m. Three weeks after the recruits join, those of the most skilled

in estimating distances--about an eighth of the total number--are selected to undergo further instruction. For this purpose they are placed under the orders of an officer charged with this instruction, who trains them for at least three hours, every other day, in estimating distances on varied ground. The better half of these men, regardless of the company to which they may belong, receive further instruction. Exercises on wholly unknown terrain are to be had with these men and not only extended marches but even railway journeys not exceeding 30 km. are authorized for this purpose.

In =Austria= the men are required to estimate distances up to 800 paces (600 m.),_i.e._, up to the range within which they might frequently have to choose their target independently. Only officers, non-commissioned officers, and specially skilled men are required to estimate ranges up to 2000 paces (1500 m.). The mean error of twenty determinations at short, mid, and long ranges, of a “reliable range finder,” is not to exceed 12 per cent. The _Roksandic_ range finding apparatus is said to give errors not exceeding 2-3 per cent when skillfully used.

To memorize distinguishing marks on the enemy as an aid in arriving at a correct estimate of the range, is not considered as simulating actual service conditions, since the power of vision of the men differs. Furthermore, one sees the enemy mostly in a prone position in action, and it is not to be expected that the men will remember the various rules for determining the range by the appearance of the enemy’s skirmishers. The same is true of the regulation which prescribes that the soldier estimating the range is to judge the effect which the target makes upon him. (England and Austria).

It will rarely be practicable for infantry to scale the range directly from a map. Infantry ranges are usually so short, in comparison to the scale of most of the maps, especially those available in the field, that it is difficult to take them between the points of a pair of dividers. Moreover, in an infantry action conspicuous objects are not likely to be located often enough near the position of the skirmishers to make it practicable to find them quickly even on the most accurate maps. The artillery is much better off in this direction; its ranges are longer and therefore more easily scaled from a map. Moreover, artillery is generally posted on or near prominent points, which may be found on almost any map. It should be remembered that a map is a horizontal projection, that any range scaled from a map is the base of a right triangle, and that the line of sight of a rifle, when firing uphill, follows the hypotenuse of that triangle.

An accurate knowledge of the range to within a meter is not necessary, as meteorological conditions,[140] especially temperature and illumination (degree of humidity of the atmosphere) affect the range of the projectile. Meteorological conditions may necessitate sight corrections amounting to 100 m. at mid ranges and to 150 m. at long ranges. According to the French Firing Regulations a difference of temperature of ±10 degrees C., changes the range of the Lebel rifle by 18 m. at 1000 m. The altitude of the terrain increases the range on account of reduced barometric pressure; this becomes a factor in the selection of a rear sight elevation at an altitude of approximately 1000 m. According to the French Firing Regulations, the range of their rifle at 1000 m. is increased as follows: At an altitude of 500 m. by 18; at 1000 m. by 42; at 1500 m. by 63; and at 2100 m. by 89 m.

[140] Lieutenant-General ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, p. 51, and also par. 70 Austrian I. F. R. The effect of temperature and of the altitude of the battlefield was strikingly illustrated in the Boer war.

These meteorological influences can be eliminated by obtaining the range from troops already engaged (artillery) or by determining the proper rear sight elevation (not the range) by trial volleys (pars. 190 and 191 German I. F. R.) or by an animated fire at will (Switzerland: fire at will, one round).

To ascertain the range by firing trial volleys is, however, practicable only when the terrain near the target is visible; when the target itself is stationary; when the ground is such that the strike of the bullets can be observed; when the firing party is not under fire; and, finally, when the necessary time is available. Since all of these preliminary conditions will rarely be fulfilled, it will only in exceptional cases be possible to determine the proper elevation by this method.

When this method is employed, volleys are fired either by sections or by platoons, with the same sight, at some one point of the target. For the first volley a rear sight elevation sufficiently below the proper one should be selected, so that hits on or in front of the target can be expected with certainty. This procedure is then repeated, as often as necessary, with correspondingly raised or lowered rear sight leaves, until the correct elevation is obtained.

This “ranging” by trial volleys promises no result, however, if any one of the above-mentioned preliminary conditions is not fulfilled. It is advantageous to establish a bracket by firing volleys, as is done by artillery, but even with a good glass it is very difficult to observe the strike of small caliber bullets. Whether it would be advisable to adopt for this ranging a specially designed weapon, firing thin-walled shell weighing about 400 g., is a question.[141]

[141] The 32 mm. _Nordenfeld_ machine gun fires a shell weighing 400 g.

The older range finding instruments depend upon angle measurements at both ends of a line (up to 25 m. long). The large range finder (_Hahn_) has been adopted in the German army. (Pars. 88-98 German I. F. R.). This apparatus permits a range to be measured from one point, up to 1200 m. on low targets, and on taller targets, such as skirmishers standing, up to 1600 m. Measurements are considered sufficiently accurate when the error amounts to

2-3% up to a range of 1000 m. 3¹⁄₂-5% „ „ „ „ 2000 „ 3-3¹⁄₂% „ „ „ „ 1500 „

On the defensive the large range finders will find employment before and during the action. The men charged with the measurement of the range should be careful not to betray the position by their activity, before fire is opened. The utility of these instruments is much more restricted in an attack. However, it will often be possible, before the fire fight begins, to ascertain the range from the point selected for the first firing position, to the position to be attacked. According to Soloviev range finders failed completely in action in Manchuria. (See p. 137 supra).

6. SELECTION OF A TARGET AND TIME FOR OPENING FIRE.

In selecting a target and opening fire it must be remembered that the fire cannot have a decisive effect unless the target is well within effective range. The leader should ask himself whether the result to be expected is properly commensurate with the probable expenditure of ammunition entailed, and whether this expenditure is warranted in view of the total amount available. But the decision to fire upon a target once made, the ammunition necessary for the attainment of the object of the fight must be expended without stinting, since all experience teaches us that an ineffective fire impairs the morale of one’s own troops, while it raises that of the enemy.

In the selection of a target, its tactical importance is the principal determining factor. The fire is first directed upon the most dangerous, generally the nearest target, or the one which is soon to become the most dangerous. Subsequently the fire should be directed upon targets which, owing to their height, width, depth, and density, promise the greatest number of effective hits.

Infantry will, as a rule, offer the most important and promising target, and the fire should be directed against the firing line, since the troops following it in close order will in any event come within range during their advance. In Italy, when two targets are available, the fire is to be directed on the one promising the best results.

Ballistic and tactical considerations determine whether fire should be opened at long or at short ranges.

Adequate results may be expected when the fire is directed against low targets at ranges of 800-1200 m., but at ranges over 1200 m. a decisive effect is only attainable by the expenditure of a large amount of ammunition. Skirmishers standing may be fired on with good effect even at ranges over 1200 m. (long ranges).

When the fire is properly controlled and directed, it will be effective against tall and deep targets within ranges corresponding to the highest graduations of the rear sight leaves. However, when the targets are narrow, a side wind is very apt to throw the cone of dispersion off the target.

The idea of using our accurate, long range rifle at long ranges in defense, thus bringing it into effective play, at a time when the danger to our own troops is still very small, is, at first glance, very tempting. Military history shows that such fire was successful here and there, especially where one of the contending parties was armed with a much superior weapon, or where the enemy failed to apply the proper remedy. But even in these cases it was successful only up to a certain point. There is this to be said against employing long range fire: Its effect is insignificant when compared with the expenditure of ammunition entailed; it is difficult to replenish ammunition and it tires the eye and the arm of the skirmisher. Poorly trained troops finally do not raise their rifles at all, but blaze away without aiming. To be sure, fire opened at an early moment annoys the advance of the enemy, but it cannot seriously retard it. Once the fire is opened, we want it to be effective; we don’t want to injure the enemy--we want to annihilate him.

Although we fully appreciate the good results obtained at long ranges on the target range, we prefer to utilize the entire staggering fire effect of our weapons at short and mid ranges, wholly for the purpose of annihilating the enemy.

Since only small targets, often scarcely discernible by the naked eye, present themselves to the attacker, the fire of the defender should not be returned at once. The forward movement should be continued by utilizing every expedient (rushes with breathing spells, and cover) until serious losses are sustained and the leader has reason to fear that his men will lose their morale and throw themselves down without orders. Frequently several groups will open fire while the others continue to advance. The endeavor should be to open fire only when the attacking force has gotten as close as possible to the lower limit of mid combat range (800-1200 m.).[142]

[142] At Paardeberg (18th March, 1900), the left wing of the Highland Brigade advanced, without firing a shot, to within 450 m. of the hostile position. This advance, to be sure, was made under cover of the fire of the right wing of the 9th Brigade, which had made a lodgment within 750 m. of the enemy’s position.

Errors in estimating the range are offset by the flat trajectory of the rifle only at short ranges, and only at these ranges can there be any question of an effective preparation of the attack by fire. These views are expressed in the German regulations.

Recent wars demonstrate that, whenever the attacker opened fire at long ranges, the attack finally came to a standstill, that the troops in many cases fired away all their ammunition, and that the whole attack failed.

“Whenever the attacking regiment opened fire this was unfortunately a sign that the attack had been repulsed.” This remark made by Kuropatkin in regard to the fight of the Russian infantry (center group) on Sept. 11th, 1877, at =Plevna=, is characteristic of the Russian ideas. On the occasion referred to, the Russians advanced on the Turkish works without fire preparation; the firing lines halted 400 to 600 m. from the Turkish position and commenced firing. They succumbed because it never occurred to the leaders to reinforce them and attempt to gain a superiority of fire. Even in Skobeleff’s attack there was no sign of actual fire preparation, but, as soon as the line halted, strong reinforcements were pushed in to carry it forward. The attack, made on a front of about 800 m., suffered heavy losses, but succeeded, although all organizations were in complete disorder. After advancing 1000 m., the decimated first line (8 battalions) halted; fifteen fresh companies carried it forward some 150 m.; then Skobeleff threw in twenty companies in one body, which carried the line forward to within approximately 100 to 150 m. of the work. At this moment Skobeleff threw himself into the fight and succeeded in taking the Turkish position with his badly cut up troops. Doubtless an act of undeniable gallantry, but not one worthy of imitation.

The war between Servia and Bulgaria (1885) is very instructive in this connection. As in 1859, 1870 and 1877, that force was defeated, which, trusting to the superiority of its rifles, opened fire at long ranges. The Servian skirmishers often did not even get within decisive range of the position of their opponents.

The British infantry, armed with a long range rifle equipped with an excellent rear sight arrangement, allowed itself to be enticed, by the long range fire of the Boers, into opening fire at 1200 and 1300 m. (Guard at Modder River) and even at 1600 and 1700 m. (6th Division at Paardeberg) against an enemy whose position was not discernible even through the most powerful glasses. The losses were small and not to be compared with those which our Guard suffered without firing, during their advance on St. Privat. The advance of the Gordon Highlanders at Doornkop (29th May, 1900) to within short range of the hostile position, without firing a shot, although they themselves were under fire from 2000 m. on, was splendid.[143]

[143] _The Times History of the War in South Africa_, IV, p. 141.

Since the assailant presents larger targets than the defender, and the latter can make preparations for firing, ascertain ranges, construct rifle-rests, and replenish ammunition without difficulty, it is proper in defense to open fire at long ranges, especially in delaying actions, for then fighting at short ranges is to be avoided in any case. It is absolutely correct for the defender to make the most of the advantages above mentioned. While everything is orderly and in readiness in the defender’s firing line, the attacker’s line is still in the process of forming. Should the defender wait until the hostile firing line has systematically deployed and has made a lodgment within short range of his position, or should he produce losses and create confusion in its ranks by suddenly opening fire?

The employment of long range fire on the defensive is justified when sufficient ammunition is available, when artillery is not present, and when the hostile infantry pursues the tactics of advancing to short range without firing. “Infantry should never attempt to take the place of artillery at long ranges or compete with the fire of that arm.” If it is important for the attacker to reach the extreme limit of mid ranges with as little firing as possible, the defender should in the first place fire on him with artillery, and, when this does not suffice or is not available, with infantry, so as to prevent him from accomplishing his object.

At mid ranges the efficacy of the defender’s fire is so great, when directed upon an infantry line advancing without fire support, that it becomes an important factor. At ranges from 1000 to 600 m., 8 to 25% hits can be counted on when the fire is directed against advancing skirmishers; and even assuming an error of ¹⁄₈ in the estimated range, 3 to 12% hits may still be expected. (Par. 623, p. 196, German I. F. R.).

If the attacker is unable to hide from the defender’s fire by using cover, his losses will increase until they become unbearable; his attack will hesitate, and he will commence firing. Fresh troops are necessary to carry the attacking line forward anew. The success of the defense is assured, if the defender is able to prevent the attacking force from getting within short range of the position. The defender’s chance of making a successful counter-attack disappears, however, as soon as the attacking force makes a lodgment within short range of the position; for the closer the defender is pressed, the closer will he be tied to his position. While the superiority of fire enjoyed by the defender at mid ranges allows him perfect freedom of action, at short ranges the attacker’s fire imposes conditions upon the defense which make the growing power of the attack sensibly felt. The moment the defender begins firing, however, he becomes at once a favorable target for the artillery of the attacking force. The defender frequently betrays his position prematurely by opening fire.

The _moral effect_ of withholding the fire (_fire surprise_) is very great.[144] A strong fire will be actually annihilating if suddenly directed upon the enemy at short ranges, especially if he is still in unsuitable formations, owing to his ignorance of the defender’s position. (Example: The British brigade under Hart at Colenso, 15th Dec., 1899, and the Highland Brigade at Magersfontain, 11th Dec., 1899) or if the morale of his troops is questionable.[145] What good troops should do in such a situation (employ rapid fire and then advance to the assault) is shown by the conduct of the IInd Battalion of the 20th Infantry at Coulomiers.[146] Steady nerves and iron discipline are, however, prerequisites for the execution of a fire surprise by the defender.

[144] Marshal BUGEAUD gives a very graphic description of the moral effect of fire in his _Aperçus sur quelques détails de guerre_, based upon his experiences in the fights with the British in the Peninsula: “The men began to get excited when still 1,000 m. from the enemy; they talked to each other; the march became more and more hurried; and disorder appeared here and there in the columns. The British remained quietly at order arms; their calm demeanor was not without effect upon our young soldiers. We approached closer, the men shouting: ‘_Vive l’empéreur! En avant, à la baionette!_’ Shakos were raised upon the points of bayonets; the march became a double time; the ranks became mixed; the excitement caused confusion here and there; and a few shots were fired from the column. The British continued to stand immovable, and seemed to pay no attention to us even when only 300 paces separated the two forces.

“The contrast was apparent. Everyone felt that he would have to deal with an opponent tried in battle; that the fire so long withheld by the enemy would surely be annihilating. Our fighting ardor cooled; the moral power which calmness, even when only apparent, exercises over confusion, which seeks to drown itself in noise, made itself felt in our ranks. At this moment, when the highest tension had been reached, the British line raised its rifles--an indescribable feeling rooted many of our men to the spot--and began to fire. The volleys, coolly delivered against a narrow front, plowed through our ranks; we wavered, decimated though we were, in order to recover; then three overpowering cheers from the opponents’ line, which rushed forward to the bayonet attack, and everybody turned to seek safety in disorderly flight.”

[145] The defense of the cemetery at Beaune la Rolande. HÖNIG, _Volkskrieg_, pp. 157 to 212.

[146] Dec. 15th, 1870. _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 20_, p. 246. KORTZFLEISCH, _Feldzug gegen den Loir_, p. 81.

Long range fire was employed with success on the defensive by the French at St. Privat (the Germans suffered the most serious losses at ranges from 1200 to 1000 m.) and by the Turks at Plevna. At 1500 m. the Russian losses were such that they were obliged to begin advancing by rushes. The losses decreased as the enemy’s position was approached. The long range fire had produced a retarding but by no means an annihilating effect. On the other hand, the fire of the defender, at extremely short ranges, had a telling effect at Beaune la Rolande; in the defense of Chagey on the Lisaine;[147] in the defense of Shipka Pass (200 to 300 paces) by the Russians, and in the engagement at Gorni Bugarov (1st Jan., 1878). Whenever the attacker enters the short range zone while still in unsuitable formations, his losses increase until they become annihilating. (Example: The bayonet attacks made by the Austrians at Nachod and Trautenau).[148]

[147] KUNZ, _Entscheidungskämpfe des Korps Werder_, II, pp. 53, 93 and 143. The village was situated in a valley and had only a limited field of fire.

[148] KÜHNE, _Kritische Wanderungen_, I, pp. 73 and 139; III, pp. 86 and 113. As regards flatness of trajectory and accuracy, the power of the needle gun (_Zündnadelgewehr_) at point blank range (280 m.) corresponds to the effect of rifle model ’98 at approximately 800 to 900 m. At Nachod the regiments named below suffered in two hours the losses given:

Loss, men; Strength; prisoners Regiment. men. included. Prisoners. Percentage. 20th Infantry 2,500 722 165 28.8% 60th Infantry 2,500 685 185 27.4%

Provisions of Various Regulations.

=Austria.= “_In attack, everything must be done to get as close as possible to the enemy before fire is opened._” In each fire position the fire should be delivered with steadiness and without haste.

In _defense_, fire is to be opened as soon as appropriate targets appear within effective range. Sometimes--especially in minor operations--it may be advantageous to let the enemy come up close and then open fire on him suddenly.

