Tactics, Volume 1 (of 2). Introduction and Formal Tactics of Infantry
VOLUME I.
INTRODUCTION AND FORMAL TACTICS OF INFANTRY.
TRANSLATED BY ~WALTER KRUEGER, First Lieutenant 23rd Infantry, U. S. Army, Instructor Army Service Schools.~
Fourth completely revised edition. With numerous plates in the text.
U. S. CAVALRY ASSOCIATION, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS. 1911
COPYRIGHT, 1911, BY WALTER KRUEGER.
=PRESS OF KETCHESON PRINTING CO., LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS.=
TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE.
The translation of this book was undertaken at the instance of Major John F. Morrison, General Staff, who desired to make use of it in the course in tactics in the Army Service Schools.
It is an epitome of the interpretation and application of tactical principles in the various armies, discussed in the light of the tactical views and methods prevailing in Germany, and amplified by numerous examples from military history.
The professional value of this book to all officers of our Regular Army and Militia who are endeavoring to gain a working knowledge of tactics, is so obvious that any comment would be superfluous.
Army Service Schools, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, December, 1910.
PREFACE.
The first volume of “Tactics,” which appeared in its first edition in 1896, and for which the preparatory work reached back more than a decade, now appears in its fourth edition in a completely changed form. The lessons gained in war and improvements in weapons have corrected many earlier views. While the Boer war confused the views on infantry combat and brought forth more lessons in a negative than in a positive form, the Russo-Japanese war has had a great educating influence, in that it corroborated the soundness of the lessons gained in the Franco-German war, but also in that it amplified those lessons commensurate with the improvements in weapons. The fundamental principles upon which success depends have remained the same.
For a long time I hesitated to comply with my publisher’s wishes for a new edition. It would not have been difficult to publish long ago a new edition, based upon the many lessons of war communicated to me by members of foreign armies soon after the Russo-Japanese war. But, after an extended period of theoretical work, I was more inclined to avail myself once more of the opportunity of gaining practical experience by service with troops. Pure theoretical reflection is only too apt to depart from the requirements of practice and to overlook the friction appearing everywhere. The battalion commander, more than any one else, is called upon to act as the tactical instructor of his officers and knows best where the shoe pinches. Moreover, the proximity of the maneuver ground to my present station gave me an opportunity of observing the field training of a large number of battalions and regiments of infantry and artillery, and to compare notes with brother officers of the other arms. In addition, several trips abroad and, incidental thereto, visits to battlefields, furnished valuable suggestions. I postponed issuing the new edition until the publication of the new Russian and Japanese Drill Regulations, which, with our own excellent regulations, best illustrate the lessons learned from the war in the Far East. For this fourth edition I was further able to draw upon the new French (1904), Italian (1905), Belgian (1906), U. S. (1904), British (1905), and Swiss (1908) Drill Regulations. This enumeration alone justifies the statement, “completely revised,” appearing on the title page.
I have earnestly endeavored to make use of foreign experiences in detail. The words of Lieutenant-General Sir Ian Hamilton of the British Army, to whose writings I owe a great deal, deserve special attention in studying the drill regulations of foreign armies: “It is a blessing that the greater and prouder an army, the more immovably it is steeped in conservatism, so that as a whole it is finally incapable of assimilating the lessons gained by other armies. Military attachés may discover the most important points in the training and employment of foreign armies and urgently recommend their imitation, but their comrades will pay no more attention to them than did Napoleon III. to Stoffel’s reports on the Prussian army before the outbreak of the Franco-German war.”
The treatment of the subject matter has remained the same throughout; it represents, as in the first edition, the principle that tactical lessons must be deduced from human nature, from the effect of weapons, and from experience in war, proper regard being had for national characteristics and historical transmission. _Tactics is psychology._ My statements in regard to fire effect are based, as before, upon the works of His Excellency, Lieutenant-General Rohne. The publications of Historical Section I of the Great General Staff and the splendid works of the late Major Kunz, furnish the basis for examples cited from military history. An almost too copious literature is already available on the Russo-Japanese war. The monographs (_Einzelschriften_) of the Great General Staff, and of Streffleur, especially “_Urteile und Beobachtungen von Mitkämpfern_,” published by the latter, afford a rich field for research.
It is not difficult to cite examples from military history in support of any tactical procedure, but such examples require a very careful sifting before they can be recommended as worthy models for our action in front of the enemy.
The Austrians deduced the necessity of the most brutal shock action from the experience gained by them in their combats in Upper Italy in 1859, and the British were not very far removed from completely denying the feasibility of making an attack soon after the Boer war; but the desire to avoid losses was forced into the background by the necessity of annihilating the enemy. In the Far East the Russians finally had to learn again the same bitter lessons as at Plevna.
Simultaneously with this fourth edition, there appears in Athens a translation in Modern Greek from the pen of Captain Strategos of the Greek General Staff, well known to many German officers from his War Academy days.
It is hoped that the fourth edition may receive the same kind reception at home and abroad that was given its three predecessors. For all communications, suggestions or corrections, directed either to me or to my publisher, I will be sincerely grateful.
THE AUTHOR.
POSEN, March, 1908.
CONTENTS.
=INTRODUCTION.= PAGE
=1. War= 1 Eternal peace 1 War the _ultimo ratio_ of state policy 2 Courts of arbitration 3
=2. Strategy and Tactics= 4 Definition of strategy and tactics 4 Relation of strategy to tactics 6
=3. The Method of Instruction= 7 Value of examples 8 Applicatory method 10 Advantages and disadvantages 10 Arrangement of the subject matter 12
=4. Drill Regulations= 13 Instructions for campaign 15 Regulations and the science of combat 15
=THE FORMAL TACTICS OF INFANTRY.=
=I. ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT= 19
=1. The Importance and Employment of Infantry= 19 Relative strength as compared to other arms 19 Élite infantry. Guards 21 Jägers and riflemen 22 Mountain infantry 23 Machine guns 24 Mounted infantry 25 Patrols and scouting detachments 27 Cyclists 28 Snowshoe runners 30
=2. The Tactical Unit= 32
=3. Organization= 34 The company 34 Peace and war strength 35 The battalion 36 The regiment 37 The brigade 37
=4. Intrenching Tool Equipment= 38
=5. The Load of the Infantryman= 39 Comparison of the loads carried by infantrymen in various armies 40
=II. THE FORMATIONS= 41
=1. The Issue of Orders= 41 Trumpet signals 41
=2. The Purpose of Formations. Comparison Between Line and Column= 42 Assembly and route formations 42 Maneuver and combat formations 43 Napoleonic columns 44 Comparison between line and column 44 The origin of column tactics 44
=3. The Company= 46 (_a_) Formation of the company 46 Number of ranks 46 Interval and distance 47 Front and facing distance 48 (_b_) Division of the company into three or four platoons 48 Losses among officers 50
=4. Length of Pace and Marching= 53 Comparison (table) 54 Double time 55
=5. Movements of the Company in Line= 56
=6. The Columns of the Company. Movements in Column. Formation of Line= 56 Column of twos 56 Column of squads 57 Route column 57 Column of fours 58 Double column of squads 59 Comparison of column of fours with column of squads 59 The importance of the squad 59 The employment of the column of squads 59 Company column 60 Column of platoons 61 Column of sections 61 Guidon flags 63 Posts of platoon commanders 63 Movements in column 64 Suggestions made by Colonel Fumet, French Army 65
=7. The Battalion= 67 Normal formation of the German battalion 67 The color 68 Formations in various armies 69 The value of double column 71 The battalion in route column 72
=8. The Regiment and the Brigade= 73 Formation in line or in echelon 73
=9. Extended Order= 75 Thin and dense skirmish lines 75 (_a_) The formation of the skirmish line 78 (_b_) Movements in skirmish line 81 Advance by rushes 82 Time required for making a rush. Strength of the force making the rush 83 Rising 84 Short or long rushes 85 Advance by crawling 86 Lessons of the Boer War 88 Lessons of the Russo-Japanese War 89 Provisions of the various regulations relative to the advance by rushes 90 Fire while in motion 92 Examples of the employment of fire while in motion 93 Examples of the employment of rushes 93 (_c_) Reinforcing the firing line 96 (_d_) Closing up. Assembling. Re-forming 97
=10. Supports= 98 Duties 98 Distance 99 Commander 100 Movements 100 Formation 100 Supports in rear of the firing line or not? 101
=11. Comparison Between Close and Extended Order= 102 Necessity of drill 104 Combat drill 105 Training 105 Training of leaders 109
=III. THE POWER OF FIREARMS AND EXPEDIENTS FOR MINIMIZING LOSSES= 111
=A. THE POWER OF FIELD ARTILLERY= 111
=1. The Field Gun= 111 Percussion shrapnel 111 Time shrapnel 112 Shell 115 The French _obus allongé_ 115
=2. The Light Field Howitzer= 116
=3. The Heavy Field Howitzer= 118
=4. Expedients for Minimizing the Effect of Fire= 118 (_a_) Increasing the difficulties in the adjustment of the hostile fire 119 (_b_) Minimizing the effect of fire 120
=5. The Results Obtained by Artillery Against Various Targets= 122 French data 123
=6. The Effect of Shrapnel Bullets on Animate Targets= 125
=B. INFANTRY FIRE= 126
=1. The Effect of a Single Projectile on Animate Targets= 126 Explosive effect 127 Tumbling bullets 127
=2. The Effect of “S” Bullets on Materials= 131
=IV. THE EMPLOYMENT OF INFANTRY FIRE= 132 Stunning and exhaustive effect 132 The engagement at Modder River, Nov. 28, 1899 132
=1. Fire Discipline= 133 The employment of the bayonet; bayonet fencing 134
=2. Fire Control and Fire Direction= 134 Squad leaders 135 Company commanders 136 Uncontrolled fire 136 Russian experiences in the Far East 137
=3. Selection of the Line to be Occupied= 138
=4. The Strength of the Firing Line= 139
=5. Ascertaining Ranges= 140 Influence of the knowledge of the range upon the efficacy of the fire 140 Ascertaining ranges by pacing or galloping 141 Influence of the terrain upon the length of pace 141 Errors of estimation 142 Provisions of various regulations 143 Memorizing distinguishing marks on the enemy 144 Scaling the range from maps 144 Obtaining the range from other troops 145 Trial volleys fired for the purpose of obtaining proper sight elevation 145 Range finding instruments 146
=6. Selection of a Target and Time for Opening Fire= 147 Short or long range fire 147 Limit of long range fire 147 The moral effect of withholding the fire 151 Marshal Bugeaud’s narrative 151 Provisions of various regulations 153 General rules for opening fire in attack and defense 154
=7. Pauses in the Fire= 155
=8. Kinds of Fire= 157 Volley fire and fire at will; bursts of fire (_rafales_) 158 The rate of fire 160 The influence of the rate of fire upon the efficacy of fire 161 The volley 163 Bursts of fire (_rafales_) 164
=9. Rear Sight Elevations and Points of Aim= 165
=10. Commands= 166
=11. The Observation of the Fire= 167
=12. The Effect of Fire= 167 Comparison between losses produced by infantry and artillery fire 167 (_a_) Influence of training 168 (_b_) Influence of the error in estimating the range 170 (_c_) Fire effect as regards time. Number of rounds to be expended 172 (_d_) Additional influences affecting the accuracy of fire 173 Wolozkoi’s theory of the effect of the constant cone of misses 173 (_e_) Influence of rifle-rests in firing 178 (_f_) Influence of the ground 179 Danger space and beaten zone 179 Firing upon hill positions 183 Indirect rifle fire 184 Ricochets 185
=13. Losses In Action= 185 Losses in the various formations 186 Losses among officers 189
=14. The Moral Effect of Fire= 191 The impressions produced upon General Bonnal by the battle of Wörth 191 Surrenders of British troops in South Africa 192 Limit of endurance in battle 193 The “void of the battlefield” 194 Mixing of organizations 195 Fighting power of improvised units 197 Overcoming crises in action 198
=V. DEPLOYMENTS FOR ACTION= 201
=1. Normal Procedure= 201 The normal attack 202 Drill attack 204
=2. Concentration, Development, and Deployment for Action= 205 Development for action 207 Deployment for action 209
=3. The Battalion, the Regiment, and the Brigade= 210 The battalion 210 The regiment 214 The brigade 216 Base units 218 Examples of changes of front 220
=4. Distribution in Depth and Frontage of Combat Formations= 222 Dangers of distribution in depth 222 Plevna and Wafangu 222, 223 Distribution in depth necessary during the preparatory stage 224 Contrast between distribution in depth and frontage 225 Dangers of over-extension (Spicheren) 225, 226 Influence of fire effect and morale upon frontage 227, 228 Influence of the task assigned a force 231 Delaying actions. Night attacks. Defense 232, 233 Approximate figures for the extent of front that may be covered 233 Frontage of the several units 235, 236 The Boer War 238 The Russo-Japanese War 239 Table of troops per km. of front 240 Recapitulation of the most important points governing frontage 241 Provisions of various regulations 241
=5. Combat Orders= 243 Combat tasks 243 Division of work in staffs 245
=6. Communication on the Battlefield= 246 Signal and wig-wag flags 246 Signal arrangements in the Austrian, French and British armies 248
=7. Local Reconnaissance of the Infantry= 248 Reconnaissance in force 251 The object of local reconnaissance 251 Scouting detachments 252
=8. The Importance of the Terrain= 254 The attack over an open plain 255 The French group attack 256 Combat sections 257
=VI. MACHINE GUNS= 259
=1. Development of the Arm= 259 Mounting and method of transportation 261, 262
=2. The Power of Machine Guns= 262 Kinds of fire 263 Combat value of machine guns and infantry 267
=3. Infantry Versus Machine Guns= 268 Conduct of troops when exposed to machine gun fire 268, 269
=4. Machine Guns in Germany= 270 Organization 270 Formations 273, 274 Machine gun companies 275
=5. Going Into Position= 276
=6. The Fire Fight= 283 Machine guns in the engagement at the Waterberg 283
=7. Machine Guns in Other Countries= 284 Switzerland 284 Austria 286 England 289 Japan and France 290 Russia 290 Machine guns at Liao Yang, 1904 291
=8. The Employment of Machine Gun Batteries= 293 Rencontre and attack 295 Rear guards 295 Defense 295 Coöperation with cavalry 296 Machine guns versus artillery 297 English views 297 Swiss views 299
=VII. INFANTRY VERSUS CAVALRY= 301 Deployment for firing 303 Moral effect of a charge 306 Aiming positions 307 Time for opening fire 308 Selection of sight elevation 310 Kind of fire 310 Distribution of fire 311 Charge of the French Cuirassiers of the Guard 311 Advance against cavalry 313 Infantry versus dismounted cavalry 313 Provisions of various regulations 314
=VIII. INFANTRY VERSUS ARTILLERY= 316
=1. The Passage of Infantry Through Artillery Lines= 316
=2. The Advance Under Artillery Fire= 318 Increasing the difficulties in the adjustment of the hostile fire 318 Fire for effect 320 Formations used by infantry when under artillery fire Russo- Japanese War 322 Lessons of war 321, 323
=3. Firing on Hostile Artillery in Position= 324 Cover afforded by steel shields 324
=IX. THE ATTACK= 329 Attack and defense compared 329
=1. The Surprise= 330 Examples of surprises 331
=2. The Rencontre= 333 Conduct of the advance guard 334 Issue of orders 336 Conduct of the main body 338 Provisions of various regulations 339 Examples 339
=X. THE ATTACK ON AN ENEMY DEPLOYED FOR DEFENSE= 340
=1. Lessons of War= 340 Boer War 340 The infantry attack in the Russo-Japanese War 340 Russian infantry 340 Japanese infantry 341 Examples 343, 344
=2. The Conditions Upon which Success Depends= 345
=3. Preparation of the Attack= 346 Reconnaissance. Preparatory position 346
=4. The Coöperation of Infantry and Artillery in Battle= 351 Preparation of the assault 352
=5. The Point of Attack= 355
=6. Envelopment= 356 Holding attack 357 Launching the enveloping force 359 Separation of holding and flank attacks 361 Provisions of various regulations 362
=7. Removal of Packs= 363
=8. The Employment of Machine Guns= 365
=9. The Conduct of the Attack= 365 The advance of the firing line 365 Distances 368 The fire fight 369 The superiority of fire 370 Fixing bayonets 372
=10. The Assault= 373 The decision to assault 373 The decision to assault emanating from the firing line 375 Fire support during the assault 379 Bayonet fights 382 Wounds produced by cutting weapons 384 Assaulting distances 385 Conduct after a successful attack 385 Conduct after an unsuccessful attack 386
=11. The Use of the Spade in Attack= 387 Sand bags 390 Results of Russian experiments 390 Provisions of various regulations 392 General rules governing the use of the spade in attack 393
=12. The Employment of Reserves= 394 Launching or withholding reserves 395
=13. The Conduct of the Leaders in Action= 399
=14. United Action Versus Tactical Missions= 401 The attack on the “Tannenwäldchen” at Colombey Aug. 14, 1870 402, 403 The attack on Grugies (St. Quentin) 403 The dangers of assigning tasks 405
=XI. THE DEFENSE= 408
=1. The Passive Defense= 409
=2. The Defense Seeking a Decision= 409 Troops required to occupy the position 410 Division of the position into sections 411 Advanced positions 413
=3. Fortifying the Position= 415 Battalion groups 417 Observation of the foreground 420 Clearing the foreground 421 Dummy intrenchments and masks 421 Cover trenches and communicating trenches 421 Obstacles 422 Russian views 422
=4. The Conduct of the Defense= 423 Protection of the flanks 425 Employment of machine guns 425 Occupation of the position 426
=5. The Counter-Attack= 428 Position of the general reserve 429 The moment for making the counter-attack 432 The counter-attack after the position is carried 433 The counter-attack in conjunction with a movement to the rear 434 Frontal counter-attack 436 Provisions of various regulations 438
=XII. THE RETREAT= 440 Breaking off an action 441 Rallying positions 442
=XIII. CONTAINING ACTIONS= 445 The delaying action and the holding attack 445
=XIV. THE INFANTRY COMBAT ACCORDING TO VARIOUS DRILL REGULATIONS= 448 The Austrian Drill Regulations of 1903 448 The Italian Drill Regulations of 1903 and 1906 451 The French Drill Regulations of 1904 453 The British Drill Regulations of 1905 459 The Japanese Drill Regulations of 1907 463 The Russian Drill Regulations of 1907 466 The Swiss Drill Regulations of 1908 466
=XV. THE EXPENDITURE AND SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION= 468
=1. Historical Sketch= 468 Table showing ammunition supply of the various armies of the world 475
=2. Regulations Governing the Supply of Ammunition in Armies= 476 Germany 476 Austria 479 Russia 480 France 480 England 482 Italy 483
=3. What Deductions May Be Made From the Regulations of the Various Armies= 483
=INDEX= 487
=INDEX OF EXAMPLES FROM MILITARY HISTORY= 527
ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS TRANSLATION.
C. D. R. = Cavalry Drill Regulations. F. A. D. R. = Field Artillery Drill Regulations. F. A. F. R. = Field Artillery Firing Regulations. F. S. R. = Field Service Regulations. Gen. St. W. (_Generalstabswerk_) = German General Staff account of the Franco-German War (unless otherwise indicated). I. D. R. = Infantry Drill Regulations. I. F. R. = Infantry Firing Regulations.
g. = gram = 15,432 troy grains. kg. = kilogram = 1000 g. = 2.2 lbs. kgm. = a unit of work accomplished in raising a kilogram through a meter against the force of gravity. m. = meter = 39.37 in. km. = kilometer = 1000 m. or ⁵⁄₈ mile. x = pace.
