CHAPTER XL

A FORECAST OF WHAT TANKS MAY DO

Accepting war as a science and an art, that it is founded on definite principles which are applied according to the conditions of the moment, we may scientifically reduce it to its component elements, which are: Men, weapons, and movement. A combination of these three is an army, a body of men which can fight and move.

Tactics, or the art of moving armed men on the battlefield, change directly in accordance with the nature of the weapons themselves and the mobility of the means of transport. Each new or improved weapon or method of movement demands a corresponding change in the art of war.

Tools, or weapons, if only the right ones can be discovered, form 99 per cent. of victory. Strategy, command, leadership, courage, discipline, supply, organisation, and all the moral and physical paraphernalia of war are as nothing to a high superiority of weapons; at most they go to form the 1 per cent. which makes the whole possible. Indeed, as Carlyle writes, “Savage animalism is nothing, inventive spiritualism is all.”

To-day the introduction of the tank on the battlefield entirely revolutionises the art of war in that:

(i) It increases mobility by replacing muscular force by mechanical power.

(ii) It increases security by rendering innocuous the effect of bullets through the feasibility of carrying armour plate.

(iii) It increases offensive power by relieving the man from carrying his weapons or the horse from dragging them, and by facilitating ammunition supply it increases the destructive power of the weapons it carries.

In other words, an army moved by petrol can obtain a greater effect from its weapons in a given time with less loss to itself than one which relies on muscular energy as its motive force. Whilst securing its crew dynamically a tank enables it to fight statically, it is in every respect the “landship” it was first called.

These are our premises and from them we may deduce the following all-important fact: That in all wars, and especially modern wars--wars in which weapons change rapidly--no army of fifty years before any date selected would stand a “dog’s chance” against the army existing at this date, not even if it were composed entirely of Winkelrieds and Marshal Neys. Consider the following examples:

(i) Napoleon was an infinitely greater general than Lord Raglan; yet Lord Raglan would, in 1855, have beaten any army Napoleon, in 1805, could have led against him, because Lord Raglan’s men were armed with the Minie rifle.

(ii) Eleven years after Inkerman, Moltke would have beaten Lord Raglan’s army hollow, not because he was a greater soldier than Lord Raglan, but because his men were armed with the needle gun.

From this we may deduce the fact, which has already been stated, namely, that weapons form 99 per cent. of victory, consequently the General Staff of every army should be composed of mechanical clairvoyants, seers of new conditions, new fields of war to exploit, and new tools to assist in this exploitation. Had Napoleon, in 1805, offered a prize of £1,000,000 for a weapon 100 per cent. more efficient than the “Brown Bess,” it is almost a certainty that, by 1815, he would have got it; for the want of a little foresight and for the want of the understanding that progress in weapons of war is a similar problem to progress of tools in manufacture, he might have saved his Empire and ended his days as supreme tyrant of Europe.

The whole history of the evolution of machine tools is that of the elimination of the workman and the replacement of muscular energy by steam, electricity, or some other form of power. “Fewer men, more machines, higher output” has during the last hundred years been the motto of every progressive workshop. Likewise we believe that from now onwards in every progressive army will a similar motto be adopted. Further than this, we believe that those nations which have proved their ability in the past as leaders of science and mechanical engineering will in the future be those which will produce the most efficient armies, for these armies will be based on the foundations of the commercial sciences.

Accepting that the main factor in future warfare will be the replacing of man-power by machine-power, the logical deduction is that the ideal army to aim at is _one_ man, not a conscripted nation, not even a super-scientist, but one man who can press a button or pull a plug and so put into operation war-machines evolved by the best brains of the nation during peacetime. Such an army need not even occupy the theatre of operations in which the war is to be fought; _he_ may be ensconced thousands of miles away, perhaps in Kamtchatka, fighting a battle on the Western Front. Is this impossible? Not at all; even in the late war we can picture to ourselves a one-armed cripple sitting in Muravieff-Amourski and electrically discharging gas against the Hindenburg Line directly his indicator announces a favourable wind.

So far the chemist, but is man going to be controlled by gas, are human destinies to be limited by a “whiff of phosgene”?

“Certainly not,” answers the soldier mechanic. “It is true that the future may produce many unknown gases which, as long as they remain unknown to the opposing side, are unlikely to be rendered innocuous by means of a respirator; I, however, will scrap the respirator and place my men in gas-proof tanks, and whenever my indicator denotes impure air, the crews will batten down their hatches, their engines will be run off accumulators, and they themselves will live on oxygen or compressed air. I will apply to land-warfare naval methods undreamt of before, I will produce a land machine which will, so to speak, submerge itself when the gas cloud approaches, just as a submarine submerges in the sea when a destroyer draws near.”

There is an answer to every weapon, and that side which has most thoroughly thought these answers out during days of peace is the one which is most likely to produce a steel-shod Achilles for days of war.

Without journeying so far as Amourski let us imagine that war was to break out again three years hence and that we were equipped with a tank 200 per cent. superior to our at present best type--a machine travelling at fifteen miles an hour in place of five, and that the Germans sitting behind their Hindenburg Line were still backing personnel against matériel, numbers of men against perfection of weapons.

An army is an organisation, comparable, like all other organisations, very closely with the human body. It possesses a body and a brain; its fighting troops are the former, its headquarters staffs the latter. In the past the usual process of tactics has been to wage a body warfare: one body is moved up against the other body and like two boxers they pummel each other until one is knocked out. But suppose that boxer “A” could by some simple operation paralyse the brain of boxer “B,” what use would all boxer “B’s” muscular strength be to him, even if it rivalled that of Samson and Goliath combined? No use at all, as David proved!

Now apply this process to the battle of 1923. The tank fleets, under cover of dense clouds of smoke, or at night-time, move forward, not against the body of the enemy’s army but against his brains; their objectives are not the enemy’s infantry or the enemy’s guns, not positions or tactical localities, but the billets of the German headquarters staffs--the Army, Corps, and Divisional headquarters. These they capture, destroy or disperse; what then is the body going to do, for its brain is paralysed? Who is going to control it, feed it with reserves, ammunition, and supplies? Who is going to manœuvre it to give it foot play? Either it will stand still and be knocked out, or, much more likely, it will be seized by panic and become paralysed to action.

What is the answer to this type of brain warfare? The answer is the tank; the brains will get into metal skulls or boxes, the bodies will get into the same, and land fleet will manœuvre against land fleet.

The growth of these tactics may be slow, but eventually they will become imperative. It may be urged that the field gun is master of the tank in the open, just as a land battery is master of a ship at sea. This is only true as long as the gunner can see his target, and no known means at present exist whereby sight can penetrate a dense cloud of smoke. It may also be urged that a heavy machine gun will enable the infantry to protect themselves against tanks. But to be mobile the weight of the machine gun is limited to the carrying power of two men--about 80 lb., and there is no known reason why a tank should not be armoured to withstand the bullets of such a weapon. If a heavier machine gun is made it will be forced to take to a mounting, and for choice to a mechanical one; it will in fact become a tank or a tank destroyer.