A decisive fire effect can only be counted on when the targets are situated within effective range. Ineffective fire is a waste of ammunition which impairs the morale of one’s own troops and raises that of the enemy. For firing at long ranges it is necessary to consider whether a sufficient amount of ammunition is available. Long range fire should, in any case, be used only when the size of the target makes an adequate fire effect probable, and when the range is known, or can be ascertained with accuracy. In long range fire the use of small units, each expending a large amount of ammunition, is as a rule to be recommended. The _distribution_ and _concentration_ of fire should be regulated by the officer charged with fire direction.

“_Effective fire, delivered suddenly, especially when taking an enemy in flank or in reverse, even when delivered only by relatively small forces, shakes the morale of the enemy in the most effective manner._” (Fire surprise). “Under certain circumstances, but especially when the enemy has used up all, or nearly all, of his reserves, comparatively small detachments, skillfully led, can contribute materially to success, or even bring about the decision, if they are able to get on the enemy’s flank or rear and open fire on him suddenly at short range.” Such fire surprises should be attempted when the conditions essential for their success are present.[149]

[149] In minor operations this would be a proper place for the employment of large scouting detachments, the importance of which decreases with the size of the contending forces. Such tasks can, however, be just as well performed by a well-trained body of infantry.

=France.= In _attack_, fire is opened as late as possible, at any rate not until the losses make it necessary to discontinue the forward movement. Fire is the only means which makes a further advance possible.

In _defense_, long range fire may be used under certain circumstances. “Sudden and violent rafales delivered at short range take the attacker by surprise if, all at once, he loses a great many men.”

=England= (1905). _Attack._ Infantry is to advance as close as possible to the enemy before opening fire; small losses must be endured. Fire is decisive under 540 m. (600 yds.). Artillery and infantry should support each other. Attention is called to the support afforded advancing skirmishers by the fire of infantry units and machine guns held in rear. The British are thus the first to prescribe “fire of position.” Their Firing Regulations require that “fire of position” be practiced by company at a range of 900 m. The company forms line of skirmishers (2-pace intervals) while movable disappearing targets are placed opposite it. The fire is to increase in intensity when the attacking infantry advances over level ground or finds obstacles; it is discontinued when cover is reached. “Fire of position” is not without danger, but seems to be practicable occasionally. Aside from its employment in “fire of position,” long range fire is to be used in attack in the following cases: In enveloping movements for the purpose of enfilading the enemy’s line; when favorable targets present themselves; in containing actions or in feints; in concentrated collective fire; and finally in pursuit. _Defense_: Fire is to be opened at 1000 m. on skirmishers, but it may be advantageous to withhold it until the hostile line comes within short range. This will give good results when the enemy is in ignorance of the defender’s position, or when the attack is made by poorly disciplined troops. Continued long range fire tires the eye and the hand.

=Italy.= In _attack_, the firing line is to reach the extreme limit of short range (500 m.) with as little firing as possible; to open fire before this with a part of the advancing force is only permissible when necessary to carry the line forward. _Defense._ As soon as the defender has a chance of obtaining some fire effect, he should open fire to prevent the attacking infantry from getting within short range. Fire at long (up to 1800 m.) and at mid ranges (up to 1000 m.) may also be used for this purpose. The battalion commander determines when fire is to be opened.

From what has been said in the preceding pages as to the time when infantry should open fire, we may deduce the following =General Rules=:--

It is permissible to open fire at an early moment only in exceptional cases when the situation requires it; good preparation, which assures the efficacy of fire and a high moral effect from the very beginning, is of greater importance.

(a) IN ATTACK.

The attacker should advance without firing to ranges at which an adequate fire effect against the low targets presented by the defender may be expected. To open fire at an earlier moment is permissible only when the defender’s fire is so strong that effective ranges cannot be reached without firing. Long range fire is only a means to an end. In a pursuit long range fire will, however, be employed for the purpose of annoying the enemy.

(b) IN DEFENSE.[150]

[150] In Manchuria the Russians, when on the defensive, opened fire on favorable targets at 1,500 m.; on skirmish lines at 1,000 m.

Fire may be opened at long ranges when sufficient ammunition is available, only when the object is to gain time, and in decisive actions, when the enemy presents favorable targets and we have no artillery. Unless other reasons prevent, fire is opened as soon as targets are clearly discernible and easily brought into line with the sights. It is advisable to withhold the fire when the hostile artillery is superior, when the opponent’s troops are of poor quality, and when it is impossible to surprise the enemy with our fire while he is in unsuitable formations. In defense, as in attack, the decision must be sought by the employment of rapid fire at short range.

7. PAUSES IN THE FIRE.[151]

[151] A Russian company commander contributes the following in _Mitteilungen der Infanterie Schieszschulen_: “On Sept. 3rd, 1904, the fire in one of the trenches at Liao Yang lasted throughout the entire day. The men were finally completely exhausted; their shoulders, hands and fingers stiff. They had to be given some rest, and something to eat and drink. Then the fire was resumed, only to die down again. The fire of the skirmishers was not very effective, as they were completely exhausted and used up.”

=Swiss.= Firing Regulations p. 44: “It may be advantageous in defense to fire on the attacker only until he himself opens fire, and then to remain under cover until he resumes his forward movement. A prompt resumption of the fire by the defender must, however, be assured.”

=France.= “The fire should cease when the hostile infantry halts and takes to cover; its volume is increased as soon as the assailant resumes his forward movement, or when he shows himself in dense formations on open ground.”

The efficacy of fire depends upon its accuracy, its direction with reference to the target, and its volume. In the past, pauses in the fire were necessary to allow the powder smoke to clear away; at present they are of advantage because they give the men a breathing spell; rest eyes and nerves; enable ammunition to be distributed, and allow preparations to be made for concerted action. In making use of such pauses good cover, good observation of the enemy and instant readiness for resuming the fire are essential. In a serious engagement the men either maintain a vigorous, animated fire or they rest. If the advancing enemy takes to cover, the fire must cease, only to be resumed with full vigor when favorable targets appear. The attacker (like the British in South Africa advancing against the Boers) will in many cases--especially at the beginning of a campaign--be deceived into believing that the defender has withdrawn; should the attacker now advance, the defender, by suddenly resuming his fire, will surprise him to such an extent that he may be repulsed.[152] Pauses in the fire are a practical expedient for maintaining fire discipline and enable the leader to keep his troops in hand. An organization is capable of performing its duty well, so long as it obeys the command “cease firing.” It might be well at this point to determine when the defender should _change his rear sight elevations_ if the attacker advances by rushes. At mid ranges it might be advisable to stop firing, so as to present no target to the enemy when his line throws itself down after a rush, and to utilize this interruption for changing the rear sight elevation. When this is done during a forward rush of the enemy, the rapidity of fire will suffer at the most favorable moment for bringing an effective fire to bear upon the enemy.

[152] Compare HÖNIG, _Vierundzwanzig Stunden Moltkescher Strategie_, p. 145, relative to the various opinions entertained in the staffs of Generals v. Göben and Steinmetz in regard to the pause in the fire of the French at Point du Jour. _Der 18. August_, pp. 269, 271 and 352.

8. KINDS OF FIRE.

In the days of slow loading rifles of limited range, the importance of the _volley_ was due to the fact that it enabled the leader to develop the greatest volume of fire in tactically favorable moments, or, in other words, when large targets were visible for a short time. Modern combat is conducted under different conditions. When black powder was used the volley had the advantage of permitting the powder smoke to clear away during the pauses. This advantage has now also disappeared.

In the Russo-Japanese war, the Japanese used “fire at will” almost exclusively. Volleys were used by them only at long ranges; by troops held in rear and, after an assault, to get the men in hand. These views are not changed in the new regulations, but immediately after firing a volley the men are to re-load without command. Rapid fire is retained. The Russians placed their faith principally in volley fire,[153] but were soon forced to resort to fire at will. The Russian regulations recommended volley fire up to the decisive firing position, not so much because of a belief in the superior efficacy of this kind of fire, but out of distrust of the individual training of their men; certainly an admission of the deficiency of that kind of training in their army. It was feared that fire at will would impair fire discipline and cause waste of ammunition, and it was believed that the immediate influence of superiors could not be dispensed with. Even the new provisional regulations have not discarded volley fire, which may be employed by section or by platoon. Fire at will may be divided into slow fire (one shot from each squad) and lively fire with counted cartridges.

[153] At Nicholson’s Neck (24th Oct., 1899) the British leaders ordered their men, who were firing at will on the Boers advancing from cover to cover (“_Boer Attack_”) to discontinue that fire, and to use volleys only. But the enemy consistently avoided presenting large targets to the British volley fire.

_Germany._ _Volleys_ (pars. 106-108 German I. F. R.) are to be employed by platoons or companies when in close order; in skirmish line (par. 193 German I. F. R.) only when the enemy is surprised or the organization is to be kept firmly in hand. Volleys, however, can be used only when the troops themselves are not exposed to an effective fire. An organization will be able to ascertain the range by means of trial volleys only in exceptional cases.

“_The highest attainable rate of fire_--the word rapid fire has been elided--is to be used in attack during the preparation for the assault; in defense to repulse a hostile assault; in warding off a cavalry charge; in all combat situations in which a sudden or immediate collision with the enemy occurs; and, finally, in pursuit.” (Par. 208 German I. F. R.).

_Fire at will_ is used both in extended and close order.

=Volley Fire and Fire at Will. Bursts of Fire (Rafales).= “_Il n’y a de feu practicable devant l’ennemi que celui à volonté._” NAPOLEON.[154]

[154] “Fire at will is the only kind of fire practicable when engaged with the enemy.” NAPOLEON.

“It may be objected that one frequently reads in military history of effective volleys. The explanation of this is that many of the so-called volleys mentioned in accounts were volleys only in name. In a few instances the defender endeavored to fire volleys, but usually their effect was insignificant.” V. BOGUSLAWSKI.

“Fire at will was forbidden. Volley fire was used only by direction of the commanders of the battalion sections of the line. The order to fire volleys quickly ran along the trenches. For a few minutes a certain amount of unrest was noticeable among the men, which, if allowed to continue, might have degenerated into confusion and later perhaps into disorderly flight.

“The first volley was not quite successful. It was ragged--some men even firing a second time without waiting for the command, an example likely to be followed by the others. The force was on the point of getting out of hand. Volleys fired by neighboring sections drowned the voice of the commander. In such situations only personal experience and resourcefulness can tell a company commander what to do. We recommend a course which has always been attended with success in practice. Let the officer commanding a section jump upon the parapet and from there give the order ‘cease firing.’ Then, if the enemy’s fire permits, and his own heart is stout enough, let him order the next volley from his position on the parapet. When once the force is again under control, the volleys will be as good as if the enemy were not so close.” KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER _Kritische Rückblicke auf den Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_, II, pp. 304 and 310.

In his _Comments on Drill Regulations_ (16th Nov., 1840) Prince WILLIAM, subsequently Emperor WILLIAM I. of Germany, says:

“I am personally opposed to volleys by battalion. I am of the opinion that in war volleys and file fire will seldom be used. Should this fire be used, however, no one will be able to stop file firing after volley firing, even though not ordered, _because in my opinion it is impossible to combat human nature_, which finds more security in rapid loading and firing than in awaiting the commands....”

_Russian experiences in Manchuria._ “At first _volleys_ by formed bodies of troops were attempted, but later fire at will was used. In the latter, the men were forbidden to hurry, were instructed to bring their pieces down to the ‘ready,’ and, whenever it was possible to see the enemy--who was advancing by rushes--to change their rear sight elevations at the whistle signal of their commander.... When at a distance from the enemy the men remained cool and fired faultless volleys. When the enemy came closer the volleys deteriorated. The Russians used only fire at will at ranges under 800 paces. This enabled the men to fire on individual hostile skirmishers and to place the boldest out of action.” SOLOVIEV.

=Austria.= _Volleys_ are employed, as a rule, only by bodies in close order, for the purpose of finding the range, and for firing upon targets which appear suddenly at long range and which will probably be visible for only a short time. Fire at will is the principal kind of fire used, the rate of fire being increased or decreased by the men according to the existing situation. When necessary, the leaders should regulate the fire; but this should only be done in exceptional cases as the men are apt to increase rather than diminish the rate of fire (“Rapid fire”).

The _maximum rate of fire_ is to be employed: “In _attack_, for the purpose of gaining a superiority of fire at short range; in _defense_, for the purpose of warding off an impending assault. It is moreover to be used to inflict the greatest possible losses on a defeated enemy as long as he is within effective range; and, finally, in fire surprises, repulse of cavalry attacks, and in rencontres with the enemy.”

=France.= The French _Lebel_ rifle has a cylindrical magazine situated under the stock and has a capacity of eight cartridges which have to be loaded singly. As a rule, _fire with counted cartridges_ is employed (_feu à cartouches comptées_) for the purpose of obtaining a “burst of fire” (_rafale_). The _rafale_ consists of firmly controlled, concentrated, collective fire. Fire at will (_feu à volonté_) is also used, eight rounds per minute being fired at the short ranges. The rapidity of this fire at will may be increased up to 12 rounds per minute by employing the cartridges in the magazine (_feu à répétition_). One minute is required to fill the magazine. Volleys are to be employed in night combats and when it becomes necessary to control the men. In exceptional cases individual men are directed to fire.

=England and Switzerland.= The only fire employed is fire at will. The rapidity of this fire varies according to the nature of the target and the range.

=Italy.= Fire at will (in close order in two or four ranks).

=Japan and Russia.= (See p. 157, supra).

The Rate of Fire.

As regards its rate, fire may be divided into three classes, viz., _slow fire_, _accelerated fire_, and _rapid fire_. The command “fire more slowly” (or more rapidly) serves only the purpose of diminishing (or increasing) the rate of fire.

The rate of fire depends upon the purpose of action, the character of the target, and the available ammunition. Unfavorable illumination and the difficulty of clearly distinguishing the target at long ranges will reduce the rate of fire. The aiming position (_i.e._, whether the rifle is fired from a prone position or from a rest) also affects the rate of fire. A well trained company at peace strength will, moreover, be able to fire more rapidly than one on a war footing.

Hurried firing should unquestionably be condemned. The rapidity with which our rifles can be loaded enables us to produce the maximum fire effect in the minimum time against narrow targets. _The desire of the soldier to make every shot a hit, carefully inculcated in time of peace, will of itself regulate the rate of fire._ As the rate of fire depends upon the distinctness with which the target can be seen, it will naturally increase as the range decreases, thus generally corresponding to the requirements of the tactical situation. Moreover, as it is easier to aim at tall targets than at head targets, this also exercises either an accelerating or a retarding effect, as the case may be. Lieutenant-General Rohne has done a great deal to bring about a correct appreciation of the rate of fire. He states: “The opposition to an increased rate of fire is perhaps due to the belief that it is invariably coupled with a reduction in accuracy. This is not the case, however, and even if it were true to a certain extent, it need not necessarily be harmful. To be sure, when a high rate of fire is solely due to the excitement of the skirmishers, it is unquestionably to be condemned because no attempt is made at aiming; but when it is the product of systematic peace training, it need not necessarily preclude good aiming. It is entirely consistent with a high rate of fire to load and point quickly, to keep the target constantly in view, and, at the same time, to aim accurately and to pull the trigger without flinching.

“The leader who reduces the rapidity of fire in battle in order to save ammunition, wastes lives and time, both more valuable than ammunition. Disabled soldiers are more difficult to replace than ammunition, and lost time cannot be replaced at all.”[155]

[155] _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, 2nd Edition.

A high rate of fire need by no means be synonymous with waste of ammunition. Ammunition would unquestionably be wasted if fire were delivered for hours at the same high rate. It is very probable, however, that in the battles of the future the fire will be moderate for some time, or, better still, cease entirely, only to break forth like a thunderstorm over the enemy when opportunity offers or necessity demands. The slower the troops fire the longer they will present a target to the enemy. The coolness shown in firing individual shots at the commencement of an action will disappear owing to the impression produced by losses. This is apparent even in field firing. Lieutenant-General Rohne arrives at the following average results:

Ranges up to 400 m. 5 rounds per minute; „ from 400- 700 „ 4-5 „ „ „ „ „ 700-1000 „ 3-4 „ „ „ „ „ 1000-1300 „ 2-3 „ „ „ „ „ 1300-1500 „ 1-4 „ „ „ „ over 1500 „ 1 „ „ „

Troops going into action for the first time are inclined to fire entirely too fast, due to their desire to overcome their nervousness. Veteran troops seek to attain the same result, not through rapidity of fire, but through accuracy. Only the determination to make hits is calculated to overcome nervousness. Wherever this determination is lacking, wild firing (fire panic), which is in any case difficult to prevent, will surely result. Fire delivered hurriedly during unexpected rencontres is almost invariably ineffective.[156] For this reason most of the firing regulations have eliminated the command “Rapid Fire,” which is only calculated to produce confusion.

[156] At Beaumont the 9th Company of the 27th Infantry, after a long advance at double time, encountered the flank of a hostile battalion. The men became excited, raised the leaves of their rear sights, and opened rapid fire, which had no effect whatever, as the range was only 200 paces. _Geschichte des Regiments, Nr. 27_, p. 95.

The Italian Firing Regulations contain the following statement in regard to the effect of accelerated fire (see p. 140 supra).[157]

[157] Consult also _Schieszversuche der k. u. k. Armeeschieszschule seit dem Jahre 1900_, Vienna, 1905. ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, 2nd Edition, p. 132.

1. _When the appropriate elevation is used_, two-thirds of the percentage of hits obtained by firing 5-6 rounds from each rifle per minute, may be expected when firing at the rate of 12-14 rounds per minute.