INTRODUCTION.
1. WAR.
Clausewitz, in his work _On War_, defines war as “a continuation of state policy by other means; an act of violence committed to force the opponent to comply with our will.” The civil code is incapable of furnishing full satisfaction to individuals in cases of outraged honor, and is obliged, under certain circumstances, to allow the injured party to obtain such satisfaction by immediate chastisement of the offender or by challenging him to a duel. In like manner there is no law which could afford nations complete satisfaction for affronts to their honor; and it is obvious that it would be as impossible to abolish war in the world, in the family of nations, as it would be to abolish dueling among the subjects of a state. The total abolition of dueling would produce the same results on the life of the individual that the cessation of wars would produce on the development of the national life of every state and on the intercourse of nations with one another. “Eternal peace,” wrote Moltke on December 11th, 1880, to Professor Bluntschli, “is a dream, and not even a beautiful one; for war is a part of God’s system in ruling the universe. In war, man develops the highest virtues; courage and unselfishness, devotion to duty and self-sacrifice even to death. Without war the world would stagnate in materialism.” Treitschke ventured a similar opinion in 1869.[1] “Every nation, especially a refined and cultured one, is apt to lapse into effeminacy and selfishness during a protracted period of peace. The unlimited comfort enjoyed by society causes not only the downfall of the state but destroys at the same time all those ideals which make life worth living. Narrow provincialism or selfish and worldly activity, looking only toward the gratification of all desires of the individual, undermines the foundations of a higher moral philosophy and the belief in ideals. Fools arrive at the vain conclusion that the life object of the individual is acquisition and enjoyment; that the purpose of the state is simply to facilitate the business affairs of its citizens; that man is appointed by an all-wise providence to buy cheaply and to sell at a profit; they conclude that war, which interferes with man’s activities, is the greatest evil, and that modern armies are only a sorry remnant of mediaeval barbarism. * * * It proves a positive blessing to such a generation if fate commits it to a great and righteous war, and the more it has become attached to the comfortable habits of mere social existence, the more violent the reaction which rouses it to warlike deeds in the service of the state. * * *” “The moment the state calls, ‘My life, my existence is at stake,’ there is aroused in a free people that highest of all virtues, the courage of self-sacrifice, which can never exist in time of peace nor be developed to such an extent by peaceful pursuits. Millions are united in the one thought--the fatherland; they are animated by that common sentiment of devotion unto death--patriotism--which, once experienced, is never again forgotten, and which ennobles and hallows the life of a whole generation. * * *” The greatness of war lies in those very phases which an effeminate civilization deems impious. “A great nation must be powerful,” exclaimed Scherr, in 1870.[2] “That is not only its duty, but its nature. If opposition is encountered, a nation is not only permitted to force a way for its righteous cause and resort to war, but it is its duty to do so. War always has been, and, so long as men and nations exist on the earth, it always will be, the _ultima ratio_.”
[1] _Das konstitutionelle Königtum in Deutschland_, in _Historische und politische Aufsätze_, New edition, II.
[2] _Das grosze Jahr_, in _Hammerschläge und Historien_.
Since war is the _ultima ratio_ of state policy, and as a sovereign state must insist on absolute independence in determining its affairs and its course of action, it follows that the verdict of a court of arbitration, on the larger and more serious questions, can have a decisive influence on the action of the contending parties only if the arbitrator possesses the power to enforce his decision, and is embued with a determination to use that power. Thus the Pope was able to arbitrate the question of right between Germany and Spain as to the possession of the Caroline Islands, but a like verdict could never decide the question of might between Germany and France as to the possession of Alsace-Lorraine.[3]
[3] The constitution of the old German Confederation provided for a settlement of disputes arising among its members; this verdict was to be enforced by summary proceedings when necessary. The war of 1866 proved that the paragraphs of the constitution mentioned, of necessity had to fail the moment the vital interests of two powerful states came into conflict. See VON LETTOW-VORBECK, _Geschichte des Krieges von 1866_, I, p. 115.
The utopian plans for a universal international court of arbitration are chimerical and conjured up by idealists unacquainted with the harsh facts of reality, if their ideas are not, indeed--as are many proposals for disarmament--calculated to serve as a cloak for ambitious plans.
If diplomatic means do not suffice to adjust a dispute, then the question of right between two states at once becomes a question of might. But the existence of a spirit of fair play is taken into account nevertheless, for each party to the controversy will seek to have the justice of its cause recognized. The moral support engendered by fighting for a just cause is so great that no state is willing to dispense with it.[4] This circumstance, coupled with the growing power of public opinion and with the influence of representative government, has contributed to reduce the number of wars. Wars between cabinets, like those in the days of Louis XIV., are no longer possible. As a result of the universal liability to service, the whole nation takes part in a war; every class of society suffers and has its pursuits interfered with; everything presses to an early decision, to a prompt crushing of the opponent.
[4] “If princes wish war they proceed to make war and then send for an industrious jurist who demonstrates that it is therefore right.” FREDERICK II.
“Every war is just which is necessary and every battle holy in which lies our last hope.” MACHIAVELLI, _Il Principe_.
This is attained by defeating the enemy’s forces, by occupying the hostile country and seizing the enemy’s sources of supply, so that he will be convinced of the futility of further resistance. (Campaigns of 1859, 1866, and 1870-71). Only in the rarest cases will it be necessary to continue the war until the power of resistance of the hostile state is completely destroyed. (American Civil War). The extent to which the enemy’s power of resistance may have to be crippled or broken, in order to compel peace, depends upon his tenacity. Political considerations will also have to be taken into account in answering this question. From the military point of view, however, the purpose of every war will always be the complete overthrow of the enemy.
2. STRATEGY AND TACTICS.
Precise definitions of strategy and tactics, clearly fixing the scope of each, have been vainly sought in the past. That efforts in this direction have led to no results is only natural, as tactics and strategy are complementary subjects that often encroach upon each other, while grand tactics is frequently identical with strategy.
Von Bülow, the author of _The Spirit of Modern Warfare_ (1798)[5], calls those movements strategical which are made outside the enemy’s sphere of information. Von Willisen considers strategy the science of communications, tactics the science of fighting. Von Clausewitz calls strategy the science of the use of battles for the purpose of the war (Jomini: “_l’art de diriger les armées sur les théatres d’opérations_”)[6], tactics the science of the use of military forces in battle (Jomini: “_l’art de diriger les troupes sur les champs de bataille_”).[7][8] General von Horsetzki (1892) defines strategy as the study of the conditions necessary for success in war. Archduke Charles calls strategy the “science of war” and tactics the “art of war”. Frederick the Great and Napoleon always employed the term “_l’art de guerre_” instead of the term “_strategy_”. None of these definitions are comprehensive enough, because they do not cover marches, outposts, the supply service, and enterprises in minor tactics. Professor Delbrück’s definition is much more appropriate: “Strategy is the science of utilizing military resources for the attainment of the object of the war, tactics the art of leading troops into and in battle.” Thiers, the French historian, instead of seeking to define strategy and tactics, contents himself with explaining the problems of each: “_Le stratège doit concevoir le plan de campagne, embrasser d’un seul coup d’oeil tout le théatre présumé de la guerre, tracer lignes d’opérations et diriger les masses sur les points décisifs. Le tacticien a pour mission de régler l’ordre de leurs marches, de les disposer en bataille aux différents points, indiqués par le stratège, d’engager l’action, de la soutenir et de manoeuvrer pour atteindre le but proposé._”[9] Fieldmarshal Moltke calls strategy “the application of common sense to the conduct of war.”[10] For practical purposes it is sufficient to define strategy as the _science of the conduct of war_, tactics as the _science of troop-leading_. Strategy brings about the decision on the theater of war, while the duty of carrying it out, in the manner desired by the commander-in-chief, devolves upon tactics. Thus the strategical idea culminates on the battlefield. The concentric advance of the Prussian armies into Bohemia in 1866 naturally led to a complete envelopment of the Austrians on the field of Königgrätz. The German attack in the battle on the Hallue, Dec. 23rd, 1870, was based on the strategical requirement of driving the French from their line of retreat leading to Arras and Bapaume, by enveloping their right flank. The attempts made by the 15th Infantry Division, which was holding the enemy in front, to envelop the left wing of the French, interfered with the execution of the correct strategical plan. Thus, in following up a success, in itself quite unimportant (the capture of Bussy), the leading basic principle was forgotten. The same thing happened here that Moltke censured in his official report on the war of 1866, wherein he stated: “The higher commanders have not been able to make their influence felt down to the subordinate grades. Frequently, as soon as the divisions and brigades have come in contact with the enemy, all control over them has entirely ceased.”
[5] _Geist des neueren Kriegssystems._
[6] “The art of directing armies In the theater of operations.”
[7] “The art of directing troops on the field of battle.”
[8] “Everything affecting the use of troops in battle and the regulation of their activity with reference to battle, has been included in the term ‘tactics’, while the term strategy is synonymous with ‘generalship,’ exclusive of such matters as fall into the domain of tactics.” BLUME, _Strategie_, p. 33.
“Tactics teaches _how_, and strategy _why_, one should fight.” General V. SCHERFF.
Strategy determines direction and objective of the movement of armies, while the manner of execution belongs to tactics.
[9] “Strategy should devise the plan of campaign, take in with a comprehensive glance the entire probable theater of war, establish the lines of operations and direct the masses on the decisive points.
“It is the mission of the tactician to decide upon the order of march of the troops, to form them for battle at the various points determined by strategy, to begin the action, to sustain it, and to maneuver so as to attain the desired end.” THIERS.
[10] V. MOLTKE, _Tactical Problems, No. 58_ (1878) p. 133.
Archduke Charles considered the subordination of tactics to strategy a law. “Tactics should execute the conceptions of strategy; where the two come in conflict, where strategical considerations are opposed to tactical interests, the strategical considerations should, as a rule, take precedence. Tactics must occupy a subordinate place and attempt to neutralize existing disadvantages by skillful dispositions.” Clausewitz not unjustly censures Archduke Charles for placing advantages of terrain in the first rank, and for failing to attach the proper importance to the annihilation of the hostile forces. Should the demands of strategy conflict with those of tactics on the battlefield, the latter must unquestionably take precedence, since the general’s foremost thought must be the annihilation of the hostile forces. Tactical considerations should likewise govern in the selection of the direction of attack in a battle, strategical reasons for striking in this or that direction becoming effective only after the attainment of tactical success. It is true that strategy, by directing the armies and their concentration on the battlefield, provides tactics with the tools for fighting and assures the probability of victory; but, on the other hand, the commander-in-chief appropriates the fruits of each victory and makes them the basis for further plans. “The demands of strategy are silent in the presence of tactical victory; they adapt themselves to the newly created situation.” Fieldmarshal MOLTKE.[11]
[11] The view that the direction of attack should be governed by the possibility of easy execution in minor warfare only, is held by General v. Scherff, who says: “General v. Moltke was not influenced by the question ‘will the attack here or there be tactically easier or more difficult?’ Only the question, ‘will it there be strategically advantageous or not’ was able to determine his course with reference to measures on the battlefield.”
3. THE METHOD OF INSTRUCTION.
While Archduke Charles considers mathematical axioms the basis of the higher art of war, military history is for us the principal source from which to gather knowledge.[12]
[12] See lecture by Prince HOHENLOHE: _Kriegserfahrung und Kriegsgeschichte_, Neisse, 1879.
“Let my son often read and meditate upon history; it is the only true philosophy. Let him often read and meditate upon the wars of the great captains; it is the only means of learning the art of war.” NAPOLEON I., on April 17th, 1821.
“Past events are useful to feed the imagination and furnish the memory, provided their study is the repetition of ideas that judgment should pass upon.” FREDERICK THE GREAT.
In military history we have a guide by which, if we lack personal experience in war, we can test the results of our reflections and of our experience on the drillground. Military history moreover enables us to appreciate those controlling factors which, in map problems, do not appear at all, and which, in exercises on the terrain, appear only in a restricted measure. One must learn the conduct of war from the experience of others; one’s own experience is costly and is almost invariably gained too late. That experience in war, of itself, is not sufficient (aside from the fact that it is gained too late in a given case) is illustrated by the defeat of the Austrians in 1866, of the French in 1870-71, and of the British in South Africa. “_Les Autrichiens_,” says Colonel Foch,[13] “_ont fait la guerre sans la comprendre, les Prussiens l’ont compris sans la faire, mais ils l’ont étudiée._” “Military history is neither a compilation of clever theories nor a book designed for whiling away idle moments. It is, on the contrary, a careful teacher, who, if we are attentive, allows us to view and grasp matters which we have never before been in a position to see, but which, nevertheless, are liable to confront us in the same, a similar, or a changed form, and demand unpremeditated, instant and decisive action, entailing heavy responsibilities. Military history, it is true, offers us, in the first instance, only events and their outline, conditions and phenomena, but it also presents, what the cleverest theory is unable to furnish, a graphic illustration of the disturbing elements in war, an illustration of the influences, doubts, embarrassments, unforeseen accidents, surprises and delays. It describes the course pursued by commanders and by practical military common sense in surmounting these difficulties. It prepares in advance the mental balance necessary at the moment of action; it should prepare also for the unexpected. It affords a substitute for lack of military experience, for the accumulation of which the life of the individual, prior to the moment of action, has been too short.”[14] The pedantic enumeration of a few examples in support of a stated opinion cannot suffice. It should not be difficult to find examples from military history in support of any opinion; frequently even an incorrect tactical contention can be vindicated by such examples. For in war the action taken is as often wrong as correct; the scales are turned by factors which in most cases appear indistinctly or not at all. The experiences of military history must, therefore, only be used with caution if tactical lessons are to be drawn from them. “A mere allusion to historical events,” says Clausewitz in his chapter on examples, “has the further disadvantage that some readers are either not sufficiently acquainted with these events, or remember them too imperfectly to enter into the author’s ideas, so that such students are compelled to accept his statements blindly or to remain unconvinced. It is, of course, very difficult to describe historical events as they ought to be described if they are to be used as proofs, for authors usually lack the means, as well as the time and space, necessary for such descriptions. We maintain, however, that in establishing a new or a doubtful view, a single event, thoroughly described, is more instructive than a mere allusion to ten. The principal evil resulting from a superficial reference to historical events does not lie in the fact that the author cites them incorrectly in support of his theory, but in the fact that he has never become thoroughly acquainted with those events. In consequence of such a superficial, haphazard treatment of history, a hundred erroneous views and theoretical projects are created, which would never have appeared if the author had been compelled to deduce, from a careful analysis of the connected facts in the case, what he publishes and wishes to support by historical proofs. If we have convinced ourselves of the above outlined difficulties attending the employment of historical examples, and appreciate the necessity for thoroughness in their treatment, we will come to the conclusion that the more recent military history is the most natural source from which to select examples, inasmuch as recent history alone is sufficiently known and analyzed.”[15] The events from military history mentioned in this work are cited simply as proofs of certain phenomena; the proper analysis of these proofs must be left to the student.
[13] _Principes de la Guerre_, 1903.
“The Austrians,” says Colonel Foch, “made war without understanding it; the Germans understood war without making it; but they studied it.”
[14] From _Meinungen und Mahnungen_, Vienna, 1894.
[15] _On War_, II, Chapter 6, p. 111.
See also CLAUSEWITZ’ remarks on “_Criticism_,” II, Chapter 5.
The applicatory method[16] is used frequently by preference as the system of instruction, but its creator, General von Verdy du Vernois, considers it merely a complement of the deductive method, on which it is predicated and based. “The weakness of the whole applicatory system of instruction lies in the fact that a textbook based upon it, although written by a master hand, can portray only isolated examples, and that these, studied again and again, soon lose their value in the same manner as a maneuver terrain that has become too well known. For, although we ordinarily find principles represented in a connected form, this method of instruction can only convey them in a fragmentary manner in connection with the details of the events described.”[17] The success of the applicatory method depends largely upon the individuality of the instructor, and owes its charm to the personal intercourse between teacher and pupil. Only an expert, who possesses a thorough professional knowledge, who is master of his subject, and who has the faculty of presenting it skillfully, will be able to produce imaginary scenes which faithfully represent reality and are free from objectionable features. By constant practice with specific cases, under the most diverse situations, the nature of war may in this way be taught and initiative developed as well as facility acquired in issuing appropriate, clear, and concise orders. One danger of using nothing but the applicatory method must be noted. The instructor, as representative of a definite theory, finds it comparatively easy to select the conditions governing a specific case in such a way that the theory which he represents necessarily appears to be the correct one. This is especially true when the director of an applicatory problem determines the action of the opposing side. The two methods (the applicatory, or inductive, and the deductive) must be so supplemented that the lesson in tactics clearly illustrates the purpose and object of a tactical operation and allows of the attainment of a thorough knowledge of the means necessary to gain that object.[18] “He who is able to understand the situation, has a definite purpose in view, and knows the means with which to carry out that purpose, will, by a simple mental operation, arrive in each particular case at an appropriate decision, and will be able, furthermore, to carry out that decision, provided he does not lose his head. If a clear comprehension of the purpose in view and of the means for carrying out that purpose lie within the sphere of theory, the estimate of the situation and the decision are governed by the circumstances of the particular case. Should the training in this direction lie outside the sphere of theory, it will logically belong to the domain of the applicatory method of instruction. The two methods must, therefore, supplement each other.
[16] See KÜHNE, _Kritische Wanderungen_, 4 and 5, Preface p. 5.
[17] VON BOGUSLAWSKI, _Entwickelung der Taktik_, II, p. 17.
[18] “When one attempts to establish a principle, immediately a great number of officers, imagining that they are solving the question, at once cry out: ‘Everything depends on circumstances; according to the wind must the sails be set.’ But if you do not know beforehand which sail is proper for such and such a wind, how can you set the sail according to the wind?” BUGEAUD, _Aperçus sur quelques détails de guerre_.
If the decision is to culminate in action, strength of character is required, providing the determination to execute, in spite of unavoidable difficulties, what has been recognized as proper, and also the professional ability necessary to carry out the determination to its logical conclusion. All that theory can do toward forming this character is to emphasize its importance and to refer students to military history. The applicatory method, however, can develop strength of character by compelling the student to form decisions under pressure of a specified time limit (in solving problems) or by subjecting him to the influences of certain situations such as would be encountered in war (maneuvers). The means available in tactical instruction in time of peace, for the development of strength of character, are, however, very limited when compared with the great demands made by the abnormal conditions of war, so out of all proportion to those of peace. This should be thoroughly understood, lest we overestimate the value of these means as well as the results to be obtained from them in times of peace.
After theory has fulfilled its mission of clearly indicating the purpose and object of an operation, as well as the means by which it may be attained, and applicatory practice has performed its office of developing initiative and professional skill, a third factor is still necessary--the study of military history. From this fountain of knowledge both “theory” and “applicatory method” must draw their material; to this source they must again and again refer in order to guard against erroneous ideas of their own creation, which are often as different from reality as day is from night.”[19]
[19] F. C. V. H. (_Fieldmarshal Lieutenant General_ CONRAD V. HÖTZENDORF, Chief of Staff of the Austro-Hungarian Army). _Zum Studium der Taktik_, p. 2.
Viewed as the science of the leading and employment of troops, tactics may be divided into two parts:
1. =Formal tactics=, or that contained in drill regulations. This portion of tactics furnishes the formations used by troops when assembled, on the march, and in action, and contains the regulations governing the conduct in battle of troops acting alone without regard to the coöperation of the other arms, and without reference to the terrain.
