m. In attacking a hill position, when the fire is well observed, the

distance of this point from the position will be considerably greater.

“But, no matter where the actual location of this point may be, skillful infantry will start its assault very close to the point fixed by the regulations, and never beyond it, so as to avoid interfering with the fire of its artillery. Under such circumstances, it may be a skillful move for a defender who is still full of fight, to decrease the distance which separates him from the hostile infantry, in order that, by so doing, he may escape from the hostile artillery fire and from the smoke which obscures his vision. If he finds cover farther to the front, so much the better, for he will then have that much of an advantage over the attacker.”

The weakness of most defensive positions lies in the danger of a sudden attack being directed against a flank. The assailant will endeavor to avoid making an attack against the front of a position prepared for defense, when such an attack has small chances of succeeding, and seek the decision by attacking a flank, where conditions are, to a certain extent at least, equalized. The danger of a flank attack increases with the length of the defensive line. It is by no means a good move to prolong the threatened wing (French VIth Army Corps at St. Privat) for the purpose of warding off an envelopment. The power of extension is bound to reach a limit sooner or later, and the wing attacked will then be so weak and attenuated that it will not be capable of offering serious resistance.

To ward off an employment by refusing a flank likewise promises little success. The enemy’s superiority of fire will make itself felt, first of all, at the salient thus formed (see p. 357 supra), and his convergent artillery and infantry fire, which may even enfilade parts of the line, will paralyze all tactical movements of the defender at this point.

By prolonging the line and by refusing a flank, we only postpone the decision a little while, but cannot effectively cope with an envelopment. This must be accomplished in a different manner.

The best scheme would be to flank the enemy’s enveloping force by posting an echelon in a suitable position, or to bring about a decision by employing the reserve offensively. However, for carrying out these measures, more time is required than for merely refusing a flank. Time may be gained by making an extensive reconnaissance on the flanks with strong detachments, and by occupying supporting points lying on the flanks, which the enemy would have to take before he could think of attacking the main position.

* * * * *

In employing machine guns in defense, it should be borne in mind that they are unsuited for carrying on protracted fire fights, and that the mobility of the machine gun batteries cannot be utilized when, from the very start, they are assigned a section to defend.

In general, it will be advisable in defense to keep the machine guns at first with the reserve, and to employ them, when necessary, to reinforce the defensive line at threatened points, to prevent envelopment, to repulse an assault, or to participate in an offensive movement.

This does not preclude their coming into action at the very opening of an engagement, for instance, where it is necessary to command important avenues of approach.

When a withdrawal under cover is assured, it will also be possible to post machine gun batteries in such a manner, in front or on a flank of the main position, that they can bring a sudden fire to bear on the area in which the opponent will in all probability post his artillery.

Machine gun fire may sometimes be employed to sweep defiladed spaces in front of the defensive line.

* * * * *

If the direction of the hostile attack is known, the occupation of the position should not be longer deferred. It is always risky to occupy the position in the face of hostile batteries, especially as the fire of the defender’s guns is masked by the skirmishers moving forward. If the defender can manage to give the attacker the impression that the position is still unoccupied, perhaps thereby inducing him to advance less cautiously, and then surprise him with fire, a depressing moral effect far exceeding the material success may be counted upon.[458] The firing line should be made so strong that the fire fight will have a chance of succeeding. A gradual launching of the troops should not be decided upon, as the losses are comparatively insignificant in defense, and as it is important to develop a heavy fire so as to make it difficult for the enemy to gain the fire superiority. The principles governing the moment for opening fire have already been discussed (pp. 147 and 154 supra).

[458] Engagement at Modder River, on November 28th, 1899. Engagement at Colenso, on December 15th, 1899.

The enemy must be prevented from gaining the superiority of fire. This should be accomplished by concentrating the fire from a large number of rifles upon the parts of the enemy’s force in motion. The defender should make the most of the advantage which his preparedness gives him. The attacker’s firing line with its supports forms the target. A departure from this rule is in order, in the case of a French assailant, as the latter places the bulk of his force in the reserves and not in the firing line. It will frequently be practicable for the defender to discontinue his fire and to take cover when the assailant lies down and fires; but, while under cover, everything should be prepared for resuming the fire when the enemy rises to continue his advance (p. 156 supra).

If it has been found impossible to prevent the enemy from reaching the extreme limit of short ranges, the commander must decide whether to continue the fight until a decision is reached, or whether to break off the action.

When the opponent has entered the zone of short ranges, it will be too late for the defender to retire, unless the terrain in rear of the position is especially favorable, or other troops can take a hand in the fight to cover the withdrawal. The onrushing assailant is received with accelerated fire; the defender fixes bayonets, determined to risk a fight at close quarters. “The defender who does not fix bayonets is already casting furtive glances towards the best line of retreat.”

While repulsing an assault, it would be a good plan for the defender to step upon the rear wall of the trench so that the latter would become an obstacle for the attacker. But this scheme can only be employed when the troops are completely in hand.

While the fire of the defender is increased to the utmost intensity by the entrance into the fight of all the supports, the general reserve, which now takes a hand in the fight, seeks to bring about the decision by advancing to attack. On arriving close enough to assault, the attack reaches its most critical stage, and even a counter-attack made by a comparatively small force may turn the scale in favor of the defense.

5. THE COUNTER-ATTACK.[459]

[459] See F.C. V. H. _Zum Studium der Taktik_, p. 418 et seq.

In large engagements, the great power of resistance possessed by well posted bodies of troops will often determine the commander of the force on the defensive to contain the enemy at one point with a strong defensive position, while at the same time assuming the offensive at another. (This was planned, but not carried out, at Dresden, in 1813, and at Troyes, early in February, 1814; carried out with success, in Lee’s operations around Richmond, during the latter part of June, 1862, and on the Lisaine in 1871; and miscarried on the Shaho, because Kuropatkin made his decision dependent upon reports in regard to the position of hostile reserves, which were non-existent in reality). Whether the offensive should be assumed while the enemy is still in the act of deploying,[460] or whether one must be satisfied with assuming the offensive at the last moment, is best determined by the relative strength of the opposing forces. When battle-fronts are short this may still be advantageous, but when the lines are long, a counter-attack can affect only a small part of the assailant’s line, while the major portion thereof successfully pushes the attack home. Then the position and the day will be lost anyway, in spite of a local success.

[460] Roszbach, 1758; Austerlitz. 1805 (_Schlachterfolg_, p. 28); Salamanca, 1812.

The initial measures taken assure freedom of action to the defense, but the commander must not await exhaustive messages. Prompt action is necessary, either for throwing back the advanced troops of the assailant, or for striking a blow at the hostile flank. In the latter case, it is an advantage if only weak reserves are struck, but hostile forces making a turning movement may also be encountered, and the commander will have to decide whether to deploy quickly and assail the enemy, or whether to take his chances in a rencontre.[461]

[461] The advance of Memerby’s Brigade during the battle of Noisseville. KUNZ, _Noisseville_, p. 41.

Even a success gained at a tactically unfavorable point will make itself felt, if it is won early enough and if the most is made of it. As a rule, tactical considerations determine where the commander should launch his reserves for the counter-attack.

The counter-attack here meant is an act of the commander of the whole force; in bodies of troops acting as part of a larger force and in numerically inferior forces, the warding off of the flank attack remains almost always the only remedy.

“The general reserve should be posted at the point from which it can best move forward, counter to the probable direction of the hostile attack, while, at the same time, making the most of the features of the ground. When only one flank is secure, the general reserve is, as a rule, placed in echelon in rear of the unprotected wing. When both flanks are in the air, nothing remains but to place sufficient reserves in readiness in rear of one flank to ward off a hostile envelopment, while retaining as strong a force as possible in rear of the other for the purpose of bringing about the decision. The echeloned general reserve must have room for development, whether this be for warding off a hostile envelopment or for making a counter-attack.” (Par. 410 German I. D. R.).

The general reserve should be posted in rear of the center of the position only when the front is short and the situation is not as yet cleared up. In this position it will frequently be exposed to the fire directed against the first line, and its entry into action will usually involve a loss of time. When adequate information is available of the measures taken by the opponent, or the nature of the ground compels him to direct his decisive attack against a wing, this alone determines the position of the general reserve.

Since the counter-attack is to take the enemy by surprise, the position of the general reserve must be concealed, and precautions must be taken to keep hostile patrols in the dark, as long as possible, in regard to its actual location. The ground over which the general reserve is to advance should be free from obstacles, so that the counter-attack can be made rapidly and with uniformity.

Since the assailant will almost invariably endeavor to direct his attack against a flank, the general reserve of the defender should be posted at such a distance in rear of the threatened wing that the troops composing it will be sheltered to some extent from hostile fire. In order that the fully deployed general reserve, when making a counter-attack, may clear with its inner flank the outer flank of the line holding the position, and not get into the latter’s zone of fire, a sufficient interval must be left between the two. This interval should increase with the size of the reserve. As a rule, the counter-attack should be launched so as to produce the decision when the assailant has arrived within assaulting distance of the defender. This requires that the general reserve and the line holding the position be separated by an interval of at least 200 m. In addition, the counter-attack must be so made that it will actually strike the assailant in flank; and this it cannot do unless the general reserve is posted sufficiently far to a flank. The center of the reserve should be launched so as to strike not only the flank of the enemy’s firing line, but that of his supports as well. If the general reserve is posted too near the first line, there is danger of it being enveloped together with the first line, and committed to purely defensive action (refusing a flank). On the other hand, if it is posted too far to a flank, its timely entry into action is not absolutely assured; the assailant may turn against it, cut it off from the defensive position, and defeat it in detail. The farther the general reserve is off to a flank, the more effectively will it strike the enemy in flank, but it will be correspondingly more difficult to conceal it. The necessity of pushing the general reserve far to a flank decreases, as the scope of the attacker’s envelopment of the defensive line increases. It may frequently be to the defender’s advantage to induce the assailant to make a far-reaching envelopment, provided the line defending the position is not placed in an unfavorable tactical situation by so doing. Since the attacker will probably have detachments echeloned in rear of his flank, the troops entrusted with the counter-attack must similarly have an echelon in rear of their exposed flank in order to protect themselves against a flank attack.

It is impossible to lay down a fixed, normal strength for the reserve. This depends upon the strength of the position, and the degree of resistance the intrenchments are capable of rendering; but, in any case, the force intended for local defense should be strong enough to compel the enemy to deploy completely, and prevent his carrying the defenses before the counter-attack is made. Large quantities of ammunition and intrenchments capable of rendering effective resistance must compensate for the shortage of men in warding off the enemy, in order that the general reserve may be made as strong as possible. The question, as to how thinly the position must be occupied, and how strong the general reserve may be made, can only be answered in each particular case. If the attack made by the general reserve is to produce any effect, it must not be undertaken with too small a force, as it could then be checked by weak detachments.

While the general reserve lies in waiting for the enemy, it may either--

1. Remain in a preparatory position, in one or more groups, and deploy during its forward movement; or

2. Take up the attack formation from the start.

The first method has the advantage, when the space required is small, of permitting the general reserve to be concealed, and allows changes to be made in the direction of march and in the dispositions.

The second, although it enables the reserve to advance promptly to the counter-attack, is rarely suitable, as the reserve in combat formation is not so easily concealed, as it is more difficult to make changes in the dispositions and the direction of march, and as this formation seems only practicable for making an advance in one direction--straight to the front.

It is of the utmost importance to know when the counter-attack should be launched. In warding off the enemy by purely frontal action, no special disadvantages result from prematurely launching the general reserve; if it enters the action too late, it will still be able to throw back the assailant who has penetrated into the position. With the counter-attack it is different; it must take place when the opponent is under the most effective fire at short range. If the counter-attack is made prematurely, especially when the reserves and flank echelons of the attacker have not as yet been used up, the latter, while, indeed, exposed to the most violent fire of the defender, will be able to take counter-measures. In that case, two entirely independent actions may result, and the counter-attack made by the general reserve may be checked by the retained echelons of the attacker and repulsed by their fire. When launched prematurely, the counter-attack will not always repulse the hostile attack; and when launched too late, it may perhaps still bring about the decision, or avert a defeat, but it will never produce decisive results.

A counter-attack made after the attacker has penetrated into the position, and while he is endeavoring to dislodge the garrisons of such supporting points as still offer resistance, reckons with the fact that the hitherto victorious assailant, exhausted and in confusion, will not be a match for a well aimed blow delivered by a considerable number of troops. However, a defender will scarcely contemplate such an employment of his general reserve; for him the important thing is to repulse the attack in front of and not within the position. Although military history presents comparatively numerous instances of such _retours offensifs_, this may be explained by the fact that the counter-attack was launched too late. The weakness of the assailant is but momentary, and the most must be made of this by advancing against him promptly by the shortest line. But if the assailant has had time to re-form and to bring up his batteries, it will usually be too late to make a counter-attack.

Aymard’s Division (French), which had penetrated into =Servigny= under cover of darkness, but had made no attempt to occupy the town systematically or to re-form the disordered troops, was driven out again by a counter-attack made by only eleven Prussian companies.[462]

[462] KUNZ, _Noisseville_, p. 52. _Das Wald- und Ortsgefecht_, p. 181.

The numerous counter-attacks made by the French during the battle of =Wörth= (for example the counter-attack made by Maire’s Brigade) pushed too far forward into the zone of the German artillery fire, and did not have the expected success. The well-led French counter-attack made by about 1200 men from the south edge of the =Niederwald=, was discontinued at a timely moment.[463] The well-directed counter-attack made by the 1st Turco Regiment at =Wörth=, after the capture of =Elsaszhausen=, was successful and is especially instructive.[464] The attack made by General de Sonis for the purpose of retaking =Loigny= was undertaken too late and with inadequate forces.[465] The same is true of the counter-attack made by the 3rd Bavarian Division on =Zella= (4th July, 1866).

[463] KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, XIII, pp. 75 and 159.

[464] _Ibid._, XVI, p. 187, et seq.

[465] HÖNIG, _Volkskrieg_, IV, p. 124.

The French regulations recommend a unique procedure, which may be successful when employed against an opponent not prepared to meet it. “Under certain circumstances, counter-attacks may be combined with retreat maneuvers. The advanced troops should bring the enemy to a standstill with their fire and compel him to deploy. Then they should break off the action without becoming involved in a fight at close quarters. In this manner, the attacker is drawn onto terrain reconnoitered beforehand, where fresh troops, hidden up to the last moment, attack him impetuously under favorable conditions at a time when he is tired and worn out by a long movement.”

The most difficult thing about a counter-attack is to seize the right moment for launching it. As it is impossible to foretell how long it will take the enemy to arrive within assaulting distance, no rule can be laid down as to the proper moment for launching the counter-attack. The best plan would be to screen the movements of the reserve, and, as the attacking troops approach, to bring it gradually up to the point from which it is to move forward. A commander requires wide practical experience and great force of character to judge the situation calmly and dispassionately, while fully aware that launching the counter-attack either too soon or too late may prejudice the result. There is always danger that the suggestions which reach him from various quarters may cause him to take half-measures. The stronger the general reserve and the weaker the force holding the defenses, the more numerous and urgent will be the requests for support; and he will not find it easy to resist the temptation to grant these requests and accordingly weaken the general reserve, which is intended for offensive action.

We must now consider the question as to whether the counter-attack should rely on fire action alone, or should resort to the bayonet as well. The unexpected advance of a large body of troops against a flank of the enemy will rarely fail to produce an effect. If the enemy does not yield to fire, it is obvious that an assault will have to be made. A counter-attack made unexpectedly is, as a rule, successful at the start; but, if its commander follows up this initial success when not supported by strong reserves, a reverse may take place resulting in the defeat of the defender’s entire force.

A counter-attack made by three companies (9th, 10th, and 11th) of the 3rd Bavarian Infantry Regiment brought relief to the two batteries which had gone into action near =Goury= (battle of =Loigny=). The Ist and IInd Battalions, 3rd Infantry, the Ist and IInd Battalions, 12th Infantry, and the 7th Jäger-Battalion joined in this attack, and when the batteries finally followed, the force succeeded in throwing back the French battalions immediately opposing it. The twenty-one companies now made the mistake of attacking =Ecuillon=, which they occupied. The attacking force had traversed about 2000 m., and as there were no reserves and flank echelons, the Bavarians were obliged to give way before an assault made by seven fresh battalions against their unprotected left flank. The mistake of pushing forward too far, and the lack of supports in rear of the exposed flank, was bound to exact a penalty, as soon as the French were in a position to advance on their own account.[466]

[466] HÖNIG, _Volkskrieg_, IV, p. 43.

A very instructive episode occurred on August 26th, 1904, near =Tsinortun=. Toward noon the Japanese Guard and the 10th Division advanced through fields of tall kaoliang for the purpose of enveloping the right wing of the IIIrd Siberian Army Corps. The commanding general, Lieutenant-General Iwanov, directed the reserve (apparently parts of the 3rd East-Siberian Rifle Division) to make a counter-attack against the left flank of the Japanese. The Russian counter-attack was taken in flank by a brigade of the Guard, which followed in rear of the Japanese attacking force, and had to retire. The decision was then brought about by the counter-attack made by the 140th Infantry, which unexpectedly appeared on the left flank of the Japanese. The engagement at Tsinortun is moreover of special interest as regards the Japanese method of attack.[467]

[467] LÖFFLER, _Allgemeine Lage_, I, pp. 68 and 69. V. HOEN, _Der russisch-japanische Krieg_, in _Organ des militär-wissenschaftlichen Vereins_, p. 166. NIESSEL, _Enseignements tactiques_, p. 158.

So far we have only considered the counter-attack made against the flank of an attacker, and against the front of an enemy who has victoriously penetrated into a position. The success of a counter-attack against the enemy’s flank depends primarily on moral factors; besides, after protracted fighting, supports and reserves in rear of the flank are frequently lacking, so that the attacker cannot quickly form an adequate firing front towards a flank.[468]

[468] Examples of successful counter-attacks against an enemy’s flank: Battle of Loigny, on December 2nd, 1870; the counter-attack made by 21 companies of the 4th Brigade at Goury (HÖNIG, _Volkskrieg_, IV, p. 55), and that made by the Ist Battalion, 10th Infantry, and the Ist and IIIrd Battalions, 13th Infantry, at Goury (_ibid._, p. 41); the flank attack made by Kottwitz’ Brigade (_ibid._, p. 82, and p. 220 supra); the flank attack made by the garrison of Fougeu on the attacking columns of General Sonis: the brilliant flank attack made by the IIIrd Battalion, 90th Infantry, during the battle of Orleans, on December 4th, 1870 (KUNZ, _Orleans_, p. 148); and the counter-attack made by General Bataille on the Stiring Wald during the battle of Spicheren. The last-named counter-attack is a good model, both as regards conception and execution. (_Wald- und Ortsgefecht_, pp. 93 and 96).

Theoretically, a frontal counter-attack, _i.e._, one made straight to the front from a position, while the assailant is advancing to the assault on a broad front, ought to offer the least chances of success, but military history proves the contrary in those cases where the defender awaited the proper moment. This moment arrives when the defender clearly perceives that the enormous losses suffered by the attacker begin to impair the morale of his remaining men. This becomes apparent through a slackening in the attack, through an uncertainty of movement, and, finally, through hesitation, the latter being usually preceded by wavering.[469]

[469] “The defender will only be able to make a frontal counter-attack from his position when he has repulsed the assault and has made the most of fire action, or when it is important to drive away the enemy who has been brought to a standstill in front of the defender’s position. A premature counter-attack may lead to the loss of the position.” (Par. 414 German I. D. R.).

The moral effect of a determined counter-attack with cold steel during the closing moments of an attack will undoubtedly be great. Meckel says[470]: “Here likewise, it is of the greatest importance to bring up the supports promptly, so as to increase the volume of fire to the utmost and to produce that superiority which quite naturally resolves itself into an offensive movement. The defender who does not fix bayonets is already casting furtive glances towards the best line of retreat.”

[470] _Lehre von der Truppenführung_.

This “superiority” caused the French to advance from the wood of =Elsaszhausen= against the skirmishers of the XIth Army Corps appearing at the northern edge of the =Niederwald=. The success they met with at the start induced the French to continue their advance, and when a reverse occurred subsequently, the wood of Elsaszhausen was taken by the Hessians without difficulty.[471]

[471] KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, XIII, p. 121, et seq.

Although such counter-attacks, directed against the strong firing line of the attacker and unsupported by the defender’s fire, were frequently successful in war, this was due to the moral effect produced on the attacker by the sudden and unexpected onset of a long line of infantry. Troops thus unexpectedly attacked, and, in addition, deprived of the support of their own artillery, almost invariably lost their heads. However, if the attacker is prepared for such an event, remains cool, meets the counter-attack of the defender with a powerful fire at short ranges, and brings up his supports, in order to follow up the effect of his fire with an offensive movement, there can be no doubt as to the result.[472]

[472] The battles of Soor and Kesselsdorf are interesting examples of this. (_Kriege Friedrichs des Groszen_, II, pp. 75 and 234). In both cases the defender’s frontal counter-attack forced the assailant to face about; but at Soor a second line of infantry, and at Kesselsdorf a charge made by the Bonin Dragoons finally turned the scale in favor of the assailant.

Such a counter-attack, however, is only possible when the defender still has strong, intact reserves at his disposal, which he has kept in readiness in the closest proximity to the firing line until the decisive moment. An organization acting as part of a larger force, and whose flanks are secure, as a rule has no choice but to make a frontal counter-attack, unless offensive action is to be dispensed with altogether.

Short frontal counter-attacks from a position were made successfully by the British in the battles at the opening of the 19th Century. (In these counter-attacks, the British fired a volley and then advanced to the assault). Such successful counter-attacks were made during the battles of =Vimiero=, =Maida=, =Busaco=, and especially =Waterloo=.[473]

[473] At Waterloo, the counter-attack made by Picton’s Division and the British Guards repulsed the French attack. VON OLLECH, _Feldzug von 1815_, pp. 230 and 247. See also note p. 151 supra.

At =Beaumont=, the 66th Infantry made a counter-attack when the French had approached within 40 m. The 66th had already begun to waver, here and there, when its energetic and unexpected advance caused the French to retire.[474]

[474] HOPFFGARTEN-HEIDLER, _Beaumont_, p. 53.

In the battles of the =Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78=, frontal counter-attacks were successfully made in several instances.

In the engagement at =Kazeljevo= (5th September, 1877), the frontal counter-attack made by the Russians, who were numerically far inferior, saved them from defeat, as all their lines of retreat were obstructed by their trains, which had gone astray.[475]

[475] SPRINGER, _Der russisch-türkische Krieg_, III, p. 171.

The most instructive fight in this connection is the engagement of =Gorni Bugarov= (1st January, 1878). General Weljaminov’s detachment, which consisted of the Pensa and the Tambov Infantry Regiments, occupied a flank position on the southern foothills of the Balkans, on the road leading from =Orchanie= to =Sofia=. The Russians allowed the Turks to approach to very short range before they opened fire, which was immediately followed by a counter-attack all along the line. This seems to have been the result of the initiative of the several battalion commanders. The Turks (15 battalions) faced about and retired on Sofia. The Russian infantry was led back to its first position.[476]

[476] _Ibid._, VII, p. 134.

On the same day, the attack made by the Preobrajenski Regiment of the Russian Guard at =Tashkessen= was repulsed by the frontal counter-attack made by a weak force of Turkish infantry.[477]

[477] BAKER-PASHA, _War in Bulgaria_, II, p. 57.

During the Russo-Japanese war such frontal counter-attacks were very frequently made. When undertaken with inadequate numbers, they were invariably repulsed by the fire of the Japanese, especially when the latter found cover in previously constructed trenches.

Provisions of Various Regulations.

=Austria-Hungary.= If a counter-attack is contemplated, the commander should resist every temptation to employ parts of the general reserve for other purposes than for carrying out that attack. In this case, the general reserve should be placed in readiness so that, while the opponent advances within the decisive zone, it can quickly deploy and carry out the counter-attack with determination by directing a powerful fire against the flank of the enemy. Freedom of movement on one flank is absolutely essential to the execution of the counter-attack. Local frontal counter-attacks are to be avoided; the enemy is to be annihilated by fire.

When it is not contemplated to make a counter-attack with the general reserve, the latter is to be employed either for directly reinforcing the troops in one of the sections, or for engaging the hostile troops making an enveloping attack on the position.

=France.= The regulations make a distinction between counter-attack (_contre attaque_) and offensive return (_retour offensif_). A counter-attack is made by the reserve before the enemy penetrates into the energetically defended supporting points. In contrast herewith, every attempt to retake a captured position is called an offensive return.

