day of the week; and if they can do it for the first, they can for the six following.

The law of North Carolina prohibits the "immoderate" correction of slaves. If it has power to prohibit immoderate correction, it can prohibit _moderate_ correction--_all_ correction, which would be virtual emancipation; for, take from the master the power to inflict pain, and he is master no longer. Cease to ply the slave with the stimulus of fear; and he is free.

The Constitution of Mississippi gives the General Assembly power to make laws "to oblige the owners of slaves to _treat them with humanity_." The Constitution of Missouri has the same clause, and an additional one making it the DUTY of the legislature to pass such laws as may be necessary to secure the _humane_ treatment of the slaves. This grant to those legislatures, empowers them to decide what _is_ and what is _not_ "humane treatment." Otherwise it gives no "power"--the clause is mere waste paper, and flouts in the face of a befooled legislature. A clause giving power to require "humane treatment" covers all the _particulars_ of such treatment--gives power to exact it in _all respects--requiring_ certain acts, and _prohibiting_ others--maiming, branding, chaining together, separating families, floggings for learning the alphabet, for reading the Bible, for worshiping God according to conscience--the legislature has power to specify each of these acts--declare that it is not "_humane_ treatment," and PROHIBIT it.--The legislature may also believe that driving men and women into the field, and forcing them to work without pay, is not "humane treatment," and being Constitutionally bound "to _oblige_" masters to practise "humane treatment"--they have the power to _prohibit such_ treatment, and are bound to do it.

The law of Louisiana makes slaves real estate, prohibiting the holder, if he be also a _land_ holder, to separate them from the soil.[A] If it has power to prohibit the sale _without_ the soil, it can prohibit the sale _with_ it; and if it can prohibit the _sale_ as property, it can prohibit the _holding_ as property. Similar laws exist in the French, Spanish, and Portuguese colonies.

[Footnote A: Virginia made slaves real estate by a law passed in 1705. (_Beverly's Hist. of Va_., p. 98.) I do not find the precise time when this law was repealed, probably when Virginia became the chief slave breeder for the cotton-growing and sugar-planting country, and made young men and women "from fifteen to twenty-five" the main staple production of the State.]

The law of Louisiana requires the master to give his slaves a certain amount of food and clothing. If it can oblige the master to give the slave _one_ thing, it can oblige him to give him another: if food and clothing, then wages, liberty, his own body.

By the laws of Connecticut, slaves may receive and hold property, and prosecute suits in their own name as plaintiffs: [This last was also the law of Virginia in 1795. See Tucker's "Dissertation on Slavery," p. 73.] There were also laws making marriage contracts legal, in certain contingencies, and punishing infringements of them, ["_Reeve's Law of Baron and Femme_," p. 340-1.] Each of the laws enumerated above, does, _in principle_, abolish slavery; and all of them together abolish it in fact. True, not as a _whole_, and at a _stroke_, nor all in one place; but in its _parts_, by piecemeal, at divers times and places; thus showing that the abolition of slavery is within the boundary of legislation.

5. THE COMPETENCY OF THE LAW-MAKING POWER TO ABOLISH SLAVERY, HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED BY ALL THE SLAVEHOLDING STATES, EITHER DIRECTLY OR BY IMPLICATION. Some States recognize it in their _Constitutions_, by giving the legislature power to emancipate such slaves as may "have rendered the state some distinguished service, "and others by express prohibitory restrictions. The Constitution of Mississippi, Arkansas, and other States, restrict the power of the legislature in this respect. Why this express prohibition, if the law-making power _cannot_ abolish slavery? A stately farce, indeed, to construct a special clause, and with appropriate rites induct it into the Constitution, for the express purpose of restricting a nonentity!--to take from the law-making power what it _never had_, and what _cannot_ pertain to it! The legislatures of those States have no power to abolish slavery, simply because their Constitutions have expressly _taken away_ that power. The people of Arkansas, Mississippi, &c., well knew the competency of the law-making power to abolish slavery, and hence their zeal to _restrict_ it.

The slaveholding States have recognised this power in their _laws_. The Virginia Legislature passed a law in 1786 to prevent the further importation of Slaves, of which the following is an extract: "And be it further enacted that every slave imported into this commonwealth contrary to the true intent and meaning of this act, shall upon such importation become _free_." By a law of Virginia, passed Dec. 17, 1792, a slave brought into the state and kept _there a year_, was _free_. The Maryland Court of Appeals at the December term 1813 [case of Stewart _vs._ Oakes,] decided that a slave owned in Maryland, and sent by his master into Virginia to work at different periods, making one year in the whole, became _free_, being _emancipated_ by the law of Virginia quoted above. North Carolina and Georgia in their acts of cession, transferring to the United States the territory now constituting the States of Tennessee, Alabama and Mississippi, made it a condition of the grant, that the provisions of the ordinance of '87, should be secured to the inhabitants _with the exception of the sixth article which prohibits slavery_; thus conceding, both the competency of law to abolish slavery, and the power of Congress to do it, within its jurisdiction. (These acts show the prevalent belief at that time, in the slaveholding States, that the general government had adopted a line of policy aiming at the exclusion of slavery from the entire territory of the United States, not included within the original States, and that this policy would be pursued unless prevented by specific and formal stipulation.)

Slaveholding states have asserted this power _in their judicial decisions_. In numerous cases their highest courts have decided that if the legal owner of slaves takes them into those States where slavery has been abolished either by law or by the constitution, such removal emancipates them, such law or constitution abolishing their slavery. This principle is asserted in the decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, in the case of Lunsford _vs._ Coquillon, 14 Martin's La. Reps. 401. Also by the Supreme Court of Virginia, in the case of Hunter _vs._ Fulcher, 1 Leigh's Reps. 172. The same doctrine was laid down by Judge Washington, of the United States Supreme Court, in the case of Butler _vs._ Hopper, Washington's Circuit Court Reps. 508. This principle was also decided by the Court of Appeals in Kentucky; case of Rankin _vs._ Lydia, 2 Marshall's Reps. 407; see also, Wilson _vs._ Isbell, 5 Call's Reps. 425, Spotts _vs._ Gillespie, 6 Randolph's Reps. 566. The State _vs._ Lasselle, 1 Blackford's Reps. 60, Marie Louise _vs._ Mariot, 8 La. Reps. 475. In this case, which was tried in 1836, the slave had been taken by her master to France and brought back; Judge Mathews, of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, decided that "residence for one moment" under the laws of France emancipated her.

6. EMINENT STATESMEN, THEMSELVES SLAVEHOLDERS, HAVE CONCEDED THIS POWER. Washington, in a letter to Robert Morris, dated April 12, 1786, says: "There is not a man living, who wishes more sincerely than I do, to see a plan adopted for the abolition of slavery; but there is only one proper and effectual mode by which it can be accomplished, and that is by _legislative_ authority." In a letter to Lafayette, dated May 10, 1786, he says: "It (the abolition of slavery) certainly might, and assuredly ought to be effected, and that too by _legislative_ authority." In a letter to John Fenton Mercer, dated Sept. 9, 1786, he says: "It is among my first wishes to see some plan adopted by which slavery in this country may be abolished by _law_." In a letter to Sir John Sinclair, he says: "There are in Pennsylvania, _laws_ for the gradual abolition of slavery, which neither Maryland nor Virginia have at present, but which nothing is more certain than that they _must have_, and at a period not remote." Speaking of movements in the Virginia Legislature in 1777, for the passage of a law emancipating the slaves, Mr. Jefferson says: "The principles of the amendment were agreed on, that is to say, the freedom of all born after a certain day; but it was found that the public mind would not bear the proposition, yet the day is not far distant, when _it must bear and adopt it_."--Jefferson's Memoirs, v. 1, p. 35. It is well known that Jefferson, Pendleton, Mason, Wythe and Lee, while acting as a committee of the Virginia House of Delegates to revise the State Laws, prepared a plan for the gradual emancipation of the slaves by law. These men were the great lights of Virginia. Mason, the author of the Virginia Constitution; Pendleton, the President of the memorable Virginia Convention in 1787, and President of the Virginia Court of Appeals; Wythe was the Blackstone of the Virginia bench, for a quarter of a century Chancellor of the State, the professor of law in the University of William and Mary, and the preceptor of Jefferson, Madison, and Chief Justice Marshall. He was author of the celebrated remonstrance to the English House of Commons on the subject of the stamp act. As to Jefferson, his _name_ is his biography.

Every slaveholding member of Congress from the States of Maryland, Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Georgia, voted for the celebrated ordinance of 1787, which _abolished_ the slavery then existing in the Northwest Territory. Patrick Henry, in his well known letter to Robert Pleasants, of Virginia, January 18, 1773, says: "I believe a time will come when an opportunity will be offered to _abolish_ this lamentable evil." William Pinkney, of Maryland, advocated the abolition of slavery by law, in the legislature of that State, in 1789. Luther Martin urged the same measure both in the Federal Convention, and in his report to the Legislature of Maryland. In 1796, St. George Tucker, of Virginia, professor of law in the University of William and Mary, and Judge of the General Court, published an elaborate dissertation on slavery, addressed to the General Assembly of the State, and urging upon them the abolition of slavery by _law_.

John Jay, while New York was yet a slave State, and himself in law a slaveholder, said in a letter from Spain, in 1786, "An excellent law might be made out of the Pennsylvania one, for the gradual abolition of slavery. Were I in your legislature, I would present a bill for the purpose, drawn up with great care, and I would never cease moving it till it became a law, or I ceased to be a member."

Daniel D. Tompkins, in a message to the Legislature of New-York January 8, 1812, said: "To devise the means for the gradual and ultimate _extermination_ from amongst us of slavery, is a work worthy the representatives of a polished and enlightened nation."

The Virginia Legislature asserted this power in 1832. At the close of a month's debate, the following proceedings were had. I extract from an editorial article of the Richmond Whig, of January 26, 1832.

"The report of the Select Committee, adverse to legislation on the subject of Abolition, was in these words: _Resolved_, as the opinion of this Committee, that it is INEXPEDIENT FOR THE PRESENT, to make any _legislative enactments for the abolition of Slavery_." This Report Mr. Preston moved to reverse, and thus to declare that it _was_ expedient, _now_ to make legislative enactments for the abolition of slavery. This was meeting the question in its strongest form. It demanded action, and immediate action. On this proposition the vote was 58 to 73. Many of the most decided friends of abolition voted against the amendment; because they thought public opinion not sufficiently prepared for it, and that it might prejudice the cause to move too rapidly. The vote on Mr. Witcher's motion to postpone the whole subject indefinitely, indicates the true state of opinion in the House.--That was the test question, and was so intended and proclaimed by its mover. That motion was _negatived_, 71 to 60; showing a majority of 11, who by that vote, declared their belief that "at the proper time, and in the proper mode, Virginia ought to commence a system of gradual abolition."

7. THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES HAVE ASSERTED THIS POWER. The ordinance of '87, declaring that there should be "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude," in the North Western territory, abolished the slavery then existing there. The Supreme Court of Mississippi, in its decision in the case of Harvey vs. Decker, Walker's Mi. Reps. 36, declared that the ordinance emancipated the slaves then held there. In this decision the question is argued ably and at great length. The Supreme Court of La. made the same decision in the case of Forsyth vs. Nash, 4 Martin's La. Reps. 395. The same doctrine was laid down by Judge Porter, (late United States Senator from La.,) in his decision at the March term of the La. Supreme Court, 1830, in the case of Merry vs. Chexnaider, 20 Martin's Reps. 699.

That the ordinance abolished the slavery then existing there is also shown by the fact, that persons holding slaves in the territory petitioned for the repeal of the article abolishing slavery, assigning _that_ as a reason. "The petition of the citizens of Randolph and St. Clair counties in the Illinois country, stating that they were in possession of slaves, and praying the repeal of that act (the 6th article of the ordinance of '87) and the passage of a law legalizing slavery there." [Am. State papers, Public Lands, v. 1. p. 69.] Congress passed this ordinance before the United States Constitution was adopted, when it derived all its authority from the articles of Confederation, which conferred powers of legislation far more restricted than those conferred on Congress over the District and Territories by the United States Constitution. Now, we ask, how does the Constitution _abridge_ the powers which Congress possessed under the articles of confederation?

The abolition of the slave trade by Congress, in 1808, is another illustration of the competency of legislative power to abolish slavery. The African slave trade has become such a mere _technic_, in common parlance, that the fact of its being _proper slavery_ is overlooked. The buying and selling, the transportation, and the horrors of the middle passage, were mere _incidents_ of the slavery in which the victims were held. Let things be called by their own names. When Congress abolished the African slave trade, it abolished SLAVERY--supreme slavery--power frantic with license, trampling a whole hemisphere scathed with its fires, and running down with blood. True, Congress did not, in the abolition of the slave trade, abolish _all_ the slavery within its jurisdiction, but it did abolish all the slavery in _one_ part of its jurisdiction. What has rifled it of power to abolish slavery in _another_ part of its jurisdiction, especially in that part where it has "exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever?"

8. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES RECOGNISES THIS POWER BY THE MOST CONCLUSIVE IMPLICATION. In Art. 1, sec. 3, clause 1, it prohibits the abolition of the slave trade previous to 1808: thus implying the power of Congress to do it at once, but for the restriction; and its power to do it _unconditionally_, when that restriction ceased. Again; In Art. 4, sec. 2, "No person held to service or labor in one state under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from said service or labor." This clause was inserted, as all admit, to prevent the runaway slave from being emancipated by the _laws_ of the free states. If these laws had _no power_ to emancipate, why this constitutional guard to prevent it?

The insertion of the clause, was the testimony of the eminent jurists that framed the Constitution, to the existence of the _power_, and their public proclamation, that the abolition of slavery was within the appropriate sphere of legislation. The right of the owner to that which is rightfully property, is founded on a principle of _universal law_, and is recognised and protected by all civilized nations; property in slaves is, by general consent, an _exception_; hence slaveholders insisted upon the insertion of this clause in the United States Constitution, that they might secure by an _express provision_, that from which protection is withheld, by the acknowledged principles of universal law.[A] By demanding this provision, slaveholders consented that their slaves should not be recognised as property by the United States Constitution, and hence they found their claim, on the fact of their being "_persons_, and _held_ to service."

[Footnote A: The fact, that under the articles of Confederation, slaveholders, whose slaves had escaped into free states, had no legal power to force them back,--that _now_ they have no power to recover, by process of law, their slaves who escape to Canada, the South American States, or to Europe--the case already cited, in which the Supreme Court of Louisiana decided, that residence "_for one moment_," under the laws of France emancipated an American slave--the case of Fulton _vs._. Lewis, 3 Har. and John's Reps., 56, where the slave of a St. Domingo slaveholder, who brought him to Maryland in '93, was pronounced free by the Maryland Court of Appeals--are illustrations of the acknowledged truth here asserted, that by the consent of the civilized world, and on the principles of universal law, slaves are not "_property_," and that whenever held as property under _law_, it is only by _positive legislative acts_, forcibly setting aside the law of nature, the common law, and the principles of universal justice and right between man and man,--principles paramount to all law, and from which alone law, derives its intrinsic authoritative sanction.]

9. CONGRESS HAS UNQUESTIONABLE POWER TO ADOPT THE COMMON LAW, AS THE LEGAL SYSTEM, WITHIN ITS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION.--This has been done, with certain restrictions, in most of the States, either by legislative acts or by constitutional implication. THE COMMON LAW KNOWS NO SLAVES. Its principles annihilate slavery wherever they touch it. It is a universal, unconditional, abolition act. Wherever slavery is a legal system, it is so only by _statute_ law, and in violation of the common law. The declaration of Lord Chief Justice Holt, that, "by the common law, no man can have property in another," is an acknowledged axiom, and based upon the well known common law definition of property. "The subjects of dominion or property are _things_, as contra-distinguished from _persons_." Let Congress adopt the common law in the District of Columbia, and slavery there is at once abolished. Congress may well be at home in common law legislation, for the common law is the grand element of the United States Constitution. All its _fundamental_ provisions are instinct with its spirit; and its existence, principles, and paramount authority, are presupposed and assumed throughout the whole. The preamble of the Constitution plants the standard of the Common Law immovably in its foreground. "We, the people of the United States, in order to ESTABLISH JUSTICE, &c., do ordain and establish this Constitution;" thus proclaiming _devotion to_ JUSTICE, as the controlling motive in the organization of the Government, and its secure establishment the chief object of its aims. By this most solemn recognition, the common law, that grand legal embodyment of "_justice_" and fundamental right--was made the Groundwork of the Constitution, and intrenched behind its strongest munitions. The second clause of Sec. 9, Art. 1; Sec. 4, Art. 2, and the last clause of Sec. 2, Art. 3, with Articles 7, 8, 9, and 13 of the Amendments, are also express recognitions of the common law as the presiding Genius of the Constitution.

By adopting the common law within its exclusive jurisdiction Congress would carry out the principles of our glorious Declaration, and follow the highest precedents in our national history and jurisprudence. It is a political maxim as old as civil legislation, that laws should be strictly homogeneous with the principles of the government whose will they express, embodying and carrying them out--being indeed the _principles themselves_, in preceptive form--representatives alike of the nature and the power of the Government--standing illustrations of its genius and spirit, while they proclaim and enforce its authority. Who needs be told that slavery makes war upon the principles of the Declaration, and the spirit of the Constitution, and that these and the principles of the common law gravitate toward each other with irrepressible affinities, and mingle into one? The common law came hither with our pilgrim fathers; it was their birthright, their panoply, their glory, and their song of rejoicing in the house of their pilgrimage. It covered them in the day of their calamity, and their trust was under the shadow of its wings. From the first settlement of the country, the genius of our institutions and our national spirit have claimed it as a common possession, and exulted in it with a common pride. A century ago, Governor Pownall, one of the most eminent constitutional jurists of colonial times, said of the common law, "In all the colonies the common law is received as the foundation and main body of their law." In the Declaration of Rights, made by the Continental Congress at its first session in '74, there was the following resolution: "Resolved, That the respective colonies are entitled to the common law of England, and especially to the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage according to the course of that law." Soon after the organization of the general government, Chief Justice Ellsworth, in one of his decisions on the bench of the United States Supreme Court, said: "The common law of this country remains the same as it was before the revolution." Chief Justice Marshall, in his decision in the case of Livingston _vs._ Jefferson, said: "When our ancestors migrated to America, they brought with them the common law of their native country, so far as it was applicable to their new situation, and I do not conceive that the revolution in any degree changed the relations of man to man, or the law which regulates them. In breaking our political connection with the parent state, we did not break our connection with each other." [_Hall's Law Journal, new series._] Mr. Duponceau, in his "Dissertation on the Jurisdiction of Courts in the United States," says, "I consider the common law of England the _jus commune_ of the United States. I think I can lay it down as a correct principle, that the common law of England, as it was at the time of the Declaration of Independence, still continues to be the national law of this country, so far as it is applicable to our present state, and subject to the modifications it has received here in the course of nearly half a century." Chief Justice Taylor of North Carolina, in his decision in the case of the State _vs._ Reed, in 1823, Hawkes' N.C. Reps. 454, says, "a law of _paramount obligation to the statute_, was violated by the offence--COMMON LAW founded upon the law of nature, and confirmed by revelation." The legislation of the United States abounds in recognitions of the principles of the common law, asserting their paramount binding power. Sparing details, of which our national state papers are full, we illustrate by a single instance. It was made a condition of the admission of Louisiana into the Union, that the right of trial by jury should be secured to all her citizens,--the United States government thus employing its power to enlarge the jurisdiction of the common law in this its great representative.

Having shown that the abolition of slavery is within the competency of the law-making power, when unrestricted by constitutional provisions, and that the legislation of Congress over the District is thus unrestricted, its power to abolish slavery there is established.

We argue it further, from the fact, that slavery exists there _now_ by an act of Congress. In the act of 16th July, 1790, Congress accepted portions of territory offered by the states of Maryland and Virginia, and enacted that the laws, as they then were, should continue in force, "until Congress shall otherwise by law provide." Under these laws, adopted by Congress, and in effect re-enacted and made laws of the District, the slaves there are now held.

Is Congress so impotent in its own "exclusive jurisdiction" that it _cannot_ "otherwise by law provide?" If it can say, what _shall_ be considered property, it can say what shall _not_ be considered property. Suppose a legislature should enact that marriage contracts shall be mere bills of sale, making a husband the proprietor of his wife, as his _bona fide_ property; and suppose husbands should herd their wives in droves for the market as beasts of burden, or for the brothel as victims of lust, and then prate about their inviolable legal property, and deny the power of the legislature, which stamped them "property," to undo its own wrong, and secure to wives by law the rights of human beings. Would such cant about "legal rights" be heeded where reason and justice held sway, and where law, based upon fundamental morality, received homage? If a frantic legislature pronounces woman a chattel, has it no power, with returning reason, to take back the blasphemy? Is the impious edict irrepealable? Be it, that with legal forms it has stamped wives "wares." Can no legislation blot out the brand? Must the handwriting of Deity on human nature be expunged for ever? Has law no power to stay the erasing pen, and tear off the scrawled label that covers up the IMAGE OF GOD?

II. THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO ABOLISH SLAVERY IN THE DISTRICT HAS BEEN, TILL RECENTLY, UNIVERSALLY CONCEDED.

1. IT HAS BEEN ASSUMED BY CONGRESS ITSELF. The following record stands on the journals of the House of Representatives for 1804, p. 225: "On motion made and seconded that the House do come to the following resolution: 'Resolved, That from and after the 4th day of July, 1805, all blacks and people of color that shall be born within the District of Columbia, or whose mothers shall be the property of any person residing within said District, shall be free, the males at the age of ----, and the females at the age of ----. The main question being taken that the house do agree to said motion as originally proposed, it was negatived by a majority of 46.'" Though the motion was lost, it was on the ground of its alleged _inexpediency_ alone. In the debate which preceded the vote, the _power_ of Congress was conceded. In March, 1816, the House of Representatives passed the following resolution:--"Resolved, That a committee be appointed to inquire into the existence of an inhuman and illegal traffic in slaves, carried on in and through the District of Columbia, and to report whether any and what measures are necessary for _putting a stop to the same_."

On the 9th of January, 1829, the House of Representatives passed the following resolution by a vote of 114 to 66: "Resolved, That the Committee on the District of Columbia, be instructed to inquire into the _expediency_ of providing by _law_ for the gradual abolition of slavery within the District, in such manner that the interests of no individual shall be injured thereby." Among those who voted in the affirmative were Messrs. Barney of Md., Armstrong of Va., A.H. Shepperd of N.C., Blair of Tenn., Chilton and Lyon of Ky., Johns of Del., and others from slave states.

2. IT HAS BEES CONCEDED BY COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS, OF THE DISTRICT of COLUMBIA.--In a report of the committee on the District, Jan. 11, 1837, by their chairman, Mr. Powell of Va., there is the following declaration:--"The Congress of the United States, has by the constitution exclusive jurisdiction over the District, and has power upon this subject, (_slavery_,) as upon all other subjects of legislation, to exercise _unlimited discretion_." Reps. of Comms. 2d Sess. 19th Cong. v. iv. No. 43. In December, 1831, the committee on the District, Dr. Doddridge of Va., Chairman, reported, "That until the adjoining states act on the subject, (slavery) it would be (not _unconstitutional_ but) unwise and impolitic, if not unjust, for Congress to interfere." In April, 1836, a special committee on abolition memorials reported the following resolutions by their Chairman, Mr. Pinckney of South Carolina: "Resolved, That Congress possesses no constitutional authority to interfere in any way with the institution of slavery in any of the states of this confederacy."

"Resolved, That Congress _ought not to interfere_ in any way with slavery in the District of Columbia." "Ought not to interfere," carefully avoiding the phraseology of the first resolution, and thus in effect conceding the constitutional power. In a widely circulated "Address to the electors of the Charleston District," Mr. Pinkney is thus denounced by his own constituents: "He has proposed a resolution which is received by the plain common sense of the whole country as a concession that Congress has authority to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia."

3. IT HAS BEEN CONCEDED BY THE CITIZENS OF THE DISTRICT. A petition for the gradual abolition of slavery in the District, signed by nearly eleven hundred of its citizens, was presented to Congress, March 24, 1827. Among the signers to this petition, were Chief Justice Cranch, Judge Van Ness, Judge Morsel, Prof. J.M. Staughton, and a large number of the most influential inhabitants of the District. Mr. Dickson, of New York, asserted on the floor of Congress in 1835, that the signers of this petition owned more than half of the property in the District. The accuracy of this statement has never been questioned.

THIS POWER HAS BEEN CONCEDED BY GRAND JURIES OF THE DISTRICT. The Grand jury of the county of Alexandria, at the March term, 1802, presented the domestic slave trade as a grievance, and said, "We consider these grievances demanding _legislative_ redress." Jan. 19, 1829, Mr. Alexander, of Virginia, presented a representation of the grand jury in the city of Washington, remonstrating against "any measure for the abolition of slavery within said District, unless accompanied by measures for the removal of the emancipated from the same;" thus, not only conceding the power to emancipate slaves, but affirming an additional power, that of _excluding them when free_. Journal H.R. 1828-9, p. 174.

4. THIS POWER HAS BEEN CONCEDED BY STATE LEGISLATURES. In 1828 the Legislature of Pennsylvania instructed their Senators in Congress "to procure, if practicable, the passage of a law to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia." Jan. 28, 1829, the House of Assembly of New-York passed a resolution, that their "Senators in Congress be instructed to make every possible exertion to effect the passage of a law for the abolition of Slavery in the District of Columbia." In February, 1837, the Senate of Massachusetts "Resolved, That Congress having exclusive legislation in the District of Columbia, possess the right to abolish slavery and the slave trade therein." The House of Representatives passed the following resolution at the same session: "Resolved, That Congress having exclusive legislation in the District of Columbia, possess the right to abolish slavery in said District."

November 1, 1837, the Legislature of Vermont, "Resolved, that Congress have the full power by the constitution to abolish slavery and the slave trade in the District of Columbia, and in the territories."

May 30, 1836, a committee of the Pennsylvania Legislature reported the following resolution: "Resolved, That Congress does possess the constitutional power, and it is expedient to abolish slavery and the slave trade within the District of Columbia."

In January, 1836, the Legislature of South Carolina "Resolved, That we should consider the abolition of Slavery in the District of Columbia as a violation of the rights of the citizens of that District derived from the _implied_ conditions on which that territory was ceded to the General Government." Instead of denying the constitutional power, they virtually admit its existence, by striving to smother it under an _implication_. In February, 1836, the Legislature of North Carolina "Resolved, That, although by the Constitution _all legislative power_ over the District of Columbia is vested in the Congress of the United States, yet we would deprecate any legislative action on the part of that body towards liberating the slaves of that District, as a breach of faith towards those States by whom the territory was originally ceded. Here is a full concession of the _power_. February 2, 1836, the Virginia Legislature passed unanimously the following resolution: "Resolved, by the General Assembly of Virginia, that the following article be proposed to the several states of this Union, and to Congress, as an amendment of the Constitution of the United States: "The powers of Congress shall not be so construed as to authorize the passage of any law for the emancipation of slaves in the District of Columbia, without the consent of the individual proprietors thereof, unless by the sanction of the Legislatures of Virginia and Maryland, and under such conditions as they shall by law prescribe."

Fifty years after the formation of the United States' constitution the states are solemnly called upon by the Virginia Legislature, to amend that instrument by a clause asserting that, in the grant to Congress of "exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever" over the District, the "case" of slavery is not included!! What could have dictated such a resolution but the conviction that the power to abolish slavery is an irresistible inference from the constitution _as it is_. The fact that the same legislature passed afterward a resolution, though by no means unanimously, that Congress does not possess the power, abates not a tittle of the testimony in the first resolution. March 23d, 1824, "Mr. Brown presented the resolutions of the General Assembly of Ohio, recommending to Congress the consideration of a system for the gradual emancipation of persons of color held in servitude in the United States." On the same day, "Mr. Noble, of Indiana, communicated a resolution from the legislature of that state, respecting the gradual emancipation of slaves within the United States." Journal of the United States Senate, for 1824-5, p. 231.

The Ohio and Indiana resolutions, by taking for granted the _general_ power of Congress over the subject of slavery, do virtually assert its _special_ power within its _exclusive_ jurisdiction.

5. THIS POWER HAS BEEN CONCEDED BY BODIES OF CITIZENS IN THE SLAVE STATES. The petition of eleven hundred citizens of the District, has been already mentioned. "March 5, 1830, Mr. Washington presented a memorial of inhabitants of the county of Frederick, in the state of Maryland, praying that provision be made for the gradual abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia." Journal H.R. 1829-30, p. 358.

March 30, 1828. Mr. A.H. Shepperd, of North Carolina, presented a memorial of citizens of that state, "praying Congress to take measures for the entire abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia." Journal H.R. 1829-30, p. 379.

January 14, 1822. Mr. Rhea, of Tennessee, presented a memorial of citizens of that state, praying "that provision may be made, whereby all slaves which may hereafter be born in the District of Columbia, shall be free at a certain period of their lives." Journal H.R. 1821-22, p. 142.

December 13, 1824. Mr. Saunders of North Carolina, presented a memorial of citizens of that state, praying "that measures may be taken for the gradual abolition of slavery in the United States." Journal H.R. 1824-25, p. 27.

December 16, 1828. "Mr. Barnard presented the memorial of the American Convention for promoting the abolition of slavery, held in Baltimore, praying that slavery may be abolished in the District of Columbia." Journal U.S. Senate, 1828-29, p. 24.

6. DISTINGUISHED STATESMEN AND JURISTS IN THE SLAVEHOLDING STATES, HAVE CONCEDED THIS POWER. The testimony of Messrs. Doddridge, and Powell, of Virginia, Chief Justice Cranch, and Judges Morsel and Van Ness, of the District, has already been given. In the debate in Congress on the memorial of the Society of Friends, in 1790, Mr. Madison, in speaking of the territories of the United States, explicitly declared, from his own knowledge of the views of the members of the convention that framed the constitution, as well as from the obvious import of its terms, that in the territories, "Congress have certainly the power to regulate the subject of slavery." Congress can have no more power over the territories than that of "exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever," consequently, according to Mr. Madison, "it has certainly the power to regulate the subject of slavery in the" _District_. In March, 1816, Mr. Randolph of Va. introduced a resolution for putting a stop to the domestic slave trade within the District. December 12, 1827, Mr. Barney, of Md. presented a memorial for abolition in the District, and moved that it be printed. Mr. McDuffie, of S.C., objected to the printing, but "expressly admitted the right of Congress to grant to the people of the District any measures which they might deem necessary to free themselves from the deplorable evil."--[See letter of Mr. Claiborne of Miss. to his constituents, published in the Washington Globe, May 9, 1836.] The sentiments of Mr. Clay, of Kentucky, on the subject are well known. In a speech before the U.S. Senate, in 1836, he declared the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District "unquestionable." Messrs. Blair, of Tenn., and Chilton, Lyon, and R.M. Johnson, of Ky., A.H. Shepperd, of N.C., Messrs. Armstrong and Smyth, of Va., Messrs. Dorsey, Archer, and Barney, of Md., and Johns, of Del., with numerous others from slave states, have asserted the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District. In the speech of Mr. Smyth, of Va., on the Missouri question, January 28, 1820, he says on this point: "If the future freedom of the blacks is your real object, and not a mere pretence, why do you not begin _here_? Within the ten miles square, you have _undoubted power_ to exercise exclusive legislation. _Produce a bill to emancipate the slaves in the District of Columbia_, or, if you prefer it, to emancipate those born hereafter."

To this may be added the testimony of the present Vice President of the United States, Hon. Richard M. Johnson, of Kentucky. In a speech before the U.S. Senate, Feb. 1, 1820, (National Intelligencer, April 20, 1820) he says: "In the District of Columbia, containing a population of 30,000 souls, and probably as many slaves as the whole territory of Missouri, THE POWER OF PROVIDING FOR THEIR EMANCIPATION RESTS WITH CONGRESS ALONE. Why, then, this heart-rending sympathy for the slaves of Missouri, and this cold insensibility, this eternal apathy, towards the slaves in the District of Columbia?"

It is quite unnecessary to add, that the most distinguished northern statesmen of both political parties, have always affirmed the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District: President Van Buren in his letter of March 6, 1836, to a committee of gentlemen in North Carolina, says, "I would not, from the light now before me, feel myself safe in pronouncing that Congress does not possess the power of abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia." This declaration of the President is consistent with his avowed sentiments touching the Missouri question, on which he coincided with such men as Daniel D. Tompkins, De Witt Clinton, and others, whose names are a host.[A] It is consistent, also, with his recommendation in his late message, in which, speaking of the District, he strongly urges upon Congress "a thorough and careful revision of its local government," speaks of the "entire dependence" of the people of the District "upon Congress," recommends that a "uniform system of local government" be adopted, and adds, that "although it was selected as the seat of the General Government, the site of its public edifices, the depository of its archives, and the residence of officers entrusted with large amounts of public property, and the management of public business, yet it never has been subjected to, or received, that _special_ and _comprehensive_ legislation which these circumstances peculiarly demanded."

[Footnote A: Mr. Van Buren, when a member of the Senate of New-York, voted for the following preamble and resolutions, which passed unanimously:--Jan 28th, 1820. "Whereas the inhibiting the further extension of slavery in the United States, is a subject of deep concern to the people of this state: and whereas, we consider slavery as an evil much to be deplored, and that _every constitutional barrier should be interposed to prevent its further extension_: and that the constitution of the United States _clearly gives congress the right_ to require new states, not comprised within the original boundary of the United States, to _make the prohibition of slavery_ a condition of their admission into the Union: Therefore,

"Resolved, That our Senators be instructed, and our members of Congress be requested, to oppose the admission as a state into the Union, of an territory not comprised as aforesaid, without making _the prohibition of slavery_ therein an indispensable condition of admission." ]

The tenor of Mr. Tallmadge's speech on the right of petition, and of Mr. Webster's on the reception of abolition memorials, may be taken as universal exponents of the sentiments of northern statesmen as to the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia.

An explicit declaration, that an "_overwhelming majority_" of the _present_ Congress concede the power to abolish slavery in the District, has just been made by Hon. Robert Barnwell Rhett, a member of Congress from South Carolina, in a letter published in the Charleston Mercury of Dec. 27, 1837. The following is an extract:

"The time has arrived when we must have new guaranties under the constitution, or the Union must be dissolved. _Our views of the constitution are not those of the majority_. AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY _think that by the constitution, Congress may abolish slavery in the District of Columbia--may abolish the slave trade between the States; that is, it may prohibit their being carried out of the State in which they are--and prohibit it in all the territories, Florida among them. They think_, NOT WITHOUT STRONG REASONS, _that the power of Congress extends to all of these subjects_."

_Direct testimony_ to show that the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District, has always till recently been _universally conceded_, is perhaps quite superfluous. We subjoin, however, the following:

The Vice-President of the United States in his speech on the Missouri question, quoted above, after contending that the restriction of slavery in Missouri would be unconstitutional, declares, that the power of Congress over slavery in the District "COULD NOT BE QUESTIONED." In the speech of Mr. Smyth, of Va., also quoted above, he declares the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District to be "UNDOUBTED."

Mr. Sutherland, of Penn., in a speech in the House of Representatives, on the motion to print Mr. Pinckney's Report, is thus reported in the Washington Globe, of May 9th, '36. "He replied to the remark that the report conceded that Congress had a right to legislate upon the subject in the District of Columbia, and said that SUCH A RIGHT HAD NEVER BEEN, TILL RECENTLY, DENIED."

The American Quarterly Review, published at Philadelphia, with a large circulation and list of contributors in the slave states, holds the following language in the September No. 1833, p. 55: "Under this 'exclusive jurisdiction,' granted by the constitution, Congress has power to abolish slavery and the slave trade in the District of Columbia. It would hardly be necessary to state this as a distinct proposition, had it not been occasionally questioned. The truth of the assertion, however, is too obvious to admit of argument--and we believe HAS NEVER BEEN DISPUTED BY PERSONS WHO ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE CONSTITUTION."

OBJECTIONS TO THE FOREGOING CONCLUSIONS CONSIDERED.

We now proceed to notice briefly the main arguments that have been employed in Congress, and elsewhere against the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District. One of the most plausible is; that "the conditions on which Maryland and Virginia ceded the District to the United States, would be violated, if Congress should abolish slavery there." The reply to this is, that Congress had no power to _accept_ a cession coupled with conditions restricting that "power of exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such District," which was given it by the constitution.

To show the futility of the objection, we insert here the acts of cession. The cession of Maryland was made in November, 1788, and is as follows: "An act to cede to Congress a district of ten miles square in this state for the seat of the government of the United States."

"Be it enacted, by the General Assembly of Maryland, that the representatives of this state in the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States, appointed to assemble at New-York, on the first Wednesday of March next, be, and they are hereby authorized and required on the behalf of this state, to cede to the Congress of the United States, any district in this state, not exceeding ten miles square, which the Congress may fix upon, and accept for the seat of government of the United States." Laws of Md., v. 2., c. 46.

The cession of Virginia was made on the 3d of December, 1788, in the following words:

"Be it enacted by the General Assembly, That a tract of country, not exceeding ten miles square, or any lesser quantity, to be located within the limits of the State, and in any part thereof, as Congress may, by law, direct, shall be, and the same is hereby forever ceded and relinquished to the Congress and Government of the United States, in full and absolute right, and exclusive jurisdiction, as well of soil, as of persons residing or to reside thereon, pursuant to the tenor and effect of the eighth section of the first article of the government of the constitution of the United States."

But were there no provisos to these acts? The Maryland act had _none_. The Virginia act had this proviso: "Sect. 2. Provided, that nothing herein contained, shall be construed to vest in the United States any right of property in the soil, or to affect the rights of individuals _therein_, otherwise than the same shall or may be transferred by such individuals to the United States."

This specification touching the soil was merely definitive and explanatory of that clause in the act of cession, "_full and absolute right_." Instead of restraining the power of Congress on _slavery_ and other subjects, it even gives it freer course; for exceptions to _parts_ of a rule, give double confirmation to those parts not embraced in the exceptions. If it was the _design_ of the proviso to restrict congressional action on the subject of _slavery_, why is the _soil alone_ specified? As legal instruments are not paragons of economy in words, might not "John Doe," out of his abundance, and without spoiling his style, have afforded an additional word--at least a hint--that slavery was _meant_, though nothing was _said_ about it?

But again, Maryland and Virginia, in their acts of cession, declare them to be "in pursuance of" that clause of the constitution which gives to Congress "exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over" the ten miles square--thus, instead of _restricting_ that clause, both States _confirm_ it. Now, their acts of cession either accorded with that clause of the constitution, or they conflicted with it. If they conflicted with it, _accepting_ the cessions was a violation of the constitution. The fact that Congress accepted the cessions, proves that in its view their _terms_ did not conflict with its constitutional grant of power. The inquiry whether these acts of cession were consistent or inconsistent with the United States' constitution, is totally irrelevant to the question at issue. What saith the CONSTITUTION? That is the question. Not, what saith Virginia, or Maryland, or--equally to the point--John Bull! If Maryland and Virginia had been the authorized interpreters of the constitution for the Union, these acts of cession could hardly have been magnified more than they have been recently by the southern delegation in Congress. A true understanding of the constitution can be had, forsooth, only by holding it up in the light of Maryland and Virginia legislation!

We are told, again, that those States would not have ceded the District if they had supposed the constitution gave Congress power to abolish slavery in it.

This comes with an ill grace from Maryland and Virginia. They _knew_ the constitution. They were parties to it. They had sifted it clause by clause, in their State conventions. They had weighed its words in the balance--they had tested them as by fire; and finally, after long pondering, they _adopted_ the constitution. And _afterward_, self-moved, they ceded the ten miles square, and declared the cession made "in pursuance of" that oft-cited clause, "Congress shall have power to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such District." And now verily "they would not have ceded if they had _supposed_!" &c. Cede it they _did_, and in "full and absolute right both of soil and persons." Congress accepted the cession--state power over the District ceased, and congressional power over it commenced--and now, the sole question to be settled is, _the amount of power over the District, lodged in Congress by the constitution_. The constitution--THE CONSTITUTION--that is the point. Maryland and Virginia "suppositions" must be potent suppositions to abrogate a clause of the United States' Constitution! That clause either gives Congress power to abolish slavery in the District, or it does _not_--and that point is to be settled, not by state "suppositions," nor state usages, nor state legislation, but _by the terms of the clause themselves_.

Southern members of Congress, in the recent discussions, have conceded the power of a contingent abolition in the District, by suspending it upon the _consent_ of the people. Such a doctrine from _declaimers_ like Messrs. Alford, of Georgia, and Walker, of Mississippi, would excite no surprise; but that it should be honored with the endorsement of such men as Mr. Rives and Mr. Calhoun, is quite unaccountable. Are attributes of _sovereignty_ mere creatures of _contingency_? Is delegated _authority_ mere conditional _permission_? Is a _constitutional power_ to be exercised by those who hold it, only by popular _sufferance?_ Must it lie helpless at the pool of public sentiment, waiting the gracious troubling of its waters? Is it a lifeless corpse, save only when popular "consent" deigns to puff breath into its nostrils? Besides, if the consent of the people of the District be necessary, the consent of the _whole_ people must be had--not that of a majority, however large. Majorities, to be authoritative, must be _legal_--and a legal majority without legislative power, or right of representation, or even the electoral franchise, would be truly an anomaly! In the District of Columbia, such a thing as a majority in a legal sense is unknown to law. To talk of the power of a majority, or the will of a majority there, is mere mouthing. A majority? Then it has an authoritative will--and an organ to make it known--and an executive to carry it into effect--Where are they? We repeat it--if the consent of the people of the District be necessary, the consent of _every one_ is necessary--and _universal_ consent will come only with the Greek Kalends and a "perpetual motion." A single individual might thus _perpetuate_ slavery in defiance of the expressed will of a whole people. The most common form of this fallacy is given by Mr. Wise, of Virginia, in his speech, February 16, 1835, in which he denied the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District, unless the inhabitants owning slaves petitioned for it!! Southern members of Congress at the present session ring changes almost daily upon the same fallacy. What! pray Congress _to use_ a power which it _has not_? "It is required of a man according to what he _hath_," saith the Scripture. I commend Mr. Wise to Paul for his ethics. Would that he had got his _logic_ of him! If Congress does not possess the power, why taunt it with its weakness, by asking its exercise? Why mock it by demanding impossibilities? Petitioning, according to Mr. Wise, is, in matters of legislation, omnipotence itself; the very _source_ of all constitutional power; for, _asking_ Congress to do what it _cannot_ do, gives it the power--to pray the exercise of a power that is _not, creates_ it. A beautiful theory! Let us work it both ways. If to petition for the exercise of a power that is _not_, creates it--to petition against the exercise of a power that _is_, annihilates it. As southern gentlemen are partial to summary processes, pray, sirs, try the virtue of your own recipe on "exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever;" a better subject for experiment and test of the prescription could not be had. But if the petitions of the citizens of the District give Congress the _right_ to abolish slavery, they impose the _duty_; if they confer constitutional _authority_, they create constitutional _obligation_. If Congress _may_ abolish because of an expression of their will, it _must_ abolish at the bidding of that will. If the people of the District are a _source of power_ to Congress, their _expressed_ will has the force of a constitutional provision, and has the same binding power upon the National Legislature. To make Congress dependent on the District for authority, is to make it a _subject_ of its authority, restraining the exercise of its own discretion, and sinking it into a mere organ of the District's will. We proceed to another objection.

"_The southern states would not have ratified the constitution, if they had supposed that it gave this power._" It is a sufficient answer to this objection, that the northern states would not have ratified it, if they had supposed that it _withheld_ the power. If "suppositions" are to take the place of the constitution--coming from both sides, they neutralize each other. To argue a constitutional question by _guessing_ at the "suppositions" that might have been made by the parties to it, would find small favor in a court of law. But even a desperate shift is some easement when sorely pushed. If this question is to be settled by "suppositions" suppositions shall be forthcoming, and that without stint.

First, then, I affirm that the North ratified the constitution, "supposing" that slavery had begun to wax old, and would speedily vanish away, and especially that the abolition of the slave trade, which by the constitution was to be surrendered to Congress after twenty years, would cast it headlong.

Would the North have adopted the constitution, giving three-fifths of the "slave property" a representation, if it had "supposed" that the slaves would have increased from half a million to two millions and a half by 1838--and that the census of 1840 would give to the slave states thirty representatives of "slave property?"

If they had "supposed" that this representation would have controlled the legislation of the government, and carried against the North every question vital to its interests, would Hamilton, Franklin, Sherman, Gerry, Livingston, Langdon, and Rufus King have been such madmen, as to sign the constitution, and the Northern States such suicides as to ratify it? Every self-preserving instinct would have shrieked at such an infatuate immolation. At the adoption of the United States constitution, slavery was regarded as a fast waning system. This conviction was universal. Washington, Jefferson, Henry, Grayson, Tucker, Madison, Wythe, Pendleton, Lee, Blair, Mason, Page, Parker, Randolph, Iredell, Spaight, Ramsey, Pinkney, Martin, McHenry, Chase, and nearly all the illustrious names south of the Potomac, proclaimed it before the sun. A reason urged in the convention that formed the United States constitution, why the word slave should not be used in it, was, that _when slavery should cease_, there might remain upon the National Charter no record that it had ever been. (See speech of Mr. Burrill, of R.I., on the Missouri question.)

I now proceed to show by testimony, that at the date of the United States constitution, and for several years before and after that period, slavery was rapidly on the wane; that the American Revolution with the great events preceding, accompanying, and following it, had wrought an immense and almost universal change in the public sentiment of the nation on the subject, powerfully impelling it toward the entire abolition of the system--and that it was the _general belief_ that measures for its abolition throughout the Union, would be commenced by the individual States generally before the lapse of many years. A great mass of testimony establishing this position might be presented, but narrow space, and the importance of speedy publication, counsel brevity. Let the following proofs suffice. First, a few dates as points of observation.

