Part 8
Albert Pike, special commissioner from the State Department of the Confederate States to the Indian tribes west of Arkansas, had accompanied General McCulloch on his visit to Ross, the latter part of May, and had been present at the resulting interview. He had told[245] Toombs that he would leave Little Rock for Fort Smith the twenty-second and go at once[246] to the Cherokee country. At Fort Smith, Pike met McCulloch and the two, seeking the same object, agreed to go forward together,[247] having already been approached by an anti-Ross element of the Cherokee Nation.[248] Ross, as has been shown, insisted upon maintaining an attitude of strict neutrality, which probably did not surprise his interviewers, since, according to Pike's own testimony, he and McCulloch had not gone to Park Hill expecting to be able to effect any arrangement with Chief Ross.[249] Ross, however, did go so far as to promise[250] that within a short while he would call a meeting of the Cherokee Executive Council and confer with it further on the policy to be pursued. Ross doubtless felt that it was a part of political wisdom to do this. His was an exceedingly difficult position; for, within the nation, there was a large element in favor of secession. It was a minority party, it is true; but, none the less, it represented for the most part, the intelligence and the property and the influence of the tribe. Opposed to it and in favor of neutrality, was the large majority, not nearly so influential because made up of the full-bloods and of those otherwise poverty-stricken and obscure. In the light of previous tribal discords, the minority party was the old Ridge, or Treaty, Party, now headed by Stand Watie and E. C. Boudinot, while the majority party was the Ross, or Non-treaty Party. Ross himself, his nephew, William P. Ross, and a few others were the great exceptions to the foregoing characterization of their following. Of sturdy Scotch extraction and honest to the core, they personally stood out in strong contrast to the rank and file of the non-secessionists and it was they who so guided public sentiment that John Ross had the nation back of him when, on May 17, 1861, he issued his memorable Proclamation of Neutrality:[251]
_Proclamation to the Cherokee people_
Owing to the momentous state of affairs pending among the people of the several States, I, John Ross, Principal Chief, hereby issue this my proclamation to the people of the Cherokee Nation, reminding them of the obligations arising under their treaties with the United States, and urging them to the faithful observance of said treaties by the maintenance of peace and friendship toward the people of all the States.
The better to obtain these important ends, I earnestly impress upon all my fellow-citizens the propriety of attending to their ordinary avocations and abstaining from unprofitable discussions of events transpiring in the States and from partisan demonstrations in regard to the same.
They should not be alarmed by false reports thrown into circulation by designing men, but cultivate harmony among themselves and observe in good faith strict neutrality between the States threatening civil war. By these means alone can the Cherokee people hope to maintain their rights unimpaired and to have their own soil and firesides spared from the baleful effects of a devastating war. There has been no declaration of war between the opposing parties, and the conflict may yet be averted by compromise or a peaceful separation.
The peculiar circumstances of their condition admonish the Cherokees to the exercise of prudence in regard to a state of affairs to the existence of which they have in no way contributed; and they should avoid the performance of any act or the adoption of any policy calculated to destroy or endanger their territorial and civil rights. By honest adherence to this course they can give no just cause for aggression or invasion nor any pretext for making their country the scene of military operations, and will be in a situation to claim and retain all their rights in the final adjustment that will take place between the several States. For these reasons I earnestly impress upon the Cherokee people the importance of non-interference in the affairs of the people of the States and the observance of unswerving neutrality between them.
Trusting that God will not only keep from our own borders the desolations of war, but that He will in infinite mercy and power stay its ravages among the brotherhood of States.
Given under my hand at the executive office at Park Hill this 17th day of May, 1861.
JNO. ROSS, Principal Chief Cherokee Nation.
The discretion of the Cherokees, their wily diplomacy if, under the circumstances, you should please to call it such, was more than counterbalanced by the indiscretion and the impetuosity of some of their neighbors. It has already been noted how the Chickasaws expressed their southern sympathies in the legislative resolves[252] of the twenty-fifth of May, but not as yet how the Choctaws took an equally strong stand. Both tribes were so very pronounced in their show of affection for the Confederacy that they gave a secessionist color to the whole of the Indian Territory, so much so, in fact, that Lieutenant-colonel Hyams could report[253] to Governor Moore of Louisiana, on the twenty-eighth of May, and upon information given him by some Indian agent.