2. =Applied tactics=[20] deals with the combined action of the several arms on the march, in camp, and in action, taking into account influences of the terrain, seasons, and the time of day in field warfare. Fortress warfare should, strictly speaking, be included under this heading; that is to say, the employment of tactical principles[21] pertaining to the mobile arms, in conjunction with foot-artillery and technical troops on a prepared battlefield. The principles are the same in field and fortress warfare; the only difference between them lies in the employment of the means necessitated by the preparation of a field of battle in time of peace. Military history shows that a clear distinction between field and fortress warfare is impossible. (Sebastopol, Düppel, Plevna, and Port Arthur).
[20] V. BOGUSLAWSKI, _Entwickelung der Taktik_, II, Chapter 23. “The higher, Grand Tactics, is the Initiation and conduct of battles--subordinate, or minor tactics, is the manner of fighting, or the battle-tactics of an arm considered in its details.”
[21] MAJOR GUNDELACH, _Exerzierreglement und Festungskrieg_, Berlin, 1908.
4. DRILL REGULATIONS.
Drill regulations are the accumulation of the tactical views and lessons of a certain period. They illustrate the tactical condition which becomes perceptible at the moment of a certain development of the fighting tools as represented by man and weapons. Man, in his peculiarities, in his weaknesses, is the constant. He constitutes the psychological element, inseparable from the science of combat, and as such is the definitely given magnitude; the effect of weapons, however, appears always as the variable factor. New weapons, therefore, necessitate new tactics.
It will be observed also “that changes of tactics have not only taken place _after_ changes in weapons, which necessarily is the case, but that the interval between such changes has been unduly long. This doubtless arises from the fact that an improvement of weapons is due to the energy of one or two men, while changes in tactics have to overcome the inertia of a conservative class; but it is a great evil. It can be remedied only by a candid recognition of each change.”[22] The history of the tactics of the 19th Century furnishes more than one instructive example of the magnitude of such “obstinate conservatism.”
[22] MAHAN, _The Influence of Sea Power upon History_, pp. 9 and 10.
It is a marked peculiarity of manuals of instruction, that, no matter with what far-sightedness such regulations may have been originally compiled, they become antiquated in a comparatively short time. Napoleon estimated this period at ten years. Frequent changes are certainly not desirable, if tactical development is not to be interfered with and if inconveniences are to be avoided in organizing our mobile army from our peace organizations, Reservists, and Landwehr. On the other hand, the regulations must keep abreast of requirements if the conditions to which they owe their existence have changed. In his “Military Fantasies” the Prince de Ligne wrote in 1783: “An article which should be added to all drill regulations, and which, I know not why, is omitted, is: ‘Act sometimes contrary to the regulations.’ It is just as necessary to teach that one must act contrary to the regulations, as to teach the disorder of troops as it will occur in action.”
It is always dangerous to be behind the times, as troops thereby relinquish a superiority previously possessed over others, which knowledge they must later purchase, with streams of blood, in the face of hostile bullets. Of what avail, to the Austrians in 1866, to the Russians in 1877, were all their valiant assaults, made with tactical formations that had outlived their usefulness in the face of newer weapons, although made with the firm determination to conquer?
The self-sacrificing spirit and firmly rooted discipline of the troops found an insurmountable obstacle in the rapid fire of unshaken infantry. The war experiences of our regiments show that bullets quickly write a new tactics, demolish superannuated formations and create new ones. But at what a sacrifice![23] In the Franco-German war, superior leadership and a better artillery permitted us to pay this price for the lesson. But how an army fares when it lacks these auxiliaries is shown by the British experiences in South Africa. The initial failure of accustomed tactical formations causes a dread of the frontal attack and finally leads some tacticians to deny entirely even the feasibility of such an attack. In peace training, therefore, set forms are of less importance; stress should be laid on developing the faculty of adaptation to changing conditions of combat and terrain.
[23] It is frequently customary on the outbreak of a war to issue “Instructions for campaign,” in order to prepare troops, trained according to superannuated regulations, for action on a strange theater of war. It is desirable to disseminate the first experiences gained in action to all parts of the army. We failed to do this in 1870, and all organizations were therefore compelled to gain this experience for themselves. Even as late as the 18th of August, 1870, the Füsilier Battalion of the 85th Infantry advanced in double column formed on the center, although the campaign in Bohemia had already demonstrated that this formation was out of date. See MOLTKE, _Feldzug von 1859_, p. 65.
Further development and justification of the principles of the drill regulations, and the modification of those principles under certain assumptions, are reserved to the science of tactics. Drill regulations should not be textbooks of tactics, but, on the other hand, a textbook of tactics should deal with formations only in so far as that is necessary to ensure a clear comprehension of the fundamental principles.
“Regulations and the science of combat are in a certain sense very different subjects. The regulations are law, authority--no doubt can be entertained on this point; but that also invests them with the character of something fixed, at least for a certain space of time. They cannot be kept up to date so as to meet quickly enough the rapidly changing and ever growing demands of modern combat: that would indeed be an unfair requirement, impossible of realization. Here must enter the science of combat, which should be independent in every direction, which should know no fixed rules, and which should point to no other authority than that of truth and reality. It is not the province of the science of combat, like that of regulations, to retain that which is in keeping with prevailing views and forms; it must take into consideration the fleeting theory and practice, ever developing and changing anew.”[24]
[24] KEIM, _Gegenwärtiger Stand der Gefechtslehre_, p. 1.
A positive system of tactics will therefore be based upon one’s own drill regulations, from the standpoint of which it will investigate and compare the principles of the service manuals of the different powers, and finally develop the science still further by the aid of experience gained from military history and the knowledge of the effect of weapons. While these are the ever changing but nevertheless measurable factors of tactical reflection, a third, perhaps the most important factor, must be added, viz., that the leader must reckon with the action of men frequently exposed to the influence of great exertions and great mental agitation. _A doctrine of tactics which does not properly appreciate the psychological element stagnates in lifeless pedantry._
THE FORMAL TACTICS OF INFANTRY.
I. ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT.
1. THE IMPORTANCE AND EMPLOYMENT OF INFANTRY.
In all modern armies infantry is, in virtue of its numbers and importance, the principal arm. Since the introduction of firearms, infantry has gradually increased in importance and numbers as compared with the other arms.
In the Thirty Years’ war, the proportion of cavalry to infantry was as 1:1, or 1:2, and frequently the cavalry even predominated. In the Swedish army one gun per 1,000 men was considered sufficient. During the era of linear tactics in the 18th Century the proportion between the two principal arms had become as 1:2 and 1:3; in the Napoleonic wars as 1:6 and 1:8. The number of guns was increased to 4 per 1,000 men. In the course of a campaign the ratio changes to the disadvantage of infantry. At the outbreak of the war of 1870-71, the relative proportions of the three arms in the German IInd Army were as follows: cavalry to infantry as 1:8; and 3.4 guns per 1,000 men. The proportion between the two principal arms in the IIIrd Army Corps of the German army, at the outbreak of the Franco-German war, was as 1:18.8; on the first day of the battle of Le Mans it was as 1:16.6; at the opening of the campaign there were 4.6 guns per 1,000 men, at the close of the campaign 5.8 guns per 1,000 men. This was still more marked in the Ist Bavarian Army Corps, which, on October 31st, had 5.8 guns and on December 9th even 11.1 guns per 1,000 men. At present Germany has approximately 6, and France 3.63 guns per 1,000 infantry.
The manner in which infantry fights imprints its distinguishing mark on the tactics of an entire period; thus, according to the combat formations of infantry, we may speak of a period of “linear,” “column,” and “extended order” tactics. Infantry can be equipped more cheaply and trained more quickly than the other arms. In July, 1870, the French army consisted of 116 infantry regiments and 21 rifle battalions, but 38 rifle battalions were raised in addition to a large number of regiments of _gardes mobiles_ and volunteers.
Infantry is as well adapted for combat with firearms as for combat with the bayonet, for attack as for defense, for action in close as in extended order. It can fight on any terrain which is at all passable, and is more independent of weather and seasons than the other arms; it surpasses the other arms in endurance, a man, on account of his will power, bearing privations and exertions better than a horse. On the other hand, the losses suffered by foot troops in action and through exertions on the march are greater than those of the mounted arms.[25]
[25] Percentages of cases of sickness in the campaign 1870/71:
Infantry: 69.8; Field Officers: 13.26; Captains: 10.19; Lieutenants: 3.85% Artillery: 57.7; „ „ 4.04; „ 4.84; Lieutenants: 4.52„ Cavalry: 37.5; „ „ 5.61; „ 2.29; Lieutenants: 3.24„
The rate of march of infantry is so slow that in reconnaissance it can only by great exertions attain results which a small force of cavalry would obtain without appreciable effort. Infantry acting alone therefore unquestionably requires the assignment of mounted men for reconnaissance and messenger duty. As regards reconnaissance, infantry is like a man walking in the dark, who can guard against collisions only by stretching out his hand and feeling his way.
The lack of artillery support will also make itself felt when infantry encounters fire at ranges at which it is defenseless, owing to the limited range of its rifle. Infantry cannot dispense with artillery when it has to attack localities or fortified points in villages.
The infantry of the 19th Century fell heir to the distinction made in the 18th Century between heavy infantry (infantry of the line) and light infantry, the latter being employed only in skirmish duty and in the service of security. In the 18th Century the expensive method of recruiting by means of bounties made it necessary to avoid using troops in indecisive, costly fire actions, and to preserve the expensive personnel for decisive shock action _en masse_. Skirmishing was left to volunteer battalions, to Jägers, and to Füsiliers. In Prussia the number of Füsilier battalions was increased to 24 at the close of the 18th Century. Napoleon I. was, on principle, opposed to the theory of light infantry. He demanded but one species of infantry, “a good infantry.” In spite of this, however, he became the originator of an _élite_ infantry, when, for reasons of discipline, he created one _voltigeur_ and one _grenadier_ company in each battalion. While battalion tactics predominated, _i.e._, until the close of the campaign of 1866, this arrangement was imitated in most states. At the time of the Russo-Turkish war, Russia still had in each battalion a fifth company, one of sharpshooters, which, though not recruited at the expense of the other companies, was formed of better material and received special training in extended order fighting. Following the example set by Austria, Prussia, in 1812, designated the third rank principally for extended order fighting, by forming it into a third platoon in each company when in action. This was called the sharpshooters’ platoon and was composed of the best shots and the most skillful men of the company. As late as the campaign of 1866 there were instances of the employment of the combined sharpshooter platoons of a battalion. Here we have an actual _élite_ force assembled in provisional organizations, not at the expense of the rest of the troops, however.
The system of column tactics, which required that every company should be equally skilled in extended order fighting, led to the abolishment of _élite_ companies. The Prussian _élite_, consisting of the platoons formed from the third rank, although not always compatible with the employment of company columns, was not abolished until 1876. The experience of the Franco-German war had shown that, in view of the extensive use of extended order formations, an independent employment of single platoons was out of the question, as in the course of an action the firing line absorbs not only entire companies, but regiments and brigades; and, moreover, that every platoon, as a unit for fire action, must possess those elements which will carry it forward even after its leader has fallen.
Napoleon formed his Guards by selecting men and officers from the entire army for use as a battle reserve. By granting them privileges and by loading them with distinctions, he attached them to his person, and they assumed the character of household troops of a dynasty.
The Prussian and Russian Guards are differently constituted. They are not, strictly speaking, _corps d’élite_, for they are not selected from the ranks of the army. While it is true that the Prussian Guard receives a better class of recruits and the composition of its corps of officers and the selection of its commanders guarantee conspicuous results, its principal superiority lies in the fact that it serves constantly under the eye of the emperor.
Since the introduction of accurate breechloading weapons, and their use by all infantry, Jägers and riflemen have no tactical excuse for existing, except where they are specially trained in mountain warfare (_Chasseurs alpins_, _Alpini_)[26], or where they are intended to serve as a support for cavalry divisions. (France). While Jäger-battalions are at present employed like the rest of the infantry, they are retained by us as such because of tradition and for reasons of organization (they are recruited from forestry personnel), and an attempt is made in their tactical employment to turn their excellent marksmanship and skill in the use of ground to good account whenever possible. Jägers will be employed in defense, preferably for holding important points, and for combat and service of security on difficult terrain. Military experience has shown, however, that in actual war it was seldom possible to take advantage of these special characteristics; that in most cases the Jägers were used as other infantry, and that infantry units fighting shoulder to shoulder with Jägers accomplished as good results as the latter. Since the war of 1866 the demand for special employment of Jägers has ceased. The brief course of the campaign of 1866, in which our infantry acted mostly on the offensive, gave the Jägers an opportunity for profitable employment only where, contrary to accepted notions, they fought side by side with the rest of the infantry.[27]
[26] See _Über Gebirgstruppen_, VI, p. 273, and also _Schweizerische Monatsschrift für Offiziere aller Waffen_, 1907, May to July.
V. GRAEVENITZ, _Beiheft zum Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1903.
[27] The 6th Jäger-Battalion on July 3rd at Sendrasitz; the 4th Jäger-Battalion at Podol; the 5th at Skalitz; the Jägers of the Guard at Lipa; or where during an action a reverse threw us on the defensive (1st Jäger-Battalion at Trautenau, and also at Rosberitz). The superior commanders, in attempting to assign them a special role, frequently employed them unprofitably in taking up rallying positions (3rd, 7th, and 8th Jäger-Battalions on July 3rd), sometimes even to escort baggage (3rd and 4th Companies of the Jägers of the Guard at Soor; and the 1st and 4th Companies of the 5th Jäger-Battalion at Schweinschädel); or they distributed them along the whole front for the purpose of conducting extended order fighting. When they were thus distributed among infantry organizations their efforts merged with those of the infantry.
For example, at Königgrätz half companies of Jägers were posted on both flanks of the Guard Infantry Division, and the 2nd Jäger-Battalion was on this day distributed by companies along the front of the entire division.
V. MOLTKE, _Kritische Aufsätze zur Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1866_.
KUNZ, _Die Tätigkeit der deutschen Jäger-Bataillone im Kriege 1870/71_. On page 169, et seq., a number of excellent examples are recorded (for instance: 5th Prussian Jäger-Battalion in the actions on November 29th and 30th, 1870, and on January 19th, 1871, in siege positions in front of Paris).
Mountain warfare presents such difficult problems to troops, requires a sum total of endurance, energy and intelligence, physical qualifications and special familiarity, that neither every recruit nor every unit of the army will quite fulfill all its demands, although the experience of Suworov, during his campaign in the Alps, apparently contradicts this statement. Many disadvantages can be neutralized by peace training and discipline, of course, but training alone will not suffice. For overcoming the difficulties peculiar to mountain warfare, a suitable equipment permitting free movement, and at the same time ensuring the comfort of the men while at rest, is necessary. The lack of such mountain equipment is keenly felt even during short exercises lasting only a few days. Even Switzerland plans at present the formation of three mountain brigades. Austria already has special mountain brigades assembled for mountain warfare in its Kaiser-Jäger, Rural Riflemen, and also in the troops of Bosnia and Dalmatia. The Italian _Alpini_ (consisting of 22 battalions in time of peace, to which militia companies are attached on mobilization, and which have in addition a reserve of 22 territorial companies) form a selected corps which is doubtless capable of accomplishing excellent results. The Italians propose to attach machine guns to these units. It is worthy of note that these troops carry explosives. In France the troops garrisoned in the Alpine districts are divided into thirteen groups, each consisting of one battalion, one mountain battery, one engineer company, and machine guns.
As modern fire effect makes it impossible for mounted officers to direct the firing line, it was natural to use the more improved means of communication, the telephone and telegraph, in addition to the visual signals employed by the navy.
The improvements made in weapons have had a further influence on the transformation of the infantry. Even a small force of infantry can with its magazine fire inflict annihilating losses in a very short time on closed bodies offering favorable targets, especially when this fire is delivered from a flanking position. This requires, on the one hand, that greater attention be paid during combat to local reconnaissance, which can be but imperfectly made by mounted officers with the troops, and, on the other hand, it necessitates the employment of smaller independent detachments for our own security and for harassing the enemy. Intimately connected herewith is the introduction of machine guns, possessing great mobility, which enables them to take advantage of rapidly passing moments for pouring a heavy fire on the enemy and also for reinforcing the independent cavalry in advance of the army.
In England it was decided to form mounted infantry charged with the additional duty of augmenting the fire of a cavalry division, and of furnishing the commander-in-chief with a reserve possessing the requisite mobility to permit its being thrown to any threatened point of the long battle lines of today. But of what importance is the fire of a single battalion in the large armies of the present day? The principal drawback to the employment of mounted infantry is, however, that, when mounted, it is defenseless against cavalry, and that, while in motion, it really needs a supporting force. In the Boer war the mounted infantry grew finally to a strength of 50,000 men. As it was not confronted by cavalry, it made good during the execution of wide turning movements, which Lord Roberts employed with success for the purpose of striking the flank of the Boers, who always rapidly extended their lines. In spite of these good services, it could not be denied that mounted infantry had many faults. The men knew nothing of the care of their mounts, as is evidenced by the large percentage of horses which became unserviceable. As mounted infantry units were improvised bodies, they lacked the requisite training in marching and tactical employment. After the war had lasted for some time, the mounted infantrymen, however, had completely forgotten their infantry character and deported themselves like cavalrymen, even if only as poor ones. Thus, we find toward the close of the campaign numerous attacks made by mounted infantry on the British side, as, strange to relate, also on that of the Boers.
In this experiment of creating mounted infantry, all those drawbacks which had been learned for centuries were exemplified. As an improvisation, mounted infantry disturbs the cohesion of organizations; if permanently organized, it must become cavalry, just as the dragoons became cavalry: for mounted infantry is neither flesh, fish, nor fowl and cannot endure.
The British Drill Regulations (1904) for mounted infantry lay down the following principles for its employment:
In the practical employment of mounted infantry, sight must not be lost of the fact that this arm is drilled and trained as infantry. On account of its greater mobility, it should be able to cover greater distances, and, in addition, be capable of executing wider turning movements than infantry. As a rule, mounted infantry is to be used in the following cases:
(a) It is to perform the service of security in the immediate front of infantry divisions in conjunction with cavalry and the horse batteries assigned to the latter, in addition to augmenting the fire of the cavalry. It is further to occupy, as expeditiously as possible, tactically important positions. It is to find positions from which it can bring fire, preferably flanking fire, to bear on the flanks of hostile cavalry before the actual combat begins. It is to improve every success gained and constitute a formed nucleus in case of a retreat. Moreover, mounted infantry should enable the cavalry divisions, far in advance of the army, to devote themselves exclusively to the strategical reconnaissance with which they are charged.
(b) In addition, the mounted infantry is to constitute a light mobile reserve which the commander-in-chief can despatch at a moment’s notice from one wing to the other for the purpose of lending assistance, or for influencing the action at particular points and for which other troops are not available on account of the extraordinary extension of modern lines of battle.
(c) Finally, mounted infantry is to fill the role of a mobile column in minor warfare or in expeditions in colonial wars, and in performing this duty assume the functions of the absent cavalry in the service of reconnaissance and patrolling.
The following is the organization and strength of mounted infantry organizations:
In war every infantry battalion is to furnish one company of mounted infantry, consisting of 5 officers, 138 men, and 144 horses; and every brigade (4 battalions) one battalion of four companies. To each battalion of mounted infantry is assigned: one machine gun platoon, consisting of two guns and two ammunition carts (2 officers, 40 men, and 54 horses). Hence the aggregate strength of a battalion of mounted infantry is: 28 officers, 630 men, and 676 horses.