2. _When the elevation selected is too great or too small by 100 m._, rapid fire produces almost the _same percentage_ of hits as ordinary fire at will.

3. _When the elevation selected is in error by 200 m._, rapid fire produces almost _twice as great a percentage_ of hits as fire at will.

From the above it follows that, when the appropriate elevation is not used, accelerated fire will inflict greater losses upon the enemy than ordinary fire at will in the same length of time. Within equal periods of time the actual number of hits will be greater in animated fire at will than in slow fire; but in the latter the percentage of hits will be higher.

Of all the different kinds of fire, the _volley_ is best adapted to meet the requirement of keeping the troops in hand, of concentrating the fire, and thereby producing great moral effect. Volleys are of value to troops in ambush, in repulsing cavalry attacks, and in preventing premature firing against the wishes of the commander. They should be used against staffs which would be able to seek cover or spread out when exposed to fire at will.

As the men are, however, not equally skilled in loading their pieces, the rate of fire is very little increased by the use of volleys. The command “Fire” can only be given when the pieces of the entire unit are directed upon the target. The length of the pause between preliminary command and command of execution varies, depending upon the distinctness with which the target can be seen, the range, and the aiming position. When the fire is delivered from a prone position it will be difficult to determine when the command of execution should properly be given. Moreover, as fire from a standing or kneeling position will be the exception, this has contributed to eliminate volley firing on the battlefield, because the troops lack coolness--mental as well as physical--which is indispensable in every volley.

The material and moral effect of a volley is doubtless very considerable, but who could possibly make his voice heard when a deployed platoon of sixty men is firing? How about the efficacy of the fire when the men revert of their own accord from volleys to fire at will, which they will do when their officers are either killed or wounded and they themselves are exposed to fire?[158]

[158] During the advance on Flavigny (Vionville), the support of the 10th Company, 12th Infantry, was to move into the firing line for the purpose of firing volleys. “The volley was by no means a good one, however, and the men at once took up rapid fire. Lieutenant C---- jumped in front of the men to stop the firing, but was shot in the leg and crawled back. The rapid fire continued along the entire line.” _Geschichte des Regiments, Nr. 12_, p. 454.

During the war between Servia and Bulgaria the Servians always opened the infantry combat with volleys, but after casualties had occurred among the officers under the heavy fire of the enemy, the steady volley fire soon degenerated into wild, hurried fire at will, which produced no effect whatever.

If we use squad volleys (Russia), we approximate fire at will without any of its advantages, besides which, commands, given by so many leaders, tend to confuse the men. Moreover, it is very difficult to handle the platoon, to stop firing, to change target, and to initiate movements. Volley firing is therefore confined to the preparatory stage of combat and to rare moments in which the troops firing are not themselves under effective fire. In the defense of fortified positions many opportunities will be found for the employment of volley fire. The use of trial volleys for the purpose of testing the rear sight elevation will be confined to a few favorable cases, and it may be remarked that animated fire at will concentrated on some definite point produces the same results.

The French, who retained volleys longer than the other powers (to keep the men in hand, to regulate the expenditure of ammunition, and to direct a concentrated collective fire upon the most important target according to the will of the leader), found a substitute in the fire with counted cartridges,[159] the “burst of fire” (rafale).[160] This was also adopted by their artillery. In Germany, the importance of the sudden effect produced by these “bursts of fire” is recognized, but the same object is sought to be attained by training alone; while in Russia, fire with counted cartridges has been adopted, not for the purpose of obtaining rafale fire effect, but for keeping the men in hand. Rafale fire has the disadvantage that pauses in the fire are regulated formally, and that these pauses occur frequently at the very moment when a favorable target is still visible. Will the individual soldier remain cool in the excitement of battle and carefully count the three or five cartridges which he is to fire? In defense, rafale fire is proper, because the skirmisher in the defensive line is completely hidden during the pauses, while the attacker presents favorable targets only temporarily, thus justifying an increased expenditure of ammunition. In attack, suitable targets are rarely available for rafale fire, and a substitute for this fire must be sought in well directed, steadily delivered fire at will, interrupted by rushes to the front. During an attack, rafale fire might degenerate into wild, uncontrolled fire at will, the rapidity of which decreases only when the ammunition runs short. The employment of this class of fire might sometimes be advisable in action when it becomes necessary to hold the enemy, that is, in defensive situations. In this connection, one who is thoroughly familiar with the French army aptly says: “Rafale fire may be likened to the wild passes made by a man, backed up against a wall, for the purpose of warding off an adversary who is able to decide the controversy with one well-aimed blow.”

[159] Temporarily adopted in Germany also.

[160] Par. 194.1 of the _French Infantry Drill Regulations_ of Dec. 3rd, 1904, states: “The moral effect produced upon an opponent by the fire is much more considerable when the fire is concentrated and delivered suddenly and unexpectedly.” Par. 194.4 states: “The efficacy of the fire, due to its intensity, is augmented when the enemy is taken by surprise,” etc. Par. 195.1 states: “The fire is, as a rule, delivered by ‘rafales,’ which are short, sudden and violent; and, in exceptional cases, by volleys.”

9. REAR SIGHT ELEVATIONS AND POINTS OF AIM.

In Switzerland and Italy the employment of a single rear sight elevation, less than the actual range, is preferred, even when the range is not accurately known. The French regulations are silent on this subject. In Germany one rear sight elevation is used, as a general rule, up to 1,000 m.; beyond that range combined sights may be used in which the two rear sight elevations differ from each other by 100 or 50 m.[161]

[161] See ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, p. 93, et seq.

In view of the greater dispersion of fire in action, the author recommends the selection of either one elevation only, or, at the longer ranges, the employment of combined sights, in which the elevations differ from each other by 200 m. In peace time the use of combined sights, by well-trained marksmen, in which rear sight elevations differ by only 50 m. would, indeed, be sufficient to increase the number of hits, but on the battlefield the favorable conditions found on the target range are lacking.

“Rapidly approaching or receding targets are followed by making proper sight corrections, rear sight elevations being less than the range when the fire is delivered against advancing targets and greater than the range when the fire is delivered against receding targets. At short ranges the same result may be obtained by aiming lower or higher. It should be noted that, when firing on cavalry making a mounted attack, the danger space is continuous when the sights are raised to 700 m.” (Par. 192 German I. F. R.). As a general rule, the proper aiming point is the lowest line of the target. When it becomes necessary to aim at the center, to one side of or below a target, its dimensions will serve as a guide. A change in the rear sight elevation is necessary at medium and long ranges to raise or lower the sheaf of fire; at short ranges it is practicable to point higher only when the target is tall. When the velocity of a side wind cannot be estimated, it is advisable to distribute the fire over a broader front. At short ranges the selection of an aiming point may, under favorable circumstances, be left to the discretion of the individual skirmishers.

10. COMMANDS.

In recounting the several commands to be given for firing, the regulations take into consideration the logical sequence of the tasks devolving upon the skirmisher. Thus the first command draws the skirmisher’s attention to the target; the second indicates the range; the third directs him to open fire.

11. THE OBSERVATION OF THE FIRE.

The actions of the enemy are usually the only reliable indication of the location of the sheaf of fire directed against him; the observed strike of bullets is seldom so good an indication. It is especially difficult to judge of the distribution of projectiles from their strike in front and in rear of the target. Suggestions from the subordinate leaders, whose view of the target is generally restricted, are often more confusing than valuable.

12. THE EFFECT OF FIRE.

COMPARISON BETWEEN LOSSES PRODUCED BY INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY FIRE.

In 1866 the Austrian artillery inflicted 16% of our losses. In 1870-71 the French artillery inflicted 8% of our losses. Up to the battle of Liao Yang the 1st Japanese Army suffered the following losses:

===========+===========================+======================== | PERCENTAGES. | WOUNDS. +----------+-------+--------+--------+-------+------- | Small | Art’y |Cutting |Serious.|Slight.| Very |arms fire.| fire. |weapons.| | |slight. -----------+----------+-------+--------+--------+-------+------- Guard Div. | 88.42 | 11.50 | 0.08 | 32.17 | 62.49 | 5.34 2d Div. | 89.43 | 7.91 | 2.30 | 44.05 | 54.89 | 1.06 12th Div. | 80.52 | 14.48 | 2.09 | 39.12 | 46.36 | 14.52 -----------+----------+-------+--------+--------+-------+------- Average | 86.12 | 11.30 | 2.09 | 38.45 | 54.58 | 6.97 -----------+----------+-------+--------+--------+-------+-------

The figures given above under the captions “serious” (including killed), “slight,” and “very slight” wounds have, of course, only a relative value. The following figures express the average losses of Russians and Japanese:

Losses through rifle fire 85.9% Losses through artillery fire 11.4% Losses through cutting weapons 3.2%

Modern fire tactics count upon a prolonged fire for the purpose of gradually exhausting the enemy, and upon rapid fire, suddenly delivered, for annihilating him.

While a statement of the percentage of hits[162] throws some light upon the effect of the fire of an organization, under normal conditions, the number of figures placed out of action affords a standard of comparison by means of which tactical success may be measured, and aids in deciding how to distribute the fire. Differences in fire effect on like targets are best determined by comparing the number of figures hit per minute by 100 marksmen, as a great number of hits is presupposed, which is not the case when the percentage of hits is taken.

[162] In this connection the following works have been consulted: _Das Gefechtsmäszige Abteilungsschieszen der Infanterie_, 4th Edition (1905), by Lieutenant-General ROHNE, and _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, 2nd Edition (1906), by the same author; also _Militär-Wochenblatt_ No. 46 of 1900. To be sure, absolute trustworthiness cannot be claimed for the figures given, for the conditions of firing in action are variable; but, as obtained by Lieutenant-General Rohne, they serve as an excellent standard of comparison, and, when their relative value is considered, as a basis for tactical deductions.

(a) Influence of Training.

Individual skill in marksmanship is of decisive importance when firing at targets of appropriate size at the short ranges. A good marksman, firing at will, may (not _must_) expect a hit from each round fired, at any target within 250 m., at a single kneeling opponent within 350 m., at a kneeling file within 500 m., and at a standing file within 600 m. At ranges beyond this, influences, due to the imperfections of the rifle, make themselves felt; and these influences grow to such an extent that the best marksmanship training is unable to eliminate them. A considerable number of rifles must fire in order to produce an effect; for, as some of the pieces fire short and others over, the hits are thus distributed over a greater area. But even here skill in marksmanship is apparent in that the cone of dispersion of the excellent shots produces a shot group of small diameter, that of the poorer shots one of very large diameter. Lieutenant-General Rohne computed (_Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, p. 84) that when firing rifle model ’98 with the appropriate elevation at a target 1 m. high, the marksmen named in the following table would obtain the number of hits given at the ranges indicated:

=======+======================================== | NUMBER OF HITS OBTAINED BY +---------------+------------+----------- Range.|Excellent shots| Fair shots | Poor shots | Out of 100 rounds fired. -------+---------------+------------+----------- 1000 m.| 27. | 17.6 | 8.9 1500 m.| 14.2 | 9.7 | 4.8 -------+---------------+------------+-----------

This ratio changes, however, very seriously to the disadvantage of the excellent marksmen when the appropriate elevation is not used. The figure given below, in which the curves of hits are traced, shows that even poor shots may obtain better results in this case.

From this may be deduced the great importance of quickly and accurately ascertaining the range. The excellent ballistic qualities of our rifle and our thorough marksmanship training can assert themselves fully only when the range has been accurately determined. At ranges over 800 m. too great an accuracy in collective fire may be actually detrimental. In this case individual accuracy matters little; the important thing is to direct the densest portion of the sheaf of fire, with some degree of accuracy, on a target the range to which is known only in a general way. The importance of training soldiers in precise marksmanship is ethical rather than practical, for a good target shot need not necessarily be a battle marksman. For the latter a cool head is of more value than all the marksmanship skill of the target range.

(b) Influence of the Error in Estimating the Range.

At short ranges an error of estimation is offset by the flatness of the trajectory. Lieutenant-General Rohne used a probable error in estimation of ¹⁄₈ (12.5%) of the range in his computations. The Swiss Firing Regulations of 1905 count on an error of 100 m. at 500 m., 200 m. at 500 to 1,000 m., 300 m. at ranges over 1,000 m., and the average is taken to be ¹⁄₅ of the range, or 20%. For measurements with range finding instruments see p. 146, supra.

In the following table, the number of hits per 100 rounds fired, at a target 1 m. high, by the marksmen named, is shown under--

“a” When the fire is controlled and the appropriate elevation is used;

“b” When each skirmisher has selected the elevation corresponding to his estimate of the range. In this case it is presumed, however, that the ranges are generally estimated correctly. (ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, 2nd Edition, p. 102).

======+================+===============+=============== Range.|Excellent shots.| Fair shots. | Poor shots. +-------+--------+-------+-------+-------+------- m. | a | b | a | b | a | b ------+-------+--------+-------+-------+-------+------- 400 | 65.1 | 58.5 | 50.4 | 47.8 | 26.6 | 26.4 600 | 46.6 | 32.9 | 32.9 | 26.6 | 16.9 | 15.8 800 | 35.2 | 15.5 | 23.3 | 13.9 | 11.8 | 9.7 1000 | 27. | 7.5 | 17.6 | 7. | 8.9 | 5.9 1200 | 20.5 | 4. | 13.6 | 3.9 | 6.8 | 3.5 1400 | 16.1 | 2.4 | 10.8 | 2.4 | 5.4 | 2.2 1600 | 12.5 | 1.5 | 8.7 | 1.5 | 4.4 | 1.4 ------+-------+--------+-------+-------+-------+-------

The above table shows that when the elevation selected is in error, the number of hits decreases more rapidly the greater the skill of the marksman; and that an error in estimation is of less importance than marksmanship only at ranges under 800 m.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN “a” AND “b.”

======+================+===============+=============== Range.|Excellent shots.| Fair shots. | Poor shots. m. | | | ------+----------------+---------------+--------------- 400 | 6.6 | 2.6 | 0.4 600 | 13.7 | 6.3 | 1.1 800 | 19.8 | 9.4 | 2.1 1000 | 19.5 | 10.6 | 3.0 1200 | 16.4 | 9.7 | 3.3 1400 | 13.3 | 8.4 | 3.2 1600 | 11. | 7.2 | 2. ------+----------------+---------------+---------------

(c) Fire Effect as Regards Time. Number of Rounds to be Expended.

The greater the losses inflicted within a short period of time in a limited space, the greater the moral effect of the fire. It should therefore be the aim of the officer charged with fire direction to bring about a decisive effect within the shortest possible time. The leaders must bear in mind from the beginning of the fire fight that the ammunition carried is limited and that the expenditure of a certain amount is equivalent to a loss of power, and this is permissible only where commensurate results would be achieved. When once a decision has been formed to fire on a target, the ammunition necessary to accomplish the object of the fight must be expended without stinting, since ineffective fire impairs the morale of one’s own troops and raises that of the enemy.

When the enemy is approximately equal to us in numbers, and is deployed in line at one man per meter of front, presenting breast targets only, the number of rounds per rifle, given in round figures in the following table, will be required to place about one-third of the enemy’s force out of action:[163]

At a range of 300 m. 3 rounds, „ „ „ „ 400 „ 5 „ „ „ „ „ 500 „ 6 „ „ „ „ „ 600 „ 7.5 „ „ „ „ „ 700 „ 10 „ „ „ „ „ 800 „ 13 „ „ „ „ „ 900 „ 16 „ „ „ „ „ 1000 „ 25 „ „ „ „ „ 1100 „ 45 „ „ „ „ „ 1200 „ 50 „ „ „ „ „ 1300 „ 57 „ „ „ „ „ 1400 „ 63 „ „ „ „ „ 1500 „ 72 „ „ „ „ „ 1600 „ 80 „

[163] According to ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, 2nd Edition, p. 214.

In the above table it is assumed that an error of estimation of 7.5% was made and that at ranges over 1000 m. two elevations were used. Against head targets, approximately twice the number of rounds indicated above must be expended; and against exposed skirmishers, visible at full height, about half of the number of rounds given. The efficacy is increased when the fire comes from a flank. The following data are taken from an extended firing test: At 600-700 m., 200 skirmishers, firing 5000 rounds against 200 body targets, obtained 4.3% hits and placed 43% of the figures out of action; under the enfilading fire delivered by one platoon, the percentage of hits rose to 10.5%, and the number of incapacitated figures to 80%.

(d) Additional Influences Affecting Accuracy of Fire.

Errors in setting the sight, in pointing, aiming, and pulling the trigger, increase the area of the beaten zone at the expense of fire effect on the actual target selected. When we consider the excitement of men in action, and the numerous sources of error in setting the sights, in pointing and firing, it is clear that we have to reckon with the =effect of misses= on the field of battle more than with the really well aimed and well delivered collective fire of a considerable number of marksmen. Lieutenant Colonel Wolozkoi, late of the Russian Army,[164] attempted to obtain an approximate standard of measurement for the errors in firing made by marksmen. He bases his deductions upon the opinion that the efficacy of rifle fire in action depends entirely upon the mental and physical condition of the individual soldier at the moment; that in serious engagements this condition is such that accurate aiming cannot be expected; and finally that every skirmisher, according to the degree of his excitement or fatigue, will fire his piece at varying angles of elevation. He argues that this produces a rigid cone of dispersion, whose limits correspond to certain extreme angles of error, and whose axis (center trajectory) corresponds to a mean angle of error; that, for each class of rifles, the depth of the resulting beaten zone is constant; and that the depth of this zone increases with the range corresponding to the angles of error. It follows that the depth of this beaten zone is greater in modern rifles than in those of older pattern.