A counter-attack with troops of the second line is to be made as soon as the assailant presses the fighting line too closely. A powerful and suddenly executed counter-attack, supported by the fire of the first line, will, at the very least, check the enemy until the fighting line has had time to recover.

Occasionally, it may be advantageous not to await the crisis, but to force the assailant to deploy by directing a heavy fire upon him, then to break off the action, inducing the enemy to press on, in order to draw him, by this means, onto previously selected and reconnoitered terrain, where he is suddenly attacked in flank by fresh troops. Military history shows that this very procedure has frequently been successful. “If the attacker presses forward too hastily and if he threatens to carry the defender’s position, fresh troops, which have been assembled in a place sheltered from view, attack him energetically, while the troops already engaged increase the intensity of their fire. This powerful and energetic counter-attack produces confusion in the enemy’s ranks and compels him to retire, or at least to discontinue his forward movement until he has had time to recover.”

“The same activity, the same determination to maneuver, must prevail everywhere. Every mistake and every weakness of the enemy must be quickly perceived and promptly utilized. The troops in the counter-attack should move forward without hesitation and regardless of the cost When such a forward movement has to be discontinued, the commander must decide where it shall cease. The efforts of all should be directed toward one object, that of tiring and demoralizing the enemy by constant counter-attacks, until the moment arrives when the commander must order the offensive to be assumed.”

=England.= The counter-attack may be made either by the garrison of the firing trenches, as a frontal counter movement, or by the general reserve, accompanied by artillery and cavalry, as a decisive counter-attack. The moment when the attacker has used up his reserves and is about to assault is generally considered as the most propitious for making the counter-attack.

=Japan.= The Japanese entertain the same views as the Germans. “The better the position, the location and construction of the intrenchments, and the distribution of troops, the greater the number of men that can be saved in garrisoning the position, and the stronger the general reserve available for an offensive movement. By this means the chances of victory are increased. * * * Frequently there is danger that the defender will be committed to purely passive defense, and that freedom of action will be lost. Therefore, when the proper moment arrives, the decisive counter-attack should be made.”

XII. THE RETREAT.

(Par. 426 German I. D. R.).

A retreat under effective hostile fire means annihilation; only the presence of cover immediately in rear of the fighting line should induce a commander to come to the weighty decision of reaching it by running. (Russia). On account of the great range of modern weapons, defeated troops, on open ground, cannot escape from fire by running.[478] No rules can be laid down in regulations as to the conduct of a retreat after a defeat. As a rule, further resistance is no longer possible; neither is it practicable to leave some troops in position to cover the retreat. The defeated force must retire in a direction perpendicular to the front of the enemy,[479] and cannot re-form until the fire of the opponent ceases or at least abates. (Par. 428 German I. D. R.). Artillery which is moved to the rear at a timely moment, and all available cavalry should cover the retreat of the infantry, so as to prevent the hostile cavalry from making the most of its opportunities for effective action.

[478] Furthermore, the danger of panic should not be underestimated. See KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, XIII, p. 49, and XVI. p. 243, in regard to the panic created in a skirmish line near the Bruch Mühle west of Gunstett (Wörth). This skirmish line was running to the rear toward a rallying position and the panic was produced by the command “To the rear. Double Time! March! March!” The panic was nipped in the bud by the energetic action of a mounted field officer. Major v. Below.

[479] The 57th Infantry, whose right flank had been enveloped and roughly handled by a counter-attack made by the French, retired to its left rear through the fragments of the 16th Infantry. This caused the two regiments to change places. (The attack made by the 38th Brigade at Mars-la-Tour). _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 25, p. 35.

To order a retreat at the right moment requires military instinct; rules cannot be laid down in regard to it.

“Troops which, while engaged with the enemy, are either withdrawn by order or defeated, can no longer choose their line of retreat. If the enemy pursues, they must retire perpendicularly to their former front, without changing formation, and need a force on which they can rally in order to prepare for renewed resistance. From this it follows that a systematic retreat can only be carried out when the force still has some distribution in depth. It would be wrong however, for a force intended for decisive action to retain a reserve for covering the retreat instead of employing it for the purpose of gaining the victory.”

To break off the action by systematically relieving the troops engaged with the enemy,[480] is only possible if the force still has reserves available, if cavalry and artillery are in a position to take a hand in the fight, or if the troops that have been withdrawn are sheltered from the enemy’s fire by features of the ground--all of which depends in many cases on chance.

[480] _Taktik_, V, p. 344.

It is much more difficult to break off an action in defense than in attack, as in the former case, the assailant approaches closer with every moment. This brings up the question, as to whether it would not be better for the defender to hold out until darkness sets in than expose his troops to the incalculable results of a retreat under fire. When the assailant has once entered the zone of short ranges, the defender will no longer be able to effect a systematic retreat. If the defender has used up all his reserves, the withdrawal should be begun at the point where the enemy is not pressing his attack, or where he has been unable to gain a superiority of fire. When a withdrawal is made, the whole local front should retire at once and simultaneously; it would be a mistake to reduce gradually the strength of the units engaged, for this would only give the enemy an opportunity to annihilate completely the remaining parts. If a company cannot maintain its position, a platoon certainly could not do so.

As soon as the commander decides to break off the action, the reserve, if one is still available, should be sent to the rear to take up a rallying position, which should be so situated that it can make its influence felt as soon as the main position is evacuated. As every defeated force, or one that is withdrawn by order, retires straight to the rear, the rallying position, in order to allow the troops holding it to fire effectively, must be located as far as possible to a flank of the line of retreat. If the outer flank of the position can be advanced, fire may be opened at an earlier moment, but this will only be practicable in minor engagements. The distance of the rallying position from the main defensive position should be such as to compel the enemy to advance again under fire, and prevent his carrying both the main defensive position and the rallying position at one rush. On the other hand, the rallying position should not be so far to the rear that the retreating troops may be annihilated before they enter its effective zone. However, as the troops in the rallying position are also to effect a withdrawal, it is not a good plan for them to engage the enemy from the start at too short a range. “It is most desirable when artillery and machine guns supported by cavalry suffice for this purpose, while the infantry uninterruptedly continues its retreat. The mounted arms follow later at an increased gait.” (Par. 429 German I. D. R.).

The rallying position should be occupied in time, so that all dispositions for holding it can be made calmly and without precipitation. A powerful fire at mid and long ranges is requisite to prevent the enemy from reaching decisive ranges. The firing line should, therefore, be strong and the supports weak. If a reserve is still available, it is at once sent back into a second rallying position, to cover the withdrawal of the troops occupying the first rallying position. A free field of fire down to the shortest ranges is not necessary. If the position is on elevated ground, the firing line should be posted so far in rear of the crest that, while its fire can still sweep the ground at mid ranges, and perhaps at the extreme limit of short ranges, the skirmishers, on retiring, will be sheltered as soon as possible. Fire should be opened as soon as possible, in order to retard the enemy’s advance.

The troops holding a rallying position should delay the enemy’s advance long enough to give the retiring force ample time and room to re-form, so that it can effect its retreat in good order. When this has been accomplished, the troops occupying the rallying position retire, unless there is hope that fresh troops may bring about a change in the state of affairs. As a rule, a second rallying position will be necessary, but it would be a mistake to halt in every seemingly favorable position. When a retreat has once been decided upon, it is generally necessary to get away from the enemy as quickly as possible.

“The commander must conduct the combat attending a retreat according to a well-ordered plan. He must indicate where the rallying position is to be, what troops are to occupy it, and assign march directions to the different columns. Only after he has given these orders and has assured himself that they will be executed, does he leave the battlefield, in order to meet his troops soon thereafter with new orders.[481] The rest is the business of subordinate leaders.” (Par. 432 German I. D. R.). The latter remain with their organizations for the purpose of maintaining order and cohesion. (Par. 297 German I. D. R.). Adjutants and officers detailed to receive orders should be sent to the rear ahead of the troops.[482]

[481] This sentence in our regulations, not to be found in those of other armies, was necessary to absolve a superior commander from all blame for leaving his troops and the battlefield. V. SCHLICHTING, I, p. 115. See _Taktik_, V, p. 350.

[482] For the conduct of a retreat, see _Taktik_, V, p. 373, et seq.

XIII. CONTAINING ACTIONS.

THE DELAYING ACTION AND THE HOLDING ATTACK.

Since the attacker will invariably seek to overpower the defender, and the latter will endeavor to prevent this by force of arms, it is obvious that an enemy can be “delayed” or “held” only when he permits this to be done. It is difficult to conduct a delaying action or a holding attack, because our training, which is based on offensive action, causes subordinate leaders to follow up every little advantage. In delaying actions, the defensive, and in holding attacks, the offensive intention predominates. The latter may consist of merely threatening the enemy with an attack, or of seriously engaging him. (Par. 392 German I. D. R.). Both the delaying action and the holding attack aim at deceiving the enemy.[483] Accordingly, the characteristic features of these combats are great frontage, large expenditure of ammunition, and long range fire, but, at the same time, few rifles, in order to deceive the enemy as to the strength of our force. In both combats, troops require considerable distribution in depth. The object of a delaying action is to gain time until the troops in rear can deploy, neighboring columns can come up, or a turning movement can become effective. (Par. 417 German I. D. R.). Troops fighting a delaying action require considerable distribution in depth so that they can effect a withdrawal. Distribution in depth is still more necessary in a holding attack,[484] in order that the troops may be able to repulse a counter-attack made by the enemy, or, by attacking him energetically, prevent his withdrawing. A force fighting a delaying action should keep its supports far to the rear, while a force charged with holding the enemy should keep them in close proximity. By properly employing his artillery, the commander can best exercise an influence on the course of the combat. (Par. 419 German I. D. R.). Since a delaying action is to be fought at long ranges, a field of fire is only required at those ranges; defiladed spaces in the foreground may frequently be a positive advantage. The fire fight is kept up only so long as it is necessary to keep the enemy at a distance. In a holding attack, it will not be proper to keep up a continuous fire; the violent fire breaking forth from time to time must teach the defender that a force is lying in waiting opposite him, ready to rush forward at a moment’s notice.

[483] This is still more pronounced In demonstrations. (_Taktik_, V, p. 11). “Feints are to deceive the enemy as to our intentions, but they may consist of offensive action. The regulations do not lay down specific rules either for them or for other more rare methods of combat; accordingly, their conduct will vary with the situation.” (Par. 420, German I. D. R.).

[484] _Taktik_, V, p. 161.

The object of threatening with an attack may frequently be accomplished by engaging the enemy with several detachments which are separated by intervals. (Par. 288 German I. D. R.). The negative object of preventing the enemy from withdrawing may be accomplished with a weak force; the positive object of compelling the enemy to use up his reserves in the early stages of the fight and at a less decisive point, requires that lie be engaged with a stronger force. A determined commander will not allow himself to be held by demonstrations. The manner in which the Vth Army Corps forced the French to bring up their reserves into the first line at Wörth, is worthy of imitation.

The size of the group charged with holding the enemy depends upon the extent of front to be covered and the probable duration of the combat. The conduct of such a force will vary considerably, depending upon the distance to the point where the decisive action is to be fought. When the holding force is close to this point, it should engage the enemy energetically.

=England.= The holding attack is to deceive the enemy as to the direction in which the main attack will be made, and, when the crisis of the action approaches, prevent his withdrawing troops from those parts of his front which are only threatened and opposing the decisive attack with nearly his entire force. Accordingly, the troops making the holding attack should act vigorously, as soon as the attack develops, and be in readiness to transform their demonstration instantly into a real attack.

XIV. THE INFANTRY COMBAT ACCORDING TO VARIOUS DRILL REGULATIONS.

THE AUSTRIAN DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1903.[485]

[485] The various provisions of the German and Austrian Infantry Drill Regulations are skillfully compared by Major-General REGENSPURSKY V. REGENY, Austrian Army, in an article entitled _Die taktischen Lehren des Exerzierreglements für die k. k. Fusztruppen vom Jahre 1903. Ein Vergleich mit dem deutschen Reglement 1906_. (_Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1906, Nos. 7 and 8).

ATTACK.

Both the rencontre and the attack on a position prepared for defense are considered. The regulations in regard to the rencontre have been revised, so as to permit a commander to launch the battalions of his main body directly from route column, or to concentrate his main body farther to the rear, while his advance guard stands on the defensive. The =attack on a position prepared for defense=, even after the attacker’s artillery has succeeded in paving the way for its infantry, consists of a laborious advance from one firing position to another. The question as to whether an attack is feasible without the support of artillery fire, is answered to the effect that it will, as a rule, be a difficult undertaking, unless the artillery has sufficiently silenced the batteries of the defender. The regulations divide the attack into two clearly defined phases, viz., the advance to the decisive firing position (the main firing position), and the decisive action.

The provisions of the regulations coincide very nearly with the views considered sound in Germany, and therefore an attempt will here merely be made to point out several differences. The combat formation necessary for the decisive stage of the action is taken up during the preparatory stage, so that, when the forward movement commences, the troops need only move straight to the front. (Par. 568). In a division, by appropriately combining “tactical units”, echelons are formed, whose strength depends upon the purpose of the combat, the information of the enemy, and the relation of the division to other bodies of troops. (Pars. 533, 540 and 541). Rules for the employment of thin or dense firing lines are not given. “The attacker should advance impetuously to the point where he can employ his rifles effectively,” (Par. 582).

“In an attack, everything should be done to get within effective range of the opponent before fire is opened by the whole line.” (Par. 323). When acting as part of a larger force, a platoon may open fire independently, if it suddenly encounters the enemy or if it finds a good opportunity for firing which the company commander has overlooked. (Par. 338). Unless the battalion commander has reserved to himself the right of designating the moment for opening fire, the company commanders direct when fire shall be opened, and conduct the fire fight at mid and short ranges. At long ranges, the battalion commander designates the companies that are to fire.

=Kinds of fire.= Fire at will and volley fire are employed. As a rule, volleys are only used when the troops are in close order, but may also be used in skirmish line to test the range. According to par. 331, the rate of fire may be accelerated, and in pars. 327 and 686, fire surprises are authorized.

When exposed to effective fire, the firing line is to =advance by rushes=. These are to be made by alternate units moving forward, supported by the fire of those remaining behind. Rushes are only in exceptional cases to be made by units smaller than a platoon. “The length of the rushes depends upon the character of the ground and the tactical situation, as well as upon the physical condition of the men. They serve as an expedient for reaching the next firing position.” (Par. 313).

Movements under effective hostile fire may sometimes be made by =crawling=. This is considered especially useful in rectifying alignments. (Par. 196).

For =envelopment=, see p. 362 supra.

For the =use of the spade in attack=, see p. 393 supra.

=Assault.= “The close approach of a long firing line to an enemy who occupies a good position, may well pass as a proof of the assailant’s superiority. Nevertheless, this does not, under all circumstances, furnish assurance that a forward movement for the purpose of penetrating the hostile position will now succeed; a premature assault may still result in disaster.

“As long as the conduct of the opponent does not show clear indications that his fire power is crippled, nothing remains for the attacker but to continue the fight for the superiority of fire. In doing this, the commander should not hesitate to put in his last man if necessary. The assault--in case the enemy still offers resistance--should not be made until the attack has been pushed sufficiently close to the enemy’s position, and the power of resistance of the enemy is palpably broken.

“It is immaterial what formations are taken up for this closing act of the combat, as it should be the natural culmination of a situation strained to the utmost. The troops must understand that there is no longer any chance to go back; that on the contrary, at this moment, honor and salvation lie wholly in moving to the front.

“When the assault has once begun, the hostile position should be carried in one rush. Any hesitation or halting, at this critical stage of the action, may nullify the previous success, and must therefore be quickly overcome by the reserves, if any are still available, taking a hand in the fight.” (Pars. 590-592).

The decision to assault may emanate either from the firing line, from the commander of the whole force, or from the commander of one of the units. If the decision emanates from the firing line, all the troops are to conform to the movement of that line. The following provision, which applies even to a company acting alone, differs from the German regulations, viz., “During the assault, a part of the assailant’s force should, whenever practicable, continue its fire and direct it upon any hostile reserves that may appear.”

DEFENSE.

The regulations governing the =defense seeking a decision= differ but little from the views entertained in Germany. The actual work of preparing a position for defense is not to commence until the direction in which the enemy is going to make his attack is known. The assailant is to be prevented, as far as possible, from obtaining information of the position and the measures taken for strengthening it. This is to be accomplished by pushing small detachments to the front to hamper the enemy’s advance.

In the past, =advanced positions= were decidedly opposed by the Austrians, but at present their use is recommended in cases where time is to be gained or the enemy is to be deceived, or where fire from such positions would inflict considerable losses on the enemy. However, the regulations seek to obviate the danger of the principal fight taking place in the advanced position instead of in the main position, by adding: “But such a measure should not cause the commander to swerve from the firm determination to carry out his original intention.”

The tremendously increased fire power of infantry is to make it possible to hold the front with a comparatively weak force, while the remaining troops are concentrated as a reserve with which the actual decision is to be brought about. The commander should resist every temptation to use the general reserve for other purposes than for carrying out the =counter-attack=, which should be ordered when the assailant is under the most effective fire of the position. The general reserve should then be quickly deployed and should make its attack with determination, by directing a violent fire against the flank of the enemy. Local frontal counter-attacks are to be avoided. The garrison is only charged with the task of annihilating the enemy with its fire, which should be increased to the utmost intensity.

THE ITALIAN DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1903 AND 1906.[486]

[486] Major-General MIKULICZ RADECKI, Austrian Army, _Das neue Exerzierreglement der italienischen Infanterie_, Vienna, 1906. V. GRÄVENITZ, _Die neueren taktischen Vorschriften für das italienische Heer_, in _Vierteljahrsheft_, 1905, I, p. 90, et seq. _Der Infanteriekampf in der oberitalienischen Tiefebene_, in _Streffleur_, 1907, October and November numbers (also obtainable in special pamphlet form).

P. RATH, _Der Kampf in der italienischen Kultur_, in _Militärische Welt_, 1907, January-February number.

ATTACK.

The peculiar character of the probable Italian theater of war in Upper Italy, with its numerous forests of tall timber, and its many defiles, causes special attention to be paid to the offensive.[487] The regulations emphasize the necessity of the coöperation of infantry and artillery.

[487] Unless otherwise ordered, the advance guard advances against the hostile forces which it encounters in its march, whether its action be to determine, as quickly as possible, the strength of the opponent and to save its main body from an unnecessary delay, or whether it be to deceive the opponent as to the location of its own forces, or, in certain cases, to make the most of a surprise. (Par. 37).

Although the platoons intended for the firing line are brought up in close order formation, the actual combat formation is not taken up until the situation makes this necessary; but, in any case, the leading element is to enter the zone of hostile fire in a deployed formation. To neutralize the mixing of units as much as possible as the action progresses, the firing line is formed into groups separated by intervals of 4-5 paces, although this increases the casualties. These intervals may be increased, when required, to 10 paces. (Intervals between skirmishers in the firing line are usually at least 15 cm., otherwise 3 paces). The firing line is to advance until increased casualties force it to open fire.

=Kinds of fire.= Only fire at will is employed. (This is also used when the troops are in close order and formed in four ranks). The battalion commander in the first line directs that fire be opened, as soon as it is certain that a good effect can be produced. When two targets appear, the fire is to be directed upon the one promising the best results (_i.e._, not necessarily the one that is tactically most important). “In order that the intensity of the fire may correspond to the requirements of the tactical situation existing at the moment, officers, by reason of their tactical training, should be able to state approximately how many rounds are necessary to produce the desired effect, the range, degree of visibility and character of the target, the nature of the terrain and of their position, as well as the physical condition and morale of their men being given. From these estimates may be deduced how many rifles must be employed in order to bring about a decisive result in the shortest possible time.”

The =advance by rushes= may be made either at a walk or at a run, but the regulations do not prescribe in detail how it shall be conducted. The following points are considered especially important: The time for making a rush, its length, and whether it should be made by a whole unit simultaneously or in echelon. All this depends upon various circumstances, which the leader, alter due consideration of the terrain and the hostile fire, as well as of the physical condition and morale of his men, is to judge in each particular case. In doing this, he is to bear in mind that the rush must be made as unobserved by the enemy as possible, so that the latter cannot direct his lire upon the advancing unit.

The rushes are to be made first by those parts of the firing line which are favored by the terrain and which have gained a superiority of fire over the hostile troops immediately opposed to them. Units which could only advance by rushes at the cost of considerable and useless losses, are to wait until the neighboring units have pushed ahead, support these with their fire, and then advance in turn under cover of the fire of the others.

As a general rule, so long as the hostile fire permits, rushes are to be made by entire companies, or at least by whole platoons. The length of the rushes and whether they are made at a walk or at a run, depends upon the nature of the terrain. Upon completing a rush, fire is to be opened at once.

When the intensity of the hostile fire increases, or after the organizations have become mixed, rushes can no longer be made by entire units but only by squads or like fractions. These leave the firing line and endeavor to reach the next cover at a rapid run. or, if cover be lacking, throw themselves down in order to open fire again at the shorter range thus gained. As a rule, the leading echelons open fire at once from their new positions, so as to facilitate the advance of the others, unless special circumstances make it advisable to delay the firing until all the other units have reached a good position and are able to direct an effective fire upon the enemy.

At short ranges, in covered terrain, or on ground swept by hostile fire, the best way to avoid losses is to advance in small groups consisting of several skirmishers. During each rush, the adjoining flanks of neighboring units cease firing, so as not to injure the men of the advancing unit. Platoon and company commanders hurry ahead, while squad leaders see that all of the men move forward.

Standing crops frequently enable the echelons in rear to follow the firing line in closer order, and may even permit supports, which are to carry that line forward, to come up in that formation.

The =assault= is to be made either in close or extended order to the tune of the Royal March and with loud cheers.

The regulations assume, however, that the superiority of fire, gained by the mutual coöperation of infantry and artillery and by the participation of the reserves, will induce the opponent to retreat. When engaged with an obstinate opponent, who remains in his position, only a part of the leading line is to be launched against certain sections (_tratti_) of the defensive position, while other parts, by means of rapid fire, prevent the enemy from supporting the threatened sections. In conjunction with this frequently emphasized scheme of penetrating several specially important sections of the hostile position, the regulations express the view--by no means generally considered sound-that the capture of several judiciously chosen points will force the enemy to retreat.

The assault is, as a rule, to be made by order of the commander of the whole force. The short burst of rapid fire preceding the assault is suddenly terminated by the command “attention” (_attenti_), and at the command “to the assault” (_per l’assalto_), the men throw themselves with loud cheers, accompanied by the sounding of trumpets and the beating of drums, upon the enemy. When a unit has already gotten so close to the enemy that further waiting would be useless, it advances to the assault, after getting permission therefor, or, otherwise, on its own responsibility. All the rest of the troops are to join in this movement.

DEFENSE.

So long as it is not definitely known in which direction the enemy will approach, the position is to be occupied with as weak a force as possible. The decision is to be brought about by a =counter-attack=. Long range fire is only considered proper on broad stretches of open terrain devoid of cover; and, in general, fire is not to be opened until the enemy arrives at short ranges. As soon as fire is opened, all the supports are to be in the firing line. A counter-attack is undertaken by the first line only in exceptional cases.

THE FRENCH DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1904.

ATTACK.

Both the French and the German regulations show a decided preference for the offensive, and both have eliminated all rules which might produce normal formations. There is an unmistakable inclination towards shock tactics in the French regulations, although the term “shock troops” has been replaced by “maneuvering troops”. “The forward movement alone is decisive and irresistible.... The fire is the element that executes”. The habit of looking upon the German army as a probable opponent leads the French to provide for reconnaissance with mixed detachments. The regulations do not touch upon the tactics of the rencontre, and prescribe a more cautious conduct for the advance guard than the German regulations.[488] The advance guard is to occupy supporting points, under cover of which the main body can deploy, and to complete the reconnaissance by its fight. The necessity of infantry detachments completing the reconnaissance made by the cavalry is particularly emphasized.

[488] See pars. 354, 356, 357 and 366 German I. D. R.

Another difference between the two regulations considered lies in the manner of making use of the cover afforded by the ground. The danger of going too far in this direction is guarded against in the German regulations by assigning combat sections to the various units. The French regulations prescribe a group formation of the several combat elements, and a concentration at favorable points, while the plain devoid of cover is left unoccupied. The center of gravity of a French attack does not lie in the firing line--the fight for the superiority of fire is not mentioned--but in maneuvering troops cautiously led after the firing line. The defender is to be engaged all along the line and, when the weak points of his position are recognized, the commander-in-chief is to give the order for the assault.