The first _general_ Congress met in 1774. The revolutionary war commenced in '75. Independence was declared in '76. The articles of confederation were adopted by the thirteen states in '78. Independence acknowledged in '83. The convention for forming the U.S. constitution was held in '87, the state conventions for considering it in '87, and '88. The first Congress under the constitution in '89.

Dr. Rush, of Pennsylvania, one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, in a letter to Granville Sharpe, May 1, 1773, says "A spirit of humanity and religion begins to awaken in several of the colonies in favor of the poor negroes. Great events have been brought about by small beginnings. _Anthony Benezet stood alone a few years ago in opposing negro slavery in Philadelphia_, and NOW THREE-FOURTHS OF THE PROVINCE AS WELL AS OF THE CITY CRY OUT AGAINST IT."--[Stuart's Life of Sharpe, p. 21.]

In the preamble to the act prohibiting the importation of slaves into Rhode Island, June, 1774, is the following: "Whereas the inhabitants of America are generally engaged in the preservation of their own rights and liberties, among which that of personal freedom must be considered the greatest, and as those who are desirous of enjoying all the advantages of liberty themselves, _should be willing to extend personal liberty to others_, therefore," &c.

October 20, 1774, the Continental Congress passed the following: "We, for ourselves and the inhabitants of the several colonies whom we represent, _firmly agree and associate under the sacred ties of virtue, honor, and love of our country_, as follows:

"2d Article. We _will neither import nor purchase any slaves imported_ after the first day of December next, after which time we will _wholly discontinue_ the slave trade, and we will neither be concerned in it ourselves, nor will we hire our vessels, nor sell our commodities or manufactures to those who are concerned in it."

The Continental Congress, in 1775, setting forth the causes and the necessity for taking up arms, say: "_If it were possible_ for men who exercise their reason to believe that the divine Author of our existence intended a part of the human race to _hold an absolute property in, and unbounded power over others_," &c.

In 1776, Dr. Hopkins, then at the head of New England divines, in "An Address to the owners of negro slaves in the American colonies," says: "The conviction of the unjustifiableness of this practice (slavery) has been _increasing_, and _greatly spreading of late_, and _many_ who have had slaves, have found themselves so unable to justify their own conduct in holding them in bondage, as to be induced to _set them at liberty_. * * * * Slavery is, _in every instance_, wrong, unrighteous, and oppressive--a very great and crying sin--_there being nothing of the kind equal to it on the face of the earth._"

The same year the American Congress issued a solemn MANIFESTO to the world. These were its first words: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." _Once_, these were words of power; _now_, "a rhetorical flourish."

The celebrated Patrick Henry of Virginia, in a letter, of Jan. 18, 1773, to Robert Pleasants, afterwards president of the Virginia Abolition Society, says: "Believe me, I shall honor the Quakers for their noble efforts to abolish slavery. It is a debt we owe to the purity of our religion to show that it is at variance with that law that warrants slavery. I exhort you to persevere in so worthy a resolution."

In 1779, the Continental Congress ordered a pamphlet to be published, entitled, "Observations on the American Revolution," from which the following is an extract: "The great principle (of government) is and ever will remain in force, _that men are by nature free_; and so long as we have any idea of divine _justice_, we must associate that of _human freedom_. It is _conceded on all hands, that the right to be free_ CAN NEVER BE ALIENATED."

Extract from the Pennsylvania act for the abolition of slavery, passed March 1, 1780: * * "We conceive that it is our duty, and we rejoice that it is in our power, to extend a portion of that freedom to others which has been extended to us. Weaned by a long course of experience from those narrow prejudices and partialities we had imbibed, we find our hearts enlarged with kindness and benevolence towards men of all conditions and nations: * * * Therefore be it enacted, that no child born hereafter be a slave," &c.

Jefferson, in his Notes on Virginia, written just before the close of the Revolutionary War, says: "I think a change already perceptible since the origin of the present revolution. The spirit of the master is abating, that of the slave is rising from the dust, his condition mollifying, _the way I hope preparing under the auspices of heaven_, FOR A TOTAL EMANCIPATION."

In a letter to Dr. Price, of London, who had just published a pamphlet in favor of the abolition of slavery, Mr. Jefferson, then minister at Paris, (August 7, 1785,) says: "From the mouth to the head of the Chesapeake, _the bulk of the people will approve of your pamphlet in theory_, and it will find a respectable minority ready to _adopt it in practice_--a minority which, for weight and worth of character, _preponderates against the greater number_." Speaking of Virginia, he says: "This is the next state to which we may turn our eyes for the interesting spectacle of justice in conflict with avarice and oppression,--a conflict in which THE SACRED SIDE IS GAINING DAILY RECRUITS. Be not, therefore, discouraged--what you have written will do a _great deal of good_; and could you still trouble yourself with our welfare, no man is more able to give aid to the laboring side. The College of William and Mary, since the remodelling of its plan, is the place where are collected together all the young men of Virginia, under preparation for public life. They are there under the direction (most of them) of a Mr. Wythe, one of the most virtuous of characters, and _whose sentiments on the subject of slavery are unequivocal._ I am satisfied, if you could resolve to address an exhortation to those young men with all that eloquence of which you are master, that _its influence on the future decision of this important question would be great, perhaps decisive._ Thus, you see, that so far from thinking you have cause to repent of what you have done, _I wish you to do more, and wish it on an assurance of its effect._"--Jefferson's Posthumous Works, vol. 1, p. 268.

In 1786, John Jay drafted and signed a petition to the Legislature of New York, on the subject of slavery, beginning with these words: "Your memorialists being deeply affected by the situation of those, who, although FREE BY THE LAW OF GOD, are held in slavery by the laws of the State," &c. This memorial bore also the signatures of the celebrated Alexander Hamilton; Robert R. Livingston, afterward Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the United States, and Chancellor of the State of New-York; James Duane, Major of the City of New-York, and many others of the most eminent individuals in the State.

In the preamble of an instrument, by which Mr. Jay emancipated a slave in 1784, is the following passage:

"Whereas, the children of men are by nature equally free, and cannot, without injustice, be either reduced to or HELD in slavery."

In his letter while Minister at Spain, in 1786, he says, speaking of the abolition of slavery: "Till America comes into this measure, her prayers to heaven will be IMPIOUS. I believe God governs the world; and I believe it to be a maxim in his, as in our court, that those who ask for equity _ought to do it._"

In 1785, the New-York Manumission Society was formed. John Jay was chosen its first President, and held the office for five years. Alexander Hamilton was its second President, and after holding the office one year, resigned upon his removal to Philadelphia as Secretary of the United States' Treasury. In 1787, the Pennsylvania Abolition Society was formed. Benjamin Franklin, warm from the discussions of the convention that formed the U.S. constitution, was chosen President, and Benjamin Rush, Secretary--both signers of the Declaration of Independence. In 1789, the Maryland Abolition Society was formed. Among its officers were Samuel Chace, Judge of the U.S. Supreme Court, and Luther Martin, a member of the convention that formed the U.S. constitution. In 1790, the Connecticut Abolition Society was formed. The first President was Rev. Dr. Stiles, President of Yale College, and the Secretary, Simeon Baldwin, (the late Judge Baldwin of New Haven.) In 1791, this Society sent a memorial to Congress, from which the following is an extract:

"From a sober conviction of the unrighteousness of slavery, your petitioners have long beheld, with grief, our fellow men doomed to perpetual bondage, in a country which boasts of her freedom. Your petitioners are fully of opinion; that calm reflection will at last convince the world, that the whole system of African slavery IS unjust in its nature--impolitic in its principles--and, in its consequences, ruinous to the industry and enterprise of the citizens of these States. From a conviction of those truths, your petitioners were led, by motives, we conceive, of general philanthropy, to associate ourselves for the protection and assistance of this unfortunate part of our fellow men; and, though this Society has been _lately_ established, it has now become _generally extensive_ through this state, and, we fully believe, _embraces, on this subject, the sentiments of a large majority of its citizens._"

The same year the Virginia Abolition Society was formed. This Society, and the Maryland Society, had auxiliaries in different parts of those States. Both societies sent up memorials to Congress. The memorial of the Virginia Society is headed--"The memorial of the _Virginia Society_, for promoting the Abolition of Slavery, &c." The following is an extract:

"Your memorialists, fully believing that slavery is not only an odious degradation, but an _outrageous violation of one of the most essential rights of human nature, and utterly repugnant to the precepts of the gospel_, lament that a practice so inconsistent with true policy and the inalienable rights of men, should subsist in so enlightened an age, and among a people professing, that all mankind are, by nature, equally entitled to freedom."

About the same time a Society was formed in New Jersey. It had an acting committee of five members in each county in the State. The following is an extract from the preamble to its constitution:

"It is our boast, that we live under a government wherein _life_, _liberty_, and the _pursuit of happiness_, are recognized as the universal rights of men; and whilst we are anxious to preserve these rights to ourselves, and transmit them inviolate, to our posterity, we _abhor that inconsistent, illiberal, and interested policy, which withholds those rights from an unfortunate and degraded class of our fellow creatures._"

Among other distinguished individuals who were efficient officers of these Abolition Societies, and delegates from their respective state societies, at the annual meetings of the American convention for promoting the abolition of slavery, were Hon. Uriah Tracy, United States' Senator, from Connecticut; Hon. Zephaniah Swift, Chief Justice of the same State; Hon. Cesar A. Rodney, Attorney General of the United States; Hon. James A. Bayard, United States' Senator, from Delaware; Governor Bloomfield, of New-Jersey; Hon. Wm. Rawle, the late venerable head of the Philadelphia bar; Dr. Caspar Wistar, of Philadelphia; Messrs. Foster and Tillinghast, of Rhode Island; Messrs. Ridgely, Buchanan, and Wilkinson, of Maryland; and Messrs. Pleasants, McLean, and Anthony, of Virginia.

In July, 1787, the old Congress passed the celebrated ordinance abolishing slavery in the northwestern territory, and declaring that it should never thereafter exist there. This ordinance was passed while the convention that formed the United States' constitution was in session. At the first session of Congress under the constitution, this ordinance was ratified by a special act. Washington, fresh from the discussions of the convention, in which _more than forty days had been spent in adjusting the question of slavery, gave it his approval._ The act passed with only one dissenting voice, (that of Mr. Yates, of New York,) _the South equally with the North avowing the fitness and expediency of the measure on general considerations, and indicating thus early the line of national policy, to be pursued by the United States' Government on the subject of slavery_.

In the debates in the North Carolina Convention, Mr. Iredell, afterward a Judge of the United States' Supreme Court, said, "_When the entire abolition of slavery takes place_, it will be an event which must be pleasing to every generous mind and every friend of human nature." Mr. Galloway said, "I wish to see this abominable trade put an end to. I apprehend the clause (touching the slave trade) means _to bring forward manumission_." Luther Martin, of Maryland, a member of the convention that formed the United States Constitution, said, "We ought to authorize the General Government to make such regulations as shall be thought most advantageous for _the gradual abolition of slavery_, and the _emancipation of the slaves_ which are already in the States." Judge Wilson, of Pennsylvania, one of the framers of the constitution, said, in the Pennsylvania convention of '87, [Deb. Pa. Con. p. 303, 156:] "I consider this (the clause relative to the slave trade) as laying the foundation for _banishing slavery out of this country_. It will produce the same kind of gradual change which was produced in Pennsylvania; the new states which are to be formed will be under the control of Congress in this particular, and _slaves will never be introduced_ among them. It presents us with the pleasing prospect that the rights of mankind will be acknowledged and established _throughout the Union_. Yet the lapse of a few years, and Congress will have power to _exterminate slavery_ within our borders." In the Virginia convention of '87, Mr. Mason, author of the Virginia constitution, said, "The augmentation of slaves weakens the States, and such a trade is _diabolical_ in itself, and disgraceful to mankind. As much as I value a union of all the states, I would not admit the southern states, (i.e., South Carolina and Georgia,) into the union, _unless they agree to a discontinuance of this disgraceful trade_." Mr. Tyler opposed with great power the clause prohibiting the abolition of the slave trade till 1808, and said, "My earnest desire is, that it shall be handed down to posterity that I oppose this wicked clause." Mr. Johnson said, "The principle of emancipation _has begun since the revolution. Let us do what we will, it will come round_."--[Deb. Va. Con. p. 463.] Patrick Henry, arguing the power of Congress under the United States' constitution to abolish slavery in the States, said, in the same convention, "Another thing will contribute to bring this event (the abolition of slavery) about. Slavery is _detested_. We feel its fatal effects; we deplore it with all the pity of humanity."--[Deb. Va. Con. p. 431.] In the Mass. Con. of '88, Judge Dawes said, "Although slavery is not smitten by an apoplexy, yet _it has received a mortal wound_, and will die of consumption."--[Deb. Mass. Con. p. 60.] General Heath said that, "Slavery was confined to the States _now existing_, it _could not be extended_. By their ordinance, Congress had declared that the new States should be republican States, _and have no slavery_."--p. 147.

In the debate, in the first Congress, February 11th and 12th, 1789, on the petitions of the Society of Friends, and the Pennsylvania Abolition Society, Mr. Parker, of Virginia, said, "I cannot help expressing the pleasure I feel in finding _so considerable a part_ of the community attending to matters of such a momentous concern to the _future prosperity_ and happiness of the people of America. I think it my duty, as a citizen of the Union, _to espouse their cause_."

Mr. Page, of Virginia, (afterward Governor)--"Was _in favor_ of the commitment; he hoped that the designs of the respectable memorialists would not be stopped at the threshold, in order to preclude a fair discussion of the prayer of the memorial. With respect to the alarm that was apprehended, he conjectured there was none; but there might be just cause, if the memorial was _not_ taken into consideration. He placed himself in the case of a slave, and said, that on hearing that Congress had refused to listen to the decent suggestions of a respectable part of the community, he should infer, that the general government, _from which was expected great good would result to_ EVERY CLASS _of citizens_, had shut their ears against the voice of humanity, and he should despair of any alleviation of the miseries he and his posterity had in prospect; if any thing could induce him to rebel, it must be a stroke like this, impressing on his mind all the horrors of despair. But if he was told, that application was made in his behalf, and that Congress were willing to hear what could be urged in favor of discouraging the practice of importing his fellow-wretches, he would trust in their justice and humanity, and _wait the decision patiently_."

Mr. Scott of Pennsylvania: "I cannot, for my part, conceive how any person _can be said to acquire a property in another_. Let us argue on principles countenanced by reason, and becoming humanity. _I do not know how far I might go, if I was one of the judges of the United States, and those people were to came before me and claim their emancipation, but I am sure I would go as far as I could_."

Mr. Burke, of South Carolina, said, "He _saw the disposition of the House_, and he feared it would he referred to a committee, maugre all their opposition."

Mr. Smith of South Carolina, said, "That on entering into this government, they (South Carolina and Georgia) apprehended that the other states, * * _would, from motives of humanity and benevolence, be led to vote for a general emancipation_."

In the debate, at the same session, May 13th, 1789, on the petition of the Society of Friends respecting the slave trade, Mr. Parker, of Virginia, said, "He hoped Congress would do all that lay in their power _to restore to human nature its inherent privileges_. The inconsistency in our principles, with which we are justly charged _should be done away_."

Mr. Jackson, of Georgia, said, "IT WAS THE FASHION OF THE DAY TO FAVOR THE LIBERTY OF THE SLAVES. * * * * Will Virginia set her negroes free? _When this practice comes to be tried, then the sound of liberty will lose those charms which make it grateful to the ravished ear_."

Mr. Madison, of Virginia,--"The dictates of humanity, the principles of the people, the national safety and happiness, and prudent policy, require it of us. * * * * I conceive the constitution in this particular was formed in order that the Government, whilst it was restrained from laying a total prohibition, might be able to _give some testimony of the sense of America_, with respect to the African trade. * * * * It is to be hoped, that by expressing a national disapprobation of this trade, we may destroy it, and save ourselves from reproaches, AND OUR POSTERITY THE IMBECILITY EVER ATTENDANT ON A COUNTRY FILLED WITH SLAVES. If there is any one point in which it is clearly the policy of this nation, so far as we constitutionally can, _to vary the practice_ obtaining under some of the state governments, it is this. But it is _certain_ a majority of the states are _opposed to this practice_."--Cong. Reg. v. 1, p. 308-12.

A writer in the "Gazette of the United States," Feb. 20th, 1790, (then the government paper,) who opposes the abolition of slavery, and avows himself a _slaveholder_, says, "I have seen in the papers accounts of _large associations_, and applications to Government for _the abolition of slavery_. Religion, humanity, and the generosity natural to a free people, are the _noble principles which dictate those measures_. SUCH MOTIVES COMMAND RESPECT, AND ARE ABOVE ANY EULOGIUM WORDS CAN BESTOW."

In the convention that formed the constitution of Kentucky in 1790, the effort to prohibit slavery was nearly successful. A decided majority of that body would undoubtedly have voted for its exclusion, but for the great efforts and influence of two large slaveholders--men of commanding talents and sway--Messrs. Breckenridge and Nicholas. The following extract from a speech made in that convention by a member of it, Mr. Rice a native Virginian, is a specimen of the _free discussion_ that prevailed on that "delicate subject." Said Mr. Rice: "I do a man greater injury, when I deprive him of his liberty, than when I deprive him of his property. It is vain for me to plead that I have the sanction of law; for this makes the injury the greater--it arms the community against him, and makes his case desperate. The owners of such slaves then are _licensed robbers_, and not the just proprietors of what they claim. Freeing them is not depriving them of property, but _restoring it to the right owner_. In America, a slave is a standing monument of the tyranny and inconsistency of human governments. The master is the enemy of the slave; he _has made open war upon him_, AND IS DAILY CARRYING IT ON in unremitted efforts. Can any one imagine, then, that the slave is indebted to his master, and _bound to serve him_? Whence can the obligation arise? What is it founded upon? What is my duty to an enemy that is carrying on war against me? I do not deny, but in some circumstances, it is the duty of the slave to serve; but it is a duty he owes himself, and not his master."

President Edwards, the younger, said, in a sermon preached before the Connecticut Abolition Society, Sept. 15, 1791: "Thirty years ago, scarcely a man in this country thought either the slave trade or the slavery of negroes to be wrong; but now how many and able advocates in private life, in our legislatures, in Congress, have appeared, and have openly and irrefragably pleaded the rights of humanity in this as well as other instances? And if we judge of the future by the past, _within fifty years from this time, it will be as shameful for a man to hold a negro slave, as to be guilty of common robbery or theft_."

In 1794, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian church adopted its "Scripture proofs," notes, comments, &c. Among these was the following:

"1 Tim. i. 10. The law is made for manstealers. This crime among the Jews exposed the perpetrators of it to capital punishment. Exodus xxi. 16. And the apostle here classes them with _sinners of the first rank_. The word he uses, in its original import comprehends all who are concerned in bringing any of the human race into slavery, or in _retaining_ them in it. _Stealers of men_ are all those who bring off slaves or freemen, and _keep_, sell, or buy them."

In 1794, Dr. Rush declared: "Domestic slavery is repugnant to the principles of Christianity. It prostrates every benevolent and just principle of action in the human heart. It is rebellion against the authority of a common Father. It is a practical denial of the extent and efficacy of the death of a common Savior. It is an usurpation of the prerogative of the great Sovereign of the universe, who has solemnly claimed an exclusive property in the souls of men."

In 1790, Mr. Fiske, then an officer of Dartmouth College, afterward a Judge in Tennessee, said, in an oration published that year, speaking of slaves: "I steadfastly maintain, that we must bring them to _an equal standing, in point of privileges, with the whites_! They must enjoy all the rights belonging to human nature."

When the petition on the abolition of the slave trade was under discussion in the Congress of '89, Mr. Brown, of North Carolina, said, "The emancipation of the slaves _will be effected_ in time; it ought to be a gradual business, but he hoped that Congress would not _precipitate_ it to the great injury of the southern States." Mr. Hartley, of Pennsylvania, said, in the same debate, "_He was not a little surprised to hear the cause of slavery advocated in that house._" WASHINGTON, in a letter to Sir John Sinclair, says, "There are, in Pennsylvania, laws for the gradual abolition of slavery which neither Maryland nor Virginia have at present, but which _nothing is more certain_ than that they _must have_, and at a period NOT REMOTE." In 1782, Virginia passed her celebrated manumission act. Within nine years from that time nearly eleven thousand slaves were voluntarily emancipated by their masters. Judge Tucker's "Dissertation on Slavery," p. 72. In 1787, Maryland passed an act legalizing manumission. Mr. Dorsey, of Maryland, in a speech in Congress, December 27th, 1826, speaking of manumissions under that act, said, that "_The progress of emancipation was astonishing_, the State became crowded with a free black population."

The celebrated William Pinkney, in a speech before the Maryland House of Delegates, in 1789, on the emancipation of slaves, said, "Sir, by the eternal principles of natural justice, _no master in the state has a right to hold his slave in bondage for a single hour_.... I would as soon believe the incoherent tale of a schoolboy, who should tell me he had been frightened by a ghost, as that the grant of this permission (to emancipate) ought in any degree to alarm us. Are we apprehensive that these men will become more dangerous by becoming freemen? Are we alarmed, lest by being admitted into the enjoyment of civil rights, they will be inspired with a deadly enmity against the rights of others? Strange, unaccountable paradox! How much more rational would it be, to argue that the natural enemy of the privileges of a freeman, is he who is robbed of them himself! Dishonorable to the species is the idea that they would ever prove injurious to our interests--released from the shackles of slavery, by the justice of government and the bounty of individuals--the want of fidelity and attachment would be next to impossible."

Hon. James Campbell, in an address before the Pennsylvania Society of the Cincinnati, July 4, 1787, said, "Our separation from Great Britain has extended the empire of humanity. The time _is not far distant_ when our sister states, in imitation of our example, _shall turn their vassals into freemen_." The Convention that formed the United States' Constitution being then in session, attended at the delivery of this oration with General Washington at their head.

A Baltimore paper of September 8th, 1780, contains the following notice of Major General Gates: "A few days ago passed through this town the Hon. General Gates and lady. The General, previous to leaving Virginia, summoned his numerous family of slaves about him, and amidst their tears of affection and gratitude, gave them their FREEDOM."

In 1791 the university of William and Mary, in Virginia, conferred upon Granville Sharpe the degree of Doctor of Laws. Sharpe was at that time the acknowledged head of British abolitionists. His indefatigable exertions, prosecuted for years in the case of Somerset, procured that memorable decision in the Court of King's Bench, which settled the principle that no slave could be held in England. He was most uncompromising in his opposition to slavery, and for twenty years previous he had spoken, written, and accomplished more against it than any man living.

In the "Memoirs of the Revolutionary War in the Southern Department," by Gen. Lee, of Va., Commandant of the Partizan Legion, is the following: "The Constitution of the United States, adopted lately with so much difficulty, has effectually provided against this evil, (by importation) after a few years. It is much to be lamented that having done so much in this way, _a provision had not been made for the gradual abolition of slavery_."--p. 233, 4.

Mr. Tucker, of Virginia, Judge of the Supreme Court of that state, and professor of law in the University of William and Mary, addressed a letter to the General Assembly of that state, in 1796, urging the abolition of slavery; from which the following is an extract. Speaking of the slaves in Virginia, he says: "Should we not, at the time of the revolution, have loosed their chains and broken their fetters; or if the difficulties and dangers of such an experiment prohibited the attempt, during the convulsions of a revolution, is it not our duty, _to embrace the first moment_ of constitutional health and vigor to effectuate so desirable an object, and to remove from us a stigma with which our enemies will never fail to upbraid us, nor our consciences to reproach us?"

Mr. Faulkner, in a speech before the Virginia Legislature, Jan. 20, 1832, said--"The idea of a gradual emancipation and removal of the slaves from this commonwealth, is coeval with the declaration of our independence from the British yoke. It sprung into existence during the first session of the General Assembly, subsequent to the formation of your republican government. When Virginia stood sustained in her legislation by the pure and philosophic intellect of Pendleton--by the patriotism of Mason and Lee--by the searching vigor and sagacity of Wythe, and by the all-embracing, all-comprehensive genius of Thomas Jefferson! Sir, it was a committee composed of those five illustrious men, who, in 1777, submitted to the general assembly of this state, then in session, _a plan for the gradual emancipation of the slaves of this commonwealth_."

Hon. Benjamin Watkins Leigh, late United States' senator from Virginia, in his letters to the people of Virginia, in 1832, signed Appomattox, p. 43, says: "I thought, till very lately, that it was known to every body that during the Revolution, _and for many years after, the abolition of slavery was a favorite topic with many of our ablest statesmen_, who entertained, with respect, all the schemes which wisdom or ingenuity could suggest for accomplishing the object. Mr. Wythe, to the day of his death, _was for a simple abolition, considering the objection to color as founded in prejudice_. By degrees, all projects of the kind were abandoned. Mr. Jefferson _retained_ his opinion, and now we have these projects revived."

Governor Barbour, of Virginia, in his speech in the U.S. Senate, on the Missouri question, Jan. 1820, said:--"We are asked why has Virginia _changed her policy_ in reference to slavery? That the sentiments of _our most distinguished men_, for thirty years _entirely corresponded_ with the course which the friends of the restriction (of slavery in Missouri) now advocated; and that the Virginia delegation, one of whom was the late President of the United States, voted for the restriction, (of slavery) in the northwestern territory, and that Mr. Jefferson has delineated a gloomy picture of the baneful effects of slavery. When it is recollected that the Notes of Mr. Jefferson were written during the progress of the revolution, it is no matter of surprise that the writer should have imbibed a large portion of that enthusiasm which such an occasion was so well calculated to produce. As to the consent of the Virginia delegation to the restriction in question, whether the result of a disposition to restrain the slave trade indirectly, or the influence of that enthusiasm to which I have just alluded, * * * * it is not now important to decide. We have witnessed its effects. The liberality of Virginia, or, as the result may prove, her folly, which submitted to, or, if you will, PROPOSED _this measure_, (abolition of slavery in the N.W. territory) has eventuated in effects which speak a monitory lesson. _How is the representation from this quarter on the present question?_"

Mr. Imlay, in his early history of Kentucky, p. 185, says: "We have disgraced the fair face of humanity, and trampled upon the sacred privileges of man, at the very moment that we were exclaiming against the tyranny of your (the English) ministry. But in contending for the birthright of freedom, we have learned to feel _for the bondage of others_, and in the libations we offer to the goddess of liberty, we _contemplate an emancipation of the slaves of this country_, as honorable to themselves as it will be glorious to us."

In the debate in Congress, Jan, 20, 1806, on Mr. Sloan's motion to lay a tax on the importation of slaves, Mr. Clark of Va. said: "He was no advocate for a system of slavery." Mr. Marion, of S. Carolina, said: "He never had purchased, nor should he ever purchase a slave." Mr. Southard said: "Not revenue, but an expression of the _national sentiment_ is the principal object." Mr. Smilie--"I rejoice that the word (slave) is not in the constitution; its not being there does honor to the worthies who would not suffer it to become a _part_ of it." Mr. Alston, of N. Carolina--"In two years we shall have the power to prohibit the trade altogether. Then this House will be UNANIMOUS. No one will object to our exercising our full constitutional powers." National Intelligencer, Jan. 24, 1806.

These witnesses need no vouchers to entitle them to credit; nor their testimony comments to make it intelligible--their _names_ are their _endorsers_ and their strong words their own interpreters. We wave all comments. Our readers are of age. Whosoever hath ears to _hear_, let him HEAR. And whosoever will not hear the fathers of the revolution, the founders of the government, its chief magistrates, judges, legislators and sages, who dared and periled all under the burdens, and in the heat of the day that tried men's souls--then "neither will he be persuaded though THEY rose from the dead."

Some of the points established by the testimony are--The universal expectation that the _moral_ influence of Congress, of state legislatures, of seminaries of learning, of churches, of the ministers of religion, and of public sentiment widely embodied in abolition societies, would be exerted against slavery, calling forth by argument and appeal the moral sense of the nation, and creating a power of opinion that would abolish the system throughout the union. In a word, that free speech and a free press would be wielded against slavery without ceasing and without restriction. Full well did the south know, not only that the national government would probably legislate against slavery wherever the constitution placed it within its reach, but she knew also that Congress had already marked out the line of national policy to be pursued on the subject--had committed itself before the world to a course of action against slavery, wherever she could move upon it without encountering a conflicting jurisdiction--that the nation had established by solemn ordinance memorable precedent for subsequent action, by abolishing slavery in the northwest territory, and by declaring that it should never thenceforward exist there; and this too, as soon as by cession of Virginia and other states, the territory came under Congressional control. The south knew also that the sixth article in the ordinance prohibiting slavery was first proposed by the largest slaveholding state in the confederacy--that the chairman of the committee that reported the ordinance was a slaveholder--that the ordinance was enacted by Congress during the session of the convention that formed the United States Constitution--that the provisions of the ordinance were, both while in prospect, and when under discussion, matters of universal notoriety and _approval_ with all parties, and when finally passed, received the vote _of every member of Congress from each of the slaveholding states_. The south also had every reason for believing that the first Congress under the constitution would _ratify_ that ordinance--as it _did_ unanimously.

A crowd of reflections, suggested by the preceding testimony, press for utterance. The right of petition ravished and trampled by its constitutional guardians, and insult and defiance hurled in the faces of the SOVEREIGN PEOPLE while calmly remonstrating _with their_ SERVANTS for violence committed on the nation's charter and their own dearest rights! Add to this "the right of peaceably assembling" violently wrested--the rights of minorities, _rights_ no longer--free speech struck dumb--free _men_ outlawed and murdered--free presses cast into the streets and their fragments strewed with shoutings, or flourished in triumph before the gaze of approving crowds as proud members of prostrate law!

The spirit and power of our fathers, where are they? Their deep homage always and every where rendered to FREE THOUGHT, with its _inseparable signs--free speech and a free press_--their reverence for justice, liberty, _rights_ and all-pervading law, where are they?

But we turn from these considerations--though the times on which we have fallen, and those towards which we are borne with headlong haste, call for their discussion as with the voices of departing life--and proceed to topics relevant to the argument before us.

The seventh article of the amendments to the constitution is alleged to withhold from Congress the power to abolish slavery in the District. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." All the slaves in the District have been "deprived of liberty" by legislative acts. Now, these legislative acts "depriving" them "of liberty," were either "due process of law," or they were _not_. If they _were_, then a legislative act, taking from the master that "property" which is the identical "liberty" previously taken from the slave, would be "due process of law" _also_, and of course a _constitutional_ act; but if the legislative acts "depriving" them of "liberty" were _not_ "due process of law," then the slaves were deprived of liberty _unconstitutionally_, and these acts are _void_. In that case the _constitution emancipates them_.

If the objector reply, by saying that the import of the phrase "due process of law," is _judicial_ process solely, it is granted, and that fact is our rejoinder; for no slave in the District _has_ been deprived of his liberty by "a judicial process," or, in other words, by "due process of law;" consequently, upon the objector's own admission, every slave in the District has been deprived of liberty _unconstitutionally_, and is therefore _free by the constitution_. This is asserted only of the slaves under the "exclusive legislation" of Congress.

The last clause of the article under consideration is quoted for the same purpose: "Nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." Each of the state constitutions has a clause of similar purport. The abolition of slavery in the District by Congress, would not, as we shall presently show, violate this clause either directly or by implication. Granting for argument's sake, that slaves are "private property," and that to emancipate them, would be to "take private property" for "public use," the objector admits the power of Congress to do _this_, provided it will do something _else_, that is, _pay_ for them. Thus, instead of denying the _power_, the objector not only admits, but _affirms_ it, as the ground of the inference that compensation must accompany it. So far from disproving the existence of _one_ power, the objector asserts the existence of _two_--one, the power to take the slaves from their masters, the other, the power to take the property of the United States to pay for them.

If Congress cannot constitutionally impair the right of private property, or take it without compensation, it cannot constitutionally, _legalise_ the perpetration of such acts, by _others_, nor _protect_ those who commit them. Does the power to rob a man of his earnings, rob the earner of his right to them? Who has a better right to the _product_ than the producer?--to the _interest_, than the owner of the _principal_?--to the hands and arms, than he from whose shoulders they swing?--to the body and soul, than he whose they _are_? Congress not only impairs but annihilates the right of private property, while it withholds from the slaves of the District their title to _themselves_. What! Congress powerless to protect a man's right to _himself_, when it can make inviolable the right to a _dog_! But, waving this, I deny that the abolition of slavery in the District would violate this clause. What does the clause prohibit? The "taking" of "private property" for "public use." Suppose Congress should emancipate the slaves in the District, what would it "_take_?" Nothing. What would it _hold_? Nothing. What would it put to "public use?" Nothing. Instead of _taking_ "private property," Congress, by abolishing slavery, would say "_private property_ shall not _be_ taken; and those who have been robbed of it already, shall be kept out of it no longer; and since every man's right to his own body is _paramount_, he shall be protected in it." True, Congress may not arbitrarily take property, _as_ property, from one man and give it to another--and in the abolition of slavery no such thing is done. A legislative act changes the _condition_ of the slave--makes him his own _proprietor_ instead of the property of another. It determines a question of _original right_ between two classes of persons--doing an act of justice to one, and restraining the other from acts of injustice; or, in other words, preventing one from robbing the other, by granting to the injured party the protection of just and equitable laws.

Congress, by an act of abolition, would change the condition of seven thousand "persons" in the District, but would "take" nothing. To construe this provision so as to enable the citizens of the District to hold as property, and in perpetuity, whatever they please, or to hold it as property in all circumstances--all necessity, public welfare, and the will and power of the government to the contrary notwithstanding--is a total perversion of its whole _intent_. The _design_ of the provision, was to throw up a barrier against Governmental aggrandizement. The right to "take property" for _State uses_ is one thing;--the right so to adjust the _tenures_ by which property is held, that _each may have his own secured to him_, is another thing, and clearly within the scope of legislation. Besides, if Congress were to "take" the slaves in the District, it would be _adopting_, not abolishing slavery--becoming a slaveholder itself, instead of requiring others to be such no longer. The clause in question, prohibits the "taking" of individual property for public uses, to be employed or disposed of as property for governmental purposes. Congress, by abolishing slavery in the District, would do no such thing. It would merely change the _condition_ of that which has been recognised as a qualified property by congressional acts, though previously declared "persons" by the constitution. More than this is done continually by Congress and every other Legislature. Property the most absolute and unqualified, is annihilated by legislative acts. The embargo and non-intercourse act, prostrated at a stroke, a forest of shipping, and sunk millions of capital. To say nothing of the power of Congress to take hundreds of millions from the people by direct taxation, who doubts its power to abolish at once the whole tariff system, change the seat of Government, arrest the progress of national works, prohibit any branch of commerce with the Indian tribes or with foreign nations, change the locality of forts, arsenals, magazines, dock yards, &c., to abolish the Post Office system, the privilege of patents and copyrights, &c. By such acts Congress might, in the exercise of its acknowledged powers, annihilate property to an incalculable amount, and that without becoming liable to claims for compensation.

Finally, this clause prohibits the taking for public use of "_property_." The constitution of the United States does not recognise slaves as "PROPERTY" any where, and it does not recognise them in _any sense_ in the District of Columbia. All allusions to them in the constitution recognise them as "persons." Every reference to them points _solely_ to the element of _personality_; and thus, by the strongest implication, declares that the constitution _knows_ them only as "persons," and _will_ not recognise them in any other light. If they escape into free States, the constitution authorizes their being taken back. But how? Not as the property of an "owner," but as "persons;" and the peculiarity of the expression is a marked recognition of their _personality_--a refusal to recognise them as chattels--"persons _held_ to service." Are _oxen_ "_held_ to service?" That can be affirmed only of _persons_. Again, slaves give political power as "persons." The constitution, in settling the principle of representation, requires their enumeration in the census. How? As property? Then why not include race horses and game cocks? Slaves, like other inhabitants, are enumerated as "persons." So by the constitution, the government was pledged to non-interference with "the migration or importation of such persons" as the States might think proper to admit until 1808, and authorized the laying of a tax on each "person" so admitted. Further, slaves are recognised as _persons_ by the exaction of their _allegiance_ to the government. For offences against the government slaves are tried as _persons_; as persons they are entitled to counsel for their defence, to the rules of evidence, and to "due process of law," and as _persons_ they are punished. True, they are loaded with cruel disabilities in courts of law, such as greatly obstruct and often inevitably defeat the ends of justice, yet they are still recognised as _persons_. Even in the legislation of Congress, and in the diplomacy of the general government, notwithstanding the frequent and wide departures from the integrity of the constitution on this subject, slaves are not recognised as _property_ without qualification. Congress has always refused to grant compensation for slaves killed or taken by the enemy, even when these slaves had been impressed into the United States' service. In half a score of cases since the last war, Congress has rejected such applications for compensation. Besides, both in Congressional acts, and in our national diplomacy, slaves and property are not used as convertible terms. When mentioned in treaties and state papers it is in such a way as to distinguish them from mere property, and generally by a recognition of their _personality_. In the invariable recognition of slaves as _persons_, the United States' constitution caught the mantle of the glorious Declaration, and most worthily wears it.--It recognizes all human beings as "men," "persons," and thus as "equals." In the original draft of the Declaration, as it came from the hand of Jefferson, it is alleged that Great Britain had "waged a cruel war against _human_ nature itself, violating its most sacred rights of life and liberty in the persons of a distant people, carrying them into slavery, * * determined to keep up a market where MEN should be bought and sold,"--thus disdaining to make the charter of freedom a warrant for the arrest of _men_, that they might be shorn both of liberty and humanity.

The celebrated Roger Sherman, one of the committee of five appointed to draft the Declaration of Independence, and also a member of the convention that formed the United States' constitution, said, in the first Congress after its adoption: "The constitution _does not consider these persons,_ (slaves,) _as a species of property._"--[Lloyd's Cong. Reg. v. 1, p. 313.] That the United States' Constitution does not make slaves "property," is shown in the fact that no person, either as a citizen of the United States, or by having his domicile within the United States' government, can hold slaves. He can hold them only by deriving his power from _state_ laws, or from the laws of Congress, if he hold slaves within the District. But no person resident within the United States' jurisdiction, and not within the District, nor within a state whose laws support slavery, nor "held to service" under the laws of such state or district, having escaped therefrom, _can be held as a slave_.

Men can hold _property_ under the United States' government though residing beyond the bounds of any state, district, or territory. An inhabitant of the Wisconsin Territory can hold property there under the laws of the United States, but he cannot hold _slaves_ there under the United States' laws, nor by virtue of the United States' Constitution, nor upon the ground of his United States citizenship, nor by having his domicile within the United States' jurisdiction. The constitution no where recognizes the right to "slave property," _but merely the fact that the states have jurisdiction each in its own limits, and that there are certain "persons" within their jurisdictions "held to service" by their own laws._

Finally, in the clause under consideration, "private property" is not to be taken "without _just_ compensation." "JUST!" If justice is to be appealed to in determining the amount of compensation, let her determine the _grounds_ also. If it be her province to say _how much_ compensation is "just," it is hers to say whether _any_ is "just,"--whether the slave is "just" property _at all_, rather than a "_person_." Then, if justice adjudges the slave to be "private property," it adjudges him to be _his own_ property, since the right to one's _self_ is the first right--the source of all others--the original stock by which they are accumulated--the principal, of which they are the interest. And since the slave's "private property" has been "taken," and since "compensation" is impossible--there being no _equivalent_ for one's self--the least that can be done is to restore to him his original private property.

Having shown that in abolishing slavery, "property" would not be "taken for public use," it may be added that, in those states where slavery has been abolished by law, no claim for compensation has been allowed. Indeed the manifest absurdity of demanding it, seems to have quite forstalled the _setting up_ of such a claim.

The abolition of slavery in the District, instead of being a legislative anomaly, would proceed upon the principles of every day legislation. It has been shown already, that the United States' Constitution does not recognize slaves as "property." Yet ordinary legislation is full of precedents, showing that even _absolute_ property is in many respects wholly subject to legislation. The repeal of the law of entailments--all those acts that control the alienation of property, its disposal by will, its passing to heirs by descent, with the question, who shall be heirs, and what shall be the rule of distribution among them, or whether property shall be transmitted at all by descent, rather than escheat to the state--these, with statutes of limitation, and various other classes of legislative acts, serve to illustrate the acknowledged scope of the law-making power, even where property _is in every sense absolute_. Persons whose property is thus affected by public laws, receive from the government no compensation for their losses, unless the state has been put in possession of the property taken from them.

The preamble of the United States' Constitution declares it to be a fundamental object of the organization of the government "to ESTABLISH JUSTICE." Has Congress _no power_ to do that for which it was made the _depository of power_? CANNOT the United States' Government fulfil the purpose _for which it was brought into being_?

To abolish slavery, is to take from no rightful owner his property; but to "_establish justice_" between two parties. To emancipate the slave, is to "_establish justice_" between him and his master--to throw around the person, character, conscience, liberty, and domestic relations of the one, _the same law_ that secures and blesses the other. In other words, to prevent by _legal restraints_ one class of men from seizing upon another class, and robbing them at pleasure of their earnings, their time, their liberty, their kindred, and the very use and ownership of their own persons. Finally, to abolish slavery is to proclaim and _enact_ that innocence and helplessness--now _free plunder_--are entitled to _legal protection_; and that power, avarice, and lust, shall no longer gorge upon their spoils under the license, and by the ministrations of _law_! Congress, by possessing "exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever," has a _general protective power_ for ALL the inhabitants of the District. If it has no power to protect _one_ man, it has none to protect another--none to protect _any_--and if it _can_ protect _one_ man and is _bound_ to protect him, it _can_ protect _every_ man--all men--and is _bound_ to do it. All admit the power of Congress to protect the masters in the District against their slaves. What part of the constitution gives the power? The clause so often quoted,--"power of legislation in all cases whatsoever," equally in the "_case_" of defending the blacks against the whites, as in that of defending the whites against the blacks. The power is given also by Art. 1, Sec. 8, clause 15--"Congress shall have power to suppress insurrections"--a power to protect, as well blacks against whites, as whites against blacks. If the constitution gives power to protect _one_ class against the other, it gives power to protect _either_ against the other. Suppose the blacks in the District should seize the whites, drive them into the fields and kitchens, force them to work without pay, flog them, imprison them, and sell them at their pleasure, where would Congress find power to restrain such acts? Answer; a _general_ power in the clause so often cited, and an _express_ one in that cited above--"Congress shall have power to suppress insurrections." So much for a _supposed_ case. Here follows a _real_ one. The whites in the District _are perpetrating these identical acts_ upon seven thousand blacks daily. That Congress has power to restrain these acts in _one_ case, all assert, and in so doing they assert the power "in _all_ cases whatsoever." For the grant of power to suppress insurrections, is an _unconditional_ grant, not hampered by provisos as to the color, shape, size, sex, language, creed, or condition of the insurgents. Congress derives its power to suppress this _actual_ insurrection, from the same source whence it derived its power to suppress the _same_ acts in the case _supposed_. If one case is an insurrection, the other is. The _acts_ in both are the same; the _actors_ only are different. In the one case, ignorant and degraded--goaded by the memory of the past, stung by the present, and driven to desperation by the fearful looking for of wrongs for ever to come. In the other, enlightened into the nature of _rights_, the principles of justice, and the dictates of the law of love, unprovoked by wrongs, with cool deliberation, and by system, they perpetrate these acts upon those to whom they owe unnumbered obligations for _whole lives_ of unrequited service. On which side may palliation be pleaded, and which party may most reasonably claim an abatement of the rigors of law? If Congress has power to suppress such acts _at all_, it has power to suppress them _in_ all.

It has been shown already that _allegiance_ is exacted of the slave. Is the government of the United States unable to grant _protection_ where it exacts _allegiance_? It is an axiom of the civilized world, and a maxim even with savages, that allegiance and protection are reciprocal and correlative. Are principles powerless with us which exact homage of barbarians? _Protection is the_ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT _of every human being under the exclusive legislation of Congress who has not forfeited it by crime._

In conclusion, I argue the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District, from Art. 1, sec, 8, clause 1, of the constitution; "Congress shall have power to provide for the common defence and the general welfare of the United States." Has the government of the United States no power under this grant, to legislate within its own exclusive jurisdiction on subjects that vitally affect its interests? Suppose the slaves in the district should rise upon their masters, and the United States' government, in quelling the insurrection, should kill any number of them. Could their masters claim compensation of the government? Manifestly not; even though no proof existed that the particular slaves killed were insurgents. This was precisely the point at issue between those masters, whose slaves were killed by the State troops at the time of the Southampton insurrection, and the Virginia Legislature: no evidence was brought to show that the slaves killed by the troops were insurgents; yet the Virginia Legislature decided that their masters were _not entitled to compensation_. They proceeded on the sound principle, that a government may in self-protection destroy the claim of its subjects even to that which has been recognized as property by its own acts. If in providing for the common defence, the United States' government, in the case supposed, would have power to destroy slaves both as _property_ and _persons_, it surely might stop _half-way_, destroy them _as property_ while it legalized their existence as _persons_, and thus provided for the common defence by giving them a personal and powerful interest in the government, and securing their strength for its defence.

Like other Legislatures, Congress has power to abate nuisances--to remove or tear down unsafe buildings--to destroy infected cargoes--to lay injunctions upon manufactories injurious to the public health--and thus to "provide for the common defence and general welfare" by destroying individual property, when such property puts in jeopardy the public weal.

