Chapter 30

Now that we have become one people, and our Independence has made the independence of Louisiana, it is gratifying to recall to our recollection every testimony that may draw us closer together in our affections, as we are in our interests and common welfare. We take pleasure also in presenting an instance of American enterprise and gallantry, which ought not to be forgotten.

"Colonel Hamilton, who commanded at the British post at Detroit, came this year to Vincennes, on the Wabash, with about six hundred men, chiefly Indians, with a view to an expedition against Kaskaskia, and up the Ohio as far as Fort Pitt, and the back settlements of Virginia. Colonel Clark heard, from a trader who came down from Vincennes to Kaskaskia, that Hamilton, not intending to take the field until spring, had sent most of his force to block up the Ohio, or to harass the frontier settlers, keeping at Vincennes sixty soldiers only, with three pieces of cannon and some swivels. The resolution was immediately taken to improve the favourable opportunity for averting the impending danger; and Clark accordingly despatched a small galley, mounting two four pounders and four swivels, on board of which he put a company of soldiers, with orders to pursue her way up the Wabash, and anchor a few miles below Vincennes, suffering nothing to pass her. He now sat off with one hundred and twenty men, the whole force he could command, and marched towards Vincennes. They were five days in crossing the low lands of the Wabash, in the neighbourhood of Vincennes, after having spent sixty in crossing the wilderness, wading for several nights up to their breasts in water. Appearing suddenly before the town, they surprised and took it. Hamilton for a while defended the fort, but was at last compelled to surrender."

We now approach a period in the History of Louisiana when her direct communication and commerce with the United States began; and from this moment she became an object of great and growing interest to us. The commencement of this intercourse is of a singular character, and was conducted with singular address.

"The foundation was now laid of a commercial intercourse, through the Mississippi, between the United States and New-Orleans, which has been continued, with but little interruption, to this day, and has increased to an immense degree; and, to the future extent of which, the imagination can hardly contemplate any limit. Hitherto, the boats of the western people, venturing on the Mississippi, were arrested by the first Spanish officer who met them; and confiscation ensued, in every case; all communication between the citizens of the United States and the Spaniards being strictly prohibited. Now and then, an emigrant, desirous of settling in the district of Natchez, by personal entreaty and the solicitations of his friends, obtained a tract of land, with permission to settle on it with his family, slaves, farming utensils, and furniture. He was not allowed to bring any thing to sell without paying an enormous duty. An unexpected incident changed the face of affairs in this respect.

"The idea of a regular trade was first conceived by General Wilkinson, who had served with distinction as an officer in the late war, and whose name is as conspicuous in the annals of the west, as any other. He had connected with it a scheme for the settlement of several thousand American families in that part of the present state of Louisiana, now known as the parishes of East and West Feliciana, and that of Washita, and on White river, and other streams of the present territory of Arkansas. For these services to the Spanish government, he expected to obtain the privilege of introducing, yearly, a considerable quantity of tobacco into the Mexican market.

"With a view to the execution of his plan, Wilkinson descended the Mississippi, with an adventure of tobacco, flour, butter, and bacon. He stopped at Natchez while his boat was floating down the stream to New-Orleans, the commandant at the former place having been induced to forbear seizing it, from an apprehension that such a step would be disapproved by Miro, who might be desirous of showing some indulgence to a general officer of a nation with whom his was at peace--especially as the boat and its owner were proceeding to New-Orleans, where he could act towards them as he saw fit.

"Wilkinson having stopped at a plantation on the river, the boat reached the city before him. On its approaching the levee, a guard was immediately sent on board, and the revenue officers were about taking measures for its seizure, when a merchant, who was acquainted with Wilkinson, and had some influence with Miro, represented to him that the step Navarro was about to take might be attended with unpleasant consequences; that the people of Kentucky were already much exasperated at the conduct of the Spaniards in seizing all the property of those who navigated the Mississippi, and if this system was pursued, they would probably, in spite of Congress, take means themselves to open the navigation of the river by force. Hints were, at the same time, thrown out, that the general was a very popular character among those who were capable of inflaming the whole of the western people, and that, probably, his sending a boat before him, that it might be seized, was a scheme laid by the government of the United States, that he might, on his return, influence the minds of his countrymen; and, having brought them to the point he wished, induce them to choose him for their leader, and, spreading over the country, carry fire and desolation from one part of Louisiana to the other.