The necessity of armour in war has always been recognised, and its general disuse only dates from the sixteenth century onwards. When armour could not be used other means of protection, all makeshifts, were sought after--earth-works, entrenchments, use of ground, manœuvre, and covering fire, and as regards the last-named substitute it is interesting to go back a little into history, for, even from a cursory study, we may better understand the present and foresee the future.

In the days of our Henry VIII a body of arquebusiers had to stand twenty-five ranks deep in order to obtain continuity of fire; that is to say, that once the first rank had fired and doubled to the rear it would only be ready loaded again when the twenty-fifth rank was about to discharge its pieces. By the days of Gustavus Adolphus, the art of musketry and the musket had so far improved as to permit of these twenty-five ranks being reduced to eight. As improvement went apace we find Frederick the Great reducing them to three, and Wellington in the Peninsula to two. Even in the early period of the revolutionary wars it was found necessary for light infantry to reduce the human target they offered to the enemy’s fire by making use of extensions. In 1866 extensions became more feasible on account of the Prussians being armed with a breach-loading rifle; in 1870 they became more general; in 1899 they have grown to between ten and fifteen paces, which may be taken as the maximum for a man, armed with the magazine rifle, to deliver one round per yard of front each minute. In 1904 trenches are made use of on an extensive scale, for as extensions cannot be increased if fire effect is to be maintained, some other form of protection must be sought, and men, not being able to carry armour, must carry spades instead and so still further immobilise themselves. In 1914, after a brief hurry-scurry of open warfare, all sides take to earth and the spade reigns supreme.

Then comes the reintroduction of armour with the tank, and what do we see? Not only mobility and direct protection, but the reinstitution of the firing line, not now morcelated at fifteen paces interval between the men composing it, but at 150 to 300 paces between the tanks, the mechanical skirmishing fortresses of which it is built up. A tank with a crew of 6 men can deliver fire at the rate of 300 rounds a minute, or equivalent to 30 riflemen at a South African War extension, and being armoured they suffer practically no loss and can consequently challenge not only 30 riflemen but 300, any number, in fact, who are sent against them. The logical conclusion to be drawn from this is that extensions are useless, trenches at best but static makeshifts, the infantryman must don armour and, as he has not the strength to carry it, he must get into a tank. If this is common sense, let us attempt to visualise what a tank war of the future may entail.

In the mechanical wars of the future we must first of all recognise the fact that the earth is a solid sea as easily traversable in all directions by a tractor as a sheet of ice is by a skater; the battles in these wars will therefore more and more approximate to naval actions. As trenches, as we know them, and the ordinary field obstacles now constructed will be useless, it may become necessary during peacetime to turn the great strategical centres--manufactories, railways, stores, seats of government, etc., into defended land-ports or protected power, fuel, and control stations. The fortifications of these will probably consist of immense dry moats and extensive minefields which will constitute a direct protection against tank attacks. Water obstacles will be useless, for the tank of a few years hence will undoubtedly be of an amphibious nature. To protect these centres from the air, barracks, storehouses, mobilisation stores, tankodromes and aerodromes will all have to be constructed well beneath the surface of the ground--in fact, the future fortress will approximate closely to a gigantic dugout surrounded by a field of land mines electrically manipulated.

Near the frontier these defended ports will probably be equipped with and linked up by lethal gas works--gas-producing and storage plants, lodged below the surface, which on war being declared can instantaneously be set operating electrically by one man stationed hundreds of miles away if needs be. When this type of warfare is instituted, mobilisation will not consist in equipping with weapons a small section of the community, but in providing such of the civil population as cannot be rapidly evacuated from the area it is proposed to inundate, or placed in gastight shelters safely underground, with anti-gas appliances. Under these circumstances the defence of frontiers will be organised according to prevailing winds, and signs of war will be looked for not amongst military but civil movements.

As the gas-storage tanks are opened and the gas-producing plants set operating, fleets of fast-moving tanks, equipped with tons of liquid gas, against which the enemy will probably have no means of protection,[39] will cross the frontier and obliterate every living thing in the fields and farms, the villages and cities of the enemy’s country. Whilst life is being swept away around the frontier fleets of aeroplanes will attack the enemy’s great industrial and governing centres. All these attacks will be made, at first, not against the enemy’s army, which will be mobilising underground, but against the civil population in order to compel it to accept the will of the attacker.

If the enemy will not accept peace terms forthwith, then wars in the air and on the earth will take place between machines to gain superiority. Tank will meet tank, and, commanded from the air, fleets of these machines will manœuvre between the defended ports seeking each other out and exterminating each other in orthodox naval fashion. Whilst these small forces of men, representing perhaps 0·5 per cent. or 1 per cent. of the entire population of the country, strong through machinery, are at death-grips with their enemy, their respective nations will be producing weapons for them; so, in the future, as military fighting man-power dwindles must we expect to see military manufacturing man-power increase.

Are we safe in this little island of ours against the future? If at times, during the “alchemical” period of warfare, we have been threatened and invaded, we may be certain that during the scientific period we shall be less secure than we have been in the past.

From the present-day tank to one which can plunge into the Channel at Calais at 4 in the morning, land at Dover at six o’clock, and be outside Buckingham Palace for an early lunch will not probably require as many as the fifty-two years which have separated the _Merrimac_ from the _Tiger_ or the _Queen Elizabeth_. If this is too remote a period for the present generation to grow anxious about, there is no reason why four or five years hence ships should not be constructed as tank-carriers, these machines being conveyed across the ocean and launched into the sea near the coast carrying sufficient fuel to move them 300 or 400 miles inland. From ships as carriers it is but one step to aeroplanes as suppliers and lifters, and another to aeroplanes as tanks themselves.

If the evolution of war, in the past, has been slow, do not let us flatter ourselves that it is likely to remain so in the future. From the gliders of the Wright Brothers the aeroplane rapidly evolved, and from a 40 H.P. engine of ten or twelve years back to-day the Porte “Super-Baby” triplane carries five engines of 400 H.P. each and the Tarrant triplane has a span of 131 feet and to drive it six Napier “Lion” engines are used, developing no less than 3,000 horse-power. The tank is still in its infancy, but it will grow and one day in mechanical perfection and efficiency catch up with the super-Dreadnought and the Handley Page, and what then? A close co-operation between the great mechanical weapons, the seaship, the airship, and the landship--or, if preferred, of boat, aeroplane, and tank--will take place. These weapons will approximate and unify, evolving one arm and not three arms, which will require one defence force and not three. This, even to-day, is becoming more and more apparent, and the sooner the brains of the future Defence Force are developed the better for this nation, for to-day we are thinking, like mediæval magicians, in separate terms of air, water, and earth, and some of us in those of gabions, lances, and blunderbusses.

If great wars can be restricted or abolished by word of mouth or written agreement, the above gropings into the future, even if possible, may never materialise; but even if this be so, many small wars lie in front of us, for Europe politically, since 1914, has practically gone back 400 years, the frontiers of the smaller nations approximating closely to those of the later Middle Ages. The more nations there are in the world the more wars there will be in the making, and as half the smaller nations of central and eastern Europe consider war a national sport there is little likelihood of agreements being kept or peace being maintained; in fact, all agreements which cannot be compelled by brute force are likely to be treated as “scraps of paper.”