This division of a force into a fire and a shock group causes the French to prefer the echelon formation on general principles. A brigade is formed as follows, for example: Two battalions of the 1st regiment in the first line, which is followed at 400 m. by the third battalion (_troupe d’entrainement_); the 2nd regiment follows at a like distance as a reserve.

The regulations divide the attack into the artillery and the infantry preparation (_préparation_), the decisive action (_l’action décisive_), and the completion (_l’achèvement_).

=The artillery in the preparatory action.= The artillery is to endeavor to silence the hostile artillery as quickly as possible, without, however, expending more ammunition than is absolutely necessary.... The commander is not to give the order for the attack until the preparation is considered sufficient.

The troops are led forward over the terrain in a particularly careful manner (see p. 208 supra), and are then concentrated in a sheltered and protected place. Twelve mounted men (Reservists) are attached to every infantry regiment for reconnaissance purposes. The manner in which the French utilize the ground is typical. In this, widely separated parts of the force may unexpectedly encounter a strong hostile firing line, and may be defeated in detail.

The official regulations are supplemented by special regulations issued in March 1907 for the army maneuvers by General Lacroix, formerly commanding the VIIth Army Corps, and at present Vice President of the Supreme War Council.

=Assembly.= The division is assembled in division square (_carré de division_), in which the brigades are in line or in echelon, the regiments in line of double columns or in line of company columns, abreast or in echelon. If a frontal attack is to be made, in which successive lines are pushed forward without any attempt to envelop (in other words a pure frontal attack), the division is concentrated with the brigades abreast, their regiments in echelon. If a flank attack is to be made, in which the leading brigade must be protected by an echelon and a reserve ready for any eventuality, the division is concentrated with the brigades in echelon, their regiments abreast. The artillery is posted in section column near a road in rear of the _carré_. The pioneer company is divided into four parts, corresponding to the four heads of columns of the assembled troops, for the purpose of removing obstacles and cutting passages during the forward movement. The cavalry is pushed forward and the assembled force is protected in all directions by outposts of infantry and cavalry.

=Preparations for the advance in mass formation.= During the concentration, mounted officers reconnoiter the covering features of the terrain which are to be utilized during the advance of the massed division, and later these officers act as guides.

Preparatory attack formation.

=A. Pure frontal attack.= The leading regiment in each brigade is to have two battalions in the firing line and supports, the third to be echeloned in the rear of the outer flank. All of the battalions are to be protected by infantry patrols and by a small detachment of cavalry. The second regiment is to have one battalion echeloned in rear of the inner flank of the leading regiment, and the divisional cavalry is to be held in rear of the division, in readiness to advance to the right or the left.

=B. Flank attack.= The two regiments of the leading brigade are to furnish their own firing lines, supports, and reserves. The third regiment is to be echeloned 500 m. in rear of the others, and the fourth regiment is to form the general reserve. The cavalry is to reconnoiter on the outer flank. In this case, as well as in a pure frontal attack, the artillery is to take up a position from which it can support the attack. Drummers, trumpeters, and bands, are to march with the general reserve. The regulations state that it is absolutely essential for infantry units to be sheltered from hostile observation during their forward movement, and that they must remain under control of their leaders up to the last moment. Troops are not to deploy until they enter terrain swept by the enemy’s fire. (According to the decision of umpires at peace maneuvers, this would be at 5000 m.). It should be borne in mind that deployed troops cannot move by a flank, but only straight to the front.

The forward movement, in which the terrain will invariably cause lateral displacements of troops, is made from cover to cover, when necessary, from one supporting point to another. No hard and fast rules or normal formations are prescribed for this advance.

The advance is to be made as long as possible without firing a shot. When this is no longer practicable, recourse is to be had to fire, as the only means of making a further advance possible.

=Kinds of fire.= Fire at will (_feu à volonté_), principally used at short ranges, for the purpose of retarding the enemy’s advance; fire with counted cartridges (_feu à cartouches comptées_), the number being given (this is the fire usually employed); magazine fire (_feu à répétition_); and the fire of specially designated marksmen. Volley fire has been again prescribed. “Bursts of fire” (_rafales_) are typical of French fire tactics. (See p. 164 supra).

After fire has been opened, the advance is to be made by rushes, but the regulations do not prescribe how these shall be made.

The regulations contain a very realistic description of the infantry combat with its fluctuations, isolated attacks, and reverses. They emphasize that all must be animated by a desire to carry forward, by means of reinforcements, any troops that may have been checked. At the point where an advance is absolutely impossible, as many hostile troops as possible are to be held fast by an energetic fire fight, while the troops in the decisive attack engage the enemy and advance impetuously.

A series of attacks is to be made from the various covering features all along the line. These, made with the impetuosity inculcated by the regulations, are very apt to fail prematurely. This is particularly likely to happen because some of the troops will fall behind, while others are able to push ahead more rapidly. These attacks are to destroy the power of resistance of the enemy and to exhaust him physically. The leading units are to cover with their fire the advance of those who are less favored by the terrain.[489] During peace maneuvers, the fight now comes to a standstill at a range of 600 to 800 m.

[489] According to DENCAUSSE, in _Journal des Sciences Militaires_, 1906, and November-December number 1907, the infantry should endeavor to approach within 700-800 m. of the enemy’s position without firing a shot.

The supports (_renforts_) follow in a similar manner, ready to move up into the firing line at the first signal to that effect, or independently in case the situation requires it. Their entry into action is in a general way determined by the commander of the whole force. They are to augment the fire power of the firing line or to carry it forward. The efforts of all are to be directed toward constantly keeping up the advance.

At some points, the troops, when reinforced by their supports, will be able to attack some of the enemy’s supporting points, and to effect a lodgment on the ground captured. At other points the attacking group will be too weak to push the attack home. In such a case, the troops are to effect a lodgment on the terrain (_s’accrochent sur le sol_) in rear of the nearest cover, as close as possible to the enemy’s position, and are to maintain themselves there until artillery or neighboring troops can support them. The fire of these troops is to give the enemy the impression that an attack is to be made here also. “No matter how successful these usually protracted fights may be. troops must be launched in a decisive attack at some points. The infantry should endeavor to compensate for its numerical inferiority by skillfully utilizing the ground and intrenchments, by great activity, and, above all else, by invincible pertinacity. The supporting point will thus become the center of the fight of a separate combat group.”

The commander should endeavor to maintain cohesion, and to equalize fluctuations in the combat by controlling the activity of the artillery and by putting in fresh troops. During this group combat, the commander must decide where the retained troops should be launched for the assault. The selection of a point of attack is essentially the personal task of the commander and is an index of character and of eye for the value of ground, neither of which can be regulated by fixed rules. The regulations do not believe that close order formations can be dispensed with in launching the assaulting troops. Troops in close order, utilizing the ground to the best advantage, so as to suffer but slight losses from hostile fire, are to be brought up to the fighting line in a flexible echelon formation in order to give to that line, as _troupes d’assaut_, the impetus for the assault.

According to Thomas de Colligny,[490] formerly general staff officer of the 9th Infantry Division, a battalion designated to make an assault should form in four lines, each consisting of one company; the distance between lines being 150 m., and the front covered likewise 150 m. Each of the three leading lines should be formed in line of platoons in columns of route at deploying intervals sufficient to allow single rank line to be formed, and the fourth line in a similar formation with 10-pace intervals between platoons. When one of the lines is checked, the next succeeding one is to carry it forward. If the French believe such close order formations to be indispensable, they will be compelled to make a more extensive use of cover.

[490] _Conseils à mon bataillon_, p. 107.

Colonel Dencausse is the exponent of a suggestion made by General Bonnal. The latter forms a division for attack as follows: One regiment, on a front of 600 m., as the advanced line (_avant ligne_), in rear of that, the assaulting troops (_troupes d’assaut_). First line: one regiment, its twelve company columns abreast; second line: one regiment, its three battalions in double column at extended intervals, 300 m. in rear of the first line; third line: the fourth regiment, its battalions in route column abreast of each other, 300 m. in rear of the second line. While, during our peace maneuvers, we continue to fire on the enemy’s firing line in the expectation that his supports and reserve will in the end enter our zone of fire, it might be advisable, when confronted by a French opponent, to direct our fire on his reserves as soon as these become visible.

=Envelopment.= This is occasionally mentioned in the regulations (for example in pars. 290, 301 and 302). However, the Field Service Regulations, in discussing the attack, whose phases may vary in length depending upon the intentions of the commander, state that the attacker “may assail a wing or a flank of the enemy with superior forces for the purpose of annihilating him.”

For the =use of the spade in attack=, see p. 392 supra.

DEFENSE.

The French defense is characterized by group fortifications, advanced positions, and advanced posts[491] (intended to prevent hostile reconnaissance), and numerous counter-attacks.

[491] These frequently consist of detachments of all arms (_détachements de couverture ou de contact_). General BONNAL. (_Deutsche Revue_, December number, 1907) says: “The French regulation--in contrast to the German--provide in defense for detachments of all arms, which are pushed forward for the purpose of compelling the enemy to show his dispositions, and to draw him on in a direction favorable for the defender. Both systems have their advantages and disadvantages, and we, for our part, are of the opinion that in sending out advanced detachments one must exercise great care in order that these may not be defeated in detail, for this is invariably detrimental to the whole force.”

For defense, a force is divided into the firing line with its supports, and the maneuvering troops (general reserve) intended for offensive action. In addition to calling attention to the necessity of overwhelming with fire the hostile troops advancing over open ground, the regulations recommend that the fire be withheld occasionally and that the enemy be allowed to run into the greatly accelerated fire which is unexpectedly directed upon him. The fire is to be discontinued as soon as the enemy takes to cover, and is to be increased to the utmost intensity when he moves in dense formation over open ground. The supports are to be used to augment the fire power of the firing line.

=Counter-attack.= General Lacroix states: “The frontal attack is met by the offensive return (_retour offensif_), the flank attack by the counter-attack. In order to prepare for this, the commander should ride ahead to examine the ground, and to consider what counter-measures he should take. The artillery can render the most effective assistance by registering its fire upon the points at which the enemy will probably advance, and by preventing him from leaving his position. If the attack is successful, the local reserve advances beyond the firing line, which has entered the hostile position, and fires upon the retreating enemy. The general reserve now becomes the local reserve, and the former firing line re-forms and becomes the general reserve.”

The regulations make a distinction between counter-attack (_contre attaque_) and offensive return (_retour offensif_). A =counter-attack= is made by the reserve before the enemy penetrates into the energetically defended supporting points. In contrast herewith, every attempt to retake a captured position is called an =offensive return=. (For details see p. 439 supra).

Occasionally, it may be advantageous not to await the crisis, but to force the assailant to deploy by directing a heavy fire upon him. then to break off the action, inducing the enemy to press on, in order to draw him, by this means, onto previously selected and reconnoitered terrain, where he is suddenly attacked in flank by fresh troops. Military history shows that this very procedure has frequently been successful.

“The same activity, the same determination to maneuver, must prevail everywhere. Every mistake and every weakness of the enemy must be quickly perceived and promptly utilized. The troops in the counter-attack should move forward without hesitation and regardless of the cost. When such a forward movement has to be discontinued, the commander must decide where it shall cease. The efforts of all should be directed toward one object, that of tiring and demoralizing the enemy by constant counter-attacks, until the moment arrives when the commander must order the offensive to be assumed.”

THE BRITISH DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1905.[492]

[492] _Infantry Training._ _Combined Training_.--_Vierteljahrshefte_, 1906, III, _The Development of the Tactical Views in the British Army after the Boer War_.

ATTACK.

The regulations do not mention the rencontre. A normal offensive battle consists of “an advance from point to point. Every lodgment made in a new firing position weakens the enemy’s strength in his main position, and paves the way for a further advance; every advance must be thoroughly prepared and systematically carried out.”

In the following, the attack made by a brigade of four battalions is used as a basis. While the commander reconnoiters under the protection of his advance guard, the troops are concentrated in a “preparatory formation”, the battalions in one or more lines of “quarter columns” (column of companies). As soon as the commander has decided which flank of the enemy he will envelop, against which portion of the enemy’s line he will launch his decisive attack, he assembles his subordinate commanders to receive the orders. According to the regulations, it will rarely be possible to issue orders while the troops are still in march. The orders are, as a general rule, to be given in writing, and are to be supplemented by verbal instructions, in which the commander calls attention to the peculiarities of the terrain, especially where a hostile counter-attack is possible. In exceptional cases, the brigade commander designates the position to be taken up by the machine guns, and gives directions to them in regard to supporting the advance by long range fire. A base battalion is to be designated. When the enemy’s position is visible, a point of attack is assigned to every unit. When this is not practicable, the base battalion is led forward by officers familiar with the ground, or it is given a compass direction. Every leader is to provide independently for reconnaissance and for communication by signal flags and also by telephone; a mounted signal corps man accompanies the brigade commander.

Every unit is formed in three lines for attack.

The =first line=, consisting of scouts and skirmishers with supports, is made as weak as possible; without supports rarely more than one-fourth of the whole force.

The =second line=, the reserves of the firing line, is under the orders of the appropriate battalion commanders, and is to reinforce the firing line, protect the Hanks, and deliver long range fire. The second line is to fill up the firing line to the maximum density, _i.e._, to one man per yard of front (0.9 m.).

The =third line=, the general reserve, is to assure the success of the attack. It is to be made as strong as possible, seldom less than one-fourth of the whole force.[493] “The general reserve is directly under the orders of the commander of the whole force. It enables him to meet the varying contingencies of an engagement or to ward off counter-attacks. If the attack succeeds, the general reserve pushes forward rapidly to take up the pursuit; if the attack fails, it serves as a rallying force, but before the commander decides to leave behind even a part of it, he should consider whether, by launching all the troops at his disposal, he could break down the resistance of the defender. The commander can only exercise an influence on the course of the action by means of a reserve. If he keeps in his own hands a strong reserve, he will have it in his power to take advantage of any mistake the enemy may commit, to restore the battle should the leading troops meet with a serious check, to meet a counter-attack in force, or, in case of need, to provide the additional strength required to drive the attack home.”

[493] According to the old regulations, a part of the general reserve had to remain in rear in rallying positions. (See p. 397 supra).

In contrast with these provisions, we find, strangely enough, under the heading “Brigade”, the hint that, when advancing to the assault, it is advisable to keep back a portion of the reserve in a rallying position. Even a battalion commander is invariably to retain at least half a company at his disposal. The British were not without reason censured because their flank attacks were ineffective in South Africa on account of the lack of energy of the frontal groups, and their new regulations accordingly contain detailed rules for the conduct of the “holding attack”. The troops holding the enemy in front are to threaten him for the time being. This is to be accomplished by wide extension, and by deceiving the enemy by occasional bursts of lire (_rafales_), by employing machine guns, by retaining supports far in rear, and by retraining, for the time being, from advancing to decisive ranges. But the troops are to be ready to join in the main attack when the latter advances. The regulations state that, in order to deceive the enemy effectually, adequate forces will have to be launched and that the commander will have to act vigorously. (See p. 447 supra).

Fixed rules for the front to be covered by a unit in action are no longer given. A unit fighting alone may cover considerably more front than when acting as part of a larger force. In a decisive attack, a battalion in the first line may put 125 rifles on every 100 yards (90 m.) of front; these are distributed between firing line, supports, and battalion reserve; the latter may consist of one or more companies. Entire companies are only deployed in exceptional cases, for example on open ground, where it is difficult to bring up the supports. The size of the reserve depends upon the losses to be anticipated in the firing line; when these will be small, in all probability, the reserve may be made as strong as the firing line plus supports. In attack, a battalion may accordingly deploy on a front not exceeding 800 yards (formerly 540 m. was prescribed). A brigade of four battalions may deploy on a front of 1400-2100 m., depending upon the number of battalions engaged.

When the force arrives within 4 or 5 km. of the enemy, the battalions are formed in two lines of companies. Each company in the first line is preceded by a platoon in close order, and this is in turn protected by scouts. As soon as these scouts can advance no farther, they lie down and await the arrival of the fighting line. The latter advances under cover of the supporting fire of infantry, machine guns, and artillery. Fire of position is considered necessary. Fire at will is from now on used. This is to vary in intensity according to the character of the target, and the range. It is to increase to special violence when the attacking infantry advances over level ground or encounters obstacles. The fire is to be discontinued when the advancing skirmishers reach cover. The firing line is to advance as close to the enemy as it can without suffering excessive losses. Fire is to be opened when the hostile fire makes this necessary, but small losses are to be borne.

After the fire fight is once begun, it is to be conducted with more rifles than the enemy has in action. “Battles are only won by controlled fire directed upon targets at decisive ranges” (according to the regulations, at ranges under 540 m.). Within the zone of effective fire, all the troops are to deploy. In consequence of this, skirmishers, who endeavor to work forward independently, are scattered all over the terrain over which the attack is being made. At the initial deployment, the interval between skirmishers is to be about 5-15 paces; at short ranges, at points where the decision is sought, there is to be at least one rifle for every two or three yards of front (1.80-2.70 m. = 2¹⁄₂-3¹⁄₂ paces). Another paragraph of the regulations prescribes that the maximum density is to be one rifle per yard of front. The British views, when compared to those entertained by them immediately after the South African war, have undergone a noticeable change, especially as regards the frontage of a firing line; dense firing lines, possessing strong fire power, are at present deemed essential to a decisive fight, while the fire of widely extended lines is considered ineffective. The intervals may vary considerably, but the regulations state that it should be borne in mind that the difficulties of conducting a fight are increased and the fire power reduced when too great a front is covered; moreover, that in covered terrain, and when counter-attacks may be anticipated, an overextension is actually dangerous. Because of the necessity of moving in thin skirmish lines, it is considered essential that the men be trained to act independently, to continue the fight even in a difficult situation, and to do everything in their power to carry out the original intentions of the commander.

=Rushes= over open ground are not to exceed 80-100 yards (72-92 m.) in length; as a rule they are to be shorter. According to an example given in the Firing Regulations, rushes are to be 25 yards (22 m.) long, at ranges from 650-500 yards (580-450 m.). A rush is to be continued while the enemy’s surprise lasts and he finds no opportunity to deliver aimed fire. In covered terrain, the rushes are to be made from one covering feature to another.

“On open ground and within effective range, long lines of skirmishers, rising simultaneously, will suffer heavy losses even when making short rushes; the sudden movement of smaller units may take the enemy unawares, so that for a time at least well aimed fire is avoided. The rush is continued only while the surprise of the enemy lasts. The shorter the range, the smaller the advancing unit will have to be, and the shorter the length of the rushes.”

The dispositions for a rush are to be made as unostentatiously as possible. The rearward detachments, which follow by rushes, are to advance, if possible, beyond the group already firing. When squads are unable to advance by rushes, the men may crawl forward singly.

The regulations state that, when in close order, units of the strength of company columns (80-100 men, 4 platoons, in column of platoons at full distances), having a front of 10-12 files, suffer comparatively small losses when exposed to long range fire (1800-1200 m.). The troops are to deploy before reaching effective ranges (1200-600 m.), as they will otherwise suffer serious losses. At decisive ranges the firing line is to be filled up to its maximum density.

The whole force, a small part excepted, is to be launched in the =assault=; a sudden and unexpected advance of the assaulting troops is considered particularly important. The order for the assault is to be given by the commander of the whole force, but the manner of conducting it is left to company commanders.

When the attack would be too costly by day, however, the troops are to intrench, wait until it is dark, and then advance to assaulting distance, where they again intrench (machine guns, and even single field guns are to be taken along). The assault is to be made, after a brief but violent fire fight, at the first streak of dawn.

DEFENSE.

In defense, a force is divided into the fighting line with supports, and the reserve. The latter furnishes the outposts and the garrisons for the advanced positions (so-called temporary positions). The object of =advanced positions= is to mislead, deceive, and check the enemy. They are to be evacuated before the troops in them become seriously engaged. It is not considered necessary for the =main position= to consist of a continuous line of trenches; every platoon and even every squad may have its own trench. The principal requirements are good field of fire and mutual support by oblique or enfilade fire.

The strength of the garrison is to be governed by the size of the field of fire and the character of the works. The regulations state that, under favorable conditions, a few men can defend a broad front, but that, when the attack is favored by the terrain, a strong garrison is required. Firing trenches, unless they are to serve as dummy intrenchments, are not to be constructed so as to stand out against the horizon. The importance of masking firing trenches, and of constructing overhead cover is emphasized; special cover trenches for the supports may be constructed in rear of the crest.

Against skirmishers, fire is to be opened at 1000 m., but it is also considered desirable to withhold the fire until they get within short range. It is believed that this will be attended by success when the assailant is ignorant of the position of the defender or makes his attack with poorly disciplined troops. Continuous long range firing tires the eye and the hand. The decision is to be brought about by a =counter-attack= made by the general reserve. Local counter-attacks by section reserves are also recommended. The tendency of the British to make the section reserves very strong has been frequently observed. The final stage of the combat consists, as in Wellington’s day, of a counter-attack all along the line. As soon as the opponent has arrived within assaulting distance, the troops holding the position are to fix bayonets and, after delivering magazine fire, are to make a short frontal counter-attack.

THE JAPANESE DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1907.

ATTACK.

The Japanese views coincide almost exactly with the German, but take their peculiar theater of war into consideration.

=Kinds of fire.= Fire at will, volley fire, and rapid fire are used.

=Rushes= are not to exceed 100 m. in length, as a rule, but the regulations admonish leaders to “guard against the mistake of making rushes that are too short. When rushes are shorter than 30-40 m., their value will be insignificant, as a rule.” Leaders are likewise to avoid sending forward units smaller than a platoon, in order that the advance may not be too much retarded and the difficulties of leading increased.

The regulations particularly emphasize that it will rarely be possible “to shoot an enemy out of his position”, and that, on this account, the decision will, as a rule, be brought about by the assault with cold steel. They further state that, when the enemy can be kept down by artillery fire, the advance of the infantry will be easy; that, as it is difficult to obtain a timely effect from artillery fire directed upon an enemy who takes advantage of cover or who occupies a fortified position, the infantry cannot wait for the successful termination of the artillery combat, but, on the contrary, should advance while that combat is in progress, for only by so doing can it count upon the effective coöperation of its artillery. But, nevertheless, infantry is to make the attack independently, even if it has to dispense entirely with the coöperation of the artillery.

The regulations consider the rencontre and the attack on a position prepared for defense.

=Rencontre.= The regulations prescribe that in a rencontre the advance guard should make a vigorous but, at the same time, deliberate attack; that the commander should promptly decide what to do, even if the situation is not entirely clear; and that, when practicable, the main body should be launched as an entity. A fight against a superior enemy is only to be avoided, for the time being, in case the latter has gained a start in deployment.

=Attack on a position prepared for defense.= The commander frames his plan of attack according to the results of the reconnaissance, and leads his troops forward provisionally into a preparatory position, where he assigns deployment spaces and, if practicable, combat sections to the different units. In order that they may utilize the covering features of the ground to the best advantage, the different units are to avoid advancing abreast. On account of the difficulties attending an advance over ground swept by hostile fire, it is considered desirable for the troops to take advantage of the cover afforded by darkness. In order that, in such a case, serious lateral displacements of the troops may be avoided, the fighting line is to be sent forward the day before to endeavor to drive back the troops posted in front of the enemy’s main position. The regulations state that, when an attack is contemplated to be made during daylight against a strong position prepared for defense, there is no alternative but to approach the assaulting position by intrenching successive attack positions, but that, when circumstances permit, an attempt must be made to advance under cover of darkness to the enemy’s position. In the latter case, the assaulting position is to be designated during the day, after a thorough reconnaissance, and detailed preparations are to be made for the advance. As soon as the troops arrive during the night in the selected position, they are to construct cover quickly, and to intrench. When the ground is so hard that intrenching tools cannot be used without difficulty, recourse is to be had to the sand bags that are carried along. The men engaged in digging trenches are at all times to be ready for action.

The regulations state that whether a force which has occupied an assaulting position should make the =assault= immediately at dawn or should first prepare it by fire, will depend on circumstances; and that, if attempted at dawn, the success of the assault will depend on the suddenness and rapidity with which it is carried out. The reconnaissance of the position and the work of removing obstacles is to be completed, if possible, during the night, so that avenues of approach will be open for the assaulting troops.