Granting, for argument's sake, that slaves are "property" in the District of Columbia--if Congress has a right to annihilate property in the District when the public safety requires it, it may surely annihilate its existence _as_ property when the public safety requires it, especially if it transform into a _protection_ and _defence_ that which as _property_ perilled the public interests. In the District of Columbia there are, besides the United States' Capitol, the President's house, the national offices, &c. of the Departments of State, Treasury, War, and Navy, the General Post-office, and Patent Office. It is also the residence of the President, all the highest officers of the government, both houses of Congress, and all the foreign ambassadors. In this same District there are also _seven thousand slaves_. Jefferson, in his Notes on Va. p. 241, says of slavery, that "the State permitting one half of its citizens to trample on the rights of the other, _transforms them into enemies_;" and Richard Henry Lee, in the Va. house of Burgesses in 1758, declared that to those who held them, "_slaves must be natural enemies_." Is Congress so _impotent_ that it _cannot_ exercise that right pronounced both by municipal and national law, the most sacred and universal--the right of self-preservation and defence? Is it shut up to the _necessity_ of keeping seven thousand "enemies" in the heart of the nation's citadel? Does the iron fiat of the constitution doom it to such imbecility that it _cannot_ arrest the process that _made_ them "enemies," and still goads to deadlier hate by fiery trials, and day by day adds others to their number? Is _this_ providing for the common defence and general welfare? If to rob men of rights excites their hate, freely to restore them and make amends, will win their love.

By emancipating the slaves in the District, the government of the United States would disband an army of "enemies," and enlist "for the common defence and general welfare," a body guard of _friends_ seven thousand strong. In the last year, a handful of British soldiers sacked Washington city, burned the capitol, the President's house, and the national offices and archives; and no marvel, for thousands of the inhabitants of the District had been "TRANSFORMED INTO ENEMIES." Would _they_ beat back invasion? If the national government had exercised its constitutional "power to provide for the common defence and to promote the general welfare," by turning those "enemies" into friends, then, instead of a hostile ambush lurking in every thicket inviting assault, and secret foes in every house paralyzing defence, an army of allies would have rallied in the hour of her calamity, and shouted defiance from their munitions of rocks; whilst the banner of the republic, then trampled in dust, would have floated securely over FREEMEN exulting amidst bulwarks of strength.

To show that Congress can abolish slavery in the District, under the grant of power "to provide for the common defence and to promote the general welfare," I quote an extract from a speech of Mr. Madison, of Va., in the first Congress under the constitution, May 13, 1789. Speaking of the abolition of the slave trade, Mr. Madison says: "I should venture to say it is as much for the interests of Georgia and South Carolina, as of any state in the union. Every addition they receive to their number of slaves tends to _weaken_ them, and renders them less capable of self-defence. In case of hostilities with foreign nations, they will be the means of _inviting_ attack instead of repelling invasion. It is a necessary duty of the general government to protect every part of the empire against danger, as well _internal_ as external. _Every thing, therefore, which tends to increase this danger, though it may be a local affair, yet if it involves national expense or safety, it becomes of concern to every part of the union, and is a proper subject for the consideration of those charged with the general administration of the government._" See Cong. Reg. vol. 1, p. 310, 11.

POSTSCRIPT

My apology for adding a _postscript_, to a discussion already perhaps too protracted, is the fact that the preceding sheets were in the hands of the printer, and all but the concluding pages had gone through the press, before the passage of Mr. Calhoun's late resolutions in the Senate of the United States. A proceeding so extraordinary,--if indeed the time has not passed when _any_ acts of Congress in derogation of freedom and in deference to slavery, can be deemed extraordinary,--should not be suffered to pass in silence at such a crisis as the present; especially as the passage of one of the resolutions by a vote of 36 to 9, exhibits a shift of position on the part of the South, as sudden as it is unaccountable, being nothing less than the surrender of a fortress which until then they had defended with the pertinacity of a blind and almost infuriated fatuity. Upon the discussions during the pendency of the resolutions, and upon the vote, by which they were carried, I make no comment, save only to record my exultation in the fact there exhibited, that great emergencies are _true touchstones_, and that henceforward, until this question is settled, whoever holds a seat in Congress will find upon, and all around him, a pressure strong enough to TEST him--a focal blaze that will find its way through the carefully adjusted cloak of fair pretension, and the sevenfold brass of two-faced political intrigue, and _no_-faced _non-committalism_, piercing to the dividing asunder of joints and marrow. Be it known to every northern man who aspires to a seat in Congress, that hereafter it is the destiny of congressional action on this subject, to be a MIGHTY REVELATOR--making secret thoughts public property, and proclaiming on the house-tops what is whispered in the ear--smiting off masks, and bursting open sepulchres beautiful outwardly, and heaving up to the sun their dead men's bones. To such we say,--_Remember the Missouri Question, and the fate of those who then sold the North, and their own birthright_!

Passing by the resolutions generally without remark--the attention of the reader is specially solicited to Mr. Clay's substitute for Mr. Calhoun's fifth resolution.

"Resolved, That when the District of Columbia was ceded by the states of Virginia and Maryland to the United States, domestic slavery existed in both of these states, including the ceded territory, and that, as it still continues in both of them, it could not be abolished within the District without a violation of that good faith, which was implied in the cession and in the acceptance of the territory; nor, unless compensation were made to the proprietors of slaves, without a manifest infringement of an amendment to the constitution of the United States; nor without exciting a degree of just alarm and apprehension in the states recognizing slavery, far transcending in mischievous tendency, any possible benefit which could be accomplished by the abolition."

By voting for this resolution, the south, by a simultaneous movement, shifted its mode of defense, not so much by taking a position entirely new, as by attempting to refortify an old one--never much trusted in, and abandoned mainly long ago, as being unable to hold out against assault however unskilfully directed. In the debate on this resolution, though the southern members of Congress did not _professedly_ retreat from the ground hitherto maintained by them--that Congress has no power by the constitution to abolish slavery in the District--yet in the main they silently drew off from it.

The passage of this resolution--with the vote of every southern senator, forms a new era in the discussion of this question.

We cannot join in the lamentations of those who bewail it. We hail it, and rejoice in it. It was as we would have had it--offered by a southern senator, advocated by southern senators, and on the ground that it "was no compromise"--that it embodied the true southern principle--that "this resolution stood on as high ground as Mr. Calhoun's"--(Mr. Preston)--"that Mr. Clay's resolution was as strong as Mr. Calhoun's"--(Mr. Rives)--that "the resolution he (Mr. Calhoun) now refused to support, was as strong as his own, and that in supporting it, there was no abandonment of principle by the south."--(Mr. Walker, of Mi.)--further, that it was advocated by the southern senators generally as an expression of their views, and as setting the question of slavery in the District on its _true_ ground--that finally when the question was taken, every slaveholding senator, including Mr. Calhoun himself, voted for the resolution.

By passing this resolution, and with such avowals, the south has surrendered irrevocably the whole question at issue between them and the petitioners for abolition in the District. It has, unwittingly but explicitly, conceded the main question argued in the preceding pages.

The _only_ ground taken against the right of Congress to abolish slavery in the District is, that it existed in Maryland and Virginia when the cession was made, and "_as it still continues in both of them_, it could not be abolished without a violation of that good faith which was implied in the cession." &c. The _sole argument_ is _not_ that exclusive _sovereignty_ has no power to abolish slavery within its jurisdiction, _nor_ that the powers of even _ordinary legislation_ cannot do it,--_nor_ that the clause granting Congress "exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such District," gives no power to do it; but that the _unexpressed expectation_ of one of the parties that the other would not "in _all_ cases" _use_ the power which said party had consented _might be used_ "_in all cases_," _prohibits_ the use of it. The only cardinal point in the discussion, is here not only _yielded_, but formally laid down by the South as the leading article in their creed on the question of Congressional jurisdiction over slavery in the District. The _sole reason_ given why Congress should not abolish, and the sole evidence that if it did, such abolition would be a violation of "good faith," is that "_slavery still continues in those states_,"--thus explicitly admitting, that if slavery did _not_ "still continue" in those States, Congress _could_ abolish it in the District. The same admission is made also in the _premises_, which state that slavery existed in those states _at the time of the cession_, &c. Admitting that if it had _not_ existed there then, but had grown up in the District under _United States' laws_, Congress might constitutionally abolish it. Or that if the ceded parts of those states had been the _only_ parts in which slaves were held under their laws, Congress might have abolished in such a contingency also. The cession in that case leaving no slaves in those states,--no "good faith," would be "implied" in it, nor any "violated," by an act of abolition. The principle of the resolution makes this further admission, that if Maryland and Virginia should at once abolish their slavery, Congress might at once abolish it in the District. The principle goes even further than this, and _requires_ Congress in such case to abolish slavery in the District "by the _good faith implied_ in the cession and acceptance of the territory." Since, according to the spirit and scope of the resolution, this "implied good faith" of Maryland and Virginia in making the cession, was that Congress would do nothing within the District which should go to counteract the policy, or bring into disrepute the "institutions," or call in question the usages, or even in any way ruffle the prejudices of those states, or do what _they_ might think would unfavorably bear upon their interests; _themselves_ of course being the judges.

But let us dissect another limb of the resolution. What is to be understood by "that good faith which was IMPLIED?" It is of course an admission that such a condition was not _expressed_ in the acts of cession--that in their _terms_ there is nothing restricting the power of Congress on the subject of slavery in the District--not a word alluding to it, nor one inserted with such an _intent_. This "implied faith," then, rests on no clause or word in the United States' Constitution, or in the acts of cession, or in the acts of Congress accepting the cession, nor does it rest on any declarations of the legislatures of Maryland and Virginia made at the time, or in that generation, nor on any _act_ of theirs, nor on any declaration of the people of those states, nor on the testimony of the Washingtons, Jeffersons, Madisons, Chaces, Martins, and Jennifers, of those states and times. The assertion rests _on itself alone_! Mr. Clay and the other senators who voted for the resolution, _guess_ that Maryland and Virginia supposed that Congress would by no means _use_ the power given them by the constitution, except in such ways as would be well pleasing in the eyes of those states; especially as one of them was the "Ancient Dominion!" And now after the lapse of half a century, this _assumed expectation_ of Maryland and Virginia, the existence of which is mere matter of conjecture with the 36 senators, is conjured up and duly installed upon the judgment-seat of final appeal, before whose nod constitutions are to flee away, and with whom, solemn grants of power and explicit guaranties are, when weighed in the balance, altogether lighter than vanity!

But let us survey it in another light. Why did Maryland and Virginia leave so much to be "_implied_?" Why did they not in some way express what lay so near their hearts? Had their vocabulary run so low that a single word could not be eked out for the occasion? Or were those states so bashful of a sudden that they dare not speak out and tell what they wanted? Or did they take it for granted that Congress would always act in the premises according to their wishes, and that too, without their _making known_ their wishes? If, as honorable senators tell us, Maryland and Virginia did verily travail with such abounding _faith_, why brought they forth no _works_?

It is as true in _legislation_ as in religion, that the only _evidence_ of "faith" is _works_, and that "faith" _without_ works is _dead_, i.e. has no _power_. But here, forsooth, a blind implication with nothing _expressed_, an "implied" _faith_ without works, is _omnipotent_. Mr. Clay is lawyer enough to know that even a _senatorial hypothesis_ as to what must have been the _understanding_ of Maryland and Virginia about congressional exercise of constitutional power, _abrogates no grant_, and that to plead it in a court of law, would be of small service except to jostle "their Honors'" gravity! He need not be told that the constitution gives Congress "power to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such District." Nor that the legislatures of Maryland and Virginia constructed their acts of cession with this clause _before their eyes_, and that both of them declared those acts made "in _pursuance_" of said clause. Those states were aware that the United States in their constitution had left nothing to be "_implied_" as to the power of Congress over the District;--an admonition quite sufficient one would think to put them on their guard, and induce them to eschew vague implications and resort to _stipulations_. Full well did they know also that those were times when, in matters of high import, _nothing_ was left to be "implied." The colonies were then panting from a twenty years' conflict with the mother country, about bills of rights, charters, treaties, constitutions, grants, limitations, and _acts of cession_. The severities of a long and terrible discipline had taught them to guard at all points _legislative grants_, that their exact import and limit might be self-evident--leaving no scope for a blind "faith," that _somehow_ in the lottery of chances there would be no blanks, but making all sure by the use of explicit terms, and wisely chosen words, and _just enough_ of them. The Constitution of the United States with its amendments, those of the individual states, the national treaties, the public documents of the general and state governments at that period, show the universal conviction of legislative bodies, that when great public interest were at stake, nothing should be left to be "implied."

Further: suppose Maryland and Virginia had expressed their "implied faith" in _words_, and embodied it in their acts of cession as a proviso, declaring that Congress should not "exercise exclusive legislation in _all_ cases whatsoever over the District," but that the "case" of _slavery_ should be an exception: who does not know that Congress, if it had accepted the cession on those terms, would have violated the Constitution; and who that has ever studied the free mood of those times in its bearings on slavery--proofs of which are given in scores on the preceding pages--can for an instant believe that the people of the United States would have altered their Constitution for the purpose of providing for slavery an inviolable sanctuary; that when driven in from its outposts, and everywhere retreating discomfited before the march of freedom, it might be received into everlasting habitations on the common homestead and hearth-stone of this free republic? Besides, who can believe that Virginia made such a condition, or cherished such a purpose, when at that very moment, Washington, Jefferson, Wythe, Patrick Henry, St. George Tucker, and almost all her illustrious men, were advocating the abolition of slavery by law. When Washington had said, two years before, Maryland and Virginia "must have laws for the gradual abolition of slavery and at a period _not remote_;" and when Jefferson in his letter to Price, three years before the cession, had said, speaking of Virginia, "This is the next state to which we may turn our eyes for the interesting spectacle of justice in conflict with avarice and oppression--a conflict in which THE SACRED SIDE IS GAINING DAILY RECRUITS;" when voluntary emancipations on the soil were then progressing at the rate of between one and two thousand annually, (See Judge Tucker's "Dissertation on Slavery," p. 73;) when the public sentiment of Virginia had undergone, and was undergoing so mighty a revolution that the idea of the continuance of slavery as a permanent system could not be _tolerated_, though she then contained about half the slaves in the Union. Was this the time to stipulated for the _perpetuity_ of slavery under the exclusive legislation of Congress? and that too at the _same_ session of Congress when _every one_ of her delegation voted for the abolition of slavery in the North West Territory; a territory which she had herself ceded to Congress, and along with it had surrendered her jurisdiction over many of her citizens, inhabitants of that territory, who held slaves there--and whose slaves were emancipated by that act of Congress, in which all her delegation with one accord participated?

Now in view of the universal belief then prevalent, that slavery in this country was doomed to short life, and especially that in Maryland and Virginia it would be _speedily_ abolished--are we to be told that those states _designed_ to bind Congress _never_ to terminate it? Are we to adopt the monstrous conclusion that this was the intent of the Ancient Dominion--thus to _bind_ the United States by an "implied faith," and that when the United States _accepted_ the cession, she did solemnly thus plight her troth, and that Virginia did then so _understand_ it? Verily one would think that honorable senators supposed themselves deputed to do our _thinking_ as well as our legislation, or rather, that they themselves were absolved from such drudgery by virtue of their office!

Another absurdity of this dogma about "implied faith" is, that where there was no power to exact an _express_ pledge, there was none to demand an _implied_ one, and where there was no power to _give_ the one, there was none to give the _other_. We have shown already that Congress could not have accepted the cession with such a condition. To have signed away a part of its constitutional grant of power would have been a _breach_ of the Constitution. Further, the Congress which accepted the cession was competent to pass a resolution pledging itself not to _use all_ the power over the District committed to it by the Constitution. But here its power ended. Its resolution would only bind _itself_. Could it bind the _next_ Congress by its authority? Could the members of one Congress say to the members of another, because we do not choose to exercise all the authority vested in us by the Constitution, therefore you _shall_ not? This would have been a prohibition to do what the Constitution gives power to do. Each successive Congress would still have gone to the Constitution for its power, brushing away in its course the cobwebs stretched across its path by the officiousness of an impertinent predecessor. Again, the legislatures of Virginia and Maryland, had no power to bind Congress, either by an express or an implied pledge, never to abolish slavery in the District. Those legislatures had no power to bind _themselves_ never to abolish slavery within their own territories--the ceded parts included. Where then would they get power to bind _another_ not to do what they had no power to bind themselves not to do? If a legislature could not in this respect control the successive legislatures of its own State, could it control the successive Congresses of the United States?

But perhaps we shall be told, that the "implied faith" in the acts of cession of Maryland and Virginia was _not_ that Congress should _never_ abolish slavery in the District, but that it should not do it until _they_ had done it within their bounds! Verily this "faith" comes little short of the faith of miracles! "A good rule that works both ways." First, Maryland and Virginia have "good faith" that Congress will _not_ abolish until _they_ do; and then just as "good faith" that Congress _will_ abolish _when_ they do! Excellently accommodated! Did those States suppose that Congress would legislate over the national domain, the common jurisdiction of _all_, for Maryland and Virginia alone? And who, did they suppose, would be judges in the matter?--themselves merely? or the whole Union?

This "good faith implied in the cession" is no longer of doubtful interpretation. The principle at the bottom of it, when fairly stated, is this:--That the Government of the United States are bound in "good faith" to do in the District of Columbia, without demurring, just what and when, Maryland and Virginia do in their own States. In short, that the general government is eased of all the burdens of legislation within its exclusive jurisdiction, save that of hiring a scrivener to copy off the acts of the Maryland and Virginia legislatures as fast as they are passed, and engross them, under the title of "Laws of the United States, for the District of Columbia!" A slight additional expense would also be incurred in keeping up an express between the capitols of those States and Washington city, bringing Congress from time to time its "_instructions_" from head quarters--instructions not to be disregarded without a violation of that "good faith implied in the cession," &c.

This sets in strong light the advantages of "our glorious Union," if the doctrine of Mr. Clay and the thirty-six Senators be orthodox. The people of the United States have been permitted to set up at their own expense, and on their own territory, two great _sounding boards_ called "Senate Chamber" and "Representatives' Hall," for the purpose of sending abroad "by authority" _national_ echoes of _state_ legislation!--permitted also to keep in their pay a corps of pliant _national_ musicians, with peremptory instructions to sound on any line of the staff according as Virginia and Maryland may give the _sovereign_ key note!

Though this may have the seeming of mere raillery, yet an analysis of the resolution and of the discussions upon it, will convince every fair mind that it is but the legitimate carrying out of the _principle_ pervading both. They proceed virtually upon the hypothesis that the will and pleasure of Virginia and Maryland are _paramount_ to those of the _Union_. If the main design of setting apart a federal district had been originally the accommodation of Maryland, Virginia, and the south, with the United States as an _agent_ to consummate the object, there could hardly have been higher assumption or louder vaunting. The sole object of _having_ such a District was in effect totally perverted in the resolution of Mr. Clay, and in the discussions of the entire southern delegation, upon its passage. Instead of taking the ground, that the benefit of the whole Union was the sole _object_ of a federal district, that it was designed to guard and promote the interests of _all_ the states, and that it was to be legislated over _for this end_--the resolution proceeds upon an hypothesis _totally the reverse_. It takes a single point of _state_ policy, and exalts it above NATIONAL interests, utterly overshadowing them; abrogating national _rights_; making void a clause of the Constitution; humbling the general government into a subject--crouching for favors to a superior, and that too _on its own exclusive jurisdiction_. All the attributes of sovereignty vested in Congress by the Constitution it impales upon the point of an alleged _implication_. And this is Mr. Clay's peace-offering, to appease the lust of power and the ravenings of state encroachment! A "compromise," forsooth! that sinks the general Government on _its own territory_ into a mere colony, with Virginia and Maryland for its "mother country!" It is refreshing to turn from these shallow, distorted constructions and servile cringings, to the high bearing of other southern men in other times; men, who in their character of legislators and lawyers, disdained to accommodate their interpretations of constitutions and charters to geographical lines, or to bend them to the purposes of a political canvass. In the celebrated case of Cohens vs. the State of Virginia, Hon. William Pinkney, late of Baltimore, and Hon. Walter Jones, of Washington city, with other eminent constitutional lawyers, prepared an elaborate written opinion, from which the following is an extract: "Nor is there any danger to be apprehended from allowing to Congressional legislation with regard to the District of Columbia, its FULLEST EFFECT. Congress is responsible to the States, and to the people for that legislation. It is in truth the legislation of the states over a district placed under their control for _their own benefit_, not for that of the District, except as the prosperity of the District is involved, and necessary to the _general advantage_."--[Life of Pinkney, p. 612.]

The profound legal opinion, from which this is an extract, was elaborated at great length many years since, by a number of the most distinguished lawyers in the United States, whose signatures are appended to it. It is specific and to the point. It asserts, 1st, that Congressional legislation over the District, is "the legislation of the _States_ and the _people_," (not of _two_ states, and a mere _fraction_ of the people;) 2d. "Over a District placed under _their_ control," i.e. under the control of the _whole_ of the States, not under the control of _two twenty-sixths_ of them. 3d. That it was thus put under their Control "_for THEIR OWN benefit_," the benefit of all the States _equally_; not to secure special benefits to Maryland and Virginia, (or what it might be _conjectured_ they would regard as benefits.) 4th. It concludes by asserting that the design of this exclusive control of Congress over the District was "not for the benefit of the _District_," except as that is _connected_ with, and _a means of promoting_ the _general_ advantage. If this is the case with the _District_, which is _directly_ concerned, it is pre-eminently so with Maryland and Virginia, who are but _indirectly_ interested, and would be but remotely affected by it. The argument of Mr. Madison in the Congress of '89, an extract from which has been given on a preceding page, lays down the same principle; that though any matter "_may be a local affair, yet if it involves national EXPENSE OR SAFETY, it becomes of concern to every part of the union, and is a proper subject for the consideration of those charged with the general administration of the government_." Cong. Reg. vol. 1. p. 310, 11.

But these are only the initiatory absurdities of this "good faith _implied_." The thirty-six senators aptly illustrate the principle, that error not only conflicts with truth, but is generally at issue with itself. For if it would be a violation of "good faith" to Maryland and Virginia, for Congress to abolish slavery in the District, it would be _equally_ a violation for Congress to do it _with the consent_, or even at the earnest and unanimous petition of the people of the District: yet for years it has been the southern doctrine, that if the people of the District demand of Congress relief in this respect, it has power, as their local legislature, to grant it, and by abolishing slavery there, carry out the will of the citizens. But now new light has broken in! The optics of the thirty-six have pierced the millstone with a deeper insight, and discoveries thicken faster than they can be telegraphed! Congress has no power, O no, not a modicum, to help the slaveholders of the District, however loudly they may clamor for it. The southern doctrine, that Congress is to the District a mere local Legislature to do its pleasure, is tumbled from the genitive into the vocative! Hard fate--and that too at the hands of those who begat it! The reasonings of Messrs. Pinckney, Wise, and Leigh, are now found to be wholly at fault, and the chanticleer rhetoric of Messrs. Glascock and Garland stalks featherless and crest-fallen. For, Mr. Clay's resolution sweeps by the board all those stereotyped common-places, as "Congress a local Legislature," "consent of the District," "bound to consult the wishes of the District," &c. &c., which for the last two sessions of Congress have served to eke out scanty supplies. It declares, that _as slavery existed in Maryland and Virginia at the time of the cession, and as it still continues in both those states, it could not be abolished in the District without a violation of 'that good faith_,' &c.

But let us see where this principle of the _thirty-six_ will lead us. If "implied faith" to Maryland and Virginia _restrains_ Congress from the abolition of slavery in the District, it _requires_ Congress to do in the District what those states have done within their bounds, i.e., restrain _others_ from abolishing it. Upon the same principle Congress is _bound_, by the doctrine of Mr. Clay's resolution, to _prohibit emancipation_ within the District. There is no _stopping place_ for this plighted "faith." Congress must not only refrain from laying violent hands on slavery, _itself_, and see to it that the slaveholders themselves do not, but it is bound to keep the system up to the Maryland and Virginia standard of vigor!

Again, if the good faith of Congress to Virginia and Maryland requires that slavery should exist in the District, while it exists in those states, it requires that it should exist there _as_ it exists in those states. If to abolish _every_ form of slavery in the District would violate good faith, to abolish _the_ form existing in those states, and to substitute a totally different one, would also violate it. The Congressional "good faith" is to be kept not only with _slavery_, but with the _Maryland and Virginia systems_ of slavery. The faith of those states not being in the preservation of _a_ system, but of _their_ system; otherwise Congress, instead of _sustaining_, would counteract their policy--principles would be brought into action there conflicting with their system, and thus the true spirit of the "implied" pledge would be violated. On this principle, so long as slaves are "chattels personal" in Virginia and Maryland, Congress could not make them _real estate_, inseparable from the soil, as in Louisiana; nor could it permit slaves to read, nor to worship God according to conscience; nor could it grant them trial by jury, nor legalize marriage; nor require the master to give sufficient food and clothing; nor prohibit the violent sundering of families--because such provisions would conflict with the existing slave laws of Virginia and Maryland, and thus violate the "good faith implied," &c. So the principle of the resolution binds Congress in all these particulars: 1st. Not to abolish slavery in the District _until_ Virginia and Maryland abolish. 2d. Not to abolish any _part_ of it that exists in those states. 3d. Not to abolish any _form_ or _appendage_ of it still existing in those states. 4th. _To abolish_ when they do. 5th. To increase or abate its rigors _when, how_, and _as_ the same are modified by those states. In a word, Congressional action in the District is to float passively in the wake of legislative action on the subject in those states.

But here comes a dilemma. Suppose the legislation of those states should steer different courses--then there would be _two_ wakes! Can Congress float in both? Yea, verily! Nothing is too hard for it! Its obsequiousness equals its "power of legislation in _all_ cases whatsoever." It can float _up_ on the Virginia tide, and ebb down on the Maryland at the same time. What Maryland does, Congress will do in the Maryland part. What Virginia does, Congress will do in the Virginia part. Though Congress might not always be able to run at the bidding of both _at once_, especially in different directions, yet if it obeyed orders cheerfully, and "kept in its place," according to its "good faith implied," impossibilities might not be rigidly exacted. True, we have the highest sanction for the maxim that no _man_ can serve two masters--but if "corporations have _no_ souls," analogy would absolve Congress on that score, or at most give it only _a very small soul_--not large enough to be at all in the way, as an _exception_ to the universal rule laid down in the maxim!

In following out the absurdities of this "_implied_ good faith," it will be seen at once that the doctrine of Mr. Clay's Resolution extends to _all the subjects_ of _legislation_ existing in Maryland and Virginia, which exist also within the District. Every system, "institution," law, and established usage there, is placed beyond Congressional control equally with slavery, and by the same "implied faith." The abolition of the lottery system in the District as an _immorality_, was a flagrant breach of this "good faith" to Maryland and Virginia, as the system "still continued in those states." So to abolish imprisonment for debt, and capital punishment, to remodel the bank system, the power of corporations, the militia law, laws of limitation, &c., in the District, _unless Virginia and Maryland took the lead_, would violate the "good faith implied in the cession," &c.

That in the acts of cession no such "good faith" was "implied by Virginia and Maryland" as is claimed in the Resolution, we argue from the fact, that in 1784 Virginia ceded to the United States all her northwest territory, with the special proviso that her citizens inhabiting that territory should "have their _possessions_ and _titles_ confirmed to them, and be _protected_ in the enjoyment of their _rights_ and liberties." (See Journals of Congress, vol. 9, p. 63.) The cession was made in the form of a deed, and signed by Thomas Jefferson, Samuel Hardy, Arthur Lee, and James Monroe. Many of these inhabitants _held slaves_. Three years after the cession, the Virginia delegation in Congress _proposed_ the passage of an ordinance which should abolish slavery, in that territory, and declare that it should never thereafter exist there. All the members of Congress from Virginia and Maryland voted for this ordinance. Suppose some member of Congress had during the passage of the ordinance introduced the following resolution: "Resolved, That when the northwest territory was ceded by Virginia to the United States, domestic slavery existed in that State, including the ceded territory, and as it still continues in that State, it could not be abolished within the territory without a violation of that good faith, which was implied in the cession and in the acceptance of the territory." What would have been the indignant response of Grayson, Griffin, Madison, and the Lees, in the Congress of '87, to such a resolution, and of Carrington, Chairman of the Committee, who reported the ratification of the ordinance in the Congress of '89, and of Page and Parker, who with every other member of the Virginia delegation supported it!

But to enumerate all the absurdities into which the thirty-six Senators have plunged themselves, would be to make a quarto inventory. We decline the task; and in conclusion, merely add that Mr. Clay, in presenting this resolution, and each of the thirty-six Senators who voted for it, entered on the records of the Senate, and proclaimed to the world, a most unworthy accusation against the MILLIONS of American citizens who have during nearly half a century petitioned the national legislature to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia,--charging them either with the ignorance or the impiety of praying the nation to violate its "PLIGHTED FAITH." The resolution virtually indicts at the bar of public opinion, and brands with odium, all the Manumission Societies, the _first_ petitioners for the abolition of slavery in the District, and for a long time the only ones, petitioning from year to year through evil report and good report, still petitioning, by individual societies and in their national conventions.

But as if it were not enough to table the charge against such men as Benjamin Rush, William Rawle, John Sergeant, Robert Vaux, Cadwallader Colden, and Peter A. Jay,--to whom we may add Rufus King, James Hillhouse, William Pinkney, Thomas Addis Emmett, Daniel D. Tompkins, De Witt Clinton, James Kent, and Daniel Webster, besides eleven hundred citizens of the District itself, headed by their Chief Justice and judges--even the sovereign States of Pennsylvania, New-York, Massachusetts, and Vermont, whose legislatures have either memorialized Congress to abolish slavery in the District, or instructed their Senators to move such a measure, must be gravely informed by Messrs. Clay, Norvell, Niles, Smith, Pierce, Benton, Black, Tipton, and other honorable Senators, either that their perception is so dull, they know not what of they affirm, or that their moral sense is so blunted they can demand without compunction a violation of the nation's faith!

We have spoken already of the concessions unwittingly made in this resolution to the true doctrine of Congressional power over the District. For that concession, important as it is, we have small thanks to render. That such a resolution, passed with such an _intent_, and pressing at a thousand points on relations and interests vital to the free states, should be hailed, as it has been, by a portion of the northern press as a "compromise" originating in deference to northern interests, and to be received by us as a free-will offering of disinterested benevolence, demanding our gratitude to the mover,--may well cover us with shame. We deserve the humiliation and have well earned the mockery. Let it come!

If, after having been set up at auction in the public sales-room of the nation, and for thirty years, and by each of a score of "compromises," treacherously knocked off to the lowest bidder, and that without money and without price, the North, plundered and betrayed, _will not_, in this her accepted time, consider the things that belong to her peace before they are hidden from her eyes, then let her eat of the fruit of her own way, and be filled with her own devices! Let the shorn and blinded giant grind in the prison-house of the Philistines, till taught the folly of intrusting to Delilahs the secret and the custody of his strength.

Have the free States bound themselves by an oath never to profit by the lessons of experience? If lost to _reason_, are they dead to _instinct_ also? Can nothing rouse them to cast about for self preservation? And shall a life of tame surrenders be terminated by suicidal sacrifice?

A "COMPROMISE!" Bitter irony! Is the plucked and hood-winked North to be wheedled by the sorcery of another Missouri compromise? A compromise in which the South gained all, and the North lost all, and lost it for ever. A compromise which embargoed the free laborer of the North and West, and clutched at the staff he leaned upon, to turn it into a bludgeon and fell him with its stroke. A compromise which wrested from liberty her boundless birthright domain, stretching westward to the sunset, while it gave to slavery loose reins and a free course, from the Mississippi to the Pacific.

The resolution, as it finally passed, is here inserted. The original Resolution, as moved by Mr. Clay, was inserted at the head of this postscript with the impression that it was the _amended_ form. It will be seen however, that it underwent no material modification.

"Resolved, That the interference by the citizens of any of the states, with the view to the abolition of slavery in the District, is endangering the rights and security of the people of the District; and that any act or measure of Congress designed to abolish slavery in the District, would be a violation of the faith implied in the cessions by the states of Virginia and Maryland, a just cause of alarm to the people of the slaveholding states, and have a direct and inevitable tendency to disturb and endanger the Union."

The vote upon the Resolution stood as follows:

_Yeas_.--Messrs. Allen, Bayard, Benton, Black, Buchanan, Brown, Calhoun, Clay, of Alabama, Clay, of Kentucky, Clayton, Crittenden, Cuthbert, Fulton, Grundy, Hubbard, King, Lumpkin, Lyon, Nicholas, Niles, Norvell, Pierce, Preston, Rives, Roane, Robinson, Sevier, Smith, of Connecticut, Strange, Tallmadge, Tipton, Walker, White, Williams, Wright, Young.

_Nays_.--Messrs. DAVIS, KNIGHT, McKEAN, MORRIS, PRENTISS, RUGGLES, SMITH, of Indiana, SWIFT, WEBSTER.

NO. 5

THE ANTI-SLAVERY EXAMINER

* * * * *

THE

POWER OF CONGRESS

OVER THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

* * * * *

ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED IN THE NEW-YORK EVENING POST, UNDER THE SIGNATURE OF "WYTHE."

* * * * *

WITH ADDITIONS BY THE AUTHOR.

FOURTH EDITION.

* * * * *

NEW YORK: PUBLISHED BY THE AMERICAN ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY, No. 143 NASSAU STREET. 1838.

* * * * *

This No. contains 3-1/2 sheets.--Postage, under 100 miles, 6 cts. over 100, 10 cts.

POWER OF CONGRESS OVER THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

A civilized community presupposes a government of law. If that government be a republic, its citizens are the sole _sources_, as well as the _subjects_ of its power. Its constitution is their bill of directions to their own agents--a grant authorizing the exercise of certain powers, and prohibiting that of others. In the Constitution of the United States, whatever else may be obscure, the clause granting power to Congress over the Federal District may well defy misconstruction. Art. 1, Sec. 8, Clause 18: "The Congress shall have power to exercise exclusive legislation, _in all cases whatsoever_, over such District." Congress may make laws for the District "in all _cases_," not of all _kinds_. The grant respects the _subjects_ of legislation, _not_ the moral nature of the laws. The law-making power every where, is subject to _moral_ restrictions, whether limited by constitutions or not. No legislature can authorize murder, nor make honesty penal, nor virtue a crime, nor exact impossibilities. In these and similar respects, the power of Congress is held in check by principles existing in the nature of things, not imposed by the Constitution, but presupposed and assumed by it. The power of Congress over the District is restricted only by those principles that limit ordinary legislation, and, in some respects, it has even wider scope.

In common with the legislatures of the States, Congress cannot constitutionally pass ex post facto laws in criminal cases, nor suspend the writ of habeas corpus, nor pass a bill of attainder, nor abridge the freedom of speech and of the press, nor invade the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, nor enact laws respecting an establishment of religion. These are general limitations. Congress cannot do these things _any where_. The exact import, therefore, of the clause "in all cases whatsoever," is, _on all subjects within the appropriate sphere of legislation_. Some legislatures are restrained by constitutions from the exercise of powers strictly within the proper sphere of legislation. Congressional power over the District has no such restraint. It traverses the whole field of legitimate legislation. All the power which any legislature has within its own jurisdiction, Congress holds over the District of Columbia.

It has been asserted that the clause in question respects merely police regulations, and that its sole design was to enable Congress to protect itself against popular tumults. But if the framers of the Constitution aimed to provide for a _single_ case only, why did they provide for "_all_ cases whatsoever?" Besides, this clause was opposed in many of the state conventions, because the grant of power was not restricted to police regulations _alone_. In the Virginia Convention, George Mason, the father of the Virginia Constitution, said, "This clause gives an unlimited authority in every possible case within the District. He would willingly give them exclusive power as far as respected the police and good government of the place, but he would give them no more." Mr. Grayson said, that control over the _police_ was all-sufficient, and that the "Continental Congress never had an idea of exclusive legislation in all cases." Patrick Henry said. "Is it consistent with any principle of prudence or good policy, to grant _unlimited, unbounded authority?_" Mr. Madison said in reply: "I did conceive that the clause under consideration was one of those parts which would speak its own praise. When any power is given, its delegation necessarily involves authority to make laws to execute it. * * * * The powers which are found necessary to be given, are therefore delegated _generally_, and particular and minute specification is left to the legislature. * * * It is not within the limits of human capacity to delineate on paper all those particular cases and circumstances, in which legislation by the general legislature would be necessary." Governor Randolph said: "Holland has no ten miles square, but she has the Hague where the deputies of the States assemble. But the influence which it has given the province of Holland, to have the seat of government within its territory, subject in some respects to its control, has been injurious to the other provinces. The wisdom of the Convention is therefore manifest in granting to Congress exclusive jurisdiction over the place of their session." [_Deb. Va. Con._, p. 320.] In the forty-third number of the "Federalist," Mr. Madison says: "The indispensable necessity of _complete_ authority at the seat of government, carries its own evidence with it."

Finally, that the grant in question is to be interpreted according to the obvious import of its _terms_, is proved by the fact, that Virginia proposed an amendment to the United States' Constitution at the time of its adoption, providing that this clause "should be so construed as to give power only over the _police and good government_ of said District," _which amendment was rejected_.

The former part of the clause under consideration, "Congress shall have power to exercise _exclusive_ legislation," gives _sole_ jurisdiction, and the latter part, "in all cases whatsoever," defines the _extent_ of it. Since, then, Congress is the _sole_ legislature within the District, and since its power is limited only by the checks common to all legislatures, it follows that what the law-making power is intrinsically competent to do _any_ where, Congress is competent to do in the District of Columbia. Having disposed of preliminaries, we proceed to state and argue the _real_ question at issue.

IS THE LAW-MAKING POWER COMPETENT TO ABOLISH SLAVERY WHEN NOT RESTRICTED IN THAT PARTICULAR BY CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS--or, IS THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY WITHIN THE APPROPRIATE SPHERE OF LEGISLATION?

1. In every government, absolute sovereignty exists _somewhere_. In the United States it exists primarily with the _people_, and _ultimate_ sovereignty _always_ exists with them. In each of the States, the legislature possesses a _representative_ sovereignty, delegated by the people through the Constitution--the people thus committing to the legislature a portion of their sovereignty, and specifying in their constitutions the amount of the grant and its conditions. That the _people_ in any state where slavery exists, have the power to abolish it, none will deny. If the legislature have not the power, it is because _the people_ have reserved it to themselves. Had they lodged with the legislature "power to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever," they would have parted with their sovereignty over the legislation of the State, and so far forth, the legislature would have become _the people_, clothed with all their functions, and as such competent, _during the continuance of the grant_, to do whatever the people might have done before the surrender of their power: consequently, they would have the power to abolish slavery. The sovereignty of the District of Columbia exists _somewhere_--where is it lodged? The citizens of the District have no legislature of their own, no representation in Congress, and no political power whatever. Maryland and Virginia have surrendered to the United States their "full and absolute right and entire sovereignty," and the people of the United States have committed to Congress by the Constitution, the power to "exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such District."

Thus, the sovereignty of the District of Columbia, is shown to reside solely in the Congress of the United States; and since the power of the people of a state to abolish slavery within their own limits, results from their entire sovereignty within that state, so the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District, results from its entire sovereignty within the District. If it be objected that Congress can have no more power over the District, than was held by the legislatures of Maryland and Virginia, we ask what clause of the constitution graduates the power of Congress by the standard of those legislatures? Was the United States' constitution worked into its present shape under the measuring line and square of Virginia and Maryland? and is its power to be bevelled down till it can run in the grooves of state legislation? There is a deal of prating about constitutional power over the District, as though Congress were indebted for it to Maryland and Virginia. The powers of those states, whether prodigies or nullities, have nothing to do with the question. As well thrust in the powers of the Grand Lama to join issue upon, or twist papal bulls into constitutional tether, with which to curb congressional action. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES gives power to Congress, and takes it away, and _it alone_. Maryland and Virginia adopted the Constitution _before_ they ceded to the United States the territory of the District. By their acts of cession, they abdicated their own sovereignty over the District, and thus made room for that provided by the United States' constitution, which sovereignty was to commence as soon as a cession of territory by states, and its acceptance by Congress, furnished a sphere for its exercise. That the abolition of slavery is within the sphere of legislation, I argue.

2. FROM THE FACT, THAT SLAVERY, AS A LEGAL SYSTEM, IS THE CREATURE OF LEGISLATION. The law, by _creating_ slavery, not only affirmed its _existence_ to be within the sphere and under the control of legislation, but also, the conditions and terms of its existence, and the _question_ whether or not it should exist. Of course legislation would not travel _out_ of its sphere, in abolishing what is _within_ it, and what had been recognized to be within it, by its own act. Cannot legislatures repeal their own laws? If law can take from a man his rights, it can give them back again. If it can say, "your body belongs to your neighbor," it can say, "it belongs to _yourself_." If it can annul a man's right to himself, held by express grant from his Maker, and can create for another an _artificial_ title to him, can it not annul the artificial title, and leave the original owner to hold himself by his original title?

3. THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY HAS ALWAYS BEEN CONSIDERED WITHIN THE APPROPRIATE SPHERE OF LEGISLATION. Almost every civilized nation has abolished slavery by law. The history of legislation since the revival of letters, is a record crowded with testimony to the universally admitted competency of the law-making power to abolish slavery. It is so manifestly an attribute not merely of absolute sovereignty, but even of ordinary legislation, that the competency of a legislature to exercise it, may well nigh be reckoned among the legal axioms of the civilized world. Even the night of the dark ages was not dark enough to make this invisible.

The Abolition decree of the great council of England was passed in 1102. The memorable Irish decree, "that all the English slaves in the whole of Ireland, be immediately emancipated and restored to their former liberty," was issued in 1171. Slavery in England was abolished by a general charter of emancipation in 1381. Passing over many instances of the abolition of slavery by law, both during the middle ages and since the reformation, we find them multiplying as we approach our own times. In 1776 slavery was abolished in Prussia by special edict. In St. Domingo, Cayenne, Guadaloupe, and Martinique, in 1794, where more than 600,000 slaves were emancipated by the French government. In Java, 1811; in Ceylon, 1815; in Buenos Ayres, 1816; in St. Helena, 1819; in Colombia, 1821; by the Congress of Chili in 1821; in Cape Colony, 1823; in Malacca, 1825; in the southern provinces of Birmah, 1826; in Bolivia, 1826; in Peru, Guatemala, and Monte Video, 1828; in Jamaica, Barbados, the Bermudas, the Bahamas, Anguilla, Mauritius, St. Christopers, Nevis, the Virgin Islands, (British), Antigua, Montserrat, Dominica, St. Vincents, Grenada, Berbice, Tobago, St. Lucia, Trinidad, Honduras, Demerara, Essequibo and the Cape of Good Hope, on the 1st of August, 1834. But waving details, suffice it to say, that England, France, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Germany, have all and often given their testimony to the competency of the legislative power to abolish slavery. In our own country, the Legislature of Pennsylvania passed an act of abolition in 1780, Connecticut in 1784; Rhode Island, 1784; New-York, 1799; New-Jersey, in 1804; Vermont, by Constitution, in 1777; Massachusetts, in 1780; and New-Hampshire, in 1784.

When the competency of the law-making power to abolish slavery has thus been recognized every where and for ages, when it has been embodied in the highest precedents, and celebrated in the thousand jubilees of regenerated liberty, is it an achievement of modern discovery, that such a power is a nullity?--that all these acts of abolition are void, and that the millions disenthralled by them, are, either themselves or their posterity, still legally in bondage?

4. LEGISLATIVE POWER HAS ABOLISHED SLAVERS IN ITS PARTS. The law of South Carolina prohibits the working of slaves more than fifteen hours in the twenty-four. In other words, it takes from the slaveholder his power over nine hours of the slave's time daily; and if it can take nine hours it may take twenty-four. The laws of Georgia prohibit the working of slaves on the first day of the week; and if they can do it for the first, they can for the six following. The law of North Carolina prohibits the "immoderate" correction of slaves. If it has power to prohibit _immoderate_ correction, it can prohibit _moderate_ correction--_all_ correction, which would be virtual emancipation; for, take from the master the power to inflict pain, and he is master no longer. Cease to ply the slave with the stimulus of fear, and he is free.

The Constitution of Mississippi gives the General Assembly power to make laws "to oblige the owners of slaves to _treat them with humanity_." The Constitution of Missouri has the same clause, and an additional one making it the DUTY of the legislature to pass such laws as may be necessary to secure the _humane_ treatment of the slaves. This grant to those legislatures, empowers them to decide what _is_ and what is _not_ "humane treatment." Otherwise it gives no "power"--the clause is mere waste paper, and flouts in the face of a befooled legislature. A clause giving power to require "humane treatment" covers all the _particulars_ of such treatment--gives power to exact it in _all respects--requiring_ certain acts, and _prohibiting_ others--maiming, branding, chaining together, separating families, floggings for learning the alphabet, for reading the Bible, for worshiping God according to conscience--the legislature has power to specify each of these acts--declare that it is not "_humane_ treatment," and PROHIBIT it.--The legislature may also believe that driving men and women into the field, and forcing them to work without pay, is not "humane treatment," and being constitutionally bound "to _oblige_" masters to practise "humane treatment"--they have the _power_ to _prohibit such_ treatment, and are bound to do it.

The law of Louisiana makes slaves real estate, prohibiting the holder, if he be also a _land_ holder, to separate them from the soil.[A] If it has power to prohibit the sale _without_ the soil, it can prohibit the sale _with_ it; and if it can prohibit the _sale_ as property, it can prohibit the _holding_ as property. Similar laws exist in the French, Spanish, and Portuguese colonies. The law of Louisiana requires the master to give his slaves a certain amount of food and clothing. If it can oblige the master to give the slave _one_ thing, it can oblige him to give him another: if food and clothing, then wages, liberty, his own body. By the laws of Connecticut, slaves may receive and hold property, and prosecute suits in their own name as plaintiffs: [This last was also the law of Virginia in 1795. See Tucker's "Dissertation on Slavery," p. 73.] There were also laws making marriage contracts legal, in certain contingencies, and punishing infringements of them, ["_Reeve's Law of Baron and Femme_," p. 340-1.]