To enforce peace, power and the means of applying it will be needed by the greater nations who by law will never quarrel; here the mechanic steps forward and presents the nations concerned with the tank and the aeroplane as a means towards this end. He is perfectly right; the general introduction of mechanical weapons must bring with it the end of small wars if not also of civil disturbances.

Take the case of the defence of India. What has always been the great difficulty in our frontier expeditions? Not our enemy or his weapons, but the country which enables the Afghan to evade our columns and impede our advance. It is the resistance offered by natural obstacles which we have to overcome and not those imposed upon us by weapons which generally are vastly inferior to those with which our men are equipped.

Take the case of a punitive expedition starting from Peshawer and proceeding to Kabul. The force will consist of three bodies of troops--a small fighting advanced guard, a large main body protecting the transport, and strong flank guards protecting the main body. On account of the tactics which have to be adopted the advance is excessively slow. The main body proceeding along the roads, which almost inevitably coincide with the bottoms of the valleys, has to be kept out of rifle shot, consequently the flank guards have usually to “crown the heights” on each side of the road, which necessitates much climbing and loss of time. If the advance were over an open veldt land, as in South Africa, in place of in a hilly country, movement would be simplified, but still will the flank guards have to be thrown out because the main body, consisting of men and animals, is pervious to bullets. This perviousness to bullets is the basis of the whole trouble, and unless bullet-proof armour can be carried, when it does not matter whether the rifle is fired at a range of two yards or two miles, the only means of denying effect to the rifle is to keep it out of range of its target.

Though up to a short time ago the carrying of armour was not a feasible proposition, now it is, and there are few more difficulties in advancing up or down the Khyber with a well-constructed tank than across the open. Armour, by rendering flesh impervious to bullets, does away with the necessity of flank guards and long straggling supply columns, and our punitive expedition equipped with tanks can reach Kabul in a few days, and not only reach it but abandon its communications, as they will require no protection. If tank supply columns, which are self-protecting, are considered too slow, once the force has reached Kabul its supply and the evacuation of its sick (there will be but few wounded) can be carried out by aeroplane. The whole operation becomes too simple to be classed as an operation of war. Once impress upon the Afghan the hopelessness of facing a mechanical punitive force and he will give up rendering such forces necessary.

In our many small wars of the past we have frequently been faced with desert warfare, a warfare even more difficult than hill and mountain fighting. Here again the chief difficulty is a natural one--want of water, and not an artificial one--superiority of the enemy’s weapons. In 1885 Sir Henry Stewart started from Korti on the Nile to relieve General Gordon: his difficulties were supply difficulties, and it took him twenty-one days to reach Gubat, a distance of 180 miles. A tank moving at an average pace of ten miles an hour could have accomplished the journey in two days, and being supplied by aeroplane could have reached Khartum a few days later. One tank would have won Maiwand, Isandhlwana, and El Teb; one tank can meet any quantity of Tower muskets, or Mauser rifles for aught that; one tank, costing say £10,000, can not only win a small war normally costing £2,000,000, but render such wars in the future highly improbable if not impossible. The moral, therefore, is--get the tank.

From small wars to internal Imperial Defence is but one step. Render rebellion hopeless and it will not take place. In India we lock up in an unremunerative army 75,000 British troops and 150,000 Indian. Both these forces can be done away with and order maintained, and maintained with certainty, by a mechanical police force of 20,000 to 25,000 men.

What now is the great lesson to be learnt from the above examples? That war will be eliminated by weapons, not by words or treaties or leagues of nations; by weapons--leagues of tanks, aeroplanes, and submarines--which will render opposition hopeless or retribution so terrible that nations will think not once or twice but many times before going to war. If the civilian population of a country know that should they demand war they may be killed in a few minutes by the tens of thousands, they will not only cease to demand it but see beforehand that they are well prepared by superiority of weapons to terrify their neighbours out of declaring war against them.

Weapons we, therefore, see are, if not a means of ending war and ridding the world of this dementia, a means of maintaining peace on a far firmer footing than hitherto it has been maintained by muscular power. To limit the evolution of weapons is therefore to limit the periods of peace. An Army cannot stand still, it must develop with the civilisation of which it forms part or become barbaric. To equip our Army to-day with bows and arrows would not reduce the frequency of war, it would actually increase it, for according to his tools, so is man himself, and as an Army is built up of men, if these men are armed with bows and arrows they will in nature closely approximate to the age which produced these weapons, the age which burnt Joan of Arc. Equally so will the Army of to-day, if in equipment it be not allowed to keep pace with scientific progress, develop into a band of brigands, for in 2019 the rifle and gun of to-day, and the civilisation which produced them, will be as uncouth as the arquebus, the carronade, and the manners of the sixteenth century.

If a millennium is ever to be ushered in upon earth it will be accomplished through the development of brain-power and not through it becoming atrophied. If war is to be rendered impossible the process will be a slow evolutionary one, the desire of war gradually slowing down, and its motive force energising some other ideal. To restrict war by maintaining soldiers as ill-armed barbarians is to prevent it working out its destined course. Human nature, in spite of Benjamin Kidd, does not change in a generation, and the tendencies which beget war will out until human nature has outgrown them. The world has a soul, and like that of a man it must pass through years of love, hate, striving and ambition before attaining those of wisdom and decay.

There may yet be many wars ahead of us, but one thing would appear to be certain, and this is that small wars will disappear and great ones become less frequent, science rendering them too terrible to be entered upon lightly.

To-day we stand upon the threshold of a new epoch in the history of the world--war based on petrol, the natural sequent of an industry based on steam. That we have attained the final step on the evolutionary ladder of war is most unlikely, for mechanical and chemical weapons may disappear and be replaced by others still more terrible. Electricity has scarcely yet been touched upon and it is not impossible that mechanical warfare will be replaced by one of a wireless nature, and that not only the elements, but man’s flesh and bones, will be controlled by the “fluid” which to-day we do not even understand. This method of imposing the will of one man on another may in its turn be replaced by a purely psychological warfare, wherein weapons are not even used or battlefields sought or loss of life or limb aimed at; but, in place, the corruption of the human reason, the dimming of the human intellect, and the disintegration of the moral and spiritual life of one nation by the influence of the will of another is accomplished.

Be all these as they may, one fact stands out supreme in all types and conditions of war, and this is, that the strongest and most efficient brain wins, which applies equally to all nations as it does to all individuals.

Animal superiority over animal is based on muscle, human superiority over human is based on brain. The nation with the supreme brain will eventually rule the world, and so long as war continues the Army with the best brains (which also means the best weapons) will accomplish victory with the least loss. Our Army from to-day must step forward; “to advance is to conquer,” and this applies in greater force to brain-power than to muscle-power, for brains control muscles. To stand still is to retrogress; to glance backwards is to lose time, and if we pause now we are lost in the future. Do not, therefore, let us mark time on our own graves, do not let us hark back to 1914 with its rifles and its ammunition boots, its sabres and its horseshoes, and all its muscular barbarism; let us plan and let us think, thus shall we penetrate the veil of the future, thus shall we learn how to equip our Army with a brain and with a body which united, if war be ever again forced upon us, will compel victory at the smallest possible cost. Surely this is an ideal worthy of a great nation and of a great Army, the object of which is to prevent war and to maintain peace, to prevent war by science and not by nescience, by progress and not by retrogression.

