Part 12

Presumably, Superintendent Coffin did not altogether approve of Senator Lane's taking it upon himself to confer with the Indians who, after all, were officially Coffin's charges; for, in October, we find him, likewise, planning for an intertribal conference to be held at Humboldt.[497] It is rather interesting to look back upon all this and to realize, as perforce we must, that every plan for conferring with the southern tribes in the interests of the United States government, at this critical time, contemplated a meeting at some place outside of Indian Territory. Here were agents of the Indian's "Great Father" offering protection to the red men and yet giving incontestable proof in the very details of the offer that they did not themselves dare to venture[498] beyond the Kansas boundary. As a matter of fact, all such plans for a general conference came to nothing, although, as late as November, Lane had still the idea of one in mind. He was, at the time, hoping to meet the Indians at Leroy[499] in Coffey County, Kansas, on the twenty-fourth. Lane also continued to advocate the use of the friendly Indians as soldiers. A little earlier, Agent Johnson had endorsed[500] Lane's plan in a letter to Commissioner Dole; but the coming of General Hunter upon the scene considerably affected the sphere of influence.

Dissatisfaction with Frémont on account of his extravagance, his haphazard way of issuing commissions, his tardiness, and, above all, his general military incompetence had crystallized in September; and, by orders[501] of General Scott on the twenty-fourth of October, Hunter was directed to relieve him. Hunter reached his post in early November and almost immediately thereafter, either upon his own initiative or after consultation with someone like Coffin (it could hardly have been with Lane; for Lane had gone[502] to Washington, or with Branch; for Branch was strongly opposed to the project intended), he telegraphed[503] to the War Department "for permission to muster a Brigade of Kansas Indians into the service of the United States, to assist the friendly Creek Indians in maintaining their loyalty." Evidently, the request was not granted,[504] but duties akin to it were, by arrangement of President Lincoln, conferred upon Hunter which involved his assuming the responsibility of holding, if such a plan were feasible, an intertribal council so as to renew the confidence of the southern Indians in the United States government. A letter[505] from Dole, outlining the plan, reveals an astonishing ignorance of just how far those selfsame Indians had gone in their defection, because of the loss of the confidence.

In the giving of these new duties to General Hunter, there was not the slightest intention of ignoring Senator Lane. In fact, Dole expressly mentioned that Lane had called for just such an Indian conference[506] and suggested that, if Hunter's military duties prevented his meeting the Indians in person, Lane might take his place, "provided he can be spared from his post." The whole affair was incident to the reorganization that had recently, under general orders[507] of the ninth of November, taken place in the Western Department, from which had resulted a Department of Kansas, separate and distinct from the Department of Missouri. The Department of Kansas included "the State of Kansas, the Indian Territory west of Arkansas, and the Territories of Nebraska, Colorado, and Dakota" and was to be under the command of Major-general David Hunter[508] with headquarters at Fort Leavenworth. The idea governing this division of the old western department was, ostensibly, as Nicolay and Hay express[509] it, that Kansas might be protected, Indian Territory repossessed, and Texas reached. As we shall presently see, a similar reorganization took place, about the same time, in the Confederate western service and for very much the same reason, the condition of the Indian country being a very large proportion of that reason. It is barely possible that, as far as the United States was concerned, Senator Lane's recommendation[510] of the ninth of October was almost wholly accountable for the change.

It was, undoubtedly, high time that something vigorous was being done to stay Confederate progress in Indian Territory. Indeed, events were happening there at this very moment that made all plans for an inter-tribal conference exceedingly out of date. The Confederate government had now a large Indian force[511] in the field and expectations of an increase, provided the necessary arms[512] were obtainable. On the twenty-second[513] of November, by special orders[514] from Richmond, Indian Territory had been erected into a separate military department and Albert Pike, now a brigadier-general, assigned to the command of it. For the present, however, things seem to have remained much as they were with McCulloch nominally in command and Cooper in actual charge. Moreover, long before Pike reappeared upon the scene, matters had come to an issue between the secessionist and unionist Creeks.

Determined not to allow themselves to be over-persuaded or intimidated by the secessionist element in their nation, the unionist Creeks, under Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la, had withdrawn from active intercourse with the rival faction and, resisting all attempts of Cooper and others to inveigle them into an interview that might result in compromise, they had encamped at or near the junction of the Deep and North Forks of the Canadian River. Cooper resolved to attack them there and, for the purpose, gathered[515] together an effective fighting force of about fourteen hundred men, all Indians except for a detachment of Texas cavalry. On the fifth of November, Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la broke camp and took up the line of march for Kansas, hoping that, in Kansas, he and his followers would receive either succor or refuge. It has been estimated that Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la's force, at this time, was less than two thousand men and that it comprised, besides Creeks and Seminoles, some two or three hundred negroes. His traveling cortège was, however, very much larger; for it included women and children, the sick and the aged. Approximately half of the Creeks were on the move for pastures new. For many of them it was a second exodus.

