Chapter XXI; to the relentlessly inventive Lieutenant-Colonel L. C. A.

de B. Doucet, O.C. Tank Carrier Units, and so commander of the first supply fleet which ever “set sail” on land, for information to be found in Chapter XXII; to Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. M. Molesworth, M.C., A.D.A.S., Tank Corps, who in spite of the scholastics gave the lie to the tag _Ex nihilo nihil fit_, for parts of Chapter XXIV; to Major R. Spencer, M.C., Liaison Officer, Tank Corps, whose unfailing charm and insight always succeeded in extracting from our brave Allies not only the glamour of great adventures but the detail of truthful occurrences, for the events described in Chapters XXV and XXXVI; to Major F. E. Hotblack, D.S.O., M.C., G.S.O.2, War Office,[4] my friend and companion, who unfailingly would guide _any one_ over wire and shell-hole immune and unscathed, for Chapters XXVIII, XXXI, and XXXIV; to Lieutenant C. B. Arnold, D.S.O., Commander of Whippet Tank “Musical Box,” for the simple and heroic exploit related in Chapter XXX; to Major T. L. Leigh Mallory, D.S.O., O.C. 8th Squadron, R.A.F., whose energy resulted not only in the cementing of a close comradeship between the two supreme mechanical weapons of the age but of a close co-operation which saved many lives in battle, for much of Chapter XXXII; to Lieutenant-Colonel E. J. Carter, O.C. 17th Tank Armoured Car Battalion, who was as great a terror to the German Corps Commanders as Paul Jones was to the Manchester merchantmen and who had the supreme honour to break over the Rhine the first British flag--the colours of the Tank Corps--for Chapter XXXVIII.

It was a great brotherhood, the Tank Corps, and if there were “duds” in it there certainly were not old ones, for the Commander of the Corps, Major-General H. J. Elles, C.B., D.S.O., was under forty, and most of his staff and subordinate commanders were younger than himself. Youth is apt, rightly, to be enthusiastic, and General Elles must frequently have had a trying time in regulating this enthusiasm, canalising it forward against the enemy and backward diplomatically towards our friends.

We of the Tank Corps Headquarters Staff knew what we wanted. Realising the power of the machine which the brains of England had created, we never hesitated over a “No” when we knew that hundreds if not thousands of lives depended on a “Yes.”

Modestly, looking back on the war from a comfortable armchair in London, I see clearly, quite clearly, that we were right. The war has proved it, and our endeavours were not in vain. We were right, and youth generally is right, for it possesses mental elasticity, its brains are plastic and not polarised. The mental athlete is the young man: the Great War, like all other wars, has proved this again and again. We have heard much of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, but they scoffed at the tank just as Wurmser and Alvinzi scoffed at the ragged voltigeurs of the Army of Italy with which the Little Corporal was, in 1796, about to astonish Europe. We have also astonished Europe, we who wandered over the Somme battlefield with dimmed eyes, and over the Flanders swamps with a lump in our throats.

There was Colonel F. Searle, C.B.E., D.S.O., Chief Engineer of the Corps, a true civilian with a well-cut khaki jacket and lion-tamer’s boots. He could not understand the military ritual, and we soldiers seemed never to be able to explain it to him. Throughout the war, in spite of his immense mechanical labours, I verily believe he had only one wish, and this was to erect a guillotine outside a certain holy place. There was Major G. A. Green, M.C., Colonel Searle’s deputy, the father of terrible propositions, the visitor of battlefields, the searcher after shell-holes, the breather of profane words. The Corps owed a lot to Green; a firm believer in seeing things before criticising them, he was a very great asset.

The “King of Grocers,” this was Colonel T.J. Uzielli, D.S.O., M.C., D.A. and Q.M.G. of the Corps, business-like, and an administrator from boot to crown. Suave yet fearless, tactful yet truthful, the Corps owed much to his ability. It was never left in want, his decision gave it what it asked for, his prevision cut down this asking to a minimum. Ably seconded by Major H. C. Atkin-Berry, D.S.O., M.C., and Major R. W. Dundas, M.C., the “A” and “Q” branches of the Tank Corps Staff formed the foundation of the Corps’ efficiency.

