The 56th Division (1st London Territorial Division)

CHAPTER IX 281

Chapter 1914,527 wordsPublic domain

THE ARMISTICE

BATTLE OF THE CANAL DU NORD--BATTLE OF CAMBRAI, 1918--BATTLE OF THE SAMBRE

When once the great offensive had started there was no pause in the fighting. Divisions were relieved to reorganise. Sometimes they stood their ground, so that supplies could be brought up, and so that they might not shoot too far ahead of the base from which supplies were drawn. The turmoil of the front line was assuredly no greater than the turmoil in rear of the fighting troops. Activity, effort, unending toil, went on behind the line as well as in the line. As the troops drove the enemy in front of them, so engineers stood ready to rebuild the shattered railways and reconstruct the shell-battered roads. But the Army Service Corps could not stand still while the railways and roads were in the hands of the engineers. They had to struggle forward as best they could, and it is to their everlasting industry that the troops in the fighting areas were fed, clothed, supplied with ammunition, and, very frequently indeed, provided with water.

When the infantry of the 56th Division returned to Boyelles, the place was unrecognisable. The railway was through. Trains were in Boyelles, and lines of lorries stood, being loaded by a swarm of men. It was a cheering sight for the tired but happy division.

Meanwhile the advance continued, fiercely opposed, but irresistible. 282 On the right of Bullecourt the Fourth and Third Armies had, by the night of the 30th, reached a line from Cléry-sur-Somme, past the western edge of Marrières Wood to Combles, les Bœufs, Bancourt, Fremicourt, and Vraucourt. And, south of Péronne, Allied infantry had reached the left bank of the Somme from Nesle to the north. Farther south still, the French held Noyon. On the 1st September the Australians entered Péronne.

On the left of Bullecourt the First Army had advanced (we have already noted the advance of the Canadians) and were now on the high ground east of Cherisy and Hautcourt, and had captured Eterpigny. On the north of the Scarpe we had captured Plouvain. The Quéant-Drocourt line was now within assaulting distance.

This powerful line ran from the Hindenburg Line at Quéant to Drocourt, in the neighbourhood of Lens, and was attacked by the Canadian Corps and 4th Division, of the First Army, and the 52nd, 57th, and 63rd Divisions, of the Third Army, on the 2nd September. It was one of the greatest assaults of the war, and was completely successful.

As the 56th Division knew very well, the Germans had been contesting every inch of the ground. But now the enemy were in a most unfavourable position, and started to fall back on the whole of the Third Army front and on the right of the First Army. On the 3rd September the enemy was on the line of the Canal du Nord; on the following day he commenced to withdraw from the east bank of the Somme, south of Péronne, and on the night of the 8th September was on the line Vermand, Epehy, Havrincourt, and so along the east bank of the canal.

Meanwhile the division rested, bathed, and reorganised. Divisional 283 Headquarters were at Boisleux St. Marc, and on the 3rd September Sir Douglas Haig visited Gen. Hull and congratulated him on the good work done for the division.

On the 4th a warning order, followed by one of confirmation, was received that the division would move to the Quéant-Pronville area in readiness to relieve the 63rd Division in the line on the 5th. But at mid-day on the 5th this order was cancelled. Meanwhile the 167th and 169th Brigades had already moved to the new area, and so had a useless march back again.

On the same day Gen. Hull was informed that his division would be transferred to the XXII Corps and would relieve the 1st Division in the line, command to pass on the 9th.

Due north of Cambrai there is a very marshy tract of land. It was a feature, it will be remembered, in the scheme of attack on Cambrai in 1917. These ponds are fed by the Sensée and Cojeul Rivers, and the Canal du Nord is planned to run up, after passing Mœuvres, by Inchy-en-Artois, Marquion to a place called Palleul, where it cuts across this marsh and joins up with the Canal de l’Escaut and the Canal de la Sensée. This water covers a stretch of ground running well to the west, towards the Scarpe, and tails off near a village called Etaing. When the Canadians made their gallant and successful attack on the Quéant-Drocourt line, the left flank of the advance rested on the ponds and marshes of the Sensée, and this was the front which the 56th Division was to take over.

The line was well up to the water and extended from a point about 500 284 yards north of Eterpigny, south of Etaing, south of Lecleuse, and joined with the Canadians 1,500 yards east of Récourt.

The relief of the 1st Division took place on the 6th, 7th, and 8th, command passing at 10 a.m. on the 9th September. The enemy was quiet, but the weather was bad, cold and showery.

On the 16th it was arranged that the 4th Division should relieve the 11th, on the left, and that the 56th would extend the front held to their right, taking over from the 3rd Canadian Division. Battalions then engaged in a series of side-stepping reliefs to the right until, on the 25th, the right of the division was on the Arras-Cambrai road. On this day the only incident of note occurred when the enemy twice attempted to raid the London Scottish, and was, on each occasion, driven off with loss.

By this time preparations were complete for a further advance across the Canal du Nord on the 27th September. The crossing of the canal was to be forced by the Canadian Corps, when the 11th and 56th Divisions would relieve the left of the Canadians and attack due north along the eastern bank of the canal and towards the marshes of the Sensée. The 56th Division would be on the left--that is to say, they would advance along the canal bank. The 169th Brigade was given the task of attacking along the eastern bank, and the 168th was to clear up the western bank.

The great attack on the 27th September met with the fiercest opposition. It was obviously of vital importance to the enemy to maintain his front opposite St. Quentin and Cambrai. The advance of the British Armies was striking directly at the all-important lateral 285 communications running through Maubeuge to Hirson and Mezières, by which alone the German forces on the Champagne front could be supplied and maintained. It had been decided that the Americans were to attack west of the Meuse in the direction of Mezières, the French west of the Argonne with the same general objectives, and the Belgians in the direction of Ghent. The British attack in the centre was where the enemy’s defences were most highly organised, and if these were broken the threat directed at his vital communications would react on his defence elsewhere.

The British attack was, too, largely on the field of a former attack in 1917, but there was this difference: the Canadians had smashed through the Quéant-Drocourt system on the left. This would make the attack on the Bourlon Wood positions somewhat easier. But the whole system of defence round and about the Hindenburg Line varied in depth between 7,000 and 10,000 yards, and was a most formidable series of fortifications.

The First and Third Armies attacked with the IV, VI, XVII, and Canadian Corps, the operation of the 56th Division being on the extreme left and subsequent to the launching of the main attack. The problem on the left, which the 56th Division helped to solve, was that the northern portion of the canal was too formidable an obstacle to be crossed in the face of the enemy, and it was therefore necessary to force a passage on the narrow front about Mœuvres, and turn the line of the canal farther north by a divergent attack developed fan-wise from the point of crossing.

The morning broke wet and misty. The wind was from the west, and 286 carried the opening crash of the British barrage, at 5.30 a.m., well behind the German lines. But they did not need this sort of warning. For days they had watched the assembling of batteries, stores, a gigantic army behind the infantry, who were ever keeping a steady pressure on their advanced lines. Prepared as they were, however, nothing could stop the assaulting lines of Canadians. News came in to the 56th Division early that all was going well.

Enemy retaliation on the 56th Division was slight, and practically ceased by 5.40 a.m. But as the morning progressed it became apparent that the Canadians were meeting with strong opposition on the extreme left. They were timed to reach a line immediately south of Sauchy by mid-day, and the 169th Brigade was to carry on the attack from there at 2.48 p.m.

Brig.-Gen. Coke ordered the London Rifle Brigade to send a company, as soon as the barrage would permit, to establish posts on the east bank of the canal, and cover the Royal Engineers, who were to build a bridge about 1,000 yards north of the Arras-Cambrai road. A similar bridge was to be made some 300 yards south of the road. The northern bridge was to be complete by 11 a.m. and the southern one by mid-day. But the village of Marquion was on the east of the canal, and on the Arras-Cambrai road, and at 11.45 a.m. the village was still holding out, which made it impossible for the 169th Brigade to keep to the time-table and be in position for attack by 2.48 p.m. It was therefore decided to postpone the attack until 3.28 p.m.

Meanwhile, the Engineers (513th Coy. and 512th Coy.) and Pioneers had 287 gone forward to construct their bridges, and had found themselves opposed by hostile infantry. They, however, cleared the eastern bank and commenced to build.

At mid-day it was reported that Marquion was clear, and the 2nd London Regt. started to cross about that time, followed by the Queen’s Westminsters and the London Rifle Brigade. The advance of the 169th Brigade to the assembly positions completed the clearing of the ground behind the Canadians--the Queen’s Westminsters capturing no less than 50 prisoners from fighting groups they met with before forming up.

At three o’clock the brigade was in position with the 2nd Londons on the right and the Queen’s Westminsters on the left. The London Rifle Brigade had one company between the two branches of the River Agache clearing up the ground, and two companies in support of the 2nd Londons; the fourth company was engaged in covering the Engineers, who were making the northern bridge.

The attack swiftly reached and captured all the small copses, Kamwezi, Kiduna, and Cemetery, which yielded many prisoners, but the 2nd Londons were checked by machine-gun nests on the railway embankment south-west of Oisy. The 2nd Londons and the London Rifle Brigade attacked four times without success, and on the fifth the surviving enemy and their machine guns were captured.

The Queen’s Westminsters met with the same sort of opposition. The swampy ground in the triangle where the Agache joins the canal was an effective obstacle behind which the enemy had placed machine guns, which swept the line of advance. But the Queen’s Westminsters 288 worked cunningly round by the banks of the Agache, and eventually surrounded the Germans, capturing 1 officer and 22 other ranks (21 dead bodies were counted in the post). By 7 p.m. the line of the railway south-west of Oisy was held, and with the capture of a final machine-gun nest defending the canal bridge east of Mill Copse, the Queen’s Westminsters reached the final objective of the attack early in the morning of the 28th.