INDEX

Abancourt, 206, 231

Abbas Ridge, 100

Abbé, Bois de l’, 201

Abbeville, 34

Abelard, xv

Acheux, 58

Achicourt, 84, 105, 257

Achiet-le-Grand, 84, 176, 255

Achiet-le-Petit, 176, 292

Acq, 84

Adelpare, 208, 210

Admiralty, the, 18-20, 22, 25, 27-33

Agincourt, 2

Aillette, the, 196

Aisne, the, 14, 81, 189, 196-7, 215

Albert, 71, 175, 252-4

Alberta, 121-2

Aldershot, 9-11

Alexandria, 134

Ali El Muntar, 101, 130

Allen, Major G. W. G., M.C., xii

Alleux, Bois des, 173

Alvinzi, xiv

American Army, 270-2, 275, 277-84, 290

_American Machinist, The_, xii, 4

American Tank Corps, 268, 271-2, 274, 277-82, 284

Amervalles, 284

Amiens, 169, 217-29, 237, 243, 245, 247, 290

Ancre, the, 54, 57-9, 176, 196

Anneux, 150

Anti-tank tactics, 87-8, 260-5

Antwerp, 198

Applegarth tractor, 10

Aquenne, Bois d’, 202

Archdale, Captain O. A., xii

Archery in warfare, 2

Archinger, 4

Ardennes, the, 1

Argonne, the, 280

Armentières, 200

Arnold, Captain A. E., M.C., 235

Arnold, Lieutenant C. B., D.S.O., xiii, 235

Arrachis, Bois des, 208, 210

Arras, 81-9, 105, 108, 114, 144, 166, 250-3, 257-9

Arrol, Messrs. William, 28

Atawineh Ridge, 100

Atkin-Berry, Major H. C., D.S.O., M.C., xv

Australia Hill, 101

Australian Corps, 87, 99, 101, 109-10, 130, 203, 205, 207, 215, 217-9, 221-3, 226, 231-2, 252, 254-5, 267, 270-1, 274, 289, 290-2, 304

Aveluy, 71, 175-6

Avesnes, 257

Avonmouth, 98

Awoingt, 274

Bacon, Admiral Sir Reginald, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., D.S.O., 21-2, 66

Bailleul, 83

Bailleulval, 200

Baker, Colonel C. B., 277

Baker Carr, Brig.-Gen. C.D’A. B.S., C.M.G., D.S.O., xvi, 62

Balfour, Right Hon. A. J., 25

Bancourt, 258

Bank Farm, 121

Banteux, 138-9

Bapaume, 55, 144, 175-6, 215, 243, 247, 250-2, 293

Barastre, 175

Barry, John Richard, 9

Batter tractor, 10-13, 303

Bayonvillers, 231-2

Bazentin, 175

Bazuel, 282

Beach Post, 131

Beaucamp, 269

Beaucourt-sur-Ancre, 176, 251

Beaufort, 225

Beaumont Hamel, 58

Beauquesne, 61

Beaurains, 91

Beaurevoir, 144-5, 273, 281

Beauval, 203

Beersheba, 99-100, 130

Behagnies, 235

Belah, 101

Bellenglise, 270

Bellicourt, 272, 281

Belloy, 290

Berliet, 186

Bermicourt, 61-2, 71, 127, 141, 168, 252

Berthen, 200

Bertincourt, 143

Beugny, 174, 258

Biefvillers, 256

Big Willie, 267, 303

Bihucourt, 255

Bird, Colonel, 25

Bisley, 31, 159-61

Blangy, 62, 71, 200

Blecourt, 273

Boescheppe, 200

Bois des Bœufs, 85

Bois d’Olhain, 173

Bois l’Evêque, 282

Bony, 249, 293

Boulogne, 4

Bourg, 279

Bourgon, General de, 209

Bourlon Wood, 144-6, 149, 150-1, 156, 269

Bovington Camp, _see_ Wool

Boyd-Rochfort, Major H., D.S.O., M.C., xv

Boydell engine, 9

Boyeffles, 173

Bradley, Lieut.-Colonel D. W., D.S.O., xii, 34, 54, 154, 162

Bramond, Frank, 11

Brancourt, 281

Bray-sur-Somme, 34, 172, 175-6, 218, 225-6, 252, 254, 257

Brie Bridge, 175

Briquetterie, the, 54

Brock, Commander, 165

Broodseinde Ridge, 119

Brough, Lieut.-Colonel, C.M.G., 34, 161-2

Bruay, 200

Brussels, 108

Bucquoy, 204, 292

Buire Wood, 172

Bullecourt, 86-8, 205, 207, 213, 261

Bullhouse Farm, 159

Burnett-Stuart, Brig.-Gen., 162

Bus, 175

Bus les Artois, 209

Busnes, 200

Butler, Major-Gen., 162

Buzancy, 193

Byng, General Sir Julian (afterwards Lord), xvi, 139

Cachy, 201-2, 274

Caix, 218

California Trench, 122

Cambrai, xvi, 15, 64, 82, 129, 138-53, 155-8, 165, 167, 173, 181, 186, 215, 217, 219, 237, 242, 250, 273-6, 304