[164] _Das Gewehrfeuer im Gefecht_, 1883.

He believes that peace training will have fulfilled its mission if the skirmisher, while firing, holds his piece in the position to which he has become habituated through years of practice. This position can be none other than that in which the piece is horizontal.

Although the theory of the =Rigid, Constant Cone of Misses=, is not tenable in this form, because there will always be a reasonably compact core of hits (the dimensions of which depend upon the conditions indicated in the firing regulations) at the center of the cone of fire, the views of Colonel Wolozkoi have, nevertheless, a certain value for us, and find application in large, hotly contested battles, especially when the firing line has been exposed to the material and moral influences of hostile fire for a considerable length of time. At the commencement of every combat we can, at any rate, count on “aimed fire”; but instead of reckoning at all times with a 75% core of hits, 100 m. in diameter, we must become used to reckoning with a 30 and 40% core of hits, of the same diameter, produced by greater dispersion of the bullets.

According to experiments made by Colonel Wolozkoi, a good shot makes a mean angular error of ±8 minutes, when using the horizontal aiming position; a poor shot, one of ±40 minutes; the average error being ±25 minutes. In this, however, the sources of error, due to excitement on the part of the marksmen, are not considered. “The principal angular errors can be traced to the nervousness of the marksmen; and this is directly proportional to the magnitude of the danger and the suddenness of its appearance. The soldier judges the magnitude of danger by the number of hostile projectiles and by their effect. Therefore, the livelier the hostile fire, and the longer it continues, the greater the danger appears to him; while the less the effect of that fire, and the better he is sheltered from it, the less he will think himself endangered. On this account, the nervous tension of the individual soldier will reach different degrees of intensity according to the magnitude of the danger.

“Now there are combat situations where the danger is insignificant, and entire engagements in which the impression produced by danger may be called moderate; moreover, even in lively actions phases may occur in which this is equally true. The circumstances of each particular case will, therefore, determine how long it is possible to fire as prescribed in the firing regulations, and from what moment a reduction of efficacy, according to Colonel Wolozkoi’s theory, is unavoidable.

“The arrival of this moment will be postponed more or less by better discipline and training; and, in addition, at the commencement of an action, we may count on the men putting into practice, to a certain extent, what they have been taught in time of peace. However, the efficacy of rifle fire will deteriorate gradually, as the danger and the intensity of the fight increase, until it reaches the stage which Wolozkoi considers peculiar to all of the more serious actions.

“When discipline is still further reduced, the efforts of the men to keep under cover may lead them to duck even their heads and to fire their rifles at high angles. In this case the decisive short ranges would not be swept by fire, making it possible for the more determined of the two opponents to advance to the assault.

“This reduction of the efficacy of fire (_i.e._, the delivery of fire at high angles) may also take place when troops are surprised and, in consequence thereof, fire hurriedly. This explains why the enemy’s fire passes entirely over a body of troops which has gotten quite close to his position--by no means an unusual phenomenon in surprises.”[165]

[165] F. C. v. II. _Zum Studium der Taktik_, p. 97.

Wolozkoi assumes that the core of hits of his constant cone is formed by projectiles fired at a mean angle of departure of less than 4 degrees, while the lower trajectories of the whole cone of fire correspond to an angle of 1 degree and 30 minutes, and the upper trajectories to one of 14 degrees and 30 minutes. If we apply these figures to a particular rifle we obtain a beaten zone containing 50% of the hits (central zone) at 560-1500 m. for the _Chassepot_ rifle; at 1000-2000 m. for the 8 mm. rifle, and at 1200-3000 m. for the 6.5 mm. rifle. It should once more be emphasized that these figures are applicable in combat phases in which the men themselves are under fire, while firing, or deliver their fire hurriedly or with bad aim.

During the =Franco-German war= the German troops learned by experience that the defender’s fire inflicted serious losses on the attacker at long ranges, but that the efficacy of his fire did not increase as the skirmishers came closer to his position; that, on the contrary, the intensity of the hostile fire effect fell off noticeably at ranges below 600 m.

During the attack made by the Prussian Guard against =St. Privat=, the greatest number of dead and wounded were counted at ranges from 1200-1500 m., and the fewest losses were sustained at ranges from 500-600 m. from the enemy’s position, where it had to remain stationary on the slope for about an hour awaiting the effect of the enveloping movement made by the Saxon Army Corps. A range of 1500 m. corresponds approximately to an angle of departure of 5 degrees for the _Chassepot_ rifle. The 20th Infantry Division was molested by rifle fire from =St. Privat=, during its march from =St. Ail= to =St. Privat= (the range in this case was 2200 m., which corresponds to an angle of departure of 15 degrees 30 minutes for the _Chassepot_ rifle) although the skirmishers of the Guard, against whom this fire was directed, were only from 400 to 500 m. from the French position.

In the =Russo-Turkish war= of 1877-78, the same thing occurred. Infantry projectiles reached the Russian reserves while they were still 2500 m. from the enemy (this range corresponds to an angle of departure of 14 degrees 30 minutes).

Kuropatkin corroborates the statement that at 1500 m. and beyond (5 degrees 50 minutes), the losses produced by the Turkish rifle fire were very serious; that at 400 m. (1 degree 8 minutes) from the hostile position, on the other hand, the losses were remarkably small, sometimes even ceasing entirely. The Turks finally kept their heads under cover altogether.

A correspondent writes the following in regard to the engagement at =Slivnica= on November 17th to 19th, 1885: “When at 400 m. from the enemy, the firing lines suffered scarcely any losses, while the reserves, stationed far to the rear, suffered severely from stray shots.”

It must be the endeavor of peace training to prevent the occurrence of unaimed firing in battle. This necessitates careful supervision by squad and platoon leaders over the individual soldier in the firing line, and the severe punishment of every act of carelessness in pointing, aiming, and setting of the sight, in peace time. In war one must constantly endeavor to avoid opening fire prematurely, as it tires the eye and the arm of the soldier, to check any unjustifiable rapidity of fire, and to hold the men down to a steady and slow fire. This includes, in addition, the avoidance, by the leader, of haste in giving directions for firing. In defense, one will have to make every effort to withdraw one’s men from the moral effect of the attacker’s fire preparation, and to keep them in proper condition to repulse the assault. This requires the construction of splinter proofs, head cover, and, in case the hostile fire becomes too deadly, a cessation of fire, which is again resumed when the enemy attempts to advance. To carry this out properly, covered observation stations should be built, and the men instructed to line the parapet and to open fire at a signal previously agreed upon, sights having been set and ammunition replenished before they leave cover. A body of troops is not unfit to resist an assault simply because it has suffered a certain percentage of losses, but because each individual soldier is so mastered by the feeling that he is in danger of losing his life that he fires his piece without raising his head above the parapet. A body of troops in such a state will fire its projectiles in Wolozkoi’s “constant cone.”

A mobilized organization, thoroughly trained in time of peace, will still fire a by no means inconsiderable fraction of its projectiles with good aim and with the proper rear sight elevation, provided its officers are equal to their task.

(e) The Influence of Rifle-Rests in Firing.

Freehand firing increases the rate of fire. Whether the skirmisher fires freehand or from a rest is of influence on the accuracy of the single shot at short ranges. The Belgian, Dutch, and Italian regulations authorize the bayonet, in the absence of other expedients, to be stuck into the ground as a rifle-rest, while this is forbidden in Germany. Collective fire of short duration delivered at mid ranges has not been found superior because of the use of rifle-rests. Fire delivered from a rest is undoubtedly superior, however, when the barrel of the piece is heated by continued firing (position of the left hand supporting the piece when firing standing, prone, or kneeling) and when the arm of the skirmisher gets tired. When firing from a rest, high shots result from vibrations of the barrel;[166] and there is also danger, when under fire, that the men will not raise their heads over the parapet, but will fire their pieces into the air. This, as corroborated by the more recent campaigns, is why a fire fight at short range is by no means decided in so short a time as the peace performances of modern rifles lead one to suppose, for great losses do not take place until skirmishers, who have heretofore hugged the ground, rise. At Spionskop, the two opposing firing lines remained stationary for hours at 250 m. from each other.[167] The Japanese found in their attacks that at ranges from 150 to 75 paces the hostile fire had no effect.

[166] According to the _Swiss Firing Regulations_ the change in height in the point of the target struck amounts to ¹⁄₁₀₀₀ of the range.

[167] The British Infantry (consisting of 2694 men, exclusive of subsequent reinforcements), which was engaged at short range on Spionskop from 3 A. M. until 9:30 P. M., lost 40 officers and 721 men in 18¹⁄₂ hours (one officer to every 18.5 men), _i.e._, 28.2%. See p. 189 infra.

(f) Influence of the Ground.[168]

[168] MONDEIL, _De la résolution des problèmes de tir sur le champ de bataille_, Paris, 1900.

So far we have considered only the effect of infantry fire on level ground. The efficacy of fire is, however, greatly influenced by the inclination of the ground upon which the cone of dispersion falls. Where the ground rises in respect to the line of sight, the depth of the beaten zone is decreased; where it falls in respect to the line of sight, the depth of the beaten zone is increased.[169]

[169] Lieutenant-General ROHNE’S definitions are given below in explanation of certain technical terms:

“_Danger Space_” is the distance measured along the line of sight within which the trajectory neither rises above the height of the target nor falls below the target.

“_Beaten Zone_” is the distance measured along the surface of the ground within which the trajectory does not rise above the height of the target.

Whether a target will be struck by a bullet when the range has not been correctly estimated depends entirely upon the danger space. In pointing at the bottom line of the target, the aiming position (_i.e._, the height at which the piece is held) does not affect the danger space. When pointing at the center of the target the danger space changes, increasing for low rear sight elevations and tall targets, and decreasing for high rear sight elevations and low targets, as compared with aim taken at the bottom line of a target. “The evil effects of errors in estimating the range decrease as the ‘danger space’ increases, which, by the way, is wholly dependent upon the ballistic properties of the rifle, upon the range, and the height of the target. The danger on the ground in rear of the target fired upon, and the difficulty of bringing up reinforcements and ammunition over it, increases directly as the beaten zone, which in addition depends upon the inclination of the ground to the line of sight.”

The importance of this circumstance is frequently so magnified in the French infantry that sight is lost of tactical requirements. For example, they employ formulae to ascertain the point from which a height can be covered with grazing fire, or propose to defend the ascent to a plateau by evacuating the military crest and occupying the reverse slope, keeping the slope facing the enemy under a grazing fire with the tail ends of the trajectories.

Let A B B¹, in the accompanying figure, represent a horizontal plane pierced by trajectories C B and C¹ B¹, at an angle α, forming the beaten zone B B¹. If now the ground falls from B in the direction B D, it is obvious from the figure, that the angle of fall β decreases and the beaten zone B D increases. The limit of this increase is reached when the angle of slope is greater than the angle of fall of the projectile. In this case there is a dead angle beyond B and toward D. If, on the other hand, the ground be rising, the angle of fall will be C¹ D¹ B and the beaten zone[170] decreases to B D¹. The smaller the angle of fall of the projectile the greater the influence of the ground.

[170] The computation of beaten zones is based upon the formula deduced by Lieutenant-General ROHNE in his work _Schieszlehre für Infanterie_, p. 127:

Let α = angle of fall; γ = angle of slope (rising or falling); β = beaten zone on level ground;

then α ----- β = beaten zone on falling ground; α - γ

α ----- β = beaten zone on rising ground. α + γ

From this it follows that when fire direction is in competent hands the appearance of the enemy on the terrain as at B D will be fully taken advantage of, while firing on slope like B D¹ should be avoided. Troops will, however, rarely be in a position from which they can see a target on the slope B D. The efficacy of the fire will in such a case be more or less a matter of accident. A body of troops in broad formation will in this case receive a greater number of hits than a column, since each meter of front of the crest line receives a certain number of projectiles. It is otherwise, however, where the slope rises in respect to the line of sight. A line is more easily missed than a column of considerable depth on the march.

The following data in regard to the increase (diminution) of the depth of the beaten zones is taken from the work of Lieutenant-General ROHNE on _Das gefechtsmäszige Abteilungsschieszen der Infanterie_, p. 44:

======+===============+================ Range.| Rising Slope. | Falling Slope. m. | 1° | 2° | 1° | 2° ------+-------+-------+-------+-------- 800 | ¹⁄₂ | ¹⁄₃ | ∞ | ∞ 1000 | ²⁄₃ | ³⁄₄ | 2 | ∞ 1200 | ³⁄₄ | ³⁄₅ | ³⁄₂ | 3 1400 | ⁴⁄₅ | ⁴⁄₆ | ⁴⁄₃ | 2 ------+-------+-------+-------+--------

The above figure, taken from Lieutenant-General ROHNE’S work, _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, p. 128, shows the influence of the ground on the efficacy of fire when “poor” shots are firing at a target, 100, 200 m. etc., in rear of which are other targets of the same dimensions but situated either on level ground, on a 2-degree rising slope, or a 1-degree falling slope. On a rising slope of 2 degrees the depth of the beaten zone is decreased by half, and on a downward slope of 1 degree increased by half.

“The knowledge of this influence of the ground is of great importance to the tactician. For this reason I have selected ‘poor’ shots for the above example because the efficacy of infantry fire in battle will approximate theirs more nearly than any other. From this we may deduce that where the ground slopes upward in rear of a firing line, less distance will suffice to withdraw supports from the fire directed at the firing line than on level ground; and that, if the ground in rear of the firing line slopes downward, the distances must be increased unless the slope is so great or the hostile trajectories so flat that bullets pass over the crest, forming a ‘defiladed space,’ into which no projectiles strike.”

On ground rising in respect to the line of sight (_i.e._, on the slope of heights facing the enemy, or opposite to commanding ground, the slope facing the plain) columns suffer the greatest losses; on ground falling in respect to the line of sight (on the reverse slope of hills and on plateaus) line targets suffer the greatest losses.

Where the ground falls at a greater angle than the angle of fall of the projectiles (about 5 degrees at 1500 m., and 1 degree at 800 m.) a defiladed space is formed, which makes it possible to bring supports nearer to the firing line than would be practicable on level ground. If we assume that each graduation of the rear sight over 600 m. commands a space 100 m. deep with the normal core of hits, we obtain the following depths of the beaten zones at a range of 1500 m., with rifle model ’98 (angle of fall 5 degrees and 22 minutes):

Ground rising 1 in 10 = 6° = 50 m. „ „ 1 in 20 = 3° = 64 m. „ „ 1 in 50 = 1° = 81 m. Ground falling 1 in 10 = 6° = 360 m. „ „ 1 in 20 = 3° = 180 m. „ „ 1 in 50 = 1° = 113 m.

The figures on pages 181 and 182 show to what extent the ground is capable of increasing or diminishing the efficacy of fire. The French assert that the Würtembergers deliberately applied these principles in the defense of the park wall at =Villiers=. It was, at any rate, only an accident that the masses of troops on the west side of the gently sloping Mamelon de Villiers suffered heavy losses on November 30th, 1870.

General PAQUIÉ of the French Army[171] lays down the following rule: “When the angle of slope of falling ground corresponds to the angle of fall of the lowest trajectory of a cone of dispersion, the depth of the beaten zone will be 2¹⁄₄ times greater than on level ground. When the angle of slope of falling ground is equal to the angle of fall of the mean trajectory of a cone of dispersion, the depth of the beaten zone will be 2¹⁄₂ times greater than on level ground. When the lowest trajectory of a cone of dispersion passes over the crest of a hill at the height of a man, and when the reverse slope of that hill is equal to ¹⁄₁₀₀ of the range, the depth of the beaten zone will be five times as great as on level ground.”

[171] See also _Le tir de guerre et les expériences pratiques du camp de Châlons_. _Journal des sciences militaires_, Sept., Oct., Nov., 1808--_Le Joindre Général. Petit Guide pour les tirs collectifs_, 1904.

These data are of no practical value in war. They serve only to increase the appreciation of fire effect when examining the terrain, and train the eye in judging such situations.

The character of the ground may exert great influence when firing on intrenchments. Fire delivered from low ground against an enemy in shelter-trenches is absolutely ineffective--as shown in the action against the French IInd Corps at =Point du Jour= and by the experiences of the Russians at =Plevna= and =Gorni Dubniac=. This condition becomes aggravated the smaller the angles of fall of the projectiles, and the higher the target is situated relative to the firing position of the attacking party.

Attacks on hill positions show that there is a range at which the greatest efficacy may be obtained from fire directed against the top of the height itself. This maximum efficacy gradually dwindles as the position is approached. This fact has led the Swiss to retain a _Main Firing Position_. (See Figure, p. 182. Fire effect from A and from B). For the purpose of determining the favorable range, “D,” corresponding to a certain height (of the enemy’s position) “H,” Lieutenant-General ROHNE has deduced the following formula for rifle model ’88:[172]

D = 15.H + 500.

[172] Capitaine CUGNAC, D = 14 (H + 50). See also the work of Captain KNOBLOCH, _Zur Technik des Feuerangriffs gegen Höhenstellungen_, _Swiss Monthly Journal_, 1907.

The well-known plateau of the “Galgenhügel” at Wörth, which is at present crowned by the monument of the 50th Infantry (elevation 35 m.) could be effectively swept by the fire of our present-day weapons at 1025 m.; a further advance would reduce the fire effect. For rifle model ’98 the formula might be stated: 20. H + 600.

