CHAPTER VIII.

OBJECTIONS AGAINST ARGUING FROM THE ANALOGY OF NATURE, TO RELIGION.

If every one would consider, with such attention as they are bound, even in point of morality, to consider, what they judge and give characters of; the occasion of this chapter would be, in some good measure at least, superseded. But since this is not to be expected; for some we find do not concern themselves to understand even what they write against: since this treatise, in common with most others, lies open to objections, which may appear very material to thoughtful men at first sight; and, besides that, seems peculiarly liable to the objections of such as can judge without thinking, and of such as can censure without judging; it may not be amiss to set down the chief of these objections which occur to me, and consider them to their hands. They are such as these:

“That it is a poor thing to solve difficulties in revelation, by saying, that there are the same in natural religion; when what is wanting is to clear both of them of these their common, as well as other their respective, difficulties; that it is a strange way indeed of convincing men of the obligations of religion, to show them, that they have as little reason for their worldly pursuits: and a strange way of vindicating the justice and goodness of the Author of nature, and of removing the objections against both, to which the system of religion lies open, to show, that the like objections lie against natural providence; a way of answering objections against religion, without so much as pretending to make out, that the system of it, or the particular things in it objected against, are reasonable--especially, perhaps some may be inattentive enough to add, must this be thought strange, when it is confessed that analogy is no answer to such objections: that when this sort of reasoning is carried to the utmost length it can be imagined capable of, it will yet leave the mind in a very unsatisfied state; and that it must be unaccountable ignorance of mankind, to imagine they will be prevailed with to forego their present interests and pleasures, from regard to religion, upon doubtful evidence.”

Now, as plausible as this way of talking may appear, that appearance will be found in a great measure owing to half views, which show but part of an object, yet show that indistinctly, and to undeterminate language. By these means weak men are often deceived by others, and ludicrous men, by themselves. And even those, who are serious and considerate, cannot always readily disentangle, and at once clearly see through the perplexities, in which subjects themselves are involved; and which are heightened by the deficiencies and the abuse of words. To this latter sort of persons, the following reply to each part of this objection severally, may be of some assistance; as it may also tend a little to stop and silence others.

_First_, The thing wanted, _i.e._ what men require, is to have _all_ difficulties cleared. And this is, or at least for any thing we know to the contrary, it may be, the same as requiring to comprehend the divine nature, and the whole plan of Providence from everlasting to everlasting! But it hath always been allowed to argue from what is acknowledged, to what is disputed. And it is in no other sense a poor thing, to argue from natural religion to revealed, in the manner found fault with, than it is to argue in numberless other ways of probable deduction and inference, in matters of conduct, which we are continually reduced to the necessity of doing. Indeed the epithet _poor_ may be applied, I fear as properly, to great part or the whole of human life, as it is to the things mentioned in the objection. Is it not a poor thing, for a physician to have so little knowledge in the cure of diseases, as even the most eminent have? To act upon conjecture and guess, where the life of man is concerned? Undoubtedly it is: but not in comparison of having no skill at all in that useful art, and being obliged to act wholly in the dark.

Further: since it is as unreasonable, as it is common, to urge objections against revelation, which are of equal weight against natural religion; and those who do this, if they are not confused themselves, deal unfairly with others, in making it seem that they are arguing only against revelation, or particular doctrines of it, when in reality they are arguing against moral providence; it is a thing of consequence to show, that such objections are as much levelled against natural religion, as against revealed. Objections, which are equally applicable to both, are properly speaking answered, by its being shown that they are so, provided the former be admitted to be true. And without taking in the consideration how distinctly this is admitted, it is plainly very material to observe, that as the things objected against in natural religion are of the same kind with what is certain matter of experience in the course of providence, and in the information which God affords us concerning our temporal interest under his government; so the objections against the system of Christianity, and the evidence of it, are of the very same kind with those which are made against the system and evidence of natural religion. However, the reader upon review may see, that most of the analogies insisted upon, even in the latter part of this treatise, do not necessarily require to have more taken for granted than is in the former; [viz.] that there is an Author of nature, or natural Governor of the world: and Christianity is vindicated, not from its analogy to natural religion, but chiefly from its analogy to the experienced constitution of nature.

_Secondly_, Religion is a practical thing, and consists in such a determinate course of life, as what, there is reason to think, is commanded by the Author of nature, and will, upon the whole, be our happiness under his government. If men can be convinced, that they have the like reason to believe this, as to believe that taking care of their temporal affairs will be to their advantage; such conviction cannot but be an argument to them for the practice of religion. And if there be really any reason for believing one of these, and endeavoring to preserve life, and secure ourselves the necessaries and conveniences of it; then there is reason also for believing the other, and endeavoring to secure the interest it proposes to us. And if the interest, which religion proposes to us, be infinitely greater than our whole temporal interest; then there must be proportionably greater reason for endeavoring to secure one, than the other; since, by the supposition, the probability of our securing one is equal to the probability of our securing the other. This seems plainly unanswerable, and has a tendency to influence fair minds, who consider what our condition really is, or upon what evidence we are naturally appointed to act; and who are disposed to acquiesce in the terms upon which we live, and attend to and follow that practical instruction, whatever it be, which is afforded us.

But the chief and proper force of the argument referred to in the objection, lies in another place. The proof of religion, it is said, is involved in such inextricable difficulties, as to render it doubtful; and that it cannot be supposed that if it were true, it would be left upon doubtful evidence. Here then, over and above the force of each particular difficulty or objection, these difficulties and objections taken together are turned into a positive argument against the truth of religion; which argument would stand thus. If religion were true, it would not be left doubtful, and open to objections to the degree in which it is: therefore that it is thus left, not only renders the evidence of it weak, and lessens its force, in proportion to the weight of such objections, but also shows it to be false, or is a general presumption of its being so. Now the observation, that from the natural constitution and course of things, we must in our temporal concerns, almost continually, and even in matters of great consequence, act upon evidence of a like kind and degree to the evidence of religion, is an answer to this argument. Because it shows, that it is according to the conduct and character of the Author of nature to appoint we should act upon evidence like to that, which this argument presumes he cannot be supposed to appoint we should act upon: it is an instance, a general one, made up of numerous particular ones, of somewhat in his dealing with us, similar to what is said to be incredible. As the force of this answer lies merely in the parallel, which there is between the evidence for religion and for our temporal conduct; the answer is equally just and conclusive, whether the parallel be made out, by showing the evidence of the former to be higher, or the evidence of the latter to be lower.

_Thirdly_, The design of this treatise is not to vindicate the character of God, but to show the obligations of men: it is not to justify his providence, but to show what belongs to us to do. These are two subjects, and ought not to be confounded. Though they may at length run up into each other, yet observations may immediately tend to make out the latter, which do not appear, by any immediate connection, to the purpose of the former; which is less our concern, than many seem to think. For, first,

It is not necessary we should justify the dispensations of Providence against objections, any farther than to show, that the things objected against may, for aught we know, be consistent with justice and goodness. Suppose then, that there are things in the system of this world, and plan of Providence relating to it, which taken alone would be unjust: yet it has been shown unanswerably, that if we could take in the reference, which these things may have to other things, present past and to come; to the whole scheme, which the things objected against are parts of; these very things might, for aught we know, be found to be, not only consistent with justice, but instances of it. Indeed it has been shown, by the analogy of what we see, not only possible that this may be the case, but credible that it is. And thus objections, drawn from such things, are answered, and Providence is vindicated, as far as religion makes its vindication necessary.

Hence it appears, Secondly, that objections against the Divine justice and goodness are not endeavored to be _removed_, by showing that the like objections, allowed to be really conclusive, lie against natural providence: but those objections being supposed and shown not to be _conclusive_, the things objected against, considered as matters of fact, are farther shown to be credible, from their conformity to the constitution of nature; for instance, that God will reward and punish men for their actions hereafter, from the observation, that he does reward and punish them for their actions here. And this, I apprehend, is of weight.

Thirdly, it would be of weight, even though those objections were not answered. For, there being the proof of religion above set down; and religion implying several facts; for instance again, the fact last mentioned, that God will reward and punish men for their actions hereafter; the observation, that his present method of government is by rewards and punishments, shows that future fact not to be incredible: whatever objections men may think they have against it, as unjust or unmerciful, according to their notions of justice and mercy; or as improbable from their belief of necessity. I say, _as improbable_: for it is evident no objection against it, _as unjust_, can be urged from necessity; since this notion as much destroys injustice, as it does justice.

Fourthly, Though objections against the reasonableness of the system of religion cannot indeed be answered without entering into consideration of its reasonableness; yet objections against the credibility or truth of it may. Because the system of it is reducible into what is properly matter of fact: and the truth, the probable truth of facts, may be shown without consideration of their reasonableness. Nor is it necessary, though, in some cases and respects, it is highly useful and proper, yet it is not necessary, to give a proof of the reasonableness of every precept enjoined us, and of every particular dispensation of Providence, which comes into the system of religion. Indeed the more thoroughly a person of a right disposition is convinced of the perfection of the Divine nature and conduct, the farther he will advance towards that perfection of religion, which John[290] speaks of.[291] But the general obligations of religion are fully made out, by proving the reasonableness of the practice of it. And that the practice of religion _is_ reasonable, may be shown, though no more could be proved, than that the system of it _may be_ so, for aught we know to the contrary: and even without entering into the distinct consideration of this.

Fifthly, It is easy to see, that though the analogy of nature is not an immediate answer to objections against the wisdom, the justice, or goodness, of any doctrine or precept of religion; yet it may be, as it is, an immediate and direct answer to what is really intended by such objections; which is, to show that the things objected against are incredible.

_Fourthly_, It is most readily acknowledged, that the foregoing treatise is by no means satisfactory; very far indeed from it: but so would any natural institution of life appear, if reduced into a system, together with its evidence. Leaving religion out of the case, men are divided in their opinions, whether our pleasures overbalance our pains: and whether it be, or be not, eligible to live in this world.[292] And were all such controversies settled, which perhaps, in speculation, would be found involved in great difficulties; and were it determined upon the evidence of reason, as nature has determined it to our hands, that life is to be preserved: still, the rules which God has been pleased to afford us, for escaping the miseries of it, and obtaining its satisfactions, the rules, for instance, of preserving health, and recovering it when lost, are not only fallible and precarious, but very far from being exact. Nor are we informed by nature, as to future contingencies and accidents, so as to render it at all certain, what is the best method of managing our affairs. What will be the success of our temporal pursuits, in the common sense of the word success, is highly doubtful. And what will be the success of them in the proper sense of the word; _i.e._ what happiness or enjoyment we shall obtain by them, is doubtful in a much higher degree. Indeed the unsatisfactory nature of the evidence, with which we are obliged to take up, in the daily course of life, is scarce to be expressed. Yet men do not throw away life, or disregard the interests of it, upon account of this doubtfulness. The evidence of religion then being admitted real, those who object against it, as not satisfactory, _i.e._ as not being what they wish it, plainly forget the very condition of our being: for satisfaction, in this sense, does not belong to such a creature as man.

And, what is more material, they forget also the very nature of religion. For, religion presupposes, in all those who will embrace it, a certain degree of integrity and honesty; which it was intended to try whether men have or not, and to exercise in such as have it, in order to its improvement. Religion presupposes this as much, and in the same sense, as speaking to a man presupposes he understands the language in which you speak; or as warning a man of any danger presupposes that he hath such a regard to himself, as that he will endeavor to avoid it. Therefore the question is not at all, Whether the evidence of religion be satisfactory; but Whether it be, in reason, sufficient to prove and discipline that virtue, which it presupposes. Now the evidence of it is fully sufficient for all those purposes of _probation_; how far soever it is from being satisfactory, as to the purposes of _curiosity_, or any other: and indeed it answers the purposes of the former in several respects, which it would not do, if it were as overpowering as is required. Besides, whether the motives or the evidence for any course of action be satisfactory, meaning here, by that word, what satisfies a man that such a course of action will in event be for his good; this need never be, and I think, strictly speaking, never is, the practical question in common matters. The practical question in all cases is, Whether the evidence for a course of action be such as, taking in all circumstances, makes the faculty within us, which is the guide and judge of conduct,[293] determine that course of action to be prudent. Indeed, satisfaction that it will be for our interest or happiness, abundantly determines an action to be prudent: but evidence almost infinitely lower than this, determines actions to be so too; even in the conduct of every day.

_Fifthly_, As to the objection concerning the influence which this argument, or any part of it, may, or may not be expected to have upon men; I observe, as above, that religion being intended for a trial[294] and exercise of the morality of every person’s character, who is a subject of it; and there being, as I have shown, such evidence for it, as is sufficient, in reason, to influence men to embrace it: to object, that it is not to be imagined mankind will be influenced by such evidence, is nothing to the purpose of the foregoing treatise. For the purpose of it is not to inquire, what sort of creatures mankind are; but what the light and knowledge, which is afforded them, requires they should be: to show how, in reason, they ought to behave; not how, in fact, they will behave. This depends upon themselves, and is their own concern; the personal concern of each man in particular. How little regard the generality have to it, experience indeed does too fully show. But religion, considered as a probation, has had its end upon all persons, to whom it has been proposed with evidence sufficient in reason to influence their practice: for by this means they have been put into a state of probation; let them behave as they will in it. Thus, not only revelation, but reason also, teaches us, that by the evidence of religion being laid before men, the designs of Providence are carrying on, not only with regard to those who will be influenced by it, but likewise with regard to those who will not. Lastly, the objection here referred to, allows the thing insisted upon in this treatise to be of _some_ weight; and if so, it may be hoped it will have some influence. And if there be a probability that it will have any at all, there is the same reason in kind, though not in degree, to lay it before men, as there would be, if it were likely to have a greater influence.

Further, I desire it may be considered, with respect to the whole of the foregoing objections, that in this treatise I have argued upon the principles of others,[295] not my own: and have omitted what I think true, and of the utmost importance, because by others thought unintelligible, or not true. Thus I have argued upon the principles of the fatalists, which I do not believe: and have omitted a thing of the utmost importance which I do believe,--[viz.] the moral fitness and unfitness of actions, prior to all will whatever; which as certainly determine the divine _conduct_, as speculative truth and falsehood necessarily determine the divine _judgment_. Indeed the principle of liberty, and that of moral fitness, so force themselves upon the mind, that moralists, ancient as well as modern, have formed their language upon it. And probably it may appear in mine, though I have endeavored to avoid it; and, in order to avoid it, have sometimes been obliged to express myself in a manner, which will appear strange to such as do not observe the reason for it. But the general argument here pursued, does not at all suppose, or proceed upon these principles.

Now, these two abstract principles of liberty and moral fitness being omitted, religion can be considered in no other view, than merely as a question of fact: and in this view it is here considered. It is obvious, that Christianity, and the proof of it, are both historical. Even natural religion is, properly, a matter of fact. For, that there is a righteous Governor of the world, is so: and this proposition contains the general system of natural religion. But then, several abstract truths, and in particular those two principles, are usually taken into consideration in the proof of it: whereas it is here treated of only as a matter of fact. To explain this; That the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, is an abstract truth; but that they appear so to our mind, is only a matter of fact. This last must have been admitted, if any thing was, by those ancient sceptics, who would not admit the former: but pretended to doubt, whether there were any such thing as truth, or whether we could certainly depend upon our faculties of understanding for the knowledge of it in any case.

The assertion that there is, in the nature of things, an original standard of right and wrong in actions, independent upon all will, but which unalterably determines the will of God, to exercise that moral government over the world, which religion teaches, (_i.e._ finally and upon the whole to reward and punish men respectively as they act right or wrong;) contains an abstract truth, as well as matter of fact. But suppose that in the present state, every man without exception, was rewarded and punished, in exact proportion as he followed or transgressed that sense of right and wrong, which God has implanted in his nature: this would not be at all an abstract truth, but only a matter of fact. And though this fact were acknowledged by every one, yet the same difficulties might be raised as now are, concerning the abstract questions of liberty and moral fitness. And we should have a proof, even the certain one of experience, that the government of the world was perfectly moral, without taking in the consideration of those questions: and this proof would remain, in what way soever they were determined.

Thus, God having given mankind a moral faculty, the object of which is actions, and which naturally approves some actions as right, and of good desert, and condemns others as wrong, and of ill desert; that he will, finally and upon the whole, reward the former and punish the latter, is not an assertion of an abstract truth, but of what is as mere a fact, as his doing so at present would be. This future fact I have not, indeed, proved with the force with which it might be proved, from the principles of liberty and moral fitness; but without them have given a really conclusive practical proof of it, which is greatly strengthened by the general analogy of nature; a proof easily cavilled at, easily shown not to be demonstrative, (and it is not offered as such;) but impossible, I think, to be evaded, or answered. Thus the obligations of religion are made out, exclusive of the questions concerning liberty and moral fitness; which have been perplexed with difficulties and abstruse reasonings, as every thing may.

Hence therefore may be observed distinctly, what is the force of this treatise. It will be, to such as are convinced of religion upon the proof arising out of the two last mentioned principles, an _additional_ proof and confirmation of it: to such as do not admit those principles, an _original_ proof of it,[296] and a confirmation of that proof. Those who believe, will here find the scheme of Christianity cleared of objections, and the evidence of it in a peculiar manner strengthened. Those who do not believe will at least be shown the absurdity of all attempts to prove Christianity false, the plain undoubted credibility of it; and, I hope, a good deal more.

Thus, though some perhaps may seriously think, that analogy, as here urged, has too great stress laid upon it; and ridicule, unanswerable ridicule, may be applied, to show the argument from it in a disadvantageous light; yet there can be no question, but that it is a real one. For religion, both natural and revealed, implying in it numerous facts; analogy, being a _confirmation_ of all facts to which it can be applied, and the _only proof_ of most, cannot but be admitted by every one to be a material thing, and truly of weight on the side of religion, both natural and revealed. And it ought to be particularly regarded by such as profess to follow nature, and to be less satisfied with abstract reasonings.

CONCLUSION.

Whatever account may be given of the strange inattention and disregard, in some ages and countries, to a matter of such importance as religion; it would, before experience, be incredible, that there should be the like disregard in those, who have had the moral system of the world laid before them, as it is by Christianity, and often inculcated upon them: because this moral system carries in it a good degree of evidence for its truth, upon its being barely proposed to our thoughts. There is no need of abstruse reasonings and distinctions, to convince an unprejudiced understanding, that there is a God who made and governs the world, and will judge it in righteousness; though they may be necessary to answer abstruse difficulties, when once such are raised: when the very meaning of those words, which express most intelligibly the general doctrine of religion, is pretended to be uncertain; and the clear truth of the thing itself is obscured by the intricacies of speculation. To an unprejudiced mind, ten thousand thousand instances of design cannot but prove a designer. And it is intuitively manifest, that _creatures_ ought to live under a dutiful sense of their Maker; and that justice and charity must be his laws, to creatures whom he has made social, and placed in society.

The truth of revealed religion, peculiarly so called, is not indeed self-evident, but requires external proof, in order to its being received. Yet inattention, among us, to revealed religion, will be found to imply the same dissolute immoral temper of mind, as inattention to natural religion: because, when both are laid before us, in the manner they are in Christian countries of liberty, our obligations to inquire into both, and to embrace both upon supposition of their truth, are obligations of the same nature. Revelation claims to be the voice of God: and our obligation to attend to his voice is surely moral, in all cases. And as it is insisted, that its evidence is conclusive, upon thorough consideration of it; so it offers itself with obvious appearances of having something more than human in it, and therefore in all reason requires to have its claims most seriously examined into.

It is to be added, that though light and knowledge, in what manner soever afforded, is equally from God; yet a miraculous revelation has a peculiar tendency, from the first principles of our nature, to awaken mankind, and inspire them with reverence and awe. And this is a peculiar obligation, to attend to what claims to be so, with such appearances of truth. It is therefore most certain, that our obligations to inquire seriously into the evidence of Christianity, and, upon supposition of its truth, to embrace it, are of the utmost importance, and moral in the highest and most proper sense. Let us then suppose, that the evidence of religion in general, and of Christianity, has been seriously inquired into, by all reasonable men among us. Yet we find many professedly to reject both, upon speculative principles of infidelity. All of them do not content themselves with a bare neglect of religion, and enjoying their imaginary freedom from its restraints. Some go much beyond this. They deride God’s moral government over the world. They renounce his protection, and defy his justice. They ridicule and vilify Christianity, and blaspheme the author of it; and take all occasions to manifest scorn and contempt of revelation. This amounts to an active setting themselves against religion; to what may be considered as a positive principle of irreligion, which they cultivate within themselves; and, whether they intend this effect or not, render habitual, as a good man does the contrary principle. Others, who are not chargeable with all this profligateness, yet are in avowed opposition to religion, as if discovered to be groundless.

Now admitting, which is the supposition we go upon, that these persons act upon what they think principles of reason, (and otherwise they are not to be argued with,) it is really inconceivable, that they should imagine they clearly see the whole evidence of it, considered in itself, to be nothing at all: nor do they pretend this. They are far indeed from having a just notion of its evidence: but they would not say its evidence was nothing, if they thought the system of it, with all its circumstances, were credible, like other matters of science or history. Their manner of treating it must proceed, either from such kind of objections against all religion, as have been answered or obviated in the former part of this treatise; or else from objections, and difficulties, supposed more peculiar to Christianity. Thus, they entertain prejudices against the whole notion of a revelation, and miraculous interpositions. They find things in Scripture, whether in incidental passages, or in the general scheme of it, which appear to them unreasonable. They take for granted, that if Christianity were true, the light of it must have been more general, and the evidence of it more satisfactory, or rather overpowering: that it must and would have been, in some way, otherwise put and left, than it is. Now this is not imagining they see the evidence itself to be nothing, or inconsiderable; but quite another thing. It is being fortified _against_ the evidence, in some degree acknowledged, by thinking they see the system of Christianity, or something which appears to them necessarily connected with it, to be incredible or false; fortified against that evidence, which might otherwise make great impression upon them. Or, lastly, if any of these persons are, upon the whole, in doubt concerning the truth of Christianity; their behavior seems owing to their taking for granted, through strange inattention, that such doubting is, in a manner, the same thing as being certain against it.