Canadian Corps, 85, 163-5, 169, 203, 218-21, 223, 257-8, 269, 273

Cantigny, 188

Capper, Major-Gen. Sir John, K.C.B., 63

Capricorn Keep, 121

Carney, Driver, 234-5

Carter, Lieut.-Colonel E. J., xiii, 289-90, 294

Cassel, 119

Castel, 218

Catillon, 282, 285

Cavalry Corps, 219-20, 225, 230

Cavillon, 224

Cayeux Wood, 224

Cercottes, 184, 186

Chacrise, 193

Champlieu, 185

Charleroi, 241, 295

Charteris, Capt. the Hon. Evan, xi, xii, xv

Château-Thierry, 189, 195,290

Chaufours Wood, 248

Chaulnes, 176, 235

Chaumont, 279

Chaussée Brunehaut, 193

Chedeville, Colonel, 190

Chemin des Dames, 186-7

Chinese Labour Company, 51st, 128-9

Chipilly, 169, 224-5

Chuignolles, 252, 254, 292

Churchill, Right Hon. Winston, 18-20, 22, 24-5, 27-8, 32-3

Clapham Junction, 109

Cléry, 175

Cockcroft, the, 122

Cojeul, 92

Colincamps, 176

Cologne, 295

Cologne, river, 174-5

Combles, 55

Comines, 116

Concrois Wood, 193

Connaught Rangers, 173

Contalmaison, 176

Conty, 289-90

Courage, Brig.-Gen. A., D.S.O., M.C., xvi, 62

Courcelles, 295

Courchamps, 194

Craonne, 82, 186-7

Crested Rock, 131-2

Crèvecœur, 138-9, 144-6

Cricket Valley, 131, 133

Crinchon, river, 84

Croisilles, 94-5, 256

Crompton, Col., R.E., 23

Cugnot, 8-9

Cuvillers, 273

Cyrus, 142

Dalby-Jones, Lieut.-Colonel W., 29

Dale-Bussell, P., 23, 32-3

Debeney, General, 211

Deir el Belah, 99-100, 130-1, 133

Deligny Hill, 269

Delville Wood, 56

Dermicourt, 259

Desert Column, 130

Dessart Wood, 143, 146

Devonport, 98

D’Eyncourt, Sir Eustace Tennyson, K.C.B., xii, 22-3, 30-4, 66

Diplock, Mr., 24

Dixmude, 119

Doignies, 173-4

Doingt Wood, 172

Dolls’ House, 204

Doon Copse, 273

Dormans, 189, 195

Douai, 82

Doucet, Lieut.-Colonel L. C. A. de B., xiii

Doullens, 174

Dranoutre, 109

Drocourt-Queant Line, 82, 84, 108, 258, 293

Druid Ridge, 100

Dumble, Colonel, 23

Dunajec, the, 15, 300, 301

Dundas, Major R. W., M.C., xv

Dunlop, Andrew, 9

Durham Light Infantry, 15th, 57

Earle, Captain A., 66

Eclimeux, 62

Edgeworth, Richard Lovell, 9

El Arish, 98-9, 101, 131-3

El Burs, 101

Elles, Major-Gen. H. J., C.B., D.S.O., xiii, xiv, xvi, 28, 61, 64, 66, 147-8, 288