Colonel D. H. Cooper reached the deserted camp of Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la on the fifteenth of November and, finding his enemy gone and locating his trail, moved himself in a slightly northeasterly direction towards the Red Fork of the Arkansas. He came up with the unionist Creeks at Round Mountain on the night of the nineteenth and an indecisive engagement[516] followed, both sides claiming the victory. Under cover of darkness, Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la managed to slip away and crossed into the Cherokee country where there were plenty of disaffected full-bloods to give him sympathy. It is more than likely that they had invited him there and had prepared for his coming. Cooper did not attempt to pursue the Creek refugees, having been called back to the Arkansas line, there to wait in readiness to reënforce McCulloch should the Federals make a forward march southward from Springfield, as then seemed probable. But that danger soon passed, passed even before Cooper had had time to take the post indicated or to leave his own camp at Concharta, after a brief recuperation. He was now free to follow up the meagre advantage of the nineteenth.

The next opportunity to crush Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la came in the Battle of Bird Creek [Chusto-Talasah, Little High Shoals, or the Caving Banks],[517] fought December 9, 1861. On the twenty-ninth of the preceding month, a part of Cooper's force had set out for Tulsey Town and an advance guard had been sent up the Verdigris in the direction of a place, called "Coody's Settlement," where Colonel John Drew with a detachment of his regiment of Cherokee full-bloods was posted. The orders were that Drew should effect a junction with Cooper's main force and, on December eighth they were all encamped on Bird Creek in the southwestern corner of the Cherokee Nation. At this juncture, word came that Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la wished to treat for peace and Major Pegg, a Cherokee, with three companions was sent forward to confer with him. They found the Creek chief, surrounded by his warriors and ready for battle. It was evening and Colonel Cooper had scarcely heard the news of the Creek determination to fight when a message came that four companies of Drew's regiment, horrified at the thought of fighting with their neighbors, had dispersed and gone over to Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la. The incident did not promise well for success on the morrow and the Battle of Bird Creek was another indecisive engagement, although the Creeks, eager and resplendent with their yellow corn-shuck badges, seem to have had all the advantage of position. Again they made their escape and again Colonel Cooper was prevented from following them, this time because he was exceedingly fearful lest the Cherokee desertion might have a lasting and disastrous effect upon the remaining Indian forces, particularly upon the small group that was all that was left of the original First Cherokee Mounted Rifles. Cooper's personal opinion was, that the defection was widespread among the Cherokees and that it would be sheer folly to start out after Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la until more white troops had been added to the pursuing force, by way both of reënforcement and of encouragement.

Instead, therefore, of continuing northward, Colonel Cooper drew off in the direction of Fort Gibson and, from that point, sent for aid to Colonel James McIntosh at Van Buren. He then occupied himself with his own troops and prevailed upon John Ross to rally[518] the Cherokees. It was now the nineteenth of December and the aged chief did his best to keep his people true to the faith that the nation had pledged in the treaty of the seventh of October. He recalled to their minds the fact that it was, by all odds, the best treaty that the Cherokees had ever secured, the one that gave them the fullest recognition of their rights as a semi-independent people, and he might have added with sad, sad truth that it was the best that they could ever hope to get. He made no such pessimistic reflection, however, but concluded,

It is, therefore, our duty and interest to respect it, and we must, as the interest of our common country demands it. According to the stipulations of the treaty we must meet enemies of our allies whenever the south requires it, as they are our enemies as well as the enemies of the south; and I feel sure that no such occurrence as the one we deplore would have taken place if all things were understood as I have endeavored to explain them. Indeed the true meaning of our treaty is, that we must know no line in the presence of our invader, be he who he may....[519]

Colonel Cooper then addressed[520] the Indians and, after him, Major Pegg;[521] but they were not convinced and many of them went home, positively refusing to march farther with the army.

Meanwhile Cooper's call for reënforcements had reached McIntosh[522] and, as the need seemed so urgent, McIntosh resolved to supply it and notified Cooper to that effect. Subsequently, he decided[523] to take the field in person and to head a column, separate from Cooper's. What induced him to do this, nobody can well say. Cooper always felt that the incompleteness of the victory over Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la, which was soon to come, was mainly attributable to the divided effort of the attacking force. In the two former engagements, Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la's force, such as it was, untrained and miscellaneous, had greatly outnumbered the Confederate; but now the two were more equally matched in point of numbers and the chances of success were all on the southern side because of superior training and equipment, so Cooper was probably correct in his conjecture. McIntosh's excuse[524] for advancing precipitately and alone was, notwithstanding, very reasonable. The scarcity of forage made it expedient to march compactly; and the two generals had agreed, so McIntosh declared, when in conference at Fort Gibson, "that either force should attack the enemy on sight."