To these persons, and to this state of opinion concerning religion, the foregoing treatise is adapted. For, all the general objections against the moral system of nature having been obviated, it is shown, that there is not any peculiar presumption at all against Christianity, considered either as not discoverable by reason, or as unlike to what is so discovered; nor any, worth mentioning, against it as miraculous, if any at all; none, certainly, which can render it in the least incredible. It is shown, that, upon supposition of a divine revelation, the analogy of nature renders it beforehand highly credible, I think probable, that many things in it must appear liable to great objections; and that we must be incompetent judges of it, to a great degree. This observation is, I think, unquestionably true, and of the very utmost importance. But it is urged, as I hope it will be understood, with great caution not to vilify the faculty of reason, which is _the candle of the Lord within us_;[297] though it can afford no light, where it does not shine; nor judge, where it has no principles to judge upon. The objections here spoken of, being first answered in the view of objections against Christianity as a matter of fact, are in the next place considered as urged more immediately against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of the Christian dispensation. And it is fully made out, that they admit of exactly the like answer, in every respect, to what the like objections against the constitution of nature admit of: that, as partial views give the appearance of wrong to things, which, upon further consideration and knowledge of their relations to other things, are found just and good; so it is perfectly credible, that the things objected against the wisdom and goodness of the Christian dispensation, may be rendered instances of wisdom and goodness, by their reference to other things beyond our view. Because Christianity is a scheme as much above our comprehension, as that of nature; and like that, a scheme in which means are made use of to accomplish ends, and which, as is most credible, may be carried on by general laws. And it ought to be attended to, that this is not an answer taken merely or chiefly from our ignorance: but from something positive, which our observation shows us. For, to like objections, the like answer is experienced to be just, in numberless parallel cases.

The objections against the Christian dispensation, and the method by which it is carried on, having been thus obviated, in general, and together; the chief of them are considered distinctly, and the particular things objected to are shown credible, by their perfect analogy, each apart, to the constitution of nature. Thus, if man be fallen from his primitive state, and to be restored, and infinite wisdom and power engages in accomplishing our recovery: it were to have been expected, it is said, that this should have been effected at once; and not by such a long series of means, and such a various economy of persons and things; one dispensation preparatory to another, this to a further one, and so on through an indefinite number of ages, before the end of the scheme proposed can be completely accomplished; a scheme conducted by infinite wisdom, and executed by almighty power. But now, on the contrary, our finding that every thing in the constitution and course of nature is thus carried on, shows such expectations concerning revelation to be highly unreasonable; and is a satisfactory answer to them, when urged as objections against the credibility, that the great scheme of Providence in the redemption of the world may be of this kind, and to be accomplished in this manner.

As to the particular method of our redemption, the appointment of a Mediator between God and man: this has been shown to be most obviously analogous to the general conduct of nature, _i.e._ the God of nature, in appointing others to be the instruments of his mercy, as we experience in the daily course of Providence. The condition of this world, which the doctrine of our redemption by Christ presupposes, so much falls in with natural appearances, that heathen moralists inferred it from those appearances: inferred that human nature was fallen from its original rectitude, and in consequence of this, degraded from its primitive happiness. However this opinion came into the world, these appearances kept up the tradition, and confirmed the belief of it. And as it was the general opinion under the light of nature, that repentance and reformation, alone and by itself, was not sufficient to do away sin, and procure a full remission of the penalties annexed to it; and as the reason of the thing does not at all lead to any such conclusion; so every day’s experience shows us, that reformation is not, in any sort, sufficient to prevent the present disadvantages and miseries, which, in the natural course of things, God has annexed to folly and extravagance.

Yet there may be ground to think, that the punishments, which, by the general laws of divine government, are annexed to vice, may be prevented: that provision may have been, even originally, made, that they should be prevented by some means or other, though they could not by reformation alone. For we have daily instances of _such mercy_, in the general conduct of nature: compassion provided for misery,[298] medicines for diseases, friends against enemies. There is provision made, in the original constitution of the world, that much of the natural bad consequences of our follies, which persons themselves alone cannot prevent, may be prevented by the assistance of others; assistance which nature enables, and disposes, and appoints them to afford. By a method of goodness analogous to this, when the world lay in wickedness, and consequently in ruin, _God so loved the world, that he gave his only-begotten Son_ to save it: and _he being made perfect by suffering, became the author of eternal salvation to all them that obey him_.[299] Indeed neither reason nor analogy would lead us to think, in particular, that the interposition of Christ, in the manner in which he did interpose, would be of that efficacy for recovery of the world, which the Scripture teaches us it was. But neither would reason nor analogy lead us to think, that other particular means would be of the efficacy, which experience shows they are, in numberless instances. Therefore, as the case before us does not admit of experience; so, that neither reason nor analogy can show how, or in what particular way, the interposition of Christ, as revealed in Scripture, is of that efficacy, which it is there represented to be; this is no kind nor degree of presumption against its being really of that efficacy.

Further: the objections against Christianity, from the light of it not being universal, nor its evidence so strong as might possibly be given, have been answered by the general analogy of nature. That God has made such variety of creatures, is indeed an answer to the former: but that he dispenses his gifts in such variety, both of degrees and kinds, among creatures of the same species, and even to the same individuals at different times; is a more obvious and full answer to it. And it is so far from being the method of Providence in other cases, to afford us such overbearing evidence, as some require in proof of Christianity; that on the contrary, the evidence upon which we are naturally appointed to act in common matters, throughout a very great part of life, is doubtful in a high degree. And admitting the fact, that God has afforded to some no more than doubtful evidence of religion; the same account may be given of it, as of difficulties and temptations with regard to practice. But as it is not impossible,[300] surely, that this alleged doubtfulness may be men’s own fault; it deserves their most serious consideration, whether it be not so. However, it is certain, that doubting implies a _degree_ of evidence for that of which we doubt: and that this degree of evidence as really lays us under obligations as demonstrative evidence.

The whole of religion then is throughout credible: nor is there, I think, any thing, relating to the revealed dispensation of things, more different from the experienced constitution and course of nature, than some parts of the constitution of nature are from other parts of it. If so, the only question which remains is, What positive evidence can be alleged for the truth of Christianity? This too in general has been considered, and the objections against it estimated. Deduct, therefore, what is to be deducted from that evidence, upon account of any weight which may be thought to remain in these objections, after what the analogy of nature has suggested in answer to them: and then consider, what are the practical consequences from all this upon the most sceptical principles one can argue upon (for I am writing to persons who entertain these principles): and upon such consideration it will be obvious, that immorality, as little excuse as it admits of in itself, is greatly aggravated, in persons who have been made acquainted with Christianity, whether they believe it or not: because the moral system of nature, or natural religion, which Christianity lays before us, approves itself, almost intuitively, to a reasonable mind, upon seeing it proposed.

In the next place, with regard to Christianity, it will be observed that there is a middle between a full satisfaction of the truth of it, and a satisfaction of the contrary. The middle state of mind between these two consists in a serious apprehension, that it may be true, joined with doubt whether it is so. And this, upon the best judgment I am able to make, is as far towards speculative infidelity, as any sceptic can at all be supposed to go, who has had true Christianity, with the proper evidences of it, laid before him, and has in any tolerable measure considered them. For I would not be mistaken to comprehend all who have ever heard of it; because it seems evident, that in many countries called Christian, neither Christianity nor its evidence, is fairly laid before men. And in places where both are, there appear to be some who have very little attended to either, and who reject Christianity with a scorn proportionate to their inattention; and yet are by no means without understanding in other matters. Now it has been shown, that a serious apprehension that Christianity may be true, lays persons under the strictest obligations of a serious regard to it, throughout the whole of their life; a regard not the same exactly, but in many respects nearly the same with what a full conviction of its truth would lay them under.

_Lastly_, it will appear, that blasphemy and profaneness, with regard to Christianity, are absolutely without excuse. There is no temptation to it, but from the wantonness of vanity or mirth; and those, considering the infinite importance of the subject, are no such temptations as to afford any excuse for it. If this be a just account of things, and yet men can go on to vilify or disregard Christianity, which is to talk and act as if they had a demonstration of its falsehood, there is no reason to think they would alter their behavior to any purpose, though there were a demonstration of its truth.

DISSERTATIONS.

OF PERSONAL IDENTITY.

OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.

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In the first copy of these papers, I had inserted the two following dissertations into the chapters, on _a Future Life_, and on the _Moral Government of God_; with which they are closely connected. But as these do not directly fall under the _title_ of the foregoing treatise, and would have kept the subject of it too long out of sight, it seems more proper to place them by themselves.

DISSERTATION I.

Personal Identity.

Whether we are to live in a future state, as it is the most important question which can possibly be asked, so it is the most intelligible one which can be expressed in language. Yet strange perplexities have been raised about the meaning of that identity or sameness of person, which is implied in the notion of our living now and hereafter, or in any two successive moments. And the solution of these difficulties hath been stranger than the difficulties themselves. For, personal identity has been explained so by some, as to render the inquiry concerning a future life of no consequence at all to us the persons who are making it. And though few men can be misled by such subtleties; yet it may be proper to consider them a little.

When it is asked _wherein_ personal identity consists, the answer should be the same, as if it were asked wherein consists similitude, or equality; that all attempts to define would but perplex it. Yet there is no difficulty at all in ascertaining _the idea_. For as, upon two triangles being compared or viewed together, there arises to the mind the idea of similitude; or upon twice two and four, the idea of equality: so likewise, upon comparing the consciousness of one’s self, or one’s own existence, in any two moments, there as immediately arises to the mind the idea of personal identity. And as the two former comparisons not only give us the ideas of similitude and equality; but also show us that two triangles are alike, and twice two and four are equal: so the latter comparison not only gives us the idea of personal identity, but also shows us the identity of ourselves in those two moments; the present, suppose, and that immediately past; or the present, and that a month, a year, or twenty years past. In other words, by reflecting upon that which is myself now, and that which was myself twenty years ago, I discern they are not two, but one and the same self.

But though consciousness of what is past does thus ascertain our personal identity to ourselves, yet to say, that it _makes_ personal identity, or is necessary to our being the same persons, is to say, that a person has not existed a single moment, nor done one action, but what he can remember; indeed none but what he reflects upon. And one should really think it self-evident, that consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal identity; any more than knowledge, in any other case, can constitute truth, which it presupposes.

This wonderful mistake may possibly have arisen from hence; that to be endued with consciousness is inseparable from the idea of a person, or intelligent being. For, this might be expressed inaccurately thus, that consciousness makes personality: and from hence it might be concluded to make personal identity. But though present consciousness of what we at present do and feel is necessary to our being the persons we _now are_; yet present consciousness of past actions or feelings is not necessary to our being the same persons who performed those actions, or _once had_ those feelings.

The inquiry, what makes vegetables the same, in the common acceptation of the word, does not appear to have any relation to this of personal identity: because, the word _same_, when applied to them and to a person, is not only applied to different subjects, but it is also used in different senses. For when a man swears to the same tree, as having stood fifty years in the same place, he means only the same as to all the purposes of property, and uses of common life; and not that the tree has been all that time the same, in the strict philosophical sense of the word. For he does not know, whether any one particle of the present tree be the same with any one particle of the tree which stood in the same place fifty years ago. And if they have not one common particle of matter, they cannot be the same tree in the proper philosophic sense of the word _same_: it being evidently a contradiction in terms, to say they are, when no part of their substance, and no one of their properties is the same: no part of their substance, by the supposition; no one of their properties, because it is allowed, that the same property cannot be transferred from one substance to another. Therefore when we say the identity of sameness of a plant consists in a continuation of the same life, communicated under the same organization, to a number of particles of matter, whether the same or not; the word _same_, when applied to life and to organization, cannot possibly be understood to signify, what it signifies in this very sentence, when applied to matter. In a loose and popular sense then, the life and the organization and the plant are justly said to be the same, notwithstanding the perpetual change of the parts. But in strict and philosophical language, no man, no being, no mode of being, no any thing, can be the same with that, with which it has indeed nothing the same. Now sameness is used in this latter sense, when applied to persons. The identity of these, therefore, cannot subsist with diversity of substance.

The thing here considered, and as I think, demonstratively determined, is proposed by Mr. Locke in these words, _Whether it_; _i.e._ the same self or person, _be the same identical substance_? And he has suggested what is a much better answer to the question, than that which he gives it in form. For he defines person, _a thinking intelligent being_, &c., and personal identity, _the sameness of a rational being_.[301] The question then is, whether the same rational being is the same substance: which needs no answer, because being and substance, in this place, stand for the same idea. The ground of the doubt, whether the same person be the same substance, is said to be this; that the consciousness of our own existence, in youth and in old age, or in any two joint successive moments, is not the _same individual action_,[302] _i.e._ not the same consciousness, but different successive consciousnesses. Now it is strange that this should have occasioned such perplexities. For it is surely conceivable, that a person may have a capacity of knowing some object or other to be the same now, which it was when he contemplated it formerly: yet in this case, where, by the supposition, the object is perceived to be the same, the perception of it in any two moments cannot be one and the same perception. And thus, though the successive consciousnesses, which we have of our own existence, are not the same, yet are they consciousnesses of one and the same thing or object; of the same person, self, or living agent. The person, of whose existence the consciousness is felt now, and was felt an hour or a year ago, is discerned to be; not two persons, but one and the same person; and therefore is one and the same.

Mr. Locke’s observations upon this subject appear hasty: and he seems to profess himself dissatisfied with suppositions, which he has made relating to it.[303] But some of those hasty observations have been carried to a strange length by others; whose notion, when traced and examined to the bottom, amounts, I think, to this:[304] “That personality is not a permanent, but a transient thing: that it lives and dies, begins and ends continually: that no one can any more remain one and the same person two moments together, than two successive moments can be one and the same moment: that our substance is indeed continually changing; but whether this be so or not, is, it seems, nothing to the purpose; since it is not substance, but consciousness alone, which constitutes personality: which consciousness, being successive, cannot be the same in any two moments, nor consequently the personality constituted by it.” Hence it must follow, that it is a fallacy upon ourselves, to charge our present selves with any thing we did, or to imagine our present selves interested in any thing which befell us yesterday; or that our present self will be interested in what will befall us to-morrow: since our present self is not, in reality, the same with the self of yesterday, but another like self or person coming in its room, and mistaken for it; to which another self will succeed to-morrow. This, I say, must follow. For if the self or person of to-day, and that of to-morrow, are not the same, but only like persons; the person of to-day is really no more interested in what will befall the person of to-morrow, than in what will befall any other person.

It may be thought, perhaps, that this is not a just representation of the opinion we are speaking of: because those who maintain it allow, that a person is the same as far back as his remembrance reaches. Indeed they use the words, _identity_, and _same person_. Nor will language permit these words to be laid aside; since if they were, there must be I know not what ridiculous periphrasis substituted in the room of them. But they cannot, _consistently with themselves_, mean, that the person is really the same. For it is self-evident, that the personality cannot be really the same, if, as they expressly assert, that in which it consists is not the same. And as, consistently with themselves, they cannot, so, I think it appears, they do not _mean_, that the person is _really_ the same, but only that he is so in a fictitious sense: in such a sense only as they assert, for this they do assert, that any number of persons whatever may be the same person. The bare unfolding this notion, and laying it thus naked and open, seems the best confutation of it. However, since great stress is said to be put upon it, I add the following things.

_First_, This notion is absolutely contradictory to that certain conviction, which necessarily and every moment rises within us, when we turn our thoughts upon ourselves, when we reflect upon what is past, and look forward upon what is to come. All imagination of a daily change of that living agent which each man calls himself, for another, or of any such change throughout our whole present life, is entirely borne down by our natural sense of things. Nor is it possible for a person in his wits to alter his conduct, with regard to his health or affairs, from a suspicion, that, though he should live to-morrow, he should not, however, be the same person he is to-day. Yet, if it be reasonable to act, with respect to a future life, upon the notion that personality is transient, it is reasonable to act upon it, with respect to the present. Here then is a notion equally applicable to religion and to temporal concerns. Every one sees and feels the inexpressible absurdity of it in the latter case; therefore, if any can take up with it in the former, this cannot proceed from the reason of the thing, but must be owing to inward unfairness, and secret corruption of heart.

_Secondly_, It is not an idea, or abstract notion, or quality, but a _being_ only, which is capable of life and action, of happiness and misery. Now all beings confessedly continue the same, during the whole time of their existence. Consider then a living being now existing, and which has existed for any time alive. This living being must have done and suffered and enjoyed, what it has done and suffered and enjoyed formerly, (this living being, I say, and not another) as really as it does and suffers and enjoys, what it does and suffers and enjoys this instant. All these successive actions, enjoyments, and sufferings, are actions, enjoyments, and sufferings, of the same living being. And they are so, prior to all consideration of its remembering or forgetting: since remembering or forgetting can make no alteration in the truth of past matter of fact. And suppose this being endued with limited powers of knowledge and memory, there is no more difficulty in conceiving it to have a power of knowing itself to be the same living being which it was some time ago, of remembering some of its actions, sufferings, and enjoyments, and forgetting others, than in conceiving it to know or remember or forget any thing else.

_Thirdly_, Every person is _conscious_, that he is now the same person or self he was as far back as his remembrance reaches: since when any one reflects upon a past action of his own, he is just as certain of the person who did that action, namely, himself who now reflects upon it, as he is certain that the action was done at all. Nay, very often a person’s assurance of an action having been done, of which he is absolutely assured, arises wholly from the consciousness that he himself did it. This he, person, or self, must either be a substance, or the property of some substance. If he, a person, be a substance; then consciousness that he is the same person is consciousness that he is the same substance. If the person, or he, be the property of a substance, still consciousness that he is the same property is as certain a proof that his substance remains the same, as consciousness that he remains the same substance would be; since the same property cannot be transferred from one substance to another.

But though we are thus certain, that we are the same agents, living beings, or substances, now, which we were as far back as our remembrance reaches; yet it is asked, whether we may not possibly be deceived in it? And this question may be asked at the end of any demonstration whatever: because it is a question concerning the truth of perception by memory. He who can doubt, whether perception by memory can in this case be depended upon, may doubt also, whether perception by deduction and reasoning, which also include memory, or indeed whether intuitive perception can. Here then we can go no further. For it is ridiculous to attempt to prove the truth of those perceptions, whose truth we can no otherwise prove, than by other perceptions of exactly the same kind with them, and which there is just the same ground to suspect; or to attempt to prove the truth of our faculties, which can no otherwise be proved, than by the use or means of those very suspected faculties themselves.[305]

DISSERTATION II.

The Nature of Virtue.

That which renders beings capable of moral government, is their having a moral nature, and moral faculties of perception and of action. Brute creatures are impressed and actuated by various instincts and propensions: so also are we. But additional to this, we have a capacity of reflecting upon actions and characters, and making them an object to our thought: and on doing this, we naturally and unavoidably approve some actions, under the peculiar view of their being virtuous and of good desert; and disapprove others, as vicious and of ill desert. That we have this moral approving and disapproving[306] faculty, is certain from our experiencing it in ourselves, and recognising it in each other. It appears from our exercising it unavoidably, in the approbation and disapprobation even of feigned characters; from the words right and wrong, odious and amiable, base and worthy, with many others of like signification in all languages applied to actions and characters: from the many written systems of morals which suppose it, since it cannot be imagined, that all these authors, throughout all these treatises, had absolutely no meaning at all to their words, or a meaning merely chimerical: from our natural sense of gratitude, which, implies a distinction between merely being the instrument of good, and intending it: from the distinction every one makes between injury and mere harm, which, Hobbes says, is peculiar to mankind; and between injury and just punishment, a distinction plainly natural, prior to the consideration of human laws.

It is manifest that great part of common language, and of common behavior over the world, is formed upon supposition of such a moral faculty; whether called conscience, moral reason, moral sense, or divine reason; whether considered as a sentiment of the understanding, or as a perception of the heart; or, which seems the truth, as including both. Nor is it at all doubtful in the general, what course of action this faculty, or practical discerning power within us, approves and what it disapproves. For, as much as it has been disputed wherein virtue consists, or whatever ground for doubt there may be about particulars; yet, in general, there is in reality a universally acknowledged standard of it. It is that, which all ages and all countries have made profession of in public: it is that, which every man you meet puts on the show of: it is that, which the primary and fundamental laws of all civil constitutions over the face of the earth make it their business and endeavor to enforce the practice of upon mankind: namely, justice, veracity, and regard to common good. It being manifest then, in general, that we have such a faculty or discernment as this, it may be of use to remark some things more distinctly concerning it.

_First_, It ought to be observed, that the object of this faculty is actions,[307] comprehending under that name active or practical principles: those principles from which men would act, if occasions and circumstances gave them power; and which, when fixed and habitual in any person, we call his character. It does not appear, that brutes have the least reflex sense of actions, as distinguished from events: or that will and design, which constitute the very nature of actions as such, are at all an object to their perception. But to ours they are: and they are the object, and the only one, of the approving and disapproving faculty. Acting, conduct, behavior, abstracted from all regard to what is in fact and event the consequence of it, is itself the natural object of the moral discernment; as speculative truth and falsehood is of speculative reason. Intention of such and such consequences, is indeed, always included; for it is part of the action itself: but though the intended good or bad consequences do not follow, we have exactly the same sense of the _action_, as if they did. In like manner we think well or ill of characters, abstracted from all consideration of the good or the evil, which persons of such characters have it actually in their power to do. We never, in the moral way, applaud or blame either ourselves or others, for what we enjoy or what we suffer, or for having impressions made upon us, which we consider as altogether out of our power: but only for what we do or would have done, had it been in our power: or for what we leave undone, which we might have done, or would have left undone, though we could have done.