If the reconnaissance has gained all the necessary information, and if the preparations are completed, the assault may be made before the night is over. The regulations say that, when an assault is made at night, the distance to be covered should be very short; and that it will depend on circumstances whether the assault is made suddenly, directly from the last firing position, or whether it is carried out upon the completion of works of approach. When necessary the assaulting bodies are to carry along hand grenades and demolition tools, the latter being selected in conformity with the results of the reconnaissance.

The regulations state that to have captured a position does not suffice; that only the pursuit and dispersion of the enemy makes the victory complete. The troops that have penetrated into the hostile position are to continue the advance until they again find a field of fire, whereupon they are to fire upon the retreating enemy. The troops which do not take part in this fire are to re-form quickly, secure the captured position, take requisite measures for security, and make preparations to meet any hostile counter-attack. Troops are not to be assembled in large bodies at points exposed to hostile artillery fire. As soon as the enemy has gotten out of range, all the troops are promptly to resume the forward movement, and are to pursue him vigorously so far as due regard for cohesion and order permits.

=Intrenching tools= are to be used in attacks on fortified positions, and in strengthening ground captured from the enemy.

DEFENSE.

In defense, the Japanese regulations, like the German, provide for economical occupation of the front (group fortifications) and a general reserve, which is to be used offensively or to protect the flanks. Dummy intrenchments, patrols, and outposts are to make it difficult for the enemy to gain information of the defensive position. The Japanese views in regard to =advanced positions= are not so pronounced as the German, for, while their regulations mention the combat of the outposts pushed forward from the position, the danger of advanced positions is not especially emphasized.

The training of the soldier is to be such that even after he has fired away all of his ammunition, he will still defend his position with the bayonet.

Nothing is said in regard to the distance of the infantry position from that of the artillery. If information is received that the attacker has made a lodgment during the night in the assaulting position, small detachments are to advance and prevent him from strengthening his position.

THE RUSSIAN DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1907.

The present regulations only treat of the formal matters of training and combat.

THE SWISS DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1908.

ATTACK.

There is considerable similarity between the Swiss and the German regulations. The keynote is the offensive. The purpose of the combat and the condition of the troops are to govern the commander in deciding whether to stand on the defensive or to attack. The regulations state that decisive results are only offered by the attack; that considerations of a presumable hostile superiority and other apparently unfavorable conditions should not diminish the energy of the attack; and that the decision to launch the troops should never be made dependent upon the receipt of reports in regard to the enemy.

The offensive is invariably to be assumed, unless the situation or the mission compel the force to stand on the defensive. The regulations state that, in attack, success does not rest alone upon superiority of fire and superiority of numbers; but that an impetuous advance and an unswerving determination to win are of just as much importance. The conduct of the Swiss attack varies, depending upon whether it is made in a rencontre or on a position prepared for defense.

The views entertained in regard to the =rencontre= coincide with the German views. The regulations say that the result of the reconnaissance should not be awaited, because success depends largely upon prompt action. The commander may launch parts of his main body in succession, as soon as they arrive, when the force is operating in close country, when it is necessary to gain ground quickly on debouching from a defile, or when the enemy makes an impetuous advance. The commander is to direct all his efforts toward throwing the enemy upon the defensive, and then to launch the main body as an entity.

The Swiss regulations, similar to those of the Japanese, only discuss the =attack on a fortified position=; various modifications of the attack, depending upon the preparations made by the enemy, are authorized. Advantage is to be taken of the cover afforded by darkness, and an extensive use is to be made of =intrenching tools=. The regulations state that an assault by day only has a chance of succeeding when the defender is completely subdued, and when only insignificant obstacles and defenses are encountered. When this is not the case, the day is to be used for making preparations for the attack, and the night for executing it.

DEFENSE.

The regulations consider the involuntary defense in a rencontre; the deliberately prepared defense seeking a decision and contemplating an assumption of the offensive; the defense for the purpose of gaining time; and the occupation of a position in readiness, when the direction in which the hostile attack will be made is still in doubt, or when the commander intends to assail the enemy while the latter is in the act of deploying. In the =defense seeking a decision=, advanced positions are not to be used, because it is believed that the employment of detachments of troops in front of the defensive position will weaken the latter, and a hostile enveloping attack will soon force the advanced troops to fall back upon the main position. The regulations point out that if the advanced troops are supported by fire from the main position, the latter will be prematurely disclosed to the assailant. The employment of advanced troops is, however, considered justifiable to hold defiles, to deceive the enemy, or to support the cavalry.

The works of a position are not to be continuous, but are to be constructed in groups. Infantry positions over which artillery is to fire are not to be less than 500 m. in front of the latter.

XV. THE EXPENDITURE AND SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION.[494]

[494] Lieutenant-Colonel KOVARIK, _Versuch eines kriegsbrauchbaren Systems für den Munitionsersatz im Infanteriekampf_, Berlin, 1903.

1. HISTORICAL SKETCH.

The question of ammunition supply in action is of vital importance to the infantry. To solve it correctly means to assure the success of the infantry in fire action. The first question that needs consideration is, whether the experiences of past wars show that the ammunition at present carried by the infantry is sufficient, under all circumstances, even when ammunition columns cannot reach the battlefield in time because all the roads are choked with troops.

For our purpose, it is sufficient to go back as far as the =Franco-German war=, in which breechloaders were used for the first time against breechloaders. Every German soldier carried 80 cartridges, and the 6-horse battalion ammunition wagons carried 20 additional rounds per man.[495]

[495] Historical data given by D. GÜNTHER in _Die Entwickelung der Feuertaktik der Infanterie_, 1902.

When one considers the total number of cartridges expended during any campaign, it seems impossible that a shortage of ammunition could ever have taken place. In the =Franco-German war=, the expenditure of ammunition in the Ist Bavarian Army Corps amounted to 4,163,000 rounds (166 per rifle); in the IInd Army Corps, 1,105,600 rounds (44 per rifle); and in the Saxon Army Corps, 1,450,000 rounds (about 58 per rifle). The compilation of a table, showing the amount of ammunition expended in the Prussian army, was begun, but was soon discontinued, as it was found that the necessary data were lacking, the only information available being the record of the number of rounds issued by the reserve ammunition parks. The troops sent to the field army from the depot battalions, must have brought with them in each case a very considerable amount of ammunition, as each man carried 80 rounds, but no records are available to show how much ammunition was forwarded in this way. Furthermore, there is no record of the number of rounds actually expended and of the amount of ammunition lost or left on the dead and wounded. It is well known, that in the long periods, during which no engagement had taken place, an enormous amount of ammunition was lost on marches and in bivouacs. This applies likewise to battlefields. The commander of an ammunition column had his men pick up 22,000 rounds of needle gun ammunition in unbroken packages on the battlefield of =Hühnerwasser=.

A shortage of ammunition first manifested itself where the troops, on removing their knapsacks, had neglected to take out the tin boxes filled with ammunition (for example in the 12th Jäger-Battalion at =Sedan=),[496] or where the ammunition wagons had been sent to the rear with the field train (for example in the 50th Infantry, on January 19th, 1871, in the battle at =Mont Valérien=, and in the 38th Brigade, at the battle of =Beaune la Rolande=).[497]

[496] _Gen. St. W._, II, p. 1175.

[497] HÖNIG, _Volkskrieg_, II, p. 259.

The regimental histories contain only a few statements in regard to the amount of ammunition expended in the various engagements. Moreover, these statements are only approximations and, as a rule, cannot lay claim to trustworthiness.

The amount of ammunition expended in the opening battles of the war was very small, due to the training and fighting methods of the Prussian infantry, and to the support it received from the artillery. Moreover, the short range of the rifle prohibited long range firing.

“In order to hold its own against the intensity and long range of the hostile fire, the German infantry was compelled to fire more rapidly and at longer ranges than it had intended. In addition, the difficulties of fire control and fire direction were frequently increased on account of the tremendous loss of leaders. Under these circumstances, so much ammunition was expended that, among the troops fighting in the first line, the ammunition carried by the men was no more than enough. This explains why it not infrequently happened that the fighting efficiency of the infantry was impaired by a lack of ammunition. The first general shortage of ammunition occurred at the battle of =Mars-la-Tour= in the infantry of the IIIrd Army Corps.”[498]

[498] _Gen. St. W._, V, p. 1460.

On August 16th, at the battle of =Vionville=, the Prussian IIIrd Army Corps, whose effective strength was 21,050 rifles, expended 720,486 cartridges, which corresponds to only 34.5 rounds per rifle; yet, in spite of this, the ammunition ran short. During the lull in the battle at noon, by removing the cartridges from the dead and wounded, each man in the 35th Infantry[499] was again supplied with about 200 rounds of ammunition, which were then expended in the course of the afternoon, so that toward evening another shortage occurred.

[499] _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 35_, p. 32.

The following figures in regard to the expenditure of ammunition during the battle of =Vionville= are taken from _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 8 and 9, by Major KUNZ:

IInd Bn. Leib Regt. 12,749 rounds for 850 rifles, or 15 per rifle. Ist Bn. 40th Inf. 35,000 „ „ 450 „ „ 78 „ „ IInd Bn. 40th Inf. 6,650 „ „ 350 „ „ 19 „ „ IIIrd Bn. 40th Inf. 4,520 „ „ 300 „ „ 15 „ „

A very annoying shortage of ammunition occurred in those parts of the Leib Regiment which were with the 72nd and 40th Infantry Regiments in front of the wood. The retained echelons in the wood had sufficient ammunition, but the troops in front lacked the means wherewith to inform the retained units of the shortage. In the 11th and 72nd Infantry Regiments a serious shortage of ammunition occurred after they had been engaged but a short time. (In a little less than two hours, the 72nd Infantry suffered the following percentage of losses: Ist Battalion, 53.2%; Füsilier Battalion, 48.2%).[500]

[500] For data in regard to the expenditure of ammunition at Beaumont, see HOPFFGARTEN-HEIDLER, _Beaumont_, p. 184.

The defense of the stone wall at =Buzanval= by the 50th Infantry (German), on January 19th, 1871, was one of the most obstinate defensive fights of the war. The numerical superiority of the enemy at this point was overwhelming and his troops were excellent, nevertheless the regiment maintained the same splendid fire discipline it had already exhibited at Lundby. The fight lasted nine hours. In his history of the regiment (p. 350), Lieutenant-General v. Boguslawski says:

“The number of cartridges fired can no longer be accurately determined. Only the war diary of the IInd Battalion contains a note showing that 14,206 rounds were expended. As the 5th Company did not fire at all, and the 7th Company was only partially engaged, by far the greater portion of the ammunition must have been expended by the 6th and 8th Companies.” The IInd Battalion, like the rest, has no record showing what ammunition was supplied to it during the battle. To cite an example: The 12th Company received about 3,000 rounds of ammunition during the fight. As the strength of this company was 180 men in round numbers, each man received 17 additional cartridges. He therefore had 97 rounds available, including the ammunition originally supplied him.

“Now, as each man still had an average of 5 cartridges on going into billets, he must have expended 92 rounds. From this we may assume that during the nine hours’ fight, he fired a little more than ten rounds per hour.”

In the battle of =Beaune la Rolande=, some of the companies of the 56th Infantry near Romainville had expended all their ammunition. In the 38th Brigade, only the Ist Battalion, 57th Infantry, was able to replenish its ammunition directly from the ammunition wagons near Romainville. The defenders of Beaune did not receive such assistance however, as only one ammunition wagon was brought up (by the Füsilier-Battalion, 16th Infantry), toward the close of the battle, for the units engaged there. The ammunition it contained was distributed among the men, but was not used. Organizations belonging to the IIIrd Army Corps turned over some of their ammunition, but, in general, the brigade had to rely practically on the ammunition carried by the men, for all the ammunition wagons had driven off at the beginning of the battle. Consequently, this battle was fought almost exclusively with the ammunition carried by the men--about 80 rounds per rifle. As the French attack was not simultaneously directed against the whole front of Beaune, lulls occurred in the fight, which enabled the officers to send a supply of ammunition to the most seriously threatened points of the line. In a well disciplined organization, it is not difficult to send ammunition promptly to the most seriously threatened points by simply passing it along the line. This was actually done at Beaune la Rolande. In consequence of this redistribution, at some points in the cemetery, men fired as many as 200 rounds each, but others fired only 40 or less; the result, however, was the same, for the ammunition was almost exclusively supplied from that carried by the men--80 rounds per rifle. Moreover, a great many cartridges, and even unopened packages of ammunition, were found, on November 29th, in the position occupied by the 38th Brigade.

The following figures give an idea of the amount of ammunition expended at =St. Privat= by the 2nd Regiment of the Guard. On August 19th, the Ist Battalion required 27,340, the IInd Battalion 17,820, and the Füsilier-Battalion 7,870 rounds to replenish their ammunition supply. When the heavy losses suffered by this regiment are taken into account, the average expenditure of ammunition cannot be considered excessive.[501]

[501] _Geschichte des 2. Garde-Regiments zu Fusz_, p. 250.

At 10:30 P. M., on August 18th, the Rifle Battalion of the Guard managed to supply each one of its men with 20 rounds of ammunition, without drawing upon the contents of the ammunition wagons, which were left intact.[502]

[502] _Geschichte des Gardeschützen Bataillons_, p. 121.

The expenditure of ammunition on the French side was considerably greater in all the battles. At =Champigny=, every French infantry soldier carried 118 rounds of ammunition, which did not prove sufficient, however, to meet the demand. In the French Army of the Rhine, the average expenditure of ammunition from August 6th to 31st was 30 rounds, and in the fights of August 16th and 18th, 13 to 27 rounds per rifle. In individual cases, the expenditure of ammunition was far in excess of these figures. The men of Grenier’s Division, against which the attack of the 38th Brigade was directed, claim that they fired as many as 150 rounds apiece, on August 16th. In the evening, at the close of the battle, the commanding general of the IVth Army Corps reported a shortage of ammunition.[503] Shortage of ammunition caused Marshal Bazaine to fall back to Metz on August 17th. Notwithstanding the proximity of the fortress of Metz, the French VIth Corps was unable to replenish its supply of ammunition before it was attacked by the Prussian Guard. Detailed information available in regard to the ammunition expended by the 25th Infantry (French)[504] shows that each man had only 30 instead of 90 cartridges. (This was the regiment attacked by the Franz and 3rd Guard Regiments, who lost 2,160 men--9% hits). The statement made in the history of the 2nd Guard Regiment (p. 233), that every French soldier had 300 rounds of ammunition available on August 18th, cannot be substantiated by French records.

[503] HÖNIG, _Taktik der Zukunft_, p. 159.

[504] PAQUIÉ, _Le tir en terrain varié_, p. 39.

The expenditure of ammunition in the =Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78=, amounted to 33 rounds per rifle and carbine on the Russian side. The following detailed statements in regard to the expenditure of ammunition are available. In the engagement at =Aiaslar=, on August 23rd, 1877, the Sofia Regiment expended 94 rounds, and at =Karahassankioi=, the 140th Infantry expended 155 rounds per man. On December 28th, 1877, the 13th Rifle Battalion expended 122 rounds per man. In this connection, it may be remarked that the Russian infantryman of that day carried 60 rounds of ammunition in his cartridge boxes. The ammunition carts carried 55 additional rounds per man, and the ammunition parks 62. If, as prescribed by the regulations at that time, only one ammunition wagon followed an organization into action, each infantryman had 78 rounds available, and each man of a rifle battalion 106 rounds.

In front of =Plevna=, on July 20th, 1877, the Russians expended in six hours all the ammunition carried by the men and by the ammunition carts. On July 30th, during the second assault on =Plevna=, they expended in four hours all the ammunition carried by the men.[505] In the engagement at =Lovtcha=, the 3rd Rifle Brigade only fired during the pursuit. The brigade commander explained afterwards that his ammunition had run short nevertheless. During the advance, the ammunition wagons did not follow in rear of the organizations to which they belonged, and no provision had been made for bringing up the necessary ammunition.[506]

[505] Details given in the German translation of the Russian _Gen. St. W._ (Vienna), III, pp. 330-331.

[506] KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_, I, p. 88.

On September 1st, 1877, the regiments which made the fruitless attack on the =Omar Bey Tabia=, expended the following ammunition:

63rd Infantry[507] 55,296 rounds, or 21 per rifle 119th „ [507] 99,744 „ „ 43 „ „ 64th „ 24,650 „ „ 10 „ „ 115th „ 45,360 „ „ 24 „ „

[507] These two regiments were only engaged from 1 to 1¹⁄₂ hours.

In the Kasan Regiment (No. 64), which had expended less ammunition than any of the others on this day, the ammunition began to run short at the moment when the successful and decisive counter-attack of the Turks commenced. The same misfortune befell other organizations, after the fire fight had lasted but a comparatively short time, as apparently they had neglected to remove the cartridges from the dead and wounded.

During the assault on =Scheinovo=, on January 9th, 1878, each man of the 11th Rifle Battalion fired 120 rounds in four hours. This is an average of 2 rounds per man, per minute.

The Turks took more advantage of the rapidity of fire of their rifles than did the Russians.[508] It is said that at =Gorni Dubniac=, each man had 800-900 rounds of ammunition available, and it is a fact, that the force of 3,570 men garrisoning the group of works placed 3,533 Russians out of action, in a fight lasting 9¹⁄₂ hours, while the Turkish losses in killed and wounded only amounted to 1,280 men. During the attack, some Turks managed to fire more than 100 rounds apiece. Kuropatkin found 120 empty cartridge shells beside a dead Turkish soldier.[509] In the engagement at =Tashkessen= (31st December, 1877),[510] which lasted eight hours, the Prisrend Battalion expended 292, the Tuzla Battalion 275, and a Rifle Battalion 263 rounds per man (30 rounds per man, per hour).

[508] Each Turkish battalion was followed into action by 30 pack mules carrying 60,000 rounds of ammunition, and each man carried from 100 to 120 rounds on his person.

[509] KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_, I, p. 170.

[510] BAKER, _War in Bulgaria_, II, p. 160.

There is very little information available in regard to the expenditure of ammunition during the =Russo-Japanese war=. The Russian infantryman carried 120 rounds of ammunition, the 8 one-horse ammunition carts carried 6,600 rounds per company, and the 2 two-horse ammunition wagons of the battalions 14,400 rounds each. Assuming the strength of a company as 200, this would give 210 rounds per man. In the engagement at =Hamatan= (=Yalu=), several Russian organizations ran entirely out of ammunition. A number of rifle companies (the 6th Company, 11th Infantry, and the 2nd, 3rd and 4th, 12th Infantry), were able to replenish their supply without difficulty from the ammunition wagons. The following is taken from a thoroughly reliable report published in the _Kölnische Zeitung_ of September 24th, 1905:

During the battle of =Liao Yang=, which lasted six days, the 138th Infantry fired 99,460, and the 139th Infantry 96,040 rounds. On September 1st, the 137th Infantry expended 189,000 rounds, in other words, nearly twice as much in one day as either of the other regiments expended in six. This excessive expenditure of ammunition was due to the very severe attacks which this regiment had to withstand on that day. These attacks were repeated on the next day and the regiment expended 169,000 rounds of ammunition. From October 13th to 18th, at =Linshinpu=, the 139th Infantry expended 351,800 rounds. During this engagement the Japanese succeeded in getting within 10 m. of the Russian lines. Thirty bodies were picked up at 15 paces, and 580 bodies from 100 to 150 paces from the Russian position. The 139th Infantry lost 54 men killed, and 6 officers and 250 men wounded. Major V. Tettau[511] states that during the battle of =Liao Yang= (30th August, 1904), the 36th Infantry expended 416,800 rounds of ammunition, and the 34th Infantry (two battalions), 250,000 rounds, or for 4,200 Russian rifles an average of not less than 160 rounds per rifle.

[511] _Achtzehn Monate mit Russlands Heeren in der Mandschurei._

The Japanese infantryman carried 120 rounds, and each company had, in addition, one two-wheeled ammunition cart carrying 16,000 rounds of ammunition. When packs were removed, each man carried a bag in which were packed three days’ rations, and from 200 to 250 cartridges. The Japanese infantry invariably followed the principle that each man should be supplied with as much ammunition as possible before going into action. In the engagement at =Kinchau= (26th November, 1904), the 1st Infantry Division expended 64, the 3rd 54, and the 4th 143 rounds per man of the original effective strength.[512]

[512] _Streffleur_, _Einzelschriften_, I. p. 224.

Although, according to the examples cited, 100 to 150 rounds of ammunition per man will in general suffice in battle, cases may arise where troops could fire a greater number of rounds to good advantage. This must be taken into account when determining the number of rounds with which the infantryman should be supplied--on his person and in the ammunition wagons. Moreover, it must be remembered that the supply can be replenished without difficulty from the ammunition columns after a battle, so long as it is still possible to assign a separate road to each army corps. When this is no longer practicable, the ammunition columns will encounter almost insurmountable difficulties in supplying the infantry with ammunition.

AMMUNITION SUPPLY OF THE PRINCIPAL ARMIES OF THE WORLD.

========++=======+=====+=======+============+======+=======++ ~Coun- || Year | Cal-| Weight| System |Weight| Weight|| try.~ || of |iber.|of car-| of loading | of | of || || con- | |tridge.| | clip.| clip || || struc-| | | | |filled.|| || tion. | | | | | || || | mm. | g. | | g. | g. || --------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++ ~GER- || 1905 | 7.9 | 27.19 |Mag. in rear| 7 | 126 || MANY~ || S. | | |of barrel, | | || || | | |loaded with | | || || | | |clip holding| | || || | | |5 car- | | || || | | |tridges. | | || --------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++ ~AUS- || 1895 | 8. | 28.35 |Mag. in rear|Frame | 158.25|| TRIA~ || | | |of barrel, | 16.5 | || || | | |loaded with | | || || | | |frame | | || || | | |holding 5 | | || || | | |cartridges. | | || --------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++ ~ITALY~ || 1891 | 6.5 | 22. |Mag. in rear| 12 | 138 || ||Car- | | |of barrel, | | || ||can- | | |loaded with | | || ||Mann- | | |frame | | || ||licher.| | |holding 6 | | || || | | |cartridges. | | || --------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++ ~ENG- || 1908 | 7.71| 27.5 |Mag. in rear| Clip | 150 || LAND~ ||Lee- | | |of barrel, | 12.5 | || ||En- | | |loaded with | | || ||field. | | |clip holding| | || || | | |5 car- | | || || | | |tridges. | | || || | | |[514] | | || --------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++ ~FRANCE~|| 1886- | 8. | 29. |Mag. under | -- | -- || || 98, | | |barrel, car-| | || ||1905 D | | |tridges | | || ||Lebel. | | |loaded | | || || | | |singly. | | || --------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++ ~RUSSIA~|| 1891 | 7.62| 25.812|Mag. in rear| 9.6 | 137 || [516] ||(Three | | |of barrel, | | || ||line | | |loaded with | | || ||rifle).| | |clip holding| | || || | | |5 car- | | || || | | |tridges. | | || --------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++ ~JAPAN~ || 1897 | 6.50| 22.4 |Mag. in rear| 8.5 | 120 || [516] ||Arisaka| | |of barrel, | | || ||(Meidji| | |loaded with | | || || 80). | | |clip holding| | || || | | |5 car- | | || || | | |tridges. | | || --------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++

========++==================++===========++=================++ ~Coun- || Number of rounds || Ammunition|| Number of rounds|| try.~ || carried by a man.|| wagons. || carried by ammu-|| || || || nition wagons. || || || || No. || || Weight|| || per rifle.|| || No. kg. || ||No. [513]|| --------++------------+-----++-----------++-----------+-----++ ~GER- || 150 | ||4 Company || 14,400 | 77 || MANY~ ||N. C. O. 45| ||ammunition || | || ||Trum- |4.5 ||wagons. || | || ||peter 90| || || | || ||Drummer 30| || || | || --------++------------+-----++-----------++-----------+-----++ ~AUS- || 120 | ||4 Company || 9,450 | 47.2|| TRIA~ ||N. C. O. 40| 4.31||ammunition || | || || | ||wagons. || | || --------++------------+-----++-----------++-----------+-----++ ~ITALY~ || 162 | ||Infantry of the line, | || ||Sergt. and |3.736||in field train | 24 || ||Trum- | ||Alpini, on pack animals | || ||peter 126| ||and on carts |244 || ||Inf. | || | || ||Pioneers 108| || | || --------++------------+-----++------------------------+-----++ ~ENG- || 115 |3.48 ||8 Pack animals |250 || LAND~ || | ||8 Ammunition wagons | || --------++------------+-----++-----------++-----------+-----++ ~FRANCE~|| 120 | ||4 Company || 16,384 | 82 || ||N. C. O. 56|3.48 ||ammunition || or | || || | ||wagons. || 19,000 | || || | || || [515] | || --------++------------+-----++-----------++-----------+-----++ ~RUSSIA~|| 120 |3.33 ||24 am. ||In each of | || [516] || | ||carts: ||the 8 1- | || || | ||Ist ||horse carts| || || | ||echelon, 8 || 6000 |=36 || || | ||1-horse ||In each of | || || | ||carts ||the 16 2- | || || | ||IInd ||horse carts| || || | ||echelon, 16|| 14,400 |=30 || || | ||2-horse || | -- || || | ||carts || | 66 || --------++------------+-----++-----------++-----------+-----++ ~JAPAN~ || 120 |2.9 ||Each com- || 16,000 | 80 || [516] || | ||pany has || | || || | ||one cart. || | || --------++------------+-----++-----------++-----------+-----++

