CHAPTER III.

MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.

As the structure of the world shows _intelligence_, so the mode of distributing pleasure and pain, shows government. That is, God’s _natural_ government, such as a king exercises over his subjects.

But this does not, at first sight, determine what is the _moral character_ of such government.

I. _What is a moral or righteous government?_

=1.= Not mere rewarding and punishing.

=2.= But doing this according to character.

=3.= The perfection of moral government is doing this _exactly_.

_Objec._ God is simply and absolutely benevolent.

_Ans._ Benevolence, infinite in degree, would dispose him to produce the greatest possible happiness, regardless of behaviour. This would rob God of other attributes; and should not be asserted unless it can be proved. And whether it can be proved is not the point now in hand.

The question is not whether there may not be, in the universe, beings to whom he manifests absolute benevolence, which might not be incompatible with justice; but whether he treats _us_ so.

=4.= It must be owned to be vastly difficult, in such a disordered world, to estimate with exactness the overplus of happiness on the side of virtue: and there may be exceptions to the rule. But it is far from being doubtful that _on the whole_, virtue is happier than vice, in this world.

II. _The beginnings of a righteous administration, are seen in nature._

=1.= It has been proved (ch. ii.) that God _governs_: and it is reasonable to suppose that he would govern _righteously_.

1.) Any other rule of government would be harder to account for.

2.) The Bible doctrine that hereafter the good shall be happy, and the wicked miserable, is no more than an expectation that a method of government, now begun, shall be carried on.

=2.= The opposite consequences of prudence and rashness, show a right constitution of nature; and our ability to foresee and control these consequences, shows that we are under moral law.

=3.= God has so constructed society that vice, to a great degree, is actually punished by it.

1.) Without this, society could not exist.

2.) This is God’s government, through society; and is as _natural_, as society.

3.) Since the course of things is God’s appointment, men are unavoidably accountable for their behaviour.

_Objec._ Society often punishes good actions, and rewards wickedness.

_Ans._ 1. This is not _necessary_, and consequently not natural.

2. Good actions are never punished by society as _good_, but because considered bad.

=4.= By the course of nature, virtue is rewarded, and vice punished, _as such_, which proves a moral government; as will be seen if we rightly distinguish between actions and their qualities.

1.) An action may produce present gratification though it be wrong: in which case the gratification is in the act, not the morality of it: in other cases the enjoyment consists wholly in the quality of virtuousness.

2.) Vice is naturally attended with uneasiness, apprehension, vexation, remorse, &c.

--This is a very different feeling from that produced by mere misfortune.

--Men comfort themselves under misfortune, that it was not their own fault.

3.) Honest and good men are befriended _as such_.

4.) Injuries are resented as implying fault; and good offices are regarded with gratitude on account of the _intention_, even when they fail to benefit us.

--This is seen in family government, where children are punished for falsehood, fretfulness, &c., though no one is hurt.

--And also in civil government, where the absence or presence of ill intention goes far in determining the penalty of wrong-doing.

5.) The whole course of the world, in all ages and relations, turns much upon approbation and disapprobation.

6.) The very fact of our having a moral nature, is a proof of our being under God’s moral government.

--We are placed in a condition which unavoidably operates on our moral nature.

--Hence it arises that reward to virtue and reprobation of vice, as such, is a _rule_, never inverted. If it be thought that there are instances to the contrary, (which is not so,) they are evidently monstrous.

--The _degree_ in which virtue and vice receive proper returns, is not the question now, but only the thing itself, in some degree.

7.) It is admitted that virtue sometimes suffers, and vice prospers; but this is _disorder_, and not the order of nature.

8.) It follows, that we have in the government of the world, a declaration from God, for virtue and against vice. So far as a man is true to virtue, is he on the side of the divine administration. Such a man must have a _sense of security_, and a hope of _something better_.

=5.= This hope is confirmed by observing that virtue has necessary tendencies beyond their present effects.

1.) These are very obvious with regard to individuals.

2.) Are as real, though not so patent, in regard to society.

--The power of a society under the direction of virtue, tends to prevail over power not so directed, just as power under direction of reason, tends to prevail over brute force.

--As this may not be conceded, we will notice how the case stands, as to reason:

· Length of time, and proper opportunity, are necessary for reason to triumph over brutes.

· Rational beings, disunited, envious, unjust, and treacherous, may be overcome by brutes, uniting themselves by instinct: but this would be an inverted order of things.

--A like tendency has virtue to produce superiority.

· By making the good of society, the object of every member of it.

· By making every one industrious in his own sphere.

· By uniting all in one bond of veracity and justice.

3.) If the part of God’s government which we see, and the part we do not see, make up one scheme, then we see a _tendency_ in virtue to superiority.

4.) But to _produce_ that superiority there must be

--A force proportioned to the obstacles.

--Sufficient lapse of time.

--A fair field of trial; such as extent of time, adequate occasions, and opportunities for the virtuous to unite.

5.) These things are denied to virtue in this life, so that its tendencies, though real, are _hindered_.

6.) But it may have all requisite advantages hereafter.

--Eternity will be lasting enough.

--Good men will unite; as they cannot do now, scattered over the earth, and ignorant of one another.

--Other orders of virtuous beings will join; for the very nature of virtue is a bond of union.

7.) The tendency of such an order of things, so far as seen by vicious beings in any part of the universe, would be to the amendment of all who were capable of it, and their recovery to virtue.

8.) All this goes to show that the hinderances to virtue are contingent, and that its beneficial tendencies are God’s declarations in its favor.

9.) If the preceding considerations are thought to be too speculative, we may easily come to the same result by reflecting on the supremacy which any earthly nation would attain, by entire virtue for many ages.

REMARKS.

Consider now the general system of religion. The government of the world is one; it is moral; virtue shall in the end prevail over wickedness; and to see the importance and fitness of such an arrangement we have only to consider what would be the state of things, if vice had these advantages, or virtue the contrary.

_Objec._ Why may not things be now going on in other worlds, and continue always to go on in this world, in the same mixed and disordered state as at present?

_Ans._ We are not proving that God’s moral government is _perfect_, or the truth of religion, but only seeing what there is in the course of nature, to confirm it, supposing it to be known. Were there nothing to judge by, but the present distribution of pleasure and pain, we should have no ground to conclude that hereafter we should be rewarded or punished exactly according to our deserts. But even then there would be no indication that vice is better than virtue. Still the preceding observations _confirm_ the doctrine of future retribution; for,

1.) They show that the Author of nature is not indifferent to virtue and vice.

2.) That future distributive justice would differ not in _kind_, but in degree only, from God’s present government. It would be the _effect_, towards which we see the _tendency_.

3.) That higher rewards and punishments _may be_ hereafter.

4.) That we should _expect_ it to be so; because the tendencies of vice and virtue are immutable, while the hinderances are only artificial.

SUMMARY.

[This enumerates the steps of the argument, in the foregoing chapter, in as condensed a form as possible.]