CHAPTER VII.
DIVINE GOVERNMENT A SCHEME IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED.
Moral government, _as a fact_, has now been considered; it remains for us to remove objections against its _wisdom and goodness_. A thing being true does not prove it to be good.
In arguing as to its truth, analogy could only show it to be credible. But, if a moral government be admitted as a fact, analogy makes it credible that it is a scheme or system, and that man’s comprehension of it is necessarily so limited, as to be inadequate to determine its injustice.
This we shall find to be the case.
_Doctrine._ ON THE SUPPOSITION THAT GOD EXERCISES MORAL GOVERNMENT, THE ANALOGY OF NATURE TEACHES THAT IT MUST BE A SCHEME, AND ONE QUITE BEYOND OUR COMPREHENSION.
I. _The ordering of nature is a scheme; and makes it credible by analogy, that moral government is a scheme._
=1.= The parts curiously correspond to each other; individuals to individuals, species to species, events to events; and all these both immediate and remote.
=2.= This correspondence embraces all the past, and all the future; including all creatures, actions, and events.
1.) There is no event, which does not depend for its occurrence on some further thing, unknown to us; we cannot give the whole account of any one thing.
2.) Things apparently the most insignificant, seem to be necessary to others, of the greatest importance.
=3.= If such is God’s natural government, it is credible that such is his moral government.
1.) In fact they are so blended as to make one scheme.
--One is subservient to the other, just as the vegetable kingdom subserves the animal, and our animal organization subserves our mental.
--Every act of God seems to look beyond the occasion, and to have reference to a general plan.
--There is evidently a previous adjustment.
· The periods, &c. for trying men.
· The instruments of justice.
· The kinds of retribution.
2.) The whole comprises a system, a very small part of which is known to us: therefore no objections against any part can be insisted on.
3.) This ignorance is universally acknowledged, except in arguing against religion. That it ought to be a valid answer to objections against religion, we proceed to show.
--Suppose it to be asserted that all evils might have been prevented by repeated interpositions; or that more good might have been so produced; which would be the utmost that could be said: still,
--Our ignorance would vindicate religion from any objections arising from apparent disorders in the world.
--The government of the world might be _good_, even on those suppositions; for at most they could but suggest that it might be _better_.
--At any rate, they are mere assertions.
--Instances may be alleged, in things much less out of reach, of suppositions palpably impossible, which _all_ do not see to be so: nor _any, at first sight_.
4.) It follows that our ignorance is a satisfactory answer to all objections against the divine government.
--An objection against an act of Providence, no way connected with any other thing, as being unjust, could not be answered by our ignorance.
--But when the objection is made against an act related to other and unknown acts, then our ignorance is a full answer.
--Some unknown relation, or unknown impossibility, may render the act not only good, but good in the highest degree.
II. _Consider some particular things, in the natural government of God, the like of which we may infer, by analogy, to be contained in his moral government._
=1.= No ends are accomplished without means.
1.) Often, means very disagreeable bring the most desirable results.
2.) How means produce ends, is not learned by reason, but experience.
3.) In many cases, before experience, we should have expected contrary results.
4.) Hence we may infer that those things which are objected against God’s moral government, produce good.
5.) It is evident that our not seeing _how_ the means work good, or their seeming to have an opposite effect, offers no presumption against their fitness to work good.
6.) They may not only be fit, but the _only_ means of ultimate good.
_Objec._ Though our capacity of vice and misery may promote virtue, and _our_ suffering for sin be better than if we were restrained by force, yet it would have been better if evil had not entered the world.
_Ans._ It is granted that though sinful acts may produce benefits, to refrain from them would produce more. We have curative pains, yet pain is not better than health.
=2.= Natural government is carried on by general laws.
1.) Nature shows that this is best: all the good we enjoy is because there are general laws. They enable us to _forecast_ for the procurement of good.
2.) It may not be possible, by general laws, to prevent all irregularities, or remedy them.
3.) Direct interpositions might perhaps remedy many disorders arising under them, but this would have bad effects.
--Encouraging improvidence.
--Leaving us no rule of life.
--Every interposition would have _distant_ effects: so that we could not guess what would be the _whole_ result.
· If it be replied that those distant effects might also be corrected by direct interpositions--this is only talking at random.
_Objec._ If we are so ignorant as this whole argument supposes, we are too ignorant to understand the proofs of religion.
_Ans._ 1. Total ignorance of a subject precludes argument, but partial ignorance does not. We may, in various degrees, know a man’s character, and the way he is _likely_ to pursue certain ends; and yet not know how he _ought_ to act to gain those ends. In this case objections to his mode of pursuing ends may be answered by our ignorance, though that he _does_ act in a certain manner is capable of proof. So we may have evidence of God’s character and aims, and yet not be competent judges as to his measures. Our ignorance is a good answer to the difficulties of religion, but no objection to religion itself.
_Ans._ 2. If our ignorance did invalidate the proofs of religion, as well as the objections, yet is it undeniable that moral obligations remain unaffected by our ignorance of the consequences of obedience or violation. The consequences of vice and virtue may not be fully known, yet it is credible that they may be such as religion declares: and this credibility is an obligation, in point of prudence, to abstain from sin.
_Ans._ 3. Our answers to the objections against religion, are _not_ equally valid against the proofs of it.
[Answers rehearsed.]
_Ans._ 4. Our answers, though they may be said to be based on our ignorance, are really not so, but on what analogy teaches _concerning_ our ignorance,--viz.: that it renders us incompetent judges. They are based on experience, and what we _do know_; so that to credit religion is to trust to experience, and to disregard it is the contrary.
CONCLUSION.
=1.= The reasoning of the last chapter leads us to regard this life as part of a larger plan of things.
1.) Whether we are connected with the distant _parts_ of the universe, is uncertain; but it is very clear we are connected, more or less, with present, past, and future.
2.) We are evidently in the midst of a scheme, not fixed but progressive; and one equally incomprehensible, whether we regard the present, past, or future.
=2.= This scheme contains as much that is wonderful as religion does: for it certainly would be as wonderful that all nature came into existence without a Creator, as that there should be a Creator: and as wonderful that the Creator should act without any rule or scheme, as that he should act with one; or that he should act by a bad rule, rather than a righteous one.
=3.= Our very nature compels us to believe that the will and character of the Author of nature, is just and good.
=4.= Whatever be his character, he formed the world as it is, and controls it as he does, and has assigned us our part and lot.
=5.= Irrational creatures act their part, and receive their lot, without reflection, but creatures endued with reason, can hardly avoid reflecting whither we go, and what is the scheme, in the midst of which we find ourselves.
[Here follows a recapitulation of the book.]