========++===============++=============+=========== ~Coun- ||Reserve supply.|| Supply | Supply try.~ || || available | available || || in a | in an || || division. |army corps. --------++---------------++-------------+----------- ~GER- ||Each of the 34 || 150 | 150 MANY~ ||am. wagons of || 77 | 77 ||the 4 inf. am. || --- | 144 ||columns of an || 227 | --- ||army corps, || | 361 ||carries 23,000 || | ||rounds or 144 || | ||per rifle. || | --------++---------------++-------------+----------- ~AUS- ||Each division ||16 battalions|3 divisions TRIA~ ||has one div. ||of 800 rifles| 224 ||am. park of 30 ||each. | 18 ||am. wagons, || 120 | --- ||which carry || 47.2 |about 242 ||769,500 rounds || 57 | ||or 57 per || ----- | ||rifle. || 224. | ||The corps am. || | ||park same || | ||strength as a || | ||div. park. || | --------++---------------++------+------+----------- ~ITALY~ ||In the 3rd sec-||Line: | Alpi-|Inf. of the ||tion of the am.|| | ni: |line: ||column, 40 || 162 | 162 | 162 ||rounds per || 24 | 244 | 24 ||rifle; || 40 | 90 | 40 ||In the Arty. || --- | --- | 45 ||park of the || 226 | 496 | --- ||army corps, 45 || | | 271 ||rounds per || | | ||rifle; || | | ||In the Alpini || | | ||am. column, 90 || | | ||rounds per || | | ||rifle. || | | --------++---------------++------+------+----------- ~ENG- ||In the division|| 115 |400 rounds LAND~ ||am. column, 125|| 250 |per 1,000 ||rounds per || 125 |rifles. ||rifle. || --- | --------++---------------++-------------+----------- ~FRANCE~||In the corps || 120 | 110 ||am. park: || 82 | --- ||Ist || --- | 312 ||echelon 44.2|| 202 | ||IInd || | ||echelon 66.2|| | --------++---------------++-------------+----------- ~RUSSIA~||In the light || 120 | 267 [516] ||Arty. park 81|| 66 | 164 ||In the reserve || 81 | --- ||park 164|| --- | 431 || ---|| 267 | || 245|| | --------++---------------++-------------+----------- ~JAPAN~ || -- || -- | -- [516] || || | --------++---------------++-------------+-----------

By way of comparison with the above, the following table shows the number of rounds to 3 kg. of the ammunition for the several rifles specified:

{ Prussian smooth-bore infantry musket 85 rounds Paper Shells { Prussian rifled infantry musket (new model) 55 „ { Prussian needle gun M/41-69 78 „ { French chassepot rifle M/66 90 „

{ Infantry rifle M/71 69 „ Metal Shells { Swiss rifle, M/67, 69/71, 81 98 „ { Rifle, M/98 with loading clips 103 „

The cartridges are carried as follows by the soldier:

=Germany=: =45= rounds in each of the two cartridge boxes in front, and =60= in the knapsack;

=Austria=: =20= rounds in each of the two cartridge boxes in front, and =60= in the knapsack;

=Russia=: =30= rounds in each of the two cartridge boxes attached to the waist belt, in a breast cartridge box, and in a reserve cartridge box attached to the knapsack;

=France=: =120= rounds, in three cartridge boxes, two in front, and one behind;

=England=: In eight pockets attached to the waist belt, each holding =15= rounds (in addition each soldier carries a shoulder belt holding =50= rounds);

=Japan=: =30= rounds in each of the cartridge boxes in front, and =60= rounds in the cartridge box behind.

2. REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION IN THE VARIOUS ARMIES.

GERMANY.

(Pars. 479-482 F.S.R.)

On the march, it is best to assemble all the company ammunition wagons of the battalions, as this renders supervision easier, and enables the battalion commander to regulate the replenishment of ammunition. Companies acting alone, as well as those forming the support of an advance guard, are followed by their ammunition wagons. It does not seem desirable to unite the ammunition wagons of a regiment or of a brigade on account of the distance separating the different battalions. During the march to the battlefield, the ammunition should be taken out of the knapsacks, and the contents of the ammunition wagons distributed among the men. The men carry this extra ammunition in their haversacks and in their coat and trousers’ pockets, etc.

The two-horse company ammunition wagon, Model 1897, has a width of track of 1.53 m., and, when empty, weighs 450 kg. Compared with the ammunition wagon Model C, 1887, which was originally designed to carry ammunition in boxes, it is lighter by 75 kg., and can be turned within a shorter radius. The wagon body is provided with double doors in front and in rear. The interior is divided into four compartments (to be emptied separately), each capable of holding 16 bundles of cartridges placed on end. Each bundle contains 15 packages of 15 cartridges in clips each. Each bundle of 225 cartridges weighs 7.25 kg.

As three bundles of cartridges are to be carried by one man, according to the Field Service Regulations (par. 480), 1 non-commissioned officer and 21 men are detailed to unload the ammunition wagon. The unloading is managed as follows: Four men take post on each side of the wagon, two handing out the bundles to the other two, who lay them on the ground. The remaining men place the bundles in piles of three in such a manner that the carrying loops of two in each pile can be interlaced and held together by a stick or a bayonet. An ammunition wagon can be emptied in this manner in four minutes. The two ammunition bundles tied together are slung over the left shoulder, the rifle is slung over the right shoulder, and the third bundle is carried in the right hand. In this way, a man can carry 21.8 kg.

Each man is issued 60 to 75 cartridges from the ammunition wagon. These weigh from 1.8 to 2.4 kg. When issued too soon, this additional burden causes considerable inconvenience, and consequently reduces the marching power of the men. The leader must also decide what shall be done with the ammunition in case it has been issued prematurely, and the troops fail to get into action. As soon as the ammunition wagons are emptied, they are sent to the rear in charge of the mounted wagonmaster, and refilled from the ammunition columns. When refilled, they rejoin their proper organizations. If requested, ammunition must be issued to any body of troops.

On the battlefield, ammunition wagons, unless they have been emptied, follow the movements of the several companies and take up a position under cover, indicated by the wagonmaster, as close as possible to the firing line--never more than 800 m. in rear of it. In urgent cases, this must be done without regard to losses. The firing line is supplied with ammunition, when practicable, by the reinforcements sent forward. When the firing line is about to run short of ammunition, this fact is communicated to the troops in rear by repeatedly making the signal “m”. This signal, when made to the front by the troops in rear, signifies, “ammunition is coming up at once.”

In exceptional cases, when ammunition must be sent to the firing line by individual men, the latter should invariably be detailed from troops in rear which have not as yet been engaged. These men must endeavor to reach the firing line by rushes or by crawling, and must then remain with that line.

It is the duty of the battalion commander to see that the ammunition taken from the ammunition wagons is promptly replaced. The higher commanders would do well to provide a reserve supply of ammunition, until the arrival of the ammunition columns, by assembling the ammunition wagons of the troops held in reserve. (Par. 482 F. S. R.). It will also be advisable to assign some of the ammunition wagons of the troops held in reserve to the organizations who will, in all probability, expend a large amount of ammunition.

The ammunition should be removed from the dead and wounded. If this is done by the men of an advancing skirmish line, there is danger that the forward movement will be retarded, and that some of the men will take advantage of this opportunity to make themselves “scarce.” Officers and men should endeavor to replenish ammunition at every opportunity, without awaiting specific orders to that effect, and, in general, see that not only the prescribed number of rounds, but, on the contrary, as much ammunition as possible is on hand in the organization.

When the force is to stand on the defensive, especially if the position to be occupied has been prepared for defense, ammunition should be deposited all along the firing line. (Cartridge boxes or other utensils may be used as receptacles). It is advisable to use first the cartridges carried in caps, haversacks, coat and trousers’ pockets. The contents of the right cartridge box are saved for decisive moments when great rapidity of fire is essential. In replenishing ammunition, the right cartridge box is filled first, then the left, and the surplus is accommodated in haversack, coat and trousers’ pockets.

AUSTRIA.

(Par. 70 Regulations of 1903).

The regulations are extremely thorough and deserve special attention. If an engagement is imminent, each private receives 20 additional rounds before leaving the bivouac or reserve position, and each non-commissioned officer 100 rounds from the company ammunition wagon, so that the latter is about half emptied.[517] This brings the total amount carried by each soldier up to 140 rounds, and increases the load of the privates by 0.71 kg., and that of the non-commissioned officers by about 4 kg. When troops go into action, the ammunition wagons are assembled and accompany the battalion reserve, taking as much advantage of cover as possible, so that the attention of the enemy may not be drawn to them. After the battalion reserve has been absorbed by the firing line, the ammunition wagons accompany the regimental reserve. When exposed to artillery fire, the wagons maintain intervals of twenty paces from one another. They are either placed under the orders of the battalion adjutant, or of the senior supply officer present with them, as may be directed by the battalion commander.

[517] The company ammunition wagon carries 9,450 rounds of ammunition, packed in seven compartments. It consists of a body and a limber, has a width of track of 1.13 m., and is supplied with eight sacks which serve to carry ammunition to the troops. During the day its position is indicated by a red flag, and at night by a green lantern.

In attack, it will, as a rule, only be possible to replenish ammunition until troops get within about 1,000 paces (750 m.) of the enemy. From this point on, however, it will be extremely difficult to supply ammunition. Every lull in the fight must be taken advantage of to replenish ammunition. The firing line receives a fresh supply of ammunition through reinforcements or through small detachments under non-commissioned officers sent forward from the reserves. These detachments, after distributing the ammunition they have brought up, remain with the firing line. The companies engaged in the fire fight later take advantage of every opportunity to replenish and to redistribute ammunition.

In defense, all the ammunition wagons may be emptied before the action begins, and sent to the rear to be refilled. The ammunition should be deposited in the vicinity of the firing line. The subsequent replenishment of the supply should be managed as in an attack. If ammunition is very urgently needed by the firing line, and when no other remedy suggests itself, a part of the ammunition of the reserves may be turned over to the firing line. Special detachments should be detailed to remove the ammunition from the dead and wounded. Wounded men who are able to walk to the dressing station, turn over their ammunition to their comrades.

If another organization requests to be furnished ammunition, the entire amount required, or a part thereof, depending upon the urgency of the case and the amount available, should be turned over to it.

RUSSIA.[518]

[518] In each battalion, the ammunition wagon of the 2nd company carries 108 explosive cartridges, weighing 200 g. each, and that of the 3rd company carries 48 fuzes.

The ammunition carried in the cartridge boxes of the men may prove insufficient during an action. On open ground the ammunition wagons, assembled by regiment, accompany the regimental reserve, and in covered terrain, they are assembled by battalion, and follow the battalion reserve. When practicable, their position is to be indicated during the day by red flags placed on their flank, and at night by green lanterns. In defense, an adequate supply of ammunition should be deposited in rear of the firing line, or should be at once distributed among the men. In attack, the ammunition supply of the firing line and of the supports is to be replenished when they enter ranges under 700 m. The best means of preventing shortage of ammunition is to husband it at long ranges. Ammunition wagons are not to be emptied and their contents distributed before an action begins; on the contrary, the ammunition is to be issued during the fight, one wagon after another being emptied. Ammunition may be sent forward from the reserve to the firing line, the men who carry it remaining with that line. On the other hand--and this seems to be the method most frequently employed--men from the firing line may be sent to the rear for ammunition. The men of the reserves at once turn over one-half of their cartridges to these men, who are then assembled and sent forward under the command of a non-commissioned officer. The ammunition is carried forward in sacks--so-called “bashlicks.”

FRANCE.

Each company has one ammunition wagon, which is a part of the combat train (_train de combat_), and carries 16,384 Lebel cartridges, and 36 intrenching tools. It can carry 19,000 rounds of the new “D” ammunition,[519] So long as any ammunition remains in the ammunition wagons, they remain under all circumstances with their battalion. They are assembled in battalion groups on the left flank of their battalion. When the battalion is broken up for advance, flank, rear guard, or outpost work, they remain with the main body of the battalion. When the companies are separated for a protracted period, the battalion commander decides whether or not the ammunition wagons should accompany their respective companies. The ammunition in the wagons is, as a general rule, to be distributed before the commencement of an action. If this is impossible when the force is taken by surprise, the commander of the group of ammunition wagons must bring them up as close as possible under cover, and the battalion commander must supervise the distribution of the ammunition. In quarters and on the march, the ammunition is to be replenished by taking the ammunition from the sick, from the men detailed away, or from the supply carried by the baggage wagon.[520] The ammunition in the baggage wagon is only to be used when all these other sources are exhausted. When an encounter with the enemy may be expected, and only a short march is anticipated, the ammunition carried in the baggage wagons may be distributed before starting.

[519] The company ammunition wagon Model 1893 weighs 287 kg. when empty, and 770 kg. when filled. It carries 14,400 rounds of ammunition (net capacity 48%) or 66 rounds per rifle.

[520] The baggage wagon weighs 450 kg. when empty, and 1054 kg. when loaded. It carries 36 intrenching tools, and a tool chest. Its net capacity is 45%. Forty knapsacks may be transported on this wagon in lieu of the ammunition.

Any further replenishment of ammunition is to be ordered by the division commander. The empty company ammunition wagons are assembled in regimental groups and follow at least 1,000 m. in rear of the regimental reserve. At each halt, the wagon train is to prepare for defense. The regimental commander is to regulate the distribution of the ammunition sent forward by the ammunition columns.

When this distribution cannot be made for some reason or other, the wagons, assembled in groups of four, follow their battalions. It is the duty of the battalion commander to keep the firing line supplied with ammunition. The contents of the company ammunition wagons are not to be replenished from the ammunition columns during an action. The ammunition is to be removed from the dead and wounded.

The source of the ammunition supply is the corps ammunition park, which is divided into three echelons, as follows:

1st echelon consists of two infantry ammunition columns and marches at the head of the combat train of the troops engaged;

IInd echelon consists of three infantry ammunition columns;

IIIrd echelon carries artillery ammunition only.

Two infantry ammunition columns of the 1st echelon, which, as a rule, constitutes the “ammunition supply center” at the commencement of an action, march at the head of the combat train (_train de combat_). A half-filled infantry ammunition column must at all times be available at this “ammunition supply center.” Ammunition wagons of the infantry ammunition column are sent forward at the request of the division commander to the position taken up by the company ammunition wagons. The latter are generally posted not more than 1,000 m. in the rear of the fighting line, and parts of each infantry ammunition column (usually one ammunition wagon for each battalion) are posted by an officer not more than 1,500 m. in rear of these. The empty company ammunition wagons are not refilled, the ammunition being sent forward directly from the ammunition columns. As soon as the infantry ammunition columns are informed which organizations they are to supply, they send out non-commissioned officers to locate the ammunition wagons of those organizations and establish communication with them. The commander of the ammunition column directs where empty ammunition wagons are to assemble. In emergencies, wagons of the infantry ammunition column may also drive close up to the fighting line. In this case, empty wagons assemble near the groups of company ammunition wagons, and from there they are sent back in trains to the ammunition column to which they belong.

Every opportunity, such as a lull in the fight, or an abatement of the hostile fire, etc., must be utilized to distribute the ammunition of the company wagons or of the ammunition column.

It is prohibited to send wagons or men to the rear for the purpose of bringing up ammunition on the battlefield. All men sent forward with ammunition should remain in the firing line.

ENGLAND.

The British infantryman is usually provided with 115, and each machine gun with 3,500 rounds of ammunition. Each battalion is, in addition, provided with 8 pack animals, each carrying two ammunition chests containing 4,400 cartridges (77 kg.), and with 8 ammunition wagons.

On the march, the pack animals and half of the ammunition wagons follow immediately in rear of the battalion. The (16) remaining wagons form a reserve ammunition column at the disposal of the brigade commander, and march at the tail of the brigade. When an engagement is anticipated, 50 additional rounds (1.3 kg.) may be issued to each man before leaving camp. During an action, one pack animal and two ammunition wagons follow each half-battalion. Empty company ammunition wagons are refilled from the brigade reserve ammunition column. When the wagons of the latter are empty, they are replaced by filled wagons from the ammunition column. The teams are not transferred with the wagons, but remain with the organization to which they belong.

Ammunition wagons are expected to approach to within about 900 m. of the firing line, and pack animals to within 450 m. One non-commissioned officer and two or three privates are to be detailed from each company to bring up ammunition. Each man is to carry a sack containing 600 cartridges (16 kg.). That this method of supplying ammunition is practicable under fire is shown by the distinguished conduct lists for =Paardeberg=, where men were praised or decorated for endurance and fearlessness in bringing up ammunition. (See p. 371 supra). The men who bring up ammunition may be kept in the firing line when the ground is devoid of cover.

The division ammunition columns, although they carry both infantry and artillery ammunition, constitute an integral part of the artillery battalions.

ITALY.

When an encounter with the enemy is anticipated, the ammunition wagons are to be emptied, the men detailed to carry ammunition are to remove their packs, and each one of them is to carry ammunition weighing about 7.5 kg.

The packs are to be removed only in case of urgent necessity. When this is ordered, however, the soldier first removes all the cartridges and the emergency ration from his pack. The ammunition knapsacks, which are always to be taken along, are, however, carried in turn by all the soldiers of the company.

The advancing units that are in need of ammunition, may demand it from troops ordered to remain behind. They take along their own ammunition carriers. The latter, assembled in a squad, distribute the ammunition along the firing line, and remain with that line. In the first lull that occurs, they assemble again as a squad and take part as such in the action.

The empty ammunition knapsacks belonging to organizations in reserve are to be refilled as rapidly as possible from the ammunition wagons sent forward from the ammunition park to the fighting line.

The ammunition of the dead and wounded is to be removed ind distributed among the remaining men. During pauses in the fire, the ammunition is to be equalized in all organizations engaged in the fire fight.

The ammunition wagons of the echelons in rear are to approach the fighting line as far as the available cover permits. Their position is to be indicated by flags. The ammunition carriers are to come to these wagons to refill the empty ammunition knapsacks.

3. WHAT DEDUCTIONS MAY BE MADE FROM THE REGULATIONS OF THE VARIOUS ARMIES.

1. The contents of the ammunition wagons should be distributed at the commencement of an action. This should not be done too early as the packing and unpacking of ammunition takes time, and as the soldier will not march so well when loaded down at the wrong time with 60 to 75 additional cartridges (1.8 to 2.4 kg.), unequally distributed in haversack and pockets. It is also a good plan to issue as many rounds of ammunition to the non-commissioned officers as to the men. During a fight this ammunition can then be distributed to the men.

2. As soon as the ammunition wagons have been refilled from the ammunition columns, which have been brought up, they should at once endeavor to rejoin their battalions and should then follow as close as possible in rear of the latter. The expenditure of ammunition will never be equally distributed along the line; therefore, if the battalion commander retains all four ammunition wagons directly under his own orders, he will be better able to equalize the supply of ammunition than would be the case if each ammunition wagon, as soon as it is refilled, were to follow its own company, which, in many cases, it will scarcely find again.

3. It is the duty of the commander to assign a few ammunition wagons belonging to organizations held in reserve to bodies of troops which will in all probability need a greater quantity of ammunition.

4. The organization must be in possession of an adequate supply of ammunition on entering the zone of effective fire, i.e., at a distance of 600 m. from the enemy. The sending of individual men to the rear for the purpose of bringing up ammunition will only be practicable in rare cases. As a rule, the violence of the hostile fire will make this impossible. Only the best men can be sent back. It is asking too much to expect them to cross twice the zone swept by hostile fire. Moreover, the best men are needed in the firing line to encourage the weaker element, and to replace disabled squad leaders. Under no circumstances should the firing line be withdrawn to get ammunition from the ammunition wagons, as an attack made unexpectedly by the enemy might find the position unoccupied and thus cause its loss.[521] It is a general principle that ammunition must be sent forward from the rear.

[521] Examples: The loss of the park at Coulmiers (HELVIG, _Das 1. bayerische Armeekorps_, p. 202). The engagement at Daix on January 21st, 1871 (_Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 61_, p. 174). KUNZ, _Loigny-Poupry_, p. 77.

5. The ammunition can be removed from the dead and wounded only in defense, or in attack when the forward movement has come to a standstill. In an advance, it cannot be done without retarding the movement and without affording individual men an excuse to remain behind.

6. The bringing up of ammunition by individual men, left to their own devises, is not to be recommended, as it facilitates “shirking”; moreover, if one of the men is disabled, the ammunition he carries will never reach the firing line. Ammunition should either be sent to the firing line with each support, or it should be carried by detachments sent forward in thin skirmish lines under the command of non-commissioned officers. These detachments should remain with the firing line.

7. Whether or not signals for informing the troops in rear of a shortage of ammunition in the firing line will fulfill the expectations entertained for them, can only be determined by the test of war.

INDEX.

A.