On the “G” side there was myself. Under me came Major G. le Q. Martel, D.S.O., M.C., very much R.E. and still more tanks, the man who “sloshed” friend or foe. One day, in March 1918, I was at Fricourt, then none too healthy. Martel walked down the road: “Where are you going?” I shouted. “To Montauban,” he answered. “I hear it is full of Boche,” I replied. “Well, I will go and see,” said Martel, and off he moved eastwards. There was Major F. E. Hotblack, D.S.O., M.C., lover of beauty and battles, a mixture of Abelard and Marshal Ney. Were Ninon de l’Enclos alive he would have been at her elbow; as she is dust, he, instead, collected “troddels”[5] off dead Germans--a somewhat remarkable character. As G.S.O.2 Training, Major H. Boyd-Rochfort, D.S.O., M.C., from West Meath, his enthusiasm for tanks nearly wrecked a famous corps; yet Boyd only smiled, and his smile somehow always reminded one of Peter Kelly’s whisky, there was a handshake or a fight in it. The two G.S.O.s3 were Captain the Hon. E. Charteris and Captain I. M. Stewart, M.C. Charteris was the “_Arbiter Elegantiarum_” of our Headquarters. He kept the Corps’ records, as already stated, and without these it would scarcely have been possible to write this history. He was our _maître d’hôtel_; he gave us beach nut bacon and honey for breakfast, kept his weather eye open for a one-armed man, elaborated menus which rivalled those of Trimalchio, and gave sparkle to us all by the ripple of his wit. Lastly, Ian Stewart of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. In kilts, no girl between Hekla and Erebus has ever been known to resist him; but his efforts, whilst in the Tank Corps, did not lie in conquering hearts but in perpetually worrying my unfortunate self to become party to his own suicide--for nothing would keep him from the battlefield.

The first three brigadiers of the Corps were all remarkable men. Brigadier-General C. D’A. B. S. Baker-Carr, C.M.G., D.S.O., commanding the 1st Tank Brigade, started the war as a gentleman chauffeur, a most cheery companion, the Murat of the Corps, ever ready for a battle or a game. I remember him at Montenescourt, during the battle of Arras 1917, fighting with the telephone, at Ypres fighting with the mud, at Cambrai fighting with a comfortable, vacant, rotund little man, but ever cheerful and prepared to meet you with a smile and a glass of old brandy. Commanding the 2nd Tank Brigade was Brigadier-General A. Courage, D.S.O., M.C. He possessed only half a jaw, having lost the rest at Ypres; yet at conferences he was a host in himself, and what a “pow-wow” must have been like before the Boche bullet hit him is not even to be found in the works of the great Munchausen. No detail escaped his eye, no trouble was too great, and no fatigue sufficient to suggest a pause. The successes of Hamel and Moreuil in 1918 were due to his energy, and on these successes was the battle of Amiens founded. The last of the original Brigadiers was Brigadier-General J. Hardress-Lloyd, D.S.O., commanding the 3rd Tank Brigade. He started the war as a stowaway. This resulted in no one ever discovering what his substantive rank was; by degrees a myth as to his origin was cultivated by innumerable “A” clerks both in France and England; these lived and throve on this mystery, which no doubt will at a distant date be elucidated by some future Lemprière. Hardress-Lloyd was one of the main causes of the battle of Cambrai. He, I believe, introduced the idea to General Sir Julian Byng, this away back in August 1917. Hardress-Lloyd was a man of big ideas and always kept a good table and a fine stable--in fact, a _beau sabreur_. I will leave Hardress at that.

Above are to be sought the real foundations of the Corps’ efficiency under its gallant Commander, Major-General H. J. Elles, C.B., D.S.O., who endowed it with that high moral, that fine _esprit de corps_ and jaunty _esprit de cocarde_ which impelled it from one success to another. These foundations no future historian is likely to be so intimately acquainted with as I--and now for the story.[6]

The history itself is purposely uncritical, because any criticism which might have been included is so similar to that directed against the introducers of the locomotive and the motor-car that it would be but a repetition, tedious enough to the reader, were it here repeated.