The task of advancing on the western bank of the canal was given to the 168th Brigade, and was carried out by the Kensingtons. For some way they advanced in line with the Queen’s Westminsters, but were then held up by machine guns in Mill Copse. The country was extremely difficult owing to water. Mill Copse could only be approached by a narrow pavé lane, which was flooded and much blocked by fallen trees. At 6.30 p.m. the leading company was about 500 yards south of the copse, and it was decided not to attempt its capture by daylight, but to wait for the moon. The advance was then continued at 2 a.m., and reached the final objective without opposition.

The following day the 169th Brigade pushed on to the marsh land east of Palleul, meeting with no resistance, but securing a few prisoners. Altogether this brigade captured over 400 prisoners and 34 machine guns.

The total captures of the division were: 12 officers, 501 other ranks, 45 machine guns, and 10 trench mortars.

The 8th Middlesex (167th Brigade) then entered the village of Palleul, after making a temporary bridge over the blown-up causeway, and established a bridgehead at Arleux, a village on the north of the 289 marshes. The enemy made a small attack in this direction on the 29th, and drove in the bridgehead; they also shelled Palleul with mustard gas.

But the German resistance was broken. Gouzeaucourt, Marcoing, Noyelles-sur-l’Escaut, Fontaine-Notre-Dame, and Sailly had been captured, together with over 10,000 prisoners and 200 guns. Consternation reigned at the headquarters of the Central Powers. The Austrian Peace Note made its appearance on the 15th September; Bulgaria surrendered on the 29th; and Damascus fell on the 20th. The German troops on the Western Front fought desperately and well, but they were being beaten, and frequently, on the British front, by inferior numbers.

The actual position held by the 56th Division was along the marshy ground on both banks of the canal. It included Palleul and the Bois de Quesnoy. But on the 30th the front was prolonged to the right, when the 168th Brigade took over from the 11th Division, up to a point on the eastern outskirts of Aubencheu. The enemy were very alert, and opened heavy machine-gun fire on the approach of patrols. And on the 6th they set fire to Aubenchaul. When the fires had died down, patrols established posts on the bank of the canal.

This burning business was carried on extensively. Fires, accompanied by explosions, were continually breaking out behind the enemy lines. On the 9th October the division was ordered to take over a further length of front and relieve the whole of the 11th Division, who had their right flank on the village of Fressies. The object was to free the 11th Division, so that they could follow the enemy, who were 290 evacuating the area between the Canal de l’Escaut and the Sensée Canal, as the result of the capture of Cambrai by the Canadian Corps. (Battle of Cambrai 8th-9th October.)

During the day it was found that the enemy were actually retiring on the 11th Division front, and the 56th Division was ordered to ascertain whether the villages of Arleux, Aubigny-au-Bac, and Brunement were still occupied. Both the 167th Brigade on the left and the 168th on the right sent out patrols, which were fired on and engaged by the enemy the moment they crossed the canal. In Arleux quite an exciting patrol action was fought, in which four of the enemy were killed.

The relief of the 11th Division was completed by six in the evening. Patrols found that the enemy was still holding Fressies, and the 168th Brigade was ordered to attack and capture that village.

The operation was carried out by the Kensingtons, who stormed the village most successfully at 7 a.m. on the 11th October. Two companies only attacked, and the casualties were 1 killed and 9 wounded. On the other hand, they captured 2 officers and 39 other ranks. A most praiseworthy little action.

The enemy was now cleared from the south bank of the canal along the whole of the divisional front. The 11th Division, pressing forward, was still on the right of the 56th, and on the left was the 1st Canadian Division. Farther on the left was the VIII Corps, and, on this same day, they captured Vitry-en-Artois and drove the enemy back on Douai. On receipt of this news the 56th Divisional Artillery was ordered to keep the crossings of the canal from Arleux northwards under fire, and the 167th Brigade were instructed to push forward 291 patrols and obtain a footing in Arleux if possible. This they were unable to do, in face of the machine-gun fire, and a most unfavourable approach.

In the evening the division passed to the command of the Canadian Corps. The 1st Canadian Division, on the left of the 56th, had been pushing forward on the north of the ponds and marshes for some days, and on the 12th they captured Arleux in the early hours of the morning. The 167th Brigade co-operated in clearing up the southern portion of the village and relieved all Canadian troops, so as to include Arleux in the divisional front.

Meanwhile, during the night 12th/13th October, the 169th Brigade relieved the 168th on the right. A clever and daring enterprise to capture Aubigny-au-Bac was then undertaken; in the words of Gen. Hull, “initiated and carried out entirely under the orders of the Brigadier-General commanding the 169th Infantry Brigade, who deserves great credit for the successful exploit.”

The 169th Brigade held the right sector, with the London Rifle Brigade and the Queen’s Westminsters in line, and as the front was very extended, Brig.-Gen. Coke decided to attempt the capture of the village with two companies of the 2nd London Regt.

The problem he had before him was to attack across the Canal de la Sensée, which was 70 feet wide and had no bridges. Strong German posts were stationed at two points, where bridges had formerly existed, about 1,200 yards apart, and he decided to cross between these two destroyed bridges.

Absolute silence was essential for the success of the scheme. The 292 416th Field Coy. R.E. was ordered to construct rafts to carry over an officers’ patrol of the Queen’s Westminsters as soon as possible after dark, and, after landing, the officers were to ascertain whether a sufficiently large area, free of the enemy, existed for the assembly of the attacking company. If it was found that there was room for a company, the engineers were to construct a floating footbridge for them to cross.

The time for making reconnaissance and bringing up material was very short. The men who were to attack had to carry up the material. It was raining, and the approach was over marshy ground. All the men were wet to the skin before even the bridge was started.

Lieut. Arnold, of the 416th Field Coy., had silence and speed to consider, and also the amount of material which could be brought up in any given time. He decided he would not waste precious minutes over rafts, but would proceed at once with the foot-bridge. By three o’clock in the morning the bridge had been constructed, and the patrol of Queen’s Westminsters went across. One cannot give higher praise to the engineers than this: on landing, the patrol found that they could not proceed more than ten paces in any direction without being challenged by German sentries--there appeared to be three posts in the immediate vicinity of the bridge.

It seemed as though the enterprise must be abandoned. But as the enemy had not opened fire, the brigadier ordered the patrol to try to rush the posts without raising an alarm.

The bridge was, from its very nature, an unstable affair, with no hand-rail, and, owing to the rain which never ceased, a very slippery 293 surface. The night, however, was very dark and the rain was perhaps a great advantage. A platoon of the 2nd Londons crossed over stealthily and quickly overpowered two Germans, which was all the enemy force they found. The remaining platoons of the attacking company now crossed over.

The assembly area was far from a good one, being intersected by two small streams, La Navie and La Petite Navie, of which nothing was known. The artillery barrage was arranged against the flank of the enemy position, creeping in a north-westerly direction. To follow it in an ordinary way was out of the question, as the country was cut up by many hedges and ditches. So platoons were directed to make their own way to various points as soon as the barrage started.

At 4.30 a.m. Capt. Sloan, who was in command of the company, had his men assembled, as well as he was able, in the blackness of early morning, when dawn is postponed by rain and thick, low-flying clouds. In silence they waited for zero, which was at 5.15 a.m.

The rest is a story of complete and absolute surprise. The attack came from the least threatened side of the enemy position. Two machine-gun teams tried to resist, but after several had been killed, the rest threw up their hands. Altogether about 160 prisoners were taken in the village.

Posts were established on the outskirts of the village, but it was not found possible to occupy the station, where the enemy was strong and thoroughly roused, and so the momentary hope that Brunemont might also be surprised, vanished.

At 6 a.m. two platoons of the supporting company came up and were used 294 to reinforce the posts already established.

The enemy now began to show fight. Two machine guns worked up close and gave Capt. Sloan a lot of trouble. They were engaged with rifle grenades and rushed successfully. The remaining portion of the support company was moved across the canal and into the village.

As the morning advanced and the light grew better, the infantry observation posts in Quesnoy Wood reported parties of the enemy moving towards Aubigny. These were quickly dispersed, with many casualties, by the artillery, who also put to flight the crews of several trench mortars which were giving some trouble.

About ten o’clock a heavy enemy barrage was put down on the village, together with a concentration of machine-gun fire. This lasted for half an hour, and was followed by a most determined attack, with a force estimated at a battalion, from the north, and a smaller force from Brunemont. In spite of heavy losses, the Germans pressed on and slowly outflanked one post after another, greatly aided by trench mortars. The 2nd Londons were pressed back to La Petite Navie stream, where a stand was made and the enemy prevented from debauching from the village.

Being familiar with the ground, however, the enemy made full use of the hedges, and although the four Stokes mortars of the brigade battery, which supported the 2nd Londons, did exceedingly good work, it became advisable to fall back farther to the canal bank.

A bridgehead was maintained for some time, but at 5 p.m. all troops 295 had returned to the southern bank. They brought with them three enemy machine guns, and threw ten others into the canal.

But in the early morning, when still dark, a patrol started to cross over the bridge with the object of establishing a post on the north bank. The enemy was so close that the end of the bridge was within bombing distance. This caused the men to “bunch,” with the result that the bridge broke. Cpl. McPhie and Sapper Cox, of the 416th Field Coy. R.E., jumped into the water and held the cork floats, which supported the structure, together, getting their fingers badly trodden on by the patrol. But the patrol crossed before the two gallant men let go. Cpl. McPhie, realising the serious position of the men who had crossed to the north side, set about gathering material to repair and strengthen the bridge. Daylight came on apace, but the corporal never wavered in his intention. Having assembled what he wanted, in the nature of wood, he led the way with the curt remark to his men: “We’ve got to make a way for the patrol--it’s a death-or-glory job.”

The patrol on the north bank helped him to the best of their power, but they had the slenderest hold on that side of the canal. It was daylight, and enemy snipers were concealed in every hedge. The corporal started to work with bullets cracking like whips round his ears. He was shot in the head and fell in the water. Sapper Cox tried to pull him out, but Cpl. McPhie had sufficient strength to tell him to leave go, as he himself “was done.” Sapper Cox persisted in his efforts. The enemy fire increased: the corporal was hit again and again; Sapper Cox had six bullets through him. The corporal was dead, 296 and Cox let go of his body.