"On this, Miro expressed his wish to Navarro that the guard might be removed. This was done; and Wilkinson's friend was permitted to take charge of the boat, and sell the cargo, without paying any duty.

"On his first interview with Miro, Wilkinson, that he might not derogate from the character his friend had given him, by appearing concerned in so trifling an adventure as a boat-load of tobacco, flour, &c. observed that the cargo belonged to several of his fellow-citizens in Kentucky, who wished to avail themselves of his visit to New-Orleans to make a trial of the temper of the colonial government. On his return he could then inform the United States government, of the steps taken under his eye; so that, in future, proper measures might be adopted. He acknowledged with gratitude the attention and respect manifested towards himself, and the favour shown to the merchant who had been permitted to take care of the boat; adding, he did not wish that the intendant should expose himself to the anger of the court, by forbearing to seize the boat and cargo, if such were his instructions, and he had no authority to depart from them when circumstances might require it.

"Miro supposed, from this conversation, that Wilkinson's object was to produce a rupture rather than to avoid one. He became more and more alarmed. For two or three years before, particularly since the commissioners of the state of Georgia came to Natchez to claim the country, he had been fearful of an invasion at every rise of the water; and the rumour of a few boats having been seen together on the Ohio, was sufficient to excite his apprehensions. At his next interview with Wilkinson, having procured further information of the character, number, and disposition of the western people, and having revolved, in his mind, what measures he could take, consistently with his instructions, he concluded that he could do no better than to hold out a hope to Wilkinson, in order to secure his influence in restraining his countrymen from an invasion of Louisiana, till further instructions could be received from Madrid. The general sailed in September for Philadelphia."

In 1788, Don Martin Navarro, the intendant, left the province for Spain, and we cannot deny him the credit of sagacity, in his last communication to the king.

"Navarro's last communication to the king was a memorial which he had prepared, by order of the minister, on the danger to be apprehended by Spain, in her American colonies, from the emancipation of the late British provinces on the Atlantic. In this document, he dwells much on the ambition of the United States, and their thirst for conquest; whose views he states to be an extension of territory to the shores of the Pacific ocean; and suggests the dismemberment of the western country, by means of pensions and the grant of commercial privileges, as the most proper means, in the power of Spain, to arrest the impending danger. To effect this, was not, in his opinion, very difficult. The attempt was therefore strongly recommended, as success would greatly augment the power of Spain, and forever arrest the progress of the United States to the west.

"It would not have been difficult for the King of Spain, at this period, to have found, in Kentucky, citizens of the United States ready to come into his views. The people of that district met, this year, in a second convention, and agreed on a petition to congress for the redress of their grievances--the principal of which was, the occlusion of the Mississippi. Under the apprehension that the interference of congress could not be obtained, or might be fruitless, several expedients were talked of, no one of which was generally approved; the people being divided into no less than five parties, all of which had different, if not opposite, views.

"The first was for independence of the United States, and the formation of a new republic, unconnected with them, who was to enter into a treaty with Spain.

"Another party was willing that the country should become a part of the province of Louisiana, and submit to the admission of the laws of Spain.

"A third desired a war with Spain, and the seizure of New-Orleans.

"A fourth plan was to prevail on congress, by a show of preparation for war, to extort from the cabinet of Madrid, what it persisted in refusing.

"The last, as unnatural as the second, was to solicit France to procure a retrocession of Louisiana, and extend her protection to Kentucky."

We think the Don's scheme, for preventing the evils he anticipated, altogether chimerical; but our author has more faith in it, and believes "it would not have been difficult for the King of Spain, at this period, to find, in Kentucky, citizens of the United States ready to come into his views." We trust this is a mistake. The occlusion of the Mississippi was the grievance they deplored. It is, however, worthy of our special attention, that at the period when these matters were agitated in our western country, our states were held together by the weak and inefficient bonds of the old confederation, under which, state selfishness and state pride, now called _state rights_, predominated over the great and general interests of the Union; and the weaker members were neglected, having no superintending, supreme federal power to give an equal care and protection to every part. Our author distinctly says, that "it was in the western part of the United States that the inefficacy of the power of Congress was most complained of." The present strength and prosperity of the west, are the fruits of our "more perfect union," and the wisdom and gratitude of the west will forever make it the friend and support of that Union.