The creation of mounted infantry is only proper where climatic conditions make long marches by European troops impossible, or in cases where the arrival of a few soldiers at distant points will exert a potent influence on the actions of an opponent. As shown by our experience in Southwest Africa, the proper field for mounted infantry is colonial (guerrilla) warfare, especially when it is important to prevent the outbreak of threatened disorders and to let the country return quickly to a state of peace upon completion of the principal actions. On European theaters of war, space is lacking for the employment of mounted infantry, and, moreover, there are not enough horses. In organizing mounted infantry, an auxiliary arm, which can be of use only occasionally, has been created at the expense of infantry and cavalry. The infantry itself should endeavor to meet all demands for local reconnaissance and communication, without weakening the cavalry for its principal duties, and without, in so doing, crippling its own fighting efficiency.
For the purpose of reconnaissance, patrols or scouting detachments are used. Their usefulness in difficult country and in enterprises against the enemy’s flank or rear cannot be denied. In minor operations, by advancing on side roads, they can hamper the enemy’s reconnaissance, secure the flanks of their own force, ascertain the probable extent of the prospective battlefield, and, finally, having gained a firm foothold, they can become very annoying to the hostile artillery. In a large battle the necessary elbow room for such employment is lacking. To form special organizations of picked men, as is done in Russia, is always of doubtful value. An organization cannot dispense with its best men in action; it needs them as group leaders and as substitutes for disabled non-commissioned officers. While everything goes without a hitch, the withdrawal of good men from an organization is of little importance; the drawbacks to this procedure become apparent, however, when heavy losses deplete the ranks, when the line begins to waver, when, in the absence of officers, only the example of courageous men prevents the weak-kneed from running away. Our regulations properly appreciate the importance of psychological impressions during critical combat situations; they state: “The man who feels his courage and coolness going, in the excitement of battle, should look toward his officers. Should they have fallen, he will find plenty of non-commissioned officers and brave privates whose example will revive his courage.” (Par. 268 German I. D. R.). If it becomes necessary to despatch a stronger infantry force on a mission of minor importance, it will usually be better to detail an entire company than to improvise a detachment whose leader would know his men only imperfectly. From the standpoint of training, scouting detachments have an entirely different value. They give young infantry officers, who are tied to a command, an opportunity to develop self-confidence, decision, and tactical judgment; to cope with hardships and difficulties on their own responsibility. In this manner characteristics may be developed in the young officers which will be of benefit to them in a large battle. It is obvious that scouts should be assigned bicycles to give them the mobility which infantry lacks.
If the roads are good, cyclists[28] will frequently be able to take the place of cavalry in messenger service. In this case they remain with their organizations and perform the same duties as the other soldiers. The employment of cyclists is in accord with the principle that in war every resource the country offers for warfare should be utilized. The advantage of the use of cyclists for messenger service and their value to the command generally is obvious; they are, in addition, adapted for reconnaissance work and for reinforcing the divisional cavalry. Cyclists, however, do not lend themselves to the formation of separate organizations for battle purposes (each division has 110 cyclists), for a large number of picked men would thereby be withdrawn from the ranks of the troops engaged. An improvised cyclist detachment would, in addition, accomplish very little, as it would lack the thorough peace training requisite for cohesive action as an organization. If the opinion is entertained that cyclist detachments could furnish substantial aid to the cavalry[29] in advance of the army, that they could be employed profitably in the supply districts and in minor operations, and, finally, if the available material in the country is to be utilized, nothing remains but to proceed to the creation of cyclist companies in time of peace. The material necessary for repairs and for ammunition supply can only be entrusted to permanent organizations. The advantages of cyclists are their great mobility,[30] their prompt readiness for firing, and, above all else, the noiselessness of their movements. Their weakness lies in their dependence upon a complicated machine, in the comparatively large road space taken up by them on the march (100 cyclists in column of twos take up about 250 to 300 m. road space), and in their dependence on the terrain. The last mentioned drawback can be remedied apparently only by the adoption of a folding wheel, but, since the cyclist’s equipment cannot be secured on the machine, it is better in difficult country to push the wheels or to leave them behind under guard when necessary.
[28] Pars. 78, 82, 86, 99, 101, 132, 151, 152, 194 and 200, GERMAN F. S. R.
[29] By occupying positions so as to give the cavalry freedom of action; by advancing ahead of the reconnoitering cavalry for the purpose of re-establishing contact with the enemy, of forestalling him in occupying important points, or of outflanking him: finally, by coöperating with cavalry in cavalry combats, in covering a retreat, in outpost duty, and during the execution of technical work.
[30] According to the _Italian Regulations of 1904_, the rate of march of cyclists is as follows: slow rate 8 km., maneuvering rate, 10-12 km., road speed, 12-17 km., accelerated rate of march, up to 20 km. per hour. Cyclists can ride up to 80 km., without long rests. For riding 90-100 km., from 5 to 6 hours are required.
In Italy, France, and England more has been done towards the formation of cyclist detachments than elsewhere. In Italy each _Bersaglieri_ Regiment has one company of cyclists, which is to be employed in supporting a cavalry brigade. Cyclists have accomplished a good deal in surmounting difficulties of the terrain. In England the development of cyclist bodies is left mostly to the volunteers and their exercises have demonstrated that such units are capable of expanding in a brief space of time.
In France the cyclist movement is led by Major Gerard, who rendered valuable service during a short maneuver of the cavalry division (1905). Opinions are as yet divided as to the advisability of forming cyclist battalions. Both Major Gerard and General Langlois are advocates of their employment. General Langlois desires to oppose the brutal German battle tactics with rapid maneuvers of mobile reserves which he would form of cyclist battalions, artillery, and cavalry.
According to the Cyclist Regulations dated September 10th, 1904, the cyclist company is to be looked upon as infantry, which is capable of moving at great speed, but is tied to the network of roads. The cyclist companies are principally intended for defensive action, holding an important point until the arrival of infantry. They are also to serve as support for cavalry and artillery, but are not adapted for reconnaissance work. Since it is difficult for them to secure their flanks on the march, they are to be used mainly in combination with other arms.
In winter campaigns, when wheel and horse cannot be used, recourse is had to the Canadian snowshoe (a web shoe) or to the Norwegian snowshoe or ski (skee). In France, Italy, Austria,[31] Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland marching on snowshoes is assiduously practiced, while in Germany the troops have so far done little in this line. The ski is, however, coming more and more into vogue among the rural population of the German mountains.
[31] One of the most remarkable snowshoe marches ever recorded is without doubt that made by the ski detachment of the 4th Regiment of Tirolese Kaiser-Jägers (Austria) stationed in Salzburg. In June, 1905, this detachment, consisting of 4 officers, 15 men and 4 guides, all with field equipment, marched around the base of the “Grosz Glockner,” via Mittersil, Felber-Tauern (elev. 2,500 m.), Windisch-Matrey, Lienz, Dolsack, Hochtor (elev. 2,570 m.), into the Fuscher valley, despite violent cyclonic snow storms, a journey which, even in mid-summer, can only be undertaken by experienced tourists. In several of these detachments experiments were made with white covers for uniform and equipment, which enabled individual men and patrols to approach unseen to within 200 to 300 m. of an opponent.
Deep snow is an effective obstacle for troops not equipped with snowshoes. This is not entirely due to the fact that the march is retarded, but to the unusual difficulties attending the service of security. Covering bodies are stalled. Besides, the difficulties of maintaining communication with neighboring detachments are increased when valleys or abrupt declivities intervene between the forces. The only remedy in such cases is to employ the snowshoe, upon which one can move rapidly without regard to roads, and up or down hill without difficulty. Patrols can be despatched to adequate distances from the marching body on skis alone. Ski-runners can perform the same duty which cavalry performs on the plain; for instance, they can occupy points in advance which are of importance to us, dispute crossings with the enemy, and hold him at bay. Ski detachments alone are able to reconnoiter the condition of roads and test the carrying power of snow in advance of a command, and they alone can furnish the connecting links in an extended outpost position, because they alone are able to move off the roads. During halts they furnish guards; in action they easily turn the enemy’s flanks, reconnoiter his weak points as well as the position of his reserves; and after the fight they maintain contact with him as patrols. They can hasten forward in advance of a command and prepare cantonments and bivouacs, and attend to the cooking.
The great depth of a detachment of ski-runners is a disadvantage. Each ski-runner takes up 2.20 m., and in addition a distance of 1 m. must be left between men. Besides, as the men are not all equally skilled in using skis, the road space taken up by a detachment of runners is increased considerably. This necessitates the employment of small detachments not exceeding 100 men. The proper sphere of ski-runners is patrol duty. In winter campaigns ski-runners are a necessary substitute for cavalry. In Scandinavia reconnaissance detachments are composed of ski-runners and cavalry, the horses pulling the runners. This permits a very rapid movement over snow-covered ground and may also be employed where the use of the much slower sled is impracticable owing to the nature of the terrain. Much practice is undoubtedly necessary to acquire proficiency in this sport[32], for it surely cannot be easy to preserve an upright position on skis behind a galloping horse, while at the same time overcoming all the difficulties of the ground. When troopers cannot continue to perform reconnaissance work, they are replaced by snowshoe or ski-runners. The snowshoe performances in France, since the establishment by War Department order of a training school in Briançon, are worthy of note. According to the experiences gained at that institution, a period of four weeks is ample for training men for extended mountain marches. On January 18th, 1904, a body of men on snowshoes covered a distance of 80 km., including a climb of 1,700 m., in 20 hours (4 hours’ rest included).
[32] During the Norse winter sports of 1905, the winner covered a distance of 67 km. in 2³⁄₄ hours.
2. THE TACTICAL UNIT.
By the term tactical unit is meant the smallest element of a body of troops capable of sustaining an action independently, of performing a simple combat task, and the elements of which (man and horse) are personally known to the leader. Moreover, the tactical unit should be small enough to allow of its being controlled by the voice of a single leader. This requirement limits the battle front of the tactical unit to about 100 m., which corresponds approximately to the front of a troop[33] (_Eskadron_) in line, or to that of a battery of six pieces. The frontage of the tactical unit of cavalry might with advantage be decreased, while that of artillery, on account of its stability in action, might be extended, were it not for the fact that the increase in the quantity of matériel and in the number of horses involved in such extension would make the supervision of the unit too difficult for a single person. In nearly all large armies the strength of a troop (_Eskadron_) of cavalry and of a field battery is approximately 150 horses.[34] This corresponds approximately to what the farmer of northern Germany considers suitable to keep together in one establishment. If the estate is larger, requiring more than 150 men and horses, subsidiary farms[35] are established.
[33] _Eskadron_ has been rendered by “troop” in this work. The German _Eskadron_ consists of 4-5 officers, 138-144 men, and 135-139 horses. It is the smallest administrative unit of the German cavalry and is divided into four Züge (platoons). _Translator._
[34] GENERAL MARMONT, in his _Esprit des Institutions Militaires_, p. 41, states that experience has shown that the most suitable strength for a troop is 48 files, divided into four platoons; but, he recommends that platoons should consist of 16-18 files in order to maintain this strength throughout a campaign.
[35] _Vorwerke._
While column tactics were in vogue, the above mentioned requirements of a tactical unit were completely fulfilled by the battalion, but this is no longer the case. It is quite impossible for one voice to control the movements of a battalion in action; this is scarcely possible in case of a company. On the other hand, a company is too weak to carry out an independent mission in action. Nothing less than a battalion possesses the requisite fighting power, strength, and capacity for subdivision, to sustain an action independently, to solve minor problems of combat, and to remain a body full of fighting efficiency even after sustaining serious losses such as are unavoidable in every modern infantry action.
To attempt a further definition of the term “tactical unit” would be of little value. General von Scherff in a logical manner[36] constructs a “troop unit”[37] from “fighting groups”[38] (squad of infantry or cavalry, or one gun), several of which form a “fighting unit”[39] (company, troop or battery), “possessing the requisite power to carry out a specific task,” and placed under the command of a responsible leader. “The definition of a fighting unit includes, on principle, its indivisibility in action. Dispersion is a crime, division at least an evil.” The “combat unit”[40] consists of a number of fighting units. “The commander of the combat unit (infantry battalion, cavalry regiment, or artillery battalion) should be able to lead it as a compact entity, and should have the power of employing its component parts independently for combined action against some point.” General von Scherff has found imitators in Austria, where the term body of troops (_Truppenkörper_) is applied to an organization having the necessary means for feeding, clothing, and equipping the men, and which is composed of a number of “basic units.”[41] Such “basic units” as can be supervised, handled, and controlled directly by one leader, who knows the individual men thereof and their characteristics, are the troop (_Eskadron_), battery, and company. Von Boguslawski[42] applies the term “fighting unit” to organizations from the company (troop) to the brigade, which act in accordance with the tactics of their arm, supported by the other arms, in the sphere assigned to them by orders or by circumstances. Divisions, which, by the coöperation of the three arms, are capable of independent employment on the march and in action, he calls “combat units.” According to Boguslawski, army corps are “battle units,”[43] with which the commander reckons in battle, and which are strong enough to meet an energetic attack or to execute one themselves.
[36] _Von der Kriegführung_, p. 49.
[37] _Truppeneinheit._
[38] _Kampfgruppen._
[39] _Kampfeinheit._
[40] _Gefechtseinheit._
[41] _Schlachteneinheiten._
[42] _Entwickelung der Taktik_, III, p. 125.
[43] _Grundeinheiten._
3. ORGANIZATION.
The basic unit of infantry is the company, from 200 to 250 men strong in the larger armies. It seems hardly practicable to exceed a strength of 150 men, as this is about the greatest number in which a relation based upon personal influence of the leader on his subordinates can still be obtained. In armies in which companies are composed of more than 200 men, the numbers in excess of this figure may be regarded as a margin of safety, intended to maintain the company at a strength of 200 rifles after the first casualties of a campaign, produced by marching, detached service and battle losses. In view of the losses, which frequently increase with extraordinary rapidity in modern battles, it appears undesirable to fix a lower figure than that above mentioned, as the companies would otherwise lose their independence and could no longer be considered basic units.
===========+=========+===================================++ | | || | | || | | || | | || | | (a) PEACE STRENGTH. || |Company. +-----+--+------+------+------+-----++ | | | | | |Offi- | || | | |N.| | |cers’ |Hosp.|| | |Offi-|C.|Musi- |Pri- |Ser- |Corps|| | |cers.|O.|cians.|vates.|vants.|Men. || -----------+---------+-----+--+-------+-----+------+-----++ ~=GERMANY=~|Minimum | 4 |15| 4 | 128 | ... | ... || |Maximum | 5 |17| 4 | 142 | ... | ... || -----------+---------+-----+--+-------+-----+------+-----++ ~=AUSTRIA=~|Minimum | 4 |11| 2 | 76 | 4 | ... || |Maximum | 4 |14| 2 | 109 | 4 | ... || -----------+---------+-----+--+-------+-----+------+-----++ ~=ITALY=~ |Infantry,| | | | | | || |Bersa- | | | | | | || |glieri | 3 |13| ... | 87 | ... | ... || | | | | |Musicians (trum- || | | | | |peters only) and || | | | | |sappers armed with|| | | | | |rifle. || |Alpini | 4 |19| ... | 121| ... | ... || -----------+---------+-----+--+-------+-----+------+-----++ ~=FRANCE=~ |Ordinary | 3 |15| 2 | 108| ... | ... || |Maximum | 3 |15| 2 | 158| ... | ... || |Chasseurs| 3 |21| 2 | 125| ... | ... || | | | | | and| | || | | ...|..| ...| 150| ... | ... || -----------+---------+-----+--+-------+-----+------+-----++ ~=RUSSIA=~ |Approxi- | | | | | | || |mately | 3 | 7| ...| 96 | 4 | ... || | | | | | | [44] | || -----------+---------+-----+--+-------+-----+------+-----++
===========+=========++=========================================++ | || || | || || | || || | || || | || (b) WAR STRENGTH. || |Company. ++-----+--+------+------+------+-----+-----++ | || | | | | |Lit- | || | || |N.| | |Train |ter |Hosp.|| | ||Offi-|C.|Musi- |Pri- |Sol- |Bear-|Corps|| | ||cers.|O.|cians.|vates.|diers.|ers. |Men. || -----------+---------++-----+--+------+------+------+-----+-----++ ~=GERMANY=~|Minimum || 5 |20| 4 | 226 | 4 | 4 | 1 || |Maximum || ... |..| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... || -----------+---------++-----+--+------+------+------+-----+-----++ ~=AUSTRIA=~|Minimum || 4 |19| 4 | 195 | ... | 4 | ... || |Maximum || ... |..| ... | 4 Pio- |4 Officers’|| | || | | | neers. | servants. || -----------+---------++-----+--+------+------+------+-----+-----++ ~=ITALY=~ |Infantry,|| | | | | | | || |Bersa- || | | | | | | || |glieri || 5 |16| ... | 180 | ... | ... | ... || | ||Musicians (trumpeters only) and sappers || | || armed with rifle. || |Alpini || ... |..| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... || -----------+---------++-----+--+------+-------+-----+-----+-----++ ~=FRANCE=~ |Ordinary || 4 |28| 4 | 218 | ... | 2 | 1 || |Maximum || ... |..| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... || |Chasseurs|| ... |..| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... || | || | | | | | | || | || ... |..| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... || -----------+---------++-----+--+------+-------+-----+-----+-----++ ~=RUSSIA=~ |Approxi- || | | | | non-combatants. || |mately || 4 |22| ... | 200 | ... | 20 |... || | || | | | | | | || -----------+---------++-----+--+------+-------+-----+-----+-----++
===========+=========++=============== | ||Difference | ||between | ||minimum peace | ||strength and | ||war strength. |Company. ++-----+--+------ | || | | | || |N.| | ||Offi-|C.|Pri- | ||cers.|O.|vates. -----------+---------++-----+--+------ ~=GERMANY=~|Minimum || 1 | 5| 103 |Maximum || ... | | ... -----------+---------++-----+--+------ ~=AUSTRIA=~|Minimum || ... | 5| 132 |Maximum || 4 Officers’ | || servants. -----------+---------++-----+--+------ ~=ITALY=~ |Infantry,|| | | |Bersa- || | | |glieri || 2 | 3| 93 | ||Musicians (trum- | ||peters only) and | ||sappers armed | ||with rifle. |Alpini || ... |..| ... -----------+---------++-----+--+------ ~=FRANCE=~ |Ordinary || 1 |18| 110 |Maximum || ... | | ... |Chasseurs|| ... | | ... | || | | | || ... | | ... -----------+---------++-----+--+------ ~=RUSSIA=~ |Approxi- || | | |mately || 1 |15| 104 | || | | -----------+---------++-----+--+------
[44] In addition, five non-combatants.
After the heavy losses at =St. Privat=, two companies were combined into one for tactical purposes in some regiments of the Guard Corps. The administration of the consolidated companies had to remain distinct on account of the preparation of casualty lists, recommendations for promotion and decorations. On the day of the battle of =Orleans=, the strength of the German battalions varied from 459 men in the 1st Bavarian Army Corps to 747 men in the 40th Infantry Brigade. During the pursuit after the battle of =Le Mans=, the strength of the 56th Füsilier-Battalion was even reduced to 280 men.
The actual training of troops must be completed in the company. Combat by an independent company is the exception; combat by battalion the rule. By the consolidation of four companies into one unit, the battalion, consisting of 800-1,000 rifles, is formed. The French Chasseur battalions are the only ones that consist of six companies, because their proposed independent employment, for instance, in mountain warfare, makes it more often necessary to detach small units than is the case in operations on more favorable terrain.