ACCELERATED FIRE, effect of 162

ACCELERATED TIME, in various armies (tables) 54

ACCURACY, effect of, in collective fire 169

ACTION Breaking off an 441 Conduct and duties of the leaders in 399 Containing 445 Delaying 445

ADJUSTMENT, artillery fire 319

ADVANCE Crawling--see Crawling Fire while in motion 92, 93 Firing line in attack 366 Formations suitable for, through timber 332 Impulse from the rear 95 Infantry under artillery fire 321 Rushes--see Rushes Skirmish line 76

ADVANCE BY CRAWLING--see Crawling

ADVANCE BY RUSHES--see Rushes

ADVANCE GUARD. Battalion, formation for attack 212 Conduct in a rencontre 334 Conduct of, France 454 Italy 451

ADVANCED POSITIONS 413 Austria 450 Danger of fight being decided in 414 England 462 Examples of 412 Example of attack on 348 Japan 465 Russia 413

ADVANCED TROOPS 349

AGENTS DE LIAISON 245

AIM, points of 165

AIMING POSITION, warding off cavalry 307

ALPINI 22, 24

ALTITUDE, effect of, on ranges 145

AMMUNITION Expenditure and supply of 468 Franco-German War 468 Russo-Japanese War 473 Russo-Turkish War 472 Expenditure of, during advance by rushes 90 How carried by soldier in various armies 476 Knapsacks 483 Machine guns 261 Austria 288 England 290 Switzerland 284 Germany 273 Rate of fire versus waste of 161 Shortage of, examples 469 Supply and distribution in action 400 Supply, Austria 475, 479 Deductions from various regulations 483 Defense 400 England 475, 482 France 475, 480 Germany 475, 476 Italy 475, 483 Japan 475 Russia 475, 480 Various armies (table) 475 Wagon--see Ammunition Wagons, Weight of, in various armies (table) 40

AMMUNITION CARTS--see Ammunition Wagons

AMMUNITION KNAPSACKS 483

AMMUNITION WAGONS 72 Austria 479 England 482 France 480 Germany 477 Italy 483 Russia 480

APPLICATORY METHOD OF INSTRUCTION 10, 11

APPLIED TACTICS 12, 13

ARBITRATION, Courts of 3

ARMY CORPS, frontage in attack 236

ARTILLERY, Adjustment of fire 319 Cavalry charge supported by 313 Combat of infantry against 316 Combat of machine guns against 297 Combination fuses 113 Coöperation with infantry 351, 354 Effect of fire (France) 123, 124, 321 Field guns, in various armies 111 Fire at successive ranges 321 Fire diverted by advancing infantry 327 Fire effect of French 4-gun battery 321 Fire effect of (French data) 123, 124 Fire for effect 320 Howitzer, heavy field 118 Light field 116 Infantry screen 327 Line, distance from infantry line in defense 415 Losses, Franco-German War 20 Percentage of 188 Under infantry fire 326, 327 Percussion shell (Model 96) 115 Percussion shrapnel 111 Positions in defense 414 Preparatory action (France) in attack 454 Progressive fire 320 Searching fire 321 Shields, protection afforded by 324 Shrapnel 112, 113 Effect of (table) 114, 122 Sweeping fire 321 Time required for adjusting the fire 119 Time shell (Model 96) 116 (Model 98) 118 Time shrapnel 112, 113 Unlimbering under infantry fire 326 Zone fire 320

ASSAULT 373 Austria 449 Conduct of the 374 Decision to make an 373 England 462 Examples 376 Fire support 379 Fire while in motion 381 France 457 Guidons 355 Italy 452 Japan 464 Moment for making the 374 Pursuit after successful 385 Successful, conduct after 385 Trumpet signal, fix bayonet 377 Unsuccessful, conduct after 386

ASSAULTING DISTANCE 385, 424

ASSEMBLY FORMATIONS 42 France (_carré de division_) 454

ATTACK 329 Abridged 330 Advance of the firing line 366 Advance guard, conduct of the--in a rencontre 334 Advanced troops 349 Assault 352, 373, 374, 399 Assaulting distance 385, 424 Austria 448 Brigade, frontage of a, in 399 Column 44, 45 Comparison with defense 329 Conditions upon which success depends 345 Conduct of the 365 Coöperation of infantry and artillery 351, 352, 354 Decision to assault 373 Deliberately planned, comparison with rencontre 334, 338 Deployment, initial 366 Distances 368 Of supports from firing line 99 Duration of the 351 England 459 Envelopment 356 Examples Boer War 340 Russo-Japanese War 340, 345 Fire fight 368 Fixing bayonets 372 Formation for, of a battalion 211, 212, 213 France 453 Advance in mass formation 455 Group attack 255 Preparatory attack formation 455 Frontage 234 Army corps 236 Battalion 236 Brigade 235, 236, 399 Company 96, 235, 236 Gaps in the line 239 General rules for use of intrenching tools 393 Higher troop leading, duties 366 Holding 357, 445 Intrenching tools, use of 387 Infantry against dismounted cavalry 313 Italy 451 Japan 463 I. Army 342 Influences determining tactics in Russo-Japanese War 341 Launching the enveloping force 359 Lessons of the Boer War 340 Russo-Japanese War 340 Local reconnaissance in 347 Machine guns in 365 Methods of forming a battalion for (plates) 215, 216 Minor troop leading, duties 365 Moment for making the assault 374 Normal attack 203, 204, 205 Number of men required 234 On an enemy deployed for defense 340 Orders, issue of, in rencontre 36 Over plain devoid of cover 255 Point of 355 Position of commander in 399 Preparation by infantry and artillery (France) 454 Preparation of the 346 Preparatory position, advance into 350 Provisions of various regulations in re use of spade in 392 Pure frontal 357 Range finding instruments, employment in 146 Reconnaissance 346 In force 347 Rencontre 333 Compared with deliberately planned attack 338 Conduct of main body in a 336 Reserve, strength of 395 Reserves, employment of 394 Rules for the advance under fire 367 Sand bag cover 344, 390 Secondary 357 Separation of holding and flank attacks 361 Signal (fix bayonet) 377 Spade, use of, in 387, 392, 449, 457, 465, 466 Successful, conduct after 385 Superiority of fire, necessity of 370, 371 Supports, advance of 368 Distance from firing line 99 Surprise 330 Switzerland 466 Time for opening fire, general rules 155 Troop leading, duties of 365, 366 United, examples illustrating necessity of a 402 Unsuccessful, conduct after 386

ATTACK ON A POSITION PREPARED FOR DEFENSE Austria 448 Japan 464 Switzerland 466

AUSTRIA Advanced positions 450 Advanced troops 349 Ammunition, how carried by soldier 476 Ammunition supply 475 Regulations in re 479 Assault 449 Attack 448 Attack on a position prepared for defense 448 Battalion, formations of the 69, 72 Column of platoons, how formed 49 (plate) 62 Company, strength of (table) 35 Coöperation of infantry and artillery 354 Counter-attack 438, 450 Crawling 449 Defense 450 Seeking a decision 450 Development for action 208 Envelopment 362, 449 Fire control and fire discipline 135 Fire, kinds of 159 Time for opening 153 While in motion, experiments with 92 Firing line, method of reinforcing the 96 Position, choice of 370 Frontage 241 Front and facing distance 48 Infantry combat 448-450 Infantry versus cavalry 314 Intrenching tool equipment (table) 39 Kinds of fire 449 Load carried by a soldier 40 Machine gun 288 Ammunition supply 288 And infantry, relative fire effect of 267 Fire, kinds of 263 Formations 288 Organization 288 Pace, length and number per minute (table) 54 Ranges, ascertaining 144 Reinforcing the firing line, method of 96 Rencontre 339, 448 Rushes 90, 449 Skirmish line, formation of 80 Superiority of fire 371 Supply of ammunition 475, 479 Telegraph detachments 248 Use of spade in attack 392, 449

B.

BASE UNIT 218 Advantages and disadvantages 218, 219 Of combat, designation of 244

BATTALION Acting alone, formation for attack 212 Advance guard, formation for attack 212 Attack formation, France 457 Austrian, formation of the 69, 72 Broad column (with plates) 67, 68 Commander, duties in action 400 Post in action 400 Deep column (with plates) 67, 68 Depth on the march 72 English, formation of the 71 Formation, in a containing action 213 Forming for attack 211 French, formation of the (with plates) 70 Frontage in attack and defense 236 German, formation of the 67, 68 Group intrenchments 417 Historical development 36 Intrenching tool equipment (table) 39 Intrenchments for a 419, 421 Italian, formation of the 70 Japanese, formation of the 70 Method of forming for attack (plates) 215, 216 Movements of the 67 Normal formation 67 Organization of the 36, 37 Part of a larger force, formation in attack 213 In defense 213 Route column, formation 72 Provisions of various regulations 73 Russian, formations of the 69 Swiss, formations of the 71

BATTALION COMMANDER Duties in action 400 Post in action 400

BATTLE UNIT 34

BAYONET FENCING 134

BAYONET FIGHTS 382

BEATEN ZONE 179 Definition 179 Depth at various angles of slope--General Paquié’s rule for determining 183 Formulae for computing depth of 180 Increase and diminution of (table) 181

BELGIUM Fire control and fire direction 135 Frontage 242 Front and facing distance 48

BREAKING OFF AN ACTION 441

BRIGADE 37 Attack formation of a French 454 Cavalry, strength of 311 Combat formation 74 Development for action (with plate) 216, 217 Formations 73, 74 Frontage in attack 235, 236, 399 Importance 37, 38 Movements 73, 74 Three-unit organization 218

BROAD COLUMN (with plate) 67

C.

CADENCE 53, 54

CAVALRY Charge of French Cuirassiers of the Guard at Vionville 311 Charge supported by artillery 313 Charges 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 308, 309, 310, 311, 313 Combat of infantry against 301 Provisions of various regulations 314, 315 Combat of machine guns against 296 Dismounted, infantry attack against 313 Losses Charge of French cavalry at Vionville 312 Franco-German War 20 Percentage of 188 Massed employment 313 Moral effect of a charge 306 Regiment, strength of German 273 Relative strength as compared to infantry 311

CHANGE OF DIRECTION, how executed 219

CHANGE OF FRONT Examples of 220, 221 How executed 219

CHASSEURS ALPINS 22

CLEARING THE FOREGROUND 421

CLOSE COLUMN, definition 47

CLOSE ORDER Battalion 67 Brigade 73 Company 56 Compared with extended order 102 Regiment 73

CLOSE ORDER FORMATIONS, Effect of fire on 102, 103 Value of 103, 104

COLLECTIVE FIRE 169

COLOR, position of the 68

COLT MACHINE GUN 261

COLUMN Attack in 44, 45 Battalion in route 72 Broad (with plate) 67 Close, definition of 47 Comparison with line 42-45 Deep (with plates) 67, 68 Dimensions of broad and deep (plate) 69 Double 71 French double (plate) 70 Open, definition of 47 Route (machine gun battery) 273, 274 Section (machine gun battery) 273, 274

COLUMN OF FOURS 58 How formed (plate) 58 And squads compared 59

COLUMN OF PLATOONS 61 How formed 49 Machine gun battery 273, 274 (plate) 62 Vulnerability of 186, 187

COLUMN OF SQUADS 57 Employment of 59 (plates) 57

COLUMN OF TWOS 56

COLUMNS, line of company, France (plate) 70

COMBAT Conduct and duties of the leaders 399 Drill, importance of 105 Duration of 178 Frontage--see Frontage. Infantry 448-467 Austria 448-450 France 453-459 Italy 451-453 Japan 463-465 Japanese, Characteristics of 341 Russia 466 Switzerland 466-467 Versus artillery 316 Versus cavalry 301 Versus machine guns 268 Machine Guns 296, 297 Versus artillery 297 Versus cavalry 296 Orders 243, 244 Necessity for written 244 Patrols 80, 250 Sections 257 Assignment of 243 Division of a position into 411 Tasks, assignment of 243 Train (machine guns) 270 Unit 34

COMBAT DRILL, importance of 105

COMBAT FRONTAGE--see Frontage

COMBAT ORDERS 243 Items that should not appear in 244 Written, necessity for 244

COMBAT PATROLS 250

COMBAT SECTIONS 257 Division of a position into 411

COMBAT TRAIN, machine gun 270

COMBAT UNIT 34

COMBINED SIGHTS, use of 166

COMMANDER Battalion, post of, in action 400 Company, post of, in action 400 Conduct in action 399 Interference with subordinates 401 Post of, in action 399 Post of, in rencontre 398 Regimental, post of, in action 400 Selection of a position during combat 244

COMMANDS 41 Fire 166

COMMUNICATING TRENCHES 421

COMMUNICATION With neighboring troops and next higher headquarters 245 On the battlefield 246

COMPANY 34 Ammunition wagons 72, 477, 479, 480, 482, 483 Austrian, in column of platoons (plate) 62 Columns of the 56 Commander, duties in action 400 Post in action 400 Dimensions of the 3 and 4 platoon company (plate) 52 Division into platoons, sections, squads 46-53 3 or 4 platoons 48, 53 Formation of the 46, 47 French 4-rank formation (with plates) 65, 66 In line (plate) 49 Frontage in attack 235 Attack and defense 96 Defense and rear guard actions 236 German, In column of platoons (plate) 62 In column of squads (plate) 57 In company column (plate) 60 In line (plate) 47 In route column (plate) 57 Movements in line and column 56 Non-commissioned officers, posts of, in various armies 47 Organization of the 34, 35 Range finders, post of 46, 47 Russian, in column of platoons (plate) 62 Strength of the 24, 35 In the various armies (table) 35

COMPANY AMMUNITION WAGONS 72, 477, 479, 480, 482, 483

COMPANY COLUMN (with plates) 60 Value of 186, 187

COMPANY COMMANDER, Duties in action 400 Post in action 400

CONCENTRATED FIRE, machine guns 263

CONCENTRATION For action 205 French, into _carré de division_, in attack 454

CONE OF DISPERSION, machine gun fire 264

CONE OF MISSES, Wolozkoi’s theory of the constant 173

CONTAINING ACTIONS 445 Delaying action and holding attack compared 445

COÖPERATION Formation of a battalion in 213 Infantry and artillery 351, 352, 354 Difficulties of 354 Provisions of various regulations 354

COUNTER-ATTACK 378, 428, 453 After position is carried 433 Austria 410 Decision brought about by the 234 England 463 Examples of 433, 435, 436, 437, 438 France 439, 458 Frontal 436 In conjunction with a movement to the rear 434 Moment for making 432, 434 Moral effect of 436 Provisions of various regulations 438, 439

COURTS OF ARBITRATION 3

COVER Sand bag 344, 390 Trenches 421 Use of 256 By firing line 138

COVER TRENCHES 421

CRAWLING 86 Austria 49 How executed 87, 88

CUTTING WEAPONS, wounds produced by (%) 384

CYCLISTS 28, 29, 30, 414 Depth of detachment of 29 Rate of march of 29 Use of, on battlefield 246

D.

“D” BULLET Data regarding 130 Effect on steel shields 324

DANGER, effect of 195

DANGER SPACE, definition 179

DEEP COLUMN (with plates) 67, 68 French (with plates) 70

DEFENSE 408 Advanced positions 413 Ammunition supply 410 Austria 450 Battalion group intrenchments 417 Clearing the foreground 421 Combat sections, division of the position into 411 Communicating trenches 419, 420, 421 Company, frontage of 96 Comparison with attack 329 Conduct of the 423 Counter-attack 234, 428 After position is carried 433 Frontal 436 Moment for making 432, 434 Cover trenches 419-421 Distance of general reserve from defensive line 430 Distribution in depth in 232 Dummy intrenchments 421 England 462 Field magazines 418 Fire fight 427 Firing trenches 417 Flanks, protection of the 425 Formation of a battalion 213, 214 Fortifying the position 415 Framework of the position 414 France 458 Frontage in 232, 233 Frontage of a battalion 236 Company 96, 236 Frontal counter-attack 436 Gaps in the line 411 General reserve, location of the 411 Position of the 429 Strength of the 431 Interval between general reserve and defensive line 430 Intrenching, time essential for 416 Intrenchments, purpose of 416, 417 Italy 453 Japan 465 Long range fire, use of 150 Machine guns 295, 425 Masks 421 Number of men required in temporary 233 Observation of the foreground 420 Obstacles, construction of 421 Occupation of the position 426 Offensive, Assumption of the 428 --defensive 408 Necessity of assuming the 409 Passive 409 Position, Advanced 413 Determining factors in selecting a 414 Division of the, into sections 411 Fortifying the 415 Framework of the 414 Requirements of a 410 Purely passive 408 Range finding instruments, employment of 146 Refusing a flank 425 Reserve, strength of 395 Russia 422 Section reserves 411 Sections, division of the position into 411 Seeking a decision 233, 234, 409, 450, 467 Splinter proofs 418, 419, 420 Superiority of fire 427 Supports 410 Switzerland 467 Temporary, Frontage in 233 Number of men required in 233 Occupation of a position 408 Terrain, character of, required by 254 Time for opening fire, in (general rules) 155 Traverses 417 Trenches (dimensions) 418, 420 Troops required to occupy the position 410, 411 Weak points, strengthening of 412

DEFENSE SEEKING A DECISION 409 Austria 450 Frontage 233, 234 Number of men required 234 Switzerland 467

DELAYING ACTION 445 Compared with holding attack 445 Distribution in depth in 232 Frontage in 232

DEMOLITION TOOLS 39

DEPLOYMENT 78, 80, 209 For action 209 France, from 4-rank formation (with plate) 65, 66 Initial, in attack 366 Provisions of various regulations 80

DEPTH Battalion on the march 72 Cyclist detachment 29 Distribution in 222-225, 235, 237, 241, 242

DEVELOPMENT FOR ACTION 207 Brigade 216, 217

DISARMAMENT, proposals for 3

DISCIPLINE and the moral factors 107, 108

DISPERSION 33

DISTANCE, Definition of 47 Assaulting 385, 424 Attack 368 Between elements in the battalion 72, 73 Facing, in various armies (table) 48 General reserve from defensive line 430 Support from firing line in attack 99

DISTRIBUTION IN DEPTH 222 Maximum, when necessary 235 Necessity for 224 Necessity for, increase with size of force 241 Provisions of various regulations 241, 242 Relation to frontage 225 Examples 223, 237

DIVISION, attack formation, France 457

DOUBLE COLUMN, France (with plates) 70

DOUBLE TIME 55 In various armies (table) 54

DRILL AND TRAINING 105, 106

DRILL ATTACK 204

DRILL, importance of combat 105

DRILL REGULATIONS 13-16 Provisions of various--see under name of country

DUMMY INTRENCHMENTS 421, 423

E.

ECHELON FORMATION 73, 74

EFFECT OF FIRE 167 As regards time 172 At medium ranges 151 Influence of the elevation selected 162 On artillery when unlimbering 326 On close order formations 102, 103 On thin and dense skirmish lines 77 Standard of measurement of the 168

EFFICACY OF FIRE 140 Against hill positions 183 Dependent upon accuracy 156 Influence of the ground on 179 Influence of training 168

ELEVATIONS, rear sight 165, 310

ÉLITE TROOPS 21, 22

ENGLAND Advanced positions 413, 462 Ammunition, how carried by soldier 476 Ammunition supply 475 Regulations in re 482 Assault 462 Attack 459 Battalion, formations of the 71 Coöperation of infantry and artillery 354 Counter-attack 439, 463 Defense 462 Envelopment 362 Fire fight in attack 461 Fire of position 154 Fire, time for opening 154 Kinds of 160 Frontage 242 In attack 460 Front and facing distance 48 Frontal counter-attack 463 Group intrenchments 462 Holding attack 447 Infantry combat 459-463 Versus cavalry 314 Intrenching in attack 392 Local counter-attack 463 Machine guns 289 Ammunition supply 290 And infantry, relative fire effect 266, 267 Organization 290 Views on 297 Mounted infantry 26 Normal attack 203 Pace, length and number per minute (table) 54 Rallying position 460 Reserves, use of, prior to Boer War 397 Rushes 91, 462 Skirmish line, formation of 80 Supply of ammunition 475, 482 Telephone detachments 248 Use of spade in attack 392

ENVELOPMENT 356 Austria 362, 449 Dangers involved 358 England 363 Examples of 357-361 France 362, 457 Italy 363 Provisions of various regulations 362, 363

ESKADRONS Number in German brigade 311 Strength of 32

ESTIMATING DISTANCES--see Range

EQUIPMENT 38-40 Intrenching tool 38-40 Tent, weight of 40 Weight of, in various armies (table) 40

EXPENDITURE AND SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION 468 Examples from military history 468-474 Franco-German War 468 Russo-Japanese War 473 Russo-Turkish War 472

EXPLOSIVES 39, 480

EXTENDED ORDER 75 Compared with close order 102 Movements in 81

F.

FACING DISTANCE, in various armies (table) 48

FIELD ARTILLERY--see Artillery

FIELD GUN 111

FIELD MAGAZINES 418

FIELD TRAIN 72 Machine guns 270

FIGHTING UNIT 33

FILE CLOSERS, position of 46, 47

FIRE Accelerated, effect of 162 Beaten zone, definition 179 Collective, effect of accuracy in 169 Combined sights 166 Commands for firing 166 Constant cone of misses, Wolozkoi’s theory of the 173 Continuous, fatigue produced by 155 Control 134 Curve of hits obtained by various marksmen 170 Danger space, definition 179 Direction 134 Discipline 133 Distribution of, against charging cavalry 311 Effect 167 As regards time 172 At medium ranges 151 Influence of the elevation selected on 162 On artillery when unlimbering 326 On close order formations 102, 103 On thin and dense skirmish lines 77 Efficacy of 140 Against hill positions 183 Dependent upon accuracy 156 Influence of the ground on 179 Influence of training on 168 Elevations and points of aim 165 To be used in warding off cavalry charges 310 Employment of infantry 132 Expedients for minimizing the effect of hostile 118 Flanking 254 Formula for determining favorable range for firing against hill positions 183 Hits obtained by various marksmen (table) 171 Hostile, expedients for minimizing effect of 118 Formations suitable under 120, 121 Hurried, effect of 162 Increasing difficulties in adjusting hostile artillery fire 119 Indirect 184 Infantry 126 Against charging cavalry 308 And machine gun, relative value of 265-267 Employment of 132 Influences affecting accuracy of 173 Influence of the ground on efficacy of 179 Kinds of 157 Austria 449 France 455 Italy 451 Japan 463 Provisions of various regulations 158-160 Russo-Japanese War 157 To be used in warding off a cavalry charge 310 Long range 148, 150-153, 176 Losses produced by long range fire 176 Machine gun--see Machine Guns Marksmanship, effect of, in collective 169 Misses Effect of 173 Wolozkoi’s theory of the constant cone of 173 Moral effect of 191, 227 On charging cavalry 309 Number of rounds to be expended to accomplish a certain result 172 Oblique, effect of, against shielded batteries 324 Observation of 167 Pauses in 155 Preparation 149 Provisions of various regulations in re kinds of 158 Time for opening 153 Rafale 164 Rate of 160 At various ranges 162 Versus waste of ammunition 161 Ricochets, effect of 185 Rifle-rests, influence of 178 Superiority of, in defense 427 Time for opening 147 General rules 155 On charging cavalry 308 Provisions of various regulations 153 Training, influence of, on efficacy of 168 Trial volleys 164 Volley, value of 157, 163 With counted cartridges 164 Withholding the 151 Wolozkoi’s theory of the constant cone of misses 173

FIRE AT SUCCESSIVE RANGES 321

FIRE EFFECT 167 As regards time 172 At medium ranges 151 Influence of the elevation selected, on 162 On artillery when unlimbering 326 On close order formations 102, 103 On thin and dense skirmish lines 77 Standard of measurement of the 168

FIRE FIGHT Attack 368, 369, 461 Defense 427 Machine guns 283 Superiority of fire in attack 370-371

FIRE FOR EFFECT 320

FIRE OF POSITION 140 Infantry 85 Machine guns 85

FIRE WHILE IN MOTION 92, 381 Austrian experiments with 92 Examples of employment of 93 Losses when using 92

FIRING LINE Advance in attack 366 Assembling the 97 Closing in 97 Dense 75 Prolonging the 96 Re-forming the 97 Reinforcing the, method of 96 Selection of line to be occupied by 138 Strength and density 75 Strength of the 139 Use of cover by the 138

FIRING TRENCHES 417, 419, 420

FIXING BAYONETS 372 Signal for, in assault 377

FLAGS, Guidon 62, 63

FLANK ATTACK Separation from holding attack 361 France 455

FLANKS, protection of the, in defense 425

FOREGROUND, division into sections 411

FORMAL TACTICS 12

FORMATIONS 42 Advance through woods 332 Assembly 42, 454 Austria 49, 52, 58, 62, 69, 72 Battalion 67-73 Battle 43 Belgium 58 Brigade 73-74 England 58, 71 France 49, 65, 66, 70, 73, 454 Germany 47, 52, 57, 60, 62, 67, 68, 72 Infantry under artillery fire 318, 321-324 Influence of various rifles on density of 240 Italy 58, 70, 73 Japan 58, 70 Line and column, comparison of 43 Machine guns 273, 274 Austria 288 Germany 273, 274 Switzerland 287 Netherlands 58 Provisions of various regulations 69-71 Purpose of 42 Regiment 73, 74 Route 42 Russia 58, 62, 69, 73 Sweden 58 Switzerland 71 Tactical, importance of 108 Troops in rear of firing line 186 Vulnerability of various 181, 186, 187 Warding off a cavalry charge 302

FORTIFYING THE POSITION 415 Russia 422

FORTRESS WARFARE 13

FOURS, column of 58 Compared with column of squads 59 How formed 58

FRAMEWORK OF A POSITION 414

FRANCE Advance guard, conduct of the 454 Advance in mass formation in attack 455 Advanced positions 413 Ammunition, how carried by soldier 476 Ammunition supply 475 Regulations in re 480 Artillery fire, effect of 123, 124 Assembly (_carré de division_) 454 Assault 457 Attack 453 Artillery in the preparatory action 454 Formation Battalion 457 Brigade 454 Division 457 Infantry preparation 454 Battalion, formation of the (with plate) 70 Company (plate) 49 Strength of (table) 35 _Contre attaque_ 439 Coöperation of infantry and artillery 334 Counter-attack 378, 439, 458 In conjunction with a movement to the rear 434 Defense 458 Envelopment 363, 457 Fire, kinds of 159, 455 Fire pauses 156 Fire, time for opening 154 Flank attack 455 Frontage 241, 242 Front and facing distance 48 Group attack 255 Group combat 241, 242 Infantry combat 453-459 Infantry versus cavalry 315 Intrenching in attack 457 Intrenching, tool equipment (table) 39 Intrenchments 416 Kinds of fire 159, 455 Line of company columns 70 Load carried by soldier 40 Machine guns 290 Offensive return 458 Pace, length and number per minute (table) 54 Platoon in 4-rank formation (with plates) 65, 66 Preparatory attack formation 455 Pure frontal attack 455 Rafale fire 164 Rencontre 339 _Retour offensif_ 439 Rushes 90, 91 Signal detachments 248 Skirmish line, formation of 80 Supply of ammunition 475, 480 Supports, conduct in attack 456 Units of direction 219 Use of spade in attack 392, 457 Vulnerability of various formations 187

FRONTAGE Army corps in attack 236 Attack 234 England 460 Austria 241 Battalion in attack and defense 236 Belgium 242 Brigade in attack 235, 399 Combat formations 222 Company in attack 235, 236 Attack and defense 96 Defense 236 Rear guard action 236 Considerations governing in attack 229 Defense, factors governing in 232 Seeking a decision 233, 234 Temporary 233 England 242, 460 Examples 223, 237 France 241 Gaps in the line 239, 411 Italy 242 Japan 242 Maximum, when justifiable 235 Overextension of 238 Provisions of various regulations 241, 242 Regiment 236 Relation to distribution in depth 225 Resumé of most important points governing 241 Russia 242 Russo-Japanese War 239 Various battles 240

FRONTAL COUNTER-ATTACK 436 England 463 Examples of 437, 438

FRONT AND FACING DISTANCE in various countries (table) 48

G.