We are now introduced to the Baron de Carondelet, a name which afterwards became conspicuous in the History of Louisiana, and familiar to the citizens of the United States. He was appointed governor of the province, and entered upon his duties in 1792. "The sympathies and partialities of the people of Louisiana began to manifest themselves strongly in favour of the French patriots, principally in New-Orleans." The Baron thought it to be his duty, especially as he was a native of France, "to restrain excesses against monarchical government." He began by stopping "the exhibition of certain martial dances and revolutionary airs" at the theatre. He afterwards thought it necessary to adopt stronger measures to suppress the growing inclination to popular doctrines, and betook himself to the _custom of the country_, the New-Orleans _common law_, or rather the law of its governors, _to ship off the obnoxious persons_, without any form of trial or condemnation. He caused six individuals to be arrested and confined in the fort, and soon afterwards, "shipped them for Havana, where they were detained a twelve month." This may be a very pretty military mode of getting rid of disagreeable or troublesome people--the summary arrest--the fort--the ship and banishment; but we cannot reconcile it to our notions of liberty and law.

We pass over, as matters well known, the plans of _Genet_ at this period, and the proceedings of the Baron to defeat them.--The Baron also followed up, with great perseverance, "his favourite plan for the separation of the western people from the Union," and he continued to do so, subsequent to the ratification of the treaty between the United States and Spain. The report made by _Power_, the Baron's agent, of the dispositions of the western people, was altogether unpropitious to his design. He, however, delayed the delivery of the posts, to which the United States were entitled, under various pretences; still having the separation in view. His proceedings to effect this object are detailed, and will be read with interest. It is needless to say, that no ray of success shone upon his enterprise. Power, the active agent of the mischief, came very near to be tarred and feathered at Louisville, and was afterwards arrested by General Wilkinson, at Detroit. The Baron must have opened his eyes in astonishment at his egregious miscalculation of the dispositions of the West, when Wilkinson informed him, "that the people of Kentucky had proposed to him to raise an army of ten thousand men to take New-Orleans in case of a rupture with Spain."

Our author gives a concise account of the cession of Louisiana by Spain to France, and again by France to the United States. The negotiator by whom the latter transfer was conducted, on the part of France, was M. Marbois, and his work is the most satisfactory authority for the curious details of that extraordinary proceeding. The general character of the transaction, and the terms of purchase, are sufficiently known; but M. Marbois lets us into some of the secrets of the negotiation, and of the reasons which induced the first consul to part with this valuable territory as soon as he had acquired it. We will be brief with them.

The cession of Louisiana by France to Spain in 1763, was not only, as we have seen, a cause of violent discontent to the inhabitants of that province, but was considered in all the maritime and commercial cities of France, as impolitic and injurious; and a general wish prevailed to recover the colony. This did not escape Bonaparte, who did not delay to renew with the court of Madrid, a negotiation on the subject; having also in view a diminution of the power of England, which was never out of his mind. Profiting by the ascendancy he acquired by the victory of Marengo, he easily persuaded the Prince of Peace to restore Louisiana to France. This was done by a treaty made in October 1800. It was stipulated that the surrender should be made six months after. The treaty of 21st March 1801, renews these dispositions; but Louisiana continued for some time longer under the dominion of Spain. The differences between the United States and the French republic were terminated by a convention at Paris, on 30th of September 1800; and on the next day the treaty above mentioned with Spain was concluded at St. Ildephonso. As the war between France and England still continued, the cession of Louisiana to France was not made public; nor was possession taken. This difficulty was not removed for some time. In October 1801, preliminaries of peace were signed at London, followed up by the treaty of Amiens in March 1802. In the following September General Victor was appointed governor general of Louisiana; and Laussat the prefect sailed for New-Orleans in January.