As, in the course of time, the independence of companies in action developed, and as the combat of the battalion as an entity was transformed into combined action of the four companies, the strength of the company increased from 120 to 250 rifles while the number of companies in a battalion diminished. The battalion of Frederick the Great was divided for administrative purposes into five companies and for tactical purposes into eight _pelotons_. The battalion of the first empire consisted of six _Füsilier_ and two _Voltigeur_ companies, and the Austrian battalion, until the reorganization after 1866, consisted of six companies of which each two formed a division. Until 1866 the six company battalion predominated in the infantry of all European armies (France, Italy, Austria, and the minor German states), but early in the seventies most of the states adopted the four company battalion, Russia being the last to do this (four line and one sharpshooter company). In the regulations of 1812, Prussia had adopted the four company battalion. The independent employment of the four united sharpshooter platoons of a battalion was the exception even during the campaign of 1866. At present only the British battalion consists of eight companies, which cannot, however, be said to possess a capacity for independent action on account of their small size.
In the four-company organization the battalion possesses an asset which enables it to adapt itself easily to any combat situation. The battalion organization is the outgrowth of practical necessity; the regimental commander cannot handle 12-16 companies without difficulty, and an intermediate unit, the battalion, is necessary. The battalion is the practical, and the regiment, consisting of 3 or 4 battalions, the ideal unit. Regiments consisting of two battalions do not possess the same advantages, as the regimental staff becomes superfluous during each necessary division of the regiment. Two battalion regiments do indeed facilitate command; they are, however, more expensive in time of peace and are of advantage in action only when formed into brigades of six battalions each, in which case the commander has a compactly organized reserve available.
“The regiment, by reason of its history, the uniformity of its training, the _esprit de corps_ of its officers, and its division into three battalions--thereby facilitating subdivision--is pre-eminently fitted for carrying out definite combat tasks.” (Par. 470 German I. D. R.). A glance at the map of the battle of Vionville (5B of the German General Staff work on the Franco-German war) shows that regiments, whenever they entered the field intact, fought as unbroken units throughout the battle, whereas brigade organizations were frequently broken up.
This breaking up of brigades is practically induced by the two regiment brigade organization. (Par. 471 German I. D. R.). When once the brigade commander has assigned sections or points of attack to his regiments, there remains very little for him to do. He can form a reserve only by taking two battalions from one regiment, or one battalion from each. The brigade is, however, not like the regiment, an entity of bodies of troops, but a unit assembled for tactical purposes, which may, without regard to the whole, be increased or diminished by one or more battalions in case of necessity. On the march and in action the brigade organization as a subdivision of the division cannot always be maintained; groups are frequently formed in which the normal units must be broken up. In large battles the brigade is the largest force which may yet be employed as an intact unit, although the employment of infantry by regiments will continue to be the rule. Brigade commanders are necessary for decreasing units of command and desirable for relieving the division commanders of a part of their work. In time of peace brigade commanders are useful for directing recruitment and, moreover, as connecting links between regiments and the division. The unmistakable advantages of the three-battalion organization have induced the United States to form its brigades of three regiments, each of three battalions (of 400 men each). An English division consists of three brigades of four battalions each.
4. INTRENCHING TOOL EQUIPMENT.[45]
[45] In the Russo-Japanese war the Russian companies were equipped with 80 small spades and 20 hand axes; the Japanese companies with 68 small spades, 17 mattocks, 8 hatchets, and 30 wire cutters.
Earth as a covering material and, incidental thereto, the adoption of the small spade after the Russo-Turkish war, have increased in importance owing to the greater penetrating power of the modern infantry bullets. The disadvantages of the spade lie in the danger of its being misused and in the consequent impairment of offensive spirit. There is, moreover, danger that the fire effect will be impaired and subordinated to considerations of cover. The spade should therefore not be employed on every occasion, but only when the tactical purpose in view requires it.
What the weight of the portable intrenching equipment of the Japanese, Russian, and British infantry will be, is still undecided, but experiments are being made with a uniform tool. When we consider, that for the purpose of intrenching, one man requires a space of 1.20 m., and for handling his rifle a space of 0.8 m., and that when intrenching under fire all the men cannot work, it is obvious that it would be impracticable to equip each man with an intrenching tool. According to all experience, it is sufficient to furnish every other man with spade or pick. In addition to this, however, a company requires a large number of wire cutters. Only the French infantry is equipped with explosives, every regiment having 108 cartridges.
The following table shows the intrenching tool equipment available in each battalion:
+=========+================================+=================+======= | FOR EARTH WORK. | FOR TIMBER WORK.| ----------+-----------------+--------------+---------+-------+------- | Small | Large | Small | Large | | Intrenching | Intrenching | Intrenching | | Tools. | Tools. | Tools. | ----------+-------+---------+-------+------+---------+-------+------ |Spades.|Mattocks.|Spades.|Picks.|Hatchets.| Axes. |Total. ----------+-------+---------+-------+------+---------+-------+------ Germany | 400 | 40 | 20 | 10 | 35 | 8 | 513 Austria | 400 | 64 | 8 | 16 | ... | 8[46]| ... Italy[47] | 32 | 8 | 36 | 18 | ... | 62 | ... France[48]| 448 | 128 | ... | ... | ... |... | ... ----------+-------+---------+-------+------+---------+-------+-------
[46] Each company has 4 pioneers, which carry intrenching and carpenter tools in addition to their rifles. These men are formed into a pioneer platoon of 64 men in each regiment.
[47] The adoption of portable intrenching tools, 50 spades and 12-15 mattocks per company, is contemplated.
[48] The following demolition tools are available in each battalion: 64 picks, 64 fascine knives, and 16 wire cutters. Sappeur sections carry in addition a mattock or a pick apiece, and each ammunition carrier also carries a pick, a fascine knife, or a saw. The large intrenching tools are apparently being changed at the present moment.
5. THE LOAD OF THE INFANTRYMAN.
The load carried by the infantryman should not exceed one-third of the man’s weight (84 kg.), or not more than 28 kg. According to the “Regulations for the Employment of Infantry Equipment, M/95,” the load of a soldier whose height is 1.67 m. (the equipment consisting of new experimental pieces) is about 27 kg., distributed as follows:
Clothing 5.397 kg. Equipment[49] 3,964 „ Baggage[50] 5.600 „ Arms and ammunition 8.507 „ Rations (including breakfast). 3.238 „ ---------- Total 26.706 kg.
To this must be added intrenching tools:
Small spade and scabbard 0.89 kg. Hatchet 1.08 „ Mattock 1.48 „ Load with spade 27.596 „
[49] Tent equipment 1.620 kg.
[50] Iron ration, 2.388 kg. The British soldier carries only a 269 g. ration on his person, sufficient for 26 hours. It consists of two parts, one containing cocoa paste, the other concentrated extract of beef (Pemmican).
COMPARISON.[51]
===========+==========+=======+========+=======+=======+=========== | | | |Weight| | Weight | | | | of | Weight| of | Without | With |Clothing.|knap- | of | ammu- | spades. |spades.| |sacks.|rifles.|nition.[52] -----------+----------+-------+---------+------+-------+----------- Germany |26.706 | 27.596| 5.397 |20.919| 4.707 | 4.714 kg. Austria[53]|26.615 | 26.443| 4.428 |22.187| 4.200 | 4.080 „ Russia |28.216 | 29.206| 4.000 |22.622| 4.576 | 3.426 „ France |26.125 | | 6.222 |19.903| 5.049 | 3.675 „ Italy |29.135[54]| | 5.993 |23.143| 4.505 | 4.320 „ Japan |26.365 | | 3.475 |22.890| 4.435 | 3.600 „ -----------+----------+-------+---------+------+-------+-----------
[51] According to _Journal of Military Scientific Societies_, 1906.
[52] Italy 162, Japan and Germany 150, the other states 120 rounds per man.
[53] Depending on whether the man carries intrenching tools (front rank only) cooking utensils (rear rank and a few men of the front rank).
[54] Alpini carry 32.096 kg.
II. THE FORMATIONS.
1. THE ISSUE OF ORDERS.
Troops are set in motion by words of command, and, when these do not suffice, by orders. (Orders give information of the situation and the intentions of the commander, and assign tasks, but leave the recipient free to choose the method of carrying them out). When commands are given from a distance, time and energy may be saved by employing the telephone and visual signals. To these may be added shouts, signs, and the following signals: _To advance_, the leader raises the arm; to indicate that the command is _to follow him_, he extends his raised arm in the direction of march; _to halt_, he lowers the arm; _to deploy_, both arms are raised laterally to the height of the shoulders, and if necessary the direction the skirmish line is to take is subsequently indicated with one extended arm; _to assemble_ his men, the leader describes a circle above his head with one arm. These signals may also be made with the sabre or rifle. Additional signals should be agreed upon beforehand in each separate case. If a signal is made to a body of troops in close order, it is meant, in the first place, for its leader. (Par. 11 German I. D. R.). Other signals, such as those indicating a change of direction of march, or a change in the battle formation, must be specially agreed upon beforehand. Trumpet signals are only used by troops in garrison at drills, and in barracks or billets as service calls. To prevent troops from misunderstanding signals or from obeying those not intended for them, all trumpet calls in battle, except “charge,” “fix bayonet,” and “attention,” are forbidden.
During the engagement of =Trautenau= (27th June, 1866), the trumpet signal “assemble,” given at another point, caused four Prussian battalions to withdraw.[55] See also the effect of the signal “assemble” after the taking of =Problus=.[56] Notice the effect of the signal “form square” during the assault on the =Forest of Bor= (=Königgrätz=).[57]
[55] KÜHNE, _Kritische Wanderungen_, 3, 2nd Edition, pp. 55 and 85.
[56] _Geschichte des Infanterie-Regiments Nr. 16_, p. 230.
[57] _Geschichte des Infanterie-Regiments Nr. 57_, p. 47. HÖNIG, _Untersuchungen über die Taktik der Zukunft_, 4th Edition, p. 61.
On the morning of June 26th, 1866 (day of rest), reveille sounded by a trumpeter was mistaken for an alarm signal. The 7th Infantry Division assembled and the signal was repeated in two other army corps. Two days previous another useless alarm had occurred because a trumpeter, surprised by a number of Radetzky Hussars, had blown the alarm signal.[58]
[58] _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 66_, pp. 48/49.
The village of =Diletz= (action at =Gitschin=, 1866) was to be evacuated at the sounding of the signal (Saxon) “First Brigade withdraw.” The signal was, however, understood and carried out by only three battalions; two battalions, which were at the time engaged, did not hear it at all and maintained their position until they were taken in reverse by hostile fire and forced to withdraw.[59]
[59] _Anteil des Königlich-Sächsischen Armeekorps_, p. 130.
In the crisis of the fight of the Füsilier Battalion of the 48th Infantry and the 1st Battalion of the 52nd at =Vionville=, the signal “assemble” was sounded and repeated by other trumpeters, further mischief being averted by the energetic efforts of the officers who prevented trumpeters from blowing the call and ordered them to blow “commence firing” instead.[60]
[60] _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 52_, p. 59.
2. THE PURPOSE OF FORMATIONS. COMPARISON BETWEEN LINE AND COLUMN.
The object of assembly formations is to unite troops, usually prior to a movement, in a restricted space permitting an easy survey of the entire body. Assembly formations serve also the purpose of placing troops in readiness before starting on a march, before beginning an action, and for moving them on the battlefield when out of reach of hostile fire (columns). Route formations should permit an orderly, comfortable march of the troops, as much of the available width of road being used as possible, a space being left for orderlies and mounted messengers, and for troops which are drawn forward. In order to permit a prompt deployment of troops for action, it is necessary to reduce their depth. Columns only are suitable for moving troops. The situation existing at the moment will determine to what extent allowances may be made for the comfort of the troops, or how far considerations of comfort should be ignored in view of readiness for action, and to what extent the depth of the columns should be decreased.
The formations for moving troops (to be employed in marching across country and to be used on the battlefield) should be such as to cause the least discomfort to the troops, should make it possible to avoid obstacles, to utilize cover, facilitate changes of front and direction of march, and permit a prompt deployment in any direction. These formations are columns unless the hostile fire effect makes a deployment into line necessary.
Battle formations should be such as to permit the employment of all weapons (rifles, lances, sabres, and guns). This requirement is not satisfied by columns, but only by the line. Modern fire effect excludes every employment of close order formations under effective hostile fire and compels the most extensive deployment.
Whether line or column is the preferable battle formation is a question belonging to a bygone age. The battles of the British in Spain and at Waterloo, the engagement at Groszbeeren, and the attack of the six battalions of Borke’s Brigade (the 8th) at the Katzbach,[61] amply demonstrate that the defeat of the Prussians at Jena was not due to the employment of linear battle formations alone. In a fight with an equal opponent, formed in columns, well trained and disciplined troops, formed in line that allows of the use of all the rifles and is suitable for shock action as well, have always carried off the victory.[62] On the other hand, in the battles of the Empire we find columns formed, which of necessity excluded a large part of the men from participation in the action, but which were designed to break through the hostile battle line by sheer momentum. At Wagram, Macdonald’s Corps was formed with eight deployed battalions in rear of each other in a single column, supported on the flanks by seven and eight battalions respectively, also in column. At Austerlitz and Waterloo we find attack formations in which from eight to twelve battalions of a division were deployed one in rear of the other at distances of twenty paces. Column and line must be examined with reference to their mobility, their vulnerability and their fire and shock power.
[61] FRIEDERICH, _Herbstfeldzug, 1813_, I, p. 305.
[62] RENARD, _Considérations sur la tactique de l’infanterie en Europe_, Paris, 1857.
RÜSTOW, _Geschichte der Infanterie_, II, p. 316.
The column possesses greater mobility and is better adapted than the line for executing changes of front and for taking advantage of the cover afforded by the ground. In a column steadiness and shock power (produced by the crowding forward of the ranks in rear) and the influence exerted by the officers, is greater than in a line.
The line is more dependent on the terrain in its movements. The characteristics of the line are great frontal fire power, weakness of the flanks, difficulty of quickly changing front, and the ever present danger of being pierced. The line has been called the formation of the bold, the column that of the weak.
The column[63] was proposed as a battle formation in France as early as 1774 by Mesnil Durand, but did not find practical application until the wars of the Revolution. In those wars columns were used because the raw levies lacked the training necessary for making movements in line. Whenever a line formation was used, battalions, owing to the scarcity of efficient officers, resolved themselves into disorderly skirmish lines which were exceedingly difficult to control. The adoption of the column was, therefore, the result of practical experience, but as a formation it could be justified on the battlefield only so long as it remained capable of development for the purpose of firing. The endeavor to combine the advantages of column and line by a combination of both formations led to the placing of columns in rear of the wings of the battalions deployed in line. This formation was employed for the first time in the attack made by a demi-brigade during the battle on the =Tagliamento= (1797), and subsequently it was used at =Marengo= (attack made by Desaix’s Division).
[63] The development of the French column tactics is splendidly portrayed by KUHL in his work _Bonapartes erster Feldzug, 1796_, p. 46, et seq.
During the first decade of the 19th Century the French leaders had a marked _penchant_ for this formation, until it sank more and more into insignificance in face of the deep column. (Ney at =Waterloo=, and Macdonald at =Wagram=). Formations suggesting the above are found even in the Prussian regulations of 1876. (Posting of sharpshooter platoons of the companies at first in rear of the wings of the deployed battalion, and later in rear of the outer flank platoons of the companies).
On account of the increased penetrating power of infantry projectiles, especially at short ranges, a column will suffer greater losses than a line; at longer ranges the curvature of the trajectory causes bullets which pass over the first echelon to strike the second or third. On ground falling with respect to the line of sight, lines, and on ground rising with respect to the line of sight, columns are exposed to greater losses when they come within the beaten zone.[64]
[64] At 1000 m., the projectile of rifle model ’98 falls 5 cm. for each meter of the range, and at 1200 m. it falls 6 cm. per meter of the range, so that the second and third platoons of a company in column of platoons (7.2 m. distance between platoons) would offer a target having a vulnerable surface 35 cm. high (¹⁄₅ the height of a man), at 1000 m., 42 cm. high (¹⁄₄ the height of a man) at 1200 m.
3. THE COMPANY.
(a) Formation of the Company.
(Par. 83 German I. D. R.).
In the company the files are placed in two ranks according to height from right to left. Each four files form a squad or group, and the entire company is divided into three platoons (_Züge_). When a platoon consists of more than three squads it is divided into two sections (_Halbzüge_).
In the normal formation of the company, the three platoons, each in two ranks,[65] are posted on a line in numerical order from right to left. This formation facilitates firing and in garrison meets the requirements of barrack life, each two squads forming a section (_Korporalschaft_) under a non-commissioned officer. During the campaign of 1866 Prince Frederick Charles gave permission to arrange companies so that friends and relatives could serve together in the same squad or section. A company formed in this fashion would, of course, not look so well on parade as one formed regularly, the men according to height from right to left flank, but it would without doubt give a better account of itself in action. For details of the formation of a company and division into fractions see pars. 82-85, German I. D. R. The squad leaders and the two range finders in each platoon are posted as file closers at facing distance in rear of the rear rank of the company.
[65] The number of ranks is intimately related to the rate of fire of the infantry weapon. During the days of slow loading, the necessity of keeping at least a part of the rifles at all times ready for firing led the Imperialists in the Thirty Years’ war (loading was executed by 90 motions) to form their musketeers into sixteen ranks, while Gustavus Adolphus was able to form his infantry into six ranks owing to the greater loading facility of their rifles. In the Seven Years’ war the Prussian infantry was formed in three, that of the Austrians in four ranks, the fourth rank serving as a reserve. The first rank fired kneeling. The British infantry was the first to adopt the two rank formation for fire action, forming into four ranks for shock action and frequently for warding off cavalry attacks. Emperor Napoleon considered a third rank useless for fire and shock action and initiated the double rank formation on the eve of the battle of Leipzig. In 1888 the Prussian infantry--the last to do so--gave up the three rank formation which had long since lost its importance in battle and which was retained side by side with the double rank formation for purposes of parade only.
The _non-commissioned officers_ are posted in the front rank, on the flanks and in the center of the platoons in Russia, Austria, and Switzerland. In Germany and Italy they are all posted in rear of the line as file closers, and it is their duty to supervise the men. In France a part of the non-commissioned officers are posted in the front rank, the remainder as file closers. A German company of 200 men has a front of 100 paces, or 80 m. The infantryman with field equipment occupies a space about 75 cm. square.
The German Infantry Drill Regulations define interval (_intervalle_) as the space between two elements on the same line, and distance as the space between two elements in the direction of depth. An interval is measured from the left flank of the element on the right to the right flank of the element on the left (or vice versa); and distance in the company and in the battalion is measured from the rear of the element in front to the head of the element in rear (or vice versa). If the distance between two elements is equal to their front, the column is called an “open column”, otherwise it is called a “close column.”
FRONT AND FACING DISTANCE.