GAPS IN THE ATTACKING LINE 239

GAPS IN THE DEFENSIVE LINE 411

GATLING GUN 259

GENERAL RESERVE Distance from defensive line 430 Interval from flank of defensive line 430 Position of the, in defense 411, 429 Strength in defense 431

GERMANY Ammunition, how carried by soldier 476 Ammunition supply 475 Regulations in re 476 Battalion, formations of the 67, 68 Broad column (plate) 67 Cavalry brigade, number of _Eskadrons_ in 311 Column of platoons (plate) 62 Column of squads and route column (plate) 57 Company (plate) 47 Strength of (table) 35 Company column (plate) 60 Concentration, defense 205 Deep column (plate) 67, 68 Development for action, defense 207 Distribution in depth, defense 207 _Eskadron_, strength of 32 Fire, kinds of 158 Front and facing distance 48 Intrenching tool equipment (table) 39 Load carried by soldier 40 Machine guns--see Machine Guns Pace, length and number per minute (table) 54 Ranges, ascertaining 143 Rushes 90 Supply of ammunition 475, 476 “To form for attack,” definition 207

GROUND, influence of the 179

GROUP INTRENCHMENTS 417 England 462 Switzerland 467

GUARDS 22

GUIDON FLAGS 62, 63 Examples of the use of 355

H.

HATCHET, weight of the 40

HEADQUARTERS, distribution of work at 245

HELIOGRAPH, use of, on the battlefield 246

HISTORY--see Military History

HITS Number of, obtained by various marksmen (table) 169 Curves of hits (plate) 170 Percentage of, standard of measurement of effect of fire 168

HOLDING ATTACK 357 Compared with delaying action 445 Separation from flank attack 361 Strength of 446

HOTCHKISS MACHINE GUN 260

HOWITZER Heavy field 118 Light field 116

I.

INDIVIDUALISM, influence of, on tactics 201

INDIRECT FIRE 184

INFANTRY FIRE--see Fire

INFLUENCE OF THE GROUND 179

INFANTRY Advance under artillery fire 318 Advance under fire, rules for 367 Attack In Russo-Japanese War, characteristics of 340-345 On dismounted cavalry 313 Combat According to various drill regulations 448-467 Against artillery 316 Cavalry 301 Provisions of various regulations 314-315 Machine guns, general principles 268 In Russo-Japanese War 341 Value of, as compared with machine guns 267 Conduct under machine gun fire 269 Coöperation with artillery 351, 354 Cyclists 28, 29, 30 Deployment 201 For firing on charging cavalry 303 Élite 21 Equipment, weight of (table) in various armies 40 Fire, effect of, against shielded batteries 324, 325 Fire effect, as compared with machine guns 265 Fire of position 85 Firing on artillery in position 324 Formations for advancing under artillery fire 318, 321, 324 Importance and employment of 19-32 Japanese, tactics in Russo-Japanese War 341 Load carried 39 Local reconnaissance of the 248 Losses in Franco-German War 20 Percentage of 188 Manner of fighting 19, 20 Method of warding off a cavalry charge 304 Mounted infantry 25, 26, 27 Passage through artillery lines 316 Proportion to other arms 19 Relative strength as compared to cavalry 311 Russian, tactics in Russo-Japanese War 340 Screen for artillery 327 Tactical unit 32-34 Tactics in Russo-Japanese War 341 Time for opening fire on charging cavalry 308

INFANTRY COMBAT Austria 448-450 England 459-463 France 453-459 Italy 451-453 Japan 463-465 Russia 466 Switzerland 466-467

INFANTRY SCREEN 327

INFORMATION OFFICERS 245

INSTRUCTION Method of 7-13 Applicatory (or inductive) 10, 11 Deductive 11 Maneuvers 8, 12 Map problems 8, 11 Military history, study of 7, 8

INSTRUCTIONS FOR CAMPAIGNS 15

INTERVAL Between general reserve and flank of defensive line 430 Definition 47

INTRENCHING IN ATTACK Austria 392, 449 England 392 France 392, 457 Germany 392 Japan 392, 465 Russia 392 Switzerland 466

INTRENCHING TOOL EQUIPMENT 38-40 In various armies (table) 39

INTRENCHING TOOLS General rules for use in attack 393 Use of in attack 387 Provisions of various regulations 392, 393

INTRENCHMENTS Battalion groups of 417 Communicating trenches 419, 421 Cover trenches 419, 421 Dimensions 418, 420 Dummy 421, 423 Field magazines 418 Firing trenches 417, 419, 420 Foreground, clearing the 421 Observation of the 420 Masks 421 Narrow trenches 418 Obstacles, construction of 421 Purpose 416 Splinter proofs 418, 420 Traverses 417

IRON RATION, weight of 40

ITALY Advance guard, conduct of the 451 Ammunition knapsacks 483 Ammunition supply 475 Regulations in re 483 Assault 452 Attack 451 Battalion, formations of the 70 Company, strength of (table) 35 Coöperation of infantry and artillery 354 Counter-attack 453 Cyclists, rate of march of 29 Defense 453 Envelopment 362 Fire, kinds of 160 Time for opening 154 Frontage 242 Front and facing distance 48 Infantry combat 451-453 Intrenching tool equipment 39 Kinds of fire 451 Load carried by soldier 40 Pace, length and number per minute (table) 54 Ranges, ascertaining 143 Rushes 91, 452 Skirmish line, formation of 80 Supply of ammunition 475, 483 Vulnerability of various formations 186

J.

JAPAN Advance in skirmish line 76, 77 Advanced positions 465 Ammunition, how carried by soldier 476 Ammunition supply 475 Assault 464 Attack 463 On a position prepared for defense 464 In Russo-Japanese War, characteristics of 341, 342 Battalion, formations of the 70 Combat, characteristics of 341 Counter-attack 439 Defense 465 Fire, kinds of 160 Frontage 242 Front and facing distance 48 Infantry Combat 463-465 Tactics in Russo-Japanese War, characteristics of 341 Versus cavalry 315 Intrenching in attack 392, 465 Kinds of fire 463 Load carried by soldier 40 Machine guns 290 Pace, length and number per minute (table) 54 Pursuit 465 Rencontre 464 Rushes 91, 463 Skirmish line, formation of 80 Use of spade in attack 392, 466

JÄGER 21-23

K.

KAISERJÄGER 24

KINDS OF FIRE--see Fire

KNAPSACKS Ammunition 483 Loss of 364 Weight of, in various armies (table) 40

L.

LEADERS Conduct in action 399 Duties in action 399, 400, 401 Posts in action 399

LEADING--see Troop Leading

LESSONS OF THE BOER WAR, in re Attack 340 Rushes 88, 89

LESSONS OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR, in re Attack 340 Fire control and fire direction 137 Formations under artillery fire 321-324 Rushes 89, 90

LINE Comparison with column 42-45 Vulnerability of the 187

LINE FORMATION 73, 74

LINE OF COMPANY COLUMNS, French (with plate) 70

LINE OF PLATOONS, vulnerability of 186

LOCAL RECONNAISSANCE--see Reconnaissance

LONG RANGE FIRE 148, 150-153, 176

LOSSES Artillery under infantry fire 326, 327 British, in Boer War 193 Examples 20, 36, 45, 50, 51, 153, 167, 168, 176, 178, 188, 189, 190, 193, 227, 312, 324 Franco-German War (by arm) 20 French Cuirassiers in charge at Vionville 312 In action 185 Infantry under artillery fire 324 Percentage of 186, 188, 189, 227 Produced by Long range fire 176 Artillery and infantry fire, comparison 167, 168 Officers and men, comparison 189, 190 Skirmish line 81 When using fire while in motion 92

M.

MACHINE GUNS 259 Ammunition 261 Supply Austria 288 Battery 273 England 290 Germany 273 Russia 291 Switzerland 284 Transportation of 270 Assignment to cavalry 296 Attack, employment in 365 Austria 288 Basket mount 261 Battery (Germany) Ammunition supply 273 Column of platoons 273, 274 Combat train 276 Employment of 293 Field train 270 Fighting 270 Formations 273, 274 Movements and gaits 273 Order in line 273, 274 Organization 270 Relative combat value 273 Route column 273, 274 Section column 273, 274 Belts, ammunition 261 Cavalry 261 Colt 261 Column of platoons 273, 274 Combat Against artillery 297 Cavalry 296 Of infantry against, general principles 268 Train 270 Value as compared with skirmishers 267 Companies Germany 275 Russia 290 Switzerland 284 Cone of dispersion 264 Crawling into position (illustration) 277 Defense 414 Employment in 425 Development, historical 259 Employment of 263 English views on employment of 297 Examples of employment of 283 Feldl gun 219 Field train 270 Fighting battery 270 Fire 263 Austria 263 Comparison with infantry fire 265-267 Concentrated 263 Cone of dispersion 264 Effect of 264, 294 Germany 263 Kinds of 263, 287-288 Progressive 263 Rate of 261 Sweeping 263 Switzerland 263, 287 Formations Austria 288 Germany 273, 274 Switzerland 287 Fire effect 264, 294 As compared with a body of skirmishers 265 Fire fight 283 Fire of position 85 France 290 Gatling 259 Germany 270 Going into position 276 Historical development 259 Hotchkiss 260 In position (illustration) 279 Intrenched (illustration) 281 Japan 290 Kinds of fire Austria 263, 288 Germany 263 Switzerland 263, 287, 288 Mitrailleuse 259 Mountain batteries 288 Mounting, method of 261, 284 Organization Austria 288 England 290 Germany 270, 271, 275 Russia 291 Switzerland 284 Order in line 273-274 Progressive fire 263 Russia 290 Schwarzlose 260 Searching fire 263 Section column 273, 274 Sled mount 261 Sweeping fire 263 Swiss views on employment of 299 Tripod mount 261 Various countries 284-293 Weights of various, with mounts 261

MAGAZINES--see Field Magazines

MAIN BODY, conduct in a rencontre 336

MAIN FIRING POSITION 369

MANEUVERS 8, 12

MAP PROBLEMS 8, 11

MARCH, rate of, cyclists 29

MARCHING, length of pace and 53

MARKSMANSHIP, value of 169

MASKS 421 Influence of 120

MATTOCK, weight of 40

METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS, effect of, on range 145

METHOD OF INSTRUCTION--see Instruction

MILITARY HISTORY, EXAMPLES FROM Abridged attack 330 Advance, impulse from the rear 95 Advanced positions 412 Attack on 348 Ammunition, expenditure and supply of 89, 90, 468, 474 Artillery fire diverted from proper objective by advancing infantry 327 Artillery supporting a cavalry charge 313 Under infantry fire 326-327 Assault 376, 409 Assaulting guidons, use of 355 Attack 340-345 Formation of a brigade 207 Battalions, strength of 36 Cavalry charges 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 308, 309, 310, 311, 313 Changes of front 320, 321 Charge of French Cuirassiers of the Guard at Vionville 311 Close order formation, effect of fire on 102, 103 Column as attack formation 44, 45 Combats, duration of 178 Companies, consolidation of 36 Concentration for action 205, 209, 210 Counter-attack After position is carried 433 Against a hostile flank 435, 436 Cover, Construction of, in attack 344 Use of 257 Defensive position, location of 410 Deployment 206 Of reserves 369 Distribution in depth and frontage 222, 223, 226 Dummy trenches 421 Effect of danger 195-200 Fire on charging cavalry 308 Envelopment 357, 358, 359, 360, 361 Expenditure and supply of ammunition 468-474 Fatigue produced by continuous fire 155 Fire, Effect of 132 Kinds of, used in Russo-Japanese War 157, 159 Russo-Turkish War 158, 159 Withholding the 151, 152 Fire control and fire direction, difficulties of 137 Fire effect on close order formations 102, 103 Fire pauses 156 Fire preparation 149 Fire support during an assault 380 Fire while in motion 93 Flank attack 357 Flanking fire 354 Formations suitable under fire 121 Under artillery fire 321, 322, 323, 324 Frontage 231, 232 And distribution in depth 237 In Russo-Japanese War 239 Of battalions at Mukden 211 Overextension of 238 Frontal counter attacks 437, 438 Gaps in the line 239 Improvised units, use of 197 Influence of various rifles on density of battle formations 24 Length of rushes and expenditure of ammunition 89-90 Lessons of the Boer War, in re attack 340 Russo-Japanese War, in re attack 340 Local reconnaissance 250, 253 Long range fire 149, 150, 151, 152, 153 In defense 155 Losses 36, 50, 51, 153, 332 Percentage of 188, 189, 227 Produced by infantry and artillery fire 167 Long range fire 176 Relative, officers to men 189, 190 Under artillery fire 324 Machine guns, employment of 260, 275, 283, 289, 290 Masks, effect of 120 Mistakes caused by trumpet signals 42 Mixing of organizations 195, 226 Moral effect of a cavalry charge 306 Fire 426 Gen. Bennal’s impressions at Wörth 191 On charging cavalry 309 Number of troops required for attack and defense 234 Passage through timber 333 Ranges, underestimation of 142 Removal of packs 364 Rencontre 339 Reserves, employment of 340, 395, 396, 397 Rushes, employment of 93, 94, 95 Length of 89, 90 Sand bags, use of, in attack 344, 390 Study of 7-8 Surprise 208, 250, 252, 331, 340 Surrender of British troops in Boer War 192 Telephone communication at Mukden 247 Temperature, effect of 145 Trumpet signals, mistakes caused by 42 United attack, necessity of 402 Use of spade in attack 387, 388 Value of 8, 9, 10 Void of the battlefield 194 Volleys, use of 164 Woods, passage through 333 Wounds Produced by cutting weapons 384 Character of 128, 129

MINOR TACTICS 12

MISSES, effect of; Wolozkoi’s theory 173

MITRAILLEUSE 259

MIXING OF ORGANIZATIONS 195, 226 How prevented 96, 97

MORAL EFFECT Cavalry charge 306 Counter-attack 436 Fire 191, 227 On charging cavalry 309

MORAL FACTORS and discipline 107, 108

MOUNTAIN TROOPS 23

MOUNTAIN WARFARE 23

MOUNTED INFANTRY 25, 26, 27

MOUNTED MESSENGERS, use on battlefield 246

MUSICIANS Duties in skirmish line 79 Posts in skirmish line 79

N.

NEEDLE GUN, compared with rifle, model 98, as regards flatness of trajectory 153

NETHERLANDS, column of fours 58

NIGHT ATTACKS, distribution in depth 233

NIGHT OPERATIONS, close order formations, importance of 104

NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, posts of, in various armies 47

NORMAL ATTACK 203 v. Boguslawski’s views 204 Clausewitz’s views 204 v. Scherff’s views 205

NORMAL FORMATIONS, necessity for, in some countries 201

O.

OBSERVATION OF THE FOREGROUND 420 Compared with deliberately planned attack 334, 338

OBSERVATION STATIONS 421

OBSTACLES 422

OBUS ALLONGÉ 115

OFFENSIVE Assumption of the 428 In defense 409 Spirit of the 109, 110

OFFENSIVE-DEFENSIVE 408

OFFENSIVE RETURN (France) 439, 458

OFFICERS Demeanor, influence of 84 Losses among 50, 51 Franco-German War (by arm) 20 Relative to men 189, 190

OPEN COLUMN, depth of 47

ORDER IN LINE, machine gun batteries 273, 274

ORDERS 41 Combat 243, 244 Contents of 41 Issue of 41 In a rencontre 336

ORGANIZATION 34 Battalion 36, 37 Brigade 37, 38 Company 34, 35 In various armies (table) 35 Machine guns, Austria 288 England 290 France 290 Germany 270 Japan 290 Russia 290 Switzerland 284 Mounted infantry (England) 26 Regiment 37

ORGANIZATIONS Mixing of 195, 226 How prevented 96, 97 Use of improvised 197

P.

PACE Diminution of length of, on various slopes 141 Length of, and marching 53 In various armies (table) 54

PACES, number of, per minute 54

PACKS, removal of 363, 364

PANIC 27, 107, 441

PASSIVE DEFENSE 408, 409

PATROLS 27 Combat 80

PEACE, eternal 1

PENETRATION, “S” bullet 131

PLATOON Column of twos, vulnerability of 187 Commander, post in close order 63 Skirmish line 79 French 4-rank formation (with plates) 65, 66 Infantry, strength of the German 273 One-rank, vulnerability of the 187

PLATOONS Column of (with plate) 61, 62 How formed 49 Machine gun battery 273, 274 Division of the company into 46 Three or four platoons 48

POSITION Advance into a preparatory 350 Advanced 413 Battalion groups of intrenchments 417 Communicating trenches 421 Cover trenches 421 Determining factors in selecting a 414 Dummy intrenchments 421 Foreground, clearing the 421 Division into sections 411 Observation of the 420 Fortifying the 415 Framework of the 414 Gaps in the defensive 411 Intrenchments 418-422 Masks 421 Obstacles, construction of 421 Occupation of the 426 Rallying 442 Requisites of a defensive 410 Russian views in re defensive 422 Sections, divisions into 411 Temporary occupation 408

POSTS Battalion commander in action 400 Commander in a rencontre 338 Company commander in action 400 Musicians in skirmish line 79, 80 Non-commissioned officers in close order 47 Platoon commanders in close order 63 Skirmish line 79 Range finders in close order 46, 47 Skirmish line 79, 80 Squad leaders in close order 46, 47 Skirmish line 79 Regimental commander in action 400

PREPARATION OF THE ASSAULT 352

PREPARATION OF THE ATTACK 346 By artillery, provisions of various regulations 354

PREPARATORY POSITION 350

PROGRESSIVE FIRE Artillery 320 Machine guns 263

PURE FRONTAL ATTACK 357 France 455

PURSUIT 385 Japan 465

Q.

QUICK TIME, in various armies (table) 54

R.

RAFALE 158, 164

RALLYING POSITION 442 England 460 Occupation of the 443

RANGE Altitude, effect of, on the 145 Ascertaining the 140 Pacing and galloping 141 Provisions of various regulations 143 Ascertaining the 140 Range finding instruments 146 Trial volleys 145 Error of estimation 141 Formulae for determining favorable range for firing against hill positions 183 Influence of error in estimating the 170 Knowledge of the 140 Meteorological conditions, effect of 145 Range finding instruments, permissible error 146 Trial volleys 145

RANGE FINDERS Classification 143 Duties in machine gun detachments 283 Post in close order 46, 47 Skirmish line 79, 80

RANGE FINDING INSTRUMENTS Errors permissible 146 Principle of construction 146

RANGING--see Range

RANKS, influence of rate of fire upon the number of 46

RATIONS, weight of 40

REAR GUARD ACTION, frontage of a company in 236

RECONNAISSANCE Companies 251 Detachments of all arms 251 In attack 346 In force 251, 347 Local, in attack 347 Object of 250 Of the infantry 248 Patrols and scouting detachments 27

REGIMENT 37 Cavalry, strength of German 273 Combat frontage 236 Formation for attack 214 Formations 73, 74 Importance 37 Organization 37

REGIMENTAL COMMANDER Duties in action 400 Post in action 400

REGULATIONS--see Drill Regulations

REMOVAL OF PACKS 363, 364

RENCONTRE 333 Advance guard, conduct of the 334 Austria 448 Commander, position of 338 Conduct of main body 336 Examples of 339 Japan 464 Machine guns, examples of, in a 295, 338 Main body, launching of the 338 Orders, issue of 336 Provisions of various regulations 339 Use of echelon formation in 74 Switzerland 466

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, influence of, on war 3

RESERVE Employment of, in attack 394 Examples of employment of 340, 395, 396, 397 General, distance from defensive line 430 Interval from flank of defensive line 430 Position in defense 429 Strength of, in defense 431 In retreat 442 Launching or withholding the 396 Section 411 Size of, in various units 235 Strength of the (in attack and defense) 395

RETREAT Direction of 440, 442 Rallying position 442 Reserve 442

RICOCHETS, effect of 185

RIFLE--see Rifles

RIFLEMEN 22

RIFLE-RESTS, influence of 178

RIFLES Automatic 126 Influence of various, on density of battle formations (table) 240 Used in Russo-Japanese War 127 Weight of, in various armies (table) 40

ROAD SPACE--see Depth

ROUTE COLUMN (with plate) 57 Battalion in 72 Machine gun battery 273, 274

RUSHES Advance by 82 Austria 449 England 462 Examples of the employment of 93, 94, 95 Gait to be employed in 82, 86 How made in various armies 90, 91 Italy 452 Japan 91, 463 Length of 83 Lessons of the Boer and Russo-Japanese Wars 88, 89, 90 Long or short 85, 86 Preparation for 83 Provisions of various regulations 90-91 Russia 91 Short or long 85, 86 Strength of the rushing unit 83 Time required for 83

RUSSIA Advanced positions 413 Ammunition, how carried by soldier 476 Ammunition supply 475 Regulations in re 480 Assault 381 Battalion, formations of the 69, 73 Column of platoons (plate) 62 Company, strength of (table) 35 Defensive position, views on 422 Fire, kinds of 160 Frontage 242 Front and facing distance 48 Infantry Combat 466 Tactics in Russo-Japanese War, characteristics of 340 Versus cavalry 315 Intrenching tool equipment of Russian companies 38 Load carried by soldier 40 Machine guns 290 Pace, length and number per minute 54 Ranges, ascertaining 143 Rushes 91 Sandbag cover, results of experiments 390 Skirmish line, formation of 80 Supply of ammunition 475, 480 Use of general reserve 397 Spade in attack 392

S.

“S” BULLET Effect on corpses 130 Materials 131 Steel shields 324

SAND BAGS 344, 390 Results of Russian experiments 390

SCHWARZLOSE MACHINE GUN 260

SCOUTING DETACHMENTS 27, 28, 414 Use of, in reconnaissance 252

SEARCHING FIRE Artillery 321 Machine guns 263

SECONDARY ATTACK 357

SECTIONS Assignment of combat 243 Defensive position, division into combat 411 Division of the platoon into 46

SECTION COLUMN, machine gun battery 273, 274

SHARPSHOOTER PLATOONS 21

SHELL Comparison between that of field gun and howitzer 117 Percussion (Model 96) 115 Time (Model 96) 116 (Model 98) 118

SHIELDS Protection afforded by 324

SHRAPNEL Comparison between that of field gun and howitzer 117 Effect (tables) 114, 122 On animate targets 125 Incendiary effect 112 Percussion 111, 112 Time 112

SIGNAL LAMPS, use of, on battlefield 246

SIGNALS 41 Advance 41 Assemble 41 Attention 41 Charge 41 Deploy 41 Employment of, by combat patrols 80 Fix bayonet 41, 377 Halt 41 Misunderstanding of 42 Trumpet 41

SITUATION, estimate of the 11

SKI DETACHMENTS 30, 31, 32

SKI RUNNERS 30, 31, 32

SKIRMISH LINES Boer advance in thin 75 Cover, use of 256 Efficacy of fire against thin and dense (table) 77 Fire effect, as compared with machine guns 265 Formation of 78 In various armies 80 Gaits of 81 Japanese advance in thin 76, 77 Losses 81 Movements in 81, 82 Thin and dense 76, 77 Vulnerability of 186, 187

SNOW SHOE MARCHING 30, 31

SPADE Use of, in attack 387, 388, 392, 449, 457, 465, 466 Small, weight of 40

SPLINTER PROOFS 418, 420

SQUAD LEADERS Posts in close order 46, 47 Skirmish line 79

SQUADS Column of, compared with column of fours 59 (Plate) 57 Division of the company into 46 Machine gun, composition and duties of members of (Germany) 283

STAFFS, division of work in 245

STRATEGY Definitions of 4, 5, 6 Relation of tactics to 6, 7

SUPERIORITY OF FIRE 370, 371, 427

SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION Austria 475, 479 Deductions from various regulations 483 England 475, 482 France 475, 480 Germany 475, 476 Italy 475, 483 Japan 475 Russia 475, 480 Various armies (table) 475

SUPPORTS 98, 99 Advance of 100 In attack 368 Advantages of 102 Arguments against 101, 102 Commander, duties of 100 Conduct, French regulations 455 Defense 410 Deployment in attack 369 Distance from firing line 98, 99 Duties 98 Formations 100 Movements 100 Necessity 98 Purpose 98

SURPRISE 330 Examples of 331

SURRENDER, British troops in Boer War 192

SWEDEN, column of fours 58

SWEEPING FIRE Artillery 321 Machine guns 263

T.