[Footnote A: Virginia made slaves real estate by a law passed in 1705. (_Beverly's Hist. of Va._, p. 98.) I do not find the precise time when this law was repealed, probably when Virginia became the chief slave breeder for the cotton-growing and sugar-planting country, and made young men and women "from fifteen to twenty-five" the main staple production of the State.]

Each of the laws enumerated above, does, _in principle_, abolish slavery; and all of them together abolish it _in fact_. True, not as a _whole_, and at a _stroke_, nor all in one place; but in its _parts_, by piecemeal, at divers times and places; thus showing that the abolition of slavery is within the boundary of legislation.

In the "Washington (D.C.) City Laws," page 138, is "AN ACT to prevent horses from being cruelly beaten or abused." Similar laws have been passed by corporations in many of the slave states, and throughout the civilized world, such acts are punishable either as violations of common law or of legislative enactments. If a legislature can pass laws "to prevent _horses_ from being cruelly abused," it can pass laws to prevent _men_ from being cruelly abused, and if it can _prevent_ cruel abuse, it can define _what it is_. It can declare that to make men _work without pay_ is cruel abuse, and can PROHIBIT it.

5. THE COMPETENCY OF THE LAW-MAKING POWER TO ABOLISH SLAVERY, HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED BY ALL THE SLAVEHOLDING STATES, EITHER DIRECTLY OR BY IMPLICATION. Some States recognize it in their _Constitutions_, by giving the legislature power to emancipate such slaves as may "have rendered the state some distinguished service," and others by express prohibitory restrictions. The Constitution of Mississippi, Arkansas, and other States, restrict the power of the legislature in this respect. Why this express prohibition, if the law-making power _cannot_ abolish slavery? A stately farce indeed, with appropriate rites to induct into the Constitution a special clause, for the express purpose of restricting a nonentity!--to take from the law-making power what it _never had_, and what _cannot_ pertain to it! The legislatures of those States have no power to abolish slavery, simply because their Constitutions have expressly _taken away_ that power. The people of Arkansas, Mississippi, &c. well knew the competency of the law-making power to abolish slavery, and hence their zeal to _restrict_ it.

The slaveholding States have recognised this power in their _laws_. Virginia passed a law in 1786 to prevent the importation of Slaves, of which the following is an extract: "And be it further enacted that every slave imported into this commonwealth contrary to the true intent and meaning of this act, shall upon such importation become _free_." By a law of Virginia, passed Dec. 17, 1792, a slave brought into the state and kept _there a year_, was _free_. The Maryland Court of Appeals, Dec., 1813 [case of Stewart vs. Oakes,] decided that a slave owned in Maryland, and sent by his master into Virginia to work at different periods, making one year in the whole, became _free_, being _emancipated_ by the above law. North Carolina and Georgia in their acts of cession, transferring to the United States the territory now constituting the States of Tennessee, Alabama and Mississippi, made it a condition of the grant, that the provisions of the ordinance of '87 should be secured to the inhabitants, _with the exception of the sixth article which prohibits slavery_; thus conceding, both the competency of law to abolish slavery, and the power of Congress to do it, within its jurisdiction. (These acts show the prevalent belief at that time, in the slaveholding States, that the general government had adopted a line of policy aiming at the exclusion of slavery from the entire territory of the United States, not included within the original States, and that this policy would be pursued unless prevented by specific and formal stipulation.)

Slaveholding States have asserted this power _in their judicial decisions_. In numerous cases their highest courts have decided that if the legal owner of slaves takes them into those States where slavery has been abolished either by law or by the constitution, such removal emancipates them, such law or constitution abolishing their slavery. This principle is asserted in the decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, Lunsford vs. Coquillon, 14 Martin's La. Reps. 401. Also by the Supreme Court of Virginia, Hunter vs. Fulcher, 1 Leigh's Reps. 172. The same doctrine was laid down by Judge Washington, of the U. S. Sup. Court, Butler vs. Hopper, Washington's C. C. Reps. 508; also, by the Court of Appeals in Kentucky, Rankin vs. Lydia, 2 Marshall's Reps. 407; see also, Wilson vs. Isbell, 5 Call's Reps. 425, Spotts vs. Gillespie, 6 Randolph's Reps. 566. The State vs. Lasselle, 1 Blackford's Reps. 60, Marie Louise vs. Mariot, 8 La. Reps. 475. In this case, which was tried in 1836, the slave had been taken by her master to France and brought back; Judge Matthews, of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, decided that "residence for one moment" under the laws of France emancipated her.

6. EMINENT STATESMEN, THEMSELVES SLAVEHOLDERS, HAVE CONCEDED THIS POWER. Washington, in a letter to Robert Morris, April 12, 1786, says: "There is not a man living, who wishes more sincerely than I do, to see a plan adopted for the abolition of slavery; but there is only one proper and effectual mode by which it can be accomplished, and that is by _legislative_ authority." In a letter to Lafayette, May 10, 1786, he says: "It (the abolition of slavery) certainly might, and assuredly ought to be effected, and that too by _legislative_ authority." In a letter to John Fenton Mercer, Sept. 9, 1786, he says: "It is among my first wishes to see some plan adopted by which slavery in this country may be abolished by _law_." In a letter to Sir John Sinclair, he says: "There are in Pennsylvania, _laws_ for the gradual abolition of slavery, which neither Maryland nor Virginia have at present, but which nothing is more certain than that they _must have_, and at a period not remote." Jefferson, speaking of movements in the Virginia Legislature in 1777, for the passage of a law emancipating the slaves, says: "The principles of the amendment were agreed on, that is to say, the freedom of all born after a certain day; but it was found that the public mind would not bear the proposition, yet the day is not far distant when _it must bear and adopt it_."--Jefferson's Memoirs, v. i. p. 35. It is well known that Jefferson, Pendleton, Mason, Wythe and Lee, while acting as a committee of the Virginia House of Delegates to revise the State Laws, prepared a plan for the gradual emancipation of the slaves by law. These men were the great lights of Virginia. Mason, the author of the Virginia Constitution; Pendleton, the President of the memorable Virginia Convention in 1787, and President of the Virginia Court of Appeals; Wythe was the Blackstone of the Virginia bench, for a quarter of a century Chancellor of the State, the professor of law in the University of William and Mary, and the preceptor of Jefferson, Madison, and Chief Justice Marshall. He was the author of the celebrated remonstrance to the English House of Commons on the subject of the stamp act. As to Jefferson, his _name_ is his biography.

Every slaveholding member of Congress from the States of Maryland, Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Georgia, voted for the celebrated ordinance of 1787, which abolished the slavery then existing in the Northwest Territory. Patrick Henry, in his well known letter to Robert Pleasants, of Virginia, January 18, 1773, says: "I believe a time will come when an opportunity will be offered to abolish this lamentable evil." William Pinkney, of Maryland, advocated the abolition of slavery by law, in the legislature of that State, in 1789. Luther Martin urged the same measure both in the Federal Convention, and in his report to the Legislature of Maryland. In 1796, St. George Tucker, of Virginia, professor of law in the University of William and Mary, and Judge of the General Court, published a dissertation on slavery, urging the abolition of slavery by _law_.

John Jay, while New-York was yet a slave State, and himself in law a slaveholder, said in a letter from Spain, in 1786, "An excellent law might be made out of the Pennsylvania one, for the gradual abolition of slavery. Were I in your legislature, I would present a bill for the purpose, and I would never cease moving it till it became a law, or I ceased to be a member."

Governor Tompkins, in a message to the Legislature of New-York, January 8, 1812, said: "To devise the means for the gradual and ultimate _extermination_ from amongst us of slavery, is a work worthy the _representatives_ of a polished and enlightened nation."

The Virginia Legislature asserted this power in 1832. At the close of a month's debate, the following proceedings were had. I extract from an editorial article in the Richmond Whig, Jan. 26, 1832.

"The report of the Select Committee, adverse to legislation on the subject of Abolition, was in these words: _Resolved_, as the opinion of this Committee, that it is INEXPEDIENT FOR THE PRESENT, to make any _legislative enactments for the abolition of slavery_." This Report Mr. Preston moved to reverse, and thus to declare that it _was_ expedient, _now_ to make legislative enactments for the abolition of slavery. This was meeting the question in its strongest form. It demanded action, and immediate action. On this proposition the vote was 58 to 73. Many of the most decided friends of abolition voted against the amendment, because they thought public opinion not sufficiently prepared for it, and that it might prejudice the cause to move too rapidly. The vote on Mr. Witcher's motion to postpone the whole subject indefinitely, indicates the true state of opinion in the House. That was the test question, and was so intended and proclaimed by its mover. That motion was _negatived_, 71 to 60; showing a majority of 11, who by that vote, declared their belief that at the proper time, and in the proper mode, Virginia ought to commence a system of gradual abolition.

7. THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES HAVE ASSERTED THIS POWER. The ordinance of '87, declaring that there should be "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude," in the North Western Territory, abolished the slavery then existing there. The Sup. Court of Mississippi, [Harvey vs. Decker, Walker's Mi. Reps. 36,] declared that the ordinance of '87 emancipated the slaves then held there. In this decision the question is argued ably and at great length. The Supreme Court of La. made the same decision in the case of Forsyth vs. Nash, 4 Martin's La. Reps. 385. The same doctrine was laid down by Judge Porter, (late United States Senator from La.,) in his decision at the March term of the La. Supreme Court, 1830, Merry vs. Chexnaider, 20 Martin's Reps. 699.

That the ordinance abolished the slavery then existing there is also shown by the fact, that persons holding slaves in the territory petitioned for the repeal of the article abolishing slavery, assigning _that_ as a reason. "The petition of the citizens of Randolph and St. Clair counties in the Illinois country, stating that they were in possession of slaves, and praying the repeal of that act (the 6th article of the ordinance of '87) and the passage of a law legalizing slavery there." [Am. State papers, Public Lands, v. 1. p. 69.] Congress passed this ordinance before the United States' Constitution was adopted, when it derived all its authority from the articles of Confederation, which conferred powers of legislation far more restricted than those committed to Congress over the District and Territories by the United States' Constitution. Now, we ask, how does the Constitution _abridge_ the powers which Congress possessed under the articles of confederation?

The abolition of the slave trade by Congress, in 1808, is another illustration of the competency of legislative power to abolish slavery. The African slave trade has become such a mere _technic_, in common parlance, that the fact of its being _proper slavery_ is overlooked. The buying and selling, the transportation, and the horrors of the middle passage, were mere _incidents_ of the slavery in which the victims were held. Let things be called by their own names. When Congress abolished the African slave trade, it abolished SLAVERY--supreme slavery--power frantic with license, trampling a whole hemisphere scathed with its fires, and running down with blood. True, Congress did not, in the abolition of the slave trade, abolish all the slavery within its jurisdiction, but it did abolish _all_ the slavery _in one_ part of its jurisdiction. What has rifled it of power to abolish slavery in _another_ part of its jurisdiction, especially in that part where it has "exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever?"

8. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZES THIS POWER BY THE MOST CONCLUSIVE IMPLICATION. In Art. 1, sec. 3, clause 1, it prohibits the abolition of the slave trade previous to 1808: thus implying the power of Congress to do it at once, but for the restriction; and its power to do it _unconditionally_, when that restriction ceased. Again; In Art. 4, sec. 2, "No person held to service or labor in one state under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from said service or labor." This clause was inserted, as all admit, to prevent the runaway slave from being emancipated by the _laws_ of the free states. If these laws had _no power_ to emancipate, why this constitutional guard to prevent it?

The insertion of the clause, was the testimony of the eminent jurists that framed the Constitution, to the existence of the _power_, and their public proclamation, that the abolition of slavery was within the appropriate sphere of legislation. The right of the owner to that which is rightfully property, is founded on a principle of _universal law_, and is recognized and protected by all civilized nations; property in slaves is, by general consent, an _exception_; hence slaveholders insisted upon the insertion of this clause in the United States' Constitution, that they might secure by an _express provision_, that from which protection is withheld, by the acknowledged principles of universal law.[A] By demanding this provision, slaveholders consented that their slaves should not be recognized as property by the United States' Constitution, and hence they found their claim, on the fact of their being "_persons_, and _held_ to service."

[Footnote A: The fact, that under the articles of Confederation, slaveholders, whose slaves had escaped into free states, had no legal power to force them back,--that _now_ they have no power to recover, by process of law, their slaves who escape to Canada, the South American States, or to Europe--the case already cited, in which the Supreme Court of Louisiana decided, that residence "_for one moment_," under the laws of France emancipated an American slave--the case of Fulton, _vs._ Lewis, 3 Har. and John's Reps., 56, where the slave of a St. Domingo slaveholder, who brought him to Maryland in '93, was pronounced free by the Maryland Court of Appeals--are illustrations of the acknowledged truth here asserted, that by the consent of the civilized world, and on the principles of universal law, slaves are not "_property_," and that whenever held as property under _law_, it is only by _positive legislative acts_, forcibly setting aside the law of nature, the common law, and the principles of universal justice and right between man and man,--principles paramount to all law, and from which alone, law derives its intrinsic authoritative sanction.]

9. CONGRESS HAS UNQUESTIONABLE POWER TO ADOPT THE COMMON LAW, AS THE LEGAL SYSTEM, WITHIN ITS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION.--This has been done, with certain restrictions, in most of the States, either by legislative acts or by constitutional implication. THE COMMON LAW KNOWS NO SLAVES. Its principles annihilate slavery wherever they touch it. It is a universal, unconditional, abolition act. Wherever slavery is a legal system, it is so only by _statute_ law, and in violation of the common law. The declaration of Lord Chief Justice Holt, that, "by the common law, no man can have property in another," is an acknowledged axiom, and based upon the well known common law definition of property. "The subjects of dominion or property are _things_, as contra-distinguished from _persons_." Let Congress adopt the common law in the District of Columbia, and slavery there is abolished. Congress may well be at home in common law legislation, for the common law is the grand element of the United States' Constitution. All its _fundamental_ provisions are instinct with its spirit; and its existence, principles, and paramount authority, are presupposed and assumed throughout the whole. The preamble of the Constitution plants the standard of the Common Law immovably in its foreground. "We, the people of the United States, in order to ESTABLISH JUSTICE, &c., do ordain and establish this Constitution;" thus proclaiming _devotion_ to JUSTICE, as the controlling motive in the organization of the Government, and its secure establishment the chief object of its aims. By this most solemn recognition, the common law, that grand legal embodyment of "justice" and fundamental right--was made the groundwork of the Constitution, and intrenched behind its strongest munitions. The second clause of Sec. 9, Art. 1; Sec. 4, Art. 2, and the last clause of Sec. 2, Art. 3, with Articles 7, 8, 9, and 13 of the Amendments, are also express recognitions of the common law as the presiding Genius of the Constitution.

By adopting the common law within its exclusive jurisdiction Congress would carry out the principles of our glorious Declaration, and follow the highest precedents in our national history and jurisprudence. It is a political maxim as old as civil legislation, that laws should be strictly homogeneous with the principles of the government whose will they express, embodying and carrying them out--being indeed the _principles themselves_, in preceptive form--representatives alike of the nature and power of the Government--standing illustrations of its genius and spirit, while they proclaim and enforce its authority. Who needs be told that slavery makes war upon the principles of the Declaration, and the spirit of the Constitution, and that these and the principles of the common law gravitate towards each other with irrepressible affinities, and mingle into one? The common law came hither with our pilgrim fathers; it was their birthright, their panoply, their glory, and their song of rejoicing in the house of their pilgrimage. It covered them in the day of their calamity, and their trust was under the shadow of its wings. From the first settlement of the country, the genius of our institutions and our national spirit have claimed it as a common possession, and exulted in it with a common pride. A century ago, Governor Pownall, one of the most eminent constitutional jurists of colonial times, said of the common law, "In all the colonies the common law is received as the foundation and main body of their law." In the Declaration of Rights, made by the Continental Congress at its first session in '74, there was the following resolution: "Resolved, That the respective colonies are entitled to the common law of England, and especially to the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage according to the course of that law." Soon after the organization of the general government, Chief Justice Ellsworth, in one of his decisions on the bench of the U. S. Sup. Court, said: "The common law of this country remains the same as it was before the revolution." Chief Justice Marshall, in his decision in the case of Livingston _vs._ Jefferson, said: "When our ancestors migrated to America, they brought with them the common law of their native country, so far as it was applicable to their new situation, and I do not conceive that the revolution in any degree changed the relations of man to man, or the law which regulates them. In breaking our political connection with the parent state, we did not break our connection with each other." [_Hall's Law Journal, new series_.] Mr. Duponceau, in his "Dissertation on the Jurisdiction of Courts in the United States," says, "I consider the common law of England the _jus commune_ of the United States. I think I can lay it down as a correct principle, that the common law of England, as it was at the time of the Declaration of Independence, still continues to be the national law of this country, so far as it is applicable to our present state, and subject to the modifications it has received here in the course of nearly half a century." Chief Justice Taylor of North Carolina, in his decision in the case of the State _vs._ Reed, in 1823, Hawkes' N.C. Reps. 454, says, "a law of _paramount, obligation to the statute_, was violated by the offence--COMMON LAW, founded upon the law of nature, and confirmed by revelation." The legislation of the United States abounds in recognitions of the principles of the common law, asserting their paramount binding power. Sparing details, of which our national state papers are full, we illustrate by a single instance. It was made a condition of the admission of Louisiana into the Union, that the right of trial by jury should be secured to all her citizens,--the United States government thus employing its power to enlarge the jurisdiction of the common law in this its great representative.

Having shown that the abolition of slavery is within the competency of the law-making power, when unrestricted by constitutional provisions, and that the legislation of Congress over the District is thus unrestricted, its power to abolish slavery there is established. We argue it further, from the fact that,

10. SLAVERY NOW EXISTS IN THE DISTRICT BY AN ACT OF CONGRESS. In the act of 16th July, 1790, Congress accepted portions of territory offered by the states of Maryland and Virginia, and enacted that the laws, as they then were, should continue in force, "until Congress shall otherwise by law provide." Under these laws, adopted by Congress, and in effect re-enacted and made laws of the District, the slaves there are now held.

Is Congress so impotent in its own "exclusive jurisdiction" that it cannot "otherwise by law provide?" If it can say, what _shall_ be considered property, it can say what shall _not_ be considered property. Suppose a legislature should enact that marriage contracts should be mere bills of sale, making a husband the proprietor of his wife, as his _bona fide_ property; and suppose husbands should herd their wives in droves for the market as beasts of burden, or for the brothel as victims of lust, and then prate about their inviolable legal property, and deny the power of the legislature, which stamped them "property," to undo its own wrong, and secure to wives by law the rights of human beings. Would such cant about "legal rights" be heeded where reason and justice held sway, and where law, based upon fundamental morality, received homage? If a frantic legislature pronounces woman a chattel, has it no power, with returning reason, to take back the blasphemy? Is the impious edict irrepealable? Be it, that with legal forms it has stamped wives "wares." Can no legislation blot out the brand? Must the handwriting of Deity on human nature be expunged for ever? Has LAW no power to stay the erasing pen, and tear off the scrawled label that covers up the IMAGE OF GOD?

II. THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO ABOLISH SLAVERY IN THE DISTRICT HAS BEEN, TILL RECENTLY, UNIVERSALLY CONCEDED.

1. It has been assumed by Congress itself. The following record stands on the journals of the House of Representatives for 1804, p. 225: "On motion made and seconded that the House do come to the following resolution: 'Resolved, That from and after the 4th day of July, 1805, all blacks and people of color that shall be born within the District of Columbia, or whose mothers shall be the property of any person residing within the said District, shall be free, the males at the age of ----, and the females at the age of ----. The main question being taken that the House do agree to said motions as originally proposed, it was negatived by a majority of 46.'" Though the motion was lost, it was on the ground of its alleged _inexpediency_ alone. In the debate which preceded the vote, the power of Congress was conceded. In March, 1816, the House of Representatives passed the following resolution: "Resolved, That a committee be appointed to inquire into the existence of an inhuman and illegal traffic in slaves, carried on in and through the District of Columbia, and to report whether any and what measures are necessary for _putting a stop to the same_."

On the 9th of January, 1829, the House of Representatives passed the following resolution by a vote of 114 to 66: "Resolved, That the Committee on the District of Columbia, be instructed to inquire into the _expediency_ of providing by _law_ for the gradual abolition of slavery within the District, in such a manner that the interests of no individual shall be injured thereby." Among those who voted in the affirmative were Messrs. Barney of Md., Armstrong of Va., A.H. Shepperd of N.C., Blair of Tenn., Chilton and Lyon of Ky., Johns of Del., and others from slave states.

2. IT HAS BEEN CONCEDED BY COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS, ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.--In a report of the committee on the District, Jan. 11, 1837, by their chairman, Mr. Powell of Va., there is the following declaration: "The Congress of the United States, has by the constitution exclusive jurisdiction over the District, and has power upon this subject (_slavery_,) as upon all other subjects of legislation, to exercise _unlimited discretion_." Reports of Comms. 2d Sess. 19th Cong. v. iv. No. 43. In December, 1831, the committee on the District, Mr. Doddridge of Va., Chairman, reported, "That until the adjoining states act on the subject, (_slavery_) it would be (not _unconstitutional_ but) unwise and impolitic, if not unjust, for Congress to interfere." In April, 1836, a special committee on abolition memorials reported the following resolutions by their Chairman, Mr. Pinckney of South Carolina: "Resolved, That Congress possesses no constitutional authority to interfere in any way with the institution of slavery in any of the states of this confederacy."

"Resolved, That Congress _ought not to interfere_ in any way with slavery in the District of Columbia." "Ought not to interfere," carefully avoiding the phraseology of the first resolution, and thus in effect conceding the constitutional power. In a widely circulated "Address to the electors of the Charleston District," Mr. Pinkney is thus denounced by his own constituents: "He has proposed a resolution which is received by the plain common sense of the whole country as a concession that Congress has authority to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia."

3. IT HAS BEEN CONCEDED BY THE CITIZENS OF THE DISTRICT. A petition for the gradual abolition of slavery in the District, signed by nearly eleven hundred of its citizens, was presented to Congress, March 24, 1827. Among the signers to this petition, were Chief Justice Cranch, Judge Van Ness, Judge Morsel, Prof. J.M. Staughton, and a large number of the most influential inhabitants of the District. Mr. Dickson, of New York, asserted on the floor of Congress in 1835, that the signers to this petition owned more than half the property in the District. The accuracy of this statement has never been questioned.

THIS POWER HAS BEEN CONCEDED BY GRAND JURIES OF THE DISTRICT. The grand jury of the county of Alexandria, at the March term, 1802, presented the domestic slaves trade as a grievance, and said, "We consider these grievances demanding _legislative_ redress." Jan. 19, 1829, Mr. Alexander, of Virginia, presented a representation of the grand jury in the city of Washington, remonstrating against "any measure for the abolition of slavery within said District, unless accompanied by measures for the removal of the emancipated from the same;" thus, not only conceding the power to emancipate slaves, but affirming an additional power, that of _excluding them when free_. Journal H. R. 1828-9, p. 174.

4. THIS POWER HAS BEEN CONCEDED BY STATE LEGISLATURES. In 1828 the Legislature of Pennsylvania instructed their Senators in Congress "to procure, if practicable, the passage of a law to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia." Jan. 28, 1829, the House of Assembly of New York passed a resolution, that their "Senators in Congress be instructed to make every possible exertion to effect the passage of a law for the abolition of Slavery in the District of Columbia." In February, 1837, the Senate of Massachusetts "Resolved, That Congress having exclusive legislation in the District of Columbia, possess the right to abolish slavery and the slave trade therein." The House of Representatives passed the following resolution at the same session: "Resolved, That Congress having exclusive legislation in the District of Columbia, possess the right to abolish slavery in said District." November 1, 1837, the Legislature of Vermont, "Resolved that Congress have the full power by the constitution to abolish slavery and the slave trade in the District of Columbia, and in the territories."

In May, 1838, the Legislature of Connecticut passed a resolution asserting the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia.

In January, 1836, the Legislature of South Carolina "Resolved, That we should consider the abolition of Slavery in the District of Columbia as a violation of the rights of the citizens of that District derived from the _implied_ conditions on which that territory was ceded to the General Government." Instead of denying the constitutional power, they virtually admit its existence, by striving to smother it under an _implication_. In February, 1836, the Legislature of North Carolina "Resolved, That, although by the Constitution _all legislative power_ over the District of Columbia is vested in the Congress of the United States, yet we would deprecate any legislative action on the part of that body towards liberating the slaves of that District, as a breach of faith towards those States by whom the territory was originally ceded. Here is a full concession of the _power_. February 2, 1836, the Virginia Legislature passed unanimously the following resolution: "Resolved, by the General Assembly of Virginia, that the following article be proposed to the several states of this Union, and to Congress, as an amendment of the Constitution of the United States:" "The powers of Congress shall not be so construed as to authorize the passage of any law for the emancipation of slaves in the District of Columbia, without the consent of the individual proprietors thereof, unless by the sanction of the Legislatures of Virginia and Maryland, and under such conditions as they shall by law prescribe."

Fifty years after the formation of the United States' constitution the states are solemnly called upon by the Virginia Legislature, to amend that instrument by a clause asserting that, in the grant to Congress of "exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever" over the District, the "case" of slavery is not included!! What could have dictated such a resolution but the conviction that the power to abolish slavery is an irresistible inference from the constitution _as it is?_ The fact that the same legislature, passed afterward a resolution, though by no means unanimously, that Congress does not possess the power, abates not a title of the testimony in the first resolution. March 23d, 1824, "Mr. Brown presented the resolutions of the General Assembly of Ohio, recommending to Congress the consideration of a system for the gradual emancipation of persons of color held in servitude in the United States." On the same day, "Mr. Noble, of Indiana, communicated a resolution from the legislature of that state, respecting the gradual emancipation of slaves within the United States." Journal of the United States' Senate, for 1824-5, p.231.

The Ohio and Indiana resolutions, by taking for granted the _general_ power of Congress over the subject of slavery, do virtually assert its _special_ power within its _exclusive_ jurisdiction.

5. THIS POWER HAS BEEN CONCEDED BY BODIES OF CITIZENS IN THE SLAVE STATES. The petition of eleven hundred citizens of the District, has been already mentioned. "March 5,1830, Mr. Washington presented a memorial of inhabitants of the county of Frederick, in the state of Maryland, praying that provision be made for the gradual abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia." Journal H.R. 1829-30, p. 358.

March 30, 1828. Mr. A.H. Shepperd, of North Carolina, presented a memorial of citizens of that state, "praying Congress to take measures for the entire abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia." Journal H.R. 1829-30, p. 379.

January 14, 1822. Mr. Rhea, of Tennessee, presented a memorial of citizens of that state, praying that "provision may be made, whereby all slaves that may hereafter be born in the District of Columbia, shall be free at a certain period of their lives." Journal H.R. 1821-22, p.142.

December 13, 1824. Mr. Saunders of North Carolina, presented a memorial of the citizens of that state, praying "that measures may be taken for the gradual abolition of slavery in the United States." Journal H.R. 1824-25, p.27.

December 16, 1828. "Mr. Barnard presented the memorial of the American Convention for promoting the abolition of slavery, held in Baltimore, praying that slavery may be abolished in the District of Columbia." Journal U.S. Senate, 1828-29, p.24.

6. DISTINGUISHED STATESMEN AND JURISTS IN THE SLAVEHOLDING STATES, HAVE CONCEDED THIS POWER. The testimony Of Messrs. Doddridge, and Powell, of Virginia, Chief Justice Cranch, and Judges Morsel and Van Ness, of the District, has already been given. In the debate in Congress on the memorial of the Society of Friends, in 1790, Mr. Madison, in speaking of the territories of the United States, explicitly declared, from his own knowledge of the views of the members of the convention that framed the constitution, as well as from the obvious import of its terms, that in the territories, "Congress have certainly the power to regulate the subject of slavery." Congress can have no more power over the territories than that of "exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever," consequently, according to Mr. Madison, "it has certainly the power to regulate the subject of slavery in the" _District_. In March, 1816, Mr. Randolph of Virginia, introduced a resolution for putting a stop to the domestic slave trade within the District. December 12, 1827, Mr. Barney, of Maryland, presented a memorial for abolition in the District, and moved that it be printed. Mr. McDuffie, of S.C., objected to the printing, but "expressly admitted the right of Congress to grant to the people of the District any measure which they might deem necessary to free themselves from the deplorable evil."--[See letter of Mr. Claiborne of Miss. to his constituents published in the Washington Globe, May 9, 1836.] The sentiments of Mr. Clay of Kentucky, on the subject are well known. In a speech before the U.S. Senate, in 1836, he declared the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District "unquestionable." Messrs. Blair, of Tennessee, and Chilton, Lyon, and R.M. Johnson, of Kentucky, A.H. Shepperd, of N.C., Messrs. Armstrong and Smyth of Va., Messrs. Dorsey, Archer, and Barney, of Md., and Johns, of Del., with numerous others from slave states have asserted the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District. In the speech of Mr. Smyth, of Virginia, on the Missouri question, January 28, 1820, he says on this point: "If the future freedom of the blacks is your real object, and not a mere pretence, why do you begin _here_? Within the ten miles square, you have _undoubted power_ to exercise exclusive legislation. _Produce a bill to emancipate the slaves in the District of Columbia_, or, if you prefer it, to emancipate those born hereafter."

To this may be added the testimony of the present Vice President of the United States, Hon. Richard M. Johnson, of Kentucky. In a speech before the U.S. Senate, February 1, 1820, (National Intelligencer, April 29, 1829,) he says: "In the District of Columbia, containing a population of 30,000 souls, and probably as many slaves as the whole territory of Missouri, THE POWER OF PROVIDING FOR THEIR EMANCIPATION RESTS WITH CONGRESS ALONE. Why then, this heart-rending sympathy for the slaves of Missouri, and this cold insensibility, this eternal apathy, towards the slaves in the District of Columbia?"

It is quite unnecessary to add, that the most distinguished northern statesmen of both political parties, have always affirmed the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District. President Van Buren in his letter of March 6, 1836, to a committee of Gentlemen in North Carolina, says, "I would not, from the light now before me, feel myself safe in pronouncing that Congress does not possess the power of abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia." This declaration of the President is consistent with his avowed sentiments touching the Missouri question, on which he coincided with such men as Daniel D. Thompkins, De Witt Clinton, and others, whose names are a host.[A] It is consistent, also with his recommendation in his last message, in which speaking of the District, he strongly urges upon Congress "a thorough and careful revision of its local government," speaks of the "entire independence" of the people of the District "upon Congress," recommends that a "uniform system of local government" be adopted, and adds, that "although it was selected as the seat of the General Government, the site of its public edifices, the depository of its archives, and the residences of officers intrusted with large amounts of public property, and the management of public business, yet it never has been subjected to, or received, that _special_ and _comprehensive_ legislation which these circumstances peculiarly demanded."

[Footnote A: Mr. Van Buren, when a member of the Senate of New-York, voted for the following preamble and resolutions, which passed unanimously:--Jan. 28th, 1820. "Whereas the inhibiting the further extension of slavery in the United States, is a subject of deep concern to the people of this state: and whereas, we consider slavery as an evil much to be deplored, and that _every constitutional barrier should be interposed to prevent its further extension_: and that the constitution of the United States _clearly gives Congress the right_ to require new states, not comprised within the original boundary of the United States, to _make the prohibition of slavery_ a condition of their admission into the Union: Therefore,

Resolved, That our Senators be instructed, and our members of Congress be requested, to oppose the admission as a state into the Union, of any territory not comprised as aforesaid, without making _the prohibition of slavery_ therein an indispensible condition of admission." ]

The tenor of Mr. Tallmadge's speech on the right of petition, and of Mr. Webster's on the reception of abolition memorials, may be taken as universal exponents of the sentiments of northern statesmen as to the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia.

An explicit declaration, that an "_overwhelming majority_" of the _present_ Congress concede the power to abolish slavery in the District has just been made by Robert Barnwell Rhett, a member of Congress from South Carolina, in a letter published in the Charleston Mercury of Dec. 27, 1837. The following is an extract:

"The time has arrived when we must have new guaranties under the constitution, or the Union must be dissolved. _Our views of the constitution are not those of the majority_. AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY _think that by the constitution, Congress may abolish slavery in the District of Columbia--may abolish the slave trade between the States; that is, it may prohibit their being carried out of the State in which they are--and prohibit it in all the territories, Florida among them. They think_, NOT WITHOUT STRONG REASONS, _that the power of Congress extends to all of these subjects_."

_Direct testimony_ to show that the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District, has always till recently been _universally conceded_, is perhaps quite superfluous. We subjoin, however, the following:

The Vice-President of the United States in his speech on the Missouri question, quoted above, after contending that the restriction of slavery in Missouri would be unconstitutional, declares, that the power of Congress over slavery in the District "COULD NOT BE QUESTIONED." In the speech of Mr. Smyth, of Va., also quoted above, he declares the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District to be "UNDOUBTED."

Mr. Sutherland, of Penn., in a speech in the House of Representatives, on the motion to print Mr. Pinckney's Report, is thus reported in the Washington Globe, of May 9th, '36. "He replied to the remark that the report conceded that Congress had a right to legislate upon the subject in the District of Columbia, and said that SUCH A RIGHT HAD NEVER BEEN, TILL RECENTLY, DENIED."

The American Quarterly Review, published at Philadelphia, with a large circulation and list of contributors in the slave states, holds the following language in the September No. 1833, p. 55: "Under this 'exclusive jurisdiction,' granted by the constitution, Congress has power to abolish slavery and the slave trade in the District of Columbia. It would hardly be necessary to state this as a distinct proposition, had it not been occasionally questioned. The truth of the assertion, however, is too obvious to admit of argument--and we believe has NEVER BEEN DISPUTED BY PERSONS WHO ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE CONSTITUTION."

OBJECTIONS TO THE FOREGOING CONCLUSIONS CONSIDERED.

We now proceed to notice briefly the main arguments that have been employed in Congress and elsewhere against the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District. One of the most plausible is, that "the conditions on which Maryland and Virginia ceded the District to the United States, would be violated, if Congress should abolish slavery there." The reply to this is, that Congress had no power to _accept_ a cession coupled with conditions restricting that "power of exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such District," which was given it by the constitution.

To show the futility of the objection, we insert here the acts of cession. The cession of Maryland was made in November, 1788, and is as follows: "An act to cede to Congress a district of ten miles square in this state for the seat of the government of the United States."

"Be it enacted, by the General Assembly of Maryland, that the representatives of this state in the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States, appointed to assemble at New-York, on the first Wednesday of March next, be, and they are; hereby authorized and required on the behalf of this state, to cede to the Congress of the United States, any district in this state, not exceeding ten miles square, which the Congress may fix upon, and accept for the seat of government of the United States." Laws of Md., v. 2., c. 46.

The cession of Virginia was made on the 3d of December, 1788, in the following words:

"Be it enacted by the General Assembly, That a tract of country, not exceeding ten miles square, or any lesser quantity, to be located within the limits of the State, and in any part thereof; as Congress may, by law, direct, shall be, and the same is hereby forever ceded and relinquished to the Congress and Government of the United States, in full and absolute right, and exclusive jurisdiction, as well of soil, as of persons residing or to reside thereon, pursuant to the tenor and effect of the eighth section of the first article of the government of the constitution of the United States."

But were there no provisos to these acts? The Maryland act had _none_. The Virginia act had this proviso: "Sect. 2. Provided, that nothing herein contained, shall be construed to vest in the United States any right of property in the soil, or to affect the rights of individuals _therein_, otherwise than the same shall or may be transferred by such individuals to the United States."

This specification touching the soil was merely definitive and explanatory of that clause in the act of cession, "_full and absolute right_." Instead of restraining the power of Congress on _slavery_ and other subjects, it even gives it freer course; for exceptions to _parts_ of a rule, give double confirmation to those parts not embraced in the exceptions. If it was the _design_ of the proviso to restrict congressional action on the subject of _slavery_, why is the _soil alone_ specified? As legal instruments are not paragons of economy in words, might not "John Doe," out of his abundance, and without spoiling his style, have afforded an additional word--at least a hint--that slavery was _meant_, though nothing was said about it?

But again, Maryland and Virginia, in their acts of cession, declare them to be made "in pursuance of" that clause of the constitution which gives to Congress "exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever" over the ten miles square--thus, instead of _restricting_ that clause, both States _confirm_ it. Now, their acts of cession either accorded with that clause of the constitution, or they conflicted with it. If they conflicted with it, _accepting_ the cessions was a violation of the constitution. The fact that Congress accepted the cessions, proves that in its views their _terms_ did not conflict with its constitutional grant of power. The inquiry whether these acts of cession were consistent or inconsistent with the United Status' constitution, is totally irrelevant to the question at issue. What with the CONSTITUTION? That is the question. Not, what with Virginia, or Maryland, or--equally to the point--John Bull! If Maryland and Virginia had been the authorized interpreters of the constitution for the Union, these acts of cession could hardly have been more magnified than they have been recently by the southern delegation in Congress. A true understanding of the constitution can be had, forsooth, only by holding it up in the light of Maryland and Virginia legislation!

We are told, again, that those States would not have ceded the District if they had supposed the constitution gave Congress power to abolish slavery in it.

This comes with an ill grace from Maryland and Virginia. They _knew_ the constitution. They were parties to it. They had sifted it, clause by clause, in their State conventions. They had weighed its words in the balance--they had tested them as by fire; and, finally, after long pondering, they adopted the constitution. And _afterward_, self-moved, they ceded the ten miles square, and declared the cession made "in pursuance of" that oft-cited clause, "Congress shall have power to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such District." And now verily "they would not have ceded if they had _supposed_!" &c. Cede it they _did_, and in "full and absolute right both of soil and persons." Congress accepted the cession--state power over the District ceased, and congressional power over it commenced,--and now, the sole question to be settled is, the _amount of power over the District lodged in Congress by the constitution_. The constitution--THE CONSTITUTION--that is the point. Maryland and Virginia "suppositions" must be potent suppositions to abrogate a clause of the United States' Constitution! That clause either gives Congress power to abolish slavery in the District, or it does _not_--and that point is to be settled, not by state "suppositions," nor state usages, nor state legislation, but _by the terms of the clause themselves_.

Southern members of Congress, in the recent discussions, have conceded the power of a contingent abolition in the District, by suspending it upon the _consent_ of the people. Such a doctrine from _declaimers_ like Messrs. Alford, of Georgia, and Walker, of Mississippi, would excite no surprise; but that it should be honored with the endorsement of such men as Mr. Rives and Mr. Calhoun, is quite unaccountable. Are attributes of sovereignty mere creatures of contingency? Is delegated authority mere conditional permission? Is a constitutional power to be exercised by those who hold it, only by popular sufferance? Must it lie helpless at the pool of public sentiment, waiting the gracious troubling of its waters? Is it a lifeless corpse, save only when popular "consent" deigns to puff breath into its nostrils? Besides, if the consent of the people of the District be necessary, the consent of the _whole_ people must be had--not that of a majority, however large. Majorities, to be authoritative, must be _legal_--and a legal majority without legislative power, or right of representation, or even the electoral franchise, would be truly an anomaly! In the District of Columbia, such a thing as a majority in a legal sense is unknown to law. To talk of the power of a majority, or the will of a majority there, is mere mouthing. A majority? Then it has an authoritative will, and an organ to make it known, and an executive to carry it into effect--Where are they? We repeat it--if the consent of the people of the District be necessary, the consent of _every one_ is necessary--and _universal_ consent will come only with the Greek Kalends and a "perpetual motion." A single individual might thus perpetuate slavery in defiance of the expressed will of a whole people. The most common form of this fallacy is given by Mr. Wise, of Virginia, in his speech, February 16, 1835, in which he denied the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District, unless the inhabitants owning slaves petitioned for it!! Southern members of Congress at the present session (1837-8) ring changes almost daily upon the same fallacy. What! pray Congress _to use_ a power which it _has not_? "It is required of a man according to what he _hath_," saith the Scripture. I commend Mr. Wise to Paul for his ethics. Would that he had got his _logic_ of him! If Congress does not possess the power, why taunt it with its weakness, by asking its exercise? Petitioning, according to Mr. Wise, is, in matters of legislation, omnipotence itself; the very _source_ of all constitutional power; for, _asking_ Congress to do what it _cannot_ do, gives it the power!--to pray the exercise of a power that is _not, creates_ it! A beautiful theory! Let us work it both ways. If to petition for the exercise of a power that is _not_, creates it--to petition against the exercise of a power that _is_, annihilates it. As southern gentlemen are partial to summary processes, pray, sirs, try the virtue of your own recipe on "exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever;" a better subject for experiment and test of the prescription could not be had. But if the petitions of the citizens of the District give Congress the _right_ to abolish slavery, they impose the _duty_; if they confer constitutional _authority_, they create constitutional _obligation_. If Congress _may_ abolish because of an expression of their will, it _must_ abolish at the bidding of that will. If the people of the District are a _source of power_ to Congress, their _expressed will_ has the force of a constitutional provision, and has the same binding power upon the National Legislature. To make Congress dependent on the District for authority, is to make it a _subject_ of its authority, restraining the exercise of its own discretion, and sinking it into a mere organ of the District's will. We proceed to another objection.

"_The southern states would not have ratified the constitution, if they had supposed that it gave this power_." It is a sufficient answer to this objection, that the northern states would not have ratified it, if they had supposed that it _withheld_ the power. If "suppositions" are to take the place of the constitution--coming from both sides, they neutralize each other. To argue a constitutional question by _guessing_ at the "suppositions" that might have been made by the parties to it would find small favor in a court of law. But even a desperate shift is some easement when sorely pushed. If this question is to be settled by "suppositions," suppositions shall be forthcoming, and that without stint.

First, then, I affirm that the North ratified the constitution, "supposing" that slavery had begun to wax old, and would speedily vanish away, and especially that the abolition of the slave trade, which by the constitution was to be surrendered to Congress after twenty years, would plunge it headlong.

Would the North have adopted the constitution, giving three-fifths of the "slave property" a representation, if it had "supposed" that the slaves would have increased from half a million to two millions and a half by 1838--and that the census of 1840 would give to the slave states thirty representatives of "slave property?"

If they had "supposed" that this representation would have controlled the legislation of the government, and carried against the North every question vital to its interests, would Hamilton, Franklin, Sherman, Gerry, Livingston, Langdon, and Rufus King have been such madmen, as to sign the constitution, and the Northern States such suicides as to ratify it? Every self-preserving instinct would have shrieked at such an infatuate immolation. At the adoption of the United States constitution, slavery was regarded as a fast waning system. This conviction was universal. Washington, Jefferson, Henry, Grayson, Tucker, Madison, Wythe, Pendleton, Lee, Blair, Mason, Page, Parker, Randolph, Iredell, Spaight, Ramsey, Pinkney, Martin, McHenry, Chase, and nearly all the illustrious names south of the Potomac, proclaimed it before the sun. A reason urged in the convention that formed the United States' constitution, why the word slave should not be used in it, was, _that when slavery should cease_ there might remain upon the National Charter no record that it had ever been. (See speech of Mr. Burrill, of R.I., on the Missouri question.)

I now proceed to show by testimony, that at the date of the United States' constitution, and for several years before and after that period, slavery was rapidly on the wane; that the American Revolution with the great events preceding, accompanying, and following it, had wrought an immense and almost universal change in the public sentiment of the nation on the subject, powerfully impelling it toward the entire abolition of the system--and that it was the _general belief_ that measures for its abolition throughout the Union, would be commenced by the States generally before the lapse of many years. A great mass of testimony establishing this position might be presented, but narrow space, and the importance of speedy publication, counsel brevity. Let the following proofs suffice. First, a few dates as points of observation.

In 1757, Commissioners from seven colonies met at Albany, resolved upon a Union and proposed a plan of general government. In 1765, delegates from nine colonies met at New York and sent forth a bill of rights. The first _general_ Congress met in 1774. The first Congress of the _thirteen_ colonies met in 1775. The revolutionary war commenced in '75. Independence was declared in '76. The articles of confederation were adopted by the thirteen states in '77 and '78. Independence acknowledged in '83. The convention for forming the U.S. constitution was held in '87, the state conventions for considering it in '87 and '88. The first Congress under the constitution in '89.

Dr. Rush, of Pennsylvania, one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, in a letter to Granville Sharpe, May 1, 1773, says: "A spirit of humanity and religion begins to awaken in several of the colonies in favor of the poor negroes. Great events have been brought about by small beginnings. _Anthony Bènèzet stood alone a few years_ _ago in opposing negro slavery in Philadelphia_, and NOW THREE-FOURTHS OF THE PROVINCE AS WELL AS OF THE CITY CRY OUT AGAINST IT."--[Stuart's Life of Granville Sharpe, p. 21.]

In the preamble to the act prohibiting the importation of slaves into Rhode Island, June, 1774, is the following: "Whereas the inhabitants of America are generally engaged in the preservation of their own rights and liberties, among which that of personal freedom must be considered the greatest, and as those who are desirous of enjoying all the advantages of liberty themselves, _should be willing to extend personal liberty to others_, therefore," &c.

October 20, 1774, the Continental Congress passed the following: "We, for ourselves and the inhabitants of the several colonies whom we represent, _firmly agree and associate under the sacred ties of virtue, honor, and love of our country_, as follows:"

"2d Article. _We will neither import nor purchase any slaves imported_ after the first day of December next, after which time we will _wholly discontinue_ the slave trade, and we will neither be concerned in it ourselves, nor will we hire our vessels nor _sell our commodities or manufactures_ to those who are concerned in it."