El Sire, 101

Elveden, 31, 160-2

_Engineer, The_, xii, 9

Epehy, 174, 250, 266-72

Eppé-Sauvage, 294

Erin, 62, 70-1, 127, 180

Ervillers, 255

Escaut, the, 138

Esclairvillers Wood, 173

Espilly, 195

Estaires, 200

Estienne, General, 184-6, 198

Etricourt, 272

Ex-Crown Prince, the, 188, 217

Ex-Kaiser, the, 188

Experiments Committee, 26

Fampoux, 83

Fanny’s Farm, 111

Favreuil, 257

Fayolles, General, 290

Fender, Guillaume, 9

Ferdinand’s Farm, 121

Fère-en-Tardenois, 290

Festubert, 200

Feuchy, 85

Feuchy-Chapel, 86-87

Flers, 55-6

Flesquières, 144-9, 155, 262, 269

Flos, 55

Foch, Marshal, 200, 217

Fonsomme, 273

Fontaine-au-Bois, 282

Fontaine-Notre-Dame, 150-1, 262

Fontana, 4

Foot, Major S. H., D.S.O., xii

Forsyth-Major, Major O. A., xii, 98 _note_

Foster, Messrs. William, 24

Foster-Daimler tractor, 22, 39

Foucaucourt, 291

Fouilloy, 206

Fowke, Major-Gen. G. H., 21

Fraicourt, 275

Framerville, 225, 291

Frechencourt, 200

Frederick the Great, 14

Freiburg, 235

Fremicourt, 172, 258

French, Field-Marshal Sir John (afterwards Lord), 21

French Tank Corps, 184-98

Fresnoy-le-Petit, 267

Frezenberg, 121

Fricourt, xv, 175, 242

Fuller, Brevet-Colonel J. F. C., D.S.O., xi, 66, 299 _note_

Furse, Major-Gen. Sir William, K.C.B., D.S.O., 66

Gallipoli, 123

Gas, Poison, 17, 30, 314-5

Gauche Wood, 152

Gavrelle, 88

Gaza, 98-102, 130-4

Geninwell Copse, 173

George V, His Majesty King, 161, 165

German, Thomas, 9

German Tank Corps, 201, 212-6, 241

Gheluvelt, 119

Ghent, 108

Gilban, 98

Gird Trench, 57

Givenchy, 200

Glasgow, Brig.-Gen. W., C.H.G., 63, 67

Glencorse Wood, 261

Gommecourt, 17, 81-2, 255

Gonnelieu, 270

Gordon, General, 318

Gore-Anley, Brig.-Gen. F., D.S.O., 62-3

Gouzeaucourt, 143, 146, 266, 268-9

Graincourt, 146, 149

Grand Bois, 110

Grand Ravin, 149-50

Grand Rozoy, 196

Grandecourt, 110, 176

Green, Major G. A., M. C., xiv

Green Dump, 55

Green Hill, 101-2

Grevillers, 256

Grivesnes, 188

Grose, Francis, 4

Guards’ Division, 152, 255, 257

Guemappe, 257

Guest, Major, 26

Gueudecourt, 55-7, 260

Guillaucourt, 224, 231

Guillemont, 267-70

Guise, 198

Gun Hill, 131, 133

Gunpowder, introduction of, 2

Haig, Field-Marshal Sir Douglas (afterwards Earl), 28, 32, 287-8

Ham, 220

Hamel, xvi, 168, 217, 204-5, 207, 244, 262, 304-5

Hamelet, 206

Hamelincourt, 256

Hamencourt, 174

Hangard, Bois de, 201-2

Haplincourt, 258

Happegarbes, 285

Happy Valley, 254, 257

Harbonnières, 224, 232, 235

Hardress Lloyd, Brig.-Gen. J., D.S.O., xvi, 63

Hareira, 95, 130

Hargicourt, 267

Harp, The, 83, 85-6

Harpon, Bois de, 208, 210

Hartennes Wood, 193

Haslam, Lieut., 246

Hatfield, 30-1

Havre, 127

Havrincourt Wood, 143, 145-7, 149

Heart Hill, 100

Heavy Section Machine Gun Corps, 31, 159

Hebuterne, 176, 304

Hecq, 286

Hendecourt, 87

Henincourt, 172

Heninel, 82, 85-6, 256

Henin-sur-Cojeul, 83, 256

Herleville, 252

Hermies, 259

Hervilly, 174

Hervin Farm, 85

Hesdin, 127

Hetherington, Major T. G., 22-4

Heudicourt, 143

Hillock Farm, 122

Hindenburg, Marshal, xiv, 188, 241

Hindenburg Line, 82, 83, 86, 87, 94-5, 141, 145, 250, 256, 267, 270-2, 275, 281

Hindenburg Support Line, 145

Holden, Colonel, 25

Holdford-Walker, Major, 162

Holnon, 266

Holt caterpillar tractor, 11, 22

Holzschuher, 6-7

Honnechy, 275, 293-4

Honnecourt, 151

Hooge, 119, 121

Hornihan Roy, xvii

Hornsby tractor, 11

Hotblack, Major F. E., D.S.O., M.C., xiii, xv, 61

Houthulst Forest, 120

Humières, 62, 200

Humerœuil, 70

Imperial Defence Committee, 26

Inchy, 144

India, defence of, 317-8

Indian Cavalry Division, 130

In Seirat, 100

Inter-Allied Tank Committee, 65

Island Wood, 131

Italian Army, 130

Iveagh, Lord, 160-1

Iwuy, 144

Joffre, Marshal, 185

Joint Naval and Military Committee, 22, 25

Joly de Maizeroy, 298

Joncourt, 273

Jones, Paul, xiii

Joye Farm, 111

Kantara, 98

Kemmel, Mount, 110, 119

Kemmelbeek, the, 117

Khan Yunus, 99

Kidd, Benjamin, 319

Kirbet El Sihan, 101, 102

Kitchener, Field-Marshal Lord, 24, 30, 32

Knoll, The, 267-70

Knothe, Major H., M.C., 161

Kurd Hill, 100-2

Kurd Valley, 99

Kyeser, Conrad, 4

La Belle Etoile, 144

Labyrinth, the, 101

La Cauchie, 200

La Fère, 173

Laffaux Hill, 187

La Folie, 151

Lagash, 300

Lagnicourt, 83, 258

La Maisonette, 176

Landrecies, 170, 285-6

Landships Committee, 23-5, 28

Langemarck, 119

Lateau Wood, 148

La Vacquerie, 148

Le Bosquet, 139

Le Cateau, 282

Le Catelet, 272, 283-4

Le Quesnel, 224

Lees Hill, 101-2

Leigh-Mallory, Major T., D.S.O., xiii

Lenclos, Ninon de, xv

Leonardo da Vinci, 5, 7

Les-Trois-Bouqueteaux, 208, 210

Lestren, 200

Leuvrigny, Bois de, 195

Liessies, 294

Lihons, 225-6

Lille, 108

Little Willie, 26

Lloyd George, Right Hon. D., 25, 30, 161

Lombartbeek, the, 117

Loop, the, 34

Luce, the, 169

Ludendorff, General, xiv, 188, 218, 222-3, 237-8, 263

Lulworth, 162

Lys, the, 199

Magdhaba, 131

Macdonald’s Wood, 121

McKenna, Right Hon. Reginald, 30

Mackensen, Field-Marshal von, 15

Maclean, J. B., 66

Magny, 272

Mailly Poivres, 185

Maistre, General, 203

Malmaison, 187

Malmédy, 295

Manchester, H. H., 4 _note_, 8

Manchester Regiment, 273

Mangin, General, 189

Mansara, 99-100

Maquion, 269

Marcoing, 82, 139, 144-6, 148-50, 180

Maretz, 293

Marfaux, 195

Maricourt, 54, 175-6

Marly-le-Roi, 184

Marne, the, 14, 190, 195

Martel, Major G. le Q., D.S.O., M.C., xv, 61, 161

Martigny, 185

Martinpuich, 55

Marwitz, General von der, 151

Masnières, 139, 144-6, 149-51

Massenbach, 298

Mathew-Lannowe, Brig.-Gen. E. B., C.M.G., D.S.O., xii, 62, 66

Maubeuge, 250, 285-8

Maurice de Saxe, 298

Maurois, 275, 293

Maximilian I, 7

Mazar Trench, 101

Meaulte, 254

Menin, 276

Mercatel, 83, 92

Mercedes tractor, 11

Mericourt, 218, 225

Merlimont, 72, 200, 245, 289

Mers, 70, 289

Merville, 200, 304

Messines, 108, 113-4, 166, 180, 242, 261

Metropolitan Carriage, Wagon and Finance Co., 28

Meuse, the, 197

Mézières, 81

Miette, the, 187

_Military Antiquities_, 4

Miraumont, 176

Mœuvres, 269

Moislains, 174-5

Molesworth, Lieut.-Colonel J. D. M., M.C., xiii, 180

Molinghem, 200

Monchy le Preux, 82-4, 88, 257-8

Moncrieff, Major-Gen. Sir George Scott-, 22, 25

Mon du Hibou, 122

Money Hill, 99-100

Montauban, xv, 175-6

Montbrehain, 273-4, 281

Montdidier, 188, 196

Montenescourt, xvi, 84

Monument, the, 202

Morchies, 174, 258

Moreuil, xvi, 204, 207-8, 258

Morlancourt, 206

Mormal, Forest of, 284-6

Morval, 55

Mory Copse, 256-7

_Motor Cycle, The_, 159

Mount Pleasant Wood, 95-7

Moustier, 294-5

Moyenneville, 251, 257

Munitions, Ministry of, 25, 30-4

Murat, xvi

Musketry, art of, 312-3

Nancy, 81

Napoleon, xiv, 8, 104, 170-1, 309

Nauroy, 272

Nepal Trench, 92

Neuville St. Vaast, 84

Neuville-Vitasse, 83, 85, 86, 91, 257

Neuvilly, 284

New Zealand Division, 258, 292-3

Newburn, John, 9

Newbury, 127

Ney, Marshal, xv

Nieppe, 200

Nieuport, 15, 108

Nine Wood, 146, 149

Nord, Canal du, 144, 268-9

Noyelles, 149

Noyon, 81, 188, 229

Nutt, Major N., 98

Oise, the, 138, 172, 285

Oosthoek, 117

Oosttaverne, 109, 111, 115

Ostend, 81

Ouderdom, 109, 117

Ourcq, the, 189-90, 290

Outpost Hill, 101-2, 130