Then Sapper Hawkins ran to the bank and threw a rope to Cox. This wonderful man still had the strength to hold on to it while Hawkins drew him ashore.

Cox died two days later!

McPhie was awarded the Victoria Cross.

* * * * *

In this very fine enterprise 3 officers and 87 other ranks formed the attacking party. Altogether 6 officers and 165 other ranks passed over the canal. But this small force captured 4 officers and 203 other ranks. The casualties suffered by the whole of the 2nd Londons during the day were 3 officers and 140 other ranks.

Until the 169th Brigade handed over to the 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade, on the 14th October, they held the bridgehead and patrolled the north bank of the canal. But on the 15th the Germans succeeded in rushing the bridgehead, although they failed to get any identification.

On relief the 169th Brigade moved back to Sauchy-Cauchy, and the 168th, who were in reserve, entrained for Arras. On the 15th the 167th Brigade was relieved by the 11th Canadian Brigade and moved to Rumancourt. On the 16th the whole division was in the outskirts of Arras with headquarters at Etrun (except the artillery).

All through these weeks of fighting a great strain had been imposed on the Royal Army Service Corps and the Divisional Ammunition Column. The roads were bad and fearfully congested, and the distances were great 297 and continually changing. When the great advance commenced railhead was at a place called Tincques; on the 23rd August it changed to Gouy-en-Artois; on the 27th to Beaumetz; on the 31st to Boisleux-au-Mont. On the 8th September it was at Arras and on the 11th October at Quéant. Not for one moment had supplies failed to be up to time. The work of this branch of the organisation was excellent, and the work of these units of supply should always be borne in mind in every account of actions fought and big advances made.

The artillery remained in the line until the 23rd October, and then rested in the neighbourhood of Cambrai until the 31st October.

* * * * *

The whole of the Hindenburg Line passed into our possession during the early part of October, and a wide gap was driven through such systems of defence as existed behind it. The threat at the enemy’s communications was now direct. There were no further prepared positions between the First, Third, and Fourth Armies and Maubeuge.

In Flanders the Second Army, the Belgian Army, and some French divisions, the whole force under the King of the Belgians, had attacked on the 28th September, and were advancing rapidly through Belgium.

Between the Second Army, the right of the Flanders force, and the First Army, the left of the main British attacking force, was the Fifth Army under Gen. Birdwood. This army was in front of the Lys salient, which was thus left between the northern and southern attacks with the perilous prospect of being cut off. On the 2nd October the 298 enemy started an extensive withdrawal on the Fifth Army front.

Meanwhile the Belgian coast was cleared. Ostend fell on the 17th October, and a few days later the left flank of the Allied forces rested on the Dutch frontier. The Fourth, Third, and First Armies still pushed on towards Maubeuge, and by the end of the month the Forêt de Mormal had been reached.

The enemy was thoroughly beaten in the field. Though he blew up the railways and roads as he fled, he was becoming embarrassed by his own rearguards pressing on his heels as they were driven precipitately before the Allied infantry; and the position of his armies revealed certain and overwhelming disaster.

* * * * *

On the 27th October Austria sued for peace.

On the 28th the Italians crossed the Piave.

On the 29th the Serbians reached the Danube.

On the 30th October Turkey was granted an armistice.

The Central Powers lay gasping on the ground.

* * * * *

The 56th Division meanwhile led a quiet life, training and resting round Etrun and Arras. Organisation of battalions was overhauled in accordance with a pamphlet numbered O.B./1919 and issued by the General Staff. It was designed to deal with the decreasing strength of battalions, but, as it supposed a greater number of men than were in many cases available, it was troublesome.

The outstanding points were that platoons would now be composed of two rifle and two Lewis-gun sections; that a platoon, so long as it 299 contained two sections of three men each, was not to be amalgamated with any other platoon; and that not more than six men and one non-commissioned officer to each section should be taken into action.

“The fighting efficiency of the section,” says the pamphlet, “is of primary importance, and every endeavour must be made to strengthen the sections, if necessary, by the recall of employed men and men at courses, or even by withdrawing men from the administrative portions of battalion and company headquarters, which must in an emergency be temporarily reduced. After the requirements of the fighting portion for reconstruction have been met (50 other ranks), if the battalion is up to its full establishment, a balance of 208 men will remain for the administrative portion (90) and for reinforcements. This balance will include men undergoing courses of instruction, men on leave and in rest camps, men sick but not evacuated, and men on army, corps, divisional, or brigade employ. These latter must be reduced to the lowest figure possible, and will in no case exceed 30 men per battalion.”

The order against the amalgamation of platoons applied also to sections, but was not invariably carried out by company commanders. It had become a universal practice to detail six men and one non-commissioned officer to each post. With double sentries this gave each man one hour on and two hours off--anything less than these numbers threw a big strain on the men; and so long as the company commander had sufficient men for an adequate number of sentry posts, he made them up of that number.

The details of a battalion as arranged by this pamphlet are 300 interesting:

[Header Key: A - Fighting position. B - Administrative position. C - Reconstruction (not for reinforcement). D - Supplies for reinforcement.] --------------+---------+---------+---------+---------+--------- | A | B | C | D | Total. |Off.|O.R.|Off.|O.R.|Off.|O.R.|Off.|O.R.|Off.|O.R. +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+---- Battalion | | | | | | | | | | Headquarters | 5 | 70 | 2 | 66 | 2 | 8 | - | 27 | 9 | 171 | | | | | | | | | | 4 Company | | | | | | | | |} | Headquarters | 4 | 74 | -- | 24 | 4 | 10 | -- | -- |} | | | | | | | | | |} 8 | 110 Attached from | | | | | | | | |} | platoons | -- | 2 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |} | | | | | | | | | | | 16 Platoon | | | | | | | | |} | Headquarters | 12 | 38 | -- | 4 | 4 | 8 | -- | -- |} | | | | | | | | | |} | Section | | | | | | | | |} | commanders | | | | | | | | |} | acting as | | | | | | | | |} 16| 64 platoon | | | | | | | | |} | sergeants | -- | 10 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |} | | | | | | | | | |} | N.C.O.s for | | | | | | | | |} | reconstruction| -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 8 | -- | -- |} | | | | | | | | | | | 64 sections | -- |448 | -- | -- | -- | 16 | -- | 91 | -- | 555 +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+---- Total | 1 |642 | 2 | 90 | 10 | 50 | -- |118 | 33 | 900 --------------+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----

It will be seen that 732 other ranks were required to fill the fighting and administrative minimum. The ration strength of battalions from the 1st August and on the first of each month to the date of the armistice was:

---------------+----------+----------+----------+---------- | August. |September.| October. | November. +----+-----+----+-----+----+-----+----+----- |Off.| O.R.|Off.| O.R.|Off.|O.R. |Off.|O.R. |----+-----+----+-----+----+-----+----+----- 7th Middlesex | 39 | 950 | 35 | 678 | 43 | 865 | 43 | 863 8th “ | 40 | 948 | 38 | 787 | 41 | 864 | 39 | 813 1st Londons | 40 | 931 | 27 | 613 | 40 | 657 | 40 | 712 4th “ | 42 | 898 | 32 | 710 | 37 | 705 | 38 | 721 13th “ | 38 | 925 | 24 | 685 | 41 | 691 | 46 | 649 14th “ | 43 | 925 | 30 | 548 | 31 | 622 | 34 | 705 2nd “ | 37 | 891 | 27 | 599 | 31 | 717 | 35 | 601 5th “ | 35 | 989 | 25 | 669 | 32 | 603 | 33 | 631 16th “ | 42 | 959 | 27 | 577 | 31 | 560 | 29 | 612 ---------------+----+-----+----+-----+----+-----+----+-----

But these figures must be read with a reservation. In spite of all 301 efforts, men always disappeared. No battalion or company commander ever had the men who were on the ration strength. Guards, fatigue parties, sudden demands for men from higher commands, dozens of reasons could be given for the evaporation of strength. Probably two-thirds only of these men were really available for fighting. In those days a general when inspecting companies had no difficulty in finding fault if he wished to do so.

During the rest Gen. Hull discussed the subjects of organisation and training with the officers of each of his brigades.

But in the evening officers and men could be cheered by “Bow Bells,” which were to be heard at the theatre in Arras and the cinema at Haut Avesnes.

On the 31st the division moved into XXII Corps Reserve with headquarters at Basseville, and on the 1st November was ordered to relieve the 49th Division during the night 2nd/3rd.

On the 31st October the line immediately south of Valenciennes rested on the 4th Canadian Division, from the Canal de l’Escaut to the outskirts of the village of Famars, the 49th Division, on the high ground west of the River Rondelle, the 4th Division, astride the river and to the east of Artres, and then the 61st Division.

The 4th and 49th Divisions of the XXII Corps attacked on the 2nd November with the object of capturing the two villages of Preseau and Saultain, but only the first was taken, and the 49th Division held the Preseau-Valenciennes road.

The 56th Division was now plunged into real open fighting. Their objectives were no longer trench lines, but tactical features, such as 302 spurs, rivers, woods, and villages. An examination of Gen. Hull’s operation orders reveals the new nature of the fighting.

The 169th Brigade was given the right and the 168th the left. The objective of the XXII Corps, which was attacking with the 11th Division on the right and the 56th on the left, was given as the “general line of the Aunelle River left bank.” The Canadian Corps would cover the left flank of the 56th Division by the capture of Estreux. The division would be covered by six brigades of field artillery.

On attaining the high ground on the left of the Aunelle River, patrols would be pushed out, “since if there is any sign of enemy retreat the G.O.C. intends to push on mounted troops to secure the crossing of the Petite Aunelle River and will order the leading brigades to support them.” The mounted troops referred to were two squadrons of Australian Light Horse.

Each of the attacking brigades had at the disposal of the Brigadier a battery of field artillery, also two sections (8 guns) of the M.G. Battalion.

As the front to be covered by the 56th Division was very extensive, the 146th Brigade, of the 49th Division, remained in line on the left, and was to advance until squeezed out by the converging advance of the 56th and Canadian Divisions.