It is only in fortress warfare that it might occasionally be possible to apply this formula. To determine at what distance the defender must take position in rear of a crest, in order to sweep the slope facing the enemy with his fire (aiming points being resorted to) without being himself exposed to view, is of still less value for use in the field. According to General Warnet of the French Army, if “p” is the degree of slope expressed in centimeters, the defender should choose between two points which lie between (p + 5) 1000 and (p + 3) 1000. When the degree of slope is 1 cm. in 10 cm., the defender should take up his position either 600 or 300 m. in rear of the main crest. In such a position the defender will, it is true, be protected to a certain extent from the enemy’s fire, but can only very inadequately defend the slope facing the enemy. A concentration of fire on certain targets is impossible and the attacker is given an opportunity to reach the crest, here and there, without coming under fire. Thus ballistic advantages must be given up in the face of the numerous tactical disadvantages. We have mentioned this subject here, to show the strange excrescenses which an undeniably sound basic principle may develop in the hands of theorists, who have entirely forgotten that in war only that which is simple succeeds.

“Indirect Rifle Fire” is to be used in firing on a target not visible from the firing position. In this connection, the following is taken from the report of Captain KNOBLOCH, Austrian Army,[173] on _Schieszaufgaben unter feldmäszigen Verhältnissen_:

[173] _Verstecktes Gewehrfeuer. Vorschläge zur Erhöhung des Gefechtswertes unserer Infanterie_, Vienna, 1904. _Feldmäsziges Schieszen der Infanterie aus versteckten Stellungen._ _Organ der militär-wissenschaftlichen Vereine_, Nos. 1 and 2 of 1906. _Resultate der Schieszversuche mit verstecktem Gewehrfeuer._ _Mitteilungen über Gegenst. des Artillerie- und Geniewesens_, No. 12 of 1905. _Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1907, No. 28, pp. 144 and 155.

“Indirect rifle fire is infantry fire in which aiming points are used. These should lie above and beyond the target and in line with it. It goes without saying that an aiming point fulfilling all these conditions will rarely be found. Moreover, the aiming point must not be selected at random at some particular elevation, because the angle between target and aiming point, expressed by graduations on the rear sight leaf, might possibly lead to a negative sight setting.

“In the practical tests made on varied ground against targets of appropriate height, splendid results were obtained as regards effect; but the aiming point had to be indicated by means of a flag. Despite the fact that the terrain was covered with numerous objects, such as trees, woods, factory chimneys, etc., no suitable aiming point could be found on the terrain itself. This largely determines the value of indirect rifle fire in the field.”

This class of fire is, however, worth a trial at any rate. Moreover, its tactical, combined with its moral, advantages are so great that we could afford to accept calmly a fire effect poorer by comparison. Indirect rifle fire will, at times, give troops an opportunity to do damage to the enemy without being themselves seen or fired upon.

It remains to mention briefly the effect of =ricochets= which, as a rule, tumble[174] after striking. Their range upon rebounding is short. Bullets ricochet most frequently on water, on rocky and hard ground, more rarely on wet meadows, and on tilled soil, but they do not ricochet at all on sandy soil. Ploughed fields, in which the furrows run obliquely to the line of fire, eliminate the effect of ricochets almost entirely. When jacketed bullets (but not the massive French “D” projectiles) strike upon rocky ground, they have a tendency to alter their form materially, or to tear the jacket, thereby considerably increasing the severity of the wound which is produced. The range of ricochets upon rebounding depends mainly upon the angle at which they are deflected. When the lateral deflection is 30 degrees their range may amount to about 1300 m. The nearer a bullet strikes to the skirmisher firing it, and the smaller the angle of deflection of the consequent ricochet, the greater its range; under favorable conditions this may amount to 2500 m. According to French experiments, in firing at a range of 800 m., 4% ricochet hits struck a target, the height of a man, at 1400 m., and 1% ricochet hits a similar target at 1850 m. from the skirmisher who did the firing.

[174] According to tests, our small-caliber bullets tend to tumble even when only grazing small twigs.

13. LOSSES IN ACTION.[175]

[175] See _Taktik_, V, p. 76 _et seq._

An attempt to move troops in close order formations within the zone of uninterrupted infantry fire at ranges under 1500 m. when the enemy is still in condition to direct his fire on them, is bound to lead to losses which make the further tactical employment of these troops impossible.

Bodies of troops following the firing lines will also have to deploy when the hostile fire reaches them, unless they can find cover. It is a disadvantage for them to deploy, and every opportunity to return to close order formation must be utilized.

Troops in rear, not directly fired upon and exposed only to accidental shots, should employ narrow rather than broad formations. It might therefore seem advisable to remain in route column so long as no flanking fire is received. The Italian Firing Regulations contain the following figure showing the effect of fire directed on troops in the formations indicated.

[176] In Germany called “Column of Platoons.”

[177] In columns of fours, at 6-pace intervals.

According to the figure, the Italian Company Column (German Column of Platoons) suffers the greatest losses; the least losses are sustained by the company formed in line of platoons, each in route column, at intervals of 15 paces. According to French experiments, this formation is said to be no longer suitable when subjected to infantry fire at ranges under 1300 m.

According to French firing tests made in Châlons,[178] the following percentages of hits may be expected when using the Lebel rifle firing old model steel jacketed bullets:

==========================================+=================== | At a range of +----+----+----+---- |1200|1400|1600|1800 | m. | m. | m. | m. ------------------------------------------+----+----+----+---- Platoon (one rank) | 4.4| 3.4| 2.2| 1.4 Skirmish line, men at 3-pace intervals | 1.2|----|----|---- Platoon in column of fours | 6.6| 3.8| 2.2| 1.3 Platoon in column of twos | 5.6| 3.2| 1.9| 1.1 Company column (German column of platoons)|22.0|18.0|14.0|10.0 ------------------------------------------+----+----+----+----

[178] _Le Joindre, Petit Guide pour les tirs collectifs_, p. 15.

Lieutenant-General ROHNE, in his work, _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, p. 117, computes values for the relative vulnerability of the several formations. At a range of 1200 m., purely frontal fire only being considered, we obtain with every 1000 rounds fired with the appropriate elevation, the following number of hits against--

========+=====+=========+============= |Line.|Column of|Infantry in | |platoons.|route column. --------+-----+---------+------------- Standing| 116 | 160 | 98 Prone | 20 | 65 | 72 --------+-----+---------+-------------

And against a company deployed in line of platoons:

=========+================+==================+=================== |3 platoons, each| 3 platoons, each |6 sections, each in |in route column.|in column of twos.| column of twos. ---------+----------------+------------------+------------------- Standing | 57 | 39 | 29 Prone | 28 | 25 | 14 ---------+----------------+------------------+-------------------

The company deployed in line of sections in columns of twos would thus seem to be the most favorable formation for movements, and the line lying prone is especially well suited for halts. For movements under purely frontal, concentrated fire, the line is the least favorable formation, while the route column offers the narrowest target. In this, the character of the terrain plays a decisive role. In firing on targets consisting of columns, it has been assumed that a single projectile will place only one man out of action. Under shrapnel fire the formations are similarly arranged as regards their vulnerability, the line formation being less favorable than the column of platoons, since the former receives all bullets deflected laterally.

The total losses in battles and more serious engagements amount to from 10 to 20% of the participating troops. In some organizations the losses in killed and wounded may amount to as much as 50-60%. The loss that an organization will endure is directly proportional to its efficiency. Good troops, which unexpectedly get into a difficult situation (as, for example, the British Brigade of Highlanders at Magersfontain), and which have been trained to look upon heavy losses as unavoidable, will be capable of enduring a loss of 25% in the course of a battle without going to pieces and without discontinuing the attack.[179]

[179] It is notorious that colonial wars with their moderate losses spoil troops and their leaders in this respect.

At the battle of =Gravelotte=, in which 166,400 rifles, 21,200 sabres, and 732 guns, extending over a front of 19 km., participated on the German side, only 109,200 rifles and 628 guns fought the decisive action. The losses amounted to 9.51%, distributed as follows: 899 officers and 19,260 men; according to arms: infantry, 10.96%; cavalry, 0.66%, and artillery, 5.74%. On the decisive flank, the infantry of the Guard suffered a loss of almost 30%. On this flank, the Rifles of the Guard (_Gardeschützen_) lost 44%, the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of the Guard, 55.5% of their enlisted strength, the 6th Company of the latter regiment losing even 141 men.

Although losses are, generally speaking, smaller than during the 18th Century, and at the opening of the 19th Century, nevertheless they may amount to a considerable figure in a brief space of time in single bodies of troops which suddenly encounter a heavy fire.

At =Magersfontain=, (December 11th, 1899) the British lost 13% of their total strength; the Brigade of Highlanders, 23% (39% of the officers; i.e., 1 officer for every 14.9 men); the IInd Battalion of the Black Watch, 42%, and the IInd Battalion of the Seaforth Highlanders, 23.9%. At =Colenso= (Dec. 15th, 1899) the British lost 6.4% of their total strength; the IInd Battalion of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers, 23.9%.

=Spionskop= (Jan. 24th, 1900):

Attacking troops 2,694 men in 18¹⁄₂ hrs. 40 officers, 721 men = 28.2% Supports 1,600 „ „ 10¹⁄₂ „ 8 „ 95 „ = 6.4% Reserves 1,500 „ „ 4¹⁄₂ „ 15 „ 170 „ = 12.3% Staffs ---- ---- 5 „ --- ---- ---------------------------------------------------- 5,794 men 68 officers, 986 men = 17.5%

This action illustrates strikingly how rapidly the officers directing the fire were shot down.

Attacking troops 1 officer for every 18 men Supports 1 „ „ „ 12 „ Reserves 1 „ „ „ 11 „ -------------------------- 1 officer for every 14 men

For the purpose of comparison, we should like to mention that the Prussian Grenadier Battalion “_von Wedel_,” consisting of 12 officers and 390 men, lost 10 officers and 301 men (77%) in about one hour during the battle of =Soor= (Sept. 30th, 1745). The losses suffered by the Grenadier Battalion “_von Münchow_” at =Kesselsdorf= are possibly not much lower. The effective strength of the last named battalion is not given; it lost 5 officers and 371 men.[180]

[180] _Kriege Friedrichs des Groszen_, II, Appendix 3, pp. 11 and 47.

At =Kolin=, the Grenadier Battalion “_Nymschöfsky_” lost 652 men, and six infantry regiments lost between 900 and 1188 men, _i.e._, considerably more than 50% of their strength. Two days after the battle, the Grenadier Battalion “_Nymschöfsky_” numbered only 24 men and the enlisted strength of six infantry regiments was 233, 296, 602, 651 and 711 men respectively. The number of stragglers was undoubtedly very great.[181] At =Kolin=, the infantry lost in all 12,307 men out of 19,000, _i.e._, 65%.

[181] _Ibid._, III. Appendix, pp. 11 and 20.

The losses among officers are especially heavy. This is by no means due to the attempt of the hostile skirmishers to pick off the leaders in the combat at short range, but to the fact that, in order to lead their men, officers must expose themselves. This becomes more and more necessary the greater the moral effect of the combat on the nervous systems of the men, and the poorer the troops. According to past experience, the casualties among officers are especially heavy in the early stages of a war.[182]

[182] See _Taktik_, V, pp. 81, 88 and 358.

The relative losses of officers and men in the battles named are given, in round figures, in the following table:

At =Weiszenburg (Vth Army Corps)= 1 officer for every 14 men; „ =Wörth (Vth Army Corps)= 1 „ „ „ 20 „ ; „ =Wörth (XIth Army Corps)= 1 „ „ „ 15 „ ; „ =Vionville (IIIrd Army Corps)= 1 „ „ „ 21 „ ; „ =Vionville (Xth Army Corps)= 1 „ „ „ 24 „ ; „ =Gravelotte (Guard Corps)= 1 „ „ „ 22.5 „ ; „ =Gravelotte (XIIth Army Corps)= 1 „ „ „ 20 „ ; „ =Colenso= 1 „ „ „ 15 „ ; „ =Magersfontain= 1 „ „ „ 11.8 „ ;

Colonel HESSERT[183] writes the following in regard to the losses among the officers of the 25th Division on August 18th, 1870: “Eight of the 16 field officers and 6 of the 14 adjutants present with the regiments and battalions were either wounded or killed. Almost all of these officers were mounted. Seventeen of the 40 company commanders--almost all of them dismounted--and 43 of the 151 company officers were placed out of action. This would be a loss of 50% in field officers, 42% in adjutants, 37% in company commanders, and 29% in company officers.”

[183] _Betrachtungen über die Leistungen der französischen Gewehre M/74 und M/66_, Darmstadt, 1879, p. 115.

On this day the Rifle Battalion of the Guard lost 100% of its officers and 44% of its men--19 officers and 431 men, in about three-quarters of an hour.

On Sept. 11th, 1877, at =Plevna=, the _Ugla_ Regiment lost 20 of its officers, _i.e._, 40%; the _Jaroslaw_ Regiment, 25 officers, _i.e._, 64%; the total loss of the first named regiment amounted to 42%, that of the last named to 49%. Of the 15 company commanders of the _Vladimir_ Regiment, 14 were placed out of action.

After the assault on the =Tuminling Pass= on Oct. 12th, 1905, the East Siberian Rifle Regiment had only 2 officers with its firing line, and after the battle of =Sandepu= only 5. These examples are not isolated ones. After the battle on the =Yalu=, the 11th Rifle Regiment had present for duty only one field officer, and the 12th only 3 captains. On March 7th, 1905, the _Yoshihoka_ Regiment (3rd Japanese Division) had present for duty only 3 lieutenants; one battalion was commanded by a first sergeant and one company by a private.

14. THE MORAL EFFECT OF FIRE.

The moral effect may make itself felt in a two-fold way: as the sum of the impressions influencing the soldier at all times in action, and as the momentary general impression produced by a sudden considerable increase in the losses. The great material effect of fire creates such a consciousness of danger in men’s minds that in a defeated force more than half of its numbers succumb to this moral effect of the fire.

“Troops do not retreat because they are unable to maintain themselves owing to their numerical inferiority, but because they fear the losses which they would suffer if they advanced further. The determination to conquer has been overcome by the desire to live. The confusion of impressions increases with the size of the force. Taken individually, the men might behave quite sensibly, but in a crowd they are claimed either by insanity or lethargy. The activity of the mind is completely replaced by imagination; everything is believed; nothing is appraised; exaggeration prevails everywhere; and precipitation produces unthought of results. When the men come to their senses, it is as if they were awakened from a stupor; they are unable to understand how fear could have induced them to do the very opposite from that which would, most surely, have saved them from destruction.”[184]

[184] KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_, I, p. 150.

In the midst of the impressions of the battle of St. Privat, General von Kessel wrote: “The men appear to be either extraordinarily excited or stupefied. Their faces are distorted and only a few still retain firm will power.”

General Bonnal describes his first impressions at the battle of Wörth as follows: “Since half-past seven our battalion was lying, facing eastward, in the neighborhood of the wood of Fröschweiler. The shrieking of the Prussian shells, but especially the noise of the shells bursting in the midst of the batteries of the 3rd Division in position in our rear, made a considerable impression on our men. Their joking ceased, and nervousness was plainly visible in their pale faces. Men to whom tobacco was offered declined it; they had no desire to smoke. All eyes were focused upon the officers. The latter were congregated here and there in small groups; a few were trying hard to joke, others were walking up and down, with a cigarette between their lips, making convulsive efforts to appear at ease; a small number were entirely calm as if no danger was present.... The first batch of wounded made a strong impression. The battalion was to reinforce the Turcos in the edge of the wood of Fröschweiler. The fire of the Turcos drowned all other sounds. There was nothing to indicate that the enemy was also concentrating a heavy fire upon the wood. We deployed into line to the right. The deployment began, but scarcely ten men had reached the edge of the wood when a terrible cracking and rattling commenced. It was a mitrailleuse battery which fired a volley directly under our very noses. At this moment our men lost their heads. They blazed away like mad, crowded in three, four, and five ranks at the foot of the downward slope. The men in front had thrown themselves to the ground, the others fired kneeling or standing, leaning against trees. Since all of the men fired without aiming, enveloped moreover by a dense, impenetrable cloud of smoke, the advanced lines were in greater danger of being hit by French bullets than by those of the enemy. We had to throw ourselves to the ground to avoid being shot down by the lines in rear. On the hill opposite to us, at a range of 300 to 400 m., there rested a white smoke cloud, and we could indistinctly discern the enemy, who was keeping up a lively fire. The powder smoke enveloping us was so dense that we literally could not breathe.” This excitement gradually subsided and the leaders were able to get the troops again under control.

The numerous surrenders of British troops in the engagements of the Boer War were due to the peculiar conditions existing in the theater of war. Besides, Boer and Briton spoke the same language. During the first few days of the campaign, surrenders of detachments of considerable strength took place. These were not punished with sufficient severity. One almost gains the impression that the men considered the surrenders justifiable in order to escape from a difficult situation.