Ovillers, 54

Paillencourt, 144

Pailleul, 144

Palmer, William, 9

Palmer gunsight, 164

Parker, Lieut.-Colonel H., 277-8

Parvillers, 226

Passchendaele, 287

Patten, Colonel G. S., 279

Pedrail Co., 24, 27-8

Peizière, 173

Péronne, 229

Perry, Sir Percival, 66

Pershing, General, 279

Pierremont, 62

Pissy, 289

Ploegsteert, 200

Poelcappelle, 122-4

Point du Jour, 83

Polygonveld, 120

Poperinghe, 117, 289

Porte triplane, 316

Pozières, 176

Premont, 275

Premy Chapel, 269

Preux, 286

Proyart, 226, 292

Pusieux, 250

Quadrilateral, the, 267

Queen’s Hill, 101-2

Quennemont Farm, 268-9, 271

Rafa Trench, 99-101, 131-3

Raglan, Lord, 309

Raillencourt, 270

Ralston, W., 303

Ramicourt, 273

Ramousies, 294

Ramsey, David, 8

Ravenel, 290

Rawlinson, General Sir Henry (afterwards Lord), 227, 305

Reims, 81-2, 108, 188-90, 195, 215, 217

Reincourt, 87

Renuart Farm, 281

Ribbans, Gunner, 231, 233-4

Ribecourt, 138-9

Ricardo engine, 42

Richborough, 127

Riencourt, 55

Riguerval Wood, 275

Robersart, 282

Roberts tractor, 11

Robertson, General Sir William, 32, 161

Rochet-Schneider tractor, 11

Rockenbach, Colonel, 278-9

Roclincourt, 83-5

Rocquigny-Villers, 55

Rœux, 88, 95-7

Roisel, 172-4

Romani Trench, 99

Ronchères, 290

Ronssoy Wood, 173, 267

Rosières, 225, 246

Roulers, 197

Royal Air Force, 239, 242-9

Royal Engineers, 284

Royal Flying Corps, 61

Royal Munster Fusiliers, 173

Royal Naval Air Service, 29-30

Roye, 82, 196, 229

Rumilly, 145, 148-9

Ruyaulcourt, 143

Rycroft, Major, 232

St. Aubert, 215

St. Emilie, 173

St. Julien, 121-4

St. Leger, 256

St. Martin-Église, 62

St. Mihiel, 196-7, 279

St. Olle, 270

St. Omer, 119

St. Pierre-Divion, 58

St. Quentin, 138, 197-8, 250

St. Quentin Canal, 270

St. Ribert, Bois de, 208, 210

St. Souplet, 281, 283

Salisbury Plain, 28

Salonika, 197

Sambre, the, 284

Sampson Ridge, 101

Sancourt, 273

Sapignies, 255-7

Sautrecourt, 62

Sauvillers, 188, 204, 207-8

Sayer, Major H. S., xii

Scarpe, the, 83, 85, 138, 172-3, 250

Scheldt Canal, 284

Scherpenberg, 110

Scheuch, General, 240-1

Schott, Caspar, 8

Sea Post, 131, 133

Searle, Colonel F., C.B.E., D.S.O., xiv

Seely, Major-Gen. Right Hon. J. E. B. 66

Selle, the, 250, 281, 283-5

Sénécat Wood, 188

Senlis, 290

Sensée, the, 144, 268

Sensée Valley, 258

Sequehart, 273

Serain, 249, 275

Seranvillers, 145, 148

Serre, 17, 176, 250

Sforza, Ludovico, 5

Sheikh Abbas, 99-100

Sheikh Hasan, 131-3

Sheikh Nebhan, 100, 130

Sheikh Redwam, 101

Shekia, 99

Simencourt, 200

Simmonds, 2nd Lieutenant, 254

Smith, Geoffrey, 159

Smythe, Sir John, xvii

Soissons, 82, 108, 195, 197-8, 217

Somme, the, 16-7, 33-4, 54, 58-9, 81, 98, 134, 166, 169, 172-7, 199-201, 205-6, 212, 223, 225-6, 251-2, 287, 303-4

Sorel, 143

South African Brigade, 293

Spencer, Major R., M.C., xiii

Spree Farm, 121

Springfield, 122

Steenbeek, the, 110, 119, 121

Steenwerck, 200

Stephenson, George, xvii, 303

Stern, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Albert, K.B.E., C.M.G., 23, 30-1, 33-4, 63, 66

Stevin, Simon, 7-8

Stewart, Sir Henry, 318

Stewart, Captain Ian M., M.C., xv

Stothert & Pitt, Messrs., 28

Strahan, Captain, 232

Suez Canal, 98

Summers, Major, 162

Swanage, 164

Swinton, Major-Gen. E. D., C.B., D.S.O., xii, 18, 20-2, 26, 29, 31, 50-3, 66, 72 _note_, 159-60, 162

Symes, Lieut. K. P., 32

Tandy, Major, 161

Tank Armoured Car Battalion, Seventeenth, xiii, 289-96

Tank Corps: _esprit-de-corps_, xvi, 68-72; Headquarters Staff, xiv-xv, 60-2, 65, 103-7, 113, 174, 199, 218, 270; formation of first unit, 31; first appearance in action, 54-6; capture of the Gird Trench, 57; reorganisation, 62-7; training centres, 62, 66-7, 159-65; methods of training, 67-71; mobile canteens, 72; tank tactics, 73-80, 87, 89, 104-7, 111-6, 136-43, 252-3, 276-8; at the battle of Arras, 81-97; at the Second Battle of Gaza, 98-102; at the battle of Messines, 108-12; at the Third Battle of Ypres, 117-24; mechanical engineering side, 125-9; at the Third Battle of Gaza, 130-4; at the battle of Cambrai, 140-53; issue of “Battle Notes,” 154; growth in numbers, 172-3; at the Second Battle of the Somme, 173-7; reduction in numbers, 199; first encounter with German tanks, 201; preparations for the Great Offensive, 202-3; first experience of night warfare, 204; at the battle of Hamel, 204-7, 304-5; operations with the French Army at the battle of Moreuil, 207-11; at the battle of Amiens, 218-29; exploits of Whippet Tank “Musical Box,” 230-5; co-operation with the Royal Air Force, 242-9; at the battle of Bapaume, 250-7; at the Second Battle of Arras, 257-9; at the battle of Epehy, 266-7; at the battle of Cambrai--St. Quentin, 268-75, 304; heavy casualties, 276, 287; at the battle of the Selle, 283-5; at the battle of Maubeuge, 285; last action of the War, 286; tribute from Sir Douglas (now Earl) Haig, 287-8 First Tank Brigade, xvi, 62, 117-22, 146, 150-1, 168, 173, 200, 218, 220, 242-4, 250-1, 256-8, 266-9 Second Tank Brigade, xvi, 62, 109, 117-22, 146, 150-2, 172-3, 200, 220, 251, 266 Third Tank Brigade, 63, 117-23, 139, 146, 172, 175, 200-2, 208-11, 219-20, 222, 225-7, 243-4, 251, 256-8, 266, 271-4 Fourth Tank Brigade, 168, 172, 174-6, 199-200, 219-21, 225-7, 251-2, 256-8, 266-9, 271-4, 283-6 Fifth Tank Brigade, 168, 172, 200, 205, 208, 216, 219, 222, 226-7, 243-6, 251-2, 254, 266, 271-4

Tank Gun Carrier Companies, xii, 168-71

Tank Park, 58

Tank Signal Companies, 178-83

Tank Supply Companies, 33-4, 109-10, 166-71, 286

Tanks: their early origin, 1-2; armoured knights as living tanks, 2; fifteenth- and sixteenth-century battle-cars, 2-8; Cugnot steam car, 8; endless chain, 9-13; invention of the landship, 18-29; how the name “tank” was chosen, 29; first official trial, 30; taken over by the War Office from the Admiralty, 31; order placed for the first hundred, 32; their first appearance in action, 54-6; more successful on their second appearance, 56-7; lessons learnt from their early operations, 58-9; limitations of early tanks, 105; first use of supply tanks, 109; introduction of cloud-smoke apparatus, 165; French tanks, 184-98; German tanks, 212-6; not successful when attached to cavalry, 228-9; how they impressed the Germans, 236-41; their co-operation with aeroplanes, 242; German defence against, 260; American tanks, 279-82; retrospect of what they have accomplished, 297-307; forecast of what they may do, 308, 321 Mark I Tanks, 35-7, 44, 49-53, 63, 82, 89, 102, 105, 109-10, 166, 185, 203, 213, 261 Mark II, 37, 63, 89, 102, 110 Mark III, 37, 63, 82 Mark IV, 37-41, 44, 63, 109-10, 122, 130, 141, 167-8, 173, 201, 203, 212, 214, 253, 255, 258, 261, 267, 269 Mark V, 41-3, 199, 202-3, 206-7, 219, 223, 227, 231, 253, 256, 267 Mark V Star, 43, 219, 227, 253, 267 Mark VIII, 279 Mark IX, 167-8 Medium Mark A (“Chaser” or “Whippet”), 10, 44-7, 164, 173, 176, 201-2, 219, 223-4, 226-9, 244, 253, 255, 258 Daimler Type A.7.V., 212-3 Renault, 185-6, 279 St. Chamond, 184-5 Schneider, 184-6 Tank No. 505, 90-1; No. 716, 95-6; No. 770, 91-2; No. 783, 92-3; No. 784, 93-4; “Mabel,” 254-5; “Musical Box,” 230-5; “Tiger,” 101; “Wytschaete Express,” 111