===========+=========================+================================ | FRONT. | FACING DISTANCE. | (Per man.) | (Distance between ranks.) -----------+-------------------------+-------------------------------- Germany |About 0.80 m. Loose elbow|0.80 m. from back of front rank |contact. |man to breast of rear rank man. -----------+-------------------------+-------------------------------- Austria |About 0.75 m. Files are |120 cm. from heels of front rank |separated by an interval |man to those of rear rank man |of the width of a hand. |(according to German method of | |measuring, about 0.88 m.). -----------+-------------------------+-------------------------------- Italy |0.70 m. |0.75 m. from breast of front | |rank man to breast of rear rank | |man(according to German method | |of measuring, 0.45 m.) on the | |march, 1.20 m. (according to | |German method of measuring, | |0.90). -----------+-------------------------+-------------------------------- France |0.70 m. including 0.15 m.|1 m. from back or knapsack of |interval between files. |front rank man to breast of rear | |rank man. -----------+-------------------------+-------------------------------- Russia |0.70 m. Files are |Rear rank man is an arm’s length |separated by an interval |from back of knapsack of front |of the width of a hand. |rank man = 60-70 cm. -----------+-------------------------+-------------------------------- England |About 0.80 m. |1.50 m. from heel of front rank | |man to heel of rear rank man | |(according to German method of | |measuring, about 1.20 m.). -----------+-------------------------+-------------------------------- Switzerland|About 0.75 m. |0.80 m. from back of front rank | |man to breast of rear rank man. -----------+-------------------------+-------------------------------- Belgium |About 0.80 m. |1 m. from heel of front rank man | |to heel of rear rank man | |(according to German method of | |measuring, about 0.70 m.). -----------+-------------------------+-------------------------------- Japan |About 0.85 m. |0.75 m. from back (or knapsack) | |of front rank man to breast of | |rear rank man. -----------+-------------------------+--------------------------------
(b) Division of the Company Into Three or Four Platoons.
In Austria, France, and Italy, platoons are considered as distinct bodies, so long as they have sufficient numerical strength. They are placed side by side and constitute the company in line. In Germany and Russia the company is at each formation divided into platoons of approximately equal strength. In the armies of Austria, France, and Italy, it is contended that the soldier has nothing further to learn when once he is taken up for duty in the company. All movements are executed, after preparatory commands given by the company commanders, by commands of execution or signals given by platoon commanders. The execution of movements is retarded by this procedure and the movement itself becomes clumsy. It would also seem that the multiplicity of commands in the simple, oft-repeated movements, is superfluous, especially in the weak platoons at peace strength.
Column of platoons from line (par. 121 German I. D. R.: “Form column of platoons”) is formed in Austria as follows (Austrian I. D. R. par. 360): At the preparatory command, “Column,” given by the company commander, the leaders of the 1st, 3rd, and 4th platoons command at once, as in forming column of fours to the front, “Fours right (left), column right (left).” At the command “march,” the platoons step off, each turning in column to the rear, and are conducted to their new positions, halted, and dressed to the right (left).
The companies of all powers, those of Germany, Japan, and Belgium excepted, are divided into four platoons; each two platoons may in addition be combined into a half-company. The German, Japanese, and Belgian companies are divided into three platoons. “The platoon is not an independent subdivision by reason of the mere fact that it consists of a certain number of men, but because the term platoon denotes a force led by a man of superior intelligence. The officer commanding the platoon makes it what it should be. The strength of the platoon is therefore solely dependent upon the number of officers available.” (VON SCHERFF).
The obvious advantage of the three-platoon organization of the company is that fewer platoon commanders are required, which fact is well worthy of attention in the mobilization of units of both Line and Reserve, especially in view of the extraordinarily heavy casualties among the troop leaders in the course of a campaign.[66]
[66] See also _Taktik_, V, pp. 81, 88.
It is only necessary to recall the situation of the Guard Corps and of the IIIrd Army Corps after the battles around =Metz=, and the condition of the German troops during the advance to =Le Mans=. On January 7th, 1871, there were 36 officers with the 57th Infantry, of which 16 led platoons of the 36 platoons in the first line, and 8 lieutenants commanded companies. On mobilizing, 25 lieutenants were assigned as platoon commanders and six as company commanders in the 57th Infantry.[67]
[67] HÖNIG, _Gefechtsbilder_, I, p. 25. For additional facts in regard to the dwindling of the number of officers consult _Die sieben Tage von Le Mans_, by V. D. GOLTZ; also _Supplement to Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1873, p. 368; also VON KORTZFLEISCH, _Feldzug an der Loire_, p. 43.
The eight infantry regiments and the Jäger-Battalion of the Xth Army Corps had, at this time, instead of the required 506 officers, only 286, of which number 174 were for duty. The 22nd Infantry Division had only 108 officers left; companies and even half-battalions were led into action by very young officers of the Reserve, and, on many occasions, even by vice 1st sergeants.
On the morning of August 17th, 1870, the 40th Füsilier Regiment had two field officers and four captains present for duty. Two captains, two first lieutenants and eight second lieutenants (four of these belonging to the Reserve), led companies; only two lieutenants of the Reserve, one cadet, and four vice 1st sergeants remained available for duty as platoon commanders. The regiment participated in the battle of =Gravelotte= with this small number of officers.[68] The 6th Grenadier Regiment, which, in July, 1870, had marched out with four field officers, seven captains, six first, 14 second lieutenants, and four cadets, all on the active list, lost so many officers at =Wörth= and =Sedan= that a field officer of the 46th Infantry had to take command of the regiment; three first lieutenants of battalions; and four second lieutenants, two officers of the Reserve, and six vice 1st sergeants of the companies. The 12 companies had available five vice 1st sergeants as platoon commanders. The 1st Battalion of the 58th Infantry had only seven officers left (including its commander and the adjutant) after its losses at =Weiszenburg=.[69]
[68] KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 8/9, p. 162.
[69] _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 58_, p. 56.
The 7th Grenadier Regiment lost 40 officers at =Weiszenburg= and =Wörth=. On August 7th, three captains commanded the battalions and three officers of the 5th Jäger-Battalion were detailed to command companies in it.[70] At =Gravelotte= the Füsilier-Battalion of the 1st, the Ist Battalion of the 2nd, and the IInd Battalion of the 3rd Regiment of the Guard lost all of their officers. The French organizations, having more officers and less men than we, were by no means so badly off in 1870-71. Upon mobilizing in 1870, the German army had 13.7 officers to every 1,000 men, the French army, 32.2 officers.
[70] KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 14, p. 122.
On the other hand, it should be remembered that in armies consisting of militia it is considerably more difficult to command a platoon of 60-70 men than to command one of 40-50 men. A disadvantage inseparably connected with the four-platoon company is the small size of the platoons during peace exercises. On account of this circumstance most regulations permit the three-platoon formation when the company is small, because platoons consisting of less than ten files are of no instructional value. An advantage of the three-platoon company is the simplicity and rapidity with which changes from one formation to another may be effected.
The three-unit column of platoons is very broad for movements on the battlefield. It offers, when numbering 200 rifles, a target about 25 m. wide and only 15 m. deep. The four-unit column of platoons is better suited for movements. With a front of 17 m., its depth is only 15 m., when the distances between platoons are assumed to be 6 paces (Austria, France, Italy, Russia, 5 paces). (See p. 62).
For a company consisting of 200 rifles, the following would be the forms:
The other advantages praised by advocates of the four-unit company are:
1. That a smaller platoon is more suitable for field service--that a picket is perhaps only in the rarest cases to be made 60 men strong.
2. That a small platoon makes a better and more comprehensive employment of the company in action possible, as the company commander has an opportunity to use ¹⁄₄, ¹⁄₂, or ³⁄₄ of his company according to the requirements of the situation, while the three-unit company affords less favorable combinations, permitting only an employment of ¹⁄₃ or ²⁄₃ of its strength.
These advantages can also be obtained in the German company by the employment of sections (¹⁄₆, ¹⁄₃, ¹⁄₂, ²⁄₃, ⁵⁄₆) so that the objections to the three-unit company would appear to be groundless.
The platoons (in Italy called _plotone_, in France, _section_) are subdivided into sections (_demi-sections_, _Halbzüge_), in Austria into two skirmish groups (_Schwärme_) of 4-7 files each, and, when consisting of 16 files, into four skirmish groups (in Italy this is also done, the groups being called _squadriglio_). In Germany the platoons are divided into groups or squads of four files each, and in Russia the platoons are divided into sections of 8-15 files each and these again into groups or squads of 4-6 men each. If the squad is to have any importance at all in action, it must have a leader, and it might easily happen that a mobilized company lacks the number of leaders necessary to provide one for each group. The withdrawal from the line of a number of good shots for duty as squad leaders is compensated for, in our opinion, by the more thorough supervision over the men. This consideration has, however, apparently caused other states (Austria and France) not to count on the activity of the squad leaders in a fire action to the same extent as is the case in Germany.
4. LENGTH OF PACE AND MARCHING.
An extended, swinging step, without haste and without unduly taxing the lungs, is advantageous in all movements. When accustomed to this pace on the drill ground, the men will march with practically the same step on varied ground, and this appears more desirable than to shorten the step, while at the same time increasing the distance to be covered in a given time. The length of the pace depends largely upon the height of the individual, but even small men can maintain a step of 0.80 m. without undue exertion.[71] In Switzerland the cadence has been fixed at 116-120 steps per minute “with a view of suiting the peculiarities and the varying degree of mobility which characterize the inhabitants of the different cantons.”(!) For purely practical reasons it is advisable to fix upon some even number of paces in order that the cadence may be tested with the watch. (Austria excepted). The longest pace in conjunction with the highest cadence (_Bersaglieri_, whose march is almost a double time, excepted) is found in England and Switzerland. Such a performance could not be kept up by a fully equipped man without impairing health.
[71] When the leg is extended at an angle of 57 degrees the length of pace would be as follows:
Height of man. Length of leg. Length of foot. Length of pace. 1.6 m. 0.8 m. 0.24 m. = 0.75 m. 1.675 „ 0.857 „ 0.253 „ = 0.776 „ 1.70 „ 0.87 „ 0.26 „ = 0.80 „ 1.75 „ 0.88 „ 0.26 „ = 0.82 „
===========+====================++====================++ | QUICK TIME. || ACCELERATED TIME. || +------+-------------++------+-------------++ | | PER MINUTE. || | PER MINUTE. || | +------+------++ +------+------++ |Length|Number| ||Length|Number| || | of | of | || of | of | || | pace.|paces.| || pace.|paces.| || | m. | | m. || m. | | m. || -----------+------+------+------++------+------+------++ Germany | 0.80 | 114 | 91.2 || 0.80 | 120 | 96.00|| | | | || | | || -----------+------+------+------++------+------+------++ Austria | 0.75 | 115 | 86.25|| 0.75 | 125 | 93.75|| -----------+------+------+------++------+------+------++ Italy, Line| | | || | | || and Alpini | 0.75 | 120 | 90.00|| ... | ... | ... || Bersaglieri| 0.86 | 140 |120. || ... | ... | || -----------+------+------+------++------+------+------++ France | 0.75 | 120 | 90.00|| 0.80 | 124 | 99.00|| | | | || | | || -----------+------+------+------++------+------+------++ | 0.71 | 118 | 84- || 0.71 | | || Russia | | | || | 122 |119. || | 0.89 | 122 |109 || 0.89 | | || -----------+------+------+------++------+------+------++ Japan | 0.75 | 114 | 85.5 || ... | ... | ... || -----------+------+------+------++------+------+------++ England | 0.84 | 128 |107.5 || 0.91 | 128 |116.5 || -----------+------+------+------++------+------+------++ | | 116- | 92.8-|| | 120- | 96- || Switzerland| 0.80 | | || 0.80 | | || | | 120 | 96.00|| | 140 |112 || ===========+======+======+======++======+======+======++
===========++===================== || DOUBLE TIME. ++--------+------------ || | PER MINUTE. || +------+----- || Length |Number| || of | of | || pace. |paces.| || m. | | m. -----------++--------+------+----- Germany ||0.75- | 170- |127- ||0.90 | 180 |162 -----------++--------+------+----- Austria ||0.90 | 160 |144 -----------++--------+------+----- Italy, Line|| | | and Alpini ||0.90 | 170 |153 Bersaglieri||1.00 | 180 |180 -----------++--------+------+----- France ||0.30[72]| 180 |136 || | | -----------++--------+------+----- || | 170- |181- Russia ||1.066 | | || | 181 |192 -----------++--------+------+----- Japan ||0.85 | 170 |144 -----------++--------+------+----- England ||1.02 | 180 |183.6 -----------++--------+------+----- || | | Switzerland||0.90 | 160 |144 || | | ===========++========+======+=====
[72] The following, taken from _La marche du fantassin_ (_Journal des sciences militaires, 1897_), is here inserted for comparison.
_French Drill Reg. of 1791_ (in force until 1862): _Pas ordinaire_ 100 paces at 0.65 m. = 65 m. per minute _Frederick The Great’s Infantry_ 75 „ „ 0.70 m. = 52 m. „ „
_Prussian Drill Reg. of 1812_: _Ordinary pace_ 75 „ „ 0.70 m. = 52 m. „ „ _Accelerated pace_ 108 „ „ 0.70 m. = 75.6 m. „ „ In general, double time is considered of little value. In Austria double time is to be maintained for periods of two minutes, quick time of five minutes duration alternating, up to sixteen minutes, _i.e._, until a distance of 1,726 m. has been covered. In Germany, an alternating quick and double time march in heavy marching order is prescribed. A different practice prevails in Italy. According to the Italian Regulations all troops are to be trained to march in double time without rest and without knapsacks for 2 kilometers (with knapsacks, 1 km.); _Bersaglieri_ without knapsacks, 3 km. (with knapsacks, 1¹⁄₂ km.), also without rest (_i.e._, 13 and 16.8 minutes respectively). When we consider that in double time with the necessary alternating step, 2,000 m. can be covered in 17 minutes, and in accelerated step, in 19-20 minutes, the time gained is unimportant when compared to the fatigue of the men and the exertion of the lungs, which interferes with deliberate, accurate firing. During an Austrian firing test the number of hits fell from 76.5%, attained while advancing in quick time, to 51% after a period of double time.
The run, without keeping step (_Marsch! Marsch!_) is employed in rapidly crossing short, fire-swept spaces, in changing quickly from one formation to another, and in the charge.
5. MOVEMENTS OF THE COMPANY IN LINE.
The commander of the center platoon is the guide.
A change of direction is effected by inclining toward the new direction (at the command: “Half right, march!” when the angular change of direction is less than 45 degrees), by indicating a new point to march on, or by executing a turn.
6. THE COLUMNS OF THE COMPANY; MOVEMENTS IN COLUMN; FORMATION OF LINE.
Column of Twos.[73]
[73] _Reihenkolonne._
Column of twos is formed by facing in the indicated direction. Marching at attention the depth of an organization in column of twos is equal to its front when in line. The column of twos is used in marching by the flank for short distances only, as the march at attention in this formation unduly fatigues the men. In addition, this formation may be used, in exceptional cases, on narrow roads; but the column becomes considerably elongated (as much as 165%), when marching at route step. Line is formed from column of twos either by facing, or by executing front into line.
Column of Squads.
This is an open column formed (the company being in line at a halt or in motion) by each squad executing a turn of 90 degrees. It may also be formed from line at a halt by the squad on the designated flank moving straight to the front, the others executing a turn of 90 degrees toward the proper flank, then following the leading squad.[74] Column of squads may also be formed by executing “Squads right (left), column right (left).” Line is formed by each squad executing a turn of 90 degrees or by executing front into line (without regard to the original front).
[74] “Right forward, fours right.” _Translator._
Route column is formed from column of squads by the squads in each section closing to facing distance, the file closers, musicians, and hospital corps men forming ranks of four men, in the gaps thus created. (Par. 91 German I. D. R.) With the exception of Russia, which employs a section column, of Switzerland, which uses a column of squads, and of France, which has adopted a wheel by fours like that of the cavalry, all other armies employ the _column of fours_[75] as their march formation.
[75] _Doppelreihenkolonne_.
Column of fours is, as a rule, formed as follows:
The even numbered men place themselves on the right or left of the odd numbered men by making an appropriate turn, thus forming a column of fours whose length is equal to the front of the company in line. In the plate below let the Roman numerals represent front rank men, the Arabic numerals rear rank men, and the horizontal line the original front occupied; column of fours will then be formed to the right, in the different states, as shown:
For the purpose of increasing the front of the column, the double column of squads, having a width of 8 files, may be employed. This is formed in practice by placing the columns of two organizations (companies or battalions) side by side. In large bodies of troops, the depth of a column is reduced in this manner by one-half. A column of fours formed by closing on the center instead of by wheeling to a flank, is employed in Italy and Russia for the purpose of reducing the front of an organization.
Comparison of Column of Fours with Column of Squads.
The column of fours has the advantage over our column of squads in that it can be more quickly and easily formed; that the front rank men must make a turn, while, at the same time, observing the march direction, can scarcely be considered a disadvantage.
The column of fours and the column of squads have the same depth. The Austrians consider movements made in column of fours on the battlefield more clumsy and fatiguing than when made in column of squads, because checks are transmitted to the whole column of fours owing to its rigidity, while in column of squads the march is easier, more rapid and more orderly. The squad organization, moreover, facilitates the employment of small parties in the service of security and increases the importance of the squad leader in fire action. For the last named reason we should not like to dispense with the column of squads.
The Employment of the Column of Squads.
The route column is suitable for movements under frontal artillery fire, as the cone of dispersion of bursting time shrapnel combines small lateral spread with great effect in the direction of depth, and as it is very difficult for the opponent to observe whether a shot falls short or goes over, unless it strikes just in front of the column. When artillery can bring a flanking fire to bear on the column it becomes necessary to neutralize this by placing the platoons side by side so as not to present an easily observed target to the enemy.
Movements by the flank and changes of front are easily made in column of squads, and after some practice the deployment into line of skirmishers from this formation offers no difficulties. This column is best adapted for movements over varied ground. In column of squads difficult terrain can be crossed and advantage can be taken of the most insignificant cover. In addition, it is difficult for an enemy to observe a force moving in column of squads along the edge of woods and rows of trees, and such a column entails the least expenditure of energy on the part of the men. The leaders must insist, however, that the men cover in file, and that elongation of the column does not take place. The column of squads or the route column is therefore to be employed on the battlefield as long as possible.
A column of squads or route column may be shortened by placing the platoons, each in column of twos or squads, side by side. By this means the =Company Column= (_Kompagniekolonne_) is formed.
The normal interval between platoons in this formation, measured from the leading guide of one platoon to the leading guide of the next in line, is nine paces. This interval may be increased as required by the nature of the ground and the intended deployment for action (deployment on a broader front). Movements in company column are facilitated by the fact that platoon commanders are posted four paces in front of the center of their respective platoons. The leading squad follows the platoon leader, the guide of that squad moving directly in that officer’s tracks. Thus, small, unimportant deviations, unavoidable on varied ground, can easily be adjusted, while too definite rules would tend to restrict the mobility of the platoon commanders in front of their platoons. The principal thing is that the platoon follow its leader who guides it without command.
The musicians distribute themselves in rear of the platoons in readiness for their subsequent duty in action--that of maintaining communication between the several parts of the company. The intervals of nine paces between platoons are not rigid, but rather the reverse. The flexibility of the formation considerably facilitates movements in difficult country. This “meandering” of the company over the terrain requires special training. The old, historic company column, in which the platoons were formed in line one in rear of the other at a distance of nine paces (Russia 5 paces = 3.55 m., Austria, Italy, France, 6 paces = 4.50 m., and Japan, 8 paces = 6 m.), their commanders on their respective right flanks, is now called the
Column of Platoons.
Austria, France, and Italy have retained the old designation.
The front of the column of platoons may be decreased by forming column of sections. The column of sections is suitable as a route formation on broad roads; the transition from column of sections to column of squads is not difficult, and for the purpose of passing through occasional narrow stretches of road, the files on the flanks may be removed. In most cases it is, however, more desirable to place several columns abreast than to employ column of sections, because deployment is facilitated in the former case.
Company in Column of Platoons.
=Russia.= The four squad leaders of each platoon are posted on the flanks of the rear rank and in the center of each rank. The ranking non-commissioned officer of each platoon stands on the left flank of the front rank of his platoon. The 1st sergeant, the guidon bearer, and one trumpeter, and behind them two drummers, are posted in rear of the company.