_Secondly_, Our sense or discernment of actions as morally good or evil, implies in it a sense or discernment of them as of good or ill desert. It may be difficult to explain this perception, so as to answer all the questions which may be asked concerning it: but every one speaks of such and such actions as deserving punishment; and it is not, I suppose, pretended, that they have absolutely no meaning at all to the expression. Now the meaning plainly is not, that we conceive it for the good of society, that the doer of such actions should be made to suffer. For if, unhappily, it were resolved, that a man, who by some innocent action, was infected with the plague, should be left to perish, lest, by other people’s coming near him, the infection should spread; no one would say he _deserved_ this treatment. Innocence and ill desert are inconsistent ideas. Ill desert always supposes guilt: and if one be no part of the other, yet they are evidently and naturally connected in our mind. The sight of a man in misery raises our compassion towards him; and if this misery be inflicted on him by another, our indignation against the author of it. But when we are informed, that the sufferer is a villain, and is punished only for his treachery or cruelty; our compassion exceedingly lessens, and in many instances our indignation wholly subsides. Now what produces this effect is the conception of that in the sufferer, which we call ill desert. Upon considering then, or viewing together, our notion of vice and that of misery, there results a third, that of ill desert. And thus there is in human creatures an association of the two ideas, natural and moral evil, wickedness and punishment. If this association were merely artificial or accidental, it were nothing: but being most unquestionably natural, it greatly concerns us to attend to it, instead of endeavoring to explain it away.

It may be observed further, concerning our perception of good and of ill desert, that the former is very weak with respect to common instances of virtue. One reason of which may be, that it does not appear to a spectator, how far such instances of virtue proceed from a virtuous principle, or in what degree this principle is prevalent: since a very weak regard to virtue may be sufficient to make men act well in many common instances. On the other hand, our perception of ill desert in vicious actions lessens, in proportion to the temptations men are thought to have had to such vices. For, vice in human creatures consisting chiefly in the absence or want of the virtuous principle; though a man be overcome, suppose by tortures, it does not from thence appear to what degree the virtuous principle was wanting. All that appears is, that he had it not in such a degree, as to prevail over the temptation; but possibly he had it in a degree, which would have rendered him proof against common temptations.

_Thirdly_, Our perception of vice and ill desert arises from, and is the result of, a comparison of actions with the nature and capacities of the agent. For the mere neglect of doing what we ought to do, would, in many cases, be determined by all men to be in the highest degree vicious. This determination must arise from such comparison, and be the result of it; because such neglect would not be vicious in creatures of other natures and capacities, as brutes. It is the same also with respect to positive vices, or such as consist in doing what we ought not. For every one has a different sense of harm done by an idiot, madman, or child, and by one of mature and common understanding; though the action of both, including the intention, which is part of the action, be the same: as it may be, since idiots and madmen, as well as children, are capable not only of doing mischief but also of intending it. Now this difference must arise from somewhat discerned in the nature or capacities of one, which renders the action vicious; and the want of which, in the other, renders the same action innocent or less vicious: and this plainly supposes a comparison, whether reflected upon or not, between the action and capacities of the agent, previous to our determining an action to be vicious. Hence arises a proper application of the epithets, incongruous, unsuitable, disproportionate, unfit, to actions which our moral faculty determines to be vicious.

_Fourthly_, It deserves to be considered, whether men are more at liberty, in point of morals, to make themselves miserable without reason, than to make other people so: or dissolutely to neglect their own greater good, for the sake of a present lesser gratification, than they are to neglect the good of others, whom nature has committed to their care. It would seem, that a due concern about our own interest or happiness, and a reasonable endeavor to secure and promote it, (which is, I think, very much the meaning of the word prudence, in our language;) it would seem, that this is virtue, and the contrary behavior faulty and blamable; since, in the calmest way of reflection, we approve of the first, and condemn the other conduct, both in ourselves and others. This approbation and disapprobation are altogether different from mere desire of our own, or of their happiness, and from sorrow upon missing it. For the object or occasion of this last kind of perception is satisfaction or uneasiness: whereas the object of the first is active behavior. In one case, what our thoughts fix upon is our condition: in the other, our conduct.

It is true indeed, that nature has not given us so sensible a disapprobation of imprudence and folly, either in _ourselves_ or _others_, as of falsehood, injustice, and cruelty: I suppose, because that constant habitual sense of private interest and good, which we always carry about with us, renders such sensible disapprobation less necessary, less wanting, to keep us from imprudently neglecting our own happiness, and foolishly injuring ourselves, than it is necessary and wanting to keep us from injuring others; to whose good we cannot have so strong and constant a regard: and also because imprudence and folly, appearing to bring its own punishment more immediately and constantly than injurious behavior, it less needs the additional punishment, which would be inflicted upon it by others, had they the same sensible indignation against it, as against injustice, and fraud, and cruelty. Besides, unhappiness being in itself the natural object of compassion, the unhappiness which people bring upon themselves, though it be wilfully, excites in us some pity for them; and this of course lessens our displeasure against them. Still it is matter of experience, that we are formed so as to reflect very severely upon the greater instances of imprudent neglect and foolish rashness, both in ourselves and others. In instances of this kind, men often say of themselves with remorse, and of others with some indignation, that they deserved to suffer such calamities, because they brought them upon themselves, and would not take warning. Particularly when persons come to poverty and distress by a long course of extravagance, and after frequent admonitions, though without falsehood or injustice; we plainly, do not regard such people as alike objects of compassion with those, who are brought into the same condition by unavoidable accidents. From these things it appears, that prudence is a species of virtue, and folly of vice: meaning by _folly_, something quite different from mere incapacity; a thoughtless want of that regard and attention to our own happiness, which we had capacity for. And this the word properly includes; and, as it seems, in its usual acceptation: for we scarcely apply it to brute creatures.

However, if any person be disposed to dispute the matter, I shall very willingly give him up the words virtue and vice, as not applicable to prudence and folly: but must insist, that the faculty within us, which is the judge of actions, approves of prudent actions, and disapproves imprudent ones: I say prudent and imprudent _actions_ as such, and considered distinctly from the happiness or misery which they occasion. And by the way, this observation may help to determine what justness there is in the objection against religion, that it teaches us to be interested and selfish.

_Fifthly_, Without inquiring how far, and in what sense, virtue is resolvable into benevolence, and vice into the want of it; it may be proper to observe, that benevolence, and the want of it, singly considered, are in no sort the _whole_, of virtue and vice. For if this were the case, in the review of one’s own character, or that of others, our moral understanding and moral sense would be indifferent to every thing, but the degrees in which benevolence prevailed, and the degrees in which it was wanting. That is, we should neither approve of benevolence to some persons rather than to others, nor disapprove injustice and falsehood upon any other account, than merely as an overbalance of happiness was foreseen likely to be produced by the first, and of misery by the second. On the contrary, suppose two men competitors for any thing whatever, which would be of equal advantage to each of them; though nothing indeed would be more impertinent, than for a stranger to busy himself to get one of them preferred to the other; yet such endeavor would be virtue, in behalf of a friend or benefactor, abstracted from all consideration of distant consequences: as that examples of gratitude, and the cultivation of friendship, would be of general good to the world. Again, suppose one man should, by fraud or violence, take from another the fruit of his labor, with intent to give it to a third, who he thought would have as much pleasure from it as would balance the pleasure which the first possessor would have had in the enjoyment, and his vexation in the loss of it; suppose also that no bad consequences would follow: yet such an action would surely be vicious. Nay further, were treachery, violence, and injustice, no otherwise vicious, than as foreseen likely to produce an overbalance of misery to society; then, if in any case a man could procure to himself as great advantage by an act of injustice, as the whole foreseen inconvenience, likely to be brought upon others by it, would amount to; such a piece of injustice would not be faulty or vicious at all: because it would be no more than, in any other case, for a man to prefer his own satisfaction to another’s, in equal degrees.

The fact, then, appears to be, that we are _constituted_ so as to condemn falsehood, unprovoked violence, injustice, and to approve of benevolence to some preferably to others, abstracted from all consideration, which conduct is likeliest to produce an overbalance of happiness or misery. Therefore, were the Author of nature to propose nothing to himself as an end but the production of happiness, were his moral character merely that of benevolence; yet ours is not so. Upon that supposition indeed, the only reason of his giving us the above mentioned approbation of benevolence to some persons rather than others, and disapprobation of falsehood, unprovoked violence, and injustice, must be, that he foresaw this constitution of our nature would produce more happiness, than forming us with a temper of mere general benevolence. But still, since this is our constitution, falsehood, violence, injustice, must be vice in us; and benevolence to some, preferably to others, virtue; abstracted from all consideration of the overbalance of evil or good, which they may appear likely to produce.

Now if human creatures are endued with such a moral nature as we have been explaining, or with a moral faculty, the natural object of which is actions: moral government must consist in rendering them happy and unhappy, in rewarding and punishing them, as they follow, neglect, or depart from, the moral rule of action interwoven in their nature, or suggested and enforced by this moral faculty;[308] in rewarding and punishing them upon account of their so doing.

I am not sensible that I have, in this fifth observation, contradicted what any author designed to assert. But some of great and distinguished merit, have, I think, expressed themselves in a manner, which may occasion some danger, to careless readers, of imagining the whole of virtue to consist in singly aiming, according to the best of their judgment, at promoting the happiness of mankind in the present state; and the whole of vice, in doing what they foresee, or might foresee, is likely to produce an overbalance of unhappiness in it: than which mistakes, none can be conceived more terrible. For it is certain, that some of the most shocking instances of injustice, adultery, murder, perjury, and even of persecution, may, in many supposable cases, not have the appearance of being likely to produce an overbalance of misery in the present state; perhaps sometimes may have the contrary appearance.

This reflection might easily be carried on, but I forbear. The happiness of the world is the concern of Him who is the lord and the proprietor of it: nor do we know what we are about, when we endeavor to promote the good of mankind in any ways, but those which he has directed; that is indeed in all ways not contrary to veracity and justice. I speak thus upon supposition of persons really endeavoring, in some sort, to do good without regard to these. But the truth seems to be; that such supposed endeavors proceed, almost always, from ambition, the spirit of party, or some indirect principle, concealed perhaps in great measure from persons themselves. And though it is our business and our duty to endeavor, within the bounds of veracity and justice, to contribute to the ease, convenience, and even cheerfulness and diversion of our fellow-creatures: yet, from our short views, it is greatly uncertain, whether this endeavor will, in particular instances, produce an overbalance of happiness upon the whole; since so many and distant things must come into the account. And that which makes it our duty is, that there is some appearance that it will, and no positive appearance sufficient to balance this, on the contrary side; and also, that such benevolent endeavor is a cultivation of that most excellent of all virtuous principles, the active principle of benevolence.

However, though veracity, as well as justice, is to be our rule of life; it must be added, otherwise a snare will be laid in the way of some plain men, that the use of common forms of speech, generally understood, cannot be falsehood; and in general, that there can be no designed falsehood, without designing to deceive. It must likewise be observed, that in numberless cases, a man may be under the strictest obligations to what he foresees will deceive, without his intending it. For it is impossible not to foresee, that the words and actions of men, in different ranks and employments, and of different educations, will perpetually be mistaken by each other. And it cannot but be so, while they will judge with the utmost carelessness, as they daily do, of what they are not, perhaps, enough informed to be competent judges of, even though they considered it with great attention.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Among these were _Jones_, author of the admirable Treatise on the Canon of the New Testament: _Lardner_, _Maddox_, _Chandler_, Archbishop _Secker_, &c.

[2] Sermon at Spittle, on Abraham’s trial.

[3] Among them were CUDWORTH, born 1617; “Intel. Syst. of the Universe:” BOYLE, 1626; “Things above Reason:” STILLINGFLEET, 1635; “Letters to a Deist:” Sir I. NEWTON, 1642; “Observations on Prophecy:” LESLIE, 1650; “Short Method with Deists:” LOWTH, 1661, Vindic. of the Divine Author of the Bible: KING, 1669; “Origin of Evil:” SAM. CLARK, 1675; “Evidences of Nat. and Rev. Religion:” WATERLAND, 1683; “Scripture Vindicated:” LARDNER, 1684; “Credibility of Gospel History:” LELAND, 1691; “View of Deistical Writers,” and “Advantage and Necessity of Rev.:” CHANDLER, 1693; “Definition of Christianity,” on “Prophecy,” &c.: WARBURTON, 1698; “Divine Leg. of Moses;” Bishop NEWTON, 1704; “On the Prophecies:” WATSON, 1737; “Apology for Christianity,” (against Gibbon,) and also “Apology for the Bible,” (against Paine.)

[4] MCINTOSH: “Progress of Ethical Philosophy.”

[5] BROUGHAM: “Disc. on Nat. Theology.”

[6] Verisimile.

[7] [These three ways of being “like,” are very distinct from each other. The first is equivalent to a logical induction. The second produces belief, because the same evidence made us believe in a similar case. The third is just an analogy, in the popular sense of the term.]

[8] The story is told by Mr. Locke in the Chapter of Probability.

[9] [This is good common sense, and men always act thus if prudent. But it is not enough thus to act in the matter of salvation. “He that _believeth_ not shall be damned:” Mark xvi. 16. “He that _believeth_ hath everlasting life:” John iii. 36. “With the heart man _believeth_ unto righteousness:” Rom. x. 10. Belief is part of the sinner’s _duty_ in submitting himself to God; and not merely a question of prudence.]

[10] See Part II. chap. vi.

[11] Philocal. p. 23, Ed. Cant.

[12] [Some of these speculations, carried to the full measure of absurdity and impiety, may be found in Bayle’s great “Historical and Critical Dictionary.” See as instances, the articles ORIGEN, MANICHÆUS, PAULICIANS.]

[13] Ch. i.

[14] Ch. ii.

[15] Ch. iii.

[16] Ch. iv.

[17] Ch. v.

[18] Ch. vi.

[19] Ch. vii.

[20] Part II. Ch. i.

[21] Ch. ii.

[22] Ch. iii.

[23] Ch. iv.

[24] Ch. v.

[25] Ch. vi. vii.

[26] Ch. viii.

[27] [This chapter Dr. Chalmers regards as the least satisfactory in the book: not because lacking in just analogies, but because infected with the obscure metaphysics of that age. His reasoning, however, only serves to show that B. has perhaps made too much of the argument from the indivisibility of consciousness; and by no means that he does not fairly use it.

We certainly cannot object that the subject of identity is not made plain. Who has explained identity, or motion, or cohesion, or crystallization, or any thing? Locke goes squarely at the subject of personal identity, (see Essay, ch. 27,) but has rendered us small aid. His definition is, “Existence itself, which determines a being of any sort, to a particular time and place, incommunicable to two beings of the same kind.” I had rather define it “the uninterrupted continuance of being.” What ceases to exist, cannot again exist: for then it would exist after it had ceased to exist, and would have existed before it existed. Locke makes _consciousness_ to constitute identity, and argues that a man and a person are not the same; and that hence if I kill a man, but was not conscious of what I did, or have utterly forgotten, I am not the same person. Watts shows up this notion of Locke very ludicrously.

Butler, in his “Dissertation,” urges that consciousness _presupposes_ identity, as knowledge presupposes truth. On Locke’s theory, no person would have existed any earlier than the period to which his memory extends. We cannot suppose the soul made up of many consciousnesses, nor could memory, if material, spread itself over successive years of life.]

[28] I say _kind_ of presumption or probability; for I do not mean to affirm that there is the same _degree_ of conviction, that our living powers will continue after death, as there is, that our substances will.

[29] _Destruction of living powers_, is a manner of expression unavoidably ambiguous; and may signify either _the destruction of a living being, so as that the same living being shall be incapable of ever perceiving or acting again at all_; or _the destruction of those means and instruments by which it is capable of its present life, of its present state of perception and of action_. It is here used in the former sense. When it is used in the latter, the epithet _present_ is added. The loss of a man’s eye is a destruction of living powers in the latter sense. But we have no reason to think the destruction of living powers, in the former sense, to be possible. We have no more reason to think a being endued with living powers, ever loses them during its whole existence, than to believe that a stone ever acquires them.

[30] [The next paragraph indicates that Butler does not, as Chalmers thinks, consider this argument as “handing us over to an absolute demonstration.” It just places all arguments for and against the soul’s future life, in that balanced condition, which leaves us to learn the fact from revelation, free from presumptions _against_ its truth. This view of the case entirely relieves the objection as to the future life of brutes; and shows how entirely we must rely on revelation, as to the future, both of man and beast.]

[31] [Dodwell had published a book, in which he argues that human souls are not _naturally_ immortal, but become so, by the power of the Holy Ghost, in regeneration. Dr. Clarke replied. The controversy was continued by Collins. Dr. C. wrote four tracts on the subject.

These “presumptions” form the base of materialism, and hence the denial of a future state. Surely, thoughts and feelings, if material, have extension. But can any one conceive of love a foot long, or anger an inch thick? How superior to the gloomy mists of modern infidels have even pagans been! Cicero makes Cato say, “The soul is a simple, uncompounded substance, without parts or mixture: it cannot be divided, and so cannot perish.” And in another place, “I never could believe that the soul lost its senses by escaping from senseless matter; or that such a release will not enlarge and improve its powers;” and again, “I am persuaded that I shall only begin truly to live, when I cease to live in this world,” Xenophon reports Cyrus as saying, in his last moments, “O my sons! do not imagine that when death has taken me from you, I shall cease to exist.”]

[32] See Dr. Clarke’s Letter to Mr. Dodwell, and the defences of it.

[33] [As every particle of our bodies is changed within seven years, an average life would take us through many such changes. If the mind changes with the body, it would be unjust for an old man to be made to suffer for the sins of his youth. To escape this, the materialist is driven to affirm that _the whole_ is not altered, though every particle be changed.

This argument from the constant flux is irresistible. It proves our identity, and that matter and mind are not the same. Does it not also destroy all presumption that the Ego cannot exist without this particular body?]

[34] See Dissertation I.

[35] [The mind affects the body, as much as the body does the mind. Love, anger, &c. quicken the circulation; fear checks it; terror may stop it altogether. Mania is as often produced by moral, as by physical causes, and hence of late moral means are resorted to for cure. The brain of a maniac, seldom shows, on dissection, any derangement. But this does not prove that there was no _functional_ derangement.]

[36] [“S. What shall we say, then, of the shoemaker? That he cuts with his instrument only, or with his hands also? A. With his hands also. S. Does he use his eyes also, in making shoes? A. Yes. S. But are we agreed that he who uses, and what he uses, are different? A. Yes. S. The shoemaker, then, and harper, are different from the hands and eyes they use? A. It appears so. S. Does a man then _use_ his whole body? A. Certainly. S. But he who uses, and that which he uses are different. A. Yes. S. A man then is something different from his own body.” PLAT. ALCIBI. PRIM. p. 129, D. Stallb. Ed.

“It may easily be perceived that the _mind_ both sees and hears, and not those parts which are, so to speak, windows of the mind.” “Neither are we bodies; nor do I, while speaking this to thee, speak to thy body.” “Whatever is done by thy mind, is done by thee.” CICERO, Tusc. Disput. I. 20, 46 and 22, 52.

“The mind of each man is the man; not that figure which may be pointed out with the finger.” CIC., de Rep. b. 6, s. 24.]

[37] [Butler’s argument, if advanced for _proof_ would prove too much, not only as to brutes but as to man; for it would prove pre-existence. And this is really the tenet, (_i.e._ transmigration,) of those who arrive at the doctrine of immortality only by philosophy. Philosophy cannot establish the doctrine of a future state, nor can it afford any presumptions _against_ either a future or a pre-existent state.

Nothing is gained by insisting that reason teaches the true doctrine of the soul; any more than there would be by insisting that by it we learned the doctrine of a trinity, or atonement. Philosophy does teach that He who can _create_, under infinite diversity of forms, can _sustain_ existence, in any mode he pleases.

The reader who chooses to look further into the discussion as to the immortality of brutes, will find it spread out in POLIGNAC’S Anti-Lucretius, and still more in BAYLE’S Dictionary, under the articles PEREIRA, and RORARIUS. The topic is also discussed in DES CARTES on the Passions: BAXTER on The Nature of the Soul: HUME’S Essays, Essay 9: SEARCH’S Light of Nature: CHEYNE’S Philosophical Principles: WAGSTAFF on the Immortality of Brutes: EDWARDS’ Critical and Philosophical Exercitations: WATT’S Essays, Essay 9: COLLIBER’S Enquiry: LOCKE on the Understanding, b. 2, ch. ix.: DITTON on the Resurrection: WILLIS De Anima Brutæ.]

[38] [It is as absurd to suppose that a brain thinks, as that an eye sees, or a finger feels. The eye no more sees, than the telescope or spectacles. If the _nerve_ be paralyzed, there is no vision, though the eye be perfect. A few words spoken or read, may at once deprive of sight, or knock a person down.

The mind sometimes survives the body. Swift, utterly helpless from palsy, retained his faculties. In some, the body survives the mind. MORGAGNI, HALLER, BONNET, and others, have proved that there is no part of the brain, not even the pineal gland, which has not been found destroyed by disease, where there had been no hallucination of mind, nor any suspicion of such disease, during life.]

[39] Pp. 84, 85.

[40] [We are told by sceptics that “mind is the result of a curious and complicated organization.” A mere jumble of words! But were the mind material, there is no evidence that death would destroy it: for we do not see that death has any power over matter. The body remains the very same as it does in a swoon, till _chemical_ changes begin.]

[41] There are three distinct questions, relating to a future life, here considered: Whether death be the destruction of living agents; if not, Whether it be the destruction of their _present_ powers of reflection, as it certainly is the destruction of their present powers of sensation; and if not, Whether it be the suspension, or discontinuance of the exercise of these present reflecting powers. Now, if there be no reason to believe the last, there will be, if that were possible, less for the next, and less still for the first.

[42] This, according to Strabo, was the opinion of the Brachmans, νομίζειν μὲν γὰρ δὴ τὸν μὲν ἐνθάδε βίον, ὡς ἂν ἀκμὴν κυομένων εἶναι· τὸν δὲ θάνατον, γένεσιν εἰς τὸν ὄντως βίον, καὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα τοῖς φιλοσοφήσασι· Lib. xv. p. 1039, Ed. Amst. 1707. [“For they think that the present life is like that of those who are just ready to be born; and that death is a birth into the real life, and a happy one to those who have practised philosophy.”] To which opinion perhaps Antoninus may allude in these words, ὡς νῦν περιμένεις, πότε ἔμβρυον ἐκ τῆς γαστρὸς τῆς γυναικός σου ἐξέλθῃ, οὕτως ἐκδέχεσθαι, τὴν ὥραν ὲν ᾗ τὸ ψυχάριόν σου τοῦ ἐλύτρου τούτου ἐκπεσεῖται. Lib. ix. c. 3. [As this last passage may, by some, be thought indelicate, it is left untranslated.]