The Continental Congress, in 1775, setting forth the causes and the necessity for taking up arms, say: "_If it were possible_ for men who exercise their reason to believe that the divine Author of our existence intended a part of the human race _to hold an absolute property in_, and _unbounded power over others_," &c.

In 1776, Dr. Hopkins, then at the head of New England divines, in "An Address to the owners of negro slaves in the American colonies," says: "The conviction of the unjustifiableness of this practice (slavery) has been _increasing_, and _greatly spreading of late_, and _many_ who have had slaves, have found themselves so unable to justify their own conduct in holding them in bondage, as to be induced to _set them at liberty_. * * * * * Slavery is _in every instance_, wrong, unrighteous, and oppressive--a very great and crying sin--_there being nothing of the kind equal to it on the face of the earth_."

The same year the American Congress issued a solemn MANIFESTO to the world. These were its first words: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that _all_ men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." _Once_, these were words of power; _now_, "a rhetorical flourish."

The Virginia Gazette of March 19, 1767, in an essay on slavery says: "_There cannot be in nature, there is not in all history, an instance in which every right of man is more flagrantly violated_. Enough I hope has been effected to prove that slavery is a violation of justice and religion."

The celebrated Patrick Henry of Virginia, in a letter, Jan. 18, 1773, to Robert Pleasants, afterwards president of the Virginia Abolition Society, says: "Believe me, I shall honor the Quakers for their noble efforts to abolish slavery. It is a debt we owe to the purity of our religion to show that it is at variance with that law that warrants slavery. I exhort you to persevere in so worthy a resolution."

The Pennsylvania Chronicle of Nov. 21, 1768, says: "Let every black that shall henceforth be born amongst us be deemed free. One step farther would be to emancipate the whole race, restoring that liberty we have so long unjustly detained from them. Till some step of this kind be taken we shall justly be the derision of the whole world."

In 1779, the Continental Congress ordered a pamphlet to be published, entitled, "Observations on the American Revolution," from which the following is an extract: "The great principle (of government) is and ever will remain in force, _that men are by Nature free_; and so long as we have any idea of divine _justice_, we must associate that of _human freedom_. It is _conceded on all hands, that the right to be free_ CAN NEVER BE ALIENATED."

Extract from the Pennsylvania act for the abolition of slavery, passed March 1, 1780: * * * "We conceive that it is our duty, and we rejoice that it is in our power, to extend a portion of that freedom to others which has been extended to us. Weaned by a long course of experience from those narrow prejudices and partialities we had imbibed, we find our hearts enlarged with kindness and benevolence towards men of all conditions and nations: * * * Therefore be it enacted, that no child born hereafter be a slave," &c.

Jefferson, in his Notes on Virginia, written just before the close of the Revolutionary War, says: "I think a change already perceptible since the origin of the present revolution. The spirit of the master is abating, that of the slave is rising from the dust, his condition mollifying, _and the way I hope preparing, under the auspices of heaven_, FOR A TOTAL EMANCIPATION."

In a letter to Dr. Price, of London, who had just published a pamphlet in favor of the abolition of slavery, Mr. Jefferson, then minister at Paris, (August 7, 1785,) says: "From the mouth to the head of the Chesapeake, _the bulk of the people will approve of your pamphlet in theory_, and it will find a respectable minority ready to _adopt it in practice_--a minority which, for weight and worth of character, _preponderates against the greater number_." Speaking of Virginia, he says: "This is the next state to which we may turn our eyes for the interesting spectacle of justice in conflict with avarice and oppression,--a conflict in which the SACRED SIDE IS GAINING DAILY RECRUITS. Be not, therefore, discouraged--what you have written will do a _great deal of good_; and could you still trouble yourself with our welfare, no man is more able to give aid to the laboring side. The College of William and Mary, since the remodelling of its plan, is the place where are collected together all the young men of Virginia, under preparation for public life. They are there under the direction (most of them) of a Mr. Wythe, one of the most virtuous of characters, and _whose sentiments on the subject of slavery are unequivocal_. I am satisfied, if you could resolve to address an exhortation to those young men with all that eloquence of which you are master, that _its influence on the future decision of this important question would be great, perhaps decisive_. Thus. you see, that so far from thinking you have cause to repent of what you have done, _I wish you to do more, and I wish it on an assurance of its effect_."--Jefferson's Posthumous Works, vol. 1, p. 268.

In 1786, John Jay drafted and signed a petition to the Legislature of New York, on the subject of slavery, beginning with these words: "Your memorialists being deeply affected by the situation of those, who, although, FREE BY THE LAWS OF GOD, are held in slavery by the laws of the State," &c. This memorial bore also the signatures of the celebrated Alexander Hamilton; Robert R. Livingston, afterwards Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the United States, and Chancellor of the State of New York; James Duane, Mayor of the City of New York, and many others of the most eminent individuals in the State.

In the preamble of an instrument, by which Mr. Jay emancipated a slave in 1784, is the following passage:

"Whereas, the children of men are by nature equally free, and cannot, without injustice, be either reduced to or HELD in slavery."

In his letter while Minister at Spain, in 1786, he says, speaking of the abolition of slavery: "Till America comes into this measure, her prayers to heaven will be IMPIOUS. I believe God governs the world; and I believe it to be a maxim in his, as in our court, that those who ask for equity _ought to do it_."

In 1785, the New York Manumission Society was formed. John Jay was chosen its first President, and held the office five years. Alexander Hamilton was its second President, and after holding the office one year, resigned upon his removal to Philadelphia as Secretary of the United States' Treasury. In 1787, the Pennsylvania Abolition Society was formed. Benjamin Franklin, warm from the discussions of the convention that formed the U.S. constitution, was chosen President, and Benjamin Rush Secretary--both signers of the Declaration of Independence. In 1789, the Maryland Abolition Society was formed. Among its officers were Samuel Chase, Judge of the U.S. Supreme Court, and Luther Martin, a member of the convention that formed the U.S. constitution. In 1790, the Connecticut Abolition Society was formed. The first President was Rev. Dr. Stiles, President of Yale College, and the Secretary, Simeon Baldwin, (late Judge Baldwin of New Haven.) In 1791, this Society sent a memorial to Congress, from which the following is an extract:

"From a sober conviction of the unrighteousness of slavery, your petitioners have long beheld, with grief, our fellow men doomed to perpetual bondage, in a country which boasts of her freedom. Your petitioners were led, by motives, we conceive, of general philanthropy, to associate ourselves for the protection and assistance of this unfortunate part of our fellow men; and, though this Society has been _lately_ established, it has now become _generally extensive_ through this state, and, we fully believe, _embraces, on this subject, the sentiments of a large majority of its citizens_."

The same year the Virginia Abolition Society was formed. This Society, and the Maryland Society, had auxiliaries in different parts of those States. Both societies sent up memorials to Congress. The memorial of the Virginia Society is headed--"The memorial of the _Virginia Society_, for promoting the Abolition of Slavery," &c. The following is an extract:

"Your memorialists, fully believing that slavery is not only an odious degradation, but an _outrageous violation of one of the most essential rights of human nature, and utterly repugnant to the precepts of the gospel_," &c.

About the same time a Society was formed in New-Jersey. It had an acting committee of five members in each county in the State. The following is an extract from the preamble to its constitution:

"It is our boast, that we live under a government, wherein _life, liberty_, and the _pursuit of happiness_, are recognized as the universal rights of men. We _abhor that inconsistent, illiberal, and interested policy, which withholds those rights from an unfortunate and degraded class of our fellow creatures_."

Among other distinguished individuals who were efficient officers of these Abolition Societies, and delegates from their respective state societies, at the annual meetings of the American convention for promoting the abolition of slavery, were Hon. Uriah Tracy, United States' Senator, from Connecticut; Hon. Zephaniah Swift, Chief Justice of the same State; Hon. Cesar A. Rodney, Attorney General of the United States; Hon. James A. Bayard, United States' Senator, from Delaware; Governor Bloomfield, of New-Jersey; Hon. Wm. Rawle, the late venerable head of the Philadelphia bar; Dr. Caspar Wistar, of Philadelphia; Messrs. Foster and Tillinghast, of Rhode Island; Messrs. Ridgely, Buchanan, and Wilkinson, of Maryland; and Messrs. Pleasants, McLean, and Anthony, of Virginia.

In July, 1787, the old Congress passed the celebrated ordinance abolishing slavery in the northwestern territory, and declaring that it should never thereafter exist there. This ordinance was passed while the convention that formed the United States' constitution was in session. At the first session of Congress under the constitution, this ordinance was ratified by a special act. Washington, fresh from the discussions of the convention, in which _more than forty days had been spent in adjusting the question of slavery, gave it his approval_. The act passed with only one dissenting voice, (that of Mr. Yates, of New York,) _the South equally with the North avowing the fitness and expediency of the measure on general considerations, and indicating thus early the line of national policy, to be pursued by the United States' Government on the subject of slavery_.

In the debates in the North Carolina Convention, Mr. Iredell, afterward a Judge of the United States' Supreme Court, said, "_When the entire abolition of slavery takes place_, it will be an event which must be pleasing to every generous mind and every friend of human nature." Mr. Galloway said, "I wish to see this abominable trade put an end to. I apprehend the clause (touching the slave trade) means _to bring forward manumission_." Luther Martin, of Maryland, a member of the convention that formed the United States' Constitution, said, "We ought to authorize the General Government to make such regulations as shall be thought most advantageous for _the gradual abolition of slavery_, and the _emancipation of the slaves_ which are already in the States." Judge Wilson, of Pennsylvania, one of the framers of the constitution, said, in the Pennsylvania convention of '87, [Deb. Pa. Con. p. 303, 156:] "I consider this (the clause relative to the slave trade) as laying the foundation for _banishing slavery out of this country_. It will produce the same kind of gradual change which was produced in Pennsylvania; the new States which are to be formed will be under the control of Congress in this particular, and _slaves will never be introduced_ among them. It presents us with the pleasing prospect that the rights of mankind will be acknowledged and established _throughout the Union_. Yet the lapse of a few years, and Congress will have power to _exterminate slavery_ within our borders." In the Virginia convention of '87, Mr. Mason, author of the Virginia constitution, said, "The augmentation of slaves weakens the States, and such a trade is _diabolical_ in itself, and disgraceful to mankind. As much as I value a union of all the States, I would not admit the Southern States, (i.e., South Carolina and Georgia,) into the union, _unless they agree to a discontinuance of this disgraceful trade_." Mr. Tyler opposed with great power the clause prohibiting the abolition of the slave trade till 1808, and said, "My earnest desire is, that it shall be handed down to posterity that I oppose this wicked clause." Mr. Johnson said, "The principle of emancipation _has begun since the revolution. Let us do what we will, it will come round_."--[Deb. Va. Con. p. 463.] Patrick Henry, arguing the power of Congress under the United States' constitution to abolish slavery in the States, said, in the same convention, "Another thing will contribute to bring this event (the abolition of slavery) about. Slavery is _detested_. We feel its fatal effects; we deplore it with all the pity of humanity." Governor Randolph said: "They insist that the _abolition of slavery will result from this Constitution_. I hope that there is no one here, who will advance _an objection so dishonorable_ to Virginia--I hope that at the moment they are securing the rights of their citizens, an objection will not be started, that those unfortunate men now held in bondage, _by the operation of the general government_ may be made free!" [_Deb. Va. Con._ p. 421.] In the Mass. Con. of '88, Judge Dawes said, "Although slavery is not smitten by an apoplexy, yet _it has received a mortal wound_, and will die of consumption."--[_Deb. Mass. Con._ p. 60.] General Heath said that, "Slavery was confined to the States _now existing_, it _could not be extended_. By their ordinance, Congress had declared that the new States should be republican States, _and have no slavery_."--p. 147.

In the debate, in the first Congress, February 11th and 12th, 1789, on the petitions of the Society of Friends, and the Pennsylvania Abolition Society, Mr. Parker, of Virginia, said, "I cannot help expressing the pleasure I feel in finding _so considerable a part_ of the community attending to matters of such a momentous concern to the _future prosperity_ and happiness of the people of America. I think it my duty, as a citizen of the Union, to _espouse their cause_."

Mr. Page, of Virginia, (afterwards Governor)--"Was _in favor_ of the commitment: he hoped that the designs of the respectable memorialists would not be stopped at the threshold, in order to preclude a fair discussion of the prayer of the memorial. He placed himself in the case of a slave, and said, that on hearing that Congress had refused to listen to the decent suggestions of the respectable part of the community, he should infer, that the general government, _from which was expected great good would result to_ EVERY CLASS _of citizens_, had shut their ears against the voice of humanity, and he should despair of any alleviation of the miseries he and his posterity had in prospect; if any thing could induce him to rebel, it must be a stroke like this, impressing on his mind all the horrors of despair. But if he was told, that application was made in his behalf, and that Congress were willing to hear what could be urged in favor of discouraging the practice of importing his fellow-wretches, he would trust in their justice and humanity, and _wait the decision patiently_."

Mr. Scott of Pennsylvania: "I cannot, for my part, conceive how any person _can be said to acquire a property in another. I do not know how far I might go, if I was one of the judges of the United States, and those people were to come before me and claim their emancipation, but I am sure I would go as far as I could_."

Mr. Burke, of South Carolina, said, "He _saw the disposition of the House_, and he feared it would be referred to a committee, maugre all their opposition."

Mr. Baldwin of Georgia said that the clause in the U.S. Constitution relating to direct taxes "was intended to prevent Congress from laying any special tax upon negro slaves, _as they might, in this way, so burthen the possessors of them, as to induce a_ GENERAL EMANCIPATION."

Mr. Smith of South Carolina, said, "That on entering into this government, they (South Carolina and Georgia) apprehended that the other states, * * * _would, from motives of humanity and benevolence, be led to vote for a general emancipation_."

In the debate, at the same session, May 13th, 1789, on the petition of the society of Friends respecting the slave trade, Mr. Parker, of Virginia, said, "He hoped Congress would do all that lay in their power _to restore to human nature its inherent privileges_. The inconsistency in our principles, with which we are justly charged _should be done away_."

Mr. Jackson, of Georgia, said, "IT WAS THE FASHION OF THE DAY TO FAVOR THE LIBERTY OF THE SLAVES. * * * * * Will Virginia set her negroes free? _When this practice comes to be tried, then the sound of liberty will lose those charms which make it grateful to the ravished ear_."

Mr. Madison of Virginia,--"The dictates of humanity, the principles of the people, the national safety and happiness, and prudent policy, require it of us. * * * * * * * I conceive the constitution in this particular was formed in order that the Government, whilst it was restrained from laying a total prohibition, might be able to _give some testimony of the sense of America_, with respect to the African trade. * * * * * * It is to be hoped, that by expressing a national disapprobation of this trade, we may destroy it, and save ourselves from reproaches, AND OUR PROSPERITY THE IMBECILITY EVER ATTENDANT ON A COUNTRY FILLED WITH SLAVES."

Mr. Gerry, of Massachusetts, said, "he highly commended the part the Society of Friends had taken; it was the cause of humanity they had interested themselves in."--Cong. Reg. v. 1, p. 308-12.

A writer in the "Gazette of the Unites States," Feb. 20th, 1790, (then the government paper,) who opposes the abolition of slavery, and avows himself a _slaveholder_, says, "I have seen in the papers accounts of _large associations_, and applications to Government for _the abolition of slavery_. Religion, humanity, and the generosity natural to a free people, are the _noble principles which dictate those measures_. SUCH MOTIVES COMMAND RESPECT, AND ARE ABOVE ANY EULOGIUM WORDS CAN BESTOW."

In the convention that formed the constitution of Kentucky in 1790, the effort to prohibit slavery was nearly successful. A decided majority of that body would undoubtedly have voted for its exclusion, but for the great efforts and influence of two large slaveholders--men of commanding talents and sway--Messrs. Breckenridge and Nicholas. The following extract from a speech made in that convention by a member of it, Mr. Rice a native Virginian, is a specimen of the _free discussion_ that prevailed on that "delicate subject." Said Mr. Rice: "I do a man greater injury, when I deprive him of his liberty, than when I deprive him of his property. It is vain for me to plead that I have the sanction of law; for this makes the injury the greater--it arms the community against him, and makes his case desperate. The owners of such slaves then are _licensed robbers_, and not the just proprietors of what they claim. Freeing them is not depriving them of property, but _restoring it to the right owner_. The master is the enemy of the slave; he _has made open war upon him_, AND IS DAILY CARRYING IT ON in unremitted efforts. Can any one imagine, then, that the slave is indebted to his master, and _bound to serve him?_ Whence can the obligation arise? What is it founded upon? What is my duty to an enemy that is carrying on war against me? I do not deny, but in some circumstances, it is the duty of the slave to serve; but it is a duty he owes himself, and not his master."

President Edwards, the younger, said, in a sermon preached before the Connecticut Abolition Society, Sept. 15, 1791: "Thirty years ago, scarcely a man in this country thought either the slave trade or the slavery of negroes to be wrong; but now how many and able advocates in private life, in our legislatures, in Congress, have appeared, and have openly and irrefragably pleaded the rights of humanity in this as well as other instances? And if we judge of the future by the past, _within fifty years from this time, it will be as shameful for a man to hold a negro slave, as to be guilty of common robbery or theft_."

In 1794, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian church adopted its "Scripture proofs," notes, and comments. Among these was the following:

"1 Tim. i. 10. The law is made for manstealers. This crime among the Jews exposed the perpetrators of it to capital punishment. Exodus xxi. 16. And the apostle here classes them with _sinners of the first rank_. The word he uses, in its original import comprehends all who are concerned in bringing any of the human race into slavery, or in _retaining_ them in it. _Stealers of men_ are all those who bring off slaves or freemen, and _keep_, sell, or buy them."

In 1794, Dr. Rush declared: "Domestic slavery is repugnant to the principles of Christianity. It prostrates every benevolent and just principle of action in the human heart. It is rebellion against the authority of a common Father. It is a practical denial of the extent and efficacy of the death of a common Saviour. It is an usurpation of the prerogative of the great Sovereign of the universe, who has solemnly claimed an exclusive property in the souls of men."

In 1795, Mr. Fiske, then an officer of Dartmouth College, afterward a Judge in Tennessee, said, in an oration published that year, speaking of slaves: "I steadfastly maintain, that we must bring them to _an equal standing, in point of privileges, with the whites!_ They must enjoy all the rights belonging to human nature."

When the petition on the abolition of the slave trade was under discussion in the Congress of '89, Mr. Brown, of North Carolina, said, "The emancipation of the slaves _will be effected_ in time; it ought to be a gradual business, but he hoped that Congress would not _precipitate_ it to the great injury of the southern States." Mr. Hartley, of Pennsylvania, said, in the same debate, "_He was not a little surprised to hear the cause of slavery advocated in that house_." WASHINGTON, in a letter to Sir John Sinclair, says, "There are, in Pennsylvania, laws for the gradual abolition of slavery which neither Maryland nor Virginia have at present, but which _nothing is more certain_ than that they _must have_, and at a period NOT REMOTE." In 1782, Virginia passed her celebrated manumission act. Within nine years from that time nearly eleven thousand slaves were voluntarily emancipated by their masters. [Judge Tucker's "Dissertation on Slavery," p. 72.] In 1787, Maryland passed an act legalizing manumission. Mr. Dorsey, of Maryland, in a speech in Congress, December 27th, 1826, speaking of manumissions under that act, said, that "_The progress of emancipation was astonishing_, the State became crowded with a free black population."

The celebrated William Pinkney, in a speech before the Maryland House of Delegates, in 1789, on the emancipation of slaves, said, "Sir, by the eternal principles of natural justice, _no master in the state has a right to hold his slave in bandage for a single hour_... Are we apprehensive that these men will become more dangerous by becoming freemen? Are we alarmed, lest by being admitted into the enjoyment of civil rights, they will be inspired with a deadly enmity against the rights of others? Strange, unaccountable paradox! How much more rational would it be, to argue that the natural enemy of the privileges of a freeman, is he who is robbed of them himself!"

Hon. James Campbell, in an address before the Pennsylvania Society of Cincinnati, July 4, 1787, said, "Our separation from Great Britain has extended the empire of _humanity_. The time _is not far distant_ when our sister states, in imitation of our example, _shall turn their vassals into freemen_." The Convention that formed the United States' constitution being then in session, attended on the delivery of this oration with General Washington at their head.

A Baltimore paper of September 8th, 1780, contains the following notice of Major General Gates: "A few days ago passed through this town the Hon. General Gates and lady. The General, previous to leaving Virginia, summoned his numerous family of slaves about him, and amidst their tears of affection and gratitude, gave them their FREEDOM."

In 1791, the university of William and Mary, in Virginia, conferred upon Granville Sharpe the degree of Doctor of Laws. Sharpe was at that time the acknowledged head of British abolitionists. His indefatigable exertions, prosecuted for years in the case of Somerset, procured that memorable decision in the Court of King's Bench, which settled the principle that no slave could be held in England. He was most uncompromising in his opposition to slavery, and for twenty years previous he had spoken, written, and accomplished more against it than any man living.

In the "Memoirs of the Revolutionary War in the Southern Department," by Gen. Lee, of Va., Commandant of the Partizan Legion, is the following: "The Constitution of the United States, adopted lately with so much difficulty, has effectually provided against this evil (by importation) after a few years. It is much to be lamented that having done so much in this way, _a provision had not been made for the gradual abolition of slavery_."--pp. 233, 4.

Mr. Tucker, of Virginia, Judge of the Supreme Court of that state, and professor of law in the University of William and Mary, addressed a letter to the General Assembly of that state, in 1796, urging the abolition of slavery, from which the following is an extract. Speaking of the slaves in Virginia, he says: "Should we not, at the time of the revolution, have broken their fetters? Is it not our duty _to embrace the first moment_ of constitutional health and vigor to effectuate so desirable an object, and to remove from us a stigma with which our enemies will never fail to upbraid us, nor our consciences to reproach us?"

Mr. Faulkner, in a speech before the Virginia House of Delegates, Jan. 20, 1832, said: "The idea of a gradual emancipation and removal of the slaves from this commonwealth, is coeval with the declaration of our independence from the British yoke. When Virginia stood sustained in her legislation by the pure and philosophic intellect of Pendleton, by the patriotism of Mason and Lee, by the searching vigor and sagacity of Wythe, and by the all-embracing, all-comprehensive genius of Thomas Jefferson! Sir, it was a committee composed of those five illustrious men, who, in 1777, submitted to the general assembly of this state, then in session, _a plan for the gradual emancipation of the slaves of this commonwealth_."

Hon. Benjamin Watkins Leigh, late United States' senator from Virginia, in his letters to the people of Virginia, in 1832, signed Appomattox, p. 43, says: "I thought, till very lately, that it was known to every body that during the revolution, _and for many years after, the abolition of slavery was a favorite topic with many of our ablest statesmen_, who entertained, with respect, all the schemes which wisdom or ingenuity could suggest for accomplishing the object. Mr. Wythe, to the day of his death, _was for a simple abolition, considering the objection to color as founded in prejudice_. By degrees, all projects of the kind were abandoned. Mr. Jefferson _retained_ his opinion, and now we have these projects revived."

Governor Barbour, of Virginia, in his speech in the U.S. Senate, on the Missouri question, Jan. 1820, said: "We are asked why has Virginia changed her policy in reference to slavery? That the sentiments of our most distinguished men, for thirty years _entirely corresponded_ with the course which the friends of the restriction (of slavery in Missouri) now advocated; and that the Virginia delegation, one of whom was the late President of the United States, voted for the restriction (of slavery) in the northwestern territory, and that Mr. Jefferson has delineated a gloomy picture of the baneful effects of slavery. When it is recollected that the Notes of Mr. Jefferson were written during the progress of the revolution, it is no matter of surprise that the writer should have imbibed a large portion of that enthusiasm which such an occasion was so well calculated to produce. As to the consent of the Virginia delegation to the restriction in question, whether the result of a disposition to restrain the slave-trade indirectly, or the influence of that enthusiasm to which I have just alluded, * * * * it is not now important to decide. We have witnessed its effects. The liberality of Virginia, or, as the result may prove, her folly, which submitted to, or, if you will, PROPOSED _this measure_ (abolition of slavery in the N.W. territory) has eventuated in effects which speak a monitory lesson. _How is the representation from this quarter on the present question_?"

Mr. Imlay, in his early history of Kentucky, p. 185, says: "We have disgraced the fair face of humanity, and trampled upon the sacred privileges of man, at the very moment that we were exclaiming against the tyranny of your (the English) ministry. But in contending for the birthright of freedom, we have learned to feel _for the bondage of others_, and in the libations we offer to the goddess of liberty, we contemplate an _emancipation of the slaves of this country_, as honorable to themselves as it will be glorious to us."

In the debate in Congress, Jan. 20, 1806, on Mr. Sloan's motion to lay a tax on the importation of slaves, Mr. Clark of Va. said: "He was no advocate for a system of slavery." Mr. Marion, of S. Carolina, said: "He never had purchased, nor should he ever purchase a slave." Mr. Southard said: "Not revenue, but an expression of the _national sentiment_ is the principal object." Mr. Smilie--"I rejoice that the word (slave) is not in the constitution; its not being there does honor to the worthies who would not suffer it to become a _part_ of it." Mr. Alston, of N. Carolina--"In two years we shall have the power to prohibit the trade altogether. Then this House will be unanimous. No one will object to our exercising our full constitutional powers." National Intelligencer, Jan. 24, 1806.

These witnesses need no vouchers to entitle them to credit; nor their testimony comments to make it intelligible--their _names_ are their _endorsers_, and their strong words their own interpreters. We waive all comments. Our readers are of age. Whosoever hath ears to _hear_, let him HEAR. And whosoever will not hear the fathers of the revolution, the founders of the government, its chief magistrates, judges, legislators and sages, who dared and perilled all under the burdens, and in the heat of the day that tried men's souls--then "neither will he be persuaded though THEY rose from the dead."

Some of the points established by this testimony are--The universal expectation that Congress, state legislatures, seminaries of learning, churches, ministers of religion, and public sentiment widely embodied in abolition societies, would act against slavery, calling forth the moral sense of the nation, and creating a power of opinion that would abolish the system throughout the Union. In a word, that free speech and a free press would be wielded against it without ceasing and without restriction. Full well did the South know, not only that the national government would probably legislate against slavery wherever the constitution placed it within its reach, but she knew also that Congress had already marked out the line of national policy to be pursued on the subject--had committed itself before the world to a course of action against slavery, wherever she could move upon it without encountering a conflicting jurisdiction--that the nation had established by solemn ordinance a memorable precedent for subsequent action, by abolishing slavery in the northwest territory, and by declaring that it should never thenceforward exist there; and this too, as soon as by cession of Virginia and other states, the territory came under congressional control. The South knew also that the sixth article in the ordinance prohibiting slavery, was first proposed by the largest slaveholding state in the confederacy--that in the Congress of '84, Mr. Jefferson, as chairman of the committee on the N.W. territory, reported a resolution abolishing slavery there--that the chairman of the committee that reported the ordinance of '87 was also a slaveholder--that the ordinance was enacted by Congress during the session of the convention that formed the United States' Constitution--that the provisions of the ordinance were, both while in prospect and when under discussion, matters of universal notoriety and _approval_ with all parties, and when finally passed, received the vote of _every member of Congress from each of the slaveholding states_. The South also had every reason for believing that the first Congress under the constitution would _ratify_ that ordinance--as it did unanimously.

A crowd of reflections, suggested by the preceding testimony, presses for utterance. The right of petition ravished and trampled by its constitutional guardians, and insult and defiance hurled in the faces of the SOVEREIGN PEOPLE while calmly remonstrating _with their_ SERVANTS for violence committed on the nation's charter and their own dearest rights! Added to this "the right of peaceably assembling" violently wrested--the rights of minorities, _rights_ no longer--free speech struck dumb--free _men_ outlawed and murdered--free presses cast into the streets and their fragments strewed with shoutings, or flourished in triumph before the gaze of approving crowds as proud mementos of prostrate law! The spirit and power of our fathers, where are they? Their deep homage always and every where rendered to FREE THOUGHT, with its _inseparable signs--free speech and a free press_--their reverence for justice, liberty, _rights_ and all-pervading law, where are they?

But we turn from these considerations--though the times on which we have fallen, and those toward which we are borne with headlong haste, call for their discussion as with the voices of departing life--and proceed to topics relevant to the argument before us.

The seventh article of the amendments to the constitution is alleged to withhold from Congress the power to abolish slavery in the District. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." All the slaves in the District have been "deprived of liberty" by legislative acts. Now, these legislative acts "depriving" them "of liberty," were either "due process of law," or they were _not_. If they _were_, then a legislative act, taking from the master that "property" which is the identical "liberty" previously taken from the slave, would be "due process of law" _also_, and of course a _constitutional_ act; but if the legislative acts "depriving" them of "liberty" were _not_ "due process of law," then the slaves were deprived of liberty _unconstitutionally_, and these acts are _void_. In that case the _constitution emancipates them_.

If the objector reply, by saying that the import of the phrase "due process of law," is _judicial_ process solely, it is granted, and that fact is our rejoinder; for no slave in the District _has_ been deprived of his liberty by "a judicial process," or, in other words, by "due process of law;" consequently, upon the objector's own admission, every slave in the District has been deprived of liberty _unconstitutionally_, and is therefore _free by the constitution_. This is asserted only of the slaves under the "exclusive legislation" of Congress.

The last clause of the article under consideration is quoted for the same purpose: "Nor shall private property he taken for public use without just compensation." Each of the state constitutions has a clause of similar purport. The abolition of slavery in the District by Congress, would not, as we shall presently show; violate this clause either directly or by implication. Granting for argument's sake, that slaves are "private property," and that to emancipate them, would be to "take private property" for "public use," the objector admits the power of Congress to do _this_, provided it will do something _else_, that is, _pay_ for them. Thus, instead of denying the _power_, the objector not only admits, but _affirms_ it, as the ground of the inference that compensation must accompany it. So far from disproving the existence of _one_ power, he asserts the existence of _two_--one, the power to take the slaves from their masters, the other, the power to take the property of the United States to pay for them.

If Congress cannot constitutionally impair the right of private property, or take it without compensation, it cannot constitutionally, _legalize_ the perpetration of such acts, by _others_, nor _protect_ those who commit them. Does the power to rob a man of his earnings, rob the earner of his _right_ to them? Who has a better right to the _product_ than the producer?--to the _interest_, than the owner of the _principal_?--to the hands and arms, than he from whose shoulders they swing?--to the body and soul, than he whose they are? Congress not only impairs but annihilates the right of private property, while it withholds from the slaves of the District their title to _themselves_. What! Congress powerless to protect a man's right to _himself_, when it can make inviolable the right to a _dog_! But, waiving this, I deny that the abolition of slavery in the District would violate this clause. What does the clause prohibit? The "taking" of "private property" for "public use." Suppose Congress should emancipate the slaves in the District, what would it "_take_?" Nothing. What would it _hold_? Nothing. What would it put to "public use?" Nothing. Instead of _taking_ "private property," Congress, by abolishing slavery, would say "_private property_ shall not be taken; and those who have been robbed of it already, shall be kept out of it no longer; and every man's right to his own body shall be protected." True, Congress may not arbitrarily take property, _as_ property, from one man and give it to another--and in the abolition of slavery no such thing is done. A legislative act changes the _condition_ of the slave--makes him his own _proprietor_, instead of the property of another. It determines a question of _original right_ between two classes of persons--doing an act of justice to one, and restraining the other from acts of injustice; or, in other words, preventing one from robbing the other, by granting to the injured party the protection of just and equitable laws.

Congress, by an act of abolition, would change the condition of seven thousand "persons" in the District, but would "take" nothing. To construe this provision so as to enable the citizens of the District to hold as property, and in perpetuity, whatever they please, or to hold it as property in all circumstances--all necessity, public welfare, and the will and power of the government to the contrary notwithstanding--is a total perversion of its whole _intent_. The _design_ of the provision, was to throw up a barrier against Governmental aggrandizement. The right to "take property" for _State uses_ is one thing;--the right so to adjust the _tenures_ by which property is held, that _each may have his own secured to him_, is another thing, and clearly within the scope of legislation. Besides, if Congress were to "take" the slaves in the District, it would be _adopting_, not abolishing slavery--becoming a slaveholder itself, instead of requiring others to be such no longer. The clause in question, prohibits the "taking" of individual property for public use, to be employed or disposed of _as_ property for governmental purposes. Congress, by abolishing slavery in the District, would do no such thing. It would merely change the _condition_ of that which has been recognized as a qualified property by congressional acts, though previously declared "persons" by the constitution. More than this is done continually by Congress and every other Legislature. Property the most absolute and unqualified, is annihilated by legislative acts. The embargo and non-intercourse act, levelled at a stroke a forest of shipping, and sunk millions of capital. To say nothing of the power of Congress to take hundreds of millions from the people by direct taxation, who doubts its power to abolish at once the whole tariff system, change the seat of Government, arrest the progress of national works, prohibit any branch of commerce with the Indian tribes or with foreign nations, change the locality of forts, arsenals, magazines and dock yards; abolish the Post Office system, and the privilege of patents and copyrights? By such acts Congress might, in the exercise of its acknowledged powers, annihilate property to an incalculable amount, and that without becoming liable to claims for compensation.

Finally, this clause prohibits the taking for public use of "_property_." The constitution of the United States does not recognize slaves as "PROPERTY" any where, and it does not recognize them in _any sense_ in the District of Columbia. All allusions to them in the constitution recognize them as "persons." Every reference to them points _solely_ to the element of _personality_; and thus, by the strongest implication, declares that the constitution _knows_ them only as "persons," and _will_ not recognize them in any other light. If they escape into free States, the constitution authorizes their being taken back. But how? Not as the property of an "owner," but as "persons;" and the peculiarity of the expression is a marked recognition of their _personality_--a refusal to recognize them as chattels--"persons _held_ to service." Are _oxen "held_ to service?" That can be affirmed only of _persons_. Again, slaves give political power as "persons." The constitution, in settling the principle of representation, requires their enumeration in the census. How? As property? Then why not include race horses and game cocks? Slaves, like other inhabitants, are enumerated as "persons." So by the constitution, the government was pledged to non-interference with "the migration or importation of such _persons_" as the States might think proper to admit until 1808, and authorized the laying of a tax on each "person" so admitted. Further, slaves are recognized as _persons_ by the exaction of their _allegiance_ to the government. For offences against the government slaves are tried as _persons_; as persons they are entitled to counsel for their defence, to the rules of evidence, and to "due process of law," and as _persons_ they are punished. True, they are loaded with cruel disabilities in courts of law, such as greatly obstruct and often inevitably defeat the ends of justice, yet they are still recognized as _persons_. Even in the legislation of Congress, and in the diplomacy of the general government, notwithstanding the frequent and wide departures from the integrity of the constitution on this subject, slaves are not recognized as _property_ without qualification. Congress has always refused to grant compensation for slaves killed or taken by the enemy, even when these slaves had been impressed into the United States' service. In half a score of cases since the last war, Congress has rejected such applications for compensation. Besides, both in Congressional acts, and in our national diplomacy, slaves and property are not used as convertible terms. When mentioned in treaties and state papers it is in such a way as to distinguish them from mere property, and generally by a recognition of their _personality_. In the invariable recognition of slaves as _persons_, the United States' constitution caught the mantle of the glorious Declaration, and most worthily wears it. It recognizes all human beings as "men," "persons," and thus as "equals." In the original draft of the Declaration, as it came from the hand of Jefferson, it is alleged that Great Britain had "waged a cruel war against _human_ nature itself, violating its most sacred rights of life and liberty in the persons of a distant people, carrying them into slavery, * * determined to keep up a market where MEN should be bought and sold,"--thus disdaining to make the charter of freedom a warrant for the arrest of _men_, that they might be shorn both of liberty and humanity.

The celebrated Roger Sherman, one of the committee of five appointed to draft the Declaration of Independence, and a member of the convention that formed the United States' constitution, said, in the first Congress after its adoption: "The constitution _does not consider these persons, (slaves,) as a species of property_."--[Lloyd's Cong. Reg. v. 1, p. 313.] That the United States' Constitution does not make slaves "property," is shown in the fact, that no person, either as a citizen of the United States, or by having his domicile within the United States' government, can hold slaves. He can hold them only by deriving his power from _state_ laws, or from the laws of Congress, if he hold slaves within the District. But no person resident within the United States' jurisdiction, and _not_ within the District, nor within a state whose laws support slavery, nor "held to service" under the laws of such a state or district, having escaped therefrom, _can be held as a slave_.

Men can hold _property_ under the United States' government though residing beyond the bounds of any state, district, or territory. An inhabitant of the Iowa Territory can hold property there under the laws of the United States, but he cannot hold _slaves_ there under the United States' laws, nor by virtue of the United States' Constitution, nor upon the ground of his United States' citizenship, nor by having his domicile within the United States' jurisdiction. The constitution no where recognizes the right to "slave property," _but merely the fact that the states have jurisdiction each in its own limits, and that there are certain "persons" within their jurisdictions "held to service" by their own laws_.

Finally, in the clause under consideration "private property" is not to be taken "without just compensation." "JUST!" If justice is to be appealed to in determining the _amount_ of compensation, let her determine the _grounds_ also. If it be her province to say _how much_ compensation is "just," it is hers to say whether _any_ is "just,"--whether the slave is "just" property _at all_, rather than a "_person_". Then, if justice adjudges the slave to be "private property," it adjudges him to be _his own_ property, since the right to one's self is the first right--the source of all others--the original stock by which they are accumulated--the principal, of which they are the interest. And since the slave's "private property" has been "taken," and since "compensation" is impossible--there being no _equivalent_ for one's self--the least that can be done is to restore to him his original private property.

Having shown that in abolishing slavery, "property" would not be "taken for public use," it may be added that, in those states where slavery has been abolished by law, no claim for compensation has been allowed. Indeed the manifest absurdity of demanding it seems to have quite forestalled the _setting up_ of such a claim.

The abolition of slavery in the District instead of being a legislative anomaly, would proceed upon the principles of every day legislation. It has been shown already, that the United States' Constitution does not recognize slaves as "property." Yet ordinary legislation is full of precedents, showing that even _absolute_ property is in many respects wholly subject to legislation. The repeal of the law of entailments--all those acts that control the alienation of property, its disposal by will, its passing to heirs by descent, with the question, who shall be heirs, and what shall be the rule of distribution among them, or whether property shall be transmitted at all by descent, rather than escheat to the estate--these, with statutes of limitation, and various other classes of legislative acts, serve to illustrate the acknowledged scope of the law-making power, even where property _is in every sense absolute_. Persons whose property is thus affected by public laws, receive from the government no compensation for their losses; unless the state has been put in possession of the property taken from them.

The preamble of the United States' Constitution declares it to be a fundamental object of the organization of the government "to ESTABLISH JUSTICE." Has Congress _no power_ to do that for which it was made the depository of power? CANNOT the United States' Government fulfil the purpose for which it was brought into being?

To abolish slavery, is to take from no rightful owner his property; but to "establish justice" between two parties. To emancipate the slave, is to "establish justice" between him and his master--to throw around the person, character, conscience; liberty, and domestic relations of the one, _the same law_ that secures and blesses the other. In other words, to prevent by legal restraints one class of men from seizing upon another class, and robbing them at pleasure of their earnings, their time, their liberty, their kindred, and the very use and ownership of their own persons. Finally, to abolish slavery is to proclaim and _enact_ that innocence and helplessness--now _free plunder_--are entitled to _legal protection_; and that power, avarice, and lust, shall no longer revel upon their spoils under the license, and by the ministration of _law_! Congress, by possessing "exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever," has a _general protective power for_ ALL the inhabitants of the District. If it has no power to protect _one_ man in the District it has none to protect another--none to protect _any_--and if it _can_ protect one man and is _bound_ to do it, it _can_ protect _every_ man--and is _bound_ to do it. All admit the power of Congress to protect the masters in the District against their slaves. What part of the constitution gives the power? The clause so often quoted,--"power of legislation in all cases whatsoever," equally in the "_case_" of defending blacks against whites, as in that of defending whites against blacks. The power is also conferred by Art. 1, Sec. 8, clause 15--"Congress shall have power to suppress insurrections"--a power to protect, as well blacks against whites, as whites against blacks. If the constitution gives power to protect _one_ class against the other, it gives power to protect _either_ against the other. Suppose the blacks in the District should seize the whites, drive them into the fields and kitchens, force them to work without pay, flog them, imprison them, and sell them at their pleasure, where would Congress find power to restrain such acts? Answer; a _general_ power in the clause so often cited, and an _express_ one in that cited above--"Congress shall have power to suppress insurrections." So much for a supposed case. Here follows a real one. The whites in the District are _perpetrating these identical acts_ upon seven thousand blacks daily. That Congress has power to restrain these acts in _one_ case, all assert, and in so doing they assert the power "in _all_ cases whatsoever." For the grant of power to suppress insurrections, is an _unconditional_ grant, not hampered by provisos as to the color, shape, size, sex, language, creed, or condition of the insurgents. Congress derives its power to suppress this _actual_ insurrection, from the same source whence it derived its power to suppress the _same_ acts in the case supposed. If one case is an insurrection, the other is. The _acts_ in both are the same; the _actors_ only are different. In the one case, ignorant and degraded--goaded by the memory of the past, stung by the present, and driven to desperation by the fearful looking for of wrongs for ever to come. In the other, enlightened into the nature of _rights_, the principles of justice, and the dictates of the law of love, unprovoked by wrongs, with cool deliberation, and by system, they perpetrate these acts upon those to whom they owe unnumbered obligations for _whole lives_ of unrequited service. On which side may palliation be pleaded, and which party may most reasonably claim an abatement of the rigors of law? If Congress has power to suppress such acts _at all_, it has power to suppress them _in_ all.

It has been shown already that _allegiance_ is exacted of the slave. Is the government of the United States unable to grant _protection_ where it exacts _allegiance_? It is an axiom of the civilized world, and a maxim even with savages, that allegiance and protection are reciprocal and correlative. Are principles powerless with us which exact homage of barbarians? _Protection is the_ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT _of every human. being under the exclusive legislation of Congress who has not forfeited it by crime_.

In conclusion, I argue the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District, from Art. 1, sec. 8, clause 1, of the constitution; "Congress shall have power to provide for the common defence and the general welfare of the United States." Has the government of the United States no power under this grant to legislate within its own exclusive jurisdiction on subjects that vitally affect its interest? Suppose the slaves in the district should rise upon their masters, and the United States' government, in quelling the insurrection, should kill any number of them. Could their masters claim compensation of the government? Manifestly not; even though no proof existed that the particular slaves killed were insurgents. This was precisely the point at issue between those masters, whose slaves were killed by the State troops at the time of the Southampton insurrection, and the Virginia Legislature: no evidence was brought to show that the slaves killed by the troops were insurgents; yet the Virginia Legislature decided that their masters were _not entitled to compensation._ They proceeded on the sound principle, that the government may in self-protection destroy the claim of its subjects even to that which has been recognized as property by its own acts. If in providing for the common defence, the United States' government, in the case supposed, would have power to destroy slaves both as _property_ and _persons_, it surely might stop _half-way_, destroy them _as property_ while it legalized their existence as _persons_, and thus provided for the common defence by giving them a personal and powerful interest in the government, and securing their strength for its defence.

Like other Legislatures, Congress has power to abate nuisances--to remove or tear down unsafe buildings--to destroy infected cargoes--to lay injunctions upon manufactories injurious to the public health--and thus to "provide for the common defence and general welfare" by destroying individual property, when such property puts in jeopardy the public weal.

Granting, for argument's sake, that slaves are "property" in the District of Columbia--if Congress has a right to annihilate property there when the public safety requires it, it may annihilate its existence _as_ property when the public safety requires it, especially if it transform into a _protection_ and _defence_ that which as _property_ perilled the public interests. In the District of Columbia there are, besides the United States' Capitol, the President's house, the national offices, and archives of the Departments of State, Treasury, War, and Navy, the General Post-office, and Patent office. It is also the residence of the President, of all the highest officers of the government, of both houses of Congress, and of all the foreign ambassadors. In this same District there are also seven thousand slaves. Jefferson, in his Notes on Va. p. 241, says of slavery, that "the State permitting one half of its citizens to trample on the rights of the other, transforms them into _enemies_;" and Richard Henry Lee, in the Va. House of Burgesses in 1758, declared that to those who held them, "_slaves must be natural enemies_." Is Congress so impotent that it _cannot_ exercise that right pronounced both by municipal and national law, the most sacred and universal--the right of self-preservation and defence? Is it shut up to the _necessity_ of keeping seven thousand "enemies" in the heart of the nation's citadel? Does the iron fiat of the constitution doom it to such imbecility that it _cannot_ arrest the process that _made_ them "enemies," and still goads to deadlier hate by fiery trials, and day by day adds others to their number? Is _this_ providing for the common defence and general welfare? If to rob men of rights excites their hate, freely to restore them and make amends, will win their love.

By emancipating the slaves in the District, the government of the United States would disband an army of "enemies," and enlist "for the common defence and general welfare," a body guard of _friends_ seven thousand strong. In the last war, a handful of British soldiers sacked Washington city, burned the capitol, the President's house, and the national offices and archives; and no marvel, for thousands of the inhabitants of the District had been "TRANSFORMED INTO ENEMIES." Would _they_ beat back invasion? If the national government had exercised its constitutional "power to provide for the common defence and to promote the general welfare," by turning those "enemies" into friends, then, instead of a hostile ambush lurking in every thicket inviting assault, and secret foes in every house paralyzing defence, an army of allies would have rallied in the hour of her calamity, and shouted defiance from their munitions of rocks; whilst the banner of the republic, then trampled in dust, would have floated securely over FREEMEN exulting amidst bulwarks of strength.