Human opinion is conservative by instinct, and what to mankind is most heterodox is that which is most novel: this is a truism in war as it is in politics or religion. It took 1000 years for gunpowder to transform war. In 1590, a certain Sir John Smythe wrote a learned work: “Certain discourses concerning the forms and effects of divers sorts of weapons, and other very important matters militarie, greatlie mistaken by divers of our men of warre in these daies; and chiefly, of the Mosquet, the Caliver, and the Long-bow; as also of the great sufficiencie, excellencie and wonderful effects of Archers,” in which he extols an obsolete weapon and decries a more modern one--the arquebus. “For the reactionaries of his time George Stephenson with his locomotive was the original villan of the piece; he was received with unbridled abuse and persecution. Most of Stephenson’s time was spent in fighting fools.”[7] At the beginning of the present century nearly every English country gentleman swore that nothing would ever induce him to exchange his carriage for a motor-car--yet the locomotive and the motor-car have triumphed, and triumphed so completely that all that their inventors claimed for them appears to-day as hostile criticism against their accomplishments.

So with the tank, it has come not only to stay but to revolutionise, and I for one, enthusiastic as I am, do not for a minute doubt that my wildest dreams about its future will not only be realised but surpassed, and that from its clumsy endeavours in the Great War will arise a completely new direction in the art of warfare itself.

That the Tank had, and still has, many doubters, many open critics, is true enough; but there is no disparagement in this, rather is it a compliment, for the masses of mankind are myopic, and had they accepted it with acclaim how difficult would it have been for it even to come, let alone stay and grow.

The criticism directed against this greatest military invention of the war was the stone upon which its progress was whetted. Without criticism we might still have Big Willie, but we enthusiasts determined that not only would we break down this criticism by means of the machine itself, but that we would render our very machine ridiculous by machines of a better type, and it is ridicule which kills. So we proceeded, and as type followed type, victory followed victory. Then our critics tacked and veered: it was not the tank they objected to but our opinions regarding it; they were overstatements; why, we should soon be claiming for it powers to boil their morning tea and shave them whilst still in bed. Why not? If such acts are required, a tank can be built to accomplish them, because the tank possesses power and energy, and energy is the motive force of all things.

It is just this point that the critics missed; their minds being controlled by the conventions of the day. They could not see that if the horse-power in a man is _x_, that the circumference of his activities is a circle with _x_ as its radius. They could not see that if the horse-power of a machine is 100_x_; its circumference will be vastly greater than that of man’s; neither could they see that whilst in man _x_ is constant, provided the man is supplied regularly with beef, bread and beer, in a machine _x_ may be increased almost indefinitely, and that if a circle with _n_ as its circumference will not embrace the problem, probably all that is necessary is to add more _x_’s to its radius. Indeed, the science of mechanics is simplicity itself when compared with that of psychology, and as in war mechanics grow so will psychology, in comparison, dwindle, until perhaps we may see in armies as complete a change from hand-weapons to machine-weapons as we have seen in our workshops from hand-tools to machine-tools, and the economy will be as proportionate.

Before the Great War I was a believer in conscription and in the Nation in Arms; I was an 1870 soldier. My sojourn in the Tank Corps has dissipated these ideas. Today I am a believer in war mechanics, that is, in a mechanical army which requires few men and powerful machines. Equally am I a disbeliever in what a venerable acquaintance, old in ideas rather than years, said to me on the afternoon of November 11th, 1918. These are his words, and I repeat them as he exclaimed them: “Thank God we can now get back to real soldiering!”