... That the nations on the borders of this State (Arkansas) are anxious and desirous to be armed; that they can and will muster into the service 25,000 men; that they have immense supplies of beeves, sufficient to supply the meat for the whole Confederate service. All they ask is arms and enrollment. If within your power to forward their views with the President, it would be a great step in the right direction, and erect a more effectual barrier against the Kansas marauders than any force that could be sent against them, and thereby protect the northern boundary of both Arkansas and Louisiana. The reasons why every effort should be made to arm these people (now heart and soul with us) to defend themselves and us are so palpable, that I do not attempt to urge them upon you, but do solicit your attention, so far as is compatible with your high position, to this matter, to impress its importance on the President, and use your well-known influence to effect this much desirable result....
General McCulloch, in a letter[254] also of the twenty-eighth of May, more particularly specified the tribes that were friendly to the South, but he too mentioned some of them, the Choctaw and the Chickasaw, as "anxious to join the Southern Confederacy." It should not be a matter of surprise then to find that on the fourteenth of June, George Hudson, principal chief of the Choctaw Nation, acting in accordance with the will of the General Council, which had met four days before, publicly declared[255] the Choctaw Nation, "free and _independent_." The chief's proclamation was, in effect, a conscription act and provided for the enrollment, for military service in the interests of the Confederacy, of all competent males between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years. The General Council had authorized this and had further arranged for the appointment of commissioners "to negotiate a treaty of alliance and amity" with the Confederate States.
Under such conditions, the work of Albert Pike must have seemed all plain sailing when once he was safely beyond the Cherokee limits; but his efforts,[256] vain though they were, to persuade that tribe into an alliance did not end[257] with the first recorded interview with Ross. He kept up his intercourse with the Ridge faction; but finally decided that as far as Ross and the nation as a whole were concerned it would be best to await the issue of events. It was only too apparent to all the southern agents and commissioners that Ross would never yield his opinion unless compelled thereto by one of three things or a combination of any or all of them. The three things were, pressure from within the tribe; some extraordinary display of Confederate strength that would presage ultimate success for southern arms; and encroachment by the Federals. It was the combination that eventually won the day. Pike, meanwhile, had passed on to the Creek country.
At the North Fork Village, in the Creek country, the work of negotiating Indian treaties in the interests of the Confederacy really began and it did not end until a rather long series of them had been concluded. The series consisted of nine main treaties[258] and the nine group themselves into three distinct classes. The basis of classification is the relative strength or power of the tribe, or better, the degree of concession which the Confederacy, on account of that strength or that power or under stress of its own dire needs, felt itself obliged to make. This is the list as classified:
FIRST CLASS
1. Creek, negotiated at North Fork, Creek Nation, July[259] 10, 1861
2. Choctaw and Chickasaw, negotiated at North Fork, July 12, 1861
3. Seminole, negotiated at the Seminole Council House, August 1, 1861
4. Cherokee, negotiated at Tahlequah, Cherokee Nation, October 7, 1861
SECOND CLASS
1. Osage, negotiated at Park Hill, Cherokee Nation, October 2, 1861
2. Seneca and Shawnee, negotiated at Park Hill, October 4, 1861
3. Quapaw, negotiated at Park Hill, October 4, 1861
THIRD CLASS
1. Wichita, etc., negotiated at the Wichita Agency near the False Washita River, August 12, 1861
2. Comanche, negotiated at the Wichita Agency, August 12, 1861
Although all the treaties, made in 1861 by Albert Pike, were negotiated under authority[260] of the Act of the Provisional Congress of the Confederate States, approved May 21, 1861, by which the Confederacy offered and agreed to accept the protectorate of the Indian tribes west of Arkansas and Missouri, only those made with the great tribes contained a statement,[261] definitely showing that the protectorate had been formally offered, formally accepted and formally assumed. Thus, in a very unequivocal way, Creeks, Choctaws, Chickasaws, Seminoles, and Cherokees, all signified[262] their willingness to transfer their allegiance from the United to the Confederate States. The smaller tribes seem not to have been asked to make the same concession and their nationality was, in no sense, recognized. They acted more or less under duress or compulsion, and the very negotiation of treaties with them was taken as a full compliance with the confederate scheme.
The nationality of the great tribes, or more properly speaking, their political importance, was still further recognized by clauses guaranteeing territorial and political integrity,[263] representation by delegates[264] in the Confederate Congress, and the prospect[265] of ultimate statehood. The guarantee of territorial integrity was, of a certainty, not new. It had been inserted into various removal treaties as a safeguard against a repetition of the injustice that had been meted out to the Indians by the Southern States in Jackson's day. It comprised, in effect, a solemn promise that no state or territorial lines should ever again circumscribe the particular domain of the Indian nation securing the guarantee; and that state or territorial laws, as the case might be, should have no operation within the Indian country. The idea of congressional representation[266] was also not new, but where it had previously been but a promise or a mere contingency, it was now an assured fact, a thing definitely provided for. Ultimate statehood had, however, attached to it the old time elements of uncertainty, which is not at all surprising, considering that Walker, in his instructions[267] to Hubbard, had positively spoken against it.