On the South African battlefields, devoid of cover and swept for great distances by the hostile fire, it was indeed very difficult to penetrate the hostile position, and retrograde movements were undoubtedly attended with heavy losses. To this may be added the fact that it was easy for the Boers, who were mounted, to bar the way to isolated British forces. It must be remembered, moreover, that the operations took place during the hottest season and in a country where water is scarce; and that the men felt they had arrived at the limit of their powers of physical endurance at an earlier moment than would have been the case under different conditions. Thus, the surrender at Stromberg of troops exhausted from a night march, is perhaps excusable; not so, however, the surrender of Colonel Carleton’s detachment, which laid down its arms at Nicholson’s Neck after offering a feeble resistance. In the last-mentioned case, it is true, several Englishmen, who had already laid down their arms, stood among the Boers so that the commander of the British force did not really know just what action to take in this situation. His hesitation decided his fate. The demand must unquestionably be made in future also,[185] that troops surrounded in the field make a serious attempt to cut their way out before permitting thoughts of surrender to enter their minds.

[185] In contrast to this view the British court of inquiry found all but three of the 226 surrenders, which occurred up to June 1st, 1900, justified. In the three cases in which the verdict was adverse only a few men had surrendered. Within a period of eight months the British lost a total of 1680 officers and 2124 men killed and wounded, while their loss in prisoners amounted to 182 officers and 4984 men.

It is impossible to determine theoretically what losses troops are able to endure. After the Franco-German War it was believed that troops had reached the limit of endurance after losing one-third to one-fourth of their strength. Nowadays this limit would appear to be reached much sooner. It may be pointed out, however, that the neglect of continuing the attack at Colenso (loss 5.8%), and at Spionskop (loss 7.2%), may, in part, be charged to lack of energy in the commander; and that the Brigade of Highlanders, consisting of 2000 rifles and deployed on a front of about 4000 m., in the engagement at Paardeberg (loss 13.4%), lacked the necessary depth to continue the attack. The greater the degree of efficiency and freshness of troops, and the less the degree of suddenness with which they enter a difficult situation, the greater the losses which they will be capable of enduring. Furthermore, we should not forget that our modern personnel has become much more susceptible to the impressions of battle. The steadily improving standards of living tend to increase the instinct of self-preservation and to diminish the spirit of self-sacrifice. The spirit of the times looks upon war as an avoidable evil, and this militates directly against that courage which has a contempt for death. The fast manner of living at the present day undermines the nervous system,[186] the fanaticism and the religious and national enthusiasm of a bygone age are lacking, and, finally, the physical powers of the human species are also partly diminishing. The influence exerted by officers on the firing line is nowadays, however, considerably smaller than in the past, so much so that they can actually control only the nearest skirmishers. In addition, the nerve-racking impressions on the battlefield are much greater at present than in the past. The “_void of the battlefield_”[187] has become especially pronounced since the introduction of smokeless powder. “_The invisibility of the enemy directly affects the morale of the soldier, the sources of his energy and his courage. The soldier who cannot see his enemy, is inclined to see him everywhere. It is but a step from this impression to hesitancy and then to fear._ The inertia of the troops for whole days at Magersfontain, Colenso, and Paardeberg, frequently more than 800 m. from the enemy, was not produced by their losses, but by the moral depression which is caused within the effective zone of rifle fire.” (General NÉGRIER.)[188]

[186] See SPAITS, _Mit Kasaken durch die Mandschurei_. After the author had turned away in disgust from a Chinese execution, he wrote: “And we Europeans will feel just like this in war. We will get to a certain point where the strength of our will and our physical powers will succumb to the weakness of our nerves, and this state we will reach more quickly than did the Russians, who were better off in regard to nerves than members of those armies in which nervousness is carefully fostered.” See also this author’s remarks about _Courage_, _ibid._, p. 206.

[187] This complaint of the “void of the battlefield” is not new. A Saxon officer complains of it in his _Vertrauten Briefen_ (Cologne, 1807), and the French officers report on the “void of the battlefield” in the fights around Metz. BONNAL, _L’art nouveau en Tactique_, p. 90.

[188] _Revue des deux mondes_, for June, 1902.

The effect of danger on the battlefield is indicated by--

1. Derangement of tactical units;

2. The mixing of men of the different units during the action; and

3. The dissolution of units into disorderly masses.

According to the _History of the Kaiser Franz Regiment_ (p. 113) immediately after the battle of =St. Privat=, most of the companies numbered only 30 men, and the whole regiment only 340 men, although, allowing for losses, there should have been 1922 men. The three companies of the 39th Füsilier Regiment which had fought in the =Stiring Wald= at =Spicheren=, numbered only 6 officers and 150 men at the close of the fight in the evening,[189] which means that, allowing for losses, 350 men were missing. After the battle of =Colombey=, when the Füsilier Battalion of the 55th Regiment was assembled, three companies numbered only 120, 60 and 40 men, respectively. This battalion had lost about 300 men.[190]

[189] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 366.

[190] _Geschichte des Regiments_, p. 347.

The plan of the battle of Colombey given in the General Staff Account (_Gt. St. W._) shows at 7 P. M. 17 companies belonging to 5 different infantry regiments, and to two different infantry brigades, occupying a front of 1200 paces, in the following order:

7. 1. 4. 8. 4. 6. 12. 7. } -------, ----, ----, ----, ----, ----, ----, ----, } Jägers. 55. 15. 15. 53. 15. 15. 15. }

{ 10. 11. 12. 1. 1. 9.10. 4.3. Cos. { ------------, ----, ----, -----, -----, { 13. 13. 73. 15. 73. Inf.

At =Wörth= 17 different regiments were represented on a front of 5700 paces.

“The assault on =Elsaszhausen= (=Wörth=), after preliminary forest fighting, mixed up the troops of the different brigades and in some cases caused the dissolution of battalions.... The 44th Brigade was the only one that remained in fairly good order. Abreast and in rear of it were portions of all the other regiments (of the XIth Army Corps) which, at the moment, however, represented no actual reserves. Even the battalions in the first line hardly appeared to be tactical entities.”[191]

[191] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 268.

At several points it was possible to assemble the stragglers into formed bodies; but the men in these, commanded by strange officers, easily succumbed to the influences of the combat, and the units disintegrated rather quickly as soon as they came under fire.[192]

[192] For details see KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, XVI, pp. 122, 124, 177, 231-234.

In the =Giefert Wald= (=Spicheren=) out of 32 companies (4 brigades) only four companies fought together as a battalion. In the little =Wenzelberg Wood= (at =Nachod=) there were engaged 7¹⁄₂ Austrian battalions (belonging to four different regiments) and 2 Jäger-Battalions, all of these troops belonging to three different brigades.[193] No attempt was made to lead these troops as one body.

[193] _Austrian Gen. St. W._, 1866, III, p. 81.

In the oak wood at =Dubno= (=Skalitz=), there were engaged 12¹⁄₂ and 8¹⁄₂ battalions belonging to four different regiments and to two different army corps. “The Prussian orders led to a breaking up of the order of battle and to a considerable mixing of brigades, regiments and battalions. In consequence of this, control was lost to a certain extent by the commander-in-chief, and the result achieved was mainly due to the skill and intelligence of the subordinate leaders--especially that of the commanders of battalions and half battalions.”[194]

[194] KÜHNE, _Kritische Wanderungen_, II, p. 48.

“The wooded region in rear of =St. Hubert= was thickly infested with stragglers of all arms. White, red, and blue shoulder straps were to be seen in profusion; men with and without rifles; some with helmets, some with caps, some bareheaded. There were no officers present except those stretched wounded upon the ground. The superior officers riding through the valley assembled the men they found, but it proved only a small force that they gathered, for the greater portion of the men were safely ensconced to one side of the bottom of the valley.”[195] “At 5 P. M., the garrison of =St. Hubert= had increased to 43 companies, belonging to seven different regiments, and the result was utterly hopeless confusion.”[196]

[195] HÖNIG, _Vierundzwanzig Stunden Moltkescher Strategie_, p. 139.

[196] _Ibid._, p. 167.

“At 10 P. M., 48 battalions of the VIIth, VIIIth and IInd Corps occupied a space of barely 1500 m. front and a depth of 1000 m., east of the Mance ravine opposite the French position. Fortunately the enemy was so exhausted that we were able to commit the most serious mistakes with impunity under the very muzzles of his rifles.”[197]

[197] _Ibid._, p. 224.

“At =Sedan= bodies of infantry of the XIth Corps, as well as of the 46th Infantry and of the 5th Jäger-Battalion, had gotten mixed up with the 43rd Brigade during the course of the battle. The regiments of the 43rd Brigade had likewise been so disorganized that after the capture of =Cazal= the brigade commander had nothing at his disposal but the most heterogeneous mass of troops consisting of about a battalion.”[198]

[198] _Gen. St. W._, II, p. 1249.

“In penetrating into =Lovtcha= (1877) the foremost battalions became disorganized. The companies, and even single soldiers, stood around in irregular groups on the streets, crowded into the houses and sought cover in drainage ditches.”[199] “In one battalion of the _Kasan_ Regiment, which was to move through the town from the left flank, officers and men threw themselves down when the enemy’s fire became effective and only with difficulty could they be induced to rise. When the regimental commander fell, everybody fled, carrying along those in rear. Only two company columns, composed of stragglers of different organizations, resisted, deployed into a dense skirmish line and, encouraged by their officers, rushed forward cheering.”[200]

[199] KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den Russich-Türkischen Krieg_, I, pp. 68 and 72.

[200] _Ibid._, I, p. 72.

This fighting power of improvised units, when there were officers left to lead them, was displayed on several occasions at =Plevna=.

The IInd and IIIrd Battalions of the _Kaluga_ Regiment (in the third battle of =Plevna=) after taking the second crest, thoughtlessly continued the advance in complete disorder.

“Skobeleff foresaw the coming reverse and attempted to form a reserve, but only by dint of the greatest exertions on the part of the officers was it possible to collect about 100 men belonging to various companies. The men of the IInd and IIIrd Battalions of the Kaluga Regiment were scattered all over the battlefield, the companies had become completely mixed up, and it was a matter of the greatest difficulty to re-form them.”[201]

[201] _Ibid._, I, p. 154.

“Dense firing lines, composed of men of all the regiments, attempted to climb the opposite slope but they got only half way; 400 paces from the Turkish works they halted. The survivors of the organizations participating in the action gradually assembled in Work No. 1, which had been taken. While only a couple of hundred men had taken the work, thousands were now assembled there. Not a single company or battalion was intact, every vestige of organization had disappeared; the commanders, and officers generally, had become separated from their units.”[202]

[202] _Ibid._, I, pp. 236 and 238.

“Prince IMERETINSKI succeeded in forming stragglers into the following improvised units:

3 provisional companies of the _Libau_ Regiment. 2 „ „ „ „ _Susdal_ „ 2¹⁄₂ „ „ „ „ _Vladimir_ „ 1 detachment of 100 men of the _Reval_ Regiment.

“These re-formed stragglers were despatched to Skobeleff’s assistance and made a successful assault on Work No. 2 from Work No. 1.”[203]

[203] _Ibid._, I, p. 243.

“These stragglers subsequently formed the nucleus of the garrison of Work No. 2. During the night of the 11/12 September, the Russians succeeded in gathering 1000 more men, which were assembled in companies irrespective of the regiments to which they originally belonged. This gathering of stragglers lasted, by the way, up to the afternoon of the 12th of September. The continuance of the fight was made possible only by constantly re-forming the remnants into new organizations and then sending these forward into the fight.”[204]

[204] _Ibid._, I, p. 258.

The remedies provided by the regulations against these evils are, above all else: Restriction of the front of the several units, the deployment of tactical units side by side in action (instead of in rear of each other) and the use of every opportunity for re-establishing the original organizations. Other suggestions for stemming the tide of disorder as made by the author of _Summer Nights Dream_ (1888) (platoons formed in single rank, volley firing, and constant closing toward the center) are impracticable in a serious action. The disintegrating effect of a battle is stronger than tactical cohesion. It is better to recognize this fact than to face the enemy with illusory ideas.

It is necessary to train the men in peace time to follow willingly any officer, whether he belong to their own or to another organization; and, for that reason, exercises in provisional organizations are requisite for tactical training--a large number of officers being told to fall out at these exercises to assimilate losses which would occur in action. The control of mixed firing lines by word of command of an officer is the foundation of order and troop leading, and thus a prerequisite of success in the battles of the future. In a successful engagement, the evils above mentioned are less evident than during a reverse when troops unexpectedly suffer heavy losses or receive fire from the flank or rear. Troops formed into well-organized units can well stand such a test, but in an improvised organization, composed of fractions and men of different units, especially when their own officers are absent, such a crisis may lead to panic.

The following battle episode is very instructive: The 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry, deployed in line of company columns, advanced at =Colombey= (14th August, 1870) under French shell and _Chassepot_ fire. The morale of the 3rd Company was visibly impaired by two shells which burst, one after the other, in its ranks, placing 15-20 men out of action. “The men began to hesitate; their steps grew shorter; and, as if impelled by an invisible power, the company executed a half right turn, another half right turn, then another and another. One would have thought the movement was being executed at command. The column was now facing to the rear, and although not running, not fleeing, it was moving back to the Brasserie with suspiciously lengthening steps. The drummer, one Borchert, did everything to bring the men to their senses; the non-commissioned officers assisted bravely, but in vain; the column continued its movement to the rear. Filled with shame and indignation, the perspiration pouring out of every pore, I shouted to the men, repeatedly commanding: ‘Company ... Forward!’ But all in vain. At that moment the battalion commander--he was called the ‘marble statue’ on account of his coolness--galloped up on his bay, shouting: ‘Look at the 5th Company over yonder; see how far it has advanced.’ Then another superior officer jumped in front of the men with the words: ‘Is there no officer here at all?’ At this instant I yelled again as if my life depended upon it: ‘You men belong to the color company; Company ... Forward!’ and the spell was broken. As if on the parade ground the Grenadiers faced to the front; obediently they executed my command: ‘To the attack! Carry arms ... Forward!’ and soon thereafter we again occupied our position between the 2nd and 4th Companies.”

The company lost many men as soon as it entered the fight, among them its company commander; then the two shells burst in rapid succession within its ranks, and this explains the temporary panic. The company lost a total of 86 men (including officers).[205]

[205] RETZLAFF, _Aus meinem Tagebuch_.

Nothing is more contagious in the zone of danger than the example of fear or cowardice.[206] Appeals, threats, and intimidation are of little avail. The most effective remedy lies in developing the individual soldier’s initiative, in training him to act with common sense even when his officers are absent. We should send our soldiers into battle with a reserve of moral courage great enough to prevent the premature moral and mental depreciation of the individual.

[206] Some interesting proofs in support of this statement are:

The attack made by Captain Bechtoldsheim at Custozza against Italian infantry. _Oesterreichs Kämpfe_, II, p. 74.

The combats at the Mance ravine on Aug. 18th, 1870.

HÖNIG, _Vierundzwanzig Stunden Moltkescher Strategie_, pp. 170, 184, 193 and 215.

_Sedan_, _Gen. St. W._, II, p. 1243.

_Wald- und Ortsgefecht_, p. 179. (Aymard’s Division after the capture of Servigny).

LEHAUCOURT, _Campagne de la Loire_, II, p. 272. (The French Gardes Mobiles after the taking of Le Tuilerie at Le Mans).

V. DEPLOYMENTS FOR ACTION.

1. NORMAL PROCEDURE.

The characteristic tendency of modern times is the liberation of the individual from antiquated ideas and from the restraint exercised by ostensibly reactionary governmental power. The key-note of this tendency, which places individualism above collectivism, is absolute independence of the individual in municipal and national affairs, in science and art. Even tactics has been influenced to a certain extent by this tendency. Success in battle, however, will not be assured by the sum-total of a number of negative or positive individual efforts, but only by the simultaneous launching of masses controlled by a single will. Within these limits the independence of the individual is permissible, for a commander does not exact apathetic obedience, but, on the contrary, intelligent coöperation on the part of everyone, and this cannot be regulated by hard and fast rules.

Instead of laying down rules to cover all cases, the German Drill Regulations leave the leader free to dispose of his troops according to the purpose of the combat and the nature of the ground. In this he is assisted by the initiative and independent action of his subordinate leaders. Normal formations for attack and defense are requisite however, in armies in which the tactical training of commanders and subordinate leaders is deficient and where it is feared that the latter will abuse the latitude allowed them. Where such normal formations are prescribed, it is assumed that hard and fast rules are requisite for training; that the average officer cannot be expected to estimate a situation correctly and arrive at proper decisions; and that the majority of them must be given definite rules for combat if they are to render any service at all.

Drill regulations should facilitate quick mutual understanding between leader and organization and lay down general principles for ordinary situations, for combat tasks, and for formations, but should not, by their rules, direct the actions of a leader from the very beginning into definite grooves. If the regulations contain a normal procedure, there is danger that it will be employed where inappropriate, and that the mental alertness of the leaders will relax and fail in war at the very moment when its presence is most vitally necessary.[207]

[207] “Leaders who have been trained only in the mechanical part of drill and who subsequently have to act independently, fare like the lame man deprived of his crutches, or the near-sighted man deprived of his spectacles.” VON SEIDLITZ.

“Tactics will always vary according to the nature of the ground, therefore it is impossible to tell beforehand what might happen in each particular case.” (FREDERICK THE GREAT). Whether or not a particular normal procedure is appropriate does not depend upon the terrain but solely upon the tactical situation.[208]

[208] It is only in cases where precisely identical situations may be presumed to exist that there can be any question of a normal procedure. The last stages of the infantry attack in fortress warfare present features of this nature and on that account a normal procedure has been formulated for it in almost all of the European armies.