J. F. C. F.

LANGHAM HOTEL, LONDON, W.1. _November 20, 1919._

CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE I. THE ORIGINS OF THE TANK 1 II. THE INVENTION OF THE LANDSHIP 18 III. MECHANICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TANKS 35 IV. THE MARK I TANK AND ITS TACTICS 49 V. THE BATTLES OF THE SOMME AND ANCRE 54 VI. THE GROWTH OF THE TANK CORPS ORGANISATION 60 VII. TANK “ESPRIT DE CORPS” 68 VIII. TANK TACTICS 73 IX. THE BATTLE OF ARRAS 81 X. TANK BATTLE RECORDS 90 XI. THE SECOND BATTLE OF GAZA 98 XII. STAFF WORK AND BATTLE PREPARATION 103 XIII. THE BATTLE OF MESSINES 108 XIV. A TACTICAL APPRECIATION 113 XV. THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES 117 XVI. TANK MECHANICAL ENGINEERING 125 XVII. THE THIRD BATTLE OF GAZA 130 XVIII. ORIGINS OF THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI 135 XIX. THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI 140 XX. AN INFANTRY APPRECIATION OF TANKS 154 XXI. THE TANK CORPS TRAINING CENTRE 159 XXII. THE TANK SUPPLY COMPANIES 166 XXIII. THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME 172 XXIV. TANK SIGNALLING ORGANISATION 178 XXV. THE FRENCH TANK CORPS 184 XXVI. PREPARATIONS FOR THE GREAT OFFENSIVE 199 XXVII. THE BATTLES OF HAMEL AND MOREUIL 204 XXVIII. GERMAN TANK OPERATIONS 212 XXIX. THE BATTLE OF AMIENS 217 XXX. THE FIGHT OF A WHIPPET TANK 230 XXXI. GERMAN APPRECIATION OF BRITISH TANKS 236 XXXII. AEROPLANE CO-OPERATION WITH TANKS 242 XXXIII. THE BATTLE OF BAPAUME AND THE SECOND BATTLE OF ARRAS 250 XXXIV. GERMAN ANTI-TANK TACTICS 260 XXXV. THE BATTLES OF EPEHY AND CAMBRAI--ST. QUENTIN 266 XXXVI. THE U.S.A. TANK CORPS 277 XXXVII. THE BATTLES OF THE SELLE AND MAUBEUGE 283 XXXVIII. THE 17TH TANK ARMOURED CAR BATTALION 289 XXXIX. A RETROSPECT OF WHAT TANKS HAVE ACCOMPLISHED 297 XL. A FORECAST OF WHAT TANKS MAY DO 308 INDEX 323

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

PLATES

BIG WILLIE, MOTHER OR CENTIPEDE, ORIGINAL MARK I TANK _Frontispiece_

PLATE FACING PAGE I. LITTLE WILLIE AND MARK IV TANK (FEMALE) 26 II. GROUND OPERATED OVER BY TANKS DURING THE BATTLE OF MESSINES, SHOWING PRELIMINARY BOMBARDMENT ON JUNE 5, 1917: AND GROUND OPERATED OVER BY TANKS IN AUGUST 1917, DURING THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES 122 III. MEDIUM MARK “A” TANK (WHIPPET) 176 IV. FRENCH SCHNEIDER TANK AND FRENCH ST. CHAMOND TANK 186 V. MARK V TANK (MALE) 204 VI. FRENCH RENAULT TANK AND GERMAN TANK 214 VII. GUN CARRIER AND MARK V STAR TANK (FEMALE) 220

DIAGRAMS

1. SCOTTISH WAR CART, 1456 3 2. VALTURIO’S WAR CHARIOT, 1472 5 3. HOLZSCHUHER’S BATTLE CAR, 1558 6 4. SIMON STEVIN’S LANDSHIP, 1599 7 5. THE APPLEGARTH TRACTOR, 1886 10 6 and 6A. THE BATTER TRACTOR, 1888 12 and 13 7 to 15. TANK TACTICS 75 and 77 16. GERMAN ARTILLERY TACTICS 115

MAPS

I. THE BATTLE OF ARRAS, APRIL 9, 1917 84 II. THE SECOND BATTLE OF GAZA, APRIL 17, 1917 100 III. THE BATTLE OF MESSINES, JUNE 7, 1917 110 IV. THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES, JULY 31, 1917 120 V. THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI, NOVEMBER 20, 1917 146 VI. THE BATTLE OF SOISSONS, JULY 18, 1918 192 VII. THE BATTLE OF HAMEL, JULY 4, 1918 206 VIII. THE BATTLE OF MOREUIL, JULY 23, 1918 208 IX. THE BATTLE OF AMIENS, AUGUST 8, 1918 222 X. GENERAL MAP End of Volume

TANKS IN THE GREAT WAR