[43] [The _increase_ of a force in any direction, cannot of itself _change_ that direction. An arrow shot from a bow, towards an object, does not aim at some other object, by being shot with more force.]

[44] [Our nature will _always_ be ours, or we should cease to be ourselves, and become something else. And this nature is _social_. Every one feels, at least sometimes, that he is not complete in himself for the production of happiness; and so looks round for that which may fit his wants, and supply what he cannot produce from within. Hence amusements, of a thousand kinds, are resorted to, and still more, society. Society is a want of the mind; as food is of the body. Society, such as perfectly suits our real nature, and calls out, in a right manner, its every attribute, would secure our perfect happiness. But Such society must include God.]

[45] See Part II. chap. ii. and Part II. chap. iv.

[46] [Objections and difficulties belong to all subjects, in _some_ of their bearings. Ingenious and uncandid men may start others, which care and candor may remove. It is therefore no proof of weakness in a doctrine, that it is attacked with objections, both real and merely plausible. Error has been spread by two opposite means:--a dogmatic insisting on doubtful points, and an unteachable cavilling at certain truth.]

[47] Part I. chap. vii.

[48] [Our relation to God is “even necessary,” because we are his creatures: so that the relation must endure so long as we endure. But our relations to other creatures are contingent, and may be changed or abrogated.]

[49] Pp. 93, 94.

[50] [“The terms nature, and power of nature, and course of nature, are but empty words, and merely mean that a thing occurs usually or frequently. The raising of a human body out of the earth we call a miracle, the generation of one in the ordinary way we call natural, for no other reason than because one is usual the other unusual. Did men usually rise out of the earth like corn we should call that natural.” Dr. CLARKE, Controv. with Leibnitz.]

[51] [That man consists of parts, is evident; and the use of each part, and of the whole man, is open to investigation. In examining any part we learn what it _is_, and what it is _to do_: _e.g._ the eye, the hand, the heart. So of mental faculties; memory is to preserve ideas, shame to deter us from things shameful, compassion to induce us to relieve distress. In observing our whole make, we may see an ultimate design,--viz.: not particular animal gratifications, but intellectual and moral improvement, and happiness by that means. If this be our end, it is our duty. To disregard it, must bring punishment; for shame, anguish, remorse, are by the laws of mind, the sequences of sin.

See LAW’S Notes on King’s Origin of Evil.]

[52] [It is almost amazing that philosophy, because it discovers the laws of matter, should be placed in antagonism with the Bible which reveals a superintending Providence. The Bible itself teaches this very result of philosophy,--viz.: that the world is governed by _general laws_. See Prov. viii. 29: Job. xxxviii. 12, 24, 31, 33: Ps. cxix. 90, 91: Jer. xxxi. 35, and xxxiii. 25.]

[53] See Part II. chap. vi.

[54] Part II. chap. vi.

[55] The general consideration of a future state of punishment, most evidently belongs to the subject of natural religion. But if any of these reflections should be thought to relate more peculiarly to this doctrine, as taught in Scripture, the reader is desired to observe, that Gentile writers, both moralists and poets, speak of the future punishment of the wicked, both as to the duration and degree of it, in a like manner of expression and of description, as the Scripture does. So that all which can positively be asserted to be matter of mere revelation, with regard to this doctrine, seems to be, that the great distinction between the righteous and the wicked, shall be made at the end of this world; that each shall _then_ receive according to his deserts. Reason did, as it well might, conclude that it should, finally and upon the whole, be well with the righteous, and ill with the wicked: but it could not be determined upon any principles of reason, whether human creatures might not have been appointed to pass through other states of life and being, before that distributive justice should finally and effectually take place. Revelation teaches us, that the next state of things after the present is appointed for the execution of this justice; that it shall be no longer delayed; but _the mystery of God_, the great mystery of his suffering vice and confusion to prevail, _shall then be finished_; and he will _take to him his great power and will reign_, by rendering to every one according to his works.

[56] [Our language furnishes no finer specimens of the argument analogical. Butler here seizes the very points, which are most plausible and most insisted on, as showing the harshness and unreasonableness of Christianity; and overthrows them at a stroke by simply directing attention to the same things, in the universally observed course of nature.]

[57] Chap. i.

[58] See chaps. iv. and vi.

[59] [This chapter, more than any other, carries the force of positive argument. If in this world, we have _proofs_ that God is a moral governor, then in order to evince that we shall be under moral government _hereafter_, we have only to supply an intermediate consideration,--viz.: that God, as such, must be unchangeable. The argument, as just remarked, assumes a substantive form, because admitted facts, as to this world, exhibiting the very _principles_ on which God’s government goes at present, compel us not only to _suppose_ that the principles of God will remain, but to _believe_ so.]

[60] Chap. ii.

[61] The objections against religion, from the evidence of it not being universal, nor so strong as might possibly have been, may be urged against natural religion, as well as against revealed. And therefore the consideration of them belongs to the first part of this treatise, as well as the second. But as these objections are chiefly urged against revealed religion, I choose to consider them in the second part. And the answer to them there, ch. vi., as urged against Christianity, being almost equally applicable to them as urged against the religion of nature; to avoid repetition, the reader is referred to that chapter.

[62] Dissertation II.

[63] Chap. vi.

[64] See Lord Shaftesbury’s Inquiry concerning Virtue, Part II.

[65] [At the foundation of moral improvement, lies the conviction that what is right, is our happiness, no less than our duty. This again is based upon a conviction that God governs justly; and has all power over us for good or evil. As creation is full of the evidences of _design_, so is Providence. And as the human mind shows, in its structure, the most exquisite marks of design, so the government of mind shows a final object for all our faculties. Among the attributes of mind we observe, conspicuous, a disposition to seek ends, lay plans, and sacrifice present indulgence to future and greater good: and a facility in learning how to subordinate one thing to another, so as to secure success in our plans. This, with conscience to approve or disapprove our modes, constitutes an evident _adaptedness_ to a moral government on the part of God; and would be worse than superfluous, if there be no such government. Every rule of action, deduced by reason from the light of nature, may fairly be regarded as God’s law; and the inconveniences resulting from wrong actions, are God’s retributions. These retributions, felt or observed, are divine teachings, saying, emphatically, if you act thus you shall receive thus. We do actually so judge, in relation to physics. Every rule of motion, distance, gravitation, heat, electricity, &c. &c., is received as God’s law; and we would deem it insane to act in opposition.]

[66] [Consult CAPP on the Gov. of God: TWISSE Vindiciæ Prov. Dei: WITTICHII Excre. Theol.: DWIGHT’S Theol.: MARTINIUS de Gubernatione Mundi: LIEFCHILD on Providence: MORTON on do.: SHERLOCK on do.: RUTHERFORD on do.: and the Sermons of Thos. Leland, Porteus, Topping, Hunt, Davies, Horseley, South, Wisheart, Seed, Collings, and Doddridge.]

[67] Chap. ii.

[68] [In the structure of man, physical and mental, we find no contrivances for disease or pain, so that in general those who conform to the laws of their being, enjoy happiness; and suffering is chiefly the result of our own conduct. But, as without revelation we could only learn the evil of vice, by its effects, and would often learn it too late to retrieve our affairs, or our souls’ peace, God has in mercy given forth his teachings, by which, _beforehand_, we may know the effects of actions.]

[69] See Dissertation II.

[70] [It was contended by MANDEVILLE in his “_Fable of the Bees_,” that private vices, as luxury for instance, are often conducive to the well-being of society. This idea is fully refuted by WARBURTON, Divine Legation of Moses, b. 1: BERKELEY, Minute Philosopher, Dial. 2: and by BROWN, Characteristics, Ess. 2.]

[71] [A strong illustration of this distinction is seen in the “delivering up” of our Savior to be crucified. As to the mere act of delivering up, we find it referred, =1.= To God the Father, John iii. 16: Acts ii. 23: Rom. viii. 32. =2.= To Christ himself, Eph. v. 2, and v. 25, &c. In this last passage it is literally _delivered himself_. =3.= To the Jewish rulers, Luke xx. 20: Mark xii. 12. =4.= To Pontius Pilate, Matt. xxvii. 26: Mark xv. 15: John xix. 6. =5.= To Judas, Matt. xxvi. 15: Zec. xi. 12.

As to the _mere act_, Judas and Pilate did just what God the Father, and our Lord Jesus did. But how infinitely unlike the _qualities_ of the act!]

[72] [“When one supposes he is about to die, there comes over him a fear and anxiety about things in regard to which he felt none before. For the stories which are told about _Hades_, that such, as have practised wrong, must there suffer punishment, although made light of for a while, these torment the soul lest they should be true. But he who is conscious of innocence, has a pleasant and good hope, which will support old age.” PLATO, Respub. i. s. 5.]

[73] See Dissertation II.

[74] [Aside from revelation, our ideas of the divine attributes must be derived from a knowledge of our own. Among these is our moral sense, which constrains us to consider right and wrong as an immutable distinction, and moral worth as our highest excellence. Hence we ascribe perfect virtue to God. It does not follow from such reasoning, that we form a Deity after our own conceptions, for it is but the argument _a fortiori_, “He that formed the eye, shall he not see? He that teacheth man knowledge, shall he not know?” Ps. xciv. 9. We do not conceive of a Deity who sees just as we do; but that _he sees_, for he makes sight. So we infer that he has moral attributes, because we have them, from him.

This point is not sufficiently pressed upon infidels. They readily acknowledge God’s physical attributes, because the argument is addressed to their _understanding_, but deny his moral ones, because their _hearts_ are hardened through the deceitfulness of sin.]

[75] [It is easy to see that the occasional disadvantages of virtue, are no less conducive to moral excellence, than its being generally advantageous. In view of its general advantages, we are virtuous with a proper and commanded view to our instinctive desire for happiness. In face of its disadvantages, we cultivate virtue for its own sake.]

[76] [The common remark, “virtue brings its own reward,” is true only with qualifications. The apostles, as to _this_ life, were the most miserable of men: (1 Cor. xv. 9.) Virtue does not _always_ bring earthly rewards. The grand support of the good is drawn from considerations of that future state which the infidel denies. Observe, 1. We cannot suppose that God would so construct man, as that his principal comfort and reward for virtue, is a delusion. 2. Very good persons are often beset with painful doubts and fears, as to their future safety. Would God allow such doubts, if the expectation of future happiness were the _only_ reward of virtue? 3. This reward, at best, is private; but for the encouragement of virtue, it must have _obvious_ triumphs.

On the other hand, bad men grow callous to the rebukes of conscience, so that great sinners suffer less from remorse than small ones, and what is worse, owe their tranquillity to their guilt. Again, he who kills a good man, wholly _deprives_ him of his only reward, if this life alone gives it. And the villain who kills himself, escapes his only punishment.

Virtuous persons, in the strong language of ROBERT HALL,[A] would be “the _only_ persons who are wholly disappointed of their object; the only persons who (by a fatal and irreparable mistake), expecting an imaginary happiness in an imaginary world, lose their only opportunity of enjoying those present pleasures, of which others avail themselves; dooming themselves to grasp at shadows, while they neglect the substance, and harassed with a perpetual struggle against their natural propensities and passions, and all in vain!”

[A] Sermon on the Vanity of Man.]

[77] [Because, so soon as any community, or collection of persons, conclude a man to be wholly vicious in his course, and without any restraint of conscience, he is at once shorn of his influence, and will soon be stripped of all power of mischief. On the other hand, we see the might of virtue unarmed with power, in Luther, in Roger Williams, in Wm. Penn, and innumerable other instances.]

[78] Isa. lx. 21.

[79] P. 109.

[80] P. 110, &c.

[81] P. 111, &c.

[82] P. 118, &c.

[83] See this proof drawn out briefly, ch. vi.

[84] [This chapter is one of many attempts to account for the mixture of suffering and enjoyment in this world; and demands close examination both of its theory and its arguments. The student may consult, as he has opportunity, MUSÆI Disput.: HOLTZSFUSII Disp. de Lapsu Prim. Hominum: SELDEN de Laps. Angelorum: STAPFERI Inst.: WITSII Econom. Fœd.: BATE’S Harmony of the Divine Attrib.: CALCOTT on the Fall: SHUCKFORD on the Creation of Man: MANTON’S Sermons: SOUTH’S do.: TOPLADY’S do.: PEARSON on the Creed: LE CLERC’S Diss.: HENLY’S Dissert.: KENNICOTT on the Tree of Life: and FABRICIUS de Primo Peccato Angelorum Lapsorum.]

[85] [The _evils_ of life, are not to be regarded as entering, necessarily, into God’s plan of probation; and they are not here so presented. The Scriptures show that _all_ suffering is either punitive, or castigatory. Man at first was to be tried by temptations, not by sufferings.]

[86] Chap. ii.

[87] See Sermons preached at the _Rolle_, 1726, 2d ed. p. 205, &c. Pref. p. 25, &c. Serm. p. 21, &c.

[88] [“If we persist in our objection, notwithstanding these analogies, then should we conclude, either that we are under the regimen of an unrighteous Deity, or that there is no Deity at all.”--Dr. CHALMERS.]

[89] [Shall _we_ be of such? Shall we forget or disregard the great fact that when death has transferred us to other conditions, we, our proper selves, will remain? No longer, indeed, united with flesh and blood, surrounded with houses, lands, business, or enjoyments, such as the present, _but still ourselves_. Still with wants to be supplied, desires to be gratified, and capacities to be employed and developed!]

[90] Part II. chap. v.

[91] [This is one of those passages, remarked on in our introduction, as a statement not properly explained or guarded. We cannot suppose the author, to have overlooked the great fact of man’s fall and corruption. That the argument properly considered, stands good, is the verdict of such a man as CHALMERS. After speaking of human helplessness in matters of religion, he says, “There is nothing in this [helplessness] to break the analogies on which to found the negative vindication that forms the great and undoubted achievement of this volume. The analogy lies here:--that if a man wills to obtain prosperity in this life, he may, if observant of the rules which experience and wisdom prescribe, in general, make it good. And if he wills to attain blessedness in the next life, he shall, if observant of what religion prescribes, most certainly make it good; in conformity with the declaration, ‘he that seeketh findeth.’”]

[92] [It comes to this:--good things, in this life, are not forced upon us; for we may refuse them, or turn any of them into evils. Nor are they offered for our mere acceptance: but only as the _results_ of self-control and pains-taking. So is it, as to heaven.]

[93] [They _are_ an answer, but a cavil remains,--viz.: “the difference between temporal and eternal things, is so vast that the cases are not analogous.” Fairly considered, the cases are analogous, differing only in _degree_, and not at all in principle. What would be wrong on a great scale, is wrong on a small one.

Perhaps the analogy may be pressed further. As the happiness and life of some animals, may be sacrificed for the benefit of man, why may not the happiness and life of some men, be sacrificed for the good of innumerable beings of a higher order, who witness the affairs of this earth? It would but be securing “the greatest good of the greatest number.” No analogies could _teach_ this, for analogies of course teach nothing. But if the Scriptures contained this doctrine, immensely more repugnant than that which our author is here defending, would analogy offer repellant presumptions?]

[94] [That is, the son of Sirac, who says, “All things are double, one against another; and He hath made nothing imperfect: one thing established the good of another:” Ecclesiasticus xlii. 24.]

[95] [Consult MILLMAN’S Hist. of Christ, vol. i.: PRIESTLEY’S Institutes of Nat. and Rev. Rel., vol. i. ch. i.: and WHATELY’S Pol. Econ., sec. 5.]

[96] [We are too apt to overlook the effect of actions on the actor; (which is often the chief effect) in improving or impairing his own powers. A razor used to cut wood or stone, is not only put to an improper use, but spoiled for the use which is proper. But this is a faint illustration. The razor may be sharpened again; but how shall we restore a blunted sensibility, an enfeebled judgment, or a vitiated appetite? Our wrong-doing inflicts worse results on ourselves than on our victims; and the evil may spread disaster over our whole future. Hence the young make a fatal blunder when they suppose that an occasional indulgence in impropriety may be compatible with general welfare, and improvement. Instead of balancing the pros and cons of a particular act, in the scale of utility or pleasure, they should mark well its effects on themselves. See the description of how an upright being may fall; in a subsequent part of this chapter.]

[97] [“It might seem, at first sight, that if our state hereafter presented no temptations to falsehood, injustice, &c., our habit of indulging these vices here would be no disqualification for such a state; and our forming the contrary habits no qualification. But _habits_ of veracity, justice, &c. are not merely securities against temptations to the contrary, but needful for conserving the _principles_ of love of truth, justice, &c. As our happiness depends upon _the ratio_ between our circumstances and our dispositions, our happiness, in a state where things are ordered so as to give no scope for the practice of falsehood, injustice, &c., _must depend on our having formed a love for their opposites_. Besides, the circumstances of the future life may be such as only to remove temptations from characters formed by such moral discipline as we undergo in this life, and not all things that could be temptations to any one.”--PROF. FITZGERALD.]

[98] It may be thought, that a sense of interest would as effectually restrain creatures from doing wrong. But if by a _sense of interest_ is meant a speculative conviction or belief, that such and such indulgence would occasion them greater uneasiness, upon the whole, than satisfaction; it is contrary to present experience to say, that this sense of interest is sufficient to restrain them from thus indulging themselves. And if by a _sense of interest_ is meant a practical regard to what is upon the whole our happiness; this is not only coincident with the principle of virtue or moral rectitude, but is a part of the idea itself. And it is evident this reasonable self-love wants to be improved, as really as any principle in our nature. For we daily see it overmatched, not only by the more boisterous passions, but by curiosity, shame, love of imitation, by any thing, even indolence: especially if the interest, the temporal interest, suppose, which is the end of such self-love, be at a distance. So greatly are profligate men mistaken, when they affirm they are wholly governed by interestedness and self-love; and so little cause is there for moralists to disclaim this principle.--See p. 131.

[99] [Discipline is mainly promoted by a careful regard to acts of small individual moment. The subjecting of trivial acts to moral considerations, is the sure, and the only mode of self-culture. These acts are embryo habits, and we may often see clearly the moral character of a habit, when the single act seems indifferent. Thus viewed, the importance of single acts will seldom seem small. A single cigar, one glass of wine for convivial purposes, one story told with exaggerations, may change the complexion of our character, and of our whole destiny!

It is doing or refusing to do, from a law-abiding regard to consequences, that constitutes self-discipline. Papists wholly err in teaching the repression of bodily desires as in itself virtuous. Indulgence may be either an obstacle or an aid to moral progress, according to our reason for indulgence. When we can repress an appetite or passion whenever indulgence would be wrong, its mastery over us is broken; and when the passions and appetites act rightly, from force of virtuous habit, without direct volition, discipline is complete. Ascetic acts are only useful as _means_, and so long as they are _ascetic_ (askesis) are proofs of imperfect obedience. Discipline is good only _as_ discipline; and when complete, changes from a struggle between principle and inclination, to a spontaneous habit, and permanent mental peace.]

[100] [Chalmers objects to this hypothetical fall of man, that it wants harmony with the Scripture account. But I do not see the force of the objection. Butler _of course_ does not copy the Scripture account, for he would then depart from the aim and nature of his book. The Bible says man fell _suddenly_, no less in his state than in his character. Butler says that we could not reason out _how much_ disorder and damage would ensue from the first sin: and in saying this, avoids any incongruity with the Mosaic account, which tells us how much. What B. says of the formation of habit, by repeated transgressions, certainly cannot be gainsayed.

Adam “died,” the very day he ate the forbidden fruit. The sinner “lives” the very day he believes on the only-begotten Son of God. Increase of guilt, or growth in grace are predicable in both instances. In both also there is an instant transition into a new relationship with God.]

[101] [A forced or reluctant obedience is wholly incompatible with earthly happiness; but may, in the highest degree promote our _future_ happiness. It will not _long_ mar our happiness, even here; because being based on principle, and established by habit, it will, in process of time, be superseded by prompt and pleasurable submission. Thus a person _habitually_ virtuous, is hardly conscious of self-denial; a fact noticed by Aristotle. “He who abstains from bodily pleasures and delights, is virtuous in this very abstinence; but he who is troubled by it is undisciplined.” Ethic. Nic. ii. 3.]

[102] P. 145.

[103] [The student should learn to distinguish between the _kinds_ of necessity. There is--1. “Logical necessity,” which requires the admission of a consequent to a premise 2. “Moral necessity,” which requires means in order to ends. “Physical necessity,” which is the compulsory connection of sequences to antecedents, in the material world. 4. “Metaphysical necessity,” which belongs to God only, as existing eternally and immutably. All these exist and operate, and by them we govern ourselves.

But there are various other kinds of necessity, erroneous and pernicious, which may be grouped under two heads:--1. “Atheistic,” sometimes called the Democritic, which ascribes all things to the mechanical laws of matter. 2. “Theistic,” which admits the existence of God, but denies to him moral character, and makes him the arbitrary and only agent in the universe, and creatures not responsible. See COLLINGS on Providence, PRICE’S Dissertations, RUTHERFORD on Providence, CHARNOCK’S Sermons, and WHATELY’S Logic.]

[104] P. 157.

[105] P. 158.

[106] [HUME says, “though man, in truth, is a necessary agent, having all his actions determined by fixed and immutable laws, yet, this being concealed from him, he acts with the conviction of being a free agent.”

Which is the same as to say that God intended to conceal from men an important fact, involving the whole subject of right and wrong, but Mr. Hume found him out!]

[107] By _will_ and _character_ is meant that which, in speaking of men, we should express, not only by these words, but also by the words _temper_, _taste_, _dispositions_, _practical principles_: _that whole frame of mind, from whence we act in one manner rather than another_.

[108] Chap. ii.

[109] P. 157, &c.

[110] Chap. ii.

[111] Dissert. II.

[112] Serm. 2, at the _Rolls_.

[113] Dissert. II.