While there is considerable unanimity of opinion as to the general manner of carrying out an attack, opinions differ radically as to details. “If all the advocates of a normal attack had to describe it in words, there would be about as many suggestions as there are advocates. Which of the many normal attack schemes is the most suitable for average troops? A conference called for the purpose of investigating this point would probably have the strange result that each representative would concede that what the others desire is practicable but need not be done.”[209] Anyone who thinks himself capable of evolving a normal procedure, should bear in mind that all such systems have invariably failed to fulfill the expectations entertained for them because of obstacles which could not have been foreseen during their preparation. Regulations that prescribe too many details are very apt to lead to stereotyped forms and to that which cannot stand the test of actual war. So far every war has had surprises in store for the troops and this will be equally true in the future. Troops will be able to find a way out of such situations only if they have been taught to follow the spirit rather than the letter of their regulations, if they have been individually trained and accustomed to strict discipline, and if their leaders have been taught to reflect on tactics. It is better to send troops into battle with the order, “Help yourselves as best you can,” than to encumber them with combat rules of doubtful value which leave them in the lurch at the first opportunity, because the troops have not been taught to depend upon their own initiative. The consequent indecision is increased in the same proportion as the faith the troops and their leaders had in the lauded universal remedy, the normal procedure. In spite of the excellence of our regulations, we should accustom ourselves to the idea that a future war may correct their provisions.[210]

[209] General BRONSART V. SCHELLENDORFF, _I, Betrachtungen_, etc. p. 42

_British Drill Regulations_: “Although a normal attack is apparently capable of being changed to suit the various situations, the continual practice of it leads to a stereotyped formation, to lack of skill and mobility. The disadvantages coupled with a normal attack are not apparent in time of peace, but in war they will make themselves felt through losses and failures.”

[210] Major VON HÜLSEN, _Schema oder Selbständigkeit?_, (Berlin, 1906).

The enunciation of certain technical combat principles as a guide in the training of the troops is, however, far removed from laying down a stereotyped form for attack (normal attack). Every thinking officer will anyhow, consciously or unconsciously, formulate in his own mind some sort of a “normal attack”, which is nothing but a firm opinion of how he thinks an attack ought to be carried out. If such combat regulations are called “drill attack” (_Schulangriff_), many of the objections advanced against the normal attack are eliminated. Such definite provisions facilitate in a great measure the intercourse between leader and troops.

“Instructions as to what to do in battle,” says Clausewitz (_On War_, II), “must not be taken for more than they are; they should not be regarded as hard and fast rules or systems, but merely as good general forms which individual judgment can utilize as is most suitable.... By means of a uniform method, commanders attain skill, precision, and confidence, the possession of which qualities on their part will make the whole machine run easier....

“The drawback is that the habit of acting in a certain groove tends to become fixed and thus antiquated while the attendant circumstances imperceptibly change, and this should be prevented by enlightened and thorough criticism. When, in the year 1806, the Prussian generals (Prince Louis at =Saalfeld=; Tauenzien on the =Dornberg= at =Jena=; Grawert in front of and Rüchel in rear of =Kapellendorf=) without exception came to grief by employing Frederick the Great’s system of tactics, it was due not merely to the fact that they had gotten into a certain groove of acting which was out of date, but to the most dire poverty of resource to which a fixed system of tactics has ever led. Owing to this incapacity of thinking for themselves, they involved Hohenlohe’s army in such ruin as has never before or since overtaken any army on the battlefield.”

General von Boguslawski[211] demands that the conduct of the attack be regulated by precise instructions both on the drill-ground and in action. He states: “The many different methods of dealing with even the simplest cases, unquestionably evident in the army at the present time, are an evil calculated not only to train but also to confuse the soldier and the subordinate leader. Precise regulations are by no means incompatible with adaptation to the varying features of the terrain in a given case, and will infuse unity and certainty into offensive movements. A normal formation must be prescribed, but it should be flexible.”

[211] _Taktische Darlegungen_, p. 51.

Elsewhere he makes the following statement in regard to a normal attack: “I believe that the normal attack should be regarded as the basis of troop training--a solid foundation for further development. In carrying out the spirit of this procedure, further work should be done on varied ground. This spirit aims at the unity of the attack. The formations taught on the drill-ground should be retained as long as possible. The training of officers and men must be such, however, that they will deviate, whenever necessary, from these normal formations. But if the formations, as well as the training and drill, are truly practical and adapted for war, departures from the scheme laid down in the regulations will be insignificant. This, briefly, is my idea of the normal attack or uniform procedure, which not only does not have a detrimental effect, but, on the contrary, is absolutely necessary in order to facilitate the work of the higher leader.”

General von Scherff states:[212]

“It would contribute to clearness and to proper division of responsibility if the regulations would definitely prescribe:--

“1. That only the superior commander who makes dispositions for battle according to his own judgment, be charged with assigning appropriate missions;

“2. That the subordinate leader, charged with the execution of a mission, determine, by an independent choice of any expedient provided by the regulations, the formation in which his organization is to carry out the task assigned; and, finally,

“3. That the subsequent conduct of such an organization be governed by a definite normal procedure, familiar to the men from the drill-ground, so as to ensure mutual coöperation of its component parts.”

[212] _Einheitsangriff oder individualisierter Angriff_, Berlin, 1902.

2. CONCENTRATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEPLOYMENT FOR ACTION.[213]

[213] _Aufmarsch_, _Entfaltung_, _Entwicklung_.

Column tactics, which influenced us even after the Franco-German war, required that troops be concentrated, prior to an action, from the narrow route column into a broad combat formation. This tedious systematic =concentration=[214] was invariably employed before entering an action, except when, in critical situations, companies and battalions had to be launched into the fight directly from route column. The commander of a force could reduce the time required for going into action only by approaching the field of battle in assembly formation.[215]

[214] “By _concentration_ is meant the passage from route column to a broader close order formation. It is employed for the purpose of decreasing the depth of a column and for assembly.” (Par. 315 German I. D. R.)

[215] Examples: The approach of the IInd Army to the battlefield of Gravelotte, see _Taktik_, III, p. 305.

The advance of the 1st Army from its cantonments toward the Bistrits to the battlefield of Königgrätz was a mistake. The army first approached in route columns, then concentrated, again formed route columns, and finally concentrated for action. V. LETTOW-VORBECK, II, pp. 407 and 480. From what I know of the terrain the advance should in this case have been made in assembly formations.

Valuable time was thus lost. Even when the situation was not pressing, the leader was obliged, for example, to allow a regiment having a depth of 1200 m. to close up to a depth of 100 paces. When this had been done, he was forced to wait until thin skirmish lines gained a proper distance to the front. The rear elements were able to follow only when the skirmishers had gained a distance approximately equal to the former depth of the entire column. Such a concentration is only proper however, when the commander wishes to launch his troops subsequently in several directions. Advantage should be taken of every opportunity for decreasing the depth of the column (by forming column of sections).

The advance of large bodies of troops presents no difficulties even in close country, if, as recommended by the author,[216] the battalions in route column are placed abreast of each other and are permitted to go around obstacles and take advantage of the cover available. However, even at long ranges, troops in such formations present favorable targets to hostile machine guns and artillery.

[216] See _Taktik_, III, p. 307.

The British were surprised in close order formations at =Magersfontain= and =Colenso=. In subsequent engagements, in order to avoid this, their infantry, when still a great distance away from the enemy, took up an attack formation which permitted only movements directly to the front (at =Poplar Grove,= for example, this was done when 10 km. from the enemy). An advance in such a formation was possible only because the plains of South Africa presented no obstacles, and because the British had only to hold the enemy who stood passively on the defensive. Each brigade formed its four battalions into an open double column with a front of 2000 and a depth of 800 m., the distances and intervals between battalions being 300-400 m. Each battalion deployed from this column so that its eight companies, each in a thin line (with 2 and finally 20 pace intervals between the men), followed each other at a distance of 100-120 paces. The advantage of having troops in hand so that they can be used in other directions than straight to the front, had disappeared.

When an engagement is expected, the different elements, each in route column, are directed upon their several objectives, i.e., the column is _developed for action_. This is done because it is necessary to gain a start over the enemy in deployment and advantageous to move in route column. Thus a =development for action= (_Entfaltung_)[217] is nothing but an extension of front accomplished by breaking up the original route column into a number of separate columns. The latter march on diverging lines and can generally remain in route column. Deep column should not be formed unless an immediate extension is not anticipated. During the development for action, preparations should be made providing for the necessary depth of the combat formation.

[217] The German I. D. R. make a distinction between extension of front, “development for action” (_Entfaltung_, pars. 315 and 466), and “distribution in depth” (_Gliedern_, pars. 287-291 and 427). The term “to form for attack” (_Auseinanderziehen_, par. 241), means that troops are given a combat formation both as regards frontage and depth.

When the necessity for engaging can be foreseen, the concentration into an assembly formation should be avoided, since it generally entails a loss of time and energy, and the development for action chosen instead. (Par. 315 German I. D. R.). The latter has the additional advantage of affording a higher degree of readiness for action without letting the troops get out of hand. It should be practiced not only from route column but also from assembly formation.[218]

[218] See the defeat of the Russian Reserve Brigade under Orlov on September 2nd, 1904, at Liao Yang, in _Angriffsverfahren der Japaner_, by von Lüttwitz.

The development for action should begin as soon as there is danger of getting under effective artillery fire. The length of time required for going into action may be reduced by shortening the route column (by concentrating the troops into deep column); by forming several route columns abreast, unless column of sections has already been formed; by clearing the roads of troops; by marching across country; by indicating beforehand on which side of the infantry the artillery is to be brought up (pars. 315-323 German I. D. R.); and, finally, by directing the heads of the various elements upon their respective objectives. (Development for action).

In the Austrian regulations, the development for action is not so clearly emphasized: “A concentration preceding the attack in rencontres is permissible in only those exceptional cases when it becomes apparent, during the preparatory stage of the action, that the enemy has a visible start in deployment.” When time is not pressing, the regulations prescribe a concentration for action and, simultaneously therewith, such a grouping of the principal units (if possible out of range of the effective fire of hostile guns, and well concealed) that the attacking troops need move only straight to the front. A more extended formation is taken up when the zone of hostile artillery fire is reached. The march to the battlefield is discussed in detail by the French regulations: In the first place, in order to take advantage of cover and to keep the roads clear for artillery, it will be necessary to leave the road and to advance across country. This will, as a rule, result in widening the front of the advancing force, even though this be only to the extent of placing columns abreast of each other. Hourly halts are to be made, so as to give an opportunity for replenishing ammunition and time for reconnaissance. Small columns are preferred in woods and in close country and larger columns on passable ground. Attention is specially called to the danger to which troops are exposed when surprised in defiles by hostile fire. This march to the battlefield is followed by a concentration of the troops in concealed and protected positions.

The =deployment for action= (_Entwicklung_) consists of forming the troops for battle and includes the extension into line of skirmishers. As a rule, the deployment follows the development for action, but may be made directly from route column or from an assembly formation.

It is impossible to define clearly where the development for action ceases and where the deployment begins. The formation of a line of skirmishers to cover a route column does not constitute a deployment. There is no room for doubt that the regulations have in mind the rencontre, in which the passage from route column to skirmish line proceeds naturally and smoothly. In attacking an enemy prepared to defend a position, the procedure is much more cautious. In this case the force which has been developed for action is withdrawn as much as possible from the view and the fire of the enemy (par. 367 German I. D. R.), and led forward from cover to cover. (Par. 369 German I. D. R.). Even in situations in which haste is required, it is a good plan to follow the procedure laid down by the regulations, viz: “First direct the troops upon the proper objective, then give them a suitable formation.”

An analysis of the question as to whether an immediate launching of troops into action is necessary (5th Infantry Division at =Vionville=) or whether they should first be regularly concentrated (6th Infantry Division at =Vionville=) is of special interest. The concentration of the 1st Prussian Army Corps at =Waterloo=, and of the 5th Bavarian Infantry Brigade at =Nehweiler= (=Wörth=), almost in rear of the French, is justly criticised. At =Nachod=, the Austrian brigades, owing to their time-consuming concentration, lost an opportunity of throwing the weak Prussian advanced troops from the heights south of Wysokow, while the latter were reinforced by parts of the main body which arrived by half-battalions. This reinforcement, while made in driblets, was, however, sufficient.

During its march to the battlefield of =Gravelotte=, the 3rd Infantry Division concentrated at Buxieres for the purpose of cooking. Then it formed again in route column, concentrated once more south of Rezonville, and from there moved on in echelon formation. The concentration of the 28th Infantry Brigade on August 6th, 1870 (=Spicheren=), was still less justifiable. About noon, when the head of the brigade reached the exit of the Kollertal Wood at Raschpfuhl, it received orders to cross the Saar. Upon receiving this order, the five battalions present concentrated, unfurled their flags and then marched across country to the railroad bridge of Mattstall. In order to effect a crossing, route column had to be formed again. The delays which occurred here led the parts of the force which had crossed first, to throw themselves into the fight.[219]

[219] _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 77_, p. 51.

3. THE BATTALION, THE REGIMENT, AND THE BRIGADE.

When part of a larger force, the battalion may be broken up into companies either by directing the latter upon their respective objectives, or by forming for attack by command.

When forming for attack by command, the front, the base company, intervals, distances, and the relation of the companies to each other must be indicated. The intervals should be sufficiently large to permit the companies to move unhampered, and so maintained that irregularities of marching will not be communicated from one to the other.

A space approximately equal to the front of a platoon will suffice for this purpose. Thus the interval between companies at war strength would be 150 paces, and between companies at peace strength 100 paces. Intervals may be increased or diminished when necessary so as to enable the troops to take the fullest advantage of cover. The same holds true for distances. For rules in regard to the distance between the second and first line, see p. 121, supra. When a battalion has formed line of companies at long range from the enemy for the purpose of reducing the effect of the hostile fire, distances should be diminished to facilitate the transmission of orders.

When the battalion is acting alone, the intervals depend upon the purpose of the combat. In the fights around Mukden, some of the Japanese battalions, stationed at points where the decision was not sought, were each assigned a front of 800 m. In these cases the four companies of each battalion had to be deployed abreast of each other at large intervals.

It is impossible to prescribe fixed forms of deployment for particular situations. In each case the formation of the battalion depends upon the situation, the purpose of the combat, and the nature of the ground, the battalion commander having the option of going into action in one, two, or three lines.

Moreover, the formation depends upon whether--

1. The battalion is acting alone or as part of a larger force; and whether one or both of its flanks are resting on impassable obstacles;

2. Whether it is fighting a decisive or a containing action; whether it is to attack or to stand on the defensive;

3. Whether it is to prepare the attack by its own fire or is to take advantage of the preparation effected by other troops; and, finally,

4. Whether or not it has to fight at night.

=A battalion acting alone=, whose flanks are not resting on natural obstacles, will, as a rule, place entire companies successively into action so as to retain complete organizations for other purposes. It will seldom be proper for the battalion to form for attack in the regular manner. When this can be done the battalion should form in three lines in conformity with its task of initiating, carrying out, and deciding the fight. In this case the leading company is reinforced by the second company as soon as the situation has become sufficiently clear. More frequently, the battalion commander will send only a single company into action, retaining the others for the time being under cover.

The =advance guard battalion= of a regiment will, as a rule, be compelled to develop considerable fire in a _rencontre_ (par. 357 German I. D. R.), in order to check the advance of the enemy, and for this purpose it will frequently place two companies into action at once. But since the battalion commander cannot count upon reinforcements and, moreover, as he does not know on which flank the combat is subsequently going to develop, he will provisionally retain the other two companies in rear of the center, or echelon them in rear of both flanks. (See “a” and “b” above figure).

In a =containing action= one should endeavor to employ few rifles but, on the other hand, expend much ammunition, and keep supports and reserves far in rear so as to minimize the losses. If the force is to deploy first of all only for fire action, but is later to participate in the decisive attack, it will be advisable to place two companies in the first line, one in the second, and one in the third. The companies in the second and third lines will then be less exposed to hostile fire, and the battalion commander will be able, by first launching one and then the other company, to exercise an influence on the course of the action during a longer period than would otherwise be possible. (See “b”).

=When a battalion is fighting as part of a larger force=, and when both its flanks are secure, it will need only supports for feeding the frontal attack (par. 289 German I. D. R.) and can cover a greater front. A reserve may either be entirely dispensed with, or made very weak.

When only one flank of the battalion is secure, the threatened flank should be protected by echeloning the supports and the reserve in rear of it. In this position, these echelons are not so apt to be bullet-stops as when they are placed in rear of the center. Besides, they can more easily execute enveloping movements and can take a hostile flank attack in flank. When both flanks are in the air, only the most essential precautions should be taken on the one flank, while on the other everything available is united for the decisive attack.

In =defense=, three companies can sometimes be taken into the first line for the purpose of developing a strong fire, while the fourth company is held in rear of a threatened flank or in rear of the center. (See “d”). When it is desired to employ the reserve offensively, only one or two companies are placed in the first line, the others being held in reserve in rear of the flank which is to take the offensive. Interval and distance increase with the size of this reserve.

When a battalion from the reserve is called upon to make an immediate attack which has been prepared by the fire of other troops, all its companies may be taken at once into the first line. In this case the battalion may be formed for attack with its companies at close intervals. This might also be a suitable combat formation for night operations. All these formations are subject to change however, as soon as the proper utilization of cover makes it necessary.

The general principles stated for a battalion are also applicable to a =regiment=. The regiment may either be directly formed for attack, or the heads of the battalions may be deflected toward the points where the deployment is to take place. An interval of 300-400 m. between heads of battalions is best calculated to facilitate the subsequent deployment. The distances depend upon the nature of the ground and the purpose of the combat.