The privilege of attacking Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la fell, under this arrangement, supposing it was made, to McIntosh, who had been able to push on in advance of Cooper. The Battle of Chustenahlah was fought in the early afternoon of December 26, 1861, and ended in what seemed the complete defeat of the Creeks. McIntosh reported that, although their position was strong, they were forced to retreat

To the rocky gorges amid the deep recesses of the mountains, where they were pursued by our victorious troops and routed in every instance with great loss. They endeavored to make a stand at their encampment, but their efforts were ineffectual, and we were soon in the midst of it. The battle lasted until 4 o'clock, when the firing gradually ceased....[525]

And then the Creeks fled, leaving practically everything in the shape of property behind them. Cooper came up and detachments of his troops pursued them almost to the Kansas line. The weather was bitterly cold, provisions scarce, the country rough and bleak. The pursuit took the form of a seven day scout; but the Creeks, no matter how great their dispersion, were headed straight for Walnut Creek, Kansas.

Their coming was anticipated. Hearing of their approach, Superintendent Coffin had directed[526] all the agents[527] under his charge to report to him for duty at a place on the Verdigris River called Fort Roe[528] "about thirty-five or forty miles from Leroy and Burlington." It was Coffin's intention to meet the refugees upon their first arrival; but, as Commissioner Dole was expected soon to be at Fort Leavenworth, he thought it best to wait[529] and consult with him. It does not seem to have been recorded on just what date the first of the Indian refugees crossed the Kansas line, but they were very soon crossing in great numbers and, by the time Coffin finally reached them, their condition was truly pitiable. They took up their station on the bare prairies between the Verdigris and the Arkansas Rivers and stretched themselves in almost hopeless confusion over about two hundred miles of country. Fortunately the land upon which they camped was Indian land, New York Indian land, and the few white men thereon were legally intruders and could not consistently object to the presence of the refugees. The numbers of the refugees were variously estimated. Starting with about forty-five hundred,[530] they increased daily and at an astonishing rate; for the exodus of the Creeks was but the signal for the flight of other tribesmen from Indian Territory, of all those, in fact, who were either tired of their alliance with the Confederacy or had never been in sympathy with it and were only too eager to take the first chance to escape from it.

The suffering of the refugees, due to destitution and exposure, was something horrible to think upon. Superintendent Coffin had little to give them. He appealed to General Hunter for an allowance from the army supplies and Hunter sent down his chief commissary of subsistence, Captain J. W. Turner, to do what he could to relieve the distress. Hunter also sent Brigade-surgeon A. B. Campbell; for it was not simply food and clothing, that were needed and roof shelter, but medical attendance. As soon as possible, cheap blankets[531] were furnished and some condemned army tents. The journey northward had been undertaken in the bitterest of cold weather. With a raw northwest wind beating in their faces,

And over the snow-covered roads, they travelled all night and the next day, without halting to rest. Many of them were on foot, without shoes, and very thinly clad.... In this condition they had accomplished a journey of about three hundred miles; but quite a number froze to death on the route, and their bodies with a shroud of snow, were left where they fell to feed the hungry wolves....

Families who in their country had been wealthy, and who could count their cattle by the thousands and horses by hundreds, and owned large numbers of slaves, and who at home had lived at ease and comfort, were without the necessaries of life.[532]

When, sometime in early December, Commissioner Dole heard of the resistance that the unionist Creeks were making to Colonel Cooper, he immediately applied once more, through the Secretary of the Interior, to the War Department for troops sufficient to assert Federal supremacy south of the Kansas line, his immediate object being, the strengthening of the force then opposed to Cooper. At the moment, Lane's expedition was under consideration, Lane having managed to convince the Washington authorities, both congressional and administrative, that an expedition southward was absolutely necessary[533] for the protection of the frontier.