[114] However, I am far from intending to deny, that the will of God is determined, by what is fit, by the right and reason of the case; though one chooses to decline matters of such abstract speculation, and to speak with caution when one does speak of them. But if it be intelligible to say, that _it is fit and reasonable for every one to consult his own happiness_, then _fitness of action, or the right and reason of the case_, is an intelligible manner of speaking. And it seems as inconceivable, to suppose God to approve one course of action, or one end, preferably to another, which yet his acting at all from design implies that he does, without supposing somewhat prior in that end, to be the ground of the preference; as to suppose him to discern an abstract proposition to be true, without supposing somewhat prior in it, to be the ground of the discernment. It doth not therefore appear, that moral right is any more relative to perception, than abstract truth is; or that it is any more improper to speak of the fitness and lightness of actions and ends, as founded in the nature of things, than to speak of abstract truth, as thus founded.

[115] P. 118.

[116] P. 110, &c.

[117] Chap. ii.

[118] Dissertation II.

[119] Pp. 68, 71.

[120] Serm. 8th, at the _Rolls_.

[121] [Consult, in favor of the doctrine of necessity, atheistical writers generally; such as Fichte, Hegel, D’Holback, Comte, Crousse, Martineau, Leroux, and Holyoake--also, BELSHAM’S Essays, COLLINS on Liberty, CROMBIE on Phil. Necessity, HOBBES’ Liberty and Necessity, and Leviathan, PRIESTLEY on Liberty, HARTLEY on Man, and EDWARDS on the Will.

Against the doctrine, see BEATTIE’S Works, Part 2; Replies to Hobbes by BRAMHALL and LAWSON; Replies to Priestley by PALMER and BRYANT; GROVE on Liberty; CLARKE’S Sermons at the Boyle Lectures; GIBB’S Contemplations; KING’S Origin of Evil; REID on the Mind; WATTS on Liberty; HARRIS’ Boyle Lectures; JACKSON’S Defence; BUTTERWORTH on Moral Government.]

[122] [MAIMONIDES makes use of the following similitude. “Suppose one of good understanding, whose mother had died soon after he was born to be brought up on an island, where he saw no human being but his father nor the female of any beast. This person when grown up inquires how men are produced. He is told that they are bred in the womb of one of the same species and that while in the womb we are very small and there move and are nourished. The young man inquires whether when thus in the womb we did not eat, and drink, and breathe, as we do now, and is answered, No. Then he denies it, and offers demonstration that it could not be so. For says he, if either of us cease to breathe our life is gone; and how could we have lived close shut up in a womb for months? So if we cease to eat and drink, we die, and how could the child live so for months? and thus he satisfies himself that it is _impossible_ man should come into existence in such a manner.”]

[123] [Let us imagine a person to be taken to view some great historical painting, before which hangs a thick curtain. The attendant raises the curtain a few inches. Can the spectator, from the unmeaning strip of foreground, derive any conception of the figures yet concealed? Much less is he able to criticize their proportions, or beauty, or perspective, or even the design of the artist? The small fragment of a tree, or flower, or animal, or building, may seem quite unmeaning and even ugly, though the whole would present beauty, fitness, or grandeur. Now the portion of God’s dominions within our survey, is as utterly insignificant, compared to the universe, and its interminable duration, as, an atom compared to a planet or a man’s age to eternity.

The concluding observations of this chapter, abundantly remove every difficulty as to such ignorance being as valid against the _proofs_ of religion, as it is against _objections_ to it.]

[124] [No truly philosophical mind can be arrogant; because the wider the range of thought, the greater are the discoveries of our ignorance. The young student may well hesitate to decide points, on which the profoundest thinkers take opposite sides, and when conscious of inability intrust himself to the guidance of those whose lives are best.]

[125] Pp. 177, 178.

[126] P. 173, &c.

[127] P. 175.

[128] Pp. 72, 73.

[129] P. 68, and Part II. chap. vi.

[130] Serm. at the _Rolls_, p. 312, 2d ed.

[131] P. 172, &c.

[132] See Part II. ch. ii.

[133] P. 173.

[134] [The remainder of this chapter is a recapitulation of the whole argument from the beginning; and should be carefully conned.]

[135] Part II. ch. vi.

[136] P. 108.

[137] [There is a slight indication in this chapter that Butler falls into the old plan of settling the necessity of Christianity, before determining its truth. Paley discards this order of arrangement, in his very first sentence; and with good reason. The necessity of revelation is an abstraction; the proofs of it are patent facts. To hold in abeyance the credentials presented by Christianity, till we first satisfy ourselves that God could or would make any such announcements, is unphilosophical and irreverent. This chapter discusses the _importance_ rather than the necessity of revelation; and so is a fitting commencement of the discussion. Every truth disclosed in revelation, over and above the truths which natural religion furnishes, proves the _necessity_ of revelation, if we would know any thing of _such_ truths. And it is such truths which constitute the very peculiarities of revelation, and teach the _way of salvation_, for the sinful and helpless.]

[138] [No one can read the writings of the great sages of antiquity without a full and sad conviction that in relation to the character of God, the sinfulness of man, the future state, and the rules of living, those prime points on which we need knowledge, they were almost profoundly ignorant. See on this point, LELAND’S Adv. and Necess.: CHALMERS’ Nat. Theol.: MCCOSH’S Div. Gov.: PASCAL’S Thoughts: WARBURTON’S Div. Legation.]

[139] Invenis multos----propterea nolle fieri Christianos, quia quasi sufficiunt sibi de bona vita sua. Bene vivere opus est, ait. Quid mihi præcepturus est Christus? Ut bene vivam? Jam bene vivo. Quid mihi necessarius est Christus; nullum homicidium, nullum furtum, nullam rapinam facio, res alienas non concupisco, nullo adulterio contaminor? Nam inveniatur in vita mea aliquid quod reprehendatur, et qui reprehenderit faciat Christianum. _Aug. in Psal._ xxxi. [You find many who refuse to become Christians, because they feel sufficient of themselves to lead a good life. “We ought to live well.” says one. “What will Christ teach me? To live well? I do live well, what need then have I of Christ? I commit no murder, no theft, no robbery. I covet no man’s goods, and am polluted by no adultery. Let some one find in me any thing to censure, and he who can do so, may make me a Christian.”]

[140] [The true mode of distinguishing a temporary, local, or individual command from such as are of universal and perpetual obligation, is well laid down by WAYLAND, _Mor. Sci._ ch. ix. sec. 2.]

[141] [Natural religion shows us the danger of sin; but not the infinite danger of eternal retribution, and the hopelessness of restoration after death. And as to the efficacy of repentance, it rather opposes that doctrine than teaches it. At least it does not teach that repentance may be accepted, so as not only to cancel guilt, but restore to the favor of God.]

[142] [“Christianity was left with Christians, to be transmitted, in like manner as the religion of nature had been left, with mankind in general. There was however this difference that by an institution of external religion with a standing ministry for instruction and discipline, it pleased God to unite Christiana into _visible churches_, and all along to preserve them over a great part of the world, and thus perpetuate a general publication of the Gospel.” BUTLER’S sermon before the Soc. for Prop. the Gospel. He goes on to show, in that discourse, that these churches, however corrupt any may become, are repositories for the written oracles of God, and so carry the antidote to their heresies.]

[143] Rev. xxii. 11.

[144] [“It is no real objection to this, though it may seem so at first sight, to say that since Christianity is a _remedial_ system, designed to obviate those very evils which have been produced by the neglect and abuse of the light of nature, it ought not to be _liable_ to the same perversions. Because--1. Christianity is not designed primarily to remedy the defects of _nature_, but of an unnatural state of ruin into which men were brought by _the Fall_. And 2. It is remedial of the defects of nature in a _great degree_, by its giving additional advantages. 3. It might be impossible that it should be remedial in a greater degree than it is, without destroying man’s free agency; which would be to destroy its own end, the practice of virtue.”--FITZGERALD’S Notes.]

[145] [CHALMERS (Nat. Theol., b. v. ch. iv.) makes this very plain. He shows the _ethics_ of natural religion to be one thing and its _objects_ another. Natural religion discloses no Redeemer or Sanctifier; but it teaches how we should regard such a person, if there be one. It teaches love and conformity to such a being by the _relation_ in which we of course stand to him. How we are to _express_ that love and obedience it cannot teach.]

[146] See The Nature, Obligation, and Efficacy, of the Christian Sacraments, &c., [by WATERLAND,] and COLLIBER of Revealed Religion, as there quoted.

[147] [If Christianity were but “a republication of natural religion,” or as Tindall says, “as old as creation,” why do deists oppose it? It does indeed republish natural religion, but it adds stupendous truths beside. If it gave us no new light, no new motives, it would be but a tremendous curse, making us all the more responsible, and none the more instructed or secure.]

[148] P. 94.

[149] Ch. v.

[150] John iii. 5.

[151] This is the distinction between moral and positive precepts considered respectively as such. But yet, since the latter have somewhat of a moral nature, we may see the reason of them, considered in this view. Moral and positive precepts are in some respects alike, in other respects different. So far as they are alike, we discern the reasons of both; so far as they are different, we discern the reasons of the former, but not of the latter. See p. 189, &c.

[152] [Without offering the least objection to what is here said of the comparative value of moral and positive institutions, it should not be overlooked that sometimes, obedience to a positive rite is more indicative of an obedient spirit, than obedience to a moral rule. The latter is urged by its intrinsic propriety, over and above the command, and appeals to several of our finer impulses. The former rests singly on our reverence for the will of God. There are many who would repel a temptation to steal, or to lie, who yet are insensible to the duty of baptism or the Lord’s supper.]

[153] Matt. ix. 13, and xii. 7.

[154] Hosea vi. 6.

[155] See Matt. xii. 7.

[156] See ch. iii.

[157] [Dr. ANGUS judiciously remarks on this sentence, “This sentiment, as understood by Butler, is just, but very liable to abuse. Clearly, the Bible must be so interpreted as to agree with _all_ known truth, whether of natural religion or natural science. At the same time, to correct the theology of the Bible by the theology of nature, as finite and guilty men understand it, may involve the rejection of Bible theology entirely; and of the very light and teaching it was intended to supply. The converse of Butler’s statement is equally true, and even more important. If in natural theology there be found any facts, the seeming lesson of which is contrary to revealed religion, such seeming lesson is not the real one.” Practically, it will be found that seeming meanings of Scripture, really erroneous, are corrected by other parts of Scripture itself. I understand Butler as only affirming that we must interpret Scripture according to immutable principles, and _known truth_. The infidel rejects it for not conforming to his _assumed hypothesis_.]

[158] P. 203.

[159] Chaps. iii., iv., v., vi.

[160] Chap. vii.

[161] P. 172.

[162] [Papists urge that the actual conversion of the bread and wine in the Eucharist is an invisible miracle. But an invisible miracle is such because wrought under circumstances which _exclude_ examination: while transubstantiation _invites_ and _facilitates_ examination. It is wrought publicly, and constantly, and yet cannot be discovered to be a miracle. Indeed it supposes the working of a second miracle, to make the first invisible.]

[163] [Paley shows conclusively that a denial of miracles leads not only to a denial of revelation, but a denial of the existence of God, all of whose extraordinary acts are necessarily miraculous.]

[164] [WHATELY, in his _Logic_, b. iii., has shown the folly of the Deistical attempts to explain our Savior’s miracles as mere natural events. Having labored to show this of some _one_ of the miracles, they then do so as to _another_, and thence infer that _all_ were accidental conjunctures of natural circumstances. He says, they might as well argue “that because it is not improbable one may throw sixes once in a hundred throws, therefore it is no more improbable that one may throw sixes a hundred times running.”

FITZGERALD says, “the improbability of a whole series of strange natural events, taking place unaccountably, one after another, amounts to a far greater improbability than is involved in the admission of miracles.”]

[165] [That man, at first, must have had supernatural _instructions_, or in other words some revelations, is shown by Archbishop WHATELY in his “Origin of Civilization.” Rev. SAMUEL STANHOPE SMITH expresses his conviction, both from reason and history, that man in his savage state could not even have preserved life without instruction from his Creator.]

[166] [The maintenance by the Jews, of a system of pure Theism, through so many and so rude ages, without being superior, or even equal to their neighbors, in science and civilization, can only be accounted for on the presumption of a revelation.]

[167] P. 166, &c.

[168] [MILLS (Logic, chap. 24, § 5,) points out what he deems a mistake of “some of the writers against Hume on Miracles,” in confounding the improbability of an event, before its occurrence, with the improbability afterwards; that is, considering them equal in degree. He fully proves that the great Laplace fell into this error, and the student should consult the passage.

Prof. FITZGERALD holds Butler to have fallen into the mistake adverted to by Mills; and quotes the latter author in a way which seems to make him say that such is his opinion also. I do not so understand Mills, nor do I see that Butler has confounded these meanings; but the very contrary. He expressly affirms, and most truly, that the strongest presumption may lie against “the most ordinary facts _before the proof_ which yet is overcome by almost any proof.” Butler’s position here, may be thus illustrated. Suppose a hundred numbers to be put in a box, and it is proposed to draw out the number 42. Now there are 99 chances to 1 against drawing that, or any other _given_ number. But suppose a child tells you he put the hundred numbers into a box, and drew out one, and it proved to be 42; you at once believe, for that was as likely to come as any other.

The proof of Christianity from prophecy becomes amazingly strong, thus viewed. There are many predictions, for instance that Christ should be born at a certain time, and place, and under certain very particular circumstances. The probabilities against such a _conjuncture_ of events are almost infinite; yet they happened exactly as foretold.]

[169] [For instance, a mass of ice or snow, may imperceptibly accumulate for an age, and then suddenly fall and overwhelm a village. Or a planet, or comet, may have been gradually nearing our earth for a million of years, without producing, _as yet_, any effect on our orbit; but in process of time, its proximity may work great changes in our condition.]

[170] P. 208.

[171] 1 Cor. i. 28.

[172] See Chap. vi.

[173] See Chap. vi.

[174] [See note, page 218.]

[175] P. 220.

[176] [It is not to be understood that Butler would not have the ordinary rules of interpretation applied to the Holy Scriptures. Because the interpretation, “if not gathered _out_ of the words, must be brought _into_ them.” We cannot interpret them as if we knew beforehand, what the Holy Ghost meant to say; as SPINOZA proposes to do, in his Philosophia Scripturæ Interpretes. The student will do well to consult BENSON’S Hulsean Lectures on Scripture Difficulties: KING’S Morsels of Criticism: STORR, Exertationes Exeget.: MICHAELIS, Introd. ad. Nov. Test.: and FEATLEY’S Key.]

[177] Pp. 207, 208.

[178] [See 1 Cor. xii. 1-10: xiii. 1: and xiv. 1-19.]

[179] [“The power of healing, or working miracles, is, during the whole course of its operation, one continued arrest or diversion of the general laws of matter and motion. It was therefore fit that this power should be given occasionally. But the _speaking with tongues_, when once the gift was conferred, became thenceforth a natural power; just as the free use of members of the body, after being restored, by miracle, to the exercise of their natural functions. In healing, the apostles are to be considered as the workers of a miracle; in speaking strange tongues, as persons on whom a miracle is performed.”--WARBURTON, Doct. of Grace, b. i. ch. iii.]

[180] Heb. vi. 1.

[181] Acts iii. 21.

[182] [The doctrine of “development” has of late been popular in some quarters. Butler here shows the only _safe_ notion we may entertain on that subject. “Exact thought, and careful consideration” may show us how to confute specious heresies, expound embarrassing passages, dissipate painful doubts, and remove many prejudices or misapprehensions. But revelation is complete as it stands.

We may hope for progress in theology as in other sciences; not in the development of new facts or faith, as Papists and Socinians pretend, but in the increase of sound wisdom, aided by a more perfect interpretation of God’s word.]

[183] Chap. vi.

[184] Chap. v.

[185] Chap. vii.

[186] Chap. iv. latter part, and v. vi.

[187] [This pregnant paragraph should receive very full attention. We know much of men, little of God. What men are likely to do, or say, in certain circumstances, is often very clear; and generally may be guessed at. But what God would do or say in new contingencies, who shall attempt to prescribe or predict? We are poorly qualified to assert that such and such declarations could not have come from infinite wisdom; but we are quite competent to affirm that such and such things could not have come from human contrivance or enthusiasm.]

[188] In the foregoing chapter.

[189] Part I, ch. vii., to which this all along refers.

[190] [“It is the last step of reason to know there is an infinity of things which surpass it.”--PASCAL. “The wall of adamant which bounds human inquiry, has scarcely ever been discovered by any adventurer, till he was aroused by the shock that drove him back.”--Sir JAS. MACKINTOSH. “Of the dark parts of revelation there are two sorts: one which may be cleared up by the studious; the other which will always reside within the shadow of God’s throne where it would be impiety to intrude.”--WARBURTON. “A Christianity without mystery is as unphilosophical as it is unscriptural.”--ANGUS.]

[191] John xi. 52.

[192] 2 Peter iii. 13.

[193] 1 Peter i. 11, 12.

[194] Phil. ii. [6-11.]

[195] [The influences of the Holy Spirit are not only “given to good men,” but are sent upon many who live unmindful of eternity, quickening their consciences, enlightening their understandings and arresting their passions, and thus it is they are converted unto the truth in Christ.]

[196] John xiv. 2.

[197] John v. 22, 23.

[198] Matt. xxviii. 18.

[199] 1 Cor. xv. 28.

[200] 1 Tim. iii. 16.

[201] P. 174, &c.

[202] 1 Cor. i. [18-25.]

[203] Pp. 178, 179.

[204] Pp. 180, 181.

[205] P. 172, &c.

[206] [“Providence hurries not himself to display to-day the consequence of the principle he yesterday announced. He will draw it out in the lapse of ages Even according to our reasoning logic is none the less sure, because it is slow.”--GUIZOT on Civilization, Lect. I.

How impressively is this sentiment sustained by modern geology, and astronomy!]

[207] [“Philosophers make shameful and dangerous mistakes, when they judge of the Divine economy. He cannot, they tell us, act thus, it would be contrary to his wisdom, or his justice, &c. But while they make these peremptory assertions they show themselves to be unacquainted with the fundamental rules of their own science, and with the origin of all late improvements. True philosophy would begin the other way, with observing the constitution of the world, how God has made us, and in what circumstances he has placed us, and _then_ from what he has done, form a sure judgment what he would do. Thus might they learn ‘the invisible things of God from those which are clearly seen’ the things which are not accomplished from those which are.”--POWELL’S _Use and Abuse of Philosophy_.]

[208] 1 Tim. ii. 5.

[209] [The interposition of a man of known probity and worth often saves the thoughtless or the guilty from punishment. Mediation is seen in a thousand forms in the arrangements of social life; and the common sense of all mankind approves of it. The release of the offending, by the intercession of the good, and all the benefits of advice, caution, example, instruction, persuasion, and authority, are instances of mediation.]

[210] [MR. NEWMAN notices a distinction between the facts of revelation, and its principles; and considers the argument from analogy more concerned with its principles than with its facts. “The revealed facts are special and singular, from the nature of the case, but the revealed principles are common to all the works of God; and if the Author of nature be the author of grace, it may be expected that the principles displayed in them will be the same, and form a connecting link between them. In this identity of _principle_, lies the analogy of natural and revealed religion, in Butler’s sense of the word. The Incarnation is a fact, and cannot be paralleled by any thing in nature: the doctrine of mediation is a principle, and is abundantly exemplified in nature.”--_Essay on Developments._]

[211] [The student will find the inadequacy of repentance to cancel guilt, beautifully exhibited by WAYLAND, Mor. Science: MAGEE, Atonement: HOWE, Living Temple.]

[212] P. 232, &c.

[213] John iii. 16.

[214] It cannot, I suppose, be imagined, even by the most cursory reader, that it is, in any sort, affirmed or implied in any thing said in this chapter, that none can have the benefit of the general redemption, but such as have the advantage of being made acquainted with it in the present life. But it may be needful to mention, that several questions, which have been brought into the subject before us, and determined, are not in the least entered into here, questions which have been, I fear, rashly determined, and perhaps with equal rashness contrary ways. For instance, whether God could have saved the world by other means than the death of Christ, consistently with the general laws of his government. And had not Christ come into the world, what would have been the future condition of the better sort of men; those just persons over the face of the earth, for whom Manasses in his prayer[A] asserts, repentance was not appointed. The meaning of the first of these questions is greatly ambiguous: and neither of them can properly be answered, without going upon that infinitely absurd supposition, that we know the whole of the case. And perhaps the very inquiry, _What would have followed, if God had not done as he has_, may have in it some very great impropriety: and ought not to be carried on any further than is necessary to help our partial and inadequate conceptions of things.

[A] [The “prayer of Manasses” is one of the apocryphal books of the Old Testament, which next precedes “Maccabees.”]

[215] John i., and viii. 12.

[216] Rom. iii. 25, v. 11: 1 Cor. v. 7: Eph. v. 2: 1 John ii. 2: Matt xxvi. 28.

[217] John i. 29, 36, and throughout the book of Revelation.

[218] Throughout the epistle to the Hebrews.

[219] Isa. liii.: Dan. ix. 24: Ps. cx. 4.

[220] Heb. x. 1.

[221] Heb. viii. 4, 5.

[222] Heb. x. 4, 5, 7, 9, 10.

[223] Heb. ix. 28.

[224] John xi. 51, 52.

[225] 1 Pet. iii. 18.

[226] Matt. xx. 28: Mark x. 45: 1 Tim. ii. 6.

[227] 2 Pet. ii. 1: Rev. xiv. 4: 1 Cor. vi. 20.

[228] 1 Pet. i. 19: Rev. v. 9: Gal. iii. 13.

[229] Heb. vii. 25: 1 John ii. 1, 2.

[230] Heb. ii. 10.: v. 9.

[231] 2 Cor. v. 19: Rom. v. 10: Eph. ii. 16.

[232] Heb. ii. 14. See also a remarkable passage in the book of Job, xxxiii. 24.

[233] Phil. ii. 8, 9: John iii. 35, and v. 22, 23.

[234] Rev. v. 12, 13.

[235] John vi. 14.

[236] P. 188, &c.

[237] Eph. iv. 12, 13.

[238] John xiv. 2, 3: Rev. iii. 21, and xi. 15.

[239] 2 Thess. i. 8.

[240] Heb. ix. 26.

[241] [Consult MAGEE, on Atonement: STAPFERI Institutiones: TURRETIN, De Satisfactione: CHALMERS, Discourses: OWEN, Satis. of Christ.]

[242] P. 194, &c.