The retrocession of the province to France created much uneasiness and alarm in the United States. The free navigation of the Mississippi became daily of more importance, and it was apprehended that the French would not be found as peaceable neighbours as the Spaniards. Every one remembers the short and uneasy existence of the insincere peace of Amiens. A renewal of the war was seen to be inevitable, and the American cabinet perceived that, in such an event, France would postpone the occupation of Louisiana. This state of things was justly thought to be favourable to an arrangement with France on the subject of the deposit at New-Orleans and the navigation of the river. Mr. Monroe was sent to that country for this purpose, where Mr. Livingston, our minister, had been pursuing it for many months; his overtures received little or no attention. The debates in our senate are not forgotten, on the motion of Mr. Ross; nor the prospect then in view of our taking by force of arms what it was believed would never be gained by treaty. In the spring of 1803, war was clearly inevitable between France and England; and Bonaparte knew that Louisiana, in that event, would be at the mercy of his enemy. He at once determined to change his policy in regard to that province, and to part with it, as the only means of saving it from England. On the 10th of April 1803, he entered upon the execution of his design, and called two counsellors to him, and addressed them "with that vehemence and passion which he particularly manifested in political affairs." He said he knew the full value of Louisiana, and had been desirous of repairing the fault by which it was lost--that "a few lines of a treaty have restored it to me, and I have scarcely recovered it when I must expect to lose it." Looking to the strength it would give to the United States, he said: "But if it escapes from me, it shall one day cost dearer to those who oblige me to strip myself of it, than to those to whom I wish to deliver it." After some remarks upon the naval strength in the Gulf of Mexico, and the ease with which they might take Louisiana, he added;--

"I think of ceding it to the United States. I can scarcely say that I cede it to them, for it is not yet in our possession. If, however, I leave the least time to our enemies, I shall only transmit an empty title to those republicans whose friendship I seek. They only ask of me one town in Louisiana, but I already consider the colony as entirely lost, and it appears to me that in the hands of this growing power, it will be more useful to the policy and even to the commerce of France, than if I should attempt to keep it."

The counsellors differed in their opinions, diametrically, each giving his reasons at large. The first consul decided the question immediately; he promptly declared, that

"Irresolution and deliberation are no longer in season. I renounce Louisiana. It is not only New-Orleans that I will cede, it is the whole colony without any reservation. I know the price of what I abandon, and I have sufficiently proved the importance that I attach to this province, since my first diplomatic act with Spain had for its object the recovery of it. I renounce it with the greatest regret. To attempt obstinately to retain it would be folly. I direct you to negotiate this affair with the envoys of the United States. Do not even await the arrival of Mr. Monroe: have an interview this very day with Mr. Livingston."

We hope and believe that one of the predictions of this luminous mind will not be fulfilled, although we have lately seen some appearances of its accomplishment.

"Perhaps it will also be objected to me, that the Americans may be found too powerful for Europe in two or three centuries: but my foresight does not embrace such remote fears. Besides, we may hereafter expect rivalries among the members of the Union. The confederations, that are called perpetual, only last till one of the contracting parties finds it to its interest to break them, and it is to prevent the danger, to which the colossal power of England exposes us, that I would provide a remedy."

"The conferences began the same day between Mr. Livingston and M. Barbe Marbois, to whom the first consul confided the negotiation." Pending the preliminary discussions, Mr. Monroe arrived at Paris; but even then Mr. Livingston despaired of success, and said to Mr. Monroe, "I wish that the resolution offered by Mr. Ross in the senate had been adopted. Only force can give us New-Orleans; we must employ force; let us first get possession of the country and negotiate afterwards." Mr. Livingston, however, was happily mistaken. "The first difficulties," says M. Marbois, "were smoothed by a circumstance which is rarely met with in congresses and diplomatic conferences. The plenipotentiaries having been long acquainted, were disposed to treat each other with confidence." The negotiation, under such auspices, proceeded rapidly, but not without some distrust on our part.

"Mr. Monroe, still affected by the distrust of his colleague, did not hear without surprise the first overtures that were frankly made by M. de Marbois. Instead of the cession of a town and its inconsiderable territory, a vast portion of America was in some sort offered to the United States. They only asked for the mere right of navigating the Mississippi, and their sovereignty was about to be extended over the largest rivers of the world. They passed over an interior frontier to carry their limits to the great Pacific ocean."

The termination of this important negotiation was as speedy and satisfactory, as it has been and will be important in its consequences. M. Marbois truly observes, "the cession of Louisiana was a certain guarantee of the future greatness of the United States; and opposed an insurmountable obstacle to any design formed by the English of becoming predominant in America." In relation to the stipulations in the treaty, that the inhabitants should be incorporated in the Union, and, in due time, be admitted as a state, &c. M. Marbois records.