Somewhat earlier, in fact in the late autumn, the non-secession Indians of various tribes had made their own appeal for help. They had made it to the United States government and also, a little later on, to the Indian tribes of Kansas. Along about the first of November, a mixed delegation[534] of Creeks, Seminoles, and Chickasaws had made its appearance[535] at Leroy and, finding there the United States Creek agent, George A. Cutler, had consulted with him "in reference to the intentions of the Federal government regarding the protection due them under treaty stipulations." Cutler advised the Indians to talk the matter over with Senator Lane and accompanied them to Fort Scott, Lane's headquarters, for the purpose. Arriving there, they learned that Lane had gone to Washington and had left his command in charge of Colonel James Montgomery. Colonel Montgomery counselled with the Indians as Cutler had done and helped them to reach the decision that it would be best to proceed to Washington and lay their complaints before the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. At the same time, Montgomery notified[536] President Lincoln of their intention.

Still accompanied by Agent Cutler, the delegation resumed its journey, going by way of Fort Leavenworth. There they conferred[537] with General Hunter and left greatly strengthened in their resolution of proceeding to Washington; for Hunter, too, thought that such a trip might compel the government to realize the Indian's very real distress and its own obligation to relieve it. We are fain to believe that General Hunter personally believed in the military necessity of securing Indian Territory even though he did do all he could to oppose the project of Senator Lane in the early months of 1862 and even though he did disapprove of the formation of the department of Kansas and his own assignment to it instead of to that of Missouri, which would have been his preference. If he at any time to date had wavered[538] in his opinion as to the needs of the Indians and their legitimate claim upon the United States government for protection, Carruth's letter of November twenty-sixth ought to have settled the matter, unless, indeed, its rather savage tone had created prejudice instead of working conviction as was intended.

... I have from the first believed it would be good policy to let loose the northern Indians, under the employ of government; it certainly would be better for the border States to have the Indian country for a battle ground than to have it remain a shelter for rebel hordes the coming winter....[539]

The visit of the Indians to Washington proved very opportune. By the twenty-seventh of December, they were back at Fort Leavenworth and considerably reassured. Superintendent Coffin had a council with them on the twenty-eighth "at the Fort to good satisfaction." He says of his interview,

I gave them Presents of Pipes, tobacco, and Sugar, and they went on their way to Fort Scott rejoicing they seem to be in fine Spirits,[540] but are at a Loss what to do for a living til Lanes Army goes down there into the Indian Territory they want very much to get Some of the Funds now due the Creeks....[541]

A more pathetic appeal, and one more immediately telling in its effects, was that made to the brother Indians of Kansas. It came direct from Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la and when it reached the Delawares found in them a ready response. It invited their coöperation[542] in the war and asked for men and ammunition.[543] This is the Delaware reply:[544]

We are much rejoiced to receive your letter by James McDaniel[545] and David Balon. Our Agent has sent it to our great Father, the President, "at Washington," and to Gen. Hunter at "Fort Leavenworth." It gives us great pleasure to hear that you are good and true friends to the President, and to the Government of the United States. We hope you will continue to be their friend. If bad men of the South ask you to go to war against the President, stop your ears, don't listen to them, they are your worst enemies, they are trying to destroy you and the Country.

Grand Children it does our hearts good, we rejoice to hear of the victories you have gained over your enemies of the Government under your brave leader Oputh-la-yar-ho-la.

Grand Children we are ready and willing to help you. Our brave Warriors are ready to spill their Blood for you, and are only waiting to hear from our great Father at Washington, we have asked of him the privaledge of going to your assistance, and hope that our request will be granted, we don't wish to go to War against the wishes of our great Father the President. We have heard that the President will soon have a large Army in the Indian Country to protect you, that he has ordered Gen. Lane to march to your relief. We are confident that our great Father is able and will protect his red children--Grand Children we pray to the "great spirit" to protect you and keep you out of the hands of the bad men of the South, who are trying to destroy you and the Government--We have no fears as to the result of this war--the President has large Armies in the field that will conquer and punish the Rebels--We are proud of our Muscogee Children.

The United States government had already determined upon an expedition to the Indian country and, yielding to the importunities of Senator Lane, who represented General Hunter as in full accord with himself in the matter, had decided to use the Kansas Indians in the making up of the attacking force. It was well that the Indians had manifested a readiness to fight and that the Delawares, particularly, had overcome their previous aversion. The first official record of the fact that the decision to use the Kansas Indians had been reached appears to be a communication[546] from Assistant Adjutant-general E. D. Townsend to Surgeon-general C. A. Finley, under date of December 31, 1861, notifying him that medical supplies would soon be needed for a force of about twenty-seven thousand men, about four thousand of whom were to be Indians, which was to be concentrated at an early day near Fort Leavenworth. On the third of January, Lane wrote[547] to Hunter, informing him, as if at first hand and semi-officially, of the new plan. It is not to be wondered at that General Hunter took offence at the officiousness and presumption Lane displayed. In point of fact, it was a clear case of executive interference.