To show that Congress can abolish slavery in the District, under the grant of power "to provide for the common defence and to promote the general welfare," I quote an extract from a speech of Mr. Madison, of Va., in the first Congress under the constitution, May 13, 1789. Speaking of the abolition of the slave trade, Mr. Madison says: "I should venture to say it is as much for the interests of Georgia and South Carolina, as of any state in the union. Every addition they receive to their number of slaves tends to _weaken_ them, and renders them less capable of self-defence. In case of hostilities with foreign nations, they will be the means of _inviting_ attack instead of repelling invasion. It is a necessary duty of the general government to protect every part of the empire against danger, as well _internal_ as external. _Every thing, therefore, which tends to increase this danger, though it may be a local affair, yet if it involves national expense or safety, it becomes of concern to every part of the union, and is a proper subject for the consideration of those charged with the general administration of the government._" Cong. Reg. vol. 1, p. 310, 11.

WYTHE.

POSTSCRIPT

My apology for adding a _postscript_, to a discussion already perhaps too protracted, is the fact that the preceding sheets were in the hands of the printer, and all but the concluding pages had gone through the press, before the passage of Mr. Calhoun's late resolutions in the Senate of the United States. A proceeding so extraordinary,--if indeed henceforward _any_ act of Congress in derogation of freedom and in deference to slavery, can be deemed extraordinary,--should not be passed in silence at such a crisis as the present; especially as the passage of one of the resolutions by a vote of 36 to 9, exhibits a shift of position on the part of the South, as sudden as it is unaccountable, being nothing less than the surrender of a fortress which until then, they had defended with the pertinacity of a blind and almost infuriated fatuity. Upon the discussions during the pendency of the resolutions, and upon the vote, by which they were carried, I make no comment, save only to record my exultation in the fact there exhibited, that great emergencies are _true touchstones_, and that henceforward, until this question is settled, whoever holds a seat in Congress will find upon, and around him, a pressure strong enough to test him--a focal blaze that will find its way through the carefully adjusted cloak of fair pretension, and the sevenfold brass of two faced political intrigue, and _no_-faced _non-committalism_, piercing to the dividing asunder of joints and marrow. Be it known to every northern man who aspires to a seat in our national councils, that hereafter congressional action on this subject will be a MIGHTY REVELATOR--making secret thoughts public property, and proclaiming on the house-tops what is whispered in the ear--smiting off masks, and bursting open sepulchres beautiful outwardly, and up-heaving to the sun their dead men's bones. To such we say,--_Remember the Missouri Question, and the fate of those who then sold the free states and their own birthright!_

Passing by the resolutions generally without remark--the attention of the reader is specially solicited to Mr. Clay's substitute for Mr. Calhoun's fifth resolution.

"Resolved, That when the District of Columbia was ceded by the states of Virginia and Maryland to the United States, domestic slavery existed in both of these states, including the ceded territory, and that, as it still continues in both of them, it could not be abolished within the District without a violation of that good faith, which was implied in the cession and in the acceptance of the territory; nor, unless compensation were made to the proprietors of slaves, without a manifest infringement of an amendment to the constitution of the United States; nor without exciting a degree of just alarm and apprehension in the states recognizing slavery, far transcending in mischievous tendency, any possible benefit which could be accomplished by the abolition."

By advocating this resolution, the south shifted its mode of defence, not by taking a position entirely new, but by attempting to refortify an old one--abandoned mainly long ago, as being unable to hold out against assault however unskillfully directed. In the debate on this resolution, the southern members of Congress silently drew off from the ground hitherto maintained by them, viz.--that Congress has no power by the constitution to abolish slavery in the District.

The passage of this resolution--with the vote of every southern senator, forms a new era in the discussion of this question. We cannot join in the lamentations of those who bewail it. We hail it, and rejoice in it. It was as we would have had it--offered by a southern senator, advocated by southern senators, and on the ground that it "was no compromise"--that it embodied the true southern principle--that "this resolution stood on as high ground as Mr. Calhoun's."--(Mr. Preston)--"that Mr. Clay's resolution was as strong as Mr. Calhoun's"--(Mr. Rives)--that "the resolution he (Mr. Calhoun) now refused to support, was as strong as his own, and that in supporting it, there was no abandonment of principle by the south."--(Mr. Walker, of Mi.)--further, that it was advocated by the southern senators generally as an expression of their views, and as setting the question of slavery in the District on its _true_ ground--that finally, when the question was taken, every slaveholding senator, including Mr. Calhoun himself, voted for the resolution.

By passing this resolution, and with such avowals, the south has unwittingly but explicitly, conceded the main point argued in the preceding pages, and surrendered the whole question at issue between them and the petitioners for abolition in the District.

The _only_ ground taken against the right of Congress to abolish slavery in the District is, that it existed in Maryland and Virginia when the cession was made, and "_as it still continues in both of them_, it could not be abolished without a violation of that good faith which was implied in the cession," &c. The argument is not that exclusive _sovereignty_ has no power to abolish slavery within its jurisdiction, nor that the powers of even ordinary legislation cannot do it, nor that the clause granting Congress "exclusive legislation in all cases what soever over such District," gives no power to do it; but that the _unexpressed expectation_ of one of the parties that the other would not "in all cases" use the power which said party had consented might be used "_in all cases," prohibits_ the use of it. The only cardinal point in the discussion, is here not only yielded, but formally laid down by the South as the leading article in their creed on the question of Congressional jurisdiction over slavery in the District. The reason given why Congress should not abolish, and the sole evidence that if it did, such abolition would be a violation of "good faith," is that "_slavery still continues in those states_,"--thus admitting, that if slavery did _not_ "still continue" in those States, Congress could abolish it in the District. The same admission is made also in the _premises_, which state that slavery existed in those states _at the time of the cession_, &c. Admitting that if it had not existed there then, but had grown up in the District under United States' laws, Congress might constitutionally abolish it. Or that if the ceded parts of those states had been the _only_ parts in which slaves were held under their laws, Congress might have abolished in such a contingency also. The cession in that case leaving no slaves in those states,--no "good faith" would be "implied" in it, nor any "violated" by an act of abolition. The resolution makes virtually this further admission, that if Maryland and Virginia should at once abolish their slavery, Congress might at once abolish it in the District. The principle goes even further than this, and _requires_ Congress in such case to abolish slavery in the District "by the _good faith implied_ in the cession and acceptance of the territory." Since, according to the spirit and scope of the resolution, this "implied good faith" of Maryland and Virginia in making the cession, was, that Congress would do nothing within the District which should counteract the policy, or discredit the "institutions," or call in question the usages, or even in any way ruffle the prejudices of those states, or do what _they_ might think would unfavorably bear upon their interests; _themselves_ of course being the judges.

But let us dissect another limb of the resolution. What is to be understood by "that good faith which was IMPLIED?" It is of course an admission that such a condition was not _expressed_ in the acts of cession--that in their terms there is nothing restricting the power of Congress on the subject of slavery in the District. This "implied faith," then, rests on no clause or word in the United States' Constitution, or in the acts of cession, or in the acts of Congress accepting the cession, nor on any declarations of the legislatures of Maryland and Virginia, nor on any _act_ of theirs, nor on any declaration of the _people_ of those states, nor on the testimony of the Washingtons, Jeffersons, Madisons, Chases, Martins, and Jennifers, of those states and times. The assertion rests _on itself alone!_ Mr. Clay _guesses_ that Maryland and Virginia _supposed_ that Congress would by no means _use_ the power given them by the Constitution, except in such ways as would be well pleasing in the eyes of those states; especially as one of them was the "Ancient Dominion!" And now after half a century, this _assumed expectation_ of Maryland and Virginia, the existence of which is mere matter of conjecture with the 36 senators, is conjured up and duly installed upon the judgment-seat of final appeal, before whose nod constitutions are to flee away, and with whom, solemn grants of power and explicit guaranties are, when weighed in the balance, altogether lighter than vanity!

But survey it in another light. Why did Maryland and Virginia leave so much to be "_implied?_?" Why did they not in some way _express_ what lay so near their hearts? Had their vocabulary run so low that a single word could not be eked out for the occasion? Or were those states so bashful of a sudden that they dare not speak out and tell what they wanted? Or did they take it for granted that Congress would always know their wishes by intuition, and always take them for law? If, as honorable senators tell us, Maryland and Virginia did verily travail with such abounding _faith_, why brought they forth no _works_?

It is as true in legislation as in religion, that the only evidence of "faith" is works, and that "faith" _without_ works is _dead_, i.e. has no _power_. But here, forsooth, a blind implication with nothing _expressed_, an "implied" faith without works, is omnipotent! Mr. Clay is lawyer enough to know that Maryland and Virginia notions of constitutional power, _abrogate no grant_, and that to plead them in a court of law, would be of small service, except to jostle "their Honors'" gravity! He need not be told that the Constitution gives Congress "power to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such District;" nor that Maryland and Virginia constructed their acts of cession with this clause _before their eyes_, and declared those acts made "in _pursuance_" of it. Those states knew that the U.S. Constitution had left nothing to be "_implied_" as to the power of Congress over the District; an admonition quite sufficient, one would think, to put them on their guard, and lead them to eschew vague implications, and to resort to _stipulations_. They knew, moreover, that those were times when, in matters of high import, _nothing_ was left to be "implied." The colonies were then panting from a twenty years' conflict with the mother country, about bills of rights, charters, treaties, constitutions, grants, limitations, and _acts of cession_. The severities of a long and terrible discipline had taught them to guard at all points _legislative grants_, that their exact import and limit might be self-evident--leaving no scope for a blind "faith" that _somehow_ in the lottery of chances, every ticket would turn up a prize. Toil, suffering, blood, and treasure outpoured like water over a whole generation, counselled them to make all sure by the use of explicit terms, and well chosen words, and just enough of them. The Constitution of the United States, with its amendments, those of the individual states, the national treaties, and the public documents of the general and state governments at that period, show the universal conviction of legislative bodies, that nothing should be left to be "implied," when great public interests were at stake.

Further: suppose Maryland and Virginia had expressed their "implied faith" in _words_, and embodied it in their acts of cession as a proviso, declaring that Congress should not "exercise exclusive legislation in _all_ cases whatsoever over the District," but that the "case" of _slavery_ should be an exception: who does not know that Congress, if it had accepted the cession on those terms, would have violated the Constitution; and who that has studied the free mood of those times in its bearings on slavery--proofs of which are given in scores on the preceding pages--[See pp. 25-37.] can be made to believe that the people of the United States would have re-modelled their Constitution for the purpose of providing for slavery an inviolable sanctuary; that when driven in from its outposts, and everywhere retreating discomfited before the march of freedom, it might be received into everlasting habitations on the common homestead and hearth-stone of the republic? Who can believe that Virginia made such a condition, or cherished such a purpose, when Washington, Jefferson, Wythe, Patrick Henry, St. George Tucker, and all her most illustrious men, were at that moment advocating the abolition of slavery by law; when Washington had said, two years before, that Maryland and Virginia "must have laws for the gradual abolition of slavery, and at a period _not remote_;" and when Jefferson in his letter to Dr. Price, three years before the cession, had said, speaking of Virginia, "This is the next state to which we may turn our eyes for the interesting spectacle of justice in conflict with avarice and oppression--a conflict in which THE SACRED SIDE IS GAINING DAILY RECRUITS;" when voluntary emancipations on the soil were then progressing at the rate of between one and two thousand annually, (See Judge Tucker's "Dissertation on Slavery," p. 73;) when the public sentiment of Virginia had undergone, so mighty a revolution that the idea of the continuance of slavery as a permanent system could not be tolerated, though she then contained about half the slaves in the Union. Was this the time to stipulate for the _perpetuity_ of slavery under the exclusive legislation of Congress? and that too when at the _same_ session _every one_ of her delegation voted for the abolition of slavery in the North West Territory; a territory which she herself had ceded to the Union, and surrendered along with it her jurisdiction over her citizens, inhabitants of that territory, who held slaves there--and whose slaves were emancipated by that act of Congress, in which all her delegation with one accord participated?

Now in view of the universal belief then prevalent, that slavery in this country was doomed to short life, and especially that in Maryland and Virginia it would be _speedily_ abolished--must we adopt the monstrous conclusion that those states _designed_ to bind Congress _never_ to terminate it?--that it was the _intent_ of the Ancient Dominion thus to _bind_ the United States by an "implied faith," and that when the national government _accepted_ the cession, she did solemnly thus plight her troth, and that Virginia did then so _understand_ it? Verily, honorable senators must suppose themselves deputed to do our _thinking_ for us as well as our legislation, or rather, that they are themselves absolved from such drudgery by virtue of their office!

Another absurdity of this "implied faith" dogma is, that where there was no power to exact an _express_ pledge, there was none to demand an _implied_ one, and where there was no power to give the one, there was none to give the other. We have shown already that Congress could not have accepted the cession with such a condition. To have signed away a part of its constitutional grant of power would have been a _breach_ of the Constitution. The Congress which accepted the cession was competent to pass a resolution pledging itself not to _use all_ the power over the District committed to it by the Constitution. But here its power ended. Its resolution could only bind _itself_. It had no authority to bind a subsequent Congress. Could the members of one Congress say to those of another, because we do not choose to exercise all the authority vested in us by the Constitution, therefore you _shall_ not? This would, have been a prohibition to do what the Constitution gives power to do. Each successive Congress would still have gone to THE CONSTITUTION for its power, brushing away in its course the cobwebs stretched across its path by the officiousness of an impertinent predecessor. Again, the legislatures of Virginia and Maryland, had no power to bind Congress, either by an express or an implied pledge, never to abolish slavery in the District. Those legislatures had no power to bind _themselves_ never to abolish slavery within their own territories--the ceded parts included. Where then would they get power to bind _another_ not to do what they had no power to bind _themselves_ not to do? If a legislature could not in this respect control the successive legislatures of its own State, could it control the successive Congresses of the United States?

But perhaps we shall be told, that the "implied faith" of Maryland and Virginia was _not_ that Congress should _never_ abolish slavery in the District, but that it should not do it until _they_ had done it within their bounds! Verily this "faith" comes little short of the faith of miracles! Maryland and Virginia have "good faith" that Congress will not abolish until _they_ do; and then just as "good faith" that Congress _will_ abolish _when_ they do! Excellently accommodated! Did those states suppose that Congress would legislate over the national domain, for Maryland and Virginia alone? And who, did they suppose, would be judges in the matter?--themselves merely? or the whole Union?

This "good faith implied in the cession" is no longer of doubtful interpretation. The principle at the bottom of it, when fairly stated, is this:--That the Government of the United States are bound in "good faith" to do in the District of Columbia, without demurring, just what and when, Maryland and Virginia do within their own bounds. In short, that the general government is eased of all the burdens of legislation within its exclusive jurisdiction, save that of hiring a scrivener to copy off the acts of the Maryland and Virginia legislatures as fast as they are passed, and engross them, under the title of "Laws of the United States for the District of Columbia!" A slight additional expense would also be incurred in keeping up an express between the capitols of those States and Washington city, bringing Congress from time to time its "_instructions_" from head quarters!

What a "glorious Union" this doctrine of Mr. Clay bequeaths to the people of the United States! We have been permitted to set up at our own expense, and on our own territory, two great _sounding-boards_ called "Senate Chamber" and "Representatives' Hall," for the purpose of sending abroad "by authority" _national_ echoes of _state_ legislation! --permitted also to keep in our pay a corps of pliant _national_ musicians, with peremptory instructions to sound on any line of the staff according as Virginia and Maryland may give the sovereign key note!

A careful analysis of Mr. Clay's resolution and of the discussions upon it, will convince every fair mind that this is but the legitimate carrying out of the _principle_ pervading both. They proceed virtually upon the hypothesis that the will and pleasure of Virginia and Maryland are paramount to those of the Union. If the original design of setting apart a federal district had been for the sole accommodation of the south, there could hardly have been higher assumption or louder vaunting. The only object of _having_ such a District was in effect totally perverted in the resolution of Mr. Clay, and in the discussions of the entire southern delegation, upon its passage. Instead of taking the ground, that the benefit of the whole Union was the sole _object_ of a federal district, and that it was to be legislated over _for this end_--the resolution proceeds upon an hypothesis totally the reverse. It takes a single point of _state_ policy, and exalts it above NATIONAL interests, utterly overshadowing them; abrogating national rights; making void a clause of the Constitution; humbling the general government into a subject crouching for favors to a superior, and that too within its own exclusive jurisdiction. All the attributes of sovereignty vested in Congress by the Constitution, it impales upon the point of an alleged _implication_. And this is Mr. Clay's peace-offering, to the lust of power and the ravenings of state encroachment! A "compromise," forsooth! that sinks the general government on _its own territory_, into a mere colony, with Virginia and Maryland for its "mother country!" It is refreshing to turn from these shallow, distorted constructions and servile cringings, to the high bearing of other southern men in other times; men, who as legislators and lawyers, scorned to accommodate their interpretations of constitutions and charters to geographical lines, or to bend them to the purposes of a political canvass. In the celebrated case of Cohens _vs._ the State of Virginia, Hon. William Pinkney, late of Baltimore, and Hon. Walter Jones, of Washington city, with other eminent constitutional lawyers, prepared an elaborate opinion, from which the following is an extract: "Nor is there any danger to be apprehended from allowing to Congressional legislation with regard to the District of Columbia, its FULLEST EFFECT. Congress is responsible to the States, and to the people for that legislation. It is in truth the legislation of the states over a district placed under their control FOR THEIR OWN BENEFIT, not for that of the District, except as the prosperity of the District is involved, and _necessary to the general advantage_."--[Life of Pinkney, p. 612.]

This profound legal opinion asserts, 1st, that Congressional legislation over the District, is "the legislation of the _states_ and the _people_." (not of _two_ states, and a mere _fraction_ of the people;) 2d. "Over a District placed under _their_ control," i.e. under the control of _all_ the States, not of _two twenty-sixths_ of them. 3d. That it was thus put under their control "_for_ THEIR OWN _benefit_." 4th. It asserts that the design of this exclusive control of Congress over the District was "not for the benefit of the _District_," except as that is _connected_ with, and _a means of promoting_ the _general_ advantage. If this is the case with the _District_, which is _directly_ concerned, it is pre-eminently so with Maryland and Virginia, which are but _indirectly_ interested. The argument of Mr. Madison in the Congress of '89, an extract from which has been given on a preceding page, lays down the same principle; that though any matter "_may be a local affair, yet if it involves national_ EXPENSE or SAFETY, _it becomes of concern to every part of the union, and is a proper subject for the consideration of those charged with the general administration of the government_."--Cong. Reg. vol. 1. p. 310.

But these are only the initiatory absurdities of this "good faith _implied_." Mr. Clay's resolution aptly illustrates the principle, that error not only conflicts with truth, but is generally at issue with itself: For if it would be a violation of "good faith" to Maryland and Virginia, for Congress to abolish slavery in the District, it would be _equally_ a violation for Congress to do it _with the consent_, or even at the unanimous petition of the people of the District: yet for years it has been the southern doctrine, that if the people of the District demand of Congress relief in this respect, it has power, as their local legislature, to grant it, and by abolishing slavery there, carry out the will of the citizens. But now new light has broken in! The optics of Mr. Clay have pierced the millstone with a deeper insight, and discoveries thicken faster than they can be telegraphed! Congress has no power, O no, not a modicum! to help the slaveholders of the District, however loudly they may clamor for it. The southern doctrine, that Congress is to the District a mere local Legislature to do its pleasure, is tumbled from the genitive into the vocative! Hard fate--and that too at the hands of those who begat it! The reasonings of Messrs. Pinckney and Wise, are now found to be wholly at fault, and the chanticleer rhetoric of Messrs. Glascock and Garland stalks featherless and crest-fallen. For the resolution sweeps by the board all those stereotyped common-places, such as "Congress a local Legislature," "consent of the District," "bound to consult the wishes of the District," with other catch phrases, which for the last two sessions of Congress have served to eke out scanty supplies. It declares, that as slavery existed in _Maryland and Virginia at the time of the cession, and as_ it still continues _in both those states_, it could not be abolished in the District without a violation of "that good faith," &c.

But let us see where this principle will lead us. If "implied faith" to Maryland and Virginia _restrains_ Congress from the abolition of slavery in the District, because those states have not abolished _their_ slavery, it _requires_ Congress to do in the District what those states have done within their own limits, i.e., restrain _others_ from abolishing it. Upon the same principle Congress is _bound_ to _prohibit emancipation_ within the District. There is no _stopping place_ for this plighted "faith." Congress must not only refrain from laying violent hands on slavery, and see to it that the slaveholders themselves do not, but it is bound to keep the system up to the Maryland and Virginia standard of vigor!

Again, if the good faith of Congress to Virginia and Maryland requires that slavery should exist in the District, while it exists in those states, it requires that it should exist there as it exists in those states. If to abolish _every_ form of slavery in the District would violate good faith, to abolish _the_ form existing in those states, and to substitute a different one, would also violate it. The Congressional "good faith" is to be kept not only with _slavery_, but with the _Maryland and Virginia systems_ of slavery. The faith of those states being not that Congress would maintain a system, but _their_ system; otherwise instead of _sustaining_, Congress would counteract their policy--principles would be brought into action there conflicting with their system, and thus the true sprit of the "implied" pledge would be violated. On this principle, so long as slaves are "chattels personal" in Virginia and Maryland, Congress could not make them _real estate_ in the District, as they are in Louisiana; nor could it permit slaves to read, nor to worship God according to conscience; nor could it grant them trial by jury, nor legalize marriage; nor require the master to give sufficient food and clothing; nor prohibit the violent sundering of families--because such provisions would conflict with the existing slave laws of Virginia and Maryland, and thus violate the "good faith implied," &c. So the principle of the resolution binds Congress in all these particulars: 1st. Not to abolish slavery in the District _until_ Virginia and Maryland abolish. 2d. Not to abolish any _part_ of it that exists in those states. 3d. Not to abolish any _form_ or _appendage_ of it still existing in those states. 4th. To _abolish_ when they do. 5th. To increase or abate its rigors _when, how,_ and _as_ the same are modified by those states. In a word, Congressional action in the District is to float passively in the wake of legislative action on the subject in those states.

But here comes a dilemma. Suppose the legislation of those states should steer different courses--then there would be _two_ wakes! Can Congress float in both? Yea, verily! Nothing is too hard for it! Its obsequiousness equals its "power of legislation in _all_ cases whatsoever." It can float _up_ on the Virginia tide, and ebb down on the Maryland. What Maryland does, Congress will do in the Maryland part. What Virginia does, Congress will do in the Virginia part. Though it might not always be able to run at the bidding of both _at once_, especially in different directions, yet if it obeyed orders cheerfully, and "kept in its place," according to its "good faith implied," impossibilities might not be rigidly exacted. True, we have the highest sanction for the maxim that no _man_ can serve two masters--but if "corporations have no souls," analogy would absolve Congress on that score, or at most give it only a _very small soul_--not large enough to be at all in the way, as an exception to the universal rule laid down in the maxim!

In following out the absurdities of this "implied good faith," it will be seen at once that the doctrine of Mr. Clay's Resolution extends to _all the subjects of legislation_ existing in Maryland and Virginia, which exist also within the District. Every system, "institution," law, and established usage there, is placed beyond Congressional control equally with slavery, and by the same "implied faith." The abolition of the lottery system in the District as an immorality, was a flagrant breach of this "good faith" to Maryland and Virginia, as the system "still continued in those states." So to abolish imprisonment for debt, or capital punishment, to remodel the bank system, the power of corporations, the militia law, laws of limitation, &c., in the District, _unless Virginia and Maryland took the lead,_ would violate the "good faith implied in the cession."

That in the acts of cession no such "good faith" was "implied" by Virginia and Maryland as is claimed in the Resolution, we argue from the fact, that in 1784 Virginia ceded to the United States all her north-west territory, with the special proviso that her citizens inhabiting that territory should "have their _possessions_ and _titles_ confirmed to them, and be _protected_ in the enjoyment of their _rights_ and liberties." (See Journals of Congress, vol. 9, p. 63.) The cession was made in the form of a deed, and signed by Thomas Jefferson, Samuel Hardy, Arthur Lee, and James Munroe. Many of these inhabitants _held slaves._ Three years after the cession, the Virginia delegation in Congress _proposed_ the passage of an ordinance which should abolish slavery, in that territory, and declare that it should never thereafter exist there. All the members of Congress from Virginia and Maryland voted for this ordinance. Suppose some member of Congress had during the passage of the ordinance introduced the following resolution: "Resolved, that when the northwest territory was ceded by Virginia to the United States, domestic slavery existed in that State, including the ceded territory, and as it still continues in that State, it could not be abolished within the territory without a violation of that good faith, which was implied in the cession and in the acceptance of the territory." What would have been the indignant response of Grayson, Griffin, Madison, and the Lees, in the Congress of '87, to such a resolution, and of Carrington, Chairman of the Committee, who reported the ratification of the ordinance in the Congress of '89, and of Page and Parker, who with every other member of the Virginia delegation supported it?

But to enumerate all the absurdities into which those interested for this resolution have plunged themselves, would be to make a quarto inventory. We decline the task; and in conclusion merely add, that Mr. Clay, in presenting it, and each of the thirty-six Senators who voted for it, entered on the records of the Senate, and proclaimed to the world, a most unworthy accusation against the millions of American citizens who have during nearly half a century petitioned the national legislature to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia,--charging them either with the ignorance or the impiety of praying the nation to violate its "Plighted Faith." The resolution virtually indicts at the bar of public opinion, and brands with odium, all the early Manumission Societies, the _first_ petitioners for the abolition of slavery in the District, and for a long time the only ones, petitioning from year to year through evil report and good report, still petitioning, by individual societies and in their national conventions.

But as if it were not enough to table the charge against such men as Benjamin Rush, William Rawle, John Sergeant, Roberts Vaux, Cadwallader Colden, and Peter A. Jay,--to whom we may add Rufus King, James Hillhouse, William Pinkney, Thomas Addis Emmett, Daniel D. Tompkins, De Witt Clinton, James Kent, and Daniel Webster, besides eleven hundred citizens of the District itself, headed by their Chief Justice and Judges--even the sovereign States of Pennsylvania, New-York, Massachusetts, Vermont, and Connecticut, whose legislatures have either memorialized Congress to abolish slavery in the District, or instructed their Senators to move such a measure, must be gravely informed by Messrs. Clay, Norvell, Niles, Smith, Pierce, Benton, Black, Tipton, and other honorable Senators, either that their perception is so dull, they know not whereof they affirm, or that their moral sense is so blunted they can demand without compunction a violation of the nation's faith!

We have spoken already of the concessions unwittingly made in this resolution to the true doctrine of Congressional power over the District. For that concession, important as it is; we have small thanks to render. That such a resolution, passed with such an _intent_, and pressing at a thousand points on relations and interests vital to the free states, should be hailed, as it has been, by a portion of the northern press as a "compromise" originating in deference to northern interests, and to be received by us as a free-will offering of disinterested benevolence, demanding our gratitude to the mover,--may well cover us with shame. We deserve the humiliation and have well earned the mockery. Let it come!

If, after having been set up at auction in the public sales-room of the nation, and for thirty years, and by each of a score of "compromises," treacherously knocked off to the lowest bidder, and that without money and without price, the North, plundered and betrayed, _will not_, in this her accepted time, consider the things that belong to her peace before they are hidden from her eyes, then let her eat of the fruit of her own way, and be filled with her own devices! Let the shorn and blinded giant grind in the prison-house of the Philistines, till taught by weariness and pain the folly of entrusting to Delilahs the secret and the custody of his strength.

Have the free States bound themselves by an oath never to profit by the lessons of experience? If lost to reason, are they dead to _instinct_ also? Can nothing rouse them to cast about for self preservation? And shall a life of tame surrenders be terminated by suicidal sacrifice?

A "COMPROMISE!" Bitter irony! Is the plucked and hoodwinked North to be wheedled by the sorcery of another Missouri compromise? A compromise in which the South gained all, and the North lost all, and lost it forever. A compromise which embargoed the free laborer of the North and West, and, clutched at the staff he leaned upon, to turn it into a bludgeon and fell him with its stroke. A compromise which wrested from liberty her boundless birthright domain, stretching westward to the sunset, while it gave to slavery loose reins and a free coarse, from the Mississippi to the Pacific.

The resolution, as it finally passed, is here inserted.

"Resolved, That the interference by the citizens of any of the states, with the view to the abolition of slavery in the District, is endangering the rights and security of the people of the District; and that any act or measure of Congress designed to abolish slavery in the District, would be a violation of the faith implied in the cessions by the states of Virginia and Maryland, a just cause of alarm to the people of the slaveholding states, and have a direct and inevitable tendency to disturb and endanger the Union."

The vote upon the resolution stood as follows:

_Yeas_.--Messrs. Allen, Bayard, Benton, Black, Buchanan, Brown, Calhoun, Clay of Alabama, Clay of Kentucky, Clayton, Crittenden, Cuthbert, Fulton, Grundy, Hubbard, King, Lumpkin, Lyon, Nicholas. Niles, Norvell, Pierce, Preston, Rives, Roane, Robinson, Sevier, Smith, of Connecticut, Strange, Tallmadge, Tipton, Walker, White, Williams, Wright, Young--36.

_Nays_.--Messrs. DAVIS, KNIGHT, McKEAN, MORRIS, PRENTISS, RUGGLES, SMITH, of Indiana, SWIFT, WEBSTER--9.

* * * * *

ANTI-SLAVERY EXAMINER. NO. 6.

NARRATIVE OF JAMES WILLIAMS, AN AMERICAN SLAVE.

ONE DOLLAR PER 100] [143 NASSAU ST. N.Y.

* * * * *

PREFACE.

"American Slavery," said the celebrated John Wesley, "is the _vilest_ beneath the sun!" Of the truth of this emphatic remark, no other proof is required, than an examination of the statute books of the American slave states. Tested by its own laws, in all that facilitates and protects the hateful process of converting a man into a "_chattel personal_;" in all that stamps the law-maker, and law-upholder with meanness and hypocrisy, it certainly has no present rival of its "bad eminence," and we may search in vain the history of a world's despotism for a parallel. The civil code of Justinian never acknowledged, with that of our democratic despotisms, the essential equality of man. The dreamer in the gardens of Epicurus recognized neither in himself, nor in the slave who ministered to his luxury, the immortality of the spiritual nature. Neither Solon nor Lycurgus taught the inalienability of human rights. The Barons of the Feudal System, whose maxim was emphatically that of Wordsworth's robber,

"That he should take who had the power, And he should keep who can."

while trampling on the necks of their vassals, and counting the life of a man as of less value than that of a wild beast, never appealed to God for the sincerity of their belief, that all men were created equal. It was reserved for American slave-holders to present to the world the hideous anomaly of a code of laws, beginning with the emphatic declaration of the inalienable rights of all men to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and closing with a deliberate and systematic denial of those rights, in respect to a large portion of their countrymen; engrossing on the same parchment the antagonist laws of liberty and tyranny. The very nature of this unnatural combination has rendered it necessary that American slavery, in law and in practice, should exceed every other in severity and cool atrocity. The masters of Greece and Rome permitted their slaves to read and write and worship the gods of paganism in peace and security, for there was nothing in the laws, literature, or religion of the age to awaken in the soul of the bondman a just sense of his rights as a man. But the American slaveholder cannot be thus lenient. In the excess of his benevolence, as a political propagandist, he has kindled a fire for the oppressed of the old world to gaze at with hope, and for crowned heads and dynasties to tremble at; but a due regard to the safety of his "peculiar institution," compels him to put out the eyes of his own people, lest they too should see it. Calling on all the world to shake off the fetters of oppression, and wade through the blood of tyrants to freedom, he has been compelled to smother, in darkness and silence, the minds of his own bondmen, lest they too should hear and obey the summons, by putting the knife to his own throat.--Proclaiming the truths of Divine Revelation, and sending the Scriptures to the four quarters of the earth, he has found it necessary to maintain heathenism at home by special enactments; and to make the second offence of teaching his slaves the message of salvation punishable with _death_!

What marvel then that American slavery even on the _statute book_ assumes the right to transform moral beings into brutes:[A] that it legalizes man's usurpation of Divine authority; the substitution of the will of the master, for the moral government of God: that it annihilates the rights of conscience; debars from the enjoyment of religious rights and privileges by specific enactments; and enjoins disobedience to the Divine lawgiver: that it discourages purity and chastity, encourages crime, legalizes concubinage; and, while it places the slave entirely in the hands of his master, provides no real protection for his life or his person.

[Footnote A: The _cardinal principle_ of slavery, that a slave is not to be ranked among sentient beings, but among things, as an article of property, a chattel personal, obtains as undoubted law, in all the slave states. (Judge Stroud's Sketch of Slave Laws, p. 22.)]

But it may be said, that these laws afford no certain evidence of the actual condition of the slaves: that, in judging the system by its code, no allowance is made for the humanity of individual masters. It was a just remark of the celebrated Priestley, that "_no people ever were found to be better than their laws, though many have been known to be worse._" All history and common experience confirm this. Besides, admitting that the legal severity of a system may be softened in the practice of the humane, may it not also be aggravated by that of the avaricious and cruel?

But what are the testimony and admissions of slaveholders themselves on this point? In an Essay published in Charleston, S.C., in 1822, and entitled "A Refutation of the Calumnies circulated against the Southern and Western States," by the late Edwin C. Holland, Esq., it is stated, that "all slaveholders have laid down non-resistance, and perfect and uniform _obedience_ to their orders as fundamental principles in the government of their slaves:" that this is "a _necessary_ result of the relation," and "_unavoidable_." Robert J. Turnbull, Esq., of South Carolina, in remarking upon the management of slaves, says, "The only principle upon which may authority over them, (the slaves,) can be maintained is _fear_, and he who denies this has little knowledge of them." To this may be added the testimony of Judge Ruffin, of North Carolina, as quoted in Wheeler's Law of Slavery, p. 217. "The slave, to remain a slave, must feel that there is _no appeal from his master_. No man can anticipate the provocations which the slave would give, nor the consequent wrath of the master, prompting him to BLOODY VENGEANCE on the turbulent traitor, a vengeance _generally_ practised with impunity by reason of its _privacy_."

In an Essay on the "improvement of negroes on plantations," by Rev. Thomas S. Clay, a slaveholder of Bryan county, Georgia, and Printed at the request of the Georgia Presbytery, in 1833, we are told "that the present economy of the slave system is _to get all you can_ from the slave, and give him in return _as little as will barely support him in a working condition_!" Here, in a few words, the whole enormity of slavery is exposed to view: "to _get all you can_ from the slave"--by means of whips and forks and irons--by every device for torturing the body, without destroying its capability of labor; and in return give him as little of his coarse fare as will keep him, like a mere beast of burden, in a "_working condition_;" this is slavery, as explained by the slaveholder himself. Mr. Clay further says: "_Offences against the master_ are more severely punished than violations of the law of God, a fault which affects the slave's personal character a good deal. As examples we may notice, that _running away_ is more severely punished than adultery." "He (the slave) only knows his master as lawgiver and executioner, and the _sole object of punishment_ held up to his view, is to make him _a more obedient and profitable slave_."

Hon. W.B. Seabrook, in an address before the Agricultural Society of St. John's, Colleton, published by order of the Society, at Charleston, in 1834, after stating that "as Slavery exists in South Carolina, the action of the citizens should rigidly conform to that state of things:" and, that "no _abstract opinions of the rights of man_ should be allowed in any instance to modify the _police system of a plantation_," proceeds as follows. "_He_ (the slave) _should be practically treated as a slave_; and thoroughly taught the true cardinal principle on which our peculiar institutions are founded, viz.; that to his owner he is bound by the law of God and man; and that no human authority can sever the link which unites them. The great aim of the slaveholder, then, should be to keep his people in strict _subordination_. In this, it may in truth be said, lies his _entire duty_." Again, in speaking of the punishments of slaves, he remarks: "If to our army the disuse of THE LASH has been prejudicial, to the slaveholder it would operate to deprive him of the MAIN SUPPORT of his authority. For the first class of offences, I consider imprisonment in THE STOCKS[A] at night, with or without hard labor by day, as a powerful auxiliary in the cause of _good_ government." "_Experience_ has convinced me that there is no punishment to which the slave looks with more horror, than that upon which I am commenting, (the stocks,) and none which has been attended with happier results."

[Footnote A: Of the nature of this punishment in the stocks, something may be learned by the following extract of a letter from a gentleman in Tallahassee, Florida, to the editor of the Ohio Atlas, dated June 9, 1835: "A planter, a professer of religion, in conversing upon the universality of whipping, remarked, that a planter in G____, who had whipped a great deal, at length got tired of it, and invented the following _excellent_ method of punishment, which I saw practised while I was paying him a visit. The negro was placed in a sitting position, with his hands made fast above his head, and his feet in the stocks, so that he could not move any part of the body. The master retired, intending to leave him till morning, but we were awakened in the night by the groans of the negro, which were so doleful that we feared he was dying. We went to him, and found him covered with a cold sweat, and almost gone. He could not have lived an hour longer. Mr. ---- found the 'stocks' such an effective punishment, that it almost superseded the whip."]

There is yet another class of testimony quite as pertinent as the foregoing, which may at any time be gleaned from the newspapers of the slave states--the advertisements of masters for their runaway slaves, and casual paragraphs coldly relating cruelties, which would disgrace a land of Heathenism. Let the following suffice for a specimen:

* * * * *

To the Editors of the Constitutionalist.

_Aiken, S.C., Dec._ 20, 1836.

I have just returned from an inquest I held over the dead body of a negro man, a runaway, that was shot near the South Edisto, in this district, (Barnwell,) on Saturday morning last. He came to his death by his own recklessness. He refused to be taken alive; and said that other attempts to take him had been made, and he was determined that he would not be taken. When taken he was nearly naked--had a large dirk or knife and a heavy club. He was at first, (when those who were in pursuit of him found it absolutely necessary,) shot at with small shot, with the intention of merely crippling him. He was shot at several times, and at last he was so disabled as to be compelled to surrender. He kept in the run of a creek in a very dense swamp all the time that the neighbors were in pursuit of him. As soon as the negro was taken, the best medical aid was procured, but he died on the same evening. One of the witnesses at the inquisition stated that the negro boy said that he was from Mississippi, and belonged to so many persons he did not know who his master was; but again he said his master's name was _Brown_. He said his own name was Sam; and when asked by another witness who his master was, he muttered something like Augusta or Augustine. The boy was apparently above 35 or 40 years of age--about six feet high--slightly yellow in the face--very long beard or whiskers--and very stout built, and a stern countenance; and appeared to have been run away a long time.

WILLIAM H. PRITCHARD,

_Coroner, (ex officio,) Barnwell Dist., S.C._

The Mississippi and other papers will please copy the above.--_Georgia Constitutionalist_.

* * * * *

$100 REWARD.--Ran away from the subscriber, living on Herring Bay, Ann Arundel county, Md., on Saturday, 28th January, negro man Elijah, who calls himself Elijah Cook, is about 21 years of age, well made, of a very dark complexion has an impediment in his speech, and _a scar on his left cheek bone, apparently occasioned by a shot_.

J. SCRIVENER. Annapolis (Md.) Rep., Feb., 1837.

* * * * *

$40 REWARD.--Ran away from my residence near Mobile, two negro men, Isaac and Tim. Isaac is from 25 to 30 years old, dark complexion, scar on the right side of the head, and also one on the right side of the body, occasioned by BUCK SHOT. Tim is 22 years old, dark complexion, scar on the right cheek, as also another on the back of the neck. Captains and owners of steamboats, vessels, and water crafts of every description, are cautioned against taking them on board under the penalty of the law; and all other persons against harboring or in any manner favoring the escape of said negroes under like penalty.

_Mobile, Sept_. 1. SARAH WALSH. Montgomery (Ala.) Advertiser, Sept. 29, 1837.

* * * * *

$200 REWARD.--Ran away from the subscriber, about three years ago, a certain negro man named Ben, (commonly known by the name of Ben Fox.) He is about five feet five or six inches high, chunky made, yellow complexion, and has but one eye. Also, one other negro, by the name of Rigdon, who ran away on the 8th of this month. He is stout made, tall, and very black, with large lips.

I will give the reward of one hundred dollars for each of the above negroes, to be delivered to me or confined in the jail of Lenoir or Jones county, or _for the killing of them so that I can see them_. Masters of vessels and all others are cautioned against harboring, employing, or carrying them away, under the penalty of the law.

W.D. COBB. _Lenoir county, N.C., Nov_. 12, 1836.

* * * * *

"A negro who had absconded from his master, and for who a reward was offered of $100, has been apprehended and committed to prison in Savannah, Georgia. The Editor who states the fact, adds, with as much coolness as though there was no barbarity in the matter, that he did not surrender until he was considerably _maimed by the dogs_[A] that had been set on him,--desperately fighting them, one of which he cut badly with a sword."

_New-York Commercial Advertiser, June_, 8, 1827.

[Footnote A: In regard to the use of bloodhounds, for the recapture of runaway slaves, we insert the following from the New-York Evangelist, being an extract of a letter from Natchez (Miss.) under date of January 31, 1835: "An instance was related to me in Claiborne County, in Mississippi. A runaway was heard about the house in the night. The hound was put upon his track, and in the morning was found watching the dead body of the negro. The dogs are trained to this service when young. A negro is directed to go into the woods and secure himself upon a tree. When sufficient time has elapsed for doing this, the hound is put upon his track. The blacks are compelled to worry them until they make them their implacable enemies: and it is common to meet with dogs which will take no notice of whites, though entire strangers, but will suffer no blacks beside the house servants to enter the yard."]

* * * * *

From the foregoing evidence on the part of slaveholders themselves, we gather the following facts:

1. That perfect obedience is required of the slave--that he is made to feel that there is no appeal from his master.

2. That the authority of the master is only maintained by fear--a "_reign of terror_."

3. That "the economy of slavery is to _get all you can_ from the slave, and give him in return as little as will barely support him in a working condition."

4. That runaway slaves may be shot down with impunity by any white person.

5. That masters offer rewards for "_killing_" their slaves, "_so that they may see them_!"

6. That slaves are branded with hot irons, and very much scarred with the whip.

7. That _iron collars_, with projecting prongs, rendering it almost impossible for the wearer to lie down, are fastened upon the _necks of women_.

8. That the LASH is the MAIN SUPPORT of the slaveholder's authority: but, that the _stocks_ are "a powerful auxiliary" to his government.

9. That runaway slaves are chased with dogs--men hunted like beasts of prey.

Such is American Slavery in practice.

The testimony thus far adduced is only that of the slaveholder and wrong-doer himself: the admission of men who have a direct interest in keeping out of sight the horrors of their system. It is besides no voluntary admission. Having "framed iniquity by law," it is out of their power to hide it. For the recovery of their runaway property, they are compelled to advertise in the public journals, and that it may be identified, they are under the necessity of describing the marks of the whip on the backs of women, the iron collars about the neck--the gun-shot wounds, and the traces of the branding-iron. Such testimony must, in the nature of things, be partial and incomplete. But for a full revelation of the secrets of the prison-house, we must look to the slave himself. The Inquisitors of Goa and Madrid never disclosed the peculiar atrocities of their "hall of horrors." It was the escaping heretic, with his swollen and disjointed limbs, and bearing about him the scars of rack and fire, who exposed them to the gaze and abhorrence of Christendom.

The following pages contain the simple and unvarnished story of an AMERICAN SLAVE,--of one, whose situation, in the first place, as a favorite servant in an aristocratic family in Virginia; and afterwards as the sole and confidential driver on a large plantation in Alabama, afforded him rare and peculiar advantages for accurate observation of the practical workings of the system. His intelligence, evident candor, and grateful remembrance of those kindnesses, which in a land of Slavery, made his cup of suffering less bitter; the perfect accordance of his statements, (made at different times, and to different individuals),[B] one with another, as well as those statements themselves, all afford strong confirmation of the truth and accuracy of his story. There seems to have been no effort, on his part to make his picture of Slavery one of entire darkness--he details every thing of a mitigating character which fell under his observation; and even the cruel deception of his master has not rendered him unmindful of his early kindness.

[Footnote B: The reader is referred to JOHN G. WHITTIER, of Philadelphia, or to the following gentlemen, who have heard the whole, or a part of his story, from his own lips: Emmor Kimber, of Kimberton, Pa., Lindley Coates, of Lancaster Co., do.; James Mott, of Philadelphia, Lewis Tappan, Elizur Wright Jun., Rev. Dr. Follen, and James G. Birney, of New York. The latter gentleman, who was a few years ago, a citizen of Alabama, assures us that the statements made to him by James Williams, were such as he had every reason to believe, from his own knowledge of slavery in that State.]

The editor is fully aware that he has not been able to present this affecting narrative in the simplicity and vivid freshness with which it fell from the lips of the narrator. He has, however, as closely as possible, copied his manner, and in many instances his precise language. THE SLAVE HAS SPOKEN FOR HIMSELF. Acting merely as his amanuensis, he has carefully abstained from comments of his own.[A]

[Footnote A: As the narrator was unable to read or write, it is quite possible that the orthography of some of the names of individuals mentioned in his story may not be entirely correct. For instance, the name of his master may have been either Larrimer, or Larrrimore.]

The picture here presented to the people of the free states, is, in many respects, a novel one. We all know something of Virginia and Kentucky Slavery. We have heard of the internal slave trade--the pangs of separation--the slave ship with its "cargo of despair" bound for the New-Orleans market--the weary journey of the chained Coffle to the cotton country. But here, in a great measure, we have lost sight of the victims of avarice and lust. We have not studied the dreadful economy of the cotton plantation, and know but little of the secrets of its unlimited despotism.