TACTICAL FORMATIONS, Importance of 108

TACTICAL MISSIONS, compared with united action 401

TACTICAL UNIT 32, 33, 34

TACTICS Applied 12, 13 Changes in 13, 14 Definitions of 4, 5, 6 Formal 12 Grand 12 Japanese infantry in Russo-Japanese War, characteristics of 341 Minor 12 Relation of strategy to 6-7 Russian infantry in Russo-Japanese War, characteristics of 340

TARGET, selection of a 147

TASKS Assignment of 218 Dangers of assigning 405

TELEGRAPH, FIELD, use of, on battlefield 246

TELEPHONE, FIELD, use of, in infantry combat 246

TEMPORARY OCCUPATION of a position 408

TERRAIN, importance of 254

TIMBER, advance through 332

TRAINING and drill 105, 106 Influence of, on efficacy of fire 168

TRAVERSES 417

TRENCHES 416-420 Dimensions 418

TROOP LEADING Duties of higher 366 Minor 365

TROOP UNIT 34

TRUMPET SIGNALS 41

TWOS, column of 56

U.

UNIFORM, color of, influence on visibility 119

UNITED ACTION Compared with tactical missions 401 Dangers of 405

UNITED STATES, three-unit organization 38, 218

UNIVERSAL SERVICE, influence of, on war 4

USE OF SPADE IN ATTACK 387 Austria 449 France 457 Japan 465 Provisions of various regulations 392 Switzerland 466

V.

VOID OF THE BATTLEFIELD 194

VOLLEY Value of the 157, 163 Trial 145

VULNERABILITY of various formations 186, 187

W.

WAR 2, 3, 4 Importance and necessity of 2 Influence of representative government in reducing number of wars 3 Influence of universal service on 4 Lessons of, in re attack 340 Rushes 88, 89 Purpose of 4 _Ultimo ratio_ of state policy 2, 3

WEAPONS, changes and improvements in 13

WIGWAG FLAGS, use of, in infantry action 246

WIRE CUTTERS 39

WITHDRAWAL 441 Conduct of a 441

WOLOZKOI’S THEORY of the constant cone of misses 173

WOODS, advance through 332

WOUNDS Produced by cutting weapons, (%) 384 Infantry and artillery fire, comparison 167 Jacketed bullets 129 Shrapnel bullets 125 Small arms in Russo-Japanese War, character of 127, 128

Z.

ZONE FIRE, artillery 320

INDEX OF EXAMPLES FROM MILITARY HISTORY.

A.

=~Aiaslar~=, August 25, 1877. PAGE Ammunition, expenditure of 472

=~Albuera~=, 1811. Losses 227

=~Amiens~=, November 27, 1870. Frontage 237

=~Austerlitz.~= Attacking column, formation 44

=~Azay~=, January 6, 1871. Masks, effect of 112

B.

=~Baalon~=, September 17, 1870. Surprise 331

=~Beaumont~=, August 30, 1870. Advance guard, deployment of 231, 232 Artillery, losses of the 327 Cavalry charge 309 Deployment of an advance guard 231, 232 Distribution in depth 231, 232 Flank attack 357 Frontage 231, 232 Frontal counter-attack 437 Ineffective rapid fire at short ranges 162 Line of platoons in columns of twos 121 Losses, artillery under infantry fire 327 Rencontre 339 Surprise 331 Woods, passage through 333

=~Beaune la Bolande~=, November 28, 1870. Ammunition, expenditure and supply of 470 Shortage of 469 Short range fire 153 Withholding the fire 152

=~Belmont~=, November 22, 1899. Night march 351

=~Boer War~=--see South African War (1899-1902).

=~Busaco.~= Frontal counter-attack 437

=~Buzanval~=, January 19, 1871. Ammunition, expenditure of 470

C.

=~Casablanca~=, 1907. Effect of infantry fire on charging cavalry 308

=~Chagey~=, January 11, 1871. Short range fire 153

=~Champigny~=, November 30, 1870. Ammunition, expenditure and supply 471 Influence of the ground on efficacy of fire 183 Jägers, employment of 23

=~Chevilly~=, November 30, 1870. Fire while in motion 93

=~Chlum~= (Königgrätz), 1866. Flank attack 357

=~Colenso~=, December 15, 1899. Artillery under infantry fire 326 Boer position, location of 410 Density of battle line 240 Insufficient reconnaissance 340 Losses 189 Officers 190 Moral effect of fire 152, 426 Pure frontal attack 340 Reconnaissance, lack of local 249 Reserves, use of 340 Surprise 340 Withholding the fire, moral effect 152

=~Colombey~=, August 14, 1870. Attack on Aubigny 405 On the “Tannenwäldchen” 403 Frontage 237 Losses 195 Mixing of organizations 195 Moral effect of fire 199

=~Coulmiers~=, November 9, 1870. Ammunition supply 484 Reserve, employment of the 395

=~Coulomiers~=, December 15, 1870. Withholding the fire 152

=~Custozza~=, 1866. Battle lines, density of 240 Cavalry charge 302 Moral effect of a 200 Reserves, employment of 396

D.

=~Daix~=, November 26, 1870. Ammunition, supply of 484

=~Datshishiao~=, July 24, 1904. Bayonet fight 382

=~Diamond Hill~=, 1900. Frontage 238

=~Doornkop~=, May 29, 1900. Opening fire 150

E.

=~Etoges~=, 1814. Infantry versus cavalry 313

F.

=~Franco-German War~= (1870-71). Ammunition, expenditure and supply of 468 Close order formations, impossibility of employing, in first line 102 Fire, efficacy of 176 Frontages 237 Losses among officers, percentage of (by arm) 20 Officers, number of, per 1000 men 51 Proportion of the various arms 19

=~Fuchau~=, 1905. Local reconnaissance 250

G.

=~Garcia Hernandez~=, 1812. Cavalry charge 309

=~Gitschin~=, 1866. Trumpet signal, misunderstanding caused by 42

=~Gorni Bugarov~=, January 1, 1878. Frontal counter-attack 438 Short range fire 153

=~Gorni Dubniac~=, October 24, 1877. Ammunition, expenditure and supply of 473 Assault, inability to 409 Fire, ineffectiveness of uphill 183 Intrenching in attack 389 Isolated attacks with inadequate forces 223 Perseverance under fire 387 Reserves, deployment of 369 Rushes, advance by 95 Signal for attack, failure of 361 Strength, relative, of opposing forces 234

=~Gravelotte~= (St. Privat). Advance to the battlefield 67 Ammunition, expenditure 471 Artillery under infantry fire 326 Assault 376 Assaulting distance 385 Attack made by the III. Army Corps 398 Battle lines, density of 240 Close order formations under fire 103 Columns of twos, line of 121 Companies, consolidation of 36 Concentration for action 210 Density of battle lines 240 Enfilade fire 254 Envelopment 361 Fire, Artillery under infantry 326 Close order formation under 103 Columns of twos, line of, under 121 Enfilade 254 Long range 152 Pause 156 Perseverance under 108, 387 Uphill, ineffectiveness of 183 Flanking fire 254 Infantry fire, artillery under 326 Intrenchments, construction of 388 Losses, aggregate and detail 188 At various ranges 176 Franz regiment 195 Officers 33, 51, 190 Lull in the fight at Point du Jour 156 March formations 67 Mitrailleuses, employment of 260 Mixing of organizations 196 Officers, losses among 33, 51, 190 Organizations, mixing of 196 Ranges, underestimation of 142 Reconnaissance, relaxing in the 347 Reserves 398 Stragglers 196 Uphill fire against trenches, ineffectiveness of 183

H.

=~Haicheng~=, 1904. Advanced positions, several lines of 412

=~Hallue~=, December 23, 1870. Envelopment 6 Attempted, by first line 360 Frontage 232

=~l’Hay~=, September 30, 1870. Fire while in motion 93

=~Helmstedt~=, July 25, 1866. Change of front 220

=~Hühnerwasser~=, 1866. Ammunition found on the battlefield 469

K.

=~Karahassankioi~=, August 23, 1877. Ammunition, expenditure of 472

=~Katzbach~=, August 26, 1813. Attack in line 108

=~Kazeljevo.~= Frontal counter-attack 438

=~Kesselsdorf~=, 1745. Frontal counter-attack 437 Losses 189

=~Kinchau~=, November 26, 1904. Ammunition, expenditure of 474 Assaulting distance 385

=~Kolin~=, 1757. Losses 189

=~Königgrätz~=, July 3, 1866. Adjustment of fire facilitated by a poplar 120 Advance to the battlefield 205 Battle lines, density of 240 Cavalry charge, moral effect of a 306 Flank attack 357, 359 Jägers, employment of 23 Trumpet signal, misunderstanding caused by 42

L.

=~Ladon~=, November 26, 1870. Envelopment 361

=~Ladonchamps~= (near Metz). Artillery fire, ineffectiveness of 120

=~Ladysmith~=, 1900. Supports 98

=~Le Bourget~=, October 30, 1870. Assaulting distance 385 Columns of twos, line of 121 Rushes 93, 94

=~Le Mans.~= Battalions, strength of 36 Gatling guns 260 Officers, number present for duty 50

=~Liao Yang~=, 1904. Ammunition, expenditure of 473, 474 Battle lines, density of 239 Fire 155 Frontage 239 Intrenching tools, use of, in attack 392 Machine guns 291 Strength of opposing forces 341 Surprise 208, 250

=~Linshinpu~=, 1904. Ammunition, expenditure of 473

=~Lisaine.~= Frontage 228

=~Loigny~=, December 2, 1870. Advance to the battlefield 67 Counter-attack 433, 435, 436 Intrenching tools, lack of 388 Wheel executed by Kottwitz’ Brigade 220

=~Lovtcha~=, September 1, 1877. Ammunition, expenditure of 472 Mixing of organizations 197 Registration mark for artillery fire 120 Rushes 95 Strength of opposing forces 234

M.

=~Magersfontain~=, December 11, 1899. Boer position, location of 410 Convalescence of wounded 129 Dummy trenches 421 Fire surprise 133 Frontage 227, 238 Lack of reinforcements 227 Losses 189 Officers 190 Perseverance under fire 137, 387 Pure frontal attack 340 Reconnaissance, lack of local 249 Reinforcements, lack of 227 Reserves, employment of 340 Withholding the fire, moral effect of 152

=~Maida.~= Frontal counter-attack 437

=~Marengo~=, 1800. Attacking column, formation of 45

=~Mars-la-Tour~=--see Vionville.

=~Minden~=, 1757. Infantry versus cavalry 313

=~Modder River~=, November 28, 1899. Boer position, location of 410 Fire fight 132, 371 Moral effect of fire 426 Opening fire at long range 150 Perseverance under fire 132 Pure frontal attack 340 Reconnaissance, lack of 252, 340 Surprise 252, 340

=~Montoy~= (Noisseville). Surprise 332

=~Mont Valérien~=, January 19, 1871. Ammunition, shortage of 469

=~Mukden~=, 1905. Advance in thin skirmish lines 76, 77 Assault with cold steel 134 Attack, mode of Japanese 343, 344 Battle lines, density of 239, 240 Bayonet fights 382 Construction of cover in attack 344 Frontage 239 Gaps in the attacking line 239 Machine guns 292 Perseverance under fire 348 Reserves 395, 396 Sand bags, use of, in attack 344 Skirmish lines, thin 76, 77 Strength of opposing forces 341 Telephone communication 247

N.

=~Nachod~=, 1866. Bayonet attack 153 Concentration 209 Frontage 231 Losses 153 Mixing of organizations 196 Rencontre 339

=~Nicholson’s Neck~=, October 24, 1899. Crawling 87, 88 Volleys, ineffectiveness of 157

=~Noisseville.~= Bayonet fight 382 Counter-attack 429, 433 Flank attack 358 Intrenching tools, lack of 388 Losses 332 Reconnaissance 253 Surprise 331

=~Nuits~=, December 18, 1870. Abridged attack 330

O.

=~Oerrshikiatsy~= (Shaho), 1904. Intrenching tools, use of, in attack 388

=~Orleans~=, December 3, 1870. Counter-attack 436 Strength of German battalions 36

P.

=~Paardeberg~=, February 18, 1900. Advance without firing 149 Convalescence of wounded 129 Crawling 87 Distribution in depth, lack of 238 Frontage 76, 227 Intrenching tools, use of, in attack 388 Opening fire at long range 150 Reinforcements, lack of 227 Skirmish lines, thin 76

=~Pieters Hill~=, February 27, 1900. Fire support 380 Frontage 238 Machine guns 289, 298

=~Plevna~=, 1877. Ammunition, expenditure of 472 Attacks with inadequate forces 222, 223 Bayonet fights 382 Combat impressions 191 Fire, opening 152 Uphill, ineffectiveness of 183 While in motion 93 Improvised units 197, 198 Intrenching tools, use of 388 Isolated attacks with inadequate forces 222, 223 Knapsacks, loss of 364 Losses among officers 190 At various ranges 152, 177 Mixing of organizations 197 Officers, losses among 190 Opening fire at long range 152 Ranges, underestimation of 142 Reserves, deployment of 369 Employment of 395 Rushes 95 Strength of opposing forces 234 Underestimation of ranges 142 Volleys 158

=~Podol~=, June 26, 1866. Jägers 23

=~Poplar Grove~=, March 7, 1900. Advance in attack formation 206 Attack formation of a brigade 207 Frontage 238

R.

=~Russo-Japanese War.~= Advance in thin skirmish lines 76, 77 Ammunition, expenditure and supply of 473 Formations under artillery fire 321, 322 Frontage 238 Infantry attack 137, 340 Local reconnaissance 250 Machine guns 290 Rushes 89 Strength of opposing forces 341 Wounds, character of 128

=~Russo-Turkish War~=, 1877-78. Ammunition, expenditure of 472 Attacks 222, 223 Frontal counter-attacks 438 Losses 176

S.

=~St. Privat~=--see Gravelotte.

=~St. Quentin~=, January 19, 1871. Attack on Grugies, isolated 403 Bayonet attack 103

=~Sandepu~=, 1904. Losses among officers 190

=~Sapignies.~= Cavalry charge 302

=~Scheinovo~=, January 9, 1878. Ammunition, expenditure of 94, 95, 473 Cavalry charge 303 Losses 94, 95 Rushes 94, 95 Simultaneous attack 361

=~Sedan.~= Ammunition, expenditure of 469 Cavalry charge 308, 310, 311 Losses among officers 51 Mixing of organizations 197 Packs, removal of 469

=~Shaho~=, 1904. Advanced positions 348 Artillery, capture of 326 Attack formation of a brigade 343 Battle lines, density of 239 Frontage 239 Infantry attack 343 Intrenching tools, use of 388 Machine guns 292 Reserves 396

=~Shiliho~=, 1905. Attack 344 Rushes 90

=~Shipka Pass~=, 1877. Short range fire 153

=~Skalitz~=, 1812. Jägers 23 Mixing of organizations 196

=~Slivnica~=, November 17 and 19, 1885. Losses at long ranges 177

=~Solferino~=, 1859. Bayonet fight 382 Battle lines, density of 240

=~Soor~=, 1745. Losses 189 Frontal counter-attack 437

=~Soor~=, 1866. Jägers 23

=~South African War~= (1899-1902). Assaults 379 Crawling 87, 88 Front, overextension of 238 Lessons gained from the 88, 340 Machine guns 289 Mounted infantry 25 Rushes 88 Skirmish lines, thin 75 Surrenders 192 Wounds, character of 129

=~Spicheren.~= Advance in assembly formation 210 Ammunition, expenditure of 469 Attack, orders for 349 Change of front 220 Concentration 210 Counter-attack 436 Envelopment 357, 358, 360 Formation in echelon and in line 74, 226 Front, change of 220 Frontage 226 Knapsacks, loss of 364 Losses 195 Mixing of organizations 196, 226 Orders for attack 349 Stragglers 195

=~Spionskop~=, 1900. Crawling 88 Losses at short ranges, insignificant 178, 189 Reserves 340

T.

=~Tagliamento~=, 1797. Attack formations 45

=~Tashkessen~=, January 1, 1878. Ammunition, expenditure of 473 Frontal counter-attack 438

=~Tel el Kebir~=, 1882. Night attack 233

=~Terrayama~= (Temple Hill), October 11, 1904. Attack 343 Bayonet fight 382 Intrenching tools, use of 388

=~Tobitschau~=, 1866. Cavalry charge 313

=~Towan~=, 1904. Perseverance under fire 348

=~Trautenau~=, 1866. Bayonet attack 153 Jägers 23 Packs, removal of 364 Rencontre 339 Trumpet signal, misunderstanding caused by 42

=~Tsinortun~=, August 26, 1904. Counter-attack 435

=~Tugela~= (Pieters Hill), 1900. Rushes 95

=~Tuminling Pass~=, 1904. Losses, officers 190

V.

=~Vauxchamps~=, February 14, 1814. Infantry versus cavalry 313

=~Villepion~=, December 1, 1870. Holding wavering troops 382 Intrenching tools, use of 388

=~Villermain-Cravant~=, 1870. Flank march along hostile front 360

=~Villiers~=, October 30, 1870. Influence of the ground on the efficacy of fire 183

=~Vimiero.~= Frontal counter-attack 437

=~Vionville.~= Abridged attack 330 Advance in broad formations 67 Ammunition, expenditure and supply of 469, 470 Artillery fire diverted by infantry 327 Cavalry charge 302, 304, 311, 313 Moral effect of 302 Preparation by artillery fire 313 Close order formations, losses in 102, 103 Concentration 209 Cover, use of 257 Direction of retreat 440 Flanking fire 254 Losses in close order formations 102, 103 Officers 190 Masks 120 Moral effect of a cavalry charge 302, 303 Packs, removal of 364 Rencontre 339 Reserves, employment of 397 Retreat 440 Trumpet signal, misunderstanding caused by 42 United attack, necessity of a 403 Volley fire, ineffectiveness of 164

=~Vouziers~=, December 15, 1870. Surprise 331

W.

=~Wafangu~=, June 15, 1904. Attack 341 Communication 247 Distribution in depth, excessive 223 Envelopment 341, 359

=~Wagram~=, 1809. Attacking column, formation of 44, 45

=~Waterberg~=, 1904. Assaulting guidons 355 Machine guns, employment of 283

=~Waterloo~=, 1815. Attacking column, formation of 44, 45 Battle lines, density of 240 Concentration 209 Frontal counter-attack 437

=~Weiszenburg~=, August 2, 1870. Losses among officers 51, 190 Masks 120

=~Wörth~=, August 6, 1870. Assault 376 Assaulting distance 385 Attack, orders to 349 Battle lines, density of 240 Cavalry charge 310, 311 Change of front 220 Colors 69 Concentration 209 Counter-attack 433 Distance, elimination of, during advance 72 Distribution in depth 224 Fire while in motion 93 Interference by the commander-in-chief 248 Losses 227 Officers 51 Relative, officers and men 190 Mixing of organizations 196 Moral effect of fire 191 Officers, losses among 51 Orders to attack 349 Packs, removal of 364 Panic 440 Passage through woods 333 Reserve, employment of the 395 Stragglers 196 Supports 224 Uphill fire 183 Woods, passage through 254

Y.

=~Yalu~=, 1904. Ammunition, expenditure and supply of 473 Attack 341 Bayonet fight 382 Losses, officers 190 Machine guns 291

=~Yangtsuling~=, 1904. Attack 343

=~Yoshirei~=, July 31, 1904. Formations under artillery fire 321, 323

=~Yuhuntun~=, 1905. Perseverance under fire 348

=~Yuputz~=, March 1, 1905. Sand bags, use of 390

=~Yushuling~=, 1904. Intrenching tools, use of 388

Z.

=~Zella.~= Counter-attack 433

Transcriber’s Notes

Depending on the hard- and software used to read this text, not all elements may display as intended.

The language used in this text is that of the printed book, including the use of inconsistent, erroneous, unusual or archaic spelling, hyphenation, capitalisation, punctuation, etc., except as indicated under Changes below. This applies to proper and geographical names and non-English words and phrases as well; accents and diacriticals have not been added or corrected unless mentioned below.

The use of physical units has not been corrected; for example, the author regularly uses m for speed, kgm for energy, etc.

In addition to the abbreviations given on page xxi, the book regularly uses differently abbreviated or shortened titles (sometimes single words) or translations of references; this has not been standardised.

Page ix, Table of Contents: the differences between the Table of Contents and the headings in the text have not been rectified. Apart from (minor) differences in wording, not all headings in the text occur in the Table of Contents, and not all entries in the Table of Contents occur as headings in the text. Any auto-generated Table of Contents may therefore differ from the one on page ix ff.

Page 71, “in double column of twice the width of front”: the source document was unclear at this point, the text might also have read “in double column or twice the width of front”.

Page 183, 187: (Général) Le Joindre is the author of the publication, but his name is presented here as part of the title.

Page 195, troop diagram: due to width restrictions, the diagram had to be split into two rows (as it was in the printed book).

Page 475: The table appears to contain totals that do not agree with the data provided. Since it is not clear where the error was made, these calculations have been left as they were: row Germany, last column; row Austria, last column but one; row France, last column.

The table contains footnote markers, but there are no corresponding footnotes on this or the following pages. In an earlier edition of the book, the footnotes (using the numbering from the table in this text) were as follows:

[513] The strength of a company is assumed as 200 men (England excepted). [514] 10 Cartridges packed in a box. [515] New “D” ammunition. [516] During the Russo-Japanese war.

Changes made

Some minor obvious typographical and punctuation errors have been corrected silently; some tables have been split or re-arranged for better readability.

Footnotes and illustrations have been moved outside text paragraphs.

Spaced and non-spaced and italicised or regular “i.e.” and “Ibid./ibid.” have been standardised to “_i.e._” and “_Ibid._”/“_ibid._” “Minarelli Fitzgerald” has been standardised to “Minarelli-Fitzgerald”.

Page 8: “sans le comprendre” and “sans le faire” changed to “sans la comprendre” and “sans la faire”.

Various pages: “Wald und Ortsgefecht” and “Gruppen und Einheitsangriff” have been changed to “Wald- und Ortsgefecht“ and “Gruppen- und Einheitsangriff”.

Page 11, footnote [18]: opening quote marks inserted before When one attempts ....

Page 93: closing quote marks inserted after ... (300-400 paces).

Page 143, footnote [139]: closing quote mark deleted at end of footnote.

Page 162: “_... seit dem Jahre_, 1900,” changed to “_ ... seit dem Jahre 1900_,”

Page 180: B′, C′ and D′ in the text have been changed to B, C and D cf. the illustration. Footnote [170]: angles have been transcribed α, β and γ for consistency with the illustration and the text.

Page 195: Negrier changed to Négrier; footnote anchor [191] inserted.

Page 229: closing quote mark inserted after ... the size of this echelon.

Page 253: “Patrouillen und Radfahrkommandos” changed to “Patrouillen- und Radfahr-Kommandos”.

Page 257: “and that cover to be utilized only” changed to “and that cover be utilized only”.

Page 265, table: the column header “Machine gun” has been considered to be a heading a single column only.

Page 304, footnote [306]: closing quote mark inserted after ... of units in rear.

Page 324: “Csicseries v. Bacsany” changed to “Csicserics v. Bacsany”; “Feldgeschüts” changed to “Feldgeschütz”.

Page 354: closing quote mark inserted after ... the advance of the attacker’s infantry.

Page 355: “veritable bouclier” changed to “véritable bouclier”.

Page 395: “Helwig” changed to “Helvig”.

Page 399: footnote [430]: “_pp._ 484 and 558” changed to “pp. 484 and 558”; footnote [431]: “Les Expéditions de Tonkins” changed to “Les Expéditions de Tonkin”.

Page 429: closing quote mark inserted after ... or for making a counter-attack.

Page 458, footnote [491]: “détachments de couverture” changed to “détachements de couverture”.

Indexes: some entries moved to their proper alphabetical order.

Page 513: page number 363 changed to 263 (entry Machine guns, Kinds of fire, Switzerland).