The staves of the guidon flags (_Jalonneurflaggen_) are inserted into the rifle barrel of a soldier (in case of a battalion into the rifle barrel of a N. C. O.) and serve to indicate battalions and companies.
According to the color scheme used in Russia: red = 1, blue = 2, white = 3, green = 4. “R” indicates the number of the regiment in the division, “B” the number of battalion, and “K” the number of the company. A red flag is carried by the 1st Company, and a red flag with one green horizontal and one blue vertical stripe is carried by the 8th Company of the 1st Regiment of an infantry division. In Japan and England so-called storm-flags (small national flags) have been adopted to facilitate mutual recognition of friendly troops.
Posts of Platoon Commanders.
In Switzerland, in Russia, and in Germany, the post of platoon commanders is on the flanks of their respective platoons when the company is in column of platoons. In England and Austria platoon commanders are posted in rear of their platoons, with the exception of the commander of the leading platoon, who is posted beside his guide. In all other states platoon commanders are posted in front of their platoons. Officers are posted in front of their platoons so as to facilitate observation on their part, and so that their platoons can follow them. This position becomes a necessity when the regulations require that all movements of the company be executed at commands given by platoon commanders. When they are posted in front of their platoons, they cannot supervise their men unless they turn around to do so.
The column of platoons is a close column from which line cannot be formed directly. It has not been found necessary in Germany to provide an open column permitting prompt deployment toward a flank. The column of platoons unites the company on the smallest space and facilitates supervision, but in companies at full war strength it is not well adapted for executing changes of front and for taking advantage of cover, on account of the size of the platoons (40 files each). In platoons at war strength the men look more toward the point upon which they are to march than upon the enemy, and the deployment of the rear platoons offers difficulties which occur principally when a deployment in an oblique direction or one by the whole company becomes necessary.
The column of platoons is formed by the flank platoons placing themselves in rear of the center platoon. Line is again formed by rear platoons moving to right and left and abreast of the leading platoon.
The German company column is much more flexible, and the advantage of a prompt deployment for action, made possible by the fact that all platoon commanders and the heads of platoons are in the lead and therefore can see the objective, should not be underestimated. The company column is formed from line by the center platoon forming column of squads to the front (or rear), the flank platoons, each in column of squads, closing on the center platoon, heads of the three columns on the same line. Company column is formed as follows from column of platoons: the leading platoon executes squads right (left), column left (right), the two rear platoons execute squads right (left), and are led to a position abreast of the leading platoon. Company column from column of squads is formed by rear platoons moving to the right and left respectively, and abreast of the leading platoon.
When line is to be formed from company column, the flank platoons have to incline to the right and left respectively in order to gain sufficient interval.
Movements in Column.
For marching short distances to a flank, column of twos may be employed; for longer distances, column of squads (or fours); and the march direction may be changed by inclining in the proper direction.
* * * * *
Since March 1904, experiments, which deserve to be mentioned here, have been made in France under the direction of Colonel Fumet, having for their object the simplification of the drill regulations. In the experiments a four-rank formation is being considered. In this proposed scheme the platoon is formed so as to place the four single-rank squads (_escouades_) in rear of each other at the very close facing distance of 0.50 m., the leaders of the _escouades_ taking post on the right flank, a first class private being posted on each flank and in the center of each _escouade_.
The platoon at war strength (50 men) has a front of 8-10 m. and a depth of 3 m. The movements are very simple. Route column is formed by simply facing to flank, without first dividing the platoon into squads. Double rank line may be formed from column of fours, by executing right and left front into line. The double rank line may be deployed into half-platoons. Furthermore, a single rank line may be formed by the men of the rear rank stepping up into the front rank. One drawback of this scheme is, that, in forming route column, facing distance of 0.80 m. between ranks is to be gradually gained after stepping off. The deployment of half-platoons into line of skirmishers offers no difficulties. It is otherwise, however, when the platoon is formed in four ranks and marching in platoon front, for then line of skirmishers can be formed only by deploying each rank in turn. The depth of the column may be decreased by placing platoons (formed in column of twos or fours) abreast, this expedient affording a suitable route formation on broad roads. The company is formed by placing the platoons on a line and abreast of each other at intervals of 2 m. In the battalion, column of platoons and “mass” are the only formations considered. In the “mass” formation the companies, each in line, are in rear of each other.
7. THE BATTALION.
The movements of the battalion have been considerably simplified in all armies. Battalion drill is, however, necessary, since, as shown by the advance of the IInd Army on the morning of August 18th, 1870, simultaneous movements of large masses across country will be unavoidable in future wars on account of the great size of modern armies.[76]
[76] Additional examples: Advance of the 6th Infantry Division on Vionville. _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 556. The flank march made by the 3rd and 4th Bavarian Brigades from La Maladerie toward Schloss Goury (5 km. battle of Loigny). HÖNIG, _Volkskrieg_, IV, p. 22.
Advance of the 33rd Infantry Brigade from Champdoux against Loigny (_ibid._, IV, p. 80).
Advance of the 22nd Infantry Division from Lumeau on Poupry, 4.5 km. (_ibid._, IV, p. 139).
Advance of the French to the battle on December 1st, 1870 (_ibid._, III, p. 164).
Normal Formation of the German Battalion.
The four columns of platoons, or the company columns of a battalion, may be placed, as dictated by space or purpose, abreast of each other as a =broad column= (_Breitkolonne_), or in rear of each other as a =deep column= (_Tiefkolonne_). The numerical order of companies is immaterial.
The deep column is employed for assembling troops if the terrain necessitates a formation on a narrow front. If sufficient distance is allowed between companies, line may be formed to a flank, but this increases the depth of the column to such an extent that movements at attention are impossible. The deep column may be used as a route formation in addition to the column of squads. During the change from route formation to that of action, the deep column formation may be retained so long as the depth of the whole column does not have to be further reduced. When necessary, the deep column may be replaced by a formation in which the four companies, each in route column, are placed abreast of each other.
The broad column finds proper employment, aside from parades, in cases where the terrain or the contemplated deployment requires more front than depth. It is also advisable to assemble the widely scattered troops in a broad column after an action. The broad column does not lend itself, however, to the execution of changes of front by battalion; but should such changes of front become necessary, they are always to be executed by company.
The color is posted between the right and left center companies, in broad column, and on the right flank of the third company, in deep column. In action the color remains with the company with which it happens to be at the moment.[77] Should this company also join the firing line, the color accompanies it; but under all circumstances one squad must remain with the color. (Par. 236 German I. D. R.). It has been contended that this is a disadvantage, as the enemy can direct his fire on the color and the men in its vicinity. If the colors, upon which the soldiers have been sworn, are taken into the field, it is always better to endure the unavoidable losses incidental to carrying them, and even to expose them to capture, than to send them back to a safe place under escort.[78] At the Albrechtshaus farm (Wörth) the colors served as rallying points around which the disordered skirmishers rapidly assembled.[79]
[77] In Japan the color joins the battalion commander. British troops leave their colors in their garrisons. In Russia and France the color is carried only by one battalion of each regiment.
[78] See KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 14, p. 180, battle of Wörth. A platoon of the Füsilier-Battalion of the 47th Infantry was sent to the rear with the color, and a squad of the Füsilier-Battalion of the 46th Infantry finally had six colors to guard. In the 88th Infantry, out of a total of 48 sections, 9 sections remained in rear as a guard for 2 colors, but finally 6 of these sections crossed the Sauer.
[79] KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 13, pp. 77, 152.
The figures given on pages 72 and 73 of the German Infantry Drill Regulations illustrate formations with organizations at peace strength. The approximate dimensions of broad and deep columns at war strength are as follows:
=Russia.= Numerous formations are prescribed. In addition to route column, columns with half company front and with company front are prescribed. Reserve columns are mentioned. These, according to the number of companies on the same line, are called single platoon column (deep column), two platoon column (double column), or four platoon column.
=Austria.= _The mass_, in which the companies of the battalion are on the same line, each company in company column[80] with intervals of three paces between companies, is employed for assembling the battalion in a restricted space in a position in readiness when out of range of hostile fire, or for assembling the battalion under cover. The _line of columns_, in which the companies, each in column or some other suitable formation, are formed abreast of each other at deploying intervals plus three paces, is also used.
[80] In the Austrian company column (_Kompagniekolonne_), the platoons, each in line, are formed one in rear of the other. This formation was formerly called company column (_Kompagniekolonne_) by the Germans also, but at present they designate it by the term “column of platoons” (_Zugkolonne_). _Translator._
_The line._ In this formation the companies, each in line, are placed abreast of each other at intervals of three paces.
_The column._ In this formation the companies are placed in rear of each other, each either in line or in column, with distances of nine paces between companies. The companies are numbered 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, etc., from head to rear, if in column, and from right to left, if in line.
=Italy.= The formations are like those of Austria, but the double column has been retained.
=Japan.= The only formations prescribed are the broad and deep column.
=France.= The companies are formed in column or in _ligne de sections par quatre_, intervals and distances being 10 paces. Distances and intervals may be increased when required. The _battalion in line_ in which the companies are formed in line in numerical order, abreast of each other at intervals of six paces, is only retained as a parade formation.
_Line of company columns_ (_ligne de colonnes_). Companies abreast with intervals of six paces.
_Deep column_ (_colonne de bataillon_). The companies in normal formation in rear of each other at distances of 10 paces.
_Double column_ (_colonne double_). Intervals and distances 10 paces.
The formation in which the companies are abreast of each other, each in column of fours at deploying intervals, is employed in marching across country and also under artillery fire. Only the regiment carries a color, the battalion a guidon (_fanion_).
=England.= Columns are formed, in view of the (8) weak companies in a battalion, with company or half-company front at full or reduced distances (_quarter column_). In actions with savages echelon formations and the square are also employed.
=Switzerland.= The company is divided into four platoons. The line is used as an assembly formation and for purposes of parade. The company column, corresponding to the German formation of the same name, is used for movements on the battlefield. In both line and company column the platoons are posted abreast, at intervals of three paces. Finally the route column is used. This is formed either by wheeling by squads, or by platoons executing column right (left). On the battlefield the platoon may be deployed and formed in several lines.
In the battalion, company columns in line of columns, or route columns in the battalion column, are posted abreast at intervals of 10 paces. Line and double column are abolished.
Opinions are divided as to the value of the double column. Formerly, when the double column was still the column of attack from which deployment for fire action had to be made, a discussion of its merits was of special importance. While Austria abandoned the double column formation in 1881 and Germany in 1905, Switzerland replaced it by a column having a front of two platoons (_Plotonkolonne_), and Russia readopted it again recently. All other states utilize it as of equal value with the deep column in making movements beyond range of artillery fire and as an assembly formation in addition to the deep column. The change from double column to any company column formation is easier than a like change from the Swiss “Ploton column” (double column of platoons), which has the same front, since in the double column two companies can be deployed at the same time toward both flanks.
The deep column appears to be better adapted for making movements and for advancing under cover, and, on account of its narrow front, a force in this formation is better able to adapt itself to the forms of the ground in hilly or close country than a body of troops in double column of twice the width of front.
The Battalion in Route Column.
(Par. 316 German F. S. R.).
The companies are formed in route column and follow each other at distances of 8 m. Mounted officers, musicians,[81] led horses and vehicles are to be included in actual depths of columns given and not in the distances. A permanent extension of distances for the purpose of restricting checks of the march to a single organization is as little permissible as the permanent elimination or reduction of distances; distances may be dispensed with temporarily only. The reduction of the depth of a column, obtained by eliminating distances between elements entirely, is so small that the rapidity of deployment gained does not, by any means, compensate for the increased exertion of the troops.[82]
[81] A trumpeter marches in rear of the battalion for the purpose of blowing “Give way,” when necessary to open one side of the road. At this signal all the troops close in toward the flank of the guide.
[82] The depth of a brigade of six battalions on the march is about 2500 m. By eliminating distances between elements a space of only 100 m. is gained, while by marching in a front of six files, approximately 750 m. is gained. The march of the 10th Infantry Division from Weiszenburg to Preuschdorf, on August 5th, 1870, proved exceedingly fatiguing. The distances between organizations had been eliminated pursuant to orders. “Some of the rearmost elements had to double time uphill to keep up whenever the head of the column went down hill. Great fatigue and many cases of overexertion were the result.” _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 37_, p. 124.
During the march the company commander goes wherever his presence may be necessary for the proper supervision of his company. Neither are platoon commanders tied to a fixed place; one officer is, however, required to march in rear of the company. The company ammunition wagons follow in rear of their respective companies, or, assembled, in rear of the battalion. In marches in campaign the field train marches separately.
The depth of the battalion on the march, without field train, is 400 m., and the depth of the field train is 100 m.
=Austria.= Column of fours. Depth of a battalion on the march, including combat train, 670 paces (502 m.). The distance between companies is nine paces (6.7 m.).
=France.= The distance between companies is 10 paces (7.5 m.). The depth of each rank is reckoned at 1.40 m. on the march (in Germany 1.10 m.), and that of every 100 men at 50 m. Depth of a battalion, including combat train, on the march is 450 m.
=Russia.= The distance between companies is 10 paces (7.1 m.). The battalion without combat train has a depth of 350 paces (249 m.). The combat train follows in rear of the regiment.
A German regiment of four battalions with combat train has a depth of 1,650 m. on the march; a Russian regiment, a depth of 1,725 paces (@ 71 cm.)=1,215 m. (elongation on the march not considered).
=Italy.= The distance between companies is 10 paces (7.5 m.). The battalion has a depth of 422 m. on the march.
8. THE REGIMENT AND THE BRIGADE.
For a discussion of the importance of the regiment and of the brigade see page 37 _supra_. All movements must be executed in an orderly manner by regiment and brigade, in any formation, without breaking up tactical units, and the entity of the whole body must be preserved at the same time by a skillful use of the terrain. If necessary, a base battalion may be designated.
When regiments or brigades are assembled, the formation, disposition, intervals and distances of the tactical units depend upon the terrain and the intentions of the commander. Frequently the tactical units (battalions and regiments) are assembled in separate groups.
When considerations of the enemy and the terrain do not dictate otherwise, the battalions, each, as a rule, in deep column, are posted in one or more lines, at 30-pace intervals and distances, rear battalions covering those in front or the gaps between them. An appropriate formation will frequently be that in which route columns are placed abreast and on the same line.
In the brigade, when assembled or deployed, the regiments may be placed abreast of each other, on the same line, or in rear of each other, _i.e._, in line or in echelon. When the regiments are formed side by side, two adjacent independent sections are created, each commanded by a regimental commander; this insures better supervision, better control, and a more energetic conduct of the action, since the first line can be reinforced by troops belonging to the same organization. This formation, moreover, facilitates tactical combinations. It may, however, be a disadvantage that the first line is not subject to the orders of a single commander; that it is difficult to employ the reserve battalions in one body; and that the brigade commander can influence the action only by withdrawing units from the regiments for the purpose of forming a reserve.[83] The echelon formation, each echelon consisting of a regiment, is frequently used in rencontres, because troops are thrown into action directly from route column. The regimental commanders then become leaders of echelons, the first line cannot be reinforced by its own troops, and the organizations of different regiments finally become mixed. The echelon formation is proper only when the second line is intended to be used independently abreast of the first in the course of the action; for example, on a flank, for the purpose of making or warding off a flank attack.[84] When part of a larger force, the most suitable combat formation for troops is usually the one in which the regiments are formed side by side.
[83] For historical reference as to the importance of the brigade in action, see essay published in _Jahrbücher für Armee und Marine_ (August and September numbers 1877) entitled: _Die Infanterie Brigade in ihrer Entwickelung aus der Brigade von 1812_. In regard to the employment of regiments in line or in echelon, see Memoir by General von Moltke on the tactical lessons gained in the campaign of 1866. MOLTKE, _Taktisch-strategische Aufsätze_, p. 99, et seq.
[84] The fight of François’ Brigade at Spicheren. _Gen. St. W._ I, p. 310, et seq. The formation, side by side, of the six battalions of the IIIrd Army Corps in the attack on the hill at Forbach (Spicheren) would have been inappropriate and would have disrupted all organizations.
The disadvantages of the echelon formation, when taken up from route column, can be obviated by deploying the second regiment in rear of a flank of the first. It should be kept intact in that position until the decisive moment, although the state of the fight may, at the outset, invite a more rapid extension of front.
9. EXTENDED ORDER.
Combats are begun and carried out in extended order. The defender can be induced to disclose his dispositions, to occupy his position, and to open fire, only by the advance upon him of a skirmish line. The deployment of a thin firing line will frequently suffice to furnish the commander of the attacking force with a clue to the strength of the force holding the hostile position. In close country, skirmishers are pushed forward primarily to guard against surprise the force which sends them out, but when thrown forward only a few hundred meters in open country, such skirmishers are unable to furnish protection. The strength and density of a firing line (by means of which the fight is sustained) depend upon marksmanship, upon the purpose of the action, and upon the terrain. The poorer the marksmanship or the weapon, or the more unfavorable the field of fire, the greater the number of skirmishers needed (_i.e._, the denser the firing line).[85] If the enemy is merely to be kept at a distance, less skirmishers (_i.e._, a thinner firing line furnished with plenty of ammunition) will be required, than if the action is to be carried to a decisive conclusion.
[85] The Boers with their superior weapons and better marksmanship, and further because they never cared to become involved in a fight at close quarters, found thin firing lines sufficient.
Cohesion and order are best maintained, and the least time is lost in action, if efficient, dense firing lines are led forward as units up to the moment of opening fire. (Pars. 169, 321, 334 and 413 German I. D. R.). But on open terrain such dense firing lines would begin to suffer too great a loss at ranges at which they could not reply to the fire. Nothing remains then but to cover the available front with a very thin firing line, followed at irregular distances by thin skirmish lines which ploy for the purpose of utilizing cover or for opening fire. Skirmish lines of this description will hardly justify the opponent’s expenditure of ammunition, as he can only cover broad spaces with volley fire. On the other hand, these skirmish lines are in themselves too weak to facilitate the approach of the following echelons by their fire. Besides, it must not be overlooked that the soldier, separated by a considerable interval from his comrades in line during the advance, and withdrawn from the influence of his officers, succumbs more easily to temporary spells of weakness and is more apt to remain behind than the skirmisher in a dense firing line. The advance in several successive, thin skirmish lines is therefore only an expedient. In each case the leaders will have to decide whether, in view of the close proximity of the enemy, a united advance with dense, powerful skirmish lines is possible or advisable (for instance, when entering at once upon the decisive stage of the action). Before opening fire the firing lines must be sufficiently reinforced. (Par. 334 German I. D. R.).
This advance in thin skirmish lines stood the test both in the Boer war and in the Russo-Japanese war,[86] but we must not forget that thin skirmish lines are only maneuver formations in an attack that is to be pushed home, and that the mistake made by the British of attempting to make an attack with such weak skirmish lines should not be imitated. The Japanese also used this formation after they had once opened fire with a dense skirmish line.[87]
[86] Four battalions of the 6th Division advanced at Paardeberg on February 18th, 1900, on a front of 2000 m. with 800-1000 rifles, in two lines of equal strength and separated by a distance of 300 m., the remainder following at 400 m. Three battalions of the Highland Brigade even advanced on a front of 4000 m. See my lecture: _Lehren des Burenkrieges_. _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 33, pp. 43 and 67.
For the Japanese procedure see V. LÜTTWITZ, _Angriffsverfahren der Japaner_, pp. 44 and 66. BRONSART VON SCHELLENDORFF, _Sechs Monate beim japanischen Feldheer_, p. 217.