The regimental commander assigns tasks to his battalion commanders, but leaves the latter entire freedom of action in regard to the formation to be taken up and the manner of deploying. He should interfere with companies only in exceptional cases. Such interference is justified only when the conduct of subordinate leaders threatens to impair unity of action in the combat and when time is lacking to observe the proper channels in communicating an order.

In developing the =brigade=[220] for action, the depth of column begins to exert an influence. Every concentration of the brigade retards its entry into action. If the longest distance to be covered in developing the brigade is assigned to the leading element of the column, the march into action will be accelerated.

[220] For historical references in regard to the importance in action of the brigade, see essay published in _Jahrbücher für Armee und Marine_ (August-September number of 1877) entitled, _Die Infanterie-Brigade in ihrer Entwicklung aus der Brigade von 1812_. In regard to the employment of the regiments in line or in echelon, see MOLTKE, _Kritische Aufsätze sur Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1866_. MOLTKE’S _Taktisch-Strategische Aufsätze_, p. 99, et seq.

When an infantry brigade approaching the battlefield is to prolong the flank of the fighting line, its entry into action might be hastened, perhaps, by letting the rear regiment continue the march in the original direction while the leading regiment takes the longer route. The rear regiment would then be abreast of the leading one after about 15 minutes. If the battalions are subsequently developed on radiating lines, the development of the whole force will, after a few minutes, have progressed far enough to permit a deployment of skirmishers.

When the brigade takes up a combat formation, each regiment is assigned a separate task (attack of a point, or defense of a section). If the tasks assigned are definite and harmonize with each other, mutual coöperation will be assured. The brigade commander ordinarily sends his orders to the regimental commanders, but, when circumstances (haste, correction of errors) compel him to depart from this rule, he should inform those officers of the action taken. In a brigade consisting of two regiments, its commander, in order to be able to influence the action, will be compelled to retain at least one battalion as a reserve.

Brigades of three regiments[221] (each of three battalions) have an advantage in this respect. But if such an increase in infantry units were contemplated, it would be better, for reasons that will be given later on,[222] to form the additional troops into a third division in each army corps.

[221] The British division consists of twelve battalions formed into three brigades.

In the United States the three unit organization is most clearly marked. The division consists of three brigades, each brigade of three regiments, and each regiment of three battalions. The battalions have a strength of only 400 men.

[222] _Taktik_ (_Kriegsgliederung_), III, p. 31, et seq.

Base Units.

The possibility of regulating the movements of a body of troops by means of a base unit, depends upon a number of preliminary conditions which will seldom be fulfilled in war:

1. _The leader of the base unit would have to remain unharmed to the very last._ If he were disabled the command of the unit would devolve upon the next in rank who would perhaps not join it in every case.

2. _The fresh organisation which imparts the impetus necessary for a further advance, would have to maintain the direction after the original base unit had ceased to exist on account of the mixing of organizations._

3. _The base unit would have to encounter less difficulties during its advance than the other units of the force._ If the base unit were to encounter greater difficulties than the other units, this might serve as an excuse for reducing the rate of advance. In attack, the organization nearest the enemy, in other words, the one that is led better and more energetically than the others, is quite naturally charged with maintaining the direction. Moreover, this organization will be able to facilitate by its fire the advance of the elements in rear.

The designation of a base unit[223] or unit of direction on the battlefield cripples the energy of an entire line and the initiative of the individual in favor of uniformity of movement. A base unit is only profitable in night operations, in crossing unfavorable ground (woods), and in bringing the fighting line up to the effective zone of hostile fire. “With the entry into action, the importance of the base company gradually decreases as the demands made by the combat increase”. (Par. 242 German I. D. R.). In all other cases, it is better to indicate either the objective on which the troops are to march, or the flank toward which they are to maintain connection.

[223] “A unit may also be designated upon which the others have to regulate their movements without thereby being curbed in their endeavor to advance (base unit of combat).” (Par. 371 German I. D. R.)

In France units of direction are prescribed (_la direction est confidée aux unités qui suivent les chemins ou les lignes naturelles du terrain_), but their duties are not given in detail. Units of direction are also prescribed in Austria.

A _change of direction_ of march is executed by wheeling or turning with the subordinate units toward the new front. (Par. 185 German I. D. R.). A _change of front_ is effected in the same manner. With long lines, echeloning and movements by the flank will result, which can only be rectified gradually by issuing appropriate orders. When skirmishers have been deployed in a wrong direction, or when a deployment in another direction becomes necessary after the conclusion of a combat, it is advisable to deploy a new line in the desired direction, from the closed bodies still available, and to withdraw, at the same time, those parts of the former skirmish line which are no longer necessary.

Examples of Changes of Front.

1. Engagement at =Helmstedt=, on July 25th, 1866. The 20th Infantry had to deploy to its left rear after its successful attack on the Ütting Hill.[224]

[224] _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 20_, p. 54.

2. The battalions of the XIth Army Corps wheeling toward the =Niederwald= after crossing the Sauer (battle of =Wörth=).[225]

[225] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 254, sketch p. 262.

3. The wheel executed by Kottwitz’ Brigade during the battle of =Loigny-Poupry= (2nd Dec., 1870). (This is also cited as an example of the conduct of a counter-attack made by the defender). Toward noon the advance guard of the 17th Infantry Division held =Lumeau=. The 33rd Brigade, its battalions in double column, was concentrated south of =Champdoux=. The division commander retained two battalions as a reserve and ordered Major-General von Kottwitz “to execute a quarter wheel to the right and to form his command for attack in the general direction of Loigny,” for the purpose of relieving the pressure on the Bavarians defending =Schlosz Goury=. The attack was directed against the French Division Jauréguiberry, which was attacking Schlosz Goury. This division first came under fire at 3-400 m. and then approached to within about 150 m. of the defenders’ position; strong reserves followed in rear of its right flank, but otherwise nothing was done to protect the right.

By wheeling at once to the right, the right wing of Kottwitz’ Brigade would still have struck the eastern garden wall of Schlosz Goury, and, as Loigny had been indicated to the general as the objective, a fan-shaped extension of the brigade, precluding mutual coöperation, would have been unavoidable. The general had fourteen companies at his disposal and decided to advance in a southerly direction until his second line overlapped the most advanced hostile line, so that the attack as planned would have struck simultaneously both the first and second lines of the enemy. The slight loss of time involved caused the general no uneasiness, as he could carry out his intentions without interference beyond range of the fire of the enemy, whom he could observe during the entire movement. The brigade formed for attack, during its movement to the south, when about 1200 m. from Goury. The general, who was on the right flank, halted the brigade after it had advanced far enough, and wheeled it to the right.

As the second line overlapped the first, the Füsilier Battalion of the 76th Infantry had to shorten its step until the 2nd and 3rd Companies of the same regiment had come abreast and until the 6th and 8th Companies of the 75th Infantry had also joined the line. The center half-battalion, (2nd and 3rd Companies of the 76th Infantry), the unit of direction, was ordered to march on the church spire of Loigny. All the units of the force, with the exception of the IInd Battalion, 76th Infantry, at once deployed lines of skirmishers. The 1st and 4th Companies, 76th Infantry, and 5th Company, 75th Infantry, covered the left flank and turned toward Ecuillon. Of the eleven companies launched in this flank attack, six were in the first line (approximately 1100 rifles on a front of 800 m.), and five in the second.

The bulk of the second line, in an endeavor to close with the enemy quickly, joined the firing line when 400 m. from the enemy. The attack came as a complete surprise to the French; their lines were taken in flank, and all their attempts to form new defensive lines to oppose the onslaught of the Hansards proved unavailing. The dense, unwieldy masses of the French were more and more crowded together by the uninterrupted advance of the Hansards and offered good objectives to the German marksmen. The advance of the brigade was supported by the artillery in position near Lumeau. This artillery followed the brigade to Ecuillon.

The Hansards traversed a distance of 3500 m. during this attack. The right wing and the bulk of the 2nd and 3rd Companies, 76th Infantry, which had been detailed as the unit of direction, with orders to march on the church spire of Loigny, strayed to Fougon; the left wing penetrated into Loigny.[226]

[226] See HÖNIG, _Volkskrieg_, IV, p. 80; also KUNZ, _Loigny_, p. 105.

4. The advance of six battalions of the IIIrd Army Corps against the =Forbach Hill= (=Spicheren=).[227]

[227] _Gen. St. W._, I. p. 356.

4. DISTRIBUTION IN DEPTH AND FRONTAGE OF COMBAT FORMATIONS.[228]

[228] See _Taktik_, V, _Gefechtslehre_, p. 38.

The infantry combat is decided by the combined action of long firing lines. Retained forces, not launched against the enemy for the purpose of crushing him, exert no influence whatever on the decision, since they only increase losses without contributing to the fire effect. In the battles of the past, distribution in depth at the decisive stage of the combat (unless necessary as a measure of precaution, in securing the flanks, for example), was only permissible so long as the short range of the weapons allowed reserves to be kept in readiness so close to the firing line that they could assault _en masse_ at once and without any diminution of their strength. The deciding factor, which rested in retained reserves during the Napoleonic era, lies at present in the firing line.[229]

[229] The French still entertain a contrary opinion.

=Distribution in depth= _is, therefore, only a means to an end; an expedient made use of to maintain a dense firing line permanently at a constant strength; to give the firing line the impetus for the assault; to protect it against a reverse; and to secure its flanks. Victory is assured only by the simultaneous employment of superior fighting forces. A force should go into action in a deep combat formation, but it must extend its front during the fight._ To launch an insufficient number of troops for combat and to reinforce them gradually is a fatal error, as we are thereby compelled to fight a superior force continually with an inferior one, without being able to take advantage of the superiority which we may actually possess.

The Russian attacks in the battles around =Plevna= are very instructive in this respect. On July 30th, 1877, the =Grivica= intrenchments were attacked by two columns consisting of nine battalions. The Ist and IInd Battalions of the 121st Infantry succeeded in reaching the trench, but then the attack failed. The IIIrd Battalion then attacked, with a similar result Thereupon the IInd and IIIrd Battalions of the 123rd Infantry were launched, but these also only succeeded in reaching the edge of the ditch of the trench. The attack of the left column proceeded in a similar manner, likewise that made by the reserves. An attack made simultaneously by the entire force undoubtedly would have been successful.[230]

[230] _Russisch-Türkischer Krieg_ (_Gen. St. W._), German Translation, III, pp. 254 and 264.

On September 11th, 1877, after the attack made by the 63rd and 117th Infantry Regiments on the =Omar Bey Tabia= had been repulsed, the 64th and 118th Infantry Regiments of the IVth Army Corps, and the 31st Infantry Division of the IXth Army Corps (the last mentioned force was not under the orders of the commander of the IVth Army Corps) were placed in readiness for a renewed attack at 3 P. M. In spite of the heavy losses (42 and 49%) and the fact that the failure of the first attack had demonstrated that such a small force was insufficient for taking the Turkish work, only two regiments were again sent forward to the attack (in other words, 6 battalions instead of 18). When this assault had also been repulsed, and one regiment from the reserve had in addition been thrown in, 6 battalions of the 15 still intact, were again sent forward, but they likewise failed to take the work. A regiment began its attack only when the preceding one had been repulsed with loss. The 24 battalions lost 115 officers and 4319 men. A timely reinforcement by troops in reserve would have averted a reverse at any rate, and a simultaneous employment of adequate forces would have assured the success of the Russian infantry.[231]

[231] KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_, I, p. 211.

The same thing occurred at =Gorni-Dubniac=. As the Russians, who advanced on a broad front, did not attack simultaneously, the weak garrison of the trenches was able to concentrate its fire on the isolated attacking groups which followed each other.

The same peculiar feature, namely, small frontage with insufficient fire power and strong reserves, was frequently observed during the battles in the =Russo-Japanese war=. On the left flank, at =Wafangu= (15th June, 1904), the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division advanced with one battalion of the 2nd Regiment and one of the 3rd in the first line, with four battalions in the second line, and with three battalions of the 1st Regiment in the third line. A full development of the fire power of the division did not take place at all.[232] The 2nd and 3rd Regiments, in all about 6000 men, lost 49 officers and 1464 men. The 1¹⁄₂ batteries attached to the division were shot to pieces in a short time and fell into the hands of the Japanese.

[232] LÖFFLER, _Russisch-Japanischer Krieg_, I, p. 56.

Distribution in depth is necessary during the preparatory stage of the fight, as it enables the commander to meet unexpected developments in the situation. Moreover, it is justifiable so long as the information in regard to the strength and intentions of the enemy is insufficient. When reconnaissance work is not thoroughly performed, the force may be obliged to deploy in a direction other than the one originally chosen. This will be difficult to do as changes of front and movements by the flank can only be made when the front is narrow. Moreover, after a force is once deployed within the zone of hostile fire, it is committed to the direction chosen and can only move straight to the front. Considerable changes of front can only be executed by the lines in rear. The troops held in rear are to reinforce the firing line and to increase its density to the maximum at the decisive moment. As the losses are smaller in defense than in attack, a force can cover a broader front and keep its supports in closer proximity to the firing line in the former than in the latter case, especially if it was able to strengthen its position. The reserve, however, should be kept at a greater distance from the firing line than in attack, in order that it may retain complete freedom of movement--in covering the retreat, or in making a counter-attack--and may not be involved in the fire fight.

The reserves of the attacker are to protect the flanks, give the impetus for the assault, serve as a force upon which the attacking line can rally, and cover the re-forming of the troops after a successful attack. The several echelons of the attack formation, except the small fractions immediately supporting the firing line[233] and covering its flanks, should have become merged with that line by the time the decisive moment of the combat arrives. The commander who takes up an unnecessarily deep attack formation dispenses with an advantage; on the other hand, the one who prematurely deploys in force, exposes himself to grave danger. _The troops should be sent into action in a deep combat formation, since the firing line is to be fed from the rear until the decisive moment arrives, but every available man should be thrown in for the assault._

[233] The advantage of having such supporting forces in rear of the line is clearly shown in the fights of the 18th Brigade at Wörth. KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 14, pp. 110, 129 and 172.

=Distribution in depth and frontage= are interdependent; the greater the frontage, the less the distribution in depth, and vice versa. In every deployment for action the following question awaits solution by the troop leader: “How deep ought the formation to be and how great an extension of front is allowable.” The result of the combat depends in many cases upon a happy answer to this question. Broad combat formations have great initial energy, facilitate turning and flank movements, but their energy is not constant when the means are not available to replace casualties. In addition, the difficulty of leading, the danger of the line being penetrated, and the weakness of the flanks grow apace with the extension of front. Distribution in depth makes it possible to initiate the combat with a part of the force and to get information of the situation; to fight the action with another part of the force in accordance with this information; and, finally, to bring about the decision and reap the fruits of that decision with the third part. A deep combat formation enables the leader to exercise a constant influence on the course of action; it gives him the means with which to execute turning movements or to repulse them--something which would be entirely impossible, or, at any rate, only possible under great difficulties, with troops deployed in the first line. As only a limited number of rifles can be brought into play in a deep combat formation, it is obvious that this is an element of weakness of which an opponent deployed on a broader front, may take advantage.

Although the danger of going too far in distributing a force in depth is not inconsiderable, this is, at any rate, a smaller error than the opposite extreme, that of deploying troops, from the very start, on too broad a front.

At noon on August 6th, 1870, General von François received an order for his brigade to dislodge the hostile artillery posted on the =Roten Berg= of the =Spicheren Heights=,[234] it being assumed that only insignificant hostile forces were in front. The other brigade of the 14th Division was expected to be able to take part in the action in about three hours. When the attacking force was 2000 m. from its objective, the IInd Battalion, 74th Infantry, and the IIIrd Battalion, 39th Infantry, were set in motion against the French right flank, while the Ist Battalion and the Füsilier Battalion of the 74th Infantry were retained as a reserve. The brigade accordingly covered a front of about 4000 m. While the frontal attack on the Roten Berg was undoubtedly difficult,[235] this wide extension, which made all leading impossible, increased the difficulties still further. In the first place, the brigade commander led his two reserve battalions against the Roten Berg and fell finally while leading a company. The brigade was too weak to carry out the task imposed upon it. The 28th Brigade, which followed, came into action at various points of the battlefield, so that the two brigades became mixed, thus considerably increasing the difficulties of leading. At 3 P. M., the following troops were in the first line on the right wing:[236]

I. Bn. II. Bn. 1. 2. and ¹⁄₂3. Cos. 4. and 1. Cos. -------- ------------ -------------------- -------------- 53. Inf. ~=74. Inf.=~ ~=74. Inf.=~ 77. Inf.

10. 11. and 12. Cos. ¹⁄₂3. Co. -------------------- ------------ ~=39. Inf.=~ ~=74. Inf.=~

[234] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 310.

[235] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 318.

[236] The units printed in heavy type belong to the 27th Brigade. The 4th Company of the 74th Infantry was separated by 2.5 km., as the crow flies, from the left flank of its battalion.

The following troops were in the second line:

Füsilier Bn. 2. and 3. Cos.[237] II. Bn. and Füsilier Bn. ------------ ------------------- ------------------------ 53. Inf. 77. Inf. 77. Inf.

[237] These two companies were separated by about 1 km. from the other companies of their battalion.

This admixture of organizations along a front of about 1.5 km. might have been prevented by the commander. Toward 6 P. M., a similar situation existed on the Roten Berg and at the south end of the Giefert Wald--39²⁄₃ companies belonging to the 12th, 39th, 40th, 48th and 74th Infantry Regiments were scattered along a front of 1600