All the treaties, without distinction of class, recognized the land rights of the Indians and their existing territorial limits, but with the usual restriction upon alienation to foreign powers. A sale or cession to a foreign state, without the consent of the Confederate States, was to result in forfeiture and reversion to the Confederate States. By the Choctaw and Chickasaw Treaty, the arrangement,[268] already satisfactorily reached, for a Chickasaw country distinct from a Choctaw was continued, the Indians of both tribes being given the privilege of having their particular land surveyed and sectionized whenever they might so please, provided it be done by regular legislative process.[269] The same treaty transferred[270] the lease of the Wichita Reserve from the United to the Confederate States and limited it to ninety-nine years. Practically the same bands of Indians were to be accommodated in this Leased District as before; namely, those whose permanent ranges were south of the Canadian or between it and the Arkansas. The New Mexican Indians were still to be absolutely excluded. The Choctaw and Chickasaw Indians reserved the right to pass upon the accommodation of any other Indians than those specifically mentioned in the treaty. The individual bands, so accommodated in the Leased District, were to be settled upon reserves and to hold the same in fee. Finally, the treaty placed,[271] for the time being, the Wichitas and their fellow reservees exclusively under the control of the Confederate States with a limited jurisdiction resting in the Choctaw Nation and a full right of settlement in Choctaws and Chickasaws.
In regard to special features of the land rights of tribes other than those already mentioned, it is well to observe, perhaps, that the title to the reservation then occupied by the Seminoles was admitted to be dependent upon Creek sufferance;[272] that the United States patent of December 31, 1838, was recognized[273] as protecting the Cherokee; and that the Osage lands in Kansas were inferentially covered by the Confederate guarantee, given that tribe, of title in perpetuity.[274] The Confederate States, moreover, agreed to indemnify[275] the Cherokees should their Neutral Lands be lost to them through the misfortune of the war. It is rather interesting to see that this new government, in promising the insignificant tribes a permanent occupancy of their present holdings, made use of the same high-flown, meaningless language that the United States had so long used; but Albert Pike knew better than to assure the truly powerful tribes that they should hold their lands themselves and in common "as long as the grass should grow and the waters run." That language could yet be made appealing and effective, though, in official dealings with weak Wichitas,[276] Senecas, and Shawnees,[277] and, strange as it may seem, even with Creeks.[278] In reciprocal fashion, the wild Comanches could most naïvely promise[279] to hold the Confederate States "by the hand, and have but one heart with them always."
Speaking of indemnification, we are reminded of other very important financial obligations assumed by the Confederacy when it made its famous treaties with the Indians west of Arkansas. Those financial obligations comprised the payment of annuities due the tribes from the United States in return for land cessions of enormous extent. They also comprised the interest on various funds, such as the Orphan Creek fund, education funds, and the like. Albert Pike had been given no specific authority to do this but he knew well that no treaties could possibly be made without it. It was not very likely that the slaveholding tribes would surrender so much wealth for nothing, and so Pike argued, when justifying himself and his actions later on. In his capacity as commissioner with plenary powers, he also promised the Indians that the Confederacy would see to it that their trust funds, secured by southern bonds, should be rendered safe and negotiable. Over and above all this, the government of the Confederate States made itself responsible for claims for damages of various sorts that the different tribes had brought or were to bring against the United States. Three good instances of the same are the following: the claim of the Cherokees for losses, personal and national, incident to the removal from Georgia; the claim[280] of the Seminoles for losses sustained by reason of General Thomas S. Jesup's emancipation[281] order during the progress of the Second Seminole War; and the claim of the Wichitas against the United States government for having granted to the Choctaws the land that belonged by hereditary preëmption to them and had so belonged from time out of mind. It is exceedingly interesting to know that these Wichitas had been colonized on the very land they claimed as indisputably their own.