[243] [This objection is ably urged by TINDALL. The answer of our author is complete. We should remember, that twice in the history of mankind, revelation _has been_ universal. The first pair, and the occupants of the ark, comprised the whole population. But how soon was light rejected! Christianity is universal, in nature and intention; is to become so in fact; and according to a very probable construction of prophecy, will continue to be universal, for three hundred and sixty thousand years.]

[244] [May not this be a principal object of the Apocalypse? As the book of Daniel furnished a constant and powerful support to the faith of the Jew, by the constant development of prophecy, so the Apocalypse, rightly studied must powerfully, and through all time, support the faith of the Christian by the continual unfolding and verification of its predictions.]

[245] 2 Cor. viii. 12.

[246] Introduction.

[247] Part I. chap. v.

[248] Part I. chap. iv. and pp. 156, 157.

[249] Pp. 156, 157.

[250] Dan. xii. 10. See also Isa. xxix. 13, 14: Matt. vi. 23, and xi. 25, and xiii. 11, 12: John iii. 19, and v. 44: 1 Cor. ii. 14, and 2 Cor. iv. 4: 2 Tim. iii. 13; and that affectionate as well as authoritative admonition, so very many times inculcated, _He that hath ears to hear, let him hear_. Grotius saw so strongly the thing intended in these and other passages of Scripture of the like sense, as to say, that the proof given us of Christianity was less than it might have been, for this very purpose: _Ut ita sermo Evangelii tanquam lapis esset Lydius ad quem ingenia sanabilia explorarentur_. De Ver. R. C. lib. ii. [So that the Gospel should be a touchstone, to test the honesty of men’s dispositions.]

[251] Pp. 100, 257, &c.

[252] [See WITSII Meletemeta, Diss. IV.: PFAFII Disput.: CAMPBELL on Miracles: DOUGLASS’ Criterion: FARMER’S Dissertations: PALEY’S Evid.: TAYLOR’S Apol. of Ben Mordecai: TUCKER’S Light of Nat.: WATSON’S Tracts, vol. iv.: JORTIN’S Sermons: Bp. FLEETWOOD’S Essays: BOYLE Lectures: LARDNER’S Credibility.]

[253] [“The miracles of the Jewish historian, are intimately connected with all the civil affairs, and make a necessary and inseparable part. The whole history is founded in them; it consists of little else; and if it were not a history of them, it would be a history of nothing.”--BOLINGBROKE, Posthumous Works, vol. iii. p. 279.]

[254] [An admirable work on this recondite mode of proving the truth of the New Testament narrative, is PALEY’S Horæ Paulinæ. The same department of evidence is ably handled by BIRK, in his Horæ Evangelicæ, and Horæ Apostolicæ: GRAVES on the Pentateuch: and BLUNT in his “Undesigned Coincidences both of the Old and New Testament.” GROTIUS, De Veritate, has some excellent passages on the same subject.]

[255] [Clem. Rom. Ep. 1. c. 47.] CLEMENT, who is here quoted, lived in the first century, and is mentioned Phil. iv. 3. His epistle to the Corinthians, written in Greek, contains the passage here referred to, which may be thus translated: “Take the letter of the blessed Paul the Apostle. What did he write to you, in the first beginning of the Gospel? Truly he sent you a divinely inspired letter about himself, and Cephas, and Apollos.”

[256] Gal. i.: 1 Cor. xi. 23, &c.: 1 Cor. xv. 8.

[257] Rom. xv. 19: 1 Cor. xii. 8, 9, 10-28, &c., and xiii. 1, 2, 8, and the whole 14th chapter: 2 Cor. xii. 12, 13: Gal. iii. 2, 5.

[258] See the Koran, chap. xiii. and chap. xvii.

[259] [MAHOMET expressly declares that he worked no _public_ miracles in confirmation of his mission, “because the former nations have charged them with imposture.” He claims, however, to have had private miraculous assurances of his mission, and most preposterous they were.

WHATELY, in his Christian Evidences, has handled this aspect of miracles with great ability. See also PALEY’S Evidences, sec. 3: and GIBBON’S Decline and Fall, chap. 1.]

[260] [ALEXANDER, in his Evidences, and several other writers have placed this argument in a very convincing light. ARNOBIUS, one of the earliest Christian writers, asks, “Shall we say that the men of those times were inconsiderate, deceitful, stupid, and brutish enough to feign having seen what they never saw? and that when they might have lived in peace and comfort, they chose gratuitous hatred and obloquy?”

The _rejection_ of Christianity by so many in the first age was the result of the continued action of personal and hereditary prejudice and depravity, capable of resisting any supposable evidence. The _reception_ of Christianity by multitudes, under the same evidences, and to their immediate personal damage, shows strongly that there was enough evidence to produce those effects. Thus the rejection by some does not countervail the acceptance by others.]

[261] P. 294, &c.

[262] [Compare BUTLER’S Sermons; on Balaam, and on Self-deceit.]

[263] See the foregoing chapter.

[264] [“Whenever a general scheme is known to be pursued by a writer, that scheme becomes the true key in the hands of his reader, for unlocking the meaning of particular parts, which would otherwise not be seen clearly to refer to such scheme. The inspired writers had one common and predominant scheme in view, which was to _bear testimony to Jesus_. Whatever passages occur in their writings, which bear an apt and easy resemblance to the history of Jesus, may, or rather must in all reasonable construction, be applied to him.”--HURD on the Proph., p. 117.]

[265] [Consult on this point, GULICK, Theologia Prophetica: VITRINGA, Observationes: HENGSTENBURG, Christologia: HORSLEY’S Tracts and Sermons: KING’S Morsels of Criticism: WAUGH’S Dissertations: LYALL’S Propœdia Prophetica.]

[266] It appears that Porphyry did nothing worth mentioning in this way. For Jerome on the place says: _Duas posteriores bestias--in uno Macedonum regno ponit_. And as to the ten kings; _Decem reges enumerat, qui fuerunt sævissimi: ipsosque reges non unius ponit regni, verbi gratia, Macedoniæ, Syriæ, Asiæ, et Ægypti; sed de diversis regnis unum efficit regum ordinem_. [“The two latter beasts he places in one of the Macedonian kingdoms.” “He reckons up ten kings who had been excessively cruel and these not kings of one country, as Macedonia, for instance, or Syria, or Asia, or Egypt; but makes up his set of kings out of different kingdoms.”] In this way of interpretation, any thing may be made of any thing.

[267] P. 189, &c.

[268] John i. 3.

[269] Eph. iii. 9.

[270] Acts iii. 21.

[271] Rev. x. 7.

[272] Dan. ii. 44.

[273] Dan. vii. 22.

[274] Rev. xi. 17, 18; xx. 6.

[275] Dan. vii. 27.

[276] Chap. ii. iii. &c.

[277] Deut. xxviii. 64; xxx. 2, 3: Isa. xlv. 17.

[278] Isa. lx. 21: Jer. xxx. 11; xlvi. 28: Amos ix. 14, 15: Jer. xxxi. 36.

[279] Isa. viii. 14, 15; xlix. 5; chap. liii.: Mal. i. 10, 11, and chap. iii.

[280] Isa. xlix. 6, chap. ii., chap, xi., chap. lvi. 7: Mal. i. 11. To which must be added, the other prophecies of the like kind, several in the New Testament, and very many in the Old; which describe what shall be the completion of the revealed plan of Providence.

[281] [See DAVIDSON’S Disc. on Proph.: BLANEY on Daniel’s LXX. Weeks: HURD’S Introd. to the Study of Proph.: JORTIN’S Ser. at Boyle Lect.: FULLER’S Gosp. its own Witness, part ii.: WAUGH’S Diss.: APTHORPE’S Discourses.]

[282] P. 250.

[283] [Hundreds of instances might be adduced, in which profane historians corroborate the statements of the Scriptures. The following are merely specimens: DIODORUS SICULUS, STRABO, TACITUS, PLINY, and SOLINUS, speak of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah. The lives of David and Solomon are given in the remains of the PHŒNICIAN ANNALS, in DAMASCENUS, and EUPOLEMUS. MENANDER describes the carrying away of the Ten Tribes by Salmanasor. SUETONIUS, TACITUS, PLINY the younger, and NUMENIUS, speak of Jesus Christ. His miracles are owned by CELSUS, PORPHYRY, JULIAN, and Jewish writers opposed to Christianity. SUETONIUS, TACITUS, PLINY, JULIAN, and others describe his being put to death; and TACITUS says that many were put to death for adhering to his religion. PHLEGON mentions the miracles of Peter; and Paul is enumerated among eminent authors, in a fragment of LONGINUS.]

[284] [This thought is elaborated with skill by WHATELY in his “_Historic Doubts_.” He takes up all the popular infidel objections as to the life of Christ, and applies them with undiminished or even increased force against the evidences that such a man as Buonaparte ever existed.

JOHNSON in a lively sally once said--“‘It is easy to be on the negative side. I deny that Canada is taken. The French are a much more numerous people than we; and it is not likely they would allow us to take it.’ ‘But the Government have announced the fact.’ ‘Very true. But the ministry have put us to an enormous expense by the war in America, and it is their interest to persuade us that we have got something for our money.’ ‘But the fact is confirmed by thousands who were at the taking of it.’ ‘Aye, but these men have an interest in deceiving us: they don’t want you should think the French have beat them. Now suppose you go over and find it so, that would only satisfy yourself; for when you come back we will not believe you. We will say you have been bribed.’”--BOSWELL.]

[285] P. 267, &c.

[286] P. 270, &c.

[287] Deut. xxviii. 37.

[288] All the particular things mentioned in this chapter, not reducible to the head of certain miracles, or determinate completions of prophecy. See p. 263.

[289] [Butler states this argument with more than his usual brevity, and its force is not seen without reflection. “If contrivance or accident could have given to Christianity _any_ of its apparent testimonies, its miracles, its prophecies, its morals, its propagation, or [the character of] its founder, there could be no room to believe, or even imagine, that _all_ these appearances of great credibility, could be _united together_, by any such means. If successful craft could have contrived its public miracles, or the pretence of them, it requires another reach of craft, to adopt its prophecies to the same object. Further, it required not only a different, but a totally opposite art to conceive and promulgate its admirable morals. Again, its propagation, in defiance of the powers and terrors of the world, implied still other qualities of action. Lastly, the model of the life of its founder, is a work of such originality and wisdom, as could be the offspring only of consummate powers of invention, or rather never could have been _devised_, but must have come from real life. The hypothesis sinks under its incredibility. Each of these suppositions of contrivance, being arbitrary and unsupported, the climax of them is an extravagance.”--DAVISON, on Prophecy.]

[290] 1 John iv. 18.--[“There is no fear in love,” &c.]

[291] [Obedience from dread, if it continue to be the only motive, precludes advance toward perfection; for “He that feareth is not made perfect in love.” But obedience from a discernment of the reasonableness and beneficence of religion, and of the perfections of its Author, increases love till it “casteth out fear.”]

[292] [See a discussion of this subject, in BAYLE’S Historical and Biographical Dictionary: art. XENOPHANES: notes D, E, F, G.]

[293] See Dissertation II.

[294] [It is remarked by DEAN FITZGERALD, that “It is not inconceivable that the Almighty should apply such a test of men’s candor and fidelity, as should require them first to act upon a thing as true, before they were so fully satisfied of its truth as to leave no doubt remaining. Such a course of action might be the appointed, and for all we know, the only possible way of overcoming habits of thought and feeling, repugnant to the belief demanded, so that a fixed religious faith might be the reward, as it were, of a sincere course of prudent behavior.”]

[295] By _arguing upon the principles of others_, the reader will observe is meant, not proving any thing _from_ those principles, but _notwithstanding_ them. Thus religion is proved, not _from_ the opinion of necessity; which is absurd: but, _notwithstanding_ or _even though_ that opinion were admitted to be true.

[296] P. 141, &c.

[297] Prov. xx. 27.

[298] Serm. at the _Rolls_, p. 106.

[299] John iii. 16: Heb. v. 9.

[300] P. 258, &c.

[301] Locke’s Works, vol. i. p. 146.

[302] Locke, pp. 146, 147.

[303] Locke, p. 152.

[304] See an answer to Dr. Clarke’s Third Defence of his Letter to Mr. Podwell, 2d edit. p. 44, 56, &c.

[305] [“One is continually reminded throughout this dissertation, of what is called _The common-sense school_ of Scotch metaphysicians. Nor can there be any doubt that REID, in particular, was largely indebted to Butler, of whose writings he was a diligent student, for forming that sober and manly character of understanding which is, I think, his great merit.”--FITZGERALD.]

[306] This way of speaking is taken from Epictetus,[A] and is made use of as seeming the most full, and least liable to cavil. And the moral faculty may be understood to have these two epithets, δοκιμαστικὴ and ἀποδοκιμαστικὴ [applauding and condemning] upon a double account; because, upon a survey of actions, whether before or after they are done, it determines them to be good or evil; and also because it determines itself to be the guide of action and of life, in contradistinction from all other faculties, or natural principles of action; in the very same manner as speculative reason _directly_ and naturally judges of speculative truth and falsehood: and at the same time is attended with a consciousness upon _reflection_, that the natural right to judge of them belongs to it.

[A] Arr. Epict. lib. i. cap. i.

[307] Οὐδὲ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία--ἐν πείσει ἀλλὰ ἐνεργείᾳ, [Virtue and vice are not in feeling, but in action,] M. Anton, lib. ix. 16. Virtutis laus omnis in actione consistit. [The whole praise of virtue, depends on action.] Cic. Off. lib. i. cap. 6.

[308] P. 145.

INDEX TO PART I.

REFERENCES TO THE EDITOR’S NOTES ARE IN BRACKETS.

Abstract reasonings may mislead, 162 fitness of things, _note_ 166

Actions distinguished from their qualities, 111 manifest character, 156 rewarded and punished, 98 this world a theater of, 156 what sort exercise virtue, 152

Active and passive impressions, 140

Advantages of virtue, 113 may never recur, 101

Affections, excited by objects, 145 need control, 166 part of our constitution, 147

Affliction, a discipline, 150 chiefly of our own making, 100

Agent, the living, not compounded, 81

Alienation of parts of our body, 84

All things made double, 137

Allurements, use of, 151

Analogy answers objections as to a present state of trial, 135 as to modes of existence, 78 carrying the force of positive argument, [105 deals only with facts, 171 indicates future punishment, 101 may amount to proof, 168 objections which it cannot answer, 171 the only proof of some things, 79

Antiquity of religion, 167

Atheists not argued with, in this treatise, 181

Beginnings of a righteous government seen on earth, 107

Bible, teaches the existence of general laws, [99

Bodies not necessary to us, 82 not ourselves, 83 only instruments, 85, 86 their solid elements, 88

Bodily and mental habits, 134

Brain, does not think, [89

Brahminical notion of death, 92

Brutes, are they immortal?, [88 may have greater strength than man, 119 under man’s control, 119

Capacities, state of in infancy, 88 not destroyed by death, 89 not dependent on the body, 79

Causes and ends incomprehensible, 172

Changes compatible with identity, 78, 83

Character manifested by probation, 156 not given but acquired, 155 what it means, _note_ 163

Conscience, how it acts, 164 implies government, 115 a rule, 164 authority, 164 future retribution, 165 may be impaired, 168 perverted, 168

Consciousness an indiscerptible entity, 82 presupposes identity, [77

Consequences may sometimes be avoided, 102 may be foreseen, 98 show a moral government, 98

Course of nature constant, 97

Creatures finitely perfect, 147 may fall, 148 have each a way of life, 137

Danger of wrong doing, how increased, 132

Death and birth similar, 91 enlarges our sphere, 92 has no power over matter, [91 is not a suspension of our powers, 91 is not our destruction, 80 what it is, 80

Decay of vegetables, inference from, 92

Definitions of identity, 77

Delivering up of the Lord Jesus Christ, [111

Destruction of seeds, 153

Different states of human existence, 89

Difficulties belong to all subjects, [96 exercise the virtuous principle, 152

Disadvantages of virtue temporary, 126

Discipline, its true nature and use, [148

Disease not destructive to the soul, 90 sometimes remedial, 177

Disorder produced by sin, 148

Distress excites passive pity and active relief, 140

Distributive justice a natural rule, 110

Divine government a scheme, CHAP. VII.

Domestic government, 114

Dreams, what they prove, 86

Earthly satisfactions attainable, 183

Effects of actions on the actor, [143

Ends often produced by unlikely means, 180

Enjoyments in our own power to a great degree, 95

Error, how spread, [96

Evidence of natural religion, 166

Evil, may possibly be useful, 177 its possible origin, 147 not a necessary part of probation, [128

Exceptions to the happiness of virtue, 108

Experience indispensable, 141

Faculties, human, not perfect at first, 141

Fall of man, 133, [148

Fallacy in fatalism, 169

Fallen creatures require discipline, 150

Fatalism,--see _Necessity_.

Fear a proper motive to obedience, 154

Folly, destructive, as well as crime, 132

Formal notion of government, 99

Foundation of moral improvement, [108

Future advantages, how proportioned, 93

Future existence probable, CHAP. I. of brutes, [79

Future interest dependent on conduct, 95

Future life, a solemn subject, 95 not an inactive condition, 144 reconcilable with atheism, 94 this life preparatory to it, CHAP. V.

Future punishment credible, 103

Future retribution, how proved, 125

Future state different from the present, 78 brings us into new scenes, 93 may have temptations, [145 social, 144 will not require such virtues as does the present life, 154

General laws govern the world, 177, [99 produce punishment, 103 wisdom of them, 178

General method of God’s government, 97

General system of religion, 124

Gradual improvement, a wise arrangement, 141, 142

GOD an intelligent governor, 106 determined by what is fit, [166 governs by human instruments, 111 governs justly, [108 has a will and a character, 163 his aims incomprehensible, 97 his attributes inferred from our own, [115 his general government, 97 his government just and good, 176 his indirect commands, 165 moral government of, CHAP. III. natural ” , ” II. necessarily existent, 159 not indifferent to human actions, 125 not simply benevolent, 106 rewards and punishes, 169 the only necessary being, 159

Good actions, how punished, 111

Good habits necessary even to the virtuous, 149

Good men befriended as such, 112 cannot now all unite, 121

Good not forced upon us, [134

Government, civil, an ordinance of God, 111 considered as a scheme, CHAP. VII. of God, CHAP. II. not perfected in this world, 107 the formal notion of it, 98 the perfection of, 106

Habits, how formed, &c., 139 necessary to us hereafter, [145 of resignation, 155 often ruinous, 101 of virtue an improvement in virtue, 147 passive, 138 shape the character, 141

Happiness not always the _immediate_ reward of virtue, 108 not given promiscuously, 138 requisites for, 137 the result of virtue, 118

Helplessness of man, [138

Higher degrees of retribution probable, 127

Hinderances to virtue, 121

History of religion, 169

Honest men befriend the honest, 112

Hope and fear appeal to self-love, 153 are just principles of action, 154

Human life preparatory, 144

Hume’s wonderful discovery, [162

Human powers may be overtasked, 152

Identity does not depend on the sameness of the body, 83 of living agents, 77, 78 not explicable, [77

Ignorance acknowledged on all subjects but religion, 174 answers objections, 175 the argument from, 180 total, destroys proof, 178

Illustration of the modification of an action by its intention, [111

Imagination a source of discontent, 154 produces much error, 81

Immortality of brutes, 88

Improvement by discipline, 144 by habit, 147 of our faculties gradual, 141 wisdom of this, 142

Incomprehensibility of God’s plans, 97

Inconsiderateness destructive, 102

Inferiority of brute force, 119

Infidelity unjustifiable, 105

Insignificance of our knowledge, [174

Interest coincident with virtue, 154 not a sufficient restraint, _note_ 146

Interpositions to prevent irregularities, 177 would produce evil, 178

Intentional good rewarded, 114

Irregularities perhaps unavoidable, 177 seeming may not be such, 176

Inward peace attends virtue, 112

Kingdom, idea of a perfect, 123

Knowledge of man insignificant, [174

Liberty does not account for the fall, 147 implied in our present condition, 162

Life a probation, 128 one part of it preparatory to another, [142 what is it intended for, 137

Living agent not subject to death, 79

Living powers, see _Death_.

Locke on human identity, [77

Maimonides, his similitude, [173

Man an inferior part of creation, 133 a system of parts, [98 by nature social, [93 capable of improvement, 145 connected with present, past, and future, 181 dealt with as if free, 162 has a moral nature, 115 his fall not accounted for by his free agency, 147 his helplessness, [138 knows nothing fully, 173 may become qualified for new states, 137 not a competent judge of God’s schemes, 174 requires moral culture, 145

Mania often produced by moral causes, [85

Materialism, its philosophical absurdity, [81

Matter and mind not the same, [83 affect each other, 85

Means learned by experience, 176 man not a competent judge of the fitness of them, 178 not always agreeable, 176

Men often miss possible temporal good, 129

Men’s temporal interests greatly depend on themselves, 131

Might of unarmed virtue, [121

Mind influenced by the passions, 131 is the man, [87 its effects on the body, [85 may survive the body, [89 the only real percipient, 85 uses the body as an instrument, [87

Miracles, properly speaking, not unnatural, 94

Miseries as contingent as conduct, 135 generally are avoidable, 100

Mixture of suffering and enjoyment in this world, [128

Moral and natural government of God similar to each other, 184

Moral attributes of God may be inferred from our own, [115

Moral discipline, CHAP. V.

Moral government of God, CHAP. III.

Moral improvement, basis of, [108

Moral world, its apparent irregularities, 176

Mystery of God, finished, _note_ 102

Natural, the true meaning of the word, 94

Natural government of God, CHAP. II.