Tapper, Captain H. J., 61

Tara Hill, 254

Tarrant triplane, 316

Telegraph Hill, 83, 91

Tel El Ajjul, 99

Tel El Nujeid, 100

Templeux la Fosse, 172

Teneur, 127-8

Thelus, 83

Thetford, 34

Thielt, 197

Thiepval, 57

Thilloy, 172, 257-8

Tigny, 193

Tilloy les Mafflaines, 83-5, 273

Tilly-Capelle, 62

Tortoise Hill, 133

Toutencourt, 200

Trench Warfare Department, 28-9

Trescault, 269

Triangle Farm, 122-3

Tritton, Sir William, 24-6, 31

Trones Wood, 55

Tulloch, Captain T. G., 18, 20-2, 32

Tunnelling Company, 184th, 117

Umbrella Hill, 130-2

Usna Hill, 254

Uzielli, Colonel T. J., D.S.O., M.C., xiv-xv, 61

Vaire Wood, 205, 207

Valenciennes, 81, 144, 284-5

Valturio, 5

Vauban,14

Vaux-Vraucourt, 174, 258

Vaux Andigny, 283

Vaux en Amienois, 205, 209

Velu Wood, 172, 258

Vendhuile, 270

Verdrel, Bois de, 173

Verdun, 184

Vesle, the, 188

Vieille Capelle, 200

Vignacourt, 245

Villemontoire, 193

Villers-au-Flos, 55, 258

Villers-Bretonneux, 169, 201-2, 205, 215, 231, 235

Villers-Cotterets, 189, 191

Villers-Guislain, 143, 146, 151-2, 270

Villers-les-Cagnicourt, 259

Villers-Outreaux, 275

Vimy, 83-5

Vis-en-Artois, 83

Wadi El Nukhabir, 99

Wadi Ghuzze, 100

Wahl, Colonel, 187

Wailly, 71, 172, 175

Wambeke Valley, 111

Wancourt, 86, 91-2, 257

War Office, 9, 22, 25, 29-30, 32, 158-9

Wareham, 162

Warfusée, 205-6, 291

Warren, the, 101

Warvillers, 225

Waterhouse, Lieutenant, 232

Waterloo, 276

Watkins, Lieutenant, 232

Watt, James, 8, 303

Wellington, 14

Wells, H. G., 303

Wembley, 27

West, Captain, V.C., 246-7

West Indian Detachment, 130

Wheeler, Major G. L., 25, 31

Wilson, Major W. G., 25-6, 31-2, 303

Wiltje, 120

Winnipeg Cemetery, 122

Woods, Lieut.-Colonel H. K., 209

Wool Tank Corps Training Centre, xii, 62-4, 66-7, 162-5, 279-81, 289

Worgret Camp, 162

Wright Brothers, 316

Wrisberg, General von, 240

Wurmser, xiv

Wytschaete, 108-11, 119

Ypres, xvi, 14-6, 108-9, 113 _note_, 114, 117-24, 129, 138-9, 153, 166, 242, 261, 304, 306

Ytres, 143

Yunus Trench, 101, 131, 133

Yvrench, 34

Zeebrugge, 14

Zoo Trench, 92

Zowaiid Trench, 101, 131

PRINTED BY HAZELL, WATSON AND VINEY, LD., LONDON AND AYLESBURY, ENGLAND.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Previously a Tank Corps engineer officer in France.

[2] _Ibid._

[3] Previously Brigade Major, 2nd Tank Brigade, in France.

[4] Previously G.S.O.2, Intelligence Headquarters, Tank Corps.

[5] German bayonet tassels.

[6] Certain chapters of this history originally appeared in a privately circulated series of papers entitled _Weekly Tank Notes_.

[7] _How to make Railways Pay for the War_, p. 6. By Roy Horniman.

[8] The arrow was the means of immobilising the knight by forcing him to dismount. Horse armour was never very satisfactory. Regarding the maces, a chronicler writes of their use by the archers at Agincourt: “It seemed as though they were hammering upon anvils.”

[9] The idea of a mobile fortress or battle car is very old: chariots are known to have existed in Assyria as far back as the year 3500 B.C. The Egyptians and Israelites both adopted them from this source. In Biblical times their tactical utility was considerable, as the Book of Judges relates. The Chinese, as early as 1200 B.C., made use of war cars armoured against projectiles.

[10] Much of the following information is taken from an article entitled “The Forerunner of the Tank,” by H. H. Manchester, published in _The American Mechanist_, vol. 49, No. 15.

[11] “The Forerunner of the Tank,” by H. H. Manchester.

[12] For Edgeworth’s invention and the short summary of the footed-wheel, etc., which follows see _The Engineer_, August 10, 1917, and following issues.

[13] _The Engineer, ibid._

[14] The machine constructed by the Trench Warfare Department was the double bogey car designed by the Pedrail Company, of which it will be remembered twelve were originally ordered by the “Landships Committee” and eventually abandoned. The resuscitation of this machine arose as follows:

During the summer of 1915 the Trench Warfare Department approached the Pedrail Company concerning the design of a flame projector with the capacity of 12,000 gallons of petrol. In order to carry this weapon the Pedrail Company suggested their original design, which, though it was not approved of by the “Landships Committee,” was accepted by the Trench Warfare Department. One machine was placed on order and built at Bath by Messrs. Stothert and Pitt, the pedrails being manufactured by the Metropolitan Carriage, Wagon and Finance Co., Ltd., and the frame by Messrs. William Arrol. The machine when built weighed 32 tons unloaded, was equipped with two 100 h.p. Astor engines, and when tested out on Salisbury Plain attained a speed of 15 miles an hour. Only one of these machines was made, as eventually the idea of using mechanically driven flame projectors was abandoned.

[15] This is the first appearance of the word “tank” in the history of the machine. Up to December 1915, the machines now known as “tanks” were, in the experimental stage, called “landships” or “land cruisers,” and also “caterpillar machine-gun destroyers.” On December 24, whilst drafting the above report of the Conference it occurred to Colonel Swinton that the use of the above names would give away a secret which it was important to preserve. After consultation with Lieutenant-Colonel W. Daily-Jones, assistant secretary of the “Committee of Imperial Defence,” the following names were suggested by Colonel Swinton--“cistern,” “reservoir,” and “tank,” all of which were applicable to the steel-like structure of the machines in the earlier stages of manufacture. Because it was less clumsy and monosyllabic the name “tank” was decided on.

[16] On February 8, 1915.

[17] The sponsons of the Mark I were only 10 mm. armour and not proof against A.P. bullets.

[18] Map reference.

[19] The original order was for 100, this was later on increased to 150.

[20] The lighter form of tank was called “medium” because the French, by now, had produced the light Renault tank (see Plate III).

[21] At this time, January 1917, General Swinton’s notes given in