But in this narrative the scenes of the plantation rise before us, with a distinctness which approaches reality. We hear the sound of the horn at daybreak, calling the sick and the weary to toil unrequited. Woman, in her appealing delicacy and suffering, about to become a mother, is fainting under the lash, or sinking exhausted beside her cotton row. We hear the prayer for mercy answered with sneers and curses. We look on the instruments of torture, and the corpses of murdered men. We see the dogs, reeking hot from the chase, with their jaws foul with human blood. We see the meek and aged Christian scarred with the lash, and bowed down with toil, offering the supplication of a broken heart to his Father in Heaven, for the forgiveness of his brutal enemy. We hear, and from our inmost hearts repeat the affecting interrogatory of the aged slave, _"How long, Oh Lord! how long!"_

The editor has written out the details of this painful narrative with feelings of sorrow. If there be any who feel a morbid satisfaction in dwelling upon the history of outrage and cruelty, he at least is not one of them. His taste and habits incline him rather to look to the pure and beautiful in our nature--the sunniest side of humanity--its kindly sympathies--its holy affections--its charities and its love. But, it is because he has seen that all which is thus beautiful and excellent in mind and heart, perishes in the atmosphere of slavery: it is because humanity in the slave sinks down to a level with the brute and in the master gives place to the attributes of a fiend--that he has not felt at liberty to decline the task. He cannot sympathize with that abstract and delicate philanthropy, which hesitates to bring itself in contact with the sufferer, and which shrinks from the effort of searching out the extent of his afflictions. The emblem of Practical Philanthropy is the Samaritan stooping over the wounded Jew. It must be no fastidious hand which administers the oil and the wine, and binds up the unsightly gashes.

Believing, as he does, that this narrative is one of truth; that it presents an unexaggerated picture of Slavery as it exists on the cotton plantations of the South and West, he would particularly invite to its perusal, those individuals, and especially those professing Christians at the North, who have ventured to claim for such a system, the sanction and approval of the Religion of Jesus Christ. In view of the facts here presented, let these men seriously inquire of themselves, whether in advancing such a claim, they are not uttering a higher and more audacious blasphemy than any which ever fell from the pens of Voltaire and Paine. As if to cover them with confusion, and leave them utterly without excuse for thus libelling the character of a just God, these developments are making, and the veil rising, which for long years of sinful apathy has rested upon the abominations of American Slavery. Light is breaking into it's dungeons, disclosing the wreck of buried intellect--of hearts broken--of human affections outraged--of souls ruined. The world will see it as God has always seen it; and when He shall at length make inquisition for blood, and His vengeance kindle over the habitations of cruelty, with a destruction more terrible than that of Sodom and Gomorrah, His righteous dealing will be justified of man, and His name glorified among the nations, and there will be a voice of rejoicing in Earth and in Heaven. ALLELUIA!--THE PROMISE IS FULFILLED!--FOR THE SIGHING OF THE POOR AND THE OPPRESSION OF THE NEEDY, GOD HATH RISEN!

It is the earnest desire of the Editor, that this narrative may be the means, under God, of awakening in the hearts of all who read it, a sympathy for the oppressed which shall manifest itself in immediate, active, self-sacrificing exertion for their deliverance; and, while it excites abhorrence of his crimes, call forth pity for the oppressor. May it have the effect to prevent the avowed and associated friends of the slave, from giving such an undue importance to their own trials and grievances, as to forget in a great measure the sorrows of the slave. Let its cry of wo, coming up from the plantations of the South, suppress every feeling of selfishness in our hearts. Let our regret and indignation at the denial of the right of petition, be felt only because we are thereby prevented from pleading in the Halls of Congress for the "suffering and the dumb." And let the fact, that we are shut out from half the territory of our country, be lamented only because it prevents us from bearing personally to the land of Slavery, the messages of hope for the slave, and of rebuke and warning for the oppressor.

_New-York, 24th 1st mo._, 1838.

* * * * *

NARRATIVE

I was born in Powhatan County, Virginia, on the plantation of George Larrimore. Sen., at a place called Mount Pleasant, on the 16th of May 1805. May father was the slave of an orphan family whose name I have forgotten, and was under the care of a Mr. Brooks, guardian of the family. He was a native of Africa, and was brought over when a mere child, with his mother. My mother was the slave of George Larrimore, Sen. She was nearly white, and is well known to have been the daughter of Mr. Larrimore himself. She died when myself and my twin brother Meshech were five years of age--I can scarcely remember her. She had in all eight children, of whom only five are now living. One, a brother, belongs to the heirs of the late Mr. Brockenbrough of Charlottesville; of whom he hires his time, and pays annually $120 for it. He is a member of the Baptist church, and used to preach occasionally. His wife is a free woman from Philadelphia, and being able to read and write, taught her husband. The whites do not know that he can write, and have often wondered that he could preach so well without learning. It is the practice when a church is crowded, to turn the blacks out of their seats. My brother did not like this, and on one occasion preached a sermon from a text, showing that all are of one blood. Some of the whites who heard it, said that such preaching would raise an insurrection among the negroes. Two of them told him that if he would prove his doctrine by Scripture, they would let him go, but if he did not, he should have nine and thirty lashes. He accordingly preached another sermon and spoke with a great deal of boldness. The two men who were in favor of having him whipped, left before the sermon was over; those who remained, acknowledged that he had proved his doctrine, and preached a good sermon, and many of them came up and shook hands with him. The two opposers, Scott and Brockley, forbid my brother, after this, to come upon their estates. They were both Baptists, and my brother had before preached to their people. During the cholera at Richmond, my brother preached a sermon, in which he compared the pestilence to the plagues, which afflicted the Egyptian slaveholders, because they would not let the people go. After the sermon some of the whites threatened to whip him. Mr. Valentine, a merchant on Shocko Hill prevented them; and a young lawyer named Brooks said it was wrong to threaten a man for preaching the truth. Since the insurrection of Nat. Turner he has not been allowed to preach much.

My twin brother was for some time the property of Mr. John Griggs, of Richmond, who sold him about three years since, to an Alabama Cotton Planter, with whom he staid one year, and then ran away and in all probability escaped into the free states or Canada, as he was seen near the Maryland line. My other brother lives in Fredericksburg, and belongs to a Mr. Scott, a merchant formerly of Richmond. He was sold from Mr. Larrimore's plantation because his wife was a slave of Mr. Scott. My only sister is the slave of John Smith, of King William. Her husband was the slave of Mr. Smith, when the latter lived in Powhatan county, and when he removed to King William, she was taken with her husband.

My old master, George Larrimore, married Jane Roane, the sister of a gentleman named John Roane, one of the most distinguished men in Virginia, who in turn married a sister of my master. One of his sisters married a Judge Scott, and another married Mr. Brockenbrough of Charlottesville. Mr. Larrimore had three children; George, Jane, and Elizabeth. The former was just ten days older than myself; and I was his playmate and constant associate in childhood. I used to go with him to his school, and carry his books for him as far as the door, and meet him there when the school was dismissed. We were very fond of each other, and frequently slept together. He taught me the letters of the alphabet, and I should soon have acquired a knowledge of reading, had not George's mother discovered her son in the act of teaching me. She took him aside and severely reprimanded him. When I asked him, not long after, to tell me more of what he had learned at school, he said that his mother had forbidden him to do so any more, as her father had a slave, who was instructed in reading and writing, and on that account proved very troublesome. He could, they said, imitate the hand-writing of the neighboring planters, and used to write passes and certificates of freedom for the slaves, and finally wrote one for himself, and went off to Philadelphia, from whence her father received from him a saucy letter, thanking him for his education.

The early years of my life went by pleasantly. The bitterness of my lot I had not yet realized. Comfortably clothed and fed, kindly treated by my old master and mistress and the young ladies, and the playmate and confidant of my young master, I did not dream of the dark reality of evil before me.

When he was fourteen years of age, master George went to his uncle Brockenbrough's at Charlottesville, as a student of the University. After his return from College, he went to Paris and other parts of Europe, and spent three or four years in study and travelling. In the mean time I was a waiter in the house, dining-room servant, &c. My old master visited and received visits from a great number of the principal families in Virginia. Each summer, with his family, he visited the Sulphur Springs and the mountains. While George was absent, I went with him to New-Orleans, in the winter season, on account of his failing health. We spent three days in Charleston, at Mr. McDuffie's, with whom my master was on intimate terms. Mr. McDuffie spent several days on one occasion at Mt. Pleasant. He took a fancy to me, and offered my master the servant whom he brought with him and $500 beside, for me. My master considered it almost an insult, and said after he was gone, that Mr. McDuffie needed money to say the least, as much as he did.

He had a fine house in Richmond, and used to spend his winters there with his family, taking me with him. He was not there much at other times, except when the Convention of 1829 for amending the State Constitution, was held in that city. He had a quarrel with Mr. Neal of Richmond Co., in consequence of some remarks upon the subject of Slavery. It came near terminating in a duel. I recollect that during the sitting of the Convention, my master asked me before several other gentlemen, if I wished to be free and go back to my own country. I looked at him with surprise, and inquired what country?

"Africa, to be sure," said he, laughing.

I told him that was not my country--that I was born in Virginia.

"Oh yes," said he, "but your father was born in Africa." He then said that there was a place on the African coast called Liberia where a great many free blacks were going; and asked me to tell him honestly, whether I would prefer to be set free on condition of going to Africa, or live with him and remain a slave. I replied that I had rather be as I was.

I have frequently heard him speak against slavery to his visitors. I heard him say on one occasion, when some gentlemen were arguing in favor of sending the free colored people to Africa, that this was as really the black man's country as the white's, and that it would be as humane to knock the free negroes, at once, on the head, as to send them to Liberia. He was a kind man to his slaves. He was proud of them, and of the reputation he enjoyed of feeding and clothing them well. They were as near as I can judge about 300 in number. He never to my knowledge sold a slave, unless to go with a wife or husband, and at the slave's own request. But all except the very wealthiest planters in his neighborhood sold them frequently. John Smoot of Powhatan Co. has sold a great number. Bacon Tait[A] used to be one of the principal purchasers. He had a jail at Richmond where he kept them. There were many others who made a business of buying and selling slaves. I saw on one occasion while travelling with my master, a gang of nearly two hundred men fastened with chains. The women followed unchained and the children in wagons. It was a sorrowful sight. Some were praying, some crying, and they all had a look of extreme wretchedness. It is an awful thing to a Virginia slave to be sold for the Alabama and Mississippi country. I have known some of them to die of grief, and others to commit suicide, on account of it.

[Footnote A: Bacon Tait's advertisement of "new and commodious buildings" for the keeping of negroes, situated at the corner of 15th and Carey streets, appears in the Richmond Whig of Sept. 1896.--EDITOR.]

In my seventeenth year, I was married to a girl named Harriet, belonging to John Gatewood, a planter living about four miles from Mr. Pleasant. She was about a year younger than myself--was a tailoress, and used to cut out clothes for the hands.

We were married by a white clergyman named Jones; and were allowed to or three weeks to ourselves, which we spent in visiting and other amusements.

The field hands are seldom married by a clergyman. They simply invite their friends together, and have a wedding party.

Our two eldest children died in their infancy: two are now living. The youngest was only two months old when I saw him for the last time. I used to visit my wife on Saturday and Sunday evenings.

My young master came back from Europe in delicate health. He was advised by his physicians to spend the winter in New-Orleans, whither he accordingly went, taking me with him. Here he became acquainted with a French lady of one of the first families in the city. The next winter he also spent in New-Orleans, and on his third visit, three years after his return from Europe, he was married to the lady above mentioned. In May he returned to Mt. Pleasant, and found the elder Larrimore on his sick bed, from which he never rose again. He died on the 14th of July. There was a great and splendid funeral, as his relatives and friends were numerous.

His large property was left principally in the hands of his widow until her decease, after which it was to be divided among the three children. In February Mrs. Larrimore also died. The administrators upon the estate were John Green, Esq., and Benjamin Temple. My young master came back from Europe in delicate health. He way advised by his physicians to spend the winter in New-Orleans, whither he accordingly went, taking me with him. Here he became acquainted with a French lady of one of the first families in the city. The next winter he also spent in New-Orleans, and on his third visit, three years after his return from Europe, he was married to the lady above mentioned. In May he returned to Mt. Pleasant, and found the elder Larrimore on his sick bed, from which he never rose again. He died on the 14th of July. There was a great and splendid funeral, as his relatives and friends were numerous.

His large property was left principally in the hands of his widow until her decease, after which it was to be divided among the three children. In February Mrs. Larrimore also died. The administrators upon the estate were John Green, Esq., and Benjamin Temple.

My young mistresses, Jane and Elizabeth, were very kind to the servants. They seemed to feel under obligations to afford them every comfort and gratification, consistent with the dreadful relation of ownership which they sustained towards them. Whipping was scarcely known on the estate; and, whenever it did take place, it was invariably against the wishes of the young ladies.

But the wife of master George was of a disposition entirely the reverse. Feeble, languid, and inert, sitting motionless for hours at her window, or moving her small fingers over the strings of her guitar, to some soft and languishing air, she would have seemed to a stranger incapable of rousing herself from that indolent repose, in which mind as well as body participated. But, the slightest disregard of her commands--and sometimes even the neglect to anticipate her wishes, on the part of the servants; was sufficient to awake her. The inanimate and delicate beauty then changed into a stormy virago. Her black eyes flawed and sparkled with a snaky fierceness, her full lips compressed, and her brows bent and darkened. Her very voice, soft and sweet when speaking to her husband, and exquisitely fine and melodious, when accompanying her guitar, was at such times, shrill, keen, and loud. She would order the servants of my young mistresses upon her errands, and if they pleaded their prior duty to obey the calls of another, would demand that they should be forthwith whipped for their insolence. If the young ladies remonstrated with her, she met them with a perfect torrent of invective and abuse. In these paroxysms of fury she always spoke in French, with a vehemence and volubility, which strongly contrasted with the calmness and firmness of the young ladies. She would boast of what she had done in New-Orleans, and of the excellent discipline of her father's slaves. She said she had gone down in the night to the cell under her father's house, and whipped the slaves confined there with her own hands. I had heard the same thing from her father's servants at New-Orleans, when I was there with my master. She brought with her from New-Orleans a girl named Frances. I have seen her take her by the ear, lead her up to the side of the room, and beat her head against it. At other times she would snatch off her slipper and strike the girl on her face and head with it.

She seldom manifested her evil temper before master George. When she did, he was greatly troubled, and he used to speak to his sisters about it. Her manner towards him was almost invariably that of extreme fondness. She was dark complexioned, but very beautiful; and the smile of welcome with which she used to meet him was peculiarly fascinating. I did not marvel that _he_ loved her; while at the same time, in common with all the house servants, I regarded her as a being possessed with an evil spirit,--half woman, and half fiend.

Soon after the settlement of the estate, I heard my master speak of going out to Alabama. His wife had 1500 acres of wild land in Greene County in that State: and he had been negociating for 500 more. Early in the summer of 1833, he commenced making preparations for removing to that place a sufficient number of hands to cultivate it. He took great pains to buy up the wives and husbands of those of his own slaves who had married out of the estate, in order, as he said, that his hands might be contented in Alabama, and not need chaining together while on their journey. It is always found necessary by the regular slave-traders, in travelling with their slaves to the far South, to handcuff and chain their wretched victims, who have been bought up as the interest of the trader, and the luxury or necessities of the planter may chance to require, without regard to the ties sundered or the affections made desolate, by these infernal bargains. About the 1st of September, after the slaves destined for Alabama had taken a final farewell of their old home, and of the friends they were leaving behind, our party started on their long journey. There were in all 214 slaves, men, women and children. The men and women travelled on foot--the small children in the wagons, containing the baggage, &c. Previous to my departure, I visited my wife and children at Mr. Gatewood's. I took leave of them with the belief that I should return with my master, as soon as he had seen his hands established on his new plantation. I took my children in my arms and embraced them; my wife, who was a member of the Methodist church, implored the blessing of God upon me, during my absence, and I turned away to follow my master.

Our journey was a long and tedious one, especially to those who were compelled to walk the whole distance. My master rode in a sulky, and I, as his body servant, on horseback: When we crossed over the Roanoke, and were entering upon North Carolina, I remember with what sorrowful countenances and language the poor slaves looked back for the last time upon the land of their nativity. It was their last farewell to Old Virginia. We passed through Georgia, and crossing the Chattahoochee, entered Alabama. Our way for many days was through a sandy tract of country, covered with pine woods, with here and there the plantation of an Indian or a half-breed. After crossing what is called Line Creek, we found large plantations along the road, at intervals of four or five miles. The aspect of the whole country was wild and forbidding, save to the eye of a cotton-planter. The clearings were all new, and the houses rudely constructed of logs. The cotton fields, were skirted with an enormous growth of oak, pine, and other wood. Charred stumps stood thickly in the clearings, with here and there a large tree girdled by the axe and left to decay. We reached at last the place of our destination. It was a fine tract of land with a deep rich soil. We halted on a small knoll, where the tents were pitched, and the wagons unladen. I spent the night with my master at a neighboring plantation, which was under the care of an overseer named Flincher.

The next morning my master received a visit from a man named Huckstep, who had undertaken the management of his plantation as an overseer. He had been an overseer on cotton plantations many years in Georgia and North Carolina. He was apparently about forty years of age, with a sunburnt and sallow countenance. His thick shock of black hair was marked in several places with streaks of white, occasioned as he afterwards told me by blows received from slaves whom he was chastising.

After remaining in the vicinity for about a week, my master took me aside one morning--told me he was going to Selma in Dallas County, and wished me to be in readiness on his return the next day, to start for Virginia. This was to me cheering news. I spent that day and the next among my old fellow servants who had lived with me in Virginia. Some of them had messages to send by me to their friends and acquaintances. In the afternoon of the second day after my master's departure, I distributed, among them all the money which I had about me, viz., fifteen dollars. I noticed that the overseer Huckstep laughed at this and called me a fool: and that whenever I spoke of going home with my master, his countenance indicated something between a smile and a sneer.

Night came; but contrary to his promise, my master did not come. I still however expected him the next day. But another night came, and he had not returned. I grew uneasy, and inquired of Huckstep where be thought my master was.

"On his way to Old Virginia," said he, with a malicious laugh.

"But," said I. "Master George told me that he should come back and take me with him to Virginia."

"Well, boy," said the overseer, "I'll now tell ye what master George, as you call him, told me. You are to stay here and act as driver of the field hands. That was the order. So you may as well submit to it at once."

I stood silent and horror-struck. Could it be that the man whom I had served faithfully from our mutual boyhood, whose slightest wish had been my law, to serve whom I would have laid down my life, while I had confidence in his integrity--could it be that he had so cruelly and wickedly deceived me? I looked at the overseer. He stood laughing at me in my agony.

"Master George gave you no such orders," I exclaimed, maddened by the overseer's look and manner.

The overseer looked at me with a fiendish grin. "None of your insolence," said he, with a dreadful oath. "I never saw a Virginia nigger that I couldn't manage, proud as they are. Your master has left you in my hands, and you must obey my orders. If you don't, why I shall have to make you '_hug the widow there_,'" pointing to a tree, to which I afterwards found the slaves were tied when they were whipped.

That night was one of sleepless agony. Virginia--the hills and the streams of my birth-place; the kind and hospitable home; the gentle-hearted sisters, sweetening with their sympathy the sorrows of the slave--my wife--my children--all that had thus far made up my happiness, rose in contrast with my present condition. Deeply as he has wronged me, may my master himself never endure such a night of misery!

At daybreak, Huckstep told me to dress myself, and attend to his directions. I rose, subdued and wretched, and at his orders handed the horn to the headmen of the gang, who summoned the hands to the field. They were employed in clearing land for cultivation, cutting trees and burning. I was with them through the day, and at night returned once more to my lodgings to be laughed at by the overseer. He told me that I should do well, he did not doubt, by and by, but that a Virginia driver generally had to be whipped a few times himself before he could be taught to do justice to the slaves under his charge. They were not equal to those raised in North Carolina, for keeping the lazy hell-hounds, as he called the slaves, at work.

And this was my condition!--a driver set over more than one hundred and sixty of my kindred and friends, wish orders to apply the whip unsparingly to every one, whether man or woman, who faltered in the task, or was careless in the execution of it, myself subject at any moment to feel the accursed lash upon my own back, if feelings of humanity should perchance overcome the selfishness of misery, and induce me to spare and pity.

I lived in the same house with Huckstep,--a large log house, roughly finished; where we were waited upon by an old woman, whom we used to call aunt Polly. Huckstep was, I soon found, inordinately fond of peach brandy; and once or twice in the course of a month he had a drunken debauch, which usually lasted from two to four days. He was then full of talk, laughed immoderately at his own nonsense and would keep me up until late at night listening to him. He was at these periods terribly severe to his hands, and would order me to use up the cracker of my whip every day upon the poor creatures, who were toiling in the field, and in order to satisfy him, I used to tear it off when returning home at night. He would then praise me for a good fellow, and invite me to drink with him.

He used to tell me at such times, that if I would only drink as he did, I should be worth a thousand dollars more for it. He would sit hours with his peach brandy, cursing and swearing, laughing and telling stories full of obscenity and blasphemy. He would sometimes start up, take my whip, and rush out to the slave quarters, flourish it about and frighten the inmates and often cruelly beat them. He would order the women to pull up their clothes, in Alabama style, as he called it, and then whip them for not complying. He would then come back roaring and shouting to the house, and tell me what he had done; if I did not laugh with him, he would get angry and demand what the matter was. Oh! how often I have laughed, at such times, when my heart ached within me; and how often, when permitted to retire to my bed, have I found relief in tears!

He had no wife, but kept a colored mistress in a house situated on a gore of land between the plantation and that of Mr. Goldsby. He brought her with him from North Carolina, and had three children by her.

Sometimes in his fits of intoxication, he would come riding into the field, swinging his whip, and crying out to the hands to strip off their shirts, and be ready to take a whipping: and this too when they were all busily at work. At another time, he would gather the hands around him and fall to cursing and swearing about the neighboring overseers. They were, he said, cruel to their hands, whipped them unmercifully, and in addition starved them. As for himself, he was the kindest and best fellow within forty miles; and the hands ought to be thankful that they had such a good man for their overseer.

He would frequently be very familiar with me, and call me his child; he would tell me that our people were going to get Texas, a fine cotton country, and that he meant to go out there and have a plantation of his own, and I should go with him and be his overseer.

The houses in the "_negro quarters_" were constructed of logs, and from twelve to fifteen feet square; they had no glass, but there were holes to let in the light and air. The furniture consisted of a table, a few stools, and dishes made of wood, and an iron pot, and some other cooking utensils. The houses were placed about three or four rods apart, with a piece of ground attached to each of them for a garden, where the occupant could raise a few vegetables. The "quarters" were about three hundred yards from the dwelling of the overseer.

The hands were occupied in clearing land and burning brush, and in constructing their houses, through the winter. In March we commenced ploughing: and on the first of April began planting seed for cotton. The hoeing season commenced about the last of May. At the earliest dawn of day, and frequently before that time, the laborers were roused from their sleep by the blowing of the horn. It was blown by the headman of the gang who led the rest in the work and acted under my direction, as my assistant.

Previous to the blowing of the horn the hands generally rose and eat what was called the "morning's bit," consisting of ham and bread. If exhaustion and fatigue prevented their rising before the dreaded sound of the horn broke upon their slumbers, they had no time to snatch a mouthful, but were harried out at once.

It was my business to give over to each of the hands his or her appropriate implement of labor, from the toolhouse where they were deposited at night. After all had been supplied, they were taken to the field, and set at work as soon as it was sufficiently light to distinguish the plants from the grass and weeds. I was employed in passing from row to row, in order to see that the work was well done, and to urge forward the laborers. At 12 o'clock, the horn was blown from the overseer's house, calling the hands to dinner, each to his own cabin. The intermission of labor was one hour and a half to hoers and pickers, and two hours to the ploughmen. At the expiration of this interval, the horn again summoned them to thus labor. They were kept in the field until dark, when they were called home to supper.

There was little leisure for any of the hands on the plantation. In the evenings, after it was too dark for work in the field, the men were frequently employed in burning brush and in other labors until late at night. The women after toiling in the field by day, were compelled to card, spin, and weave cotton for their clothing, in the evening. Even on Sundays there was little or no respite from toil. Those who had not been able to work out all their tasks during the week were allowed by the overseer to finish it on the Sabbath, and thus save themselves from a whipping on Monday morning. Those whose tasks were finished frequently employed most of that day in cultivating their gardens.

Many of the female hands were delicate young women, who in Virginia had never been accustomed to field labor. They suffered greatly from the extreme heat and the severity of the toil. Oh! how often have I seen them dragging their weary limbs from the cotton field at nightfall, faint and exhausted. The overseer used to laugh at their sufferings. They were, he said, Virginia ladies, and altogether too delicate for Alabama use: but they must be made to do their tasks notwithstanding. The recollection of these things even now is dreadful. I used to tell the poor creatures, when compelled by the overseer to urge them forward with the whip, that I would much rather take their places, and endure the stripes than inflict them.

When but three months old, the children born on the estate were given up to the care of the old women who were not able to work out of doors. Their mothers were kept at work in the field.

It was the object of the overseer to separate me in feeling and interest as widely as possible from my suffering brethren and sisters. I had relations among the field hands, and used to call them my cousins. He forbid my doing so; and told me if I acknowledged relationship with any of the hands I should be flogged for it. He used to speak of them as devils and hell-hounds, and ridicule them in every possible way; and endeavoured to make me speak of them and regard them in the same manner. He would tell long stories about hunting and shooting "runaway niggers," and detail with great apparent satisfaction the cruel and horrid punishments which he had inflicted. One thing he said troubled him. He had once whipped a slave so severely that he died in consequence of it, and it was soon after ascertained that he was wholly innocent of the offence charged against him. That slave, he said, had haunted him ever since.

Soon after we commenced weeding our cotton, some of the hands who were threatened with a whipping for not finishing their tasks, ran away. The overseer and myself went out after them, taking with us five bloodhounds, which were kept on the Estate for the sole purpose of catching runaways. There were no other hounds in the vicinity, and the overseers of the neighboring plantations used to borrow them to hunt their runaways. A Mr. Crop, who lived about ten miles distant, had two packs, and made it his sole business to catch slaves with them. We used to set the dogs upon the track of the fugitives, and they would follow them until, to save themselves from being torn in pieces, they would climb into a tree, where the dogs kept them until we came up and secured them.

These hounds, when young, are taught to run after the negro boys; and being always kept confined except when let out in pursuit of runaways, they seldom fail of overtaking the fugitive, and seem to enjoy the sport of hunting men as much as other dogs do that of chasing a fox or a deer. My master gave a large sum for his five dogs,--a slut and her four puppies.

While going over our cotton picking for the last time, one of our hands named Little John, ran away. The next evening the dogs were started on his track. We followed them awhile, until we knew by their ceasing to bark that they had found him. We soon met the dogs returning. Their jaws, heads, and feet, were bloody. The overseer looked at them and said, "he was afraid the dogs had killed the nigger." It being dark, we could not find him that night. Early the next morning, we started off with our neighbors, Sturtivant and Flincher; and after searching about for some time, we found the body of Little John lying in the midst of a thicket of cane. It was nearly naked, and dreadfully mangled and gashed by the teeth of the dogs. They had evidently dragged it some yards through the thicket: blood, tatters of clothes, and even the entrails of the unfortunate man, were clinging to the stubs of the old and broken cane. Huckstep stooped over his saddle, looked at the body, and muttered an oath. Sturtivant swore it was no more than the fellow deserved. We dug a hole in the cane-brake, where he lay, buried him, and returned home.

The murdered young man had a mother and two sisters on the plantation, by whom he was dearly loved. When I told the old woman of what had befallen her son, she only said that it was better for poor John than to live in slavery.

Late in the fall of this year, a young man, who had already run away several times, was missing from his task. It was four days before we found him. The dogs drove him at last up a tree, where he was caught, and brought home. He was then fastened down to the ground by means of forked sticks of wood selected for the purpose, the longest fork being driven into the ground until the other closed down upon the neck, ancles, and wrists. The overseer then sent for two large cats belonging to the house. These he placed upon the naked shoulders of his victim, and dragged them suddenly by their tails downward. At first they did not scratch deeply. He then ordered me to strike them with a small stick after he had placed them once more upon the back of the sufferer. I did so; and the enraged animals extended their claws, and tore his back deeply and cruelly as they were dragged along it. He was then whipped and placed in the stocks, where he was kept for three days. On the third morning as I passed the stocks, I stopped to look at him. His head hung down over the chain which supported his neck. I spoke, but he did not answer. _He was dead in the stocks_! The overseer on seeing him seemed surprised, and, I thought, manifested some remorse. Four of the field hands took him out of the stocks and buried him: and every thing went on as usual.

It is not in my power to give a narrative of the daily occurrences on the plantation. The history of one day was that of all. The gloomy monotony of our slavery, was only broken by the overseer's periodical fits of drunkenness, at which times neither life nor limb on the estate were secure from his caprice or violence.

In the spring of 1835, the overseer brought me a letter from my wife, written for her by her young mistress, Mr. Gateweed's daughter. He read it to me: it stated that herself and children were well--spoke of her sad and heavy disappointment in consequence of my not returning with my master; and of her having been told by him that I should come back the next fall.

Hope for a moment lightened my heart; and I indulged the idea of once more returning to the bosom of my family. But I recollected that my master had already cruelly deceived me; and despair again took hold on me.

Among our hands was one whom we used to call Big Harry. He was a stout, athletic man--very intelligent, and an excellent workman; but he was of a high and proud spirit, which the weary and crushing weight of a life of slavery had not been able to subdue. On almost every plantation at the South you may find one or more individuals, whose look and air show that they have preserved their self-respect as _men_;--that with them the power of the tyrant ends with the coercion of the body--that the soul is free, and the inner man retaining the original uprightness of the image of God. You may know them by the stern sobriety of their countenances, and the contempt with which they regard the jests and pastimes of their miserable and degraded companions, who, like Samson, make sport for the keepers of their prison-house. These men are always feared as well as hated by their task-masters. Harry had never been whipped, and had always said that he would die rather than submit to it. He made no secret of his detestation of the overseer. While most of the slaves took off their hats, with cowering submission, in his presence, Harry always refused to do so. He never spoke to him except in a brief answer to his questions. Master George, who knew, and dreaded the indomitable spirit of the man, told the overseer, before he left the plantation, to beware how he attempted to punish him. But, the habits of tyranny in which Huckstep had so long indulged, had accustomed him to abject submission, on the part of his subjects; and he could not endure this upright and unbroken manliness. He used frequently to curse and swear about him, and devise plans for punishing him on account of his impudence as he called it.

A pretext was at last afforded him. Sometime in August of this year, there was a large quantity of yellow unpicked cotton lying in the gin house. Harry was employed at night in removing the cotton see, which has been thrown out by the gin. The rest of the male hands were engaged during the day in weeding the cotton for the last time, and in the nigh, in burning brush on the new lands clearing for the next year's crop. Harry was told one evening to go with the others and assist in burning the brush. He accordingly went and the next night a double quantity of seed had accumulated in the gin house: and although he worked until nearly 2 o'clock in the morning, he could not remove it all.

The next morning the overseer came into the field, and demanded of me why I had not whipped Harry for not removing all the cotton seed. He then called aloud to Harry to come forward and be whipped. Harry answered somewhat sternly that he would neither be struck by overseer nor driver; that he had worked nearly all night, and had scarcely fallen asleep when the horn blew to summon him to his toil in the field. The overseer raved and threatened, but Harry paid no farther attention to him. He then turned to me and asked me for my pistols, with a pair of which he had furnished me. I told him they were not with me. He growled an oath, threw himself on his horse and left us. In the evening I found him half drunk and raving like a madman. He said he would no longer bear with that nigger's insolence; but would whip him if it cost him his life. He at length fixed upon a plan for seizing him; and told me that he would go out in the morning, ride along by the side of Harry and talk pleasantly to him, and then, while Harry was attending to him, I was to steal upon him and knock him down, by a blow on the head, from the loaded and heavy handle of my whip. I was compelled to promise to obey his directions.

The next morning when we got to the field I told Harry of the overseer's plan, and advised him by all means to be on his guard and watch my motions. His eye glistened with gratitude. "Thank you James", said he, "I'll take care that you don't touch me."

Huckstep came into the field about 10 o'clock. He rode along by the side of Harry talking and laughing. I was walking on the other side. When I saw that Harry's eye was upon me I aimed a blow at him intending however to miss him. He evaded the blow and turned fiercely round with his hoe uplifted, threatening to cut down any one who again attempted to strike him. Huckstep cursed my awkwardness, and told Harry to put down his hoe and came to him. He refused to do so and swore he would kill the first man who tried to lay hands on him. The cowardly tyrant shrank away from his enraged bondman, and for two weeks Harry was not again molested.

About the first of September, the overseer had one of his drunken fits. He made the house literally an earthly hell. He urged me to drink, quarrelled and swore at me for declining, and chased the old woman round the house, with his bottle of peach brandy. He then told me that Harry had forgotten the attempt to seize him, and that is the morning we must try our old game over again.

On the following morning, as I was handing to each of the hands their hoes from the tool house, I caught Harry's eye. "Look out," said I to him. "Huckstep will be after you again to day." He uttered a deep curse against the overseer and passed on to his work. After breakfast Huckstep came riding out to the cotton field. He tied his horse to a tree, and came towards us. His sallow and haggard countenance was flushed, and his step unsteady. He came up by the side of Harry and began talking about the crops and the weather; I came at the same time on the other side, and in striking at him, beat off his hat. He sprang aside and stepped backwards. Huckstep with a dreadful oath commanded him to stop, saying that he had determined to whip him, and neither earth nor hell should prevent him. Harry defied him: and said he had always done the work allotted to him and that was enough: he would sooner die than have the accursed lash touch him. The overseer staggered to his horse, mounted him and rode furiously to the house, and soon made his appearance, returning, with his gun in his hand.

"Yonder comes the devil!" said one of the women whose row was near Harry's.

"Yes," said another, "He's trying to scare Harry with his gun."

"Let him try as he pleases," said Harry, in his low, deep, determined tones, "He may shoot me, but he can't whip me."

Huckstep came swearing on: when within a few yards of Harry he stopped, looked at him with a stare of mingled rage and drunken imbecility; and bid him throw down his hoe and come forward. The undaunted slave refused to comply, and continuing his work told the drunken demon to shoot if he pleased. Huckstep advanced within a few steps of him when Harry raised his hoe and told him to stand back. He stepped back a few paces, leveled his gun and fired. Harry received the charge in his breast, and fell instantly across a cotton row. He threw up his hands wildly, and groaned, "Oh, Lord!"

The hands instantly dropped their hoes. The women shrieked aloud. For my own part I stood silent with horror. The cries of the women enraged the overseer, he dropped his gun, and snatching the whip from my hand, with horrid oaths, and imprecations fell to whipping them, laying about him like a maniac. Upon Harry's sister he bestowed his blows without mercy, commanding her to quit her screaming and go to work. The poor girl, whose brother had thus been murdered before her eyes, could not wrestle down the awful agony of her feelings, and the brutal tormentor left her without effecting his object. He then, without going to look of his victim, told four of the hands to carry him to the house, and taking up his gun left the field. When we got to the poor fellow, he was alive, and groaning faintly. The hands took him up, but before they reached the house he was dead. Huckstep came out, and looked at him, and finding him dead, ordered the hands to bury him. The burial of a slave in Alabama is that of a brute. No coffin--no decent shroud--no prayer. A hole is dug, and the body (sometimes enclosed in a rude box,) is thrown in without further ceremony.

From this time the overseer was regarded by the whole gang with detestation and fear--as a being to whose rage and cruelty there were no limits. Yet he was constantly telling us that he was the kindest of overseers--that he was formerly somewhat severe in managing his hands, but that now he was, if any thing, too indulgent. Indeed he had the reputation of being a good overseer, and an excellent manager, when sober. The slaves on some of the neighboring plantations were certainly worse clothed and fed, and more frequently and cruelly whipped than ours. Whenever the saw them they complained of over working and short feeding. One of Flincher's, and one of Sturtivant's hands ran away, while I was in Alabama: and after remaining in the woods awhile, and despairing of being able to effect their escape, resolved to put an end to their existence and their slavery together. Each twisted himself a vine of the muscadine grape, and fastened one end around the limb of an oak, and made a noose in the other. Jacob, Flincher's man, swung himself off first, and expired after a long struggle. The other, horrified by the contortions and agony of his comrade, dropped his noose, and was retaken. When discovered, two or three days afterwards, the body of Jacob was dreadfully torn and mangled, by the buzzards, those winged hyenas and goules of the Southwest.

Among the slaves who were brought from Virginia, were two young and bright mulatto women, who were always understood throughout the plantation to have been the daughters of the elder Larrimore, by one of his slaves. One was named Sarah and the other Hannah. Sarah, being in a state of pregnancy, failed of executing her daily allotted task of hoeing cotton. I was ordered to whip her, and on my remonstrating with the overseer, and representing the condition of the woman, I was told that my business was to obey orders, and that if I was told "to whip a dead nigger I must do it." I accordingly gave her fifty lashes. This was on Thursday evening. On Friday she also failed through weakness, and was compelled to lie down in the field. That night the overseer himself whipped her. On Saturday the wretched woman dragged herself once more to the cotton field. In the burning sun, and in a situation which would have called forth pity in the bosom of any one save a cotton-growing overseer, she struggled to finish her task. She failed--nature could do no more--and sick and despairing, she sought her cabin. There the overseer met her and inflicted fifty more lashes upon her already lacerated back.

The next morning was the Sabbath. It brought no joy to that suffering woman. Instead of the tones of the church bell summoning to the house of prayer, she heard the dreadful sound of the lash falling upon the backs of her brethren and sisters in bondage. For the voice of prayer she heard curses. For the songs of Zion obscene and hateful blasphemies. No bible was there with its consolations for the sick of heart. Faint and fevered, scarred and smarting from the effects of her cruel punishment, she lay upon her pallet of moss--dreading the coming of her relentless persecutor,--who, in the madness of one of his periodical fits of drunkenness, was now swearing and cursing through the quarters.

Some of the poor woman's friends on the evening before, had attempted to relieve her of the task which had been assigned her, but exhausted nature, and the selfishness induced by their own miserable situation, did not permit them to finish it and the overseer, on examination, found that the week's work of the woman, was still deficient. After breakfast, he ordered her to be tied up to the limb of a tree, by means of a rope fastened round her wrists, so as to leave her feet about six inches from the ground. She begged him to let her down for she was very sick.

"Very well!" he exclaimed with a sneer and a laugh,--"I shall bleed you then, and take out some of your Virginia blood. You are too proud a miss for Alabama."

He struck her a few blows. Swinging thus by her arms, she succeeded in placing one of her feet against the body of the tree, and thus partly supported herself, and relieved in some degree the painful weight upon her wrists. He threw down his whip--took a rail from the garden fence, ordered her feet to be tied together, and thrust the rail between them. He then ordered one of the hands to sit upon it. Her back at this time was bare, but the strings of the only garment which she wore passed over her shoulders and prevented the full force of the whip from acting on her flesh. These he cut off with his pen-knife, and thus left her entirely naked. He struck her only two blows, for the second one cut open her side and abdomen with a frightful gash. Unable to look on any longer in silence, I entreated him to stop, as I feared he had killed her. The overseer looked at the wound--dropped his whip, and ordered her to be untied. She was carried into the house in a state of insensibility, and died in three days after.

During the whole season of picking cotton, the whip was frequently and severely plied. In his seasons of intoxication, the overseer made no distinction between the stout man and the feeble and delicate woman--the sick and the well. Women in a far advanced state of pregnancy were driven out to the cotton field. At other times he seemed to have some consideration; and to manifest something like humanity. Our hands did not suffer for food--they had a good supply of ham and corn-meal, while on Flincher's plantation the slaves had meat but once a year, at Christmas.

Near the commencement of the weeding season of 1835, I was ordered to whip a young woman, a light mustee, for not performing her task. I told the overseer that she was sick. He said he did not care for that, she should be made to work. A day or two afterwards, I found him in the house half intoxicated. He demanded of me why I had not whipped the girl; and I gave the same reason as before. He flew into a dreadful rage, but his miserable situation made him an object of contempt rather than fear. He sat shaking his fist at me, and swearing for nearly half an hour. He said he would teach the Virginia lady to sham sickness; and that the only reason I did not whip her was, that she was a white woman, and I did not like to cut up her delicate skin. Some time after I was ordered to give two of our women, named Hannah and big Sarah, 150 lashes each, for not performing their tasks. The overseer stood by until he saw Hannah whipped, and until Sarah had been tied up to the tree. As soon as his back was turned I struck the tree instead of the woman, who understanding my object, shrieked as if the whip at every blow was cutting into her flesh. The overseer heard the blows and the woman's cries, and supposing that all was going on according to his mind, left the field. Unfortunately the husband of Hannah stood looking on; and indignant that his wife should be whipped and Sarah spared, determined to revenge himself by informing against me.

Next morning Huckstep demanded of me whether I had whipped Sarah the day before; I replied in the affirmative. Upon this he called Sarah forward and made her show her back, which bore no traces of recent whipping. He then turned upon me and told me that the blows intended for Sarah should be laid on my back. That night the overseer, with the help of three of the hands, tied me up to a large tree--my arms and legs being clasped round it, and my body drawn up hard against it by two men pulling at my arms and one pushing against my back. The agony occasioned by this alone was almost intolerable. I felt a sense of painful suffocation, and could scarcely catch my breath.

A moment after I felt the first blow of the overseer's whip across my shoulders. It seemed to cut into my very heart. I felt the blood gush, and run down my back. I fainted at length under the torture, and on being taken down, my shoes contained blood which ran from the gashes in my back. The skin was worn off from by breast, arms, and thighs, against the rough bark of the tree. I was sick and feverish, and in great pain for three weeks afterwards; most of which time I was obliged to lie with my face downwards, in consequence of the extreme soreness of my sides and back, Huckstep himself seemed concerned about me, and would come frequently to see me, and tell me that he should not have touched me had it not been for "the cursed peach brandy."

Almost the first person that I was compelled to whip after I recovered, was the man who pushed at my back when I was tied up to the tree. The hands who were looking on at that time, all thought he pushed me much harder than was necessary: and they expected that I would retaliate upon him the injury I had received. After he was tied up, the overseer told me to give him a severe flogging, and left me. I struck the tree instead of the man. His wife, who was looking on, almost overwhelmed me with her gratitude.

At length one morning, late in the fall of 1835, I saw Huckstep, and a gentleman ride out to the field. As they approached, I saw the latter was my master. The hands all ceased their labor, and crowded around him, inquiring about old Virginia. For my own part, I could not hasten to greet him. He had too cruelly deceived me. He at length came towards me, and seemed somewhat embarrassed. "Well James," said he, "how do you stand it here?" "Badly enough," I replied. "I had no thought that you could be so cruel as to go away and leave me as you did." "Well, well, it was too bad, but it could not be helped--you must blame Huckstep for it." "But," said I, "I was not his servant; I belonged to you, and you could do as you pleased." "Well," said he, "we will talk about that by and by." He then inquired of Huckstep where big Sarah was. "She was sick and died," was the answer. He looked round amoung the slaves again, and inquired for Harry. The overseer told him that Harry undertook to kill him, and that, to save his life, he was obliged to fire upon him, and that he died of the wound. After some further inquiries, he requested me to go into the house with him. He then asked me to tell him how things had been managed during his absence. I gave him a full account of the overseer's cruelty. When he heard of the manner of Harry's death, he seemed much affected and shed tears. He was a favorite servant of his father's. I showed him the deep scars on my back occasioned by the whipping I had received. He was, or professed to be, highly indignant with Huckstep; and said he would see to it that he did not lay hands on me again. He told me he should be glad to take me with him to Virginia, but he did not know where he should find a driver who would be so kind to the hands as I was. If I would stay ten years, he would give me a thousand dollars, and a piece of land to plant on my own account. "But," said I, "my wife and children." "Well," said he, "I will do my best to purchase them, and send them on to you." I now saw that my destiny was fixed: and that I was to spend my days in Alabama, and I retired to my bed that evening with a heavy heart.

My master staid only three or four days on the plantation. Before he left, he cautioned Huckstep to be careful and not strike me again, as he would on no account permit it. He told him to give the hands food enough, and not over-work them, and, having thus satisfied his conscience, left us to our fate.

Out of the two hundred and fourteen slaves who were brought out from Virginia, at least one-third of them were members of the Methodist and Baptist churches in that State. Of this number five or six could read. Then had been torn away from the care and discipline of their respective churches, and from the means of instruction, but they retained their love for the exercises of religion; and felt a mournful pleasure in speaking of the privileges and spiritual blessings which they enjoyed in Old Virginia. Three of them had been preachers, or exhorters, viz. Solomon, usually called Uncle Solomon, Richard and David. Uncle Solomon was a grave, elderly man, mild and forgiving in his temper, and greatly esteemed among the more serious portion of our hands. He used to snatch every occasion to talk to the lewd and vicious about the concerns of their souls, and to advise them to fix their minds upon the Savior, as their only helper. Some I have heard curse and swear in answer, and others would say that they could not keep their minds upon God and the devil (meaning Huckstep) at the same time: that it was of no use to try to be religious--they had no time--that the overseer wouldn't let them meet to pray--and that even Uncle Solomon, when he prayed, had to keep one eye open all the time, to see if Huckstep was coming. Uncle Solomon could both read and write, and had brought out with him from Virginia a Bible, a hymn-book, and some other religious books, which he carefully concealed from the overseer, Huckstep was himself an open infidel as well as blasphemer. He used to tell the hands that there was no hell hereafter for white people, but that they had their punishment on earth in being obliged to take care of the negroes. As for the blacks, he was sure there was a hell for them. He used frequently to sit with his bottle by his side, and a Bible in his hand; and read passages and comment on them, and pronounce them lies. Any thing like religious feeling among the slaves irritated him. He said that so much praying and singing prevented the people from doing their tasks, as it kept them up nights, when they should be asleep. He used to mock, and in every possible way interrupt the poor slaves, who after the toil of the day, knelt in their lowly cabins to offer their prayers and supplications to Him whose ear is open to the sorrowful sighing of the prisoner, and who hath promised in His own time to come down and deliver. In his drunken seasons he would make excursions at night through the slave-quarters, enter the cabins, and frighten the inmates, especially if engaged in prayer or singing. On one of these occasions he came back rubbing his hands and laughing. He said he had found Uncle Solomon in his garden, down on his knees, praying like an old owl, and had tipped him over, and frightened him half out of his wits. At another time he found Uncle David sitting on his stool with his face thrust up the chimney, in order that his voice might not be heard by his brutal persecutor. He was praying, giving utterance to these words, probably in reference to his bondage:--"_How long, oh, Lord, how long_?" "As long as my whip!" cried the overseer, who had stolen behind him, giving him a blow. It was the sport of a demon.