Natural religion, its evidences not affected by the doctrine of necessity, 166 proof of, 166 teaches the doctrine of punishment, 102

Necessary agents may be punished, 169

Necessary bulk of one’s self, 84

Necessary existence of God, 159

Necessary tendencies of virtue, 118

Negligence and folly disastrous, 132

Necessity consigns us to a fallacy, 169 contradicts the constitution of nature, 170 destroys no proof of religion, 170 different kinds of, [157 does not exclude design, 160 doctrine of, CHAP. VI. not an agent, 159 not applicable to practice, 163 not in conflict with religion, 160 our condition indicates freedom, 162 reconcilable with religion, 168 the doctrine absurd, 157 what it means, 158 writers for and against, [170

New scenes in the next world, 93

Obedience, reluctant, useful, [152

Objections, against a proof and against a thing to be proved, 179 against the scheme of Providence, 174 analogy of plants, 92 Christianity not universal, 169 course of nature, 97 destruction of seeds, 153 difference between temporal and eternal things, [135 discipline might have been avoided, 156 God simply benevolent, 106 good and evil may be mixed in the next world, 124 gratification of appetites natural and proper, 98 ignorance, the argument from invalidates the proof of religion, 178 immortality of brutes, 87 incredible that necessary agents should be punished, 169 irregularities of the moral world, 176 necessity destroys the proof of religion, 165 our powers may be overtasked, 152 probabilities may be overbalanced by probabilities, 169 punishments are only natural events, 99 rectitude arising from hope and fear, sordid, 153 rewards and punishments, 95 sin need not have entered the world, 177 society punishes good actions, 111 special interpositions might prevent evil, 177, 178 to the doctrine of necessity, CHAP. VI. to the doctrine of future punishments, 100-103 virtue sometimes punished, 111 virtues of the present life not wanted hereafter, 154 world disciplines some to vice, 153

Obligation certain, when proofs are not, 179

Occasional disadvantages of virtue, 117

Occasional indulgences in wrong-doing awfully dangerous, [143

One period of life preparatory to another, [142

Opportunities once lost irrecoverable, 143

Organs of sense mere instruments, 89

Our moral nature proves a moral government, 115

Pain, no contrivance for it in man, [110

Partial ignorance does not destroy proof, 178

Passions carry away the judgment, 131 make our condition one of trial, 130 may account for the fall of man, 147 may be excited where gratification is impossible or unlawful, 146 may remain in a future state, 147 should be subject to the moral principle, 145 the bare excitement of, not criminal, 145 but dangerous, 146

Passive habits, 138

Passive impressions weakened by repetition, 139

Passive submission essential, 155

Peace of the virtuous, 112

Perception, instruments of, 85 possible without instruments, 86

Perfection of moral government, 106, 107 of an earthly kingdom, 123

Persecution unnatural, 111

Philosophy never arrogant, [174 what it cannot teach, [87

Pleasure not a sufficient reason for action, 98 and pain mostly depend on ourselves, 95 the distribution indicates moral government, 105

Powers may be improved by exercise, 138 may be overtasked, 152 may exist and not be exercised, 80 no reason for supposing that death will destroy them, 81

Practical proof, what, 168

Present existence unaccounted for by atheism, 94

Presumptions that death will destroy us, 81 that it will suspend our existence, 91

Presumptuousness unjustifiable, 105

Private vices not public benefits, [111

Probabilities in favor of religion may be overbalanced by probabilities against it, 169

Probation, CHAP. IV. applies to the present life as well as the future, 130 does not necessarily imply suffering, [128 implies allurements, 129 is more than moral government, 128 requires severe discipline, 150

Proofs of natural religion, 166 of religion not affected by the doctrine of necessity, 160

Propensions necessarily create temptations, 146 are excited by their appropriate objects, 147

Proper gratification of the appetites, 98

Prosperity of a virtuous community, 123 may beget discontent, 154

Providence, objections to God’s, 140, 174

Public spirit a fruit of virtue, 120

Punishment an alarming subject, 105 especially considered, 100 greater hereafter than now, 127 in a future state credible, 103, 125 is God’s voice of instruction, [108 is sometimes capital, 102 not unjust, 163 often long delayed, 101 often overtakes suddenly, 101 of virtuous actions, 111 religious and natural similar, 100 results from folly as well as crime, 132 the result of general laws, 103

Quotations. Aristotle, [152 Chalmers, [131, 138, 148 Cicero, [82, 86 Clarke, [97 Fitzgerald, [145 Robert Hall, [118 Hume, [162 Maimonides, [173 Mandeville, [111 Plato, [87, 113 Son of Sirac, [137 Strabo, [92

Rashness, consequences of, 96

Reason an incompetent judge of means, 178 gives power over brute force, 119 needs experience, 141 not dependent on bodily powers, 89 requires a fair opportunity, 119-121

Recapitulation of the whole argument, 180

Rectitude, is self-interest a proper motive to it?, 153

References to other authors. Bates, [128 Baxter, [88 Bayle, [88 Beattie, [170 Belsham, [170 Berkeley, [111 Bonnett, [89 Bramhall, [171 Brown, [111 Bryant, [171 Butterworth, [107 Calcott, [128 Capp, [109 Chalmers, [77, 79, 148 Charnock, [158 Cheyne, [88 Clarke, 82, [81, 97, 171 Colliber, [88 Collings, [158, 170 Compte, [170 Crombie, [170 Crouse, [170 Davies, [109 D’Holbach, [170 Descartes, [88 Ditton, [88 Doddridge, [109 Dodwell, [81 Dwight, [109 Edwards, [88, 170 Fabricius, [128 Fichte, [170 Gibbs, [171 Grove, [171 Haller, [89 Harris, [171 Hartley, [170 Hegel, [170 Henly, [128 Hobbes, [170 Holtzfusius, [128 Holyoake, [170 Horseley, [109 Hume, [88 Hunt, [109 Jackson, [171 Konnicott, [128 King, [98, 171 Law, [98 Lawson, [171 Le Clerc, [128 Leland, [109 Leroux, [170 Liefchild, [109 Locke, [88 Manton, [128 Martineau, [170 Martinius, [119 Milman, [142 Morgagni, [89 Morton, [109 Musæus, [128 Palmer, [171 Pearson, [128 Polignac, [88 Porteus, [109 Price, [158 Priestley, [142, 170 Reid, [170 Rutherford, [109, 158 Search, [88 Seed, [109 Selden, [128 Shaftesbury, 108 Sherlock, [109 Shuckford, [128 Son of Sirac, [137 South, [109, 128 Stapfer, [128 Strabo, 92 Toplady, [128 Topping, [109 Twisse, [109 Wagstaff, [88 Warburton, [111 Watts, [77, 88, 171 Whately, [142, 158 Willis, [88 Wisheart, [109 Witsius, [128 Wittichius, [109

Reflection not dependent on sensation, 91

Reformation is attended with discomfort, 108 may not prevent penalties, 102

Relation between us and our bodies, 85

Relations of things, limitless, 173

Religion a question of fact, 165 historical evidence of, 168 professed in all ages, 167 its proofs not affected by the doctrine of necessity, 170 nor by our ignorance, 178

Reluctant obedience profitable, [152

Remedies often very disagreeable, 176

Repentance may be too late, 104

Requisites to the superiority of reason, 119 of virtue, 120, 121

Resentment of injuries, 114

Resignation a temper consonant with God’s sovereignty, 155 essential to virtue, 154 the fruit of affliction, 155 the habit necessary hereafter, 155

Retributions are divine teachings, [108

Revelation, antiquity of, 167 not improbable, 167 not universal, _note_ 107

Rewards and punishments, how distributed, 126

Satisfactions of virtue, 108

Scheme of God incomprehensible, 172

Self-denial, its relations to present happiness, 134 not essential to piety, 152

Self-discipline, what, [148

Self-love a just principle of action, 154 appealed to, 153 how moderated and disciplined, 155 not a sufficient restraint, _note_ 146 reasonable and safe, 130

Sensation not necessary to reflection, 91

Senses not percipients, 85

Severe discipline necessary, 150

Similitude of a historical painting, [174

Simplicity of the living agent, 83

Sin, why not kept out of the world, 177

Skepticism does not justify irreligion, 105

Social, our nature essentially such, [93

Society must punish vice, 110 natural and necessary, [93 sometimes punishes the good, 111

Soul a simple substance, 82 not destroyed with the body, 79 not naturally immortal, [81

Souls of brutes, 88

Special interpositions of Providence, 177, 178

Stages of existence, 78

State of probation, CHAP. IV.

State of discipline and improvement, CHAP. V.

Submissive temper necessary, 155

Subordinations exceedingly beneficial, 142

Subserviencies in nature, 173

Sufferings may be avoided, 95 not necessary to the cultivation of virtue, [128

Temporal and religious probation similar, 132

Temptations increased by bad examples, 132 and by former errors, 132 intended for our improvement, 136 involve probation, 129 may improve or injure us, 153 security against their evils, 146 sources of, to upright beings, 147 the necessary result of propensions, 146

Tendencies of virtue, 118 hindered, 121 essential, not accidental, 126

Terms “nature” and “course of nature”, [97

Theorizing no aid to virtue, 139

Thoughtlessness often fatal, 101

Transmigration of souls, [87

Trials manifest character, 156 may exist in a future state, 147 produced by our propensions, 131 qualify for a better state, 144 unreasonable ones are not inflicted, 133 why we are subjected to them, 136

Ultimate design of man, [98

Understanding may be perverted, 168

Uneasiness produced by former sins, 109

Union of good beings, 122

Unjustifiableness of religious indifference, 105

Upright creatures may fall, 147 need good habits, 149

Universe and its government immense, 123

Vice actually punished by society 110, 111 must produce uneasiness, 112 never rewarded as such, 116 not only criminal but depraving, 149 often increased by trials, 153 punished as such, 114

Vicious men lose their influence, [121

Virtue a bond of union, 122 as such, rewarded on earth, 111 “brings its own reward”, [118 has occasional disadvantages, [117 hinderances accidental, 121 how and why rewarded, 111 improved by trials, 151 its benefits to a community, 123 natural, not vice, 116 not always rewarded in this life, 108 on the whole happier than vice, 113 secures peace, 112 tendencies essential, 126 tends to give power, 118, [121

Virtuous beings need virtuous habits, 149

Virtuous habits a security, 147 how formed, 139 improve virtue, 147 necessary in a future state, [145

Voice of nature is for virtue, 117

Waste of seeds, 153

Wickedness may produce some benefits, 177 voluntary, 136

Will and character of God, how determined, _note_ 166 what they mean, _note_ 163

Wonderful discovery of Hume, [162

World a system of subordinations, 173 a theater for the manifestation of character, 156 disciplines some to vice, 153 fitted for man’s discipline, 150 governed by fixed laws, 110

Youth a determining period, 101 if lost, not to be recovered, 143 its beneficial subordinations, 142

INDEX TO PART II.

REFERENCES TO THE EDITOR’S NOTES ARE IN BRACKETS

A common absurdity, 243

Abstract truth distinguished from facts, 305, [186

Absurdity of some objections to Christianity, 245

Abuse of our natural endowments, 217

Accidental, what events are so called, 226

Accountability gradually increases, 251

Actions, definition of, in morals, 261 distinguished from things done, 261 their bad consequences sometimes escaped, 232 virtue and vice consist in them, 261

Advantage, as proper a consideration in religion as in temporal affairs, 298 variously bestowed, 249, 312

Analogy a confirmation of all facts to which it can be applied, 306 affords no argument against the scheme of Christianity, 203 nor against miracles, 203 answers presumptions against miracles, 207 does not prove the wisdom of God, 301 does not teach that the _whole_ of God’s government is like that on earth, 204 easily cavilled at, but unanswerable, 306 between natural information and that derived from inspiration, 212 between the remedies of nature and those of grace, 219 between the gospel and human discoveries, 219 between the light of nature and of revelation, 218 between the use of natural gifts, and miraculous, 217 between the government of God and that of a human master, 261 its small influence on men, 303 how used in this treatise, 306 may show our duty, but not the design of the requirement, 246 objections to this mode of arguing, CHAP. VIII. shows that there may be infinite reasons for things, with which we are not acquainted, 188 the only ground for some of our knowledge, 306

Antidote to heresies, [191

Apocalypse, its principal object, [249

Appearances of men and things deceptive, 248

Arguments proper as to human writings, are not so as to Scripture, 214

Atonement, how held by the ancients, 241 makes the innocent suffer for the guilty, 243

Author of nature taken for granted, 298

Authoritativeness of revelation, 189

Baptism a test of obedience, [199 commanded and important, 194 why the form of words, 194

Bible, how to be interpreted, [202, 215

Brutes, their great sagacity, 216

Boundary of human inquiry, [223

Candor necessary in judging of Christianity, 302

Chance, really no such thing, 226

Characters drawn in Scripture evidently unfeigned, 287

Christ a mediator, CHAP. V. a prophet, 240 a priest and king, 241 his history, as given in Scripture, 285 his pre-existence taught, 282 his satisfaction, 239 his sufferings voluntary, 243 manner of his interposition, 238 not merely a teacher and example, 242 offered himself a propitiatory sacrifice, 241

Christianity a fearful curse, if it give no more light than natural religion, [196 a question of fact, 301 a remedial system, [193 an authoritative republication of the religion of nature, 188, 189 a particular scheme under a general plan, 194, 224 a scheme imperfectly comprehended, CHAP. IV. a scheme revealed but in part, 226 brings life and immortality to light, 190 could not possibly be a contrivance, [222, 294 demands attention, if barely probable, 253 has evidences besides miracles and prophecy, 263 in what degree remedial, [193 is a real revelation, 213 is conformable to the constitution of things, 295 its benefits require the use of means, 197 its establishment and prevalence, the most conspicuous and important event in history, 286 its evidences, CHAP. VII. its good effects not small, 192 its precepts plain and obvious, 218 its proof historical, 304 its proofs liable to objection, 260 men bound to examine its evidence, 197 miracles and prophecy its direct and fundamental proofs, 263 must have mysteries, [223 no objection to the morality of it, 214, 220, 222 not merely a republication of natural religion, [196 not primarily designed to remedy the defects of nature, [193 not the discovery of reason, 188 objections to its evidence, 210 objections to its nature, 210 offered to some in a corrupt state, 250 prescribes new duties, 194 preserves natural religion in the world, 191 propagated against all obstructions, [294 rashness of treating it lightly, 194, 196, 197 requires means to accomplish ends, 225 reveals a particular dispensation of Providence, 194 reveals important facts, 196 some of its dark parts may be cleared up, others cannot, [223 teaches more than natural religion, 194 the evils ascribed to it, are not its evils, 192 the one great question concerning it, 213, 214 the only religion professedly confirmed by miracles, 268 to be transmitted by Christians, [190 universal, in nature and intention, [248 what alone could disprove it, 295 why not remedial to a greater degree, 193 why not sooner promulgated, 219

Christians bound to spread Christianity, 190 primitive, their testimony, 267

Church men bound to support it, 193 preserves a knowledge of religion, 191 visible, its design, 190, 191

Circumstantial evidences of Christianity, 263, 281 often as convincing as direct testimony, 294

Clemens Romanus, testimony of, 266 his letter to the Corinthians, [266

Climax of infidel extravagance, [294

Coincidence of natural and revealed religion, 211, 218

Coincidences of Scripture, 266

Comparison, how it may mislead us, 201

Compassion distinct from goodness, 233 visible in the constitution of the world, 233

Consequences of infidelity; more dangerous than those of faith, 294 of sin, often averted, 233

Conversational objections to revelation, 295

Conversion, how produced, [225

Course of nature different from what we might have supposed, previous to experience, 211 none at the beginning, 205 our total darkness as to its causes, 208

Creation Mosaic account of, referred to by John, 282 a different exertion of power from government, 205 why Scripture describes it, 281

Creatures of like moral qualities placed in different religious situations, 251

Credulity of mankind acknowledged, 269

Cumulative proof of Christianity, [207

Daniel his book had more evidence of authenticity than has come to us, 279 his predictions a support of Jewish faith, [249 quoted by Christ, 279

Dark parts of revelation, [223

Degrees of evidence have degrees of weight, 255 require nice examination, 258

Deistical explanation of Christ’s miracles, [206

Deists, why do they oppose Christianity, [196

Depravity of man obvious, 238 doctrine of, [218

Desert of good and ill, the notion of, 305

Development, of truth, 218 modern, doctrine of, [218

Differences of religious advantages may have like reasons as those for different temporal advantages, 251 would remain if revelation were universal, 252

Difficulties absurdity of requiring them to be all removed, 297 as to the evidence of religion, analogous to those attending the practice of it, 256 cannot be solved by analogy, 296 speculative, may be the chief trials of some, 257 the discernment which can see them, might suffice to see through them, 260

Direct and circumstantial evidence must be taken together, 280

Diseases of body and mind, analogous as to their remedies, 220

Disobedience, without possible excuse, 253

Dispensations, preparatory one to another, 310

Disregard of religion a great profligacy, 233

Distinction between moral and positive obligation, 198, [198 between acts and principles, [235 between temporary, individual, and universal commands, [188

Doubt affords scope for probation, 262 exercises our virtuous principles, 256 implies some evidence, 252, 254, 283 involves some obligation, 263 puts us upon probation, 253

Doubtful evidence should have _some_ influence, 255

Duties arising from revealed relations, 195 moral and positive, 194

Earth, its appearances confirm Scripture, 238

Effect of Adam’s transgression, 238 of combined probabilities, 294, [294

Efficacy of repentance, [190 not taught by the light of nature, 190

End, God’s not known, 246

Enthusiasm is not peculiar to religion, 272 impairs no testimony for Christianity, 271 may often weaken testimony, 271 sometimes mixed with knavery, 272 the absence of all sign of it in Christianity, a presumptive proof in its favor, 222 will not account for the spread of Christianity, 270

Enthusiasts make as great sacrifices as Christians, 270

Epistles of Paul, proof from, 266

Eternal retribution not taught by natural religion, [190

Ethics of natural religion distinguished from its objects, [194

Events expound Scripture, 219

Evidence of Christianity impregnable, 295 collateral and direct to be viewed together, 294 from miracles and prophecy, 267 imperfect, should yet influence practice in proportion to its degree, 255 of circumstances may be most direct, 294 of religion, open to all, 260 of religion, the same in kind as that which controls us in temporal things, 258 much lower than satisfactory often determines us, 303 not only increased but multiplied by a combination of probabilities, 294, [294 reason the proper judge of, 221 requires careful sifting, 256 candor in judging, 302, [303 safety always in admitting it, 294 why liable to objection, 257

Evil, remedies provided for it, 219, 232

Exaggeration practised by many who will not lie, 272

External manner of heart worship, 195

Experience affords no presumption against Christianity, 203 corroborates Christian doctrines, 245 teaches the effects of actions, 246

Extravagance of some objections, 187, 188

Facts analogy the only proof of some, 306 distinguished from abstract truths, 305 of revelation distinguished from its principles, [235

Fall of man, assumed as a fact, 236 confirmed by appearances, 238

Falsehood, its degrees and inducements, 272

False miracles have deceived many, 273 have some historic evidence, 273

Fatalists, their principles argued upon, 304

Fear cast out by love, [301

Fitness, moral, 304, 305

Flippant objections to Christianity, 295

Folly, a real vice, 280

Foresight of brutes, 216

Future punishments, all the reasons for them not known, 234 not arbitrarily appointed, 232 natural sequences, 231, 232 rendered credible by temporal punishments, 300

Genealogy of mankind given in Scripture, 283

General laws a wise arrangement, 227 do not render miracles incredible, 227 control the Christian dispensation, 226 few events can be traced up to them, 226 miracles may be their results, 226, 227 the ground of believing there are such, 226 things called accidental governed by them, 226

Geology, its impressive lessons, [229

GOD a master giving laws, 261 all his reasons for giving a command must be certainly known, and known to have passed away, before we can safely disregard it, 188 duties towards him as the Father, 194, 195 governs by mediation, 230 his government shows compassion, 233 progressive, 229 his means and ends we cannot distinguish, 228 his providence, objections to it idle, 300, 301 his reasons not assigned, 246 his will, as absolute or conditional, 261 how he would act in contingencies, unknown, [222 how to be worshipped, a pure matter of revelation, 195 instructs us by experience, 211, 246 little known, [222 not indifferent as to who suffer, 243 reveals our duties, not his plans, 246 the real author of the prophecies, 276

Good and evil unequally distributed, 248

Government of God sometimes, apparently, tardy in its results, 224, 225

Gradual growth of causes, [208

Happiness not always secured by well-laid schemes, 247

Hazard of neglecting Christianity, 262

Heathen world, condition of, 186, 250

Hieroglyphic and figurative language of Scripture, 210

Hinderances to natural and spiritual knowledge similar, 218

History of miracles, 264 of the Jews confirmed by their condition, 289, 290 of the origin of religion, 206 furnishes no parallel to revelation, 207 prophecy is history anticipated, 281 Scripture, has not been invalidated, 283

Holy Spirit, its operations on the heart, [225

Human contrivance unequal to some things, [222

Human life, in what sense it may be called poor, 297

Human testimony, reliable notwithstanding the prevalence of falsehood, 273

Identity of principle between natural and revealed religion, [235

Ignorance of heathen writers, [187 of other worlds, forbids objections to Christianity on the ground of miracles, 207 of the laws of miracles, not greater than of natural laws, 256 of the reason of our present condition, 251 much of it our own fault, 259

Imagination may fancy unreal coincidences, 293

Immorality not authorized in Scripture, 221, 222

Impassable limit to human knowledge, [223

Imperceptible accumulation of forces, [208

Imperfect knowledge, better than acting in the dark, 297

Imperfection of language, 216

Importance of revelation, CHAP. I. an abstraction, [186 precludes the idea that the first witnesses were careless, 274

Improbability before and after an event, [207 of the Deistical theory greater than that of miracles, [206

Inadequacy of repentance, [236

Inattention to religion, real depravity, 252, 307 prevents convincement, 258

Incarnation an invisible miracle, 204 cannot be paralleled, [235

Influence of the Holy Ghost, [225 of the analogical argument, 303

Innocent sometimes suffer for the guilty, 243

Inspiration, the proper kind and extent of it not discoverable by reason, 212 not to be interpreted like other writings, 212

Inspired writers, key to their meaning, [276 their one great scheme, [276 show a foresight more than human, 278, 279

Instruction from God to savages, [206

Intercession by the good for the bad, [232

Interest, temporal, not always apparent, 302

Interpositions of men for each other, [232

Internal improbabilities weaken external proof, 215

Interpretation of Scripture, [215

Irregularity, really no such thing, 226 whence the appearance of, 227

Irregularities of men, consequences proportioned to magnitude, 233

Irreligion an aggravated sin, 233 especially in persons in high standing, 254 not justifiable on any pretence, 256, 312