[87] In regard to the advance of the 6th Reserve Regiment against Husanta-Kantsy at Mukden, on March 5th, 1905, BRONSART VON SCHELLENDORFF (_Angriffsverfahren der Japaner_, p. 225), says: “Some 500-600 m. from the Russian position, individual men sprang out of the shelter trench at intervals of 10-25 paces, rushed forward for about 30 m., or perhaps farther, where they threw themselves down and fired. This procedure was repeated until a new skirmish line, with the men approximately 3 paces apart, had been formed about 100-150 m. in front of the trench mentioned. The rest of the men, who until this moment had remained in the trench, now rushed forward in groups of 5-10 men for distances of 30 m., for the purpose of reaching the advanced line.”
It might be well to mention here that thin and dense skirmish lines, when under fire, lose an equal number of men in proportion to their strength, provided the front occupied by them is the same.
RESULTS OF A FIRING TEST AGAINST THIN AND DENSE SKIRMISH LINES.
FIRE AT WILL, FREEHAND FROM A PRONE POSITION. ============+===========+=======+======+====+=======+========+======= | | | | | Hits. | Figures| | Range & | | | +---+---+ hit. | Target. | Elevation:|No. of |No. of|Time| | +---+----+Figures | m. |rifles.|shots.|min.| | % | | % |missed. ------------+-----------+-------+------+----+---+---+---+----+------- 180 head | 680 | 166 | 1268 | 5 | 54| 4 | 49| 27 | 131 targets |Elevation | | | | | | | | placed at |used: first| | | | | | | | intervals of|600 then | | | | | | | | 1-2 paces. |700 m. | | | | | | | | ------------+-----------+-------+------+----+---+---+---+----+------- 90 head | 680 | 166 | 850 | 5 | 35| 4 | 27| 30 | 63 targets |Elevation | | | | | | | | placed at |used: first| | | | | | | | intervals of|600 then | | | | | | | | 3-4 paces. |700 m. | | | | | | | | ------------+-----------+-------+------+----+---+---+---+----+-------
The superior effect of fire on the dense skirmish line, as expressed by the greater number of hits, and in consequence thereof, by the gradually growing number of figures hit, is apparent. It is worthy of note and at first glance strange that, presupposing the two lines considered occupy an equal front, the percentage of figures hit is the same. The explanation of this lies in the fact that in correctly distributed fire any specified front space is equally covered with hits so that it is immaterial for the relative proportion of figures hit whether an equal number of figures is removed or added. While, however, the dense skirmish line still has 131 effectives, the weaker line has only 63 left. The casualties are therefore far more perceptible in the smaller force.
(a) The Formation of the Skirmish Line.
Skirmish line with intervals of two paces between the men is formed at the command, “As Skirmishers.” (Pars. 142 and 174-180 German I. D. R.). The skirmish line may be deployed from any formation, in any direction, either with or without first changing front. (Par. 177 German I. D. R.). A greater interval than two paces must be specifically ordered. Squad leaders hasten in front of their squads and form the framework of the skirmish line. The men follow their squad leaders absolutely. When the terrain requires it, squad leaders may increase or diminish intervals without command. In other armies (for instance, in those of Italy, France, and England) the desire to keep the skirmishers under control as long as possible, has led to advancing the platoons designated for the firing line at first in close order, the deployment being made only when the state of the action requires it. In France, the intervals between files may be increased, or a single rank line may be formed before the force is deployed as skirmishers. During an advance it will often happen that intervals are increased or diminished in accordance with the peculiarities of the terrain. The advance is continued until the command or signal “Halt” is given. If line of skirmishers is to be formed when marching to the rear, the command is first faced to the front and then deployed on the line then occupied. (Rallying position, par. 180 German I. D. R.). On varied ground, deployments will be made under cover whenever possible in order to allow of an immediate advance in skirmish line from that point. The number of platoons to be deployed depends upon the tactical situation. When three deployed platoons are formed abreast, it is difficult for the company commander to control them; but this formation is an appropriate one if a company is surprised or enters immediately into decisive action, or in cases where the battalion acting alone requires complete units in reserve for additional tasks. (Pars. 462, 463 and 469 German I. D. R.). When the battalion is engaged as part of a larger force, it is a good plan to occupy all the available front space at once with skirmishers and to maintain the intensity of fire of the firing line by constantly reinforcing it. The losses are less in this case than when the men crowd together in groups. (Italy).
Platoon and squad leaders are posted on the side of their commands facing the enemy while advancing; in moving to the rear, squad leaders are posted on the side away from the enemy, their duty being to maintain the march direction, and the platoon commanders remain in rear of their platoons (_i.e._, on the side toward the enemy). Russia is the only country where the leaders of a firing line are posted in the rear. In Austria one non-commissioned officer in each platoon is designated to march in rear of the advancing firing line for the purpose of supervising the skirmishers. As this non-commissioned officer is to prevent straggling, he should be selected with great care.
The platoon commander indicates the march direction to the leader of the base squad, and, accompanied by the range finders and the musicians, moves to a point at least ten paces in front of the line of his squad leaders, as a rule, opposite the center of his platoon; but he is not restricted to this position. He must possess mobility if he desires to lead his platoon skillfully on varied ground, if he expects to avoid interfering with neighboring platoons, and if he wishes to observe the enemy at the same time. The musician keeps the company commander constantly in view. (Par. 221 German I. D. R.). The range finders observe the battlefield, estimate the range to any targets appearing in view, without being specifically told to do so, communicate the range found to the platoon commander (this should not be done by shouting, as misunderstandings might result therefrom), and observe the effect of the fire. (Par. 173 German I. D. R.).
Whenever the flanks of a skirmish line are not protected by other troops or by natural obstacles, a few men under a prudent leader should always be sent out as combat patrols to the flank, or better still, to the right or left front. The patrol should under no circumstances lose connection with the command which it is to protect, but, on the other hand, should not stick so close to it that the file on the exposed flank is in a position to see as much as the combat patrol itself. As a report from a combat patrol frequently arrives too late, or cannot be made at all on account of hostile fire, signals should be agreed upon and the leader of the squad on the exposed flank of the line should keep the combat patrol constantly in view. Signal flags may also be employed advantageously in such cases.
The =Austrian= deployment is similar to the German, the intervals between skirmishers being about two paces. In =Italy= the skirmishers are posted at intervals of 1.5 m. (_catena ordinaria_), but this interval may be increased by order up to three paces (_catena rada_). The interval between squads in extended order is 4-5 paces to facilitate volley fire by squad. The =French= deployment is similar to the German. An intermediate extended order formation is that in which an advance is made in line, the files at extended intervals. In =England= skirmishers are placed at intervals of 5-15 paces during the initial deployment. At short ranges where the decision is sought, one rifle per 2-3 yards of front (1.8-2.7 m.) is the rule, one rifle per yard of front (0.90 m.) being the maximum. In =Russia= and =Japan= the intervals are as ordered. In =Switzerland= skirmishers are posted at intervals of 1-2 paces; when a greater front is to be covered the intervals between squads are increased. The length of the rushes depends on the ground, the effect of fire, and the endurance of the men. In exceptional cases an advance by rushes, by squads or single men, is authorized.
(b) Movements in Skirmish Line.
Fire action requires steady breathing, and, on this account, all movements to the position at which the fire fight is to be taken up, should be made, as long as possible, in a free swinging stride. A careful observation of alignment or of intervals cannot be insisted upon. Cover found within the allotted front should be utilized by ploying, but this must neither interfere with the harmonious advance of the entire force nor cause a loss of the march direction. Considerations of cover for individual men should not interfere with the spontaneous progress of the movement. Orderly movements in long skirmish lines are best made by designating a certain element as the _base_, whose leader is far in advance of it; all neighboring leaders maintain their intervals from, and endeavor to remain approximately on line with him. This has the advantage of relieving the commander of the whole line from looking after these details and leaves him free to concentrate all his attention on the enemy. Minor changes of the march direction are executed by inclining to the right or left or by designating a new objective. More extended movements by the flank, within range of hostile fire, are possible only under cover. Changes of direction are executed like a gradual front into line, in which a temporary echeloning of the elements, or one which can be adjusted by degrees, is unavoidable. (Par. 185 German I. D. R.).
In the absence of cover, an advance in quick time will be possible only at long ranges unless the hostile fire can be kept down by fire from enfilading or commanding positions. Skirmish lines advancing without fire support over ground devoid of cover, begin to suffer appreciable losses at 1000 m. The more effective the hostile fire, the more pressing the necessity of diminishing, as far as this is possible, the periods of time during which the skirmishers present their whole bodies as targets to the enemy. This leads in itself[88] to an =advance by rushes=, since the whole distance separating the advancing line from the enemy cannot be covered in one rush. Double time may be employed by a skirmish line when it becomes necessary to reinforce an advancing firing line quickly, to forestall the enemy in reaching a certain point, or in moving under fire, from the covered fire position occupied, to another position. It is impossible to prescribe definitely and for all cases at what ranges the advance by rushes should be taken up and when fire should be opened in advancing by rushes, since it depends upon the intensity of the hostile fire.
[88] KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 14, pp. 40, 48 and 77.
The assailant will, in the first place, endeavor to advance without firing, in order to reach those ranges quickly at which his fire will begin to be effective against the well-covered targets of the defender. The skirmishers advance in strong detachments, by rushes of the greatest possible length, taking short breathing spells at each halt. Very soon, however, the hostile fire makes this advance impossible. A fire fight of variable duration must first make a further advance possible by silencing the fire of the defender. In a serious infantry engagement every step forward must be purchased by the fire of the attacking infantry. The attacker will, in exceptional cases only, continue his advance in long lines, although this must appear desirable to him, for almost invariably only a part of his force will still be able to gain ground to the front when supported by the fire of neighboring detachments. Favorable local conditions, insignificant losses, and, above all, the personality of the commander will embue a force with the determination to advance.
Time Required for Making a Rush. Strength of the Force Making the Rush.
The squad requires 5-6, the platoon at war strength about 10-15 seconds preparation for making a rush.
To cover 80 m., requires 26-30 seconds; „ „ 40 „ „ 17-20 „ „ „ 25 „ „ 10-15 „
While the attacker covers a distance of 80 m., the defender, if in readiness, can fire 4-5 shots. This proves very clearly that, in order to be able to make such a rush, a certain superiority of fire is absolutely essential. These figures change radically as soon as the troops are seriously engaged with the enemy and come under his fire at short ranges. At short ranges, aside from the size of the target offered, attempts to advance by rushes with entire companies must very soon cease of their own accord.
The character of the terrain and the fire of the enemy play a decisive role here.
The strength of the force making the rush is intimately connected with the length of the rushes. A small, isolated force would run the risk of being fired on by its own neighboring detachments. Besides, confidence and moral courage are difficult to find in a small force. It is difficult to carry forward long lines as units. The use of long lines necessitates, as a rule, an almost complete cessation of fire, and, in addition, mutual fire support suffers. Long lines should therefore be employed only when the attacker possesses a very marked superiority of fire. In practice it has been found advantageous to make the rush with the smallest fraction led by an officer, _i.e._, with a platoon.
The following appropriate statement appears in _Taktische Rückblicke auf 1866_: “In the danger zone which suddenly surrounds and startles him in war, the soldier feels, in the first place, a desire to have someone assure him that the seemingly critical situation in which he finds himself, is as it should be. His eye is naturally directed upon his officers. If the officer’s quiet glance reminds him that here, as in peace time, the first duty is obedience, and if he sees the officer subsequently advance fearlessly and vigorously, he will, as a rule, not worry about the why and wherefor. It is this faithful attachment to the person of his officer, rather than ambition and patriotism, which inspires the soldier to highest efforts. Those who suppose that all our soldiers are heroes simply because they are products of a courageous race, are very much mistaken. This would indeed be an invincible army, requiring no tactical advice, if its soldiers would do nothing in action but their simple duty voluntarily.”
The severest test of discipline is for a skirmish line to rise and rush forward under an effective hostile fire. This movement had best be executed with precision and energy even during peace exercises. The formation and manner of execution must become second nature to the soldier, like a movement of the manual of arms, which he retains during his entire military service, and a knowledge of which he brings with him when called to the colors during mobilization. The example set by advancing leaders and the arrival of reinforcements, which move forward through the firing line, have been found to be the most effective means of carrying a skirmish line forward.
The critical moment occurs when the men rise and prepare to rush forward, for an unsubdued enemy will be desirous to prevent, by increasing his fire, any attempt to advance. The fire support afforded by neighboring detachments would seem to have a conditional value only; for, being themselves under fire, the skirmishers of these detachments cannot be expected to divert their fire from the opponent previously fired upon, to an enemy by whom they themselves are not threatened. In oblique fire, the rifles, on account of their short barrel, interfere with neighboring ones, and, in addition, expose the men advancing on the flanks to the danger of being hit by the fire of their comrades. The fire support is, therefore, restricted to hindering the hostile skirmishers directly opposite from firing on the advancing unit. When the terrain is favorable, infantry and machine guns should not hesitate to fire over the heads of their own skirmishers. The coöperation of artillery will, in any case, be of great value, and infantry will have to select those moments for advancing when the defender is driven under cover by the hail of shot.
The advance by rushes, consuming time and energy, is an expedient to which the enemy compels us to resort as the only means of gaining ground to the front. The firm determination to close with the enemy and the ever-increasing difficulty of inducing the men to advance from cover, require that long rushes be made. Short rushes are neither consonant with the nature of the attack, nor with the desire to close with the enemy. “Many halts during an advance are fatal to the offensive.” (HÖNIG). The powers of endurance of the men, the character of the ground, and the hostile fire, as well as the support afforded by infantry and artillery fire, influence the length of the rush. If the leader has already caused the skirmishers to rise, it is best to let them run forward so long as the physical powers of the men and the hostile fire permit. The only danger is that the men will throw themselves down prematurely, and without orders. It is rather an advantage that during the rapid advance, increasing both muscular and nervous activity, the men do not think of danger and have no time to pay attention to their fallen comrades. One fact is, however, worthy of special attention: If we train a soldier to make long rushes in time of peace, he will be able to make them in time of war, and it is easier for a leader to decrease than to increase the length of rushes in the field.
The short rushes are considered advantageous because they take the enemy by surprise, in consequence of which he is not in a condition to direct his fire on the advancing unit. Rushes should be made with startling suddenness. They should not be made in step at double time, but, on the contrary, as rapidly as possible (by rushing); by the time the enemy directs his fire on them, the skirmishers should already have thrown themselves down. Stragglers should also throw themselves down, when the men in the lead drop down behind cover, and should then endeavor to reach the firing line by crawling.
The enemy will concentrate his fire on the unit which advanced first. The fire of this unit will at the start be rather weak, getting stronger gradually. If this unit is left in its advanced position for some time there is danger of its being thrown back; all neighboring units must therefore endeavor to rejoin it as soon as possible.
The greater the superiority of our fire, _i.e._, the marksmanship which compels the enemy to keep under cover, the greater the length of the rushes and the rapidity with which they follow upon each other.
Short rushes with small units occur quite naturally, because the platoon leader no longer succeeds in inducing his whole platoon to rise, since his influence extends only to the men nearest him, and because the flank squads at first remain behind and only gradually try to rejoin the leading skirmishers. If only a part of the skirmishers have jumped up, it is quite natural for them not to make a long rush, but to throw themselves down before reaching the new position, because of the feeling that they have been abandoned by their comrades and the fear of running into their field of fire. Thus, in spite of the best intentions of the leader, the short rush by small units occurs. In time of peace, however, we should retain the long rush by platoons and not endeavor to give human weaknesses the force of regulations.
When once compelled to employ short rushes the following question presents itself: Is the advantage of such a small gain of ground worth the trouble of inducing the soldier to rise for making an advance by rushes? Would it, therefore, not be more profitable to =crawl forward=? A man crawling on his belly presents a vulnerable surface of approximately the size of a breast plate 50 cm. high. In an advance made by a large unit, or over covered terrain (fields of standing grain) crawling would be difficult (difficulty of maintaining the direction of march and reduction of the rate of advance); it would also be difficult to get men to advance to the charge after they have crawled along in this fashion for some time. The supervision of a unit crawling forward would also be exceedingly difficult. The following results were obtained in experiments made under favorable conditions: A distance of 500 m. was covered by crawling in about 10 minutes; crawling tired the men, increased the activity of the lungs to such an extent that deliberate aiming and firing was out of the question and the motion produced a noticeable swelling of arms, hands and knees.[89] The Boers occasionally used the following method: One man crept forward once or twice his own length, raising his body slightly, while the man next to him fired; then they exchanged roles and this procedure was repeated uninterruptedly. In any case, troops ought to be able to execute both the advance by rushes and the advance by crawling with or without firing. On terrain devoid of cover a skirmish line will frequently be able to advance only by crawling.
[89] During the engagement at Paardeberg (18th February, 1900), the fighting line of the British 9th Infantry Division was reinforced by troops crawling up into the line, and carried forward to within 450 m. of the enemy’s position. An isolated assault was subsequently repulsed by the Boers.
Procedure: The man throws himself on the ground at full length, head resting upon the bent left arm, right hand grasping the small of the rifle-stock. The man moves forward by alternately bending and straightening the right leg. When the right leg is straightened the body slides forward without rising in the least from the ground, and the head also remains in position resting on the left arm. The head is raised only when the man fires his piece, the butt of which is placed against the shoulder. Crawling on all fours is very tiring, the man offers a larger target, and, in addition, is not immediately ready for firing.
In this manner the Boers succeeded in shooting the enemy out of his position. The firing line, while keeping up an incessant fire, slowly but steadily advanced. The advance of this uncanny crawling line is said to have produced an especially disquieting and paralyzing impression on the immovable defender, who was tied to his position, because of his inability to inflict perceptible losses on these small, prone targets, and because, moreover, he himself was continually under a galling fire. As no assault was made, no opportunity was offered the defender for using his rifles against targets the height of a man. The British infantrymen were, however, insufficiently trained in handling their weapons independently. As to rise and to retreat meant annihilation, the determination to resist weakened gradually during the long fire fight, and, in order to escape from this seemingly unendurable situation, which grew more and more acute with every minute, and which paralyzed every energetic decision, one avenue of escape only seemed open, that of surrender.[90]
[90] Engagement at Nicholson’s Neck, October 29th, 1900. _Vierteljahrshefte_, 1905, pp. 145 and 149.
One who fought on the Boer side writes as follows: “After we had crept up, in this manner, constantly firing and crawling, to within about 300 m. of the enemy, we saw many white handkerchiefs waving over in his lines, as a signal of surrender. As we placed little credence in these signs of surrender, however, on account of many a bad experience, we continued the advance by crawling. But, as soon as we saw that most of the men in the enemy’s ranks were throwing away their weapons, we rose to make the British prisoners. When we came up with them, I noticed that a great many of the men were weeping like children. Later, when I voiced my astonishment over the morale of their troops to some English officers, they stated that it was due to the uncanny manner of our advance.
“These officers stated, moreover, that the sight of danger approaching ever closer without their being able to ward it off effectively, caused great depression and alarm among their troops; for the Boers, utilizing every available rock in crawling over the plain, presented such an unfavorable target that the British fire had had very little effect, while they themselves had been constantly exposed to the Boer fire. All this, they claimed, had contributed to unnerve their troops.”[91]
[91] _Supplement No. 8 to Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1900. _Spionskop_, in _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 34/35, p. 59.
=Lessons of the Boer War=: “The rushes * * * were of variable length, according to the intensity of the hostile fire; they varied from 30 to 80 m. According to the opinion of many British officers it was exceedingly difficult to induce skirmishers to rise and rush forward under hostile fire; but that once upon their feet, it became necessary to push the attack forward as far as possible regardless of the increased losses entailed by the longer rushes.”[