In all the treaties, negotiated by Pike, except the two of the Third Class,[282] the Wichita and the Comanche, the institution of slavery was positively and particularly recognized, recognized as legal and as having existed from time immemorial. Property rights in slaves were guaranteed. Fugitive Slave Laws were declared operative within the Indian country, and the mutual rendition of fugitives was promised throughout the length and breadth of the Confederacy. The First Class of treaties differs from the Second in this matter but only in a very slight degree. The latter condenses in one clause[283] all that bears upon slavery in its various aspects, the former separates the discussion of the legality of the institution from that of the rendition of slaves. Of the First Class, the Creek Treaty[284] constituted the model; of the Second, the Osage.[285]
Aside from the things to which reference has already been made, the Confederate Indian treaties were, in a variety of ways and to the same extent that the Confederate constitution itself was, a reflection upon past history. To avoid the friction that had always been present between the red men and their neighbors, an attempt was now made to redefine and to readjust the relations of Indians with each other both within and without the tribe; their relations with white men considered apart from any political organization; their relations, either as individuals or as tribes, with the several states of the Confederacy; and their relations with the central government. In general, their rights, civil, political, and judicial, as men and as semi-independent communities were now specified under such conditions as made for what in times past would have been regarded as full recognition, and even for enlargement. Indian rights were at a premium because Indian alliances were in demand.
The relations of Indians with Indians need not be considered at length. Suffice it to say that many clauses were devoted to the regulation of the affairs of those tribes that were, either politically or ethnologically, closely connected with each other; as, for example, the Choctaws and Chickasaws on the one hand and the Creeks and Seminoles on the other. Still other clauses assured the tribes of protection against hostile invasion from red men and from white, and assured all the great tribes, except the Cherokees,[286] of similar protection against domestic violence.[287] The Cherokees, very possibly, were made an exception because of the known intensity of their factional strife and hatred, which, purely for its own selfish ends, the Confederacy had done so much to augment. There may also have been some lingering doubt of John Ross's sincerity in the matter of devotion to the Confederacy. The time had been and might come again when the Confederacy would find it very expedient to play off one faction against another. Injuries coming to the Indians from a failure to protect were to be indemnified out of the Confederate treasury. Could the United States, throughout the more than a hundred years of its history have had just such a law, its national treasury would have been saved millions and millions of dollars paid out in claims, just and unjust, of white men against the Indians.
As affecting their relations with white men, the Indians were conceded the right to determine absolutely, by their own legislation, the conditions of their own tribal citizenship. This would mean, of course, the free continuance of the custom of adoption, a custom more pernicious in Indian history than even the principle of equal apportionment in Frankish; because it was the entering wedge to territorial encroachment. The white man, once adopted into the tribe as a citizen, was to be protected against unjust discrimination or against the forfeiture of his acquired status. The provisions against intruders were legitimately severe, those of the United States had never been severe enough. The executive power had always been very weak and very lax but now it was to reside in the tribal Council and would bid fair to be firm because interested, or, perhaps, we should say disinterested. The Confederacy, on its part, promised that the aid of the military should be forthcoming for the expulsion of intruders on application by the agent, should the tribal authority prove inadequate. The Indians might compel the removal of obnoxious men from agency and military reserves. Unauthorized settlement within the Indian country by citizens of the Confederate States was absolutely forbidden under pain of punishment by the tribe encroached upon.
With respect to Indian trade, there was considerable innovation and considerable modification of existing laws. For years past, the Indians of the great tribes had chafed under the restrictions which the United States government had placed upon their trade and, unquestionably, no other single thing had irritated them more than the very evident monopoly right which the United States had given to a few white men over it. Indian trade, under federal regulations, was nothing more nor less than an extension of the protective policy, a policy that was destructive of all competition and that put the Indian, often to the contempt of his intelligence, at the mercy of the white sharper. Indian commissioner after Indian commissioner had protested against it, but all in vain. George W. Manypenny, particularly, had tried[288] to effect a change; for he was himself convinced that, if the Indians were capable of self-government, they were certainly capable of conducting their own trade. Needless to say, Manypenny's efforts were entirely unavailing. The Indian trade in the hands of the licensed white trader, although a pernicious thing for the Indian, was an exceedingly lucrative business for enterprising American citizens, white men who were, unfortunately, in possession of the elective franchise but of little else that was honorable and the government, controlled by constituents with local interests, dared not surrender it to the unenfranchised Indians no matter how highly competent they might be. Thus the Indian country, throughout its entire extent, was exploited for the sake of the frontiersman. Moreover, the annuity money, a just tax upon a government that had received so much real estate from the aborigines, instead of being spent judiciously to meet the ends of civilization and in such a way as to reflect credit upon the donor, who after all was a self-constituted guardian, went right back into the pockets of United States citizens but, of necessity, into those of only a very limited number of them.