Invention an irregular way of information, 216

Invisible miracles, [204 things of God, how learned, [230

Jews God’s dealing with them, 290 their continuance, a standing miracle, 290 their history confirmed by facts, 291 their system of Theism, [206

Jewish miracles, a part of civil history, [265

John, his allusion to Christ, in the beginning of his gospel, 282 his doctrine agrees with that of Paul, 282

Kingdom of Christ on earth, 241

Knowledge profound, not necessary to piety, 218 scientific and religious, have the same difficulties, 218

Knowledge of Scripture, improved in the same way as knowledge of the sciences, 218 unequally distributed, 249

Language necessarily ambiguous, 216 of the prophecies, often figurative, 210

Laplace, error of, [207

Levity destructive to religious influence, 259

Liberty belief of our, unavoidable, 304 of the will, not discussed, _note_ 304 necessary to the progress of knowledge, 218 the principle so natural that language is formed on it, 304

Life future, brought to light by the gospel, 190 may be taken away by command, 221 not thrown away because success is uncertain, 302 whether desirable or not, 301

Light of nature displayed in the Scriptures, 188 does not teach our future condition, 190 favors the doctrine of a Mediator, 230 has left the greatest heathen in doubt, 186

Ludicrous turn, danger of, 259

Mahometanism not received on the footing of miracles, [268

Mahometans and ancient Persians, how situated as to revelation, 250

Man accepted according to what he hath, 251 his circumstances no ground of complaint, 252 his obligation to study the Scriptures, 202, 262 must be renewed, 197

Manasses, prayer of, [237

Manner of worship a matter of pure revelation, 195

Martyrs could not have been impostors, 272 had full knowledge of facts, 269, 271 the full force of their testimony, 269 their obligations to veracity, 274 were not enthusiasts, 271

Means as related to ends, 225

Mediation seen everywhere, 230 exemplified in social life, [232

Mediator, appointment of, CHAP. V. the notion of, natural, 230 the Scripture doctrine of, 238-240 whether one was necessary, 243 why most objected to, 243

Medium between full satisfaction of a truth and full satisfaction to the contrary, 313

Memory, eloquence, &c. imprudently used, 217

Men apt to be deluded by pretences, 273 their conduct may be guessed at, [222

Mercy seen in the constitution of the world, 233

Messiah came at the expected time, 285 his mission, 224

Minuteness of predictions touching Christ, 207

Miracles admitted evidence for such as are false does not impair the evidence of Christian, 273 contrary to the course of nature?, 206 denying them leads to Atheism, [205 disorderly use of, 217 distinct reasons for them, 208 large historical evidence for their truth, 270 manner in which related, 264 no argument of analogy against them, 205-207 none parallel to those of Scripture, 207 not mere embellishments, 264 not to be compared to common events, 209 nowise incredible, 209 occasions for them likely to arise in the course of ages, 208 of the Old Testament, inseparable from history, [265 operate by general laws, 226 Pagan and Popish, were wrought _after_ those systems had obtained, 268 peculiar to the Jewish and Christian religions, 268 received as genuine from the first, 268, 269 regulated by general laws, 227 satisfactorily account for the existence of Christianity, 265 should be compared to uncommon events, 209 the credentials of Christianity, 267 the evidence of their truth at first, 249 the question of their truth only one of _degree_ in point of evidence, 208 the only satisfactory account of some events, 265 the real nature of presumptions against them, 208 the term a relative one, 205 their direct proof of Christianity, 264 their evidence the same as that for common facts, 264 their force as proofs, 189 visible and invisible, 204, [204 what evidence arises from their having been accepted as true by the first Christians, 268 writers upon, [264, 268

Miraculous power creation not properly an act of, 205 misused by some, 217, 267 pretences of, have deluded some, 273 why bestowed, 190

Misconduct creates need of assistance, 235

Mistake of some of Hume’s opponents, 207

Mistakes of philosophers dangerous, [230 of transcribers, &c., 228

Modern geology, lesson from, [229

Moral action, the nature of, 261 an action becomes such by command, [221

Moral duties. See _Positive_.

Moral faculty, its object, 305

Moral government. See _Government_.

Moral precepts. See _Positive_.

Moral system revealed to mankind, 190

Morality of Scripture, reason a judge of, 220

Mysteries to be expected in revelation, 223, 224 as many in nature as in Scripture, 246

Mystery of godliness, 225

Mythological writings resemble prophecy, 276

Narratives of Scripture unadorned, 228

Natural consequences of vice are judicial punishments, 197 and spiritual things analogous in importance, 219 endowments often abused, 217

Natural light compared to revelation, 218

Natural religion and revealed, coincide, 211 as much perverted as Christianity, 192 could not have been reasoned out, 192 discloses no Redeemer, [194 its ethics and objects distinguished, [194 its light wholly insufficient, 187 might be authenticated by miracles, 190 moral system of, 187 taught and confirmed by Christianity, 188, 286, 292 what it does not teach, [190, 194

Nature carried on by uniform laws, 226 implies the agency of God, 231 its light insufficient, 186

Nature and obligation of sacraments, _note_ 195

Necessity of revelation, [186

Negligence prevents the recognition of truth, 258 wholly inexcusable, 197

Obedience from dread, [301 or disobedience, an important matter, 188 to a positive rite, especially indicative of piety, 199

Objections to certain precepts of Scripture, as immoral, 221 to prophecy, from its obscurity, 275 to revelation, are of equal weight against natural religion, 97 to the analogical argument, as such, CHAP. VIII. to the distribution of good and evil, 248-250 to the doctrine of mediation, CHAP. V. to the evidence for miracles, CHAP. II. to the unequal distribution of religious knowledge, 249

Objections to Christianity as a matter of fact, 301 as a remedial system, [193, 219 as a roundabout, perplexed contrivance, 228 as deficient in point of truth, 247 as a scheme, 209 as mysterious, [223 as to its wisdom and goodness, CHAP. IV. as unimportant, CHAP. I. atonement makes the innocent suffer for the guilty, 227, 243 contains things unlike the course of nature, 204 does not remove difficulties, [223 has been perverted, 192 has been productive of evils, 192 has internal improbabilities, 225-227 disclosed to the world so recently, 219 disorderly use of miraculous gifts, 227 has small influence, 192, 303 if true would not be left doubtful, 299 is not satisfactory, 260, 261 its doctrine of mediation, CHAP. V. its external proof weakened by internal improbabilities, 215 its lack of evidence, CHAP. VI. its late introduction, 219 may be advanced flippantly, but cannot be so answered, 295 natural things too unimportant to furnish analogies in its favor, 219 not just and good, CHAP. IV. not necessary, 147 not universal, CHAP. VI., 248 slowly developed, 219 some of its precepts immoral, 221 sufficiency of natural religion, 187 vicarious sufferings, 245

Obligation arises from the bare supposableness of Christianity, 253, 262

Obligations to God arising out of relationship, 196

Obscurity in part of a prophecy, does not impair the evidence of foresight, 275

Offenders often shielded by friends, [232

Offices of Christ as a mediator, 238-240

Opinions must be distinguished from facts, 270

Ordinary rules of interpretation, [215

Pagan and Popish miracles easily accounted for, 268

Parables show what the author intended, 276

Partial views give an appearance of wrong, 309

Passion hinders correct judgment, 259

Paul, his separate testimony, 266 how he received the gospel, 267 summary of his testimony, 267

Perfection of religion, what? CHAP. VIII.

Persons for whom this treatise is written, 309

Philosophy, its true mode of proceeding, [230

Piety superior to ritual observances, 201

Pleasures and pains, which overbalance? 301

Political events, how mentioned in Scripture, 282

Popish doctrine of a miracle at the Eucharist, [204

Popular conversational objections, 295

Porphyry’s mode of interpretation frivolous, _note_ 279 objections to the book of Daniel, 279

Positive evidence of Christianity, CHAP. VII.

Positive institutions belong to the notion of a church, 192 lay us under the strictest obligation, 202 means to moral ends, 199 men disposed to depend on them, 200 necessary to keep up and propagate religion, 246 not to be made light of, 201 not to supersede moral obedience, 200 the reason of them often obvious, 198 two modes of viewing them, 198

Positive precepts compared with moral, 198, 201 create moral obligations, 221

Power of healing, [217

Practice should be influenced by probability, 254

Predictions of Christ very numerous and minute, 207, 208

Prejudice a hinderance to knowledge, 258 a mark of weakness, 280 as hostile to truth as enthusiasm, 272 operates contrary ways, 294

Preservation of the Jews as a distinct race, 291

Presumptions against miracles, 205 against revelation as miraculous, CHAP. II. none against the _general scheme_ of Christianity, 203 none peculiar to miracles, 207 strong, overcome by weak proof, 207, [207

Priesthood of Christ, 238 Jewish, typical of Christ, 239

Principles argued upon in this treatise, 304

Progressions in our existence, 229

Progress in theology probable, [218

Probable proofs, by being added, not only increase evidence, but multiply it, 294

Probability should influence practice, 254

Profane history corroborates Scripture statements, 287

Proofs of Christianity a touchstone of honesty, [259 level to common men, 260 some important ones omitted in this treatise, and why, 304 why not more plain, 261

Prophecy a joint review of prophecies furnishes a far stronger proof than examination in detail, 294 a series of, being applicable to certain events, is proof that it was intended of them, 276 compared to compiled memoirs, 278 created the expectation of a Messiah, 284 confirmed by appearances, 292 evidence from, 275 expressed in figurative language, 275 how understood by ancient Jews, 277 in relation to the Jews, 284 is history anticipated, 281 its obscurity, 275 its proofs amazingly strong, [207 may not _always_ have been understood by the writer, 278 proves foresight, 276, 279 sometimes obscured by interpreters, 210 summary of, concerning Christ, 284 use of, to future ages, 249 writers upon, 277, 285

Prophet, Christ a, 240

Prophets not the _authors_ of what they wrote, 278 their sense of their predictions not necessarily the whole sense, 278 whether they had in view the events which Christians consider fulfilments, 277

Proverbial, use of the word, 201

Providence, never hasty, [229 objections to it useless, 300, 301 the course of, progressive, 229

Province of reason, 220

Prudence, its best plans often frustrated, 247 often requires us to act with uncertain prospect of success, 247, 248

Punishment follows wickedness, _of course_, 231 instances of vicarious, 244 not always avoided by reformation, 235 not promiscuously inflicted, 243 provision made for escaping it, 232, 311 we cannot of ourselves escape it, 234 we cannot know why such and such are inflicted, 231

Quotations Angus, [202, 223 Augustine, _note_ 187 Arnobius, [269 Clemens Romanus, [266 Davidson, [294 Fitzgerald, [303 Grotius, [259 Guizot, [229 Hurd, [276 Dr. Johnson, [288 Mahomet, [268 Powell, [230 Warburton, [217, 223 Whately, [206

Rashness of interpreters, 210 of treating religion lightly, 197

Reason could not have invented Christianity, 206 could not ascertain the power of penitence, 194 discovers our relation to God the Father, 194 but not our relation to the Son and Holy Ghost, 194, 196 its limits very narrow, [223 its proper province, 220 must have right principles, 220 needs the aid of experience in judging of the consequences of actions, 246 not sufficient to construct a system of natural religion free from superstition, 186 our only faculty for judging even revelation, 210 requires the importance of a question to be taken into account, 295 teaches nothing of the certain means of either temporal or spiritual good, 197 very incompetent to judge what a revelation ought to be, 210-212

Reasoning by analogy to any extent, leaves the mind unsatisfied, 296

Redemption agreeable to our natural notions, 235 analogous to natural remedies, 232 conjectures about it must be uncertain, 242 mode of, not discoverable by reason, 243 men not competent judges of its plan, 243 on whom are its benefits, _note_ 237 Scripture account of, 239, 240 we should be thankful for it, without disputing how it was procured, 242

References to other authors Alexander, [269 Apthorpe, [285 Bayle, [301 Benson, [215 Birk, [266 Blaney, [285 Blunt, [266 Bolingbroke, [265 Boswell, [288 Boyle, [264 Butler, [190, 272 Campbell, [264 Celsus, [287 Chalmers, [187, 194, 242 Colliber, 195 Damascenus, [287 Davidson, [285 Diodorus Siculus, [287 Eupolemus, [287 Featley, [215 Fitzgerald, [193, 206, 207 Fleetwood, [264 Fuller, [285 Gibbon, [268 Graves, [266 Grotius, [266 Gulick, [277 Hengstenburg, [277 Horseley, [277 Howe, [236 Hurd, [285 Jortin, [264, 285 Julian, [257 King, [215, 277 Lardner, [264 Leland, [187 Longinus, [287 Lyall, [277 McCosh, [187 Mackintosh, [223 Magee, [236, 242 Manasses, [237 Menander, [287 Michaelis, [215 Mills, [207 Newman, [235 Numenius, [287 Owen, [242 Paley, [205, 266, 268 Pascal, [187, 223 Pfaffius, [264 Phlegon, [287 Phœnician Annals, [287 Pliny, [287 Porphyry, 279, [287 Samuel Stanhope Smith, [206 Solinus, [287 Spinoza, [215 Stapfer, [242 Storr, [215 Strabo, [287 Suetonius, [287 Tacitus, [287 Taylor, [264 Tindall, [196, 248 Tucker, [264 Turretin, [242 Vitringa, [276 Warburton, [187 Waterland, [195 Watson, [264 Waugh, [277, 285 Wayland, [188, 236 Whately, [206, 268, 288 Witsius, [264

Reformation does not always preclude punishment, 235

Regard due to the Son and Holy Spirit, 195

Regard to God as Creator, the essence of natural religion, 195

Rejection of Christ by many, at first, the argument from it, [269 foretold, 285

Relations, being learned, duties are perceived, 194

Relations of man to Deity, 194 to the Son and Holy Ghost, 195

Religion a practical thing, 298 a question of fact, 301, 304 affords particular reasons for miracles, 208 confirmed by the establishment of a church, 191 considered as external and internal, 195 doubt of its evidence does not release from moral obligation, 254 has its end on all persons to whom proposed, 303, [303 if true, why susceptible of any possible doubt? 299 its acceptance safe, 295 its general spirit intimated, 200, 201 its great importance, 254 its introduction into the world, 206 its reasonableness fully shown, if it can only be proved that it _may_ be reasonable, 301 its very nature overlooked by those who insist that it should have overwhelming evidence, 302 may be true, though doubtful, 299 must be judged by its evidences _taken together_, 294 not a thing reasoned out, 206 not equally taught to all men, 206 objections to it removed by analogy, 300 presupposes candor in those who examine it, 256, 302, [303 reason may judge of its morality, 220 reasonable, for aught which can be shown to the contrary, 301 the perception of, 302 the view of it taken in this treatise, 299 the evidence for it may be lessened, but cannot be destroyed, 295 why its evidences are allowed to admit of doubt, 249, 253, 299

Relief for evils provided, 232

Remedial nature of Christianity, [193

Remedies provided in nature, 219, 232 may be unskilfully used, 220 show the compassion of God, 233 and also his strictness, 234

Repentance cannot cancel guilt, 236, [236 general sense of mankind on the subject, 236 its efficacy not taught by natural religion, [190 its efficacy taught in the Scriptures, 190 not sufficient to preclude disaster, 234, 235

Revelation a particular part of a great plan, 224 accounts for the Theism of the Jews, [206 at the beginning of the world, would not be miraculous, 205 cannot be neglected with impunity, 260-262 considered as miraculous, CHAP. II. considered historically, 281 difference between its facts and its principles, [235 discovers new relations, and so new duties, 194 distinguished from natural religion, 195 does not compel assent, 253 has twice been universal, [248 how it could be overturned, 214 its disclosures, of course, could not have been anticipated, 211, 212 its measure of evidence puts us on probation, 253 its facts necessarily singular, [235 no more different from the course of nature than some parts of the course of nature are different from other parts, 312 necessary, CHAP. I. republishes and confirms natural religion, 188, 189 nothing incredible in it, 271 teaches that God’s laws are compassionate, 236 the use of unwritten revelation, 213 what is to be expected in revelation, 210, 212

Reverence for the will of God, [199

Ridicule of Scripture an offence against natural piety, 286 easier than examination, 259 the great weakness of being influenced by it, 280

Roman Empire mentioned, 279

Rules for health very fallible and inexact, 302 of Biblical interpretation, [215

Sacrifices commanded, 241 expiatory, 239 how the ancients regarded them, 242 learned by the heathen from tradition, 241 really efficacious, 242 the prevalence of, 236

Sacrifice of Christ an objection to it, 243 _how_ efficacious, not taught, 242 proper and real, 239-241 puts us into a capacity for salvation, 242 voluntary, 244

Safety an important consideration in judging, 294

Satirical writings, how understood, 276, 277

Scheme of nature, vast, 204 progressive, 229

Scheme of providence, if understood, would justify facts which are objected to, 300

Schemes, the best may be disconcerted, 247

Science confirms Scripture history, 287

Scorn of prophetic diction, 210

Scripture announces a general restoration of things, 282 antiquity of, 287 characters evidently not feigned, 287 confirmed by profane authors, 288 confirmed by the state of the earth, 287 considered historically, 281 contains an abridged history of the world, 282 exposed to criticism, 283 expounded by itself, [202 gives a history of this world as God’s world, 281 gives an account of civil governments only as they affected religion, 282 has internal evidence of truth, 287 history genuine, 265 how distinguished from other books, 281-283 how to be interpreted, [202 if false could be shown to be so, 283 includes a history of thousands of years, 283 includes the chronology of nearly four thousand years, 284 its authority the great question, not its contents, 214 its chronicles confirmed by history, 287 its evidences comprise a series of things of great variety and reaching to the beginning of time, 263 its evidences not intended to be overpowering, 253 its great proofs are miracles and prophecy, 264 its relation to miracles only to be accounted for on the supposition of their truth, 265 its strangeness not surprising, 288 its style objected to, 210 its truth must be judged of by the evidence _taken together_, 295 may contain things not yet discovered, 218 miracles, their first reception, 265 naturalness of its statements, 287 not composed by rules of art, 210 nothing improbable related in any part, 287 not to be judged by preconceived expectation, 215 not to be judged exactly as other books, 214 ordinary rules of interpretation, [215 our duty to search it, 202, 262 precepts, some give offence, 210 reveals our relation to the Son and Holy Spirit, 194 the possibility of its truth demands investigation, 258 truths not discoverable by reason, 203 variety of topics introduced, 283 written in a rude age, 283 why it describes creation, 282

Searching the Scriptures a great duty, 202

Self-deceit, our liability to it, 262

Serious apprehension may comport with doubt, 313

Shameful mistakes of philosophers, [230

Similarity of objections to religion and nature, 298

Sincerity of belief proved by dying for it, 270

Skepticism no justification of irreligion, 253

Sorrow cannot of itself restore abused benefits, 234

Speaking with tongues, [217

Speculative difficulties similar to external temptations, 256 the chief trial of some, 257, 259

Spread of Christianity unaccountable if it were an imposture, 290

Standing ministry, what for, [191

Strangeness of some Scripture events, 288

Stupidity of the martyrs, if insincere, [269

Subserviences, the world a system of, 229

Success, temporal, always uncertain, 302

Suffering, ignorance does not prevent it either in temporal or spiritual things, 196

Sufferings of Christ vindicate God’s law, 244 of the early Christians, 269

Sufficiency of light of nature pretended, 186

Summary of Jewish history, 284 of the historical evidence of Scripture, 292

Supernatural instructions necessary from the first, [206

Temporal interests not always discerned, 247, 248 managed by prudent persons on the very principles proposed by religion as to spiritual interests, 298, 299

Temporal interests often decided by considerations which fall short of demonstration, 299

Temporary commands, distinguished from perpetual, [188

Temptation a wholesome discipline, 256 earthly and spiritual similar, 256 calls forth virtuous effort, 257

Testimony can be destroyed only by counter-testimony, or by the incompetency of the witness, 274 for miracles not mentioned in Scripture, does not impair the testimony for those there recorded, 273 of Paul, separate and independent, 266 of profane authors to the truth of Scripture history, [287 of the first Christians, 269, 271 must be judged candidly, [259 none counter to Christianity, 275 slight, overcomes strong presumptions, 208 unconfuted, must be admitted, 273 value of, lessened by enthusiasm, 271

Theism of the Jews accounted for, [206

Theology of the Bible, not to be corrected, [202

Things which it is unreasonable to dispute, 307

Thoughtlessness of men, 233

Tradition teaches that there was a revelation at the beginning, 205 of the fall of man, 311

Transubstantiation, [205

Trial by speculative difficulties, analogous to other trials, 256

True philosophy inductive, [230

Truth of Christianity proved, unless the whole of its history and influence can be accounted for by accident, 295

Truth, how developed, [218 the, of an event may be fully proved, though no _one_ of sundry proofs may be complete, 295 whether there is any such thing, denied by skeptics, 305

Twofold effect of the analogical argument, 305

Unbelievers, acknowledgment of, 289 cannot deny a conformity between prophecy and events, 293

Understanding, its right use, 245

Undesigned coincidences in Bible history, [266

Undeterminate language deceives many, 297

Unequal distribution of religious knowledge, 249

Unfair dealing of objectors, 297

Unreasonableness of applying to passion for guidance, 295

Unsatisfactory evidence, men often obliged to act upon it, 302

Variety in the distribution of God’s gifts, 249, 312

Vastness of the scheme of nature, 204

Veracity of the first Christians, 274

Vicarious punishments witnessed every day, 244 deter from sin, 245

Vice appointed to be punished, 231 blinds men to just evidence, 255 its effects in the present world, 234 its natural consequences are God’s judicial inflictions, 197 its real enormity, 234 not palliated by any supposed lack of evidence for religion, 255

Vindication of religion by analogy impossible, 296 of the character of God, not attempted in this treatise, 299, 300

Way of salvation for the helpless, [186

Will of GOD, as absolute or conditional, 261

World, wickedness of, 238

Worship, mode of, a matter of pure revelation, 195

Writers on the atonement, [242 Christian sacraments, [195 miracles, [264, 268 necessity of revelation, [187 prophecy, [277-285 Scripture difficulties, [215 undesigned coincidences, [266

THE END.