On the night 2nd/3rd November the 169th and 168th Brigades relieved the right of the 49th Division on the Preseux-Valenciennes road without incident. Soon after 8 a.m. on the 3rd, patrols reported that the enemy had retired. The two brigades advanced and occupied Saultain, which was full of civilians, before mid-day. The cavalry and a company of New Zealand Cyclists were then ordered to push forward 303 and secure the crossings of the River Aunelle. The line of the left bank of the river was reached at 6 p.m., where machine-gun fire was encountered. The brigades remained on that line for the night.

The advance was resumed at dawn on the 4th, when the Queen’s Westminster Rifles crossed the River Aunelle and captured the village of Sebourg; there was some half-hearted opposition from about thirty of the enemy who were rounded up, but when they attempted to advance east of the village they came under intense machine-gun and rifle fire from the high ground. Attempt to turn the enemy flank met with no success, and as there was no artillery barrage arranged, Brig.-Gen. Coke contented himself by holding the road to the east of the village.

The 168th Brigade on the left were also held up by the enemy on the high ground. The 4th London Regt. led the attack and took the hamlet of Sebourtquiaux (slightly north of Sebourg), only to find that they were not only faced with the enemy on the high ground to the east, but that heavy enfilade fire was being directed on them from the village of Rombies, on the western bank of the river, and on the Canadian Corps front. The 4th London Regt. took up a position to the east of Sebourtquiaux and astride the river, and so remained for the night. (Battle of the Sambre.)

This attack had been made without artillery preparation, but the position of the artillery is well described by Brig.-Gen. Elkington in a short report drawn up at the end of the operations. He says the barrage put down on the 1st November had been a very heavy one, and that the enemy never again waited for the full weight of the artillery 304 to get into action.

“The problem for the artillery then became a matter of dealing with machine-gun nests, isolated guns, and small parties of the enemy who were delaying our advance and enabling the main body of the enemy to retire. The enemy blew up bridges and roads, whenever possible, to delay the advance of our guns. In these circumstances the following points were emphasised:

(1) The benefit of allotting artillery to each battalion commander in the front line. The battery commander, by remaining with the battalion commander and keeping good communication with his battery, could bring fire to bear at very short time on targets as they were encountered. In practice it was generally found that a full battery was too large a unit, and that four guns, or even a section, was of more use.

(2) When more than one artillery brigade was available for an infantry brigade, the necessity of keeping them écheloned in depth and maintaining all but one brigade on wheels. If resistance was encountered, the brigade, or brigades, on wheels in rear could be moved up to reinforce the artillery in the line to put down a barrage for an attack, or, if no resistance was encountered, a brigade in rear could advance through the artillery in action, which in turn could get on wheels as the advancing brigade came into action. This procedure enabled brigades to get occasional days’ rests and obviated the danger of getting roads choked with advancing artillery.

(3) The necessity of impressing on infantry commanders that though at the commencement of an attack it is possible to support them with a great weight of artillery, it is not possible to push this mass of artillery forward when movement becomes rapid, and that if they push forward 305 rapidly, they are better served by a small mobile allotment of guns.”

The rapidity of the advance was little short of marvellous, for one must remember that it did not depend on the ability of the infantry to march forward, but on the engineers behind them, who were reconstructing the roads and railways for the supply services. Lieut.-Col. Sutton, who was controlling the Quartermasters’ Branch of the division, has a note in his diary:

“The enemy has done his demolition work most effectively. Craters are blown at road junctions and render roads impassable, especially in villages, where the rim of the crater comes in many cases up to the walls of the houses. Culverts are blown on main roads, and a particularly effective blockage is caused in one place by blowing a bridge across a road and stream, so that all the material fell across the road and in the river.”

This demolition was the great feature of the advance. The infantry could always go across country, but guns and lorries were not always able to use these short cuts. The weather was unfavourable, as it rained practically every day. When craters were encountered, the leading vehicles could perhaps get round, by going off the road, but they had the effect of churning up the soft ground so that the crater soon became surrounded by an impassable bog. The engineers and 5th Cheshires worked like Trojans to fill up these terrific pits, or make a firm surface round them.

At this date railhead was at Aubigny-au-Bac, the scene of that great exploit of the 2nd London Regt. And when one takes into account dates 306 and distances, the achievement of those who were working behind the infantry must be ranked as one of the finest in the war. One cannot get a picture of the advance by considering the mere width of an army front. The infantry were the spearhead, the supplies the shaft, but the hand that grasped the whole weapon and drove it forward was that of the engineer, the pioneer, the man of the Labour Battalion. The effort of the army then must be considered in depth, from the scout to the base.

Under these circumstances communication between units became a matter of vital importance. The ordinary administrative routine of trench warfare required little modification, up to the point of the break through the Hindenburg Line--after that it became impossible. Brigade Headquarters were responsible for the distribution of rations, engineer material, ordnance, mails, and billeting. In the orders for advance the General Staff informed the Brigadier-General what units, or portion of divisional troops, including Divisional Artillery, would be under his tactical control, and these units, irrespective of their arm of the service, constituted the Brigade Group. The supply of ammunition, on the other hand, was worked by arms of the service and not by Brigade Groups. The channel of supply being the ordinary one--from the Divisional Ammunition Column to batteries, or Infantry Brigade Reserve, or Machine-gun Battalion Reserve.

* * * * *

The administrative instructions for the division point out:

“The outstanding difficulty in all the administrative services will be that of intercommunication between the 307 troops and the échelons in rear which supply them. The system of interchange of orderlies between the forward and rear échelons has been found unsatisfactory, as if the two échelons both move at the same time, all touch is lost. Prior to the advance, therefore, the administrative staff of each brigade group will fix a ‘meeting-point’ or ‘rear report centre’ as far forward as possible on the probable line of advance. This point will serve as a rendezvous for all maintenance service.... The principle of intercommunication by means of a fixed report centre will also be adopted by Divisional Artillery and the Machine Gun Battalion for the purpose of ammunition supply.”

This arrangement does not seem to have worked well for the artillery, as we find Brig.-Gen. Elkington reporting:

“For a time communication by orderly between units became the only feasible plan. Owing to the rapid movement these orderlies had the utmost difficulty in locating units. In this Divisional Artillery the system of using village churches as report centres was successfully tried, but, owing to the cessation of hostilities, the trial was not as exhaustive as could be wished. Notices showing change of location were simply stuck on the church doors or railings, and orderlies were instructed to at once proceed to the church for information on entering a village.”

This modification of the original scheme would seem to be a useful one.

In spite of all these difficulties, the 56th Division was advancing. On the 5th November a barrage was arranged to cover troops attacking the high ground to the east of the River Aunelle, as a preliminary 308 to subsequent advance. The London Rifle Brigade led the attack of the 169th Brigade at 5.30 a.m., and by 7.30 a.m. had captured the village of Angreau. Here they were checked by the enemy, who occupied the woods on both banks of the Honnelle River. On their right the 11th Division captured the village of Roisin, but on their left the 168th Brigade had not made such good progress.

Attacking, with the London Scottish on the right and the Kensingtons on the left, the 168th Brigade were much hampered by flank fire from Angre and the ground to their left, which was still held by the enemy. The situation was somewhat eased by the capture of Rombies, by the 4th Canadian Division, and at 3 p.m. the artillery put down a rolling barrage, behind which the Kensingtons, and the London Scottish on their right, advanced to the outskirts of Angre. The position for the night was on the high ground west of the River Grande Honnelle.

The enemy had determined to defend the crossing of the river, and had an excellent position on the eastern bank, where they held the Bois de Beaufort in strength. The advance was to be resumed at 5.30 a.m., but just before that hour the German artillery put down a heavy barrage of gas-shells. Undaunted, the 2nd Londons on the right and the London Rifle Brigade on the left of the 169th Brigade attacked in gas-masks and crossed the river. The 168th Brigade, attacking with the London Scottish and Kensingtons in line, met at first with slight resistance, but as soon as the river was reached they were faced with a heavy barrage of artillery and machine-gun fire. In spite of very accurate fire, they succeeded in crossing the river to the north and south of 309 Angre. The position in front of them was of considerable natural strength, but was turned by a clever move of the London Scottish from the south, which established them firmly on the east bank. The Kensingtons advanced to the high ground immediately east of the village of Angre, and here met a heavy counter-attack which drove them back to the west bank.

Meanwhile the 169th Brigade was engaged in heavy fighting. Only the northern portion of the Bois de Beaufort was included in the attack, and the enemy were found to be strongly situated on ground which dominated the western bank of the river. The attack was delivered with spirit, and the enemy driven back. The 2nd Londons had the wood in front of them, and the London Rifle Brigade shot ahead on the left, outside the wood. The enemy rallied and counter-attacked the forward troops, while at the same time a force of Germans debouched from the wood on the right flank of the Rifle Brigade men, who were driven back to the west of the river. Some of the 2nd Londons were involved in this successful enemy counter-attack, but a party of forty--a large party in those days--held on to the position they had reached in the Bois de Beaufort until late in the afternoon, when, discovering what had happened on the left, and being almost entirely surrounded, they retired fighting to the western bank of the river.

The right brigade, therefore, remained on the west bank. The casualties had been heavy, amounting to 394.

The London Scottish had retained their hold of the east bank, and later in the afternoon the Kensingtons again succeeded in crossing 310 the river, and definitely established themselves to the east and in touch with the London Scottish. The casualties of the 168th Brigade during these operations were 207. The prisoners captured by them were 111. The prisoners captured by the 169th Brigade were 43.

The general destruction of roads, combined with the vile weather, now began to cause anxiety. Horses were used as much as possible--a horse can drag a cart through places which would be impossible for a motor lorry--and civilian wagons were pressed into service, being used in conjunction with spare army horses. This was all the more necessary as the administrative branch of the division had the additional responsibility of feeding civilians.

All the villages captured or occupied by the troops were filled with civilians. So great was their emotion on their release that they pressed whatever they had in the nature of food and drink on the troops. The coffee-pot of the French or Belgian housewife was replenished with reckless disregard for “to-morrow.” And then as the country was regained, so the villagers were cut off from the source which had provided them with their limited supplies. With Germans in retreat on one side and roads blown up on the other, they were more isolated than they had ever been. On the 6th November the 56th Division was rationing 16,000 civilians, and most of this work was being done by the transport of the 168th and 169th Brigades.

The battle on the right of the division had progressed with almost unfailing success. The 11th Division on their immediate right had met with the same check on the River Honnelle, but farther south the Army had forced their way through the great Forest of Mormal, and troops 311 were well to the east of it. The German rearguards were only able, on especially favourable positions, to check the advance of a few divisions; on the whole the rearguards were being thrown back on the main retreating force. The roads were packed with enemy troops and transport, and the real modern cavalry, the low-flying aeroplanes, swooped down on them, with bomb and machine gun spreading panic and causing the utmost confusion.

During the night 6th/7th November the 63rd Division was put into line on the front of the 168th Brigade, and the 169th was relieved by the 167th Brigade. The 56th Division was then on a single brigade front, with the 11th Division on the right and the 63rd on the left.

At dawn on the 7th patrols found that the enemy was still in front of them, and at 9 a.m. the brigade attacked with the 8th Middlesex on the right and the 7th Middlesex on the left. They swept on through the northern part of the wood, and by 10.30 a.m. the 7th Middlesex entered the village of Onnezies. The Petite Honnelles River was crossed, and the village of Montignies taken in the afternoon. But after the Bavai-Hensies Road was crossed, opposition stiffened, and both artillery and machine-gun fire became severe. A line of outposts held the east of the road for the night.

Explosions and fires, which were continually observed at night behind the enemy lines, were more numerous on the night of 7th/8th, and when the advance was continued at 8 a.m., the two Middlesex battalions occupied the villages of Athis and Fayt-le-Franc with practically no opposition. By nightfall outposts were covering Petit Moranfayt, Trieu 312 Jean Sart, Ferlibray, and Richon.

The road situation was worse than ever. Railhead was at Aubigny-au-Bac, and supply lorries were unable to proceed any farther than the Honnelle River owing to the destruction of the bridges. Rain fell all the time, and cross-country tracts were impassable. All traffic was thrown on the main roads, which, to the west of the river, were now in such a state that all supplies were late. Arrangements were made for aeroplanes to drop food to the advance troops, but fortunately this was found unnecessary.

The enemy was now in full retreat on the whole of the British front. To the south the Guards Division entered Maubeuge, and to the north the Canadians were approaching Mons. The 56th Division marched forward through the villages of Coron, Rieu-de-Bury, Quevy-le-Grand, and Quevy-le-Petit, and by the evening were on the line of the Mons-Maubeuge road behind a line of outposts held by the 1st London Regt.

On the 10th November the 1st Londons continued the advance, preceded by cavalry. No serious opposition was encountered until the infantry had passed through Harvengt, when heavy machine-gun fire from both flanks held up the advance. A squadron of 16th Lancers attempted to get through, but failed. The infantry then attacked and cleared the ground, entered Harmignies, and held a line to the east.

Orders were received that night that the 63rd Division would carry on the advance as advance guard to the XXII Corps, and the necessary reliefs were carried out. The artillery of the 56th Division remained 313 in action, and were just two miles south of the spot where Brig.-Gen. Elkington was in action on the 23rd August 1914, at the battle of Mons. Gen. Hull, on the other hand, had actually held an outpost line before Harmignies with his battalion on the 22nd August, and had moved to the north to hold a line from Obourg to Mons on the 23rd. After the battle the celebrated retreat had taken him through the village of Nouvelles due west of Harmignies, and so through Quevy to Bavai, Caudray, Ham, and so on. What memories this second visit to Harmignies must have brought back to him! From retreat to victory--from a battalion to a division--Harmignies 1914, Harmignies 1918.

Brig.-Gen. Coke also fought as company commander in August 1914 within five miles of the spot where he finished in 1918.

At 7.30 a.m. on the 11th November the XXII Corps issued orders that hostilities would cease at 11 a.m. on that day, and that all troops would stand fast.

Just before 11 o’clock all batteries opened fire. Each gunner was determined to be the last man to fire a shot at the Germans. And then, in the midst of the rolling thunder of rapid fire, teams straining every nerve to throw the last shell into the breach of their gun before the “cease fire” sounded, 11 o’clock struck, the first blast of the bugles pierced the air, and with the last note silence reigned.

“There was no cheering or excitement amongst the men,” writes Brig.-Gen. Elkington. “They seemed too tired, and no one seemed able to realise that it was all over.”

G.Q.G.A. 314 _le 12 Novembre, 1918._

_Officiers, Sous-officiers, Soldats des Armées Alliées_,

Après avoir résolument arrêté l’enemi, vous l’avez pendant des mois, avec une foi et une énergie inlassables, attaqué sans répit.

Vous avez gagné le plus grande bataille de l’Histoire et sauvé la cause la plus sacrée: la Liberté du Monde.

Soyez Fiers!

D’une gloire immortelle vous avez paré vos drapeaux.

La Postérité vous garde sa reconnaissance.

Le Maréchal de France, Commandant en Chef les Armées Alliées, F. FOCH.

The division did not move to the Rhine, but remained in this area, with headquarters at Harvengt. They mended the roads, they drilled, and they had sports. Towards the end of January 1919 demobilisation had reached a point which rendered the division ineffective as a fighting unit.

The London Scottish were moved to the 9th Division, in Germany, on the 16th January, and the 7th Middlesex to the 41st Division on the 25th February. On the 14th March Gen. Hull gave up command of the division.

But their work was done. Officially the 56th Division returned the first cadre on the 14th May, the last on the 10th June, 1919.

The total casualties of this division were:

Officers 1,470 Other ranks 33,339 ------ Total 34,809

APPENDIX 315

GENERAL OFFICERS COMMANDING

G.S.O.s1

Lieut-Col. | J. E. S. Brind, C.M.G., | From Royal Artillery. | D.S.O. | Joined the 56th Division | | 6/2/16 and left 31/10/16. Lieut.-Col. | A. Bryant, D.S.O. | The Gloucestershire Regt. | | With the 56th Division | | 30/10/16 to 23/12/16. Lieut.-Col. | G. de la P. B. Pakenham,| The Border Regt. | C.M.G., D.S.O. | ------------+-------------------------+-------------------------------

G.S.O.s2 316

------------+-------------------+--------+---------+------------------ Rank. | Name. | From. | To. | Regt. ------------+-------------------+--------+---------+------------------ Major |A. E. G. Bayley, |5/2/16 |1/10/16 |Oxford and Bucks | D.S.O. | | | Light Infantry. Major |E. A. Beck, D.S.O. |28/9/16 |17/2/17 |The Royal Scots | | | | Fusiliers. Major |W. T. Brooks, |15/2/17 |3/9/17 |The D.C.L.I. | M.C. | | | Major |F. B. Hurndall, |4/9/17 |9/7/18 |The 20th Hussars. | M.C. | | | Captain, |T. O. M. Buchan, |9/7/18 |Demob. |The Queen’s R.W. T/Major | M.C. | | | Surrey Regt.

G.S.O.s3

Captain. |T. W. Bullock |5/2/16 |20/4/16 |The Dorsetshire | | | | Regt. Captain. |M. G. N. Stopford, |10/6/16 |5/12/16 |The Rifle | M.C. | | | Brigade. Captain. |J. D. Crosthwaite, |7/12/16 |7/7/17 |The 1st London | M.C. | | | Regt. Captain. |E. L. Rabone, M.C. |11/7/17 |11/11/17 |The Worcestershire | | | | Regt. Captain. |C. W. Haydon, |11/11/17|11/5/18 |The Middlesex | M.C. | | | Regt. Captain. |T. L. C. Heald |14/5/18 |4/2/19 |The 5th Cheshire | | | | Regt.

A.A. & Q.M.G.s

D.A.A.G.s

D.A.Q.M.G.s 317

A.D.C.s

56TH DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY HEADQUARTERS C.R.A.

BRIGADE MAJORS

Major |W. J. McLay | 6/2/16 | 4/6/16 | Major |J. A. Don |28/6/16 | 27/9/16 | Major |D. Thomson |27/7/16 | 21/1/18 | Major |H. D. Gale, M.C. |21/1/18 | Demob. |

STAFF CAPTAINS

Captain |B. Macmin | 6/2/16 | 22/1/17 | Captain |N. C. Lockhart |22/1/17 | 12/2/19 | Captain |J. D. Hendley Smith|12/2/19 | Demob. | -------------+-------------------+--------+---------+-----------------

[6] NOTE.--Lieut. H. C. B. Way was away from 4/2/18 to 4/4/18 as A.D.C. to G.O.C. 16th (Irish) Division.

ARTILLERY 318

1/1ST LONDON BRIGADE R.F.A. (280TH BRIGADE R.F.A.)

Commanded by: Lieut.-Col. L. A. C. Southam until March 1918. Lieut.-Col. Batt. 1916 April 16th. 93rd Battery joined and designated D/280th Brigade R.F.A. May 6th. Designated 280th Brigade R.F.A. “ 17th. B.A.C. posted to 56th D.A.C. “ 28th. 93rd Battery ceased to be D/280th Bde. R.F.A., and was transferred to 283rd Bde. R.F.A., and the original 1/11th London Howitzer Battery became D/280. Nov. 5th. Reorganised into four 6-gun batteries; “A,” 93rd, and “C,” 18-pounders; “D,” howitzers. 93rd Battery and one section “R” Battery transferred from 283rd Bde. R.F.A. The original “B” Battery split up: one section to “A,” and one section to “C.” “D” Battery only had 4 howitzers until 25/1/17, when one section 500th Howitzer Battery joined from 282nd Bde. R.F.A.

1/2ND LONDON BRIGADE R.F.A. (281ST BRIGADE R.F.A.)

Commanded by Lieut.-Col. C. C. Macdowell. 1916. April 15th. 109th Battery joined. May 12th. Designated 281st Bde. R.F.A. “ 16th. B.A.C. posted to 56th D.A.C. “ 28th. 10th (Howitzer) Battery transferred from 283rd Bde. R.F.A. and designated D/281st Battery R.F.A. 109th Battery transferred to 283rd Bde. R.F.A. Nov. 5th. Reorganised into four 6-gun batteries. “A,” 109th, and “C” 18-pounders; “D” howitzers. 109th Battery and one section “R” Battery transferred from 283rd Bde. R.F.A. The original “C” Battery split up. One section to “A” Battery. One section to “B” Battery. “D” Battery only had 4 howitzers till 23/1/17, when one section 500th Howitzer Battery joined from 282nd Bde. R.F.A.

1/3RD LONDON BRIGADE R.F.A. (282ND ARMY BRIGADE R.F.A.)

Commanded by Lieut.-Col. A. F. Prechtel. 1916 April 16th. 109th Battery R.F.A. joined and designated “R” Battery. (Duplicate--see 281st Bde.) May 6th. Designated 282nd London Bde. R.F.A. “ 7th, 8th, and 9th Batteries designated “A,” “B,” and “C” Batteries. May 17th. B.A.C. posted to 56th D.A.C. 319 “ 28th. “R” Battery posted to 283rd Bde. R.F.A. B/167th (Howitzer) Battery joined and designated D/282nd Battery R.F.A. Reorganised into four 6-gun batteries. “A,” “B,” and Nov. 5th. “C,” 18-pounders; “D” howitzers. to 500th How. Bty. R.F.A. joined 4/12/16. 1917 One Section to D/280th Bde. R.F.A. One section to D/281st Bde. R.F.A. Jan. 25th. B/126th Battery R.F.A. joined and designated A/282nd Battery. The original “A” Battery having been split up, one section each to “B” and “C.” One section D/126th Battery R.F.A. joined 25/1/17. Jan. 20th. Designated 282nd Army Bde. R.F.A. “ 25th. One Section 56th D.A.C. joined and designated 282nd B.A.C.

1/4TH (LONDON) HOWITZER BRIGADE R.F.A. (283RD BRIGADE R.F.A.)

Commanded by Lieut.-Col. Wainwright. 1915 Nov. 19th, Half of the B.A.C. left for Salonica to join 10th Division. 1916 May 6th. Designated 283rd (Howitzer) Bde. R.F.A. “ 17th. B.A.C. transferred to 56th D.A.C. “ 28th. “R” Battery joined from 282nd Bde. R.F.A. 109th Battery joined from 281st Bde. R.F.A. 93rd Battery joined from 280th Bde. R.F.A. (all 18-pounders). 10th (Howitzer) Battery transferred to 281st Bde. R.F.A. 11th (Howitzer) Battery transferred to 280th Bde. R.F.A. Nov. 5th. 93rd Battery and one section “R” Battery transferred to 280th Bde. R.F.A. 109th Battery and one section “R” Battery transferred to 281st Bde. R.F.A. Brigade ceased to exist, but the new organisation was not completed until January 1917.

56TH DIVISIONAL AMMUNITION COLUMN

Commanded by Lieut.-Col. E. W. Griffith. 1916 May 17th. The B.A.C.s of 280th, 281st, 282nd, and 283rd Bdes. R.F.A. absorbed, Then consisted of “A” Echelon (H.Q., Nos. 1, 2, and 3 sections) and “B” Echelon. 1917 Jan. 25th. One Section (No. 2) became the 282nd Army Bde. Ammunition Column. Sept. “B” Echelon reorganised as S.A.A. Section. Reorganised as H.Q., No. 1, 2, and S.A.A. Sections.

TRENCH MORTARS 320

1916 March 8th. “X” “Y,” and “Z” 2-inch Medium Batteries formed. Four mortars each. May. “V” Heavy Battery formed. 1917 Sept./Oct. Medium Batteries handed in 2-inch mortars and were armed with four 6-inch mortars each. 1918 Feb. 13th. Medium batteries reorganised into two batteries (“X” and “Y”) of 6-inch mortars each. Heavy battery taken over by Corps. 1919 Feb. 6th. Reduced to Cadre. Surplus personnel to Brigades and D.A.C.

ROYAL ENGINEERS (See C.R.E.)

416th (Edinburgh) Field Coy. R.E. 512th (London) Field Coy. R.E. 513th (London) Field Coy. R.E. 56th Divisional Signal Coy.

PIONEER BATTALION

1/5th Bn. Cheshire Regt. (Earl of Chester’s). Commanded by: Lieut.-Col. J. E. C. Groves, C.M.G., T.D., 14/2/15 to 21/2/18. Major (T/Lieut.-Col.) W. A. V. Churton, D.S.O., T.D., 21/2/18 to end.

MACHINE GUN CORPS

56th Bn. Machine Gun Corps formed on 1/3/18. (See Divisional M.G. Officers.)

R.A.S.C. UNITS

213th Coy. R.A.S.C. 214th “ “ 215th “ “ 216th “ “ Divisional Train commanded by: Lieut.-Col. A. G. Galloway, D.S.O., to Sept. 1917. Lieut.-Col. E. P. Blencowe, D.S.O., to May 1918.

R.A.M.C.

2/1st London Field Ambulance. 2/2nd “ “ “ 2/3rd “ “ “

1/1st London Mobile Vet. Section.

247th Divisional Employment Coy. formed in May 1917.

A.D.sM.S. 321

D.A.D.sM.S.

D.A.D.sV.S.

D.A.D.sO.S.

Major |J. Bishop | 6/2/16 | 10/3/16 | Captain |P. S. Tibbs | 11/3/16 | 23/7/16 | Lieut. |V. C. Ward | 24/7/16 | 22/11/16| Captain |W. D. Harbinson | 23/11/16| 27/5/17 | Major |J. W. Burbidge | 28/5/17 | Demob. |

C.sR.E.

DIVISIONAL MACHINE GUN OFFICERS

167TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

BRIGADE COMMANDERS

BRIGADE MAJORS 322

STAFF CAPTAINS

168TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

BRIGADE COMMANDERS

BRIGADE MAJORS

STAFF CAPTAINS

Major |L. L. Wheatley, | 5/2/16 | 7/3/16 |A. & S. | D.S.O. | | | Highlanders. Captain |R. E. Otter, M.C. | 7/4/16 | 20/4/17 |London Rifle | | | | Brigade. Captain |J. C. Andrews, M.C. | 26/4/17 | 7/3/18 | Q.V.R. Captain |E. F. Coke, M.C. | 7/3/18 | Demob. |8th Canadian | | | | Inantry | | | | Battn.

169TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

BRIGADE COMMANDER

BRIGADE MAJORS 323

STAFF CAPTAINS

INFANTRY BATTALIONS, 167TH BRIGADE

---------------+-----------------------------+----------------------- Battalion. | Commanding Officers. | Remarks. ---------------+-----------------------------+----------------------- 1/7th Middlesex|Lieut.-Col. E. J. King, |The Battalion went to Regt. | C.M.G., to 2/11/16, and | Gibraltar Sept. 1914. | from 4/2/17 to 14/5/17 | France to the 23rd |Lieut-.Col. E. D. Jackson, | Brigade, 8th Division, | D.S.O., from 2/11/16 to | in Feb. 1915. | 4/2/17 | |A/Lieut.-Col. F. W. D. | | Bendall, from 15/5/17 | | to 17/8/17 | |A/Lieut.-Col. P. C. Kay, | | D.S.O., M.C., from | | 31/8/17 to 16/2/18. | |A/Lieut.-Col. M. Beevor, | | from 16/2/18. | ---------------+-----------------------------+----------------------- 1/8th Middlesex|T/Lieut.-Col. E. D. W. |This Battalion went to Regt. | Gregory, from 31/5/15 to | Gibraltar in Sept. | Sept. 1915. | 1914. To the 88th |Lieut.-Col. P. L. Inkpen, | Brigade, 3rd during | D.S.O., from Sept. 1915 | Division, in France | to Oct. 1916, and Mar. | March 1915, and in | 1917 to Aug. 1917. | April joined the 23rd |Lieut.-Col. F. D. W. Bendall,| Brigade, when it was | from Oct. 1916 to | amalgamated with the | Mar. 1917. | 1/7th Middlesex. |Lieut.-Col. C. H. Pank, | Resumed independence | C.M.G., D.S.O., Sept. | on joining 56th | 1917 to Mar. 1919. | Division. |Lieut.-Col. M. B. Beevor, | | from Mar. 1918. | ---------------+-----------------------------+----------------------- 324 1/1st London |Lieut.-Col. E. G. Mercer, |Went to Malta in Sept. Regt. (Royal | C.M.G., T.D., from Jan. | 1914. France Jan. Fusiliers) | 1916 to June 1916. | 1915, joining the |Lieut.-Col. D. V. Smith, | 25th Brigade, 8th | D.S.O., V.D., from June | Division, in March. | 1916 to Oct. 1916; from | To the 56th Division | Feb. 1917 to April 1917. | April 1916. |Lieut.-Col. Kennard, from | | Oct. 1916 to Nov. 1916. | |Lieut.-Col. W. R. Glover, | | C.M.G., D.S.O., T.D., | | from Nov. 1916 to Mar. | | 1917; from April 1917. | ---------------+-----------------------------+----------------------- 1/3rd London |A/Lieut.-Col. A. E. Maitland,|To Malta in Sept. 1914. Regt. (Royal | D.S.O., M.C., until | France Jan. 1915 with Fusiliers) | Mar. 1917. | G.H.Q. troops. |Lieut.-Col. F. D. Samuel, | Garhwal Brigade, | D.S.O., T.D. | Meerut Division, on | | 1/3/15. To 142nd | | Brigade, 47th Division, | | 1/1/16. Left 56th | | Division and joined | | 173rd Brigade, 58th | | Division, 2/2/18. ---------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------

INFANTRY BATTALIONS, 168TH BRIGADE

---------------+-----------------------------+----------------------- Battalion. | Commanding Officers. | Remarks. ---------------+-----------------------------+----------------------- 1/4th London |Major W. J, Clark, until |To Malta Sept. 1914. Regt. (Royal | 23/3/16. | France Jan. 1915 as Fusiliers) |Lieut.-Col. L. L. Wheatley, | G.H.Q. troops. Joined | 8/4/16 to 11/10/16. | Ferozepore Brigade, |Lieut.-Col. H. J. Duncan | Lahore Division, on | Teape, until 17/3/17. | 1/3/15. To 140th |Lieut.-Col. A. E. Maitland, | Brigade, 47th | 17/3/17 to 20/4/17. | Division, 1/1/16. |Lieut.-Col. H. Campbell, | | 20/4/17 to 14/8/17. | |Lieut.-Col. A. F. Marchment, | | 14/8/17 to the end. | ----------------+-----------------------------+----------------------- 325 1/12th London |Colonel A. D. Bayliffe, |To France 4/1/15 as Regt. | C.M.G., T.D. | G.H.Q. troops. Joined (Rangers) | | 84th Brigade, 28th | | Division, on 4/2/15. | | Brigade moved to 5th | | Division 19/2/15 and | | rejoined 28th Division | | 6/4/15. To G.H.Q. on | | 19/5/15. Left 56th | | Division 2/2/18, and | | joined 58th Division. ---------------+-----------------------------+----------------------- 1/13th London |Lieut.-Col. H. Stafford |To France on 13/11/14, Regt. | until 28/6/16. | and joined the 24th (Kensingtons)|A/Lieut.-Col. W. W. Young | Brigade, 8th Division. | until 27/10/16. | To G.H.Q. on 19/5/15. |A/Lieut.-Col. J. C. R. | | King, until 13/6/17. | |A/Lieut.-Col. J. E. J. | | Higgins, M.C., until | | 5/8/17. | |A/Lieut.-Col. V. Flower, | | D.S.O., until 16/8/17. | |A/Lieut.-Col. R. E. F. | | Shaw, M.C., until 23/8/18. | |A/Lieut.-Col. M. A. Prismall,| | M.C., until 28/9/18. | |A/Lieut.-Col. J. Forbes | | Robertson, V.C., D.S.O., | | M.C., until 13/10/18. | |A/Lieut.-Col. F. S. B. | | Johnson, D.S.O. | ---------------+-----------------------------+----------------------- 1/14th London |Lieut-.Col. B. C. Green, |To France on lines of Regt. (London| C.M.G., T.D., until 2/8/16.| communication Sept. Scottish) |Lieut.-Col. J. H. Lindsay, | 1914. Joined 1st | D.S.O., until 6/10/16. | Brigade, 1st Division, |Lieut.-Col. James Paterson, | on 7/11/14. | M.C., until 6/3/17. | |Lieut.-Col. E. D. Jackson, | | D.S.O. | ---------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------

INFANTRY BATTALIONS, 169TH BRIGADE 326

---------------+-----------------------------+----------------------- Battalion. | Commanding Officers. | Remarks. ---------------+-----------------------------+----------------------- 1/2nd London |Lieut.-Col. James |To Malta Sept. 1914. Regt. (Royal | Attenborough, C.M.G., T.D.,| France Jan. 1915 as Fusiliers) | until Nov. 1916, and | G.H.Q. troops. Joined | Feb. 1917 to April 1917. | 17th Brigade, 6th |A/Lieut.-Col. J. P. Kellett, | Division, 1/3/15. The | D.S.O., M.C., Nov. 1916 | Brigade was transferred | to Feb. 1917; May 1917 | to 24th Division | to Aug. 1917; Jan. 1918 | 1/1/16. | to Oct. 1918; Jan. 1919. | |A/Lieut.-Col. R. E. F. | | Sneath, M.C., Aug. 1917 | | to Dec. 1917. | |A/Lieut.-Col. S. H. Stevens, | | M.C., Nov. 1918 to Jan. | | 1919. | ---------------+-----------------------------+----------------------- 1/5th London |Lieut.-Col. Bates, D.S.O., |To France and joined Regt. | until 13/8/16. | 11th Brigade, 4th (London |Lieut.-Col. R. H. Husey, | Division, 24/11/14. Rifle | D.S.O., 13/8/16 to 4/5/18. | To G.H.Q. 19/5/15. Brigade) |Lieut.-Col. C. D. Burnell, | To 8th Brigade, 3rd | D.S.O., 4/5/18 to end. | Division, 1/1/16. | Also for one month, | | 22/4/17 to 20/5/17, | | during Lieut.-Col. | | Husey’s absence. The | | latter C.O. was also | | absent from 26/3/17 to | | 22/4/17, and 12/8/17 to | | 3/12/17, when Major | | F. H. Wallis took command. | ---------------+-----------------------------+----------------------- 1/9th London |Colonel J. W. F. Dickens, |To France 24/11/14 and Regt. (Queen | D.S.O., V.D. | joined 13th Brigade, Victoria’s |Lieut.-Col. F. B. Follett, | 5th Division. Brigade Rifles) | D.S.O., M.C. | moved to 28th Division |Lieut.-Col. M. Beevor, | on 19/2/15, and back to | D.S.O. | 5th Division on 6/4/15. |Lieut.-Col. E. G. H. Towell | Left 56th Division and | | joined 58th 2/2/18. ---------------+-----------------------------+----------------------- 1/16th London |Lieut.-Col. R. Shoolbred, |To France and joined Regt. | C.M.G., T.D. | 18th Brigade, 6th (Queen’s |Lieut.-Col. E. P. Harding, | Division, 11/11/14. Westminster | O.B.E., M.C. | Rifles) |Lieut.-Col. P. M. Glazier, | | D.S.O. | | Lieut.-Col. S. R. Savill, | | D.S.O., M.C. | ---------------+-----------------------------+-----------------------

INDEX 327

Ablainzeville, 32 Achicourt, 114 Achiet-le-Grand, 32 Acq, 246 Adinfer Wood, 32 Agny, 114 Albert, battle of, 258-268 Ambrines, 8 American power, 211 Angreau, 308 Arnold, Lt., 292 Arras, battles of, 114-143, 208-242 Arthur, G. S., 40 Artillery Coy. of London (H.A.C.), 2 Athis, 311 Aubers Ridge, 104 Aubigny-au-Bac, 290-297, 312 Avesnes-le-Comte, 9, 254

Baghdad, 111, 145 Bapaume, 69 Barber, Capt. J. B., 9 Basseux, 266 Basseville, 301 Bavincourt, 254, 259 Bayley, Major A. E. G., 3 Bayliffe, Lt.-Col. A. D., 89 Bazentin, 53 Bazentin Ridge, battle of, 53 Beaudricourt, 8 Beaufort, 8 Beaumetz, 297 Beauvois, 113 Bedford Regt., 156 Belfort, 14 Bendall, Lt.-Col. F. W. D., 160 Berkshire Regt., 156 Berlencourt, 8 Berles-au-Bois, 214 Bernafay, 101 Bertincourt, 214 Beugny, 175 Biez Wood, 32 Blairville, 25, 259 Blangermont, 113 Blangerol, 113 Blavincourt, 8 Blewitt, Capt. G., 4 Bloxam, Major-Gen. (U.S.A.), 169 Boisleux-au-Mont, 297 Boisleux St. Marc, 283 Bouleaux Wood (_see_ Ginchy), 56 Bouquemaison, 120 Bouret-sur-Canche, 9 Bourlon (_see_ Cambrai)

Bovill, E. H., 40 Bow Bells, 140 Boyelles (_see_ Albert)

Brand, Capt., 109 Brigades: 6th, 202 8th, 168 9th, 168 12th, 234 44th, 253 46th, 253 53rd, 155 76th, 168 99th, 202 109th, 174 137th, 42 139th, 42 140th, 202 145th, 18 171st, 278 172nd, 275 Tank Brigades, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 171 Brigades, composition of, 4, 5 Brind, Lt.-Col. J. E. S., 3, 24 Broadbent, Capt. E. R., 4 Bruilly, 8 Brussiloff, Gen., 14, 96, 147 Bucquoy, 32 Bullecourt, 135 (_see_ Scarpe, 269-280)

Bullock, Capt. T. W., 3 Busseboom, 165

Cambrai, battle of, 163-208, 290 Campbell, Lt.-Col. H., 160 Canadian Cavalry, 177 328 Canadian Mounted Rifles, 236 Canal du Nord (battle), 280-289 Cannettemont, 8 Canteen, 9, 165 Carnoy, 69 Cavan, Gen. Lord, 75, 95 Chemin-des-Dames, 130 Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston, 50 Citadel, 52, 101 Cockerill, Capt., 39 Coke, Brig.-Gen. E. S., 3, 18, 114, 134, 237, 275, 286, 291, 303, 313 Combles (_see_ Ginchy) Corbie, 51 Coron, 312 Corps: II, 154, 163 III, 170, 171 IV, 27, 170, 171, 190, 258, 265, 285 V, 170 VI, 6, 117, 131, 170, 190, 254, 258, 265, 285 VII, 10, 19, 113, 114, 170 IX, 245 X, 48 XI, 104 XIII, 209, 221 XIV, 51, 59, 70 XV, 59 XVII, 170, 221, 247, 269, 285 XXII, 246, 283, 301 Canadian, 169, 282, 284, 291 French XVII, 6 German XIV, 18 Couin, 131 Cox (Sapper), 295 Crawford, Capt., 198 Croisette, 113 Croisilles, 117, 268-275

Dainville, 7 Delville Wood (_see_ Ginchy), 53 Divisional Band, 164 Divisional Depot Bn., 120 Divisions: Infantry: 1st, 283 2nd, 193, 202, 258 3rd, 117, 140, 168, 191, 237, 277 4th, 87, 221, 234, 237, 284, 301 5th, 55, 65, 79, 102 6th, 70, 74, 79, 82, 103, 171 8th, 154, 245 11th, 284, 301, 308, 311 12th, 171, 193 13th, 114 14th, 10, 114, 117, 134 15th, 131, 237, 253 16th, 57, 62 18th, 86, 128, 155 19th, 245 20th, 171 21st, 117, 245 25th, 155, 160, 245 29th, 171, 176 30th, 117, 128 31st, 210 36th, 171, 177 37th, 112, 138, 258 40th, 259, 279 41st, 215 42nd, 258 46th, 26 47th, 27, 192, 202 48th, 18 49th, 113, 301 50th, 128, 245 51st, 171, 177 52nd, 266, 278, 282 55th, 193 57th, 260, 272, 282 58th, 214 59th, 192 61st, 101, 140, 301 62nd, 171, 177, 210 63rd, 279, 282, 311 Cavalry: 1st, 178, 181 2nd, 191 Canadian: 1st, 247, 253 2nd, 252 3rd, 102, 224, 234, 284 4th, 236, 301, 308 New Zealand, 258 Guards, 62, 70, 74, 79, 82, 189, 258, 263, 266, 312 German: Guards, 2nd R., 35, 47 5th Bav., 74, 104 5th Bav. R., 222 5th R., 210 16th Bav., 248 20th, 188 23rd R., 222 39th, 253 41st, 241 51st R., 78 52nd, 18, 46 329 185th, 61, 248 214th, 249, 250 219th R., 222 240th, 222 Portuguese, 2nd, 244 Domart-en-Ponthieu, 6 Doullens, 6, 48 Dudgeon, Gen. F. A., 153-249

Emery, Major, 104 Eperlecques, 144, 153, 165 Essart, 32, 36 Etrun, 296

Falfemont Farm (_see_ Ginchy), 54 Falkenhayn, Gen., 10, 29, 94, 97 Fayt-le-Franc, 311 Ferlibray, 312 Flers, battle of, 54, 69 Flower, Major V. A., 160 Foch, Marshal, 245 Fonquevillers, 48 Fosseux, 209 Freeth, Brig.-Gen., 86, 109, 123, 138, 155, 249, 268 Fremicourt, 175 Frevent, 113 Friend, L. W., 228 Frigicourt, 53 Fromer-le-Grand, 48

Garland, Capt. J. R., 41 Gavrelle (_see_ Arras) Gaza, 147 German prisoners (_see_ Regiments) Ginchy, battle of, 55-66 Givenchy-le-Noble, 8 Glazier, Lt.-Col., 186, 228 Glencorse (_see_ Ypres) Gommecourt, action of, 18-47 Gouy-en-Artois, 297 Grand Rullecourt, 7 Grenas, 19 Grouping of units, 5 Grubb, Lt.-Col. H. W., 3 Guemappe (_see_ Arras, battles of), 117 Guillemont, 55 Guinecourt, 113

Haking, Gen. R., 109 Hallencourt, 3, 10, 101 Halloy, practice at, 36 Hampshire Regt., 177 Handyside, Capt. P. A. J., 41 Happy Valley, 52 Harbarcq, 140 Harmignies, 312 Harris, Major M. R., 160 Harvengt, 312 Hauteville, 131 Hawkins (Sapper), 296 Hayward, Cpl., 40 Hébuterne, 10 Heninel, 126 Henri, P., 35 Henu, 10, 18 Héricourt, 113 Hernicourt, 113 Higgins, Major J. E., 160 Hindenburg, Gen. von, 94, 98, 129, 147 Honval, 8, 113 Horne, J. A., 40 Horses, 103 Houvin, 8, 113 Hull, Major-Gen. Sir C. P. A., 1-144, 249-314 Husey, Col. R. R., 160

Ide, W. C., 40 Identification (_see_ Regiments) Indian drivers, 253 Ingpen, Lt.-Col. P. L., 160 Isonzo, 97 Ivergny, 8 Izel-les-Hameau, 253

Jackson, Lt.-Col., 188, 199 Jervis, Lt.-Col. E. C. S., 241, 265 Joffre, Marshal, 51

Kellet, Lt.-Col. J. P., 160 Kerensky, 147 King Edward’s Horse, 178 Korniloff, 147

Lagnicourt, 168 Lancashire Fusiliers, 228 Laventie, 101-113 Le Cauroy, 7, 117 Lemon, Major F. J., 3 Lestrem, 101 Leuze Wood (_see_ Ginchy), 55 Liencourt, 8 Lignereuil, 8, 254 Loch, Brig.-Gen., 3, 19, 55, 109, 123, 239, 264 Louverval, 168 Lowndes, G. A. N., 227 Ludendorff, Gen. von, 94, 98, 111, 129, 147, 152

Macdowell, Lt.-Col., 23 330 Macgregor, Capt. A. H., 56 Macintosh, Cpl., 198 McPhie, Cpl., 295 Magnicourt, 8 Maltzhorn Farm, 57 Manin, 8 Mansell Camp, 101 Marchment, Lt.-Col., 232 Marcoing (_see_ Cambrai) Maricourt, 16, 52 Masnières (_see_ Cambrai) Maurepas, 53 Mazières, 253 Méaulte, 81 Mercatel, 116 Millar, Cpl., 104 Moncheaux, 9 Monchy, 116 Mons, 313 Montauban, 53, 87 Montignies, 311 Morchies, 168 Mott, Capt., 39

Neame, Capt. P., 4 Negus, A. G., 40 Neuve Chapelle, 103 Neuville Vitasse (_see_ Arras, battles of), 115 Newnham, Capt. L. A., 4, 108, 140, 144 Nicholls, W. G., 40 Nonne Bosschen (_see_ Ypres) North Staffordshire Regt., 42 Nugent, Burnell-, Brig.-Gen., 3, 18, 20 Nuncy, 113

Oburg, 313 Onnezies, 311 Oppy (_see_ Arras) Organisation, 167, 298 Ormiston, W. H., 169 Ouderdom, 159 Ovillers, 53

Packenham, Lt.-Col., 113 Pank, Lt.-Col., 199 Petit Moranfayt, 312 Petley, R. E., 41 Phillips, Major F. A., 232 Pill-boxes, 150 Pommier, 131 Powell, Kite, 219 Prechtel, Lt.-Col., 32, 36, 46 Price, J. C. B., 228 Prior, Lt., 109 Proney, 113 Pyper, Capt. J. R., 9

Quadrilateral, 26, 60, 74 Quéant, 177, 297 Quevy-le-Grand, 312

Raids, near Arras, 247-252 Rancourt, 53 Rebreuve, 8 Regiments, German: 5th Gren. Regt., 137 7th R.I.R., 210 7th Bav., 74, 104 13th Bav., 113 14th Bav., 248 16th I.R., 241 19th Bav., 104 21st Bav., 74 28th I.R., 248 31st R.I.R., 86, 168 50th I.R., 249, 251 65th I.R., 248 84th R.I.R., 86 86th R.I.R., 168 91st I.R., 48 101st R.I.R., 222 102nd R.I.R., 222 107th I.R., 57 128th I.R., 137 152nd I.R., 241 161st I.R., 61 169th I.R., 18, 32 170th I.R., 32 214th I.R., 250 235th I.R., 78 358th I.R., 251 414th I.R., 169 471st I.R., 222 Reincourt-les-Bapaume, 69 Reninghelst, 153, 165 Richon, 312 Rieu-de-Bury, 312 Rocquingny, 69 Roe, Cardon, 140 Rose, 2/Lieut., 109 Royal Flying Corps, 15th Squad., 173 Royal Irish Rifles, 56 Rumancourt, 296 Rum jar, 126

St. Pol, 113 St. Riquier, 49 Sambre, battle of, 303 Sars-les-Bois, 8 Sauchy-Cauchy, 296 331 Savill, Lt.-Col., 272 Scarpe, 269-280 (_see_ Arras, battles of) Sebourg, 303 Séricourt, 8, 113 Shaw, Lt.-Col. R. S. F., 263 Sherwood Foresters, 42 Shoolbred, Lt.-Col., 39 Shops, 9 Sibiville, 113 Siracourt, 113 Sloan, Capt., 293 Smith, Gen. W. Douglas, 145 Souastre, 10, 19, 131 Southam, Lt.-Col., 39 Steenvoorde, 159 Stow, F. H., 41 Sutton, Capt. W. M., 3 Sutton, Lt.-Col., 305 Swainson, Capt., 39 Swift, Gen. (U.S.A.), 210

Tadpole Copse (_see_ Cambrai) Tagart, Capt., 39 Tanks, 51, 69, 70, 92, 171, 177, 261 Tidbury, Capt. O. H., 4 Tilloy (_see_ Arras, battles of), 115 Tincques, 297 Training, 166 Transloy, battle of ridges, 83 Trieu Jean Sart, 312 Trones Wood, 53

Upton, D. F., 40

Verdun, reasons for battle, 4 Victory Camp, 213 Ville-sur-Ancre, 81 Villers-au-Flos, 69 Villers Châtel, 252 Villers-sire-Simon, 8 Vimy Ridge, 102, 116, 128

Wamin, 8 Wamlin, 8 Wancourt, 124 Way, H. C. B., 3 Wheatley, Major L. L., 4 Wippenhoek, 159 Wireless, 205 Wodley, Cpl., 104 Woods, Pte., 198

Yates, A. G. V., 40 Ypres, battles of, 144-164

PRINTED BY HAZELL, WATSON AND VINEY, LD., LONDON AND AYLESBURY, ENGLAND.

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Transcriber's note:

Unprinted punctuation was added where appropriate.

Footnotes were renumbered sequentially and moved to the end of the chapter in which the anchor occurs.

On page 240, there are no subparagraphs (f) and (g); subparagraph (h) follows subparagraph (e).

A header key was added to the table on page 300 so that it would fit on a standard computer screen.

Other changes:

“compaign” to “campaign” ... unrestricted submarine campaign ...

“bebauching” to “debauching” ... prevented from debauching from the ...

“277//16” to “27/7/16”, entry for D. Thomson. in the table of 56th Divisional Artillery Headquarters, C.R.A.

“5/2/6” to “5/2/16”, appendix entry for E. S. D. E. Coke, 169th Infantry Brigade.

“Marchmont” to “Marchment” in the index and twice in the text of