Not long after my master had left us, the overseer ascertained for the first time that some of the hands could read, and that they had brought books with them from Virginia. He compelled them to give up the keys of their chests, and on searching found several Bibles and hymn-books. Uncle Solomon's chest contained quite a library, which he could read at night by the light of knots of the pitchpine. These books he collected together, and in the evening called Uncle Solomon into the house. After jeering him for some time, he gave him one of the Bibles and told him to name his text and preach him a sermon. The old man was silent. He then made him get up on the table, and ordered him to pray. Uncle Solomon meekly replied, that "forced prayer was not good for soul or body." The overseer then knelt down himself, and in a blasphemous manner, prayed that the Lord would send his spirit into Uncle Solomon; or else let the old man fall from the table and break his neck, and so have an end of "nigger preaching." On getting up from his knees he went to the cupboard, poured out a glass of brandy for himself, and brought another to the table. "James," said he, addressing me, "Uncle Solomon stands there, for all the world, like a Hickory Quaker. His spirit don't move. I'll see if another spirit wont move it." He compelled the old preacher to swallow the brandy; and then told him to preach and exhort, for the spirit was in him. He set one of the Bibles on fire, and after it was consumed, mixed up the ashes of it in a glass of water, and compelled the old man to drink it, telling him that as the spirit and the word were now both in him, there was no longer any excuse for not preaching. After tormenting the wearied old man in this way until nearly midnight he permitted him to go to his quarters.

The next day I saw Uncle Solomon, and talked with him about his treatment. He said it would not always be so--that slavery was to come to an end, for the Bible said so--that there would then be no more whippings and fightings, but the lion the lamb would lie down together, and all would be love. He said he prayed for Huckstep--that it was not he but the devil in him who behaved so. At his request, I found means to get him a Bible and a hymn-book from the overseer's room; and the old man ever afterwards kept them concealed in the hen-house.

The weeding season of 1836, was marked by repeated acts of cruelty on the part of Huckstep. One of the hands, Priscilla, was, owing to her delicate situation, unable to perform her daily task. He ordered her to be tied up against a tree, in the same manner that I had been. In this situation she was whipped until _she was delivered of a dead infant, at the foot of the tree_! Our men took her upon a sheet, and carried her to the house, where she lay sick for several months, but finally recovered. I have heard him repeatedly laugh at the circumstance.

Not long after this, we were surprised, one morning about ten o'clock, by hearing the horn blown at the house. Presently Aunt Polly came screaming into the field. "What is the matter, Aunty?" I inquired. "Oh Lor!" said she, "Old Huckstep's pitched off his horse and broke his head, and is e'en about dead."

"Thank God!" said little Simon, "The devil will have him at last."

"God-a-mighty be praised!" exclaimed half a dozen others.

The hands, with one accord dropped their hoes; and crowded round the old woman, asking questions. "Is he dead?"--"Will he die?" "Did you feel of him--was he cold?"

Aunt Polly explained as well as she could, that Huckstep, in a state of partial intoxication, had attempted to leap his horse over a fence, had fallen and cut a deep gash in his head, and that he was now lying insensible.

It is impossible to describe the effect produced by this news among the hands. Men, women and children shouted, clapped their hands, and laughed aloud. Some cursed the overseer, and others thanked the Lord for taking him away. Little Simon got down on his knees, and called loudly upon God to finish his work, and never let the overseer again enter a cotton field. "Let him die, Lord," said he, "let him. He's killed enough of us: Oh, good Lord, let him die and not live."

"Peace, peace! it is a bad spirit," said Uncle Solomon, "God himself willeth not the death of a sinner."

I followed the old woman to the house; and found Huckstep at the foot of one of those trees, so common at the South, called the Pride of China. His face was black, and there was a frightful contusion on the side of his head. He was carried into the house, where, on my bleeding him, he revived. He lay in great pain for several days, and it was nearly three weeks before he was able to come out to the cotton fields.

On returning to the field after Huckstep had revived, I found the hands sadly disappointed to hear that he was still living. Some of them fell to cursing and swearing, and were enraged with me for trying to save his life. Little Simon said I was a fool; if he had bled him he would have done it to some purpose. He would at least, have so disable his arm that he would never again try to swing a whip. Uncle Solomon remonstrated with Simon, and told that I had done right.

The neighbouring overseers used frequently to visit Huckstep, and he, in turn, visited them. I was sometimes present during their interviews, and heard them tell each other stories of horse-racing, negro-huntings, &c. Some time during this season, Ludlow, who was overseer of a plantation about eight miles from ours, told of a slave of his named Thornton, who had twice attempted to escape with his wife and one child. The first time he was caught without much difficulty, chained to the overseer's horse, and in that way brought back. The poor man, to save his wife from a beating, laid all the blame upon himself; and said that his wife had no wish to escape, and tried to prevent him from attempting it. He was severely whipped; but soon ran away again, and was again arrested. The overseer, Ludlow, said he was determined to put a stop to the runaway, and accordingly had resort to a somewhat unusual method of punishment.

There is a great scarcity of good water in that section of Alabama; and you will generally see a large cistern attached to the corners of the houses to catch water for washing &c. Underneath this cistern is frequently a tank from eight to ten feet deep, into which, when the former is full the water is permitted to run. From this tank the water is pumped out for use. Into one of these tanks the unfortunate slave was placed, and confined by one of his ancles to the bottom of it; and the water was suffered to flow in from above. He was compelled to pump out the water as fast as it came in, by means of a long rod or handle connected with the pump above ground. He was not allowed to begin until the water had risen to his middle. Any pause or delay after this, from weakness and exhaustion, would have been fatal, as the water would have risen above his head. In this horrible dungeon, toiling for his life, he was kept for twenty-four hours without any sustenance. Even Huckstep said that this was too bad--that he had himself formerly punished runaways in that way--but should not do it again.

I rejoice to be able to say that this sufferer has at last escaped with his wife and child, into a free state. He was assisted by some white men, but I do not know all the particulars of his escape.

Our overseer had not been long able to ride about the plantation after his accident, before his life was again endangered. He found two of the hands, Little Jarret and Simon, fighting with each other, and attempted to chastise both of them. Jarret bore it patiently, but Simon turned upon him, seized a stake or pin from a cart near by, and felled him to the ground. The overseer got up--went to the house, and told aunt Polly that he had nearly been killed by the 'niggers,' and requested her to tie up his head, from which the blood was streaming. As soon as this was done, he took down his gun, and went out in pursuit of Simon, who had fled to his cabin, to get some things which he supposed necessary previous to attempting his escape from the plantation. He was just stepping out of the door when he met the enraged overseer with his gun in his hand. Not a word was spoken by either. Huckstep raised his gun and fired. The man fell without a groan across the door-sill. He rose up twice on his hands and knees, but died in a few minutes. He was dragged off and buried. The overseer told me that there was no other way to deal with such a fellow. It was Alabama law, if a slave resisted to shoot him at once. He told me of a case which occurred in 1834, on a plantation about ten miles distant, and adjoining that where Crop, the negro hunter, boarded with his hounds. The overseer had bought some slaves at Selma, from a drove or coffle passing through the place. They proved very refractory. He whipped three of them, and undertook to whip a fourth who was from Maryland. The man raised his hoe in a threatening manner, and the overseer fired upon him. The slave fell, but instantly rose up on his hands and knees, and was beaten down again by the stock of the overseer's gun. The wounded wretch raised himself once more, drew a knife from the waistband of his pantaloons, and catching hold of the overseer's coat, raised himself high enough to inflict a fatal wound upon the latter. Both fell together, and died immediately after.

Nothing more of special importance occurred until July, of last year, when one of our men named John, was whipped three times for not performing his task. On the last day of the month, after his third whipping, he ran away. On the following morning, I found that he was missing at his row. The overseer said we must hunt him up; and he blew the "nigger horn," as it is called, for the dogs. This horn was only used when we went out in pursuit of fugitives. It is a cow's horn, and makes a short, loud sound. We crossed Flincher's and Goldsby's plantations, as the dogs had got upon John's track, and went of barking in that direction, and the two overseers joined us in the chase. The dogs soon caught sight of the runaway, and compelled him to climb a tree. We came up; Huckstep ordered him down, and secured him upon my horse by tying him to my back. On reaching home he was stripped entirely naked and lashed up to a tree. Flincher then volunteered to whip him on one side of his legs, and Goldsby on the other. I had, in the meantime, been ordered to prepare a wash of salt and pepper, and wash his wounds with it. The poor fellow groaned, and his flesh shrunk and quivered as the burning solution was applied to it. This wash, while it adds to the immediate torment of the sufferer, facilitates the cure of the wounded parts. Huckstep then whipped him from his neck down to his thighs, making the cuts lengthwise of his back. He was very expert with the whip, and could strike, at any time, within an inch of his mark. He then gave the whip to me and told me to strike directly across his back. When I had finished, the miserable sufferer, from his neck to his heel, was covered with blood and bruises. Goldsby and Flincher now turned to Huckstep, and told him, that I deserved a whipping as much as John did: that they had known me frequently disobey his orders, and that I was partial to the "Virginia ladies," and didn't whip them as I did the men. They said if I was a driver of theirs they would know what to do with me. Huckstep agreed with them; and after directing me to go to the house and prepare more of the wash for John's back, he called after me with an oath, to see to it that I had some for myself, for he meant to give me, at least, two hundred and fifty lashes. I returned to the house, and scarcely conscious of what I was doing, filled an iron vessel with water, put in the salt and pepper; and placed it over the embers.

As I stood by the fire watching the boiling of the mixture, and reflecting upon the dreadful torture to which I was about to he subjected, the thought of _escape_ flashed upon my mind. The chance was a desperate one; but I resolved to attempt it. I ran up stairs, tied my shirt in a handkerchief, and stepped out of the back door of the house, telling Aunt Polly to take care of the wash at the fire until I returned. The sun was about one hour high, but luckily for me the hands as well as the three overseers, were on the other side of the house. I kept the house between them and myself, and ran as fast as I could for the woods. On reaching them I found myself obliged to proceed slowly as there was a thick undergrowth of cane and reeds. Night came on. I straggled forward by a dim star-light, amidst vines and reed beds. About midnight the horizon began to be overcast; and the darkness increased until in the thick forest, I could scarcely see a yard before me. Fearing that I might lose my way and wander towards the plantation, instead of from it, I resolved to wait until day. I laid down upon a little hillock, and fell asleep.

When I awoke it was broad day. The clouds had vanished, and the hot sunshine fell through the trees upon my face. I started up, realizing my situation, and darted onward. My object was to reach the great road by which we had travelled when we came out from Virginia. I had, however, very little hope of escape. I knew that a hot pursuit would be made after me, and what I most dreaded was, that the overseer would procure Crop's bloodhounds to follow my track. If only the hounds of our plantation were sent after me, I had hopes of being able to make friends of them, as they were always good-natured and obedient to me. I travelled until, as near as I could judge, about ten o'clock, when a distant sound startled me. I stopped and listened. It was the deep bay of the bloodhound, apparently at a great distance. I hurried on until I came to a creek about fifteen yards wide, skirted by an almost impenetrable growth of reeds and cane. Plunging into it, I swam across and ran down by the side of it a short distance, and, in order to baffle the dogs, swam back to the other side again. I stopped in the reed-bed and listened. The dogs seemed close at hand, and by the loud barking I felt persuaded that Crop's hounds were with them. I thought of the fate of Little John, who had been torn in pieces by the hounds, and of the scarcely less dreadful condition of those who had escaped the dogs only to fall into the hands of the overseer. The yell of the dogs grew louder. Escape seemed impossible. I ran down to the creek with a determination to drown myself. I plunged into the water and went down to the bottom; but the dreadful strangling sensation compelled me to struggle up to the surface. Again I heard the yell of the bloodhounds; and again desperately plunged down into the water. As I went down I opened my mouth, and, choked and gasping, I found myself once more struggling upward. As I rose to the top of the water and caught a glimpse of the sunshine and the trees, the love of life revived in me. I swam to the other side of the creek, and forced my way through the reeds to a large tree, and stood under one of its lowest limbs, ready in case of necessity, to spring up into it. Here panting and exhausted, I stood waiting for the dogs. The woods seemed full of them. I heard a bell tinkle, and, a moment after, our old hound Venus came bounding through the cane, dripping wet from the creek. As the old hound came towards me, I called to her as I used to do when out hunting with her. She stopped suddenly, looked up at me, and then came wagging her tail and fawning around me. A moment after the other dog came up hot in the chase, and with their noses to the ground. I called to them, but they did not look up, but came yelling on. I was just about to spring into the tree to avoid them when Venus the old hound met them, and stopped them. They then all came fawning and playing and jumping about me. The very creatures whom a moment before I had feared would tear me limb from limb, were now leaping and licking my hands, and rolling on the leaves around me. I listened awhile in the fear of hearing the voices of men following the dogs, but there was no sound in the forest save the gurgling of the sluggish waters of the creek, and the chirp of black squirrels in the trees. I took courage and started onward once more, taking the dogs with me. The bell on the neck of the old dog, I feared might betray me, and, unable to get it off her neck, I twisted some of the long moss of the trees around it, so as to prevent its ringing. At night I halted once more with the dogs by my side. Harassed with fear, and tormented with hunger, I laid down and tried to sleep. But the dogs were uneasy, and would start up and bark at the cries or the footsteps of wild animals, and I was obliged, to use my utmost exertions to keep them quiet, fearing that their barking would draw my pursuers upon me. I slept but little; and as soon as daylight, started forward again. The next day towards evening, I reached a great road which, I rejoiced to find, was the same which my master and myself had travelled on our way to Greene county. I now thought it best to get rid of the dogs, and accordingly started them in pursuit of a deer. They went off, yelling on the track, and I never saw them again. I remembered that my master told me, near this place, that we were in the Creek country, and that there were some Indian settlements not far distant. In the course of the evening I crossed the road, and striking into a path through the woods, soon came to a number of Indian cabins. I went into one of them and begged for some food. The Indian women received me with a great deal of kindness, and gave me a good supper of venison, corn bread, and stewed pumpkin. I remained with them till the evening of the next day, when I started afresh on my journey. I kept on the road leading to Georgia. In the latter part of the night I entered into a long low bottom, heavily timbered--sometimes called Wolf Valley. It was a dreary and frightful place. As I walked on, I heard on all sides the howling of the wolves, and the quick patter of their feet on the leaves and sticks, as they ran through the woods. At daylight I laid down, but had scarcely closed my eyes when I was roused up by the wolves snarling and howling around me. I started on my feet, and saw several of them running by me. I did not again close my eyes during the whole day. In the afternoon, a bear with her two cubs came to a large chestnut tree near where I lay. She crept up the tree, went out on one of the limbs, and broke off several twigs in trying to shake down the nuts. They were not ripe enough to fall, and, after several vain attempts to procure some of them, she crawled down the tree again and went off with her young.

The day was long and tedious. As soon as it was dark, I once more resumed my journey. But fatigue and the want of food and sleep rendered me almost incapable of further effort. It was not long before I fell asleep, while walking, and wandered out of the road. I was awakened by a bunch of moss which hung down from the limb of a tree and met my face. I looked up and saw, as I thought, a large man standing just before me. My first idea was that some one had struck me over the face, and that I had been at last overtaken by Huckstep. Rubbing my eyes once more, I saw the figure before me sink down upon its hands and knees. Another glance assured me that it was a bear and not a man. He passed across the road and disappeared. This adventure kept me awake for the remainder of the night. Towards morning I passed by a plantation, on which was a fine growth of peach trees, full of ripe fruit. I took as many of them as I could conveniently carry in my hands and pockets, and retiring a little distance into the woods, laid down and slept till evening, when I again went forward.

Sleeping thus by day and travelling by night, in a direction towards the North Star, I entered Georgia. As I only travelled in the night time, I was unable to recognize rivers and places which I had seen before until I reached Columbus, where I recollected I had been with my master. From this place I took the road leading to Washington, and passed directly through that village. On leaving the village, I found myself contrary to my expectation, in an open country with no woods in view. I walked on until day broke in the east. At a considerable distance ahead, I saw a group of trees, and hurried on towards it. Large and beautiful plantations were on each side of me, from which I could hear dogs bark, and the driver's horn sounding. On reaching the trees, I found that they afforded but a poor place of concealment. On either hand, through its openings, I could see the men turning out to the cotton fields. I found a place to lie down between two oak stumps, around which the new shoots had sprung up thickly, forming a comparatively close shelter. After eating some peaches, which since leaving the Indian settlement had constituted my sole food, I fell asleep. I was waked by the barking of a dog. Raising my head and looking through the bushes, I found that the dog was barking at a black squirrel who was chattering on a limb almost directly above me. A moment after, I heard a voice speaking to the dog, and soon saw a man with a gun in his hand, stealing through the wood. He passed close to the stumps, where I lay trembling with terror lest he should discover me. He kept his eye however upon the tree, and raising his gun, fired. The squirrel dropped dead close by my side. I saw that any further attempt at concealment would be in vain, and sprang upon my feet. The man started forward on seeing me, struck at me with his gun and beat my hat off. I leaped into the road; and he followed after, swearing he would shoot me if I didn't stop. Knowing that his gun was not loaded, I paid no attention to him, but ran across the road into a cotton field where there was a great gang of slaves working. The man with the gun followed, and called to the two colored drivers who were on horseback, to ride after me and stop me. I saw a large piece of woodland at some distance ahead, and directed my course towards it. Just as I reached it, I looked back, and saw my pursuer far behind me; and found, to my great joy, that the two drivers had not followed me. I got behind a tree, and soon heard the man enter the woods and pass me. After all had been still for more than an hour, I crept into a low place in the depth of the woods and laid down amidst a bed of reeds, where I again fell asleep. Towards evening, on awaking, I found the sky beginning to be cloudy, and before night set in it was completely overcast. Having lost my hat, I tied an old handkerchief over my head, and prepared to resume my journey. It was foggy and very dark, and involved as I was in the mazes of the forest, I did not know in what direction I was going. I wandered on until I reached a road, which I supposed to be the same one which I had left. The next day the weather was still dark and rainy, and continued so for several days. During this time I slept only by leaning against the body of a tree, as the ground was soaked with rain. On the fifth night after my adventure near Washington, the clouds broke away, and the clear moonlight and the stars shone down upon me.

I looked up to see the North Star, which I supposed still before me. But I sought it in vain in all that quarter of the heavens. A dreadful thought came over me that I had been travelling out of my way. I turned round and saw the North Star, which had been shining directly upon my back. I then knew that I had been travelling away from freedom, and towards the place of my captivity ever since I left the woods into which I had been pursued on the 21st, five days before. Oh, the keen and bitter agony of that moment! I sat down on the decaying trunk of a fallen tree, and wept like a child. Exhausted in mind and body, nature came at last to my relief, and I fell asleep upon the log. When I awoke it was still dark. I rose and nerved myself for another effort for freedom. Taking the North Star for my guide, I turned upon my track, and left once more the dreaded frontiers of Alabama behind me. The next night, after crossing the one on which I travelled, and which seemed to lead more directly towards the North. I took this road, and the next night after, I came to a large village. Passing through the main street, I saw a large hotel which I at once recollected. I was in Augusta, and this was the hotel at which my master had spent several days when I was with him, on one of his southern visits. I heard the guards patrolling the town cry the hour of twelve; and fearful of being taken up, I turned out of the main street, and got upon the road leading to Petersburg. On reaching the latter place, I swam over the Savannah river into South Carolina, and from thence passed into North Carolina.

Hitherto I had lived mainly upon peaches, which were plenty on almost all the plantations in Alabama and Georgia; but the season was now too far advanced for them, and I was obliged to resort to apples. These I obtained without much difficulty until within two or three days journey of the Virginia line. At this time I had had nothing to eat but two or three small and sour apples for twenty-four hours, and I waited impatiently for night, in the hope of obtaining fruit from the orchards along the road. I passed by several plantations, but found no apples. After midnight, I passed near a large house, with fruit trees around it. I searched under, and climbed up and shook several of them to no purpose. At last I found a tree on which there were a few apples. On shaking it, half a dozen fell. I got down, and went groping and feeling about for them in the grass, but could find only two, the rest were devoured by several hogs who were there on the same errand with myself. I pursued my way until day was about breaking, when I passed another house. The feeling of extreme hunger was here so intense, that it required all the resolution I was master of to keep myself from going, up to the house and breaking into it in search of food. But the thought of being again made a slave, and of suffering the horrible punishment of a runaway restrained me. I lay in the worlds all that day without food. The next evening, I soon found a large pile of excellent apples, from which I supplied myself.

The next evening I reached Halifax Court House, and I then knew that I was near Virginia. On the 7th of October, I came to the Roanoke, and crossed it in the midst of a violent storm of rain and thunder. The current ran so furiously that I was carried down with it, and with great difficulty, and in a state of complete exhaustion, reached the opposite shore.

At about 2 o'clock, on the night of the 15th, I approached Richmond, but not daring to go into the city at that hour, on account of the patrols, I lay in the woods near Manchester, until the next evening, when I started in the twilight, in order to enter before the setting of the watch. I passed over the bridge unmolested, although in great fear, as my tattered clothes and naked head were well calculated to excite suspicion; and being well acquainted with the localities of the city, made my way to the house of a friend. I was received with the utmost kindness, and welcomed as one risen from the dead. Oh, how inexpressibly sweet were the tones of human sympathy, after the dreadful trials to which I had been subjected--the wrongs and outrages which I witnessed and suffered! For between two and three months I had not spoken with a human being, and the sound even of my own voice now seemed strange to my ears. During this time, save in two or three instances I had tasted of no food except peaches and apples. I was supplied with some dried meat and coffee, but the first mouthful occasioned nausea and faintness. I was compelled to take my bed, and lay sick for several days. By the assiduous attention and kindness of my friends, I was supplied with every thing which was necessary during my sickness. I was detained in Richmond nearly a month. As soon as I had sufficiently recovered to be able to proceed on my journey, I bade my kind host and his wife an affectionate farewell, and set forward once more towards a land of freedom. I longed to visit my wife and children in Powhatan county, but the dread of being discovered prevented me from attempting it. I had learned from my friends in Richmond that they were living and in good health, but greatly distressed on my account.

My friends had provided me with a fur cap, and with as much lean ham, cake and biscuit, as I could conveniently carry. I proceeded in the same way as before, travelling by night and lying close and sleeping by day. About the last of November I reached the Shenandoah river. It was very cold; ice had already formed along the margin, and in swimming the river I was chilled through; and my clothes froze about me soon after I had reached the opposite side. I passed into Maryland, and on the 5th of December, stepped across the line which divided the free state of Pennsylvania from the land of slavery.

I had a few shillings in money which were given me at Richmond, and after travelling nearly twenty-four hours from the time I crossed the line, I ventured to call at a tavern, and buy a dinner. On reaching Carlisle, I enquired of the ostler in a stable if he knew of any one who wished to hire a house servant or coachman. He said he did not. Some more colored people came in, and taking me aside told me that they knew that I was from Virginia, by my pronunciation of certain words--that I was probably a runaway slave--but that I need not be alarmed, as they were friends, and would do all in their power to protect me. I was taken home by one of them, and treated with the utmost kindness; and at night he took me in a wagon, and carried me some distance on my way to Harrisburg, where he said I should meet with friends.

He told me that I had better go directly to Philadelphia, as there would be less danger of my being discovered and retaken there than in the country, and there were a great many persons there who would exert themselves to secure me from the slaveholders. In parting he cautioned me against conversing or stopping with any man on the road, unless he wore a plain, straight collar on a round coat, and said, "thee," and "thou." By following his directions I arrived safely in Philadelphia, having been kindly entertained and assisted on my journey, by several benevolent gentlemen and ladies, whose compassion for the wayworn and hunted stranger I shall never forget, and whose names will always be dear to me. On reaching Philadelphia, I was visited by a large number of the Abolitionists, and friends of the colored people, who, after hearing my story, thought it would not be safe for me to remain in any part of the United States. I remained in Philadelphia a few days; and then a gentleman came on to New-York with me, I being considered on board the steam-boat, and in the cars, as his servant. I arrived at New-York, on the 1st of January. The sympathy and kindness which I have every where met with since leaving the slave states, has been the more grateful to me because it was in a great measure unexpected. The slaves are always told that if they escape into a free state, they will be seized and put in prison, until their masters send for them. I had heard Huckstep and the other overseers occasionally speak of the Abolitionists, but I did not know or dream that they were the friends of the slave. Oh, if the miserable men and women, now toiling on the plantations of Alabama, could know that thousands in the free states are praying and striving for their deliverance, how would the glad tidings be whispered from cabin to cabin, and how would the slave-mother as she watches over her infant, bless God, on her knees, for the hope that this child of her day of sorrow, might never realize in stripes, and toil, and grief unspeakable, what it is to be a slave?

* * * * *

This Narrative can he had at the Depository of the American Anti-Slavery Society, No 143 Nassau Street, New York, in a neat volume, 108 pp. 12mo., embellished with an elegant and accurate steel engraved likeness of James Williams, price 25 cts. single copy, $17 per hundred.

* * * * *

NO. 7

THE ANTI-SLAVERY EXAMINER.

EMANCIPATION IN THE WEST INDIES.

A SIX MONTHS' TOUR IN ANTIGUA, BARBADOES, AND JAMAICA IN THE YEAR 1837.

BY JAS. A. THOME, AND J. HORACE KIMBALL.

NEW YORK:

PUBLISHED BY THE AMERICAN ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY, No. 143 NASSAU-STREET. 1838.

This periodical contains 4 sheets.--Postage under 100 miles, 6 cents; over 100 miles, 10 cents.

ENTERED, according to the act of Congress, in the year 1838, by JOHN RANKIN, Treasurer, of the American, Anti-Slavery Society, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States, for the Southern District of New York.

Price $12 50 per hundred copies, 18-3/4 cents single copy, _in sheets_: $13 25 per hundred, and 20 cents single, _if stitched_.

NOTE.--This work is published in this cheap form, to give it a wide circulation. Please, _after perusal_, to send it to some friend.

This work, as originally published, can be had at the Depository of the American Anti-Slavery Society, No. 143, Nassau Street, New York, on fine paper, handsomely bound, in a volume of 489 pages, price one dollar per copy, $75 per hundred.

CONTENTS.

* * * * *

ANTIGUA.--CHAPTER I.

Geography and Statistics of the Island,--Reflections on arrival,--Interview with Clergymen,--with the Governor,--with a member of Assembly,--Sabbath,--Service at the Moravian Chapel,--Sabbath School,--Service at the Episcopal Church,--Service at the Wesleyan Chapel,--Millar's Estate,--Cane-holing,--Colored planter,--Fitch's Creek Estate,--Free Villages,--Dinner at the Governor's,--Donovan's Estate,--Breakfast at Mr. Watkins,--Dr. Ferguson,--Market,--Lockup house,--Christmas Holidays,--Colored Population,--Thibou Jarvis's Estate,--Testimony of the Manager,--Anniversary of the Friendly Society,--A negro patriarch,--Green Castle Estate,--Testimony of the Manager,--Anniversary of the Juvenile Association,--Wetherill Estate,--Testimony of the Manager,--Conversation with a boatman,--Moravian station at Newfield,--Testimony of the Missionaries,--School for Adults,--Interview with the Speaker of the Assembly,--Moravian "Speaking,"--Conversation with Emancipated Slaves,--The Rector of St. Philip's,--Frey's Estate,--Interview with the American Consul,--Sabbath at Millar's,--Breakfast at the Villa Estate,--A Fair,--Breakfast at Mr. Cranstoun's,--His Testimony,--Moravian Station at Cedar Hall,--Conversation with Emancipated Slaves,--Moravian Station at Grace Bay,--Testimony of the Missionaries,--Grandfather Jacob,--Mr. Scotland's Estate.--A day at Fitch's Creek,--Views of the Manager,--A call from the Archdeacon,--from Rev. Edward Fraser,--Wesleyan District Meeting,--Social interviews with the Missionaries,--Their Views and Testimony,--Religious Anniversaries,--Temperance Society,--Bible Society,--Wesleyan Missionary Society.--Resolution of the Meeting,--Laying the Corner Stone of a Wesleyan Chapel,--Resolutions of the Missionaries.

ANTIGUA.--CHAPTER II.

GENERAL RESULTS.

Religion,--Statistics of Denominations,--Morality,--Reverence for the Lord's Day,--Marriage,--Conjugal faithfulness,--Concubinage decreasing,--Temperance,--Profane Language rare,--Statistics of the Bible Society,--Missionary Associations,--Temperance Societies,--Friendly Societies,--Daily Meal Society,--Distressed Females' Friend Society,--Education,--Annual Examination of the Parochial School,--Infant Schools in the Country,--Examination at Parham,--at Willoughby Bay,--Mr. Thwaite's Replies to Queries on Education,--Great Ignorance before Emancipation,--Aptness of the Negroes to learn,--Civil and Political Condition of the Emancipated.

ANTIGUA.--CHAPTER III.

FACTS AND TESTIMONY.

IMMEDIATE ABOLITION--an immense change to the condition of the Slave,--Adopted from Political and Pecuniary Considerations,--Went into operation peaceably,--gave additional security to Persons and Property,--Is regarded by all as a great blessing to the Island,--Free, cheaper than Slave labor,--More work done, and better done, since Emancipation,--Freemen more easily managed than Slaves,--The Emancipated more Trustworthy than when Slaves,--They appreciate and reverence Law,--They stay at home and mind their own business,--Are less "insolent" than when Slaves,--Gratitude a strong trait of their character,--Emancipation has elevated them,--It has raised the price of Real Estate, given new life to Trade, and to all kinds of business,--Wrought a total change in the views of the Planters,--Weakened Prejudice against Color,--The Discussions preceding Emancipation restrained Masters from Cruelties,--Concluding Remarks.

BARBADOES.

Passage to Barbadoes,--Bridgetown,--Visit to the Governor,--To the Archdeacon,--Lear's Estate,--Testimony of the Manager,--Dinner Party at Lear's,--Ride to Scotland,--The Red Shanks,--Sabbath at Lear's; Religious Service,--Tour to the Windward,--Breakfast Party at the Colliton Estate,--Testimony to the Working of the Apprenticeship,--The Working of it in Demerara,--The Codrington Estate,--Codrington College,--The "Horse,"--An Estate on Fire,--The Ridge Estate; Dinner with a Company of Planters,--A Day at Colonel Ashby's; his Testimony to the Working of the Apprenticeship,--Interviews with Planters; their Testimony,--The Belle Estate,--Edgecombe Estate; Colonel Barrow,--Horton Estate,--Drax Hall Estate,--Dinner Party at the Governor's,--Testimony concerning the Apprenticeship,--Market People,--Interview with Special Justice Hamilton; his Testimony,--Station House, District A; Trials of Apprentices before Special Magistrate Colthurst,--Testimony of the Superintendent of the Rural Police,--Communication from Special Justice Colthurst,--Communication from Special Justice Hamilton,--Testimony of Clergymen and Missionaries,--Curate of St. Paul's,--A FREE Church,--A Sabbath School Annual Examination,--Interview with Episcopal Clergymen; their Testimony,--Visit to Schools,--Interview with the Superintendent of the Wesleyan Mission,--Persecution of the Methodists by Slaveholders,--The Moravian Mission,--Colored Population,--Dinner Party at Mr. Harris's,--Testimony concerning the objects of our Mission,--A New Englander,--History of an Emancipated Slave,--Breakfast Party at Mr. Thorne's,--Facts and Testimony concerning Slavery and the Apprenticeship,--History of an Emancipated Slave,--Breakfast Party at Mr. Prescod's,--Character and History of the late Editor of the New Times,--Breakfast Party at Mr. Bourne's,--Prejudice,--History and Character of an Emancipated Slave,--Prejudice, vincible,--Concubinage,--Barbadoes as it was; "Reign of Terror;"--Testimony; Cruelties,--Insurrection of 1816,--Licentiousness,--Prejudice--Indolence and Inefficiency of the Whites,--Hostility to Emancipation,--Barbadoes as it is,--The Apprenticeship System; Provisions respecting the Special Magistrates,--Provisions respecting the Master,--Provisions respecting the Apprentice,--The Design of the Apprenticeship,--Practical Operation of the Apprenticeship,--Sympathy of the Special Magistrates with the Masters,--Apprenticeship, modified Slavery,--Vexatious to the Master,--No Preparation for Freedom,--Begets hostility between Master and Apprentice,--Has illustrated the Forbearance of the Negroes,--Its tendency to exasperate them,--Testimony to the Working of the Apprenticeship in the Windward Islands generally.

JAMAICA.

Sketch of its Scenery,--Interview with the Attorney General,--The Solicitor General; his Testimony,--The American Consul; his Testimony,--The Superintendent of the Wesleyan Missions,--The Baptist Missionaries; Sabbath; Service in a Baptist Chapel,--Moravians; Episcopalians; Scotch Presbyterians,--Schools in Kingston,--Communication from the Teacher of the Wolmer Free School; Education; Statistics,--The Union School,--"Prejudice Vincible,"--Disabilities and Persecutions of Colored People,--Edward Jordan, Esq.,--Colored Members of Assembly,--Richard Hill, Esq.,--Colored Artisans and Merchants in Kingston,--Police Court of Kingston,--American Prejudice in the "limbos,"--"Amalgamation!"--St. Andrew's House of Correction; Tread-mill,--Tour through "St. Thomas in the East,"--Morant Bay; Local Magistrate; his lachrymal forebodings,--Proprietor of Green Wall Estate; his Testimony,--Testimony of a Wesleyan Missionary,--Belvidere Estate; Testimony of the Manager,--Chapel built by Apprentices,--House of Correction,--Chain-Gang,--A call from Special Justice Baines; his Testimony,--Bath,--Special Justice's Office; his Testimony,--"Alarming Rebellion,"--Testimony of a Wesleyan Missionary,--Principal of the Mico Charity School; his Testimony,--Noble instance of Filial Affection in a Negro Girl,--Plantain Garden River Valley; Alexander Barclay, Esq.,--Golden Grove Estate; Testimony of the Manager,--The Custos of the Parish; his Testimony,--Amity Hall Estate; Testimony of the Manager,--Lord Belmore's Prophecy,--Manchioneal; Special Magistrate Chamberlain; his Testimony,--his Weekly Court,--Pro slavery gnashings,--Visit with the Special Magistrate to the Williamsfield Estate; Testimony of the Manager,--Oppression of Book-keepers,--Sabbath; Service at a Baptist Chapel,--Interview with Apprentices; their Testimony,--Tour through St. Andrew's and Port Royal,--Visit to Estates in company with Special Justice Bourne,--White Emigrants to Jamaica,--Dublin Castle Estate; Special Justice Court,--A Despot in convulsions; arbitrary power dies hard,--Encounter with Mules in a mountain pass,--Silver Hill Estate; cases tried; Appraisement of an Apprentice,--Peter's Rock Estate,--Hall's Prospect Estate,--Female Traveling Merchant,--Negro Provision Grounds,--Apprentices eager to work for Money,--Jury of Inquest,--Character of Overseers,--Conversation with Special Justice Hamilton,--With a Proprietor of Estates and Local Magistrate; Testimony,--Spanishtown,--Richard Hill, Esq., Secretary of the Special Magistracy,--Testimony of Lord Sligo concerning him,--Lord Sligo's Administration; its independence and impartiality,--Statements of Mr. Hill,--Statements of Special Justice Ramsey,--Special Justice's Court,--Baptist Missionary at Spanishtown; his Testimony,--Actual Working of the Apprenticeship; no Insurrection; no fear of it; no Increase of Crime; Negroes improving; Marriage increased; Sabbath better kept; Religious Worship better attended; Law obeyed,--Apprenticeship vexatious to both parties,--Atrocities perpetrated by Masters and Magistrates,--Causes of the ill-working of the Apprenticeship--Provisions of the Emancipation Act defeated by Planters and Magistrates,--The present Governor a favorite with the Planters,--Special Justice Palmer suspended by him,--Persecution of Special Justice Bourne,--Character of the Special Magistrates,--Official Cruelty; Correspondence between a Missionary and Special Magistrate,--Sir Lionel Smith's Message to the House of Assembly,--Causes of the Diminished Crops since Emancipation,--Anticipated Consequences of full Emancipation in 1840,--Examination of the grounds of such anticipations,--Views of Missionaries and Colored People, Magistrates and Planters;--Concluding Remarks.

APPENDIX.

Official Communication from Special Justice Lyon,--Communication from the Solicitor General of Jamaica,--Communication from Special Justice Colthurst,--Official Returns of the Imports and Exports of Barbadoes,--Valuations of Apprentices in Jamaica,--Tabular View of the Crops in Jamaica for fifty-three years preceding 1836; Comments of the Jamaica Watchman on the foregoing Table,--Comments of the Spanishtown Telegraph,--Brougham's Speech in Parliament.

INTRODUCTION.

It is hardly possible that the success of British West India Emancipation should be more conclusively proved, than it has been by the absence among us of the exultation which awaited its failure. So many thousands of the citizens of the United States, without counting slaveholders, would not have suffered their prophesyings to be falsified, if they could have found whereof to manufacture fulfilment. But it is remarkable that, even since the first of August, 1834, the evils of West India emancipation on the lips of the advocates of slavery, or, as the most of them nicely prefer to be termed, the opponents of abolition, have remained in the future tense. The bad reports of the newspapers, spiritless as they have been compared with the predictions, have been traceable, on the slightest inspection, not to emancipation, but to the illegal continuance of slavery, under the cover of its legal substitute. Not the slightest reference to the rash act, whereby the thirty thousand slaves of Antigua were immediately "turned loose," now mingles with the croaking which strives to defend our republican slavery against argument and common sense.

The Executive Committee of the American Anti-Slavery Society, deemed it important that the silence which the pro-slavery press of the United States has seemed so desirous to maintain in regard to what is strangely enough termed the "great experiment of freedom," should be thoroughly broken up by a publication of facts and testimony collected on the spot. To this end, REV. JAMES A. THOME, and JOSEPH H. KIMBALL, ESQ., were deputed to the West Indies to make the proper investigations. Of their qualifications for the task, the subsequent pages will furnish the best evidence: it is proper, however, to remark, that Mr. Thome is thoroughly acquainted with our own system of slavery, being a native and still a resident of Kentucky, and the son of a slaveholder, (happily no longer so,) and that Mr. Kimball is well known as the able editor of the Herald of Freedom, published at Concord, New Hampshire.

They sailed from New York, the last of November, 1836, and returned early in June, 1837. They improved a short stay at the Danish island of St. Thomas, to give a description of slavery as it exists there, which, as it appeared for the most part in the anti-slavery papers, and as it is not directly connected with the great question at issue, has not been inserted in the present volume. Hastily touching at some of the other British islands, they made Antigua, Barbadoes, and Jamaica, successively the objects of their deliberate and laborious study--as fairly presenting the three grand phases of the "experiment"--Antigua, exemplifying immediate unrestricted abolition; Barbadoes, the best working of the apprenticeship, and Jamaica the worst. Nine weeks were spent in Antigua, and the remainder of their time was divided between the other two islands.

The reception of the delegates was in the highest degree favorable to the promotion of their object, and their work will show how well they have used the extraordinary facilities afforded them. The committee have, in some instances, restored testimonials which their modesty led them to suppress, showing in what estimation they themselves, as well as the object of their mission, were held by some of the most distinguished persons in the islands which they visited.

So wide was the field before them, and so rich and various the fruit to be gathered, that they were tempted to go far beyond the strength supplied by the failing health they carried with them. Most nobly did they postpone every personal consideration to the interests of the cause, and the reader will, we think, agree with us, that they have achieved a result which undiminished energies could not have been expected to exceed--a result sufficient, if any thing could be, to justify the sacrifice it cost them. We regret to add that the labors and exposures of Mr. Kimball, so far prevented his recovery from the disease[A] which obliged him to resort to a milder climate, or perhaps we should say aggravated it, that he has been compelled to leave to his colleague, aided by a friend, nearly the whole burden of preparing for the press--which, together with the great labor of condensing from the immense amount of collected materials, accounts for the delay of the publication. As neither Mr. Thome nor Mr. Kimball were here while the work was in the press, it is not improbable that trivial errors have occurred, especially in the names of individuals.

[Footnote A: We learn that Mr. Kimball closed his mortal career at Pembroke, N.H. April 12th, in the 25th year of his age. Very few men in the Anti-Slavery cause have been more distinguished, than this lamented brother, for the zeal, discretion and ability with which he has advocated the cause of the oppressed. "Peace to the memory of a man of worth!"]

It will be perceived that the delegates rest nothing of importance on their own unattested observation. At every point they are fortified by the statements of a multitude of responsible persons in the islands, whose names, when not forbidden, they leave taken the liberty to use in behalf of humanity. Many of these statements were given in the handwriting of the parties, and are in the possession of the Executive Committee. Most of these island authorities are as unchallengeable on the score of previous leaning towards abolitionism, as Mr. McDuffie of Mr. Calhoun would be two years hence, if slavery were to be abolished throughout the United States tomorrow.

Among the points established in this work, beyond the power of dispute or cavil, are the following:

1. That the act of IMMEDIATE EMANCIPATION in Antigua, was not attended with any disorder whatever.

2. That the emancipated slaves have readily, faithfully, and efficiently worked for wages from the first.

3. That wherever there has been any disturbance in the working of the apprenticeship, it has been invariably by the fault of the masters, or of the officers charged with the execution of the "Abolition Act."

4. That the prejudice of caste is fast disappearing in the emancipated islands.

5. That the apprenticeship was not sought for by the planters as a _preparation for freedom_.

6. That no such preparation was needed.

7. That the planters who have fairly made the "experiment," now greatly prefer the new system to the old.

8. That the emancipated people are perceptibly rising in the scale of civilization, morals, and religion.

From these established facts, reason cannot fail to make its inferences in favor of the two and a half millions of slaves in our republic. We present the work to our countrymen who yet hold slaves, with the utmost confidence that its perusal will not leave in their minds a doubt, either of the duty or perfect safety of _immediate emancipation_, however it may fail to persuade their hearts--which God grant it may not!

By order of the Executive Committee of the American Anti-Slavery Society.

New York, April 28th, 1838.

* * * * *

EXPLANATION OF TERMS USED IN THE NARRATIVE.

1. The words 'Clergy' and 'Missionary' are used to distinguish between the ministers of the English or Scotch church, and those of all other denominations.

2. The terms 'church' and 'chapel' denote a corresponding distinction in the places of worship, though the English Church have what are technically called 'chapels of ease!'

3. 'Manager' and 'overseer' are terms designating in different islands the same station. In Antigua and Barbadoes, _manager_ is the word in general use, in Jamaica it is _overseer_--both meaning the practical conductor or immediate superintendent of an estate. In our own country, a peculiar odium is attached to the latter term. In the West Indies, the station of manager or overseer is an honorable one; proprietors of estates, and even men of rank, do not hesitate to occupy it.

4. The terms 'colored' and 'black' or 'negro' indicate a distinction long kept up in the West Indies between the mixed blood and the pure negro. The former as a body were few previous to the abolition act; and for this reason chiefly we presume the term of distinction was originally applied to them. To have used these terms interchangeably in accordance with the usage in the United States, would have occasioned endless confusion in the narrative.

5. 'Praedial' and 'non-praedial' are terms used in the apprenticeship colonies to mark the difference between the agricultural class and the domestic; the former are called _praedials_, the latter _non-praedials_.

* * * * *

POPULATION OF THE BRITISH (FORMERLY SLAVE) COLONIES.

(_Compiled from recent authentic documents._)

British Colonies. White. Slave. F. Col'd. Total. Anguilla 365 2,388 357 3,110 Antigua[A] 1,980 29,839 3,895 35,714 Bahamas 4,240 9,268 2,991 16,499 Barbadoes 15,000 82,000 5,100 102,100 Berbicel 550 21,300 1,150 23,000 Bermuda[A] 3,900 4,600 740 9,240 Cape of Good Hope[B] 43,000 35,500 29,000 107,500 Demerara[B] 3,000 70,000 6,400 79,400 Dominica 850 15,400 3,600 19,850 Grenada 800 24,000 2,800 27,600 Honduras[B] 250 2,100 2,300 4,650 Jamaica 37,000 323,000 55,000 415,000 Mauritius[B] 8,000 76,000 15,000 99,000 Montserrat 330 6,200 800 7,330 Nevis 700 6,600 2,000 9,300 St. Christophers,St. Kitts 1,612 19,310 3,000 23,922 St. Lucia[B] 980 13,600 3,700 18,280 St. Vincent 1,300 23,500 2,800 27,600 Tobago 320 12,500 1,200 14,020 Tortola 480 5,400 1,300 7,180 Trinidad[B] 4,200 24,000 16,000 44,200 Virgin Isles 800 5,400 600 6,800

Total 131,257 831,105 162,733 1,125,095

[Footnote A: These islands adopted immediate emancipation, Aug 1, 1834.]

[Footnote B: These are crown colonies, and have no local legislature.]

ANTIGUA.