CHAPTER VI.

SUPPOSED LACK OF PROOF OF REVELATION, AND ITS WANT OF UNIVERSALITY.

It has been thought to be a positive argument against revelation, that its evidences are not adequate, and that it is not universally known and believed.

But the argument amounts to just this, that God would not bestow on us any favor, except in such a mode and degree as we thought best, and did exactly the same for everybody else.

Such a notion, all analogy contradicts.

I. _Men act in their most important concerns on doubtful evidence._

=1.= It is often absolutely _impossible_ to say which of two modes of acting will give most pleasure or profit.

=2.= If it were possible, we cannot know what changes temper, satiety, ill health, &c. might produce, so as to destroy our pleasure.

=3.= We cannot foresee what accidents may cut it all off.

=4.= Strong objections and difficulties may attach to the course of action we adopt, which yet all would admit ought not to deter us.

=5.= We may, after all, be deceived by appearances, or by our passions, &c.

=6.= Men think it reasonable to engage in pursuit of advantage, even when the probabilities of success are against them.

II. _As to the light of Christianity not being universal._

=1.= Temporal good is enjoyed in very different degrees even among creatures of the same species.

=2.= Yet it is certain that God governs.

=3.= We may prudently or imprudently use our good things.

=4.= The Jewish religion was not universal.

=5.= If it be _intended_ that Christianity should be a small light, shining in a great and wide-spread darkness, it would be perfectly uniform with other parts of God’s providence.

=6.= If some have Christianity so corrupted, and interpolated, as to cause thoughtful persons to doubt it, as is the case in some countries; and if, where it is the purest, some learn much less from it than they might, there are manifest parallels in God’s natural dispensations.

=7.= No more is expected of any one, than is equitable under his circumstances.

=8.= Every one is bound to get rid of his ignorance, as far as he can, and to instruct his neighbor.

=9.= If revelation _were_ universal, in extent and degree, different understandings, educations, tempers, length of lives, and outward advantages, would soon make the knowledge of it as different as it is at present.

III. _Practical reflections._

_First._ That the evidence of religion is not such as unavoidably to convince all, may be part of our probation.

=1.= It gives scope for a wise or vicious use of our understanding. Just as is the case in common affairs.

=2.= Intellectual inattention to so serious a matter, is as immoral, as disobedience after conviction of the truth.

_Secondly._ If the evidence is really doubtful, it puts us on probation.

=1.= If a man were in doubt whether a certain person had done him the greatest favor, or whether his whole temporal interest depended on him, he ought not to regard that person as he would if there were _no_ reason to think so.

=2.= So if there is only reason to apprehend that Christianity _may_ be true, we are as much bound to _examine_, &c. as we would be bound to _obey_, if we _knew_ it was true.

=3.= Considering the infinite importance of religion, there is not much difference as to what ought to be the mode of life of those who are convinced and those who doubt its truth. Their hopes and fears are the same in kind, though not in degree; and so their obligations are much the same.

=4.= Doubts presuppose _some_ evidence, belief _more_, and certainty _more still_. Each state should influence our conduct, and does so, in common things.

=5.= It shows a mental defect not to see evidence unless it is glaring; and a corrupt heart not to be influenced by it unless overpowering.

_Thirdly._ Difficulties as to believing religion, are no more a ground of complaint, than difficulties in practising it.

=1.= They constitute a wholesome discipline.

1.) In allowing an unfair mind to deceive itself.

2.) In requiring belief and the practice of virtue under some uncertainties.

=2.= In the case of some minds, speculative difficulties as to the evidence of religion is the _principal_ trial. A full conviction of its truth would _constrain_ some to obedience.

_Fourthly._ The difficulties may be _in the objector_ rather than in the religion.

=1.= Not sufficiently in earnest to be informed.

=2.= Secretly _wishes_ religion not to be true.

=3.= Looks at objections rather than replies.

=4.= Treats the subject ludicrously.

_Fifthly._ The proof of Christianity is level to common men.

=1.= They are capable of being convinced of the existence of God, and of their moral accountability.

=2.= And they can understand the evidence of miracles, and the fulfilment of prophecy.

=3.= If they are capable of seeing the difficulty, they are capable of understanding the proof.

=4.= If they pick up objections from hearsay, and will not or cannot examine them thoroughly, they must remain ignorant, just as they do as to the sciences.

_Objec._ Our directions should be too plain to _admit_ of doubt; like those of an earthly master.

_Ans._ The earthly master only wants his work done, and is careless as to the state of the heart; but as the whole of morality consists in the state of the heart, the cases are not parallel.

_Finally._ The credibility of our being in a state of probation is just as great as the credibility of there being any religion. Our probation may be whether we choose to inform ourselves as to our duty, and then whether we choose to do it.

Such is exactly the case as to temporal matters. To discern what is best often requires difficult consideration, and yet leaves doubts: and not reflecting carefully, or not acting even when there may be doubt, is often fatal.