Part 1
TEN TUDOR STATESMEN
TEN TUDOR STATESMEN
_By_ ARTHUR D. INNES
_AUTHOR OF_ “ENGLAND UNDER THE TUDORS”
LONDON EVELEIGH NASH 1906
Printed by BALLANTYNE & CO. LIMITED Tavistock Street, London
PREFATORY
The series of studies contained in this volume is in no way a history of the Tudor period. My object in preparing it has been first to form in my own mind and secondly to present to my readers a clear and consistent conception of the character of sundry persons, who in their own day either exercised an effective influence on the course of politics, or embodied political ideas which have influenced succeeding generations. The events narrated are considered not in the light of their intrinsic importance, but as they bear on the particular character under investigation.
To arrive at a fair estimate of any man’s character, the primary necessity is to endeavour to realise his point of view, to appreciate his preconceptions. If we require of him that his preconceptions shall coincide with our own, we may reconstruct an interesting dramatic figure, but we shall not discover the man as he really was. And if we do succeed in placing ourselves at his point of view, we shall almost inevitably find that the man who ultimately emerges is different from, and probably somewhat better than, the man as we had previously conceived him.
Concerning these ten figures, two curious points may be noted. Eight of them may be described as ministers: not one of the eight was actually of noble birth, two were not even of gentle birth. That fact emphasises the change in the political centre of gravity which accompanied the establishment of the Tudor Dynasty. Secondly, of those eight, four perished on the scaffold and one at the stake: a sixth was in custody under accusation of treason when death released him. That illustrates not less emphatically the distance at which we stand from the Tudors to-day.
A. D. I.
CONTENTS
I
HENRY VII PAGE
I. INTRODUCTORY 3
II. HENRY’S EARLY YEARS, ACCESSION, AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DYNASTY 5
III. THE TUDOR ABSOLUTION AND THE EXCHEQUER 11
IV. COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY 16
V. JUDICATURE 21
VI. FOREIGN POLICY 23
VII. CHARACTER 27
II
CARDINAL WOLSEY
I. APPRECIATIONS 35
II. CARDINALIS PACIFICATOR 38
III. WOLSEY AND THE FRENCH WAR 46
IV. DOMESTIC POLICY 48
V. THE DIVORCE 53
VI. WOLSEY AND THE REFORMATION 62
VII. WOLSEY’S FALL AND CHARACTER 67
III
SIR THOMAS MORE
I. INTRODUCTORY 75
II. UNDER HENRY VII 77
III. THE EARLY YEARS OF HENRY VIII 82
IV. THE “UTOPIA” 85
V. MORE IN PUBLIC LIFE 94
VI. INDIGNATIO PRINCIPIS 103
VII. CHARACTER AND DEATH 106
IV
THOMAS CROMWELL
I. THOMAS CROMWELL 115
II. EARLIER CAREER AND RISE TO POWER 117
III. PLANNING THE CAMPAIGN 125
IV. CONTRA ECCLESIAM 130
V. THE FABRIC OF DESPOTISM 135
VI. CROMWELL AND PROTESTANTISM 146
VII. CROMWELL’S FALL 151
V
HENRY VIII
I. APPRECIATIONS 157
II. THE CARDINAL RULES 159
III. WAR 167
IV. THE DIVORCE 170
V. THE NEW POLICY 177
VI. DIVERGENCES BETWEEN HENRY AND CROMWELL 182
VII. HENRY’S CLOSING YEARS 187
VIII. HENRY’S MARRIAGES 192
IX. HENRY’S CHARACTER 198
VI
PROTECTOR SOMERSET
I. MISCONCEPTIONS 205
II. THE PROTECTOR AND HIS PROBLEMS 207
III. SOMERSET AND SCOTLAND 212
IV. SOMERSET’S RELIGIOUS POLICY 217
V. SOMERSET AND THE SOCIAL PROBLEM 222
VI. THE LORD ADMIRAL 225
VII. THE EX-PROTECTOR 230
VII
ARCHBISHOP CRANMER
I. INTRODUCTORY 237
II. CRANMER AT CAMBRIDGE 239
III. RISE TO THE ARCHBISHOPRIC 244
IV. HENRY’S PRIMATE 248
V. CRANMER AND SOMERSET 258
VI. THE FLOWING TIDE OF PROTESTANTISM 263
VII. DE PROFUNDIS 267
VIII
WILLIAM CECIL (LORD BURGHLEY)
I. THE MINISTERS OF QUEEN ELIZABETH 279
II. CECIL UNDER EDWARD VI. AND MARY 281
III. FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT ELIZABETH’S ACCESSION 288
IV. DOMESTIC AND SCOTTISH POLICY 296
V. CECIL AND PROTESTANTISM 303
VI. ELIZABETH’S SECOND PERIOD 307
VII. THE WAR WITH SPAIN 315
VIII. AN APPRECIATION 319
IX
SIR FRANCIS WALSINGHAM
I. WALSINGHAM’S CHARACTER 325
II. WALSINGHAM’S RISE 328
III. AMBASSADOR AT PARIS 332
IV. ENTANGLEMENTS 339
V. DETECTIVE METHODS 348
VI. THE END 355
X
SIR WALTER RALEIGH
I. CHARACTER 361
II. RALEIGH’S RISE 363
III. VIRGINIA 369
IV. AFTER THE ARMADA 376
V. FAVOUR AND FALL 381
VI. CAPTIVE AND VICTIM 387
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
HENRY VII. _Frontispiece_
_From a Painting by an unknown Flemish artist, in the National Portrait Gallery_
_To face page_ CARDINAL WOLSEY 36
_From a Painting by_ HOLBEIN _in the collection at Christ Church, Oxford_
SIR THOMAS MORE 76
_From a Painting by_ HOLBEIN _in the National Portrait Gallery_
THOMAS CROMWELL, 1ST EARL OF ESSEX 116
_By_ HOLBEIN, _from an Engraving by Houbraken in the British Museum_
HENRY VIII. 158
_From a Portrait by_ JOST VAN CLEEF _in the Royal Collection at Hampton Court Palace_
PROTECTOR SOMERSET 206
_From a Painting by_ HOLBEIN
THOMAS CRANMER 238
_From a Painting by_ G. FLICCIUS _in the National Portrait Gallery_
WILLIAM CECIL (LORD BURGHLEY) 280
_From a Portrait by_ MARC GHEERAEDTS (?) _in the National Portrait Gallery_
SIR FRANCIS WALSINGHAM 326
_From an engraving by_ G. VERTUE _after the picture by Holbein, in the British Museum_
SIR WALTER RALEIGH 362
_From the Painting by_ FEDERIGO ZUCCARO _in the National Portrait Gallery_
HENRY VII
I
INTRODUCTORY
“This King, to speak of him in terms equal to his deserving, was one of the best sort of wonders, a wonder for wise men.” In those words Francis Bacon summed up Henry VII., a hundred years after the first Tudor king had been laid in his grave. Bacon’s history still is, and is likely to remain, the classic narrative. Not that he was a “contemporary,” or that he had access to any extraordinary sources of information; but because being at once a practical politician, a student of political theory, and a literary artist, any historical work from his pen could hardly have failed to be of the highest interest, and the subject he actually chose was--to him--peculiarly sympathetic.
It is in fact quite evident that Henry was held in the very highest estimation by his biographer. The history is addressed to Prince Charles, and it can hardly be doubted that in calling his hero “the English Solomon,” Bacon had in mind the reigning king’s description as the “Scottish Solomon”; the direct suggestion of a parallel (repeated in other terms in the Preface) must have been meant to be looked upon as a compliment by James. Henry was at least to be accounted the shrewdest ruler amongst the very astute princes who were more or less his contemporaries. Yet, for all the impression of shrewdness, Bacon fails to win our sympathy for Henry, perhaps because those two minds had too close kinship. Bacon, except in the case of a few enthusiasts, does not inspire affection. Pope’s summary is too accurate an expression of what is at least the popular conception; and Henry is judged to have been not quite so bright, nearly but not quite so wise--and still more mean. English history provides examples of monarchs whom every one actively hates like King John, or scorns like Edward II.; other monarchs too, who, if they had evil qualities, yet display something of the heroic; towards whom our feelings, if mixed, are still warm. But Henry VII. inspires almost universally a strong sentiment of cold dislike, such as no one else creates.
There is justice in that impression, but there is also injustice. In his latter years, it is hardly too much to call him detestable. He had reigned for fourteen years before he committed the one commonplace crime of tyrants which stains his record, the execution of Warwick. From that time a kind of degeneration seems to have come upon him, accelerated by the deaths first of his wisest counsellor Morton, then, two years later, of the son he loved, and then of his wife. To these years belongs nearly every story which tells seriously to his discredit. But during the earlier and longer half of his reign, his record is remarkably free from blemish, and shows an enlightenment which under happier conditions might have won him a place not only among the kings who have deserved well of the State--that, at least in the historian’s eyes, he did achieve--but among those whose memory posterity have cherished.
II
HENRY’S EARLY YEARS, ACCESSION, AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DYNASTY
After the death of Henry V., his widow accepted in marriage the hand of a Welsh knight of ancient lineage, Owen Tudor. In 1456, their son Edmund Tudor, Earl of Richmond, took to himself a very youthful bride, the Lady Margaret Beaufort, the representative of John of Gaunt’s family by Katherine Swynford, legitimatised by Act of Parliament in the reign of Richard II. On January 28, 1457, Margaret gave birth to a son, Henry, some weeks after Edmund himself had died; the charge of the boy devolving mainly upon Edmund’s brother Jasper, Earl of Pembroke. During the next fourteen years, the great Earl of Warwick was playing see-saw with the fortunes of the rival houses of York and Lancaster. In 1461, the Yorkists won the upper hand; but Jasper held out in Wales for Lancaster, for nearly seven years. Then Harlech Castle was surrendered, and young Henry was placed in charge of its captor, the new Earl of Pembroke, and was well enough treated. Then Lancaster had a turn of success, but the party was crushed at the battles of Barnet and Tewkesbury, and the line was quenched by the deaths of Henry VI. and his son. Yorkists and Lancastrians alike fixed upon young Henry Tudor as being now the representative of John of Gaunt; England was too dangerous a habitation for a possible claimant to the throne; and the boy in his fifteenth year was successfully shipped off by his friends to Brittany, where for twelve years he abode under the Duke’s protection.
If the dynasty of York had established itself in regular fashion--if Edward IV. had been followed by an Edward V. as Henry IV. had been followed by Henry V.--there would have been little enough to fear. But Edward’s brother usurped the throne by a particularly foul murder, and being on it proved himself a tyrant. Men’s eyes turned to the one scion of the Plantagenets whom it was possible to set up as a claimant to the crown. If he could be set on the throne with Edward’s daughter at his side, the rival factions of York and Lancaster might be stilled. The first attempt to challenge the usurper failed completely. Buckingham’s plan of campaign was ruined by the flooding of the Severn, and by a storm which scattered the fleet wherewith Richmond sailed from Brittany to co-operate. Henry, returning thither, had to flee very soon after to safer shelter in France. But it was not long before the attempt was renewed, this time with success. On Bosworth field Richard was slain, and Henry declared King of England.
The victor was a young man of eight-and-twenty. For fourteen years he had lived in England, amidst civil broils and perpetual alarms. For fourteen more he had lived mainly in Brittany, conscious that he was in perpetual danger of being surrendered into the hands of those who might at any time find his destruction convenient. All his life he had been in an atmosphere of suspicion, of possible treachery, encompassed with deeds of blood. He had learned to study others and to trust himself. He had learned that his life might depend on alertness and self-restraint. And he had been able to see that Louis XI. was incomparably the most successful master of state-craft of his generation. These were lessons calculated to kill all youthful qualities, and at twenty-eight Henry might as well have been forty.
This was the man who had grasped a sceptre to which it was impossible to establish for him a legal title. In plain truth, he was King of England because he was the only man of the blood-royal who was able to challenge the usurper who was wearing the crown. As far as right of inheritance went, if Edward IV.’s daughters were barred by their sex, the son of Clarence was indubitably the heir of Edward III., whether descent through the female line were admitted or no. Henry might marry Elizabeth of York and claim the crown in her right; but then her death would leave him in a highly anomalous position; it was imperative that he should be accepted himself as the lawful king in his own person. The marriage might make matters perfectly safe for a son, but not for him. Hence even the semblance of depending on his wife’s title must be avoided.
He had won the realm by the sword; that was the first step. The second was to commit the representatives of the nation to affirm that he was the lawful sovereign: this was effected by a Declaratory Act in Parliament, which judiciously abstained from naming the grounds on which his claim rested. After that was to come the marriage, which should muzzle the partisans of York. This took place in the following January; but it is easy to see that the king had good reason for not proceeding to his wife’s coronation at least till a son should be born. Not long after that son was born, the Simnel plot was brewing; the coronation under those circumstances might have taken the colour of a defensive measure. Consequently the ceremony was not performed until Elizabeth had been his wife for very nearly two years, being thus emphasised as a mere act of grace.
No doubt if, by marrying the Plantagenet princess, Henry could have appropriated the Yorkist title to himself personally whether his queen lived or died, he would have been able to do without repressing the heads of the Yorkist faction at all. But, as things stood, that could not be risked. Warwick, Clarence’s young son, was imprisoned in the Tower, and some of the last king’s principal supporters were attainted. Being thus kept dissatisfied, it was a long time before active Yorkist plots ceased. The Dowager Duchess of Burgundy, Margaret, sister of Edward IV., made her Court a regular centre of anti-Tudor intrigue; nor did Henry ever feel really safe till the myth of a surviving Richard of York was finally exploded and the actual Edward Plantagenet, Earl of Warwick, had been done to death. The course which Henry took involved a certain degree of injustice--but _Fiat Justitia, Ruat Cælum_, is a maxim that princes with an uncertain title are rarely, if ever, disposed to adopt without reservation. One is disposed to wonder rather that Warwick was allowed to live so long than that Henry ultimately yielded to the temptation to slay him.
This plain business of securing himself on the throne was necessarily the first consideration. Only an established dynasty could restore steady government in a country which within a hundred years had seen four kings slain and the great bulk of her ancient baronage wiped out. Between foreign wars, successful or the reverse, and a wild warfare of armed factions at home, stability had been destroyed. The prolonged reign of strong rulers maintaining one policy was an absolute condition of recuperation. The way in which Henry secured it was entirely characteristic and entirely successful. The sword, the poniard, and the headman’s axe or the dungeon, were normally relied on by rulers whose seat was uncertain. Henry acted on a strictly original scheme. When he took the field against rebels, he sent before him proclamations of pardon to those who would come in; and he kept his word. He did not massacre the routed foe: he spared them, seizing only their leaders. He was responsible for no murders. A Lambert Simnel or a Perkin Warbeck when captured was not hanged out of hand, but sent to join the scullions, or set in the stocks as an impostor. Executions were singularly rare; rebels who might become powerful merely had their claws clipped by fines and confiscations--very efficiently clipped, no doubt. Where imprisonment was resorted to, the confinement was seldom harsh; and the king never had qualms about restoring a quondam rebel to favour and authority, if he judged that his man would show himself worthy of the faith reposed in him. When Surrey’s gaoler offered to let him go free, Surrey refused to escape; the king had put him in ward, and the king alone should release him. The king did so, and gave him a command of the highest trust. Kildare set authority at defiance when he was Deputy in Ireland, and when he was deposed, “All Ireland cannot rule this man,” said his enemies. “Then let this man rule all Ireland,” quoth Henry, and restored him to the Deputyship. Neither Surrey nor Kildare gave him cause for repentance.
Such a record would have entitled Henry to praise as a prince of unparalleled magnanimity, but for its common-sense accompaniment of fines and confiscations. But in fact, to penalise rebellion in some sort was an absolute necessity; not to have done so would have jeopardised the throne. The method adopted might not be heroic, but it was supremely practical; inasmuch as it wrought the minimum of positive injury to the punished, while at once depriving them of power to harm and supplying the king himself with the sinews of government, of which he was sorely in need. It was dictated quite as much by policy as by magnanimity, but the mere fact that Henry recognised it from the outset as sounder policy than any precedents, recent at any rate, suggested, is testimony to the acuteness of his moral perceptions as well as to the keenness of his intelligence. Nor is it fair to deprive Henry of the credit of magnanimity, merely because the magnanimity paid. To realise that it did pay and prove completely successful, we have only to observe that after the battle of Stoke there was no baronial rising in England. Warbeck got all his support either from the exiles or from foreign courts: when he tried to raise the West of England on his own account, he collapsed ignominiously. It is true that an army of Cornish insurgents had marched to Blackheath just before, and had there been broken up; but that was a purely popular rising in protest against taxation, and its chiefs were a blacksmith and a lawyer.
III
THE TUDOR ABSOLUTISM AND THE EXCHEQUER
It was not sufficient, however, merely to secure the sceptre in the hands of a strong king; it was necessary further to establish a strong system. For half a century the great power and estates of individual barons had enabled them to keep the country in perpetual turmoil. The idea of universal obedience to the established government simply because it was established had vanished from the military and political classes: the idea even of concerted government by one class, guided by its interests as a class, had disappeared; it was only the personal factor, personal interests, that counted. Below the baronage, the gentry who bordered on the baronage, and their retainers, townsfolk and country folk stood aloof from the fighting, and lived as peacefully as they might--all things considered, with a wonderful freedom from disturbance. But standing aloof from the fighting, they had perforce stood aloof also from the business of government, which fell to the military faction that happened for the time being to have the upper hand. They were in short ready to support and profit by a government which gave promise of peace and stability, order and justice; but they were not ready to organise such a government for themselves, or to take a prominent part in conducting it. Under such conditions, the Yorkists had established a despotism, as the only workable form of government. But their despotism was one that rested almost exclusively on the personal forcefulness of the ruler. It was Henry’s task to keep the effective power concentrated in the King’s hands, but to give it a constitutional colour--to make the nation feel it as a government by consent. It was therefore necessary to eliminate factors which naturally tended to disturbance--in other words, to deprive the individual barons of the power of aggressive self-assertion; and at the same time, so to treat the naturally orderly elements of society as to keep them on the side of the government.
This was the root-principle of the Tudor Absolutism, devised and put into practice by the first Tudor king, and systematically carried out by his son and grand-daughter. The system carried England to the first place among the nations. But it broke down when the Stuarts ignored its fundamental principle, and so treated the naturally orderly elements of society as to turn them against the government. For under the system, those elements acquired the power of organisation and self-protection, as the accompaniment of the prosperity they enjoyed increasingly; and it followed that the system could only remain stable so long as there was essential harmony and sympathy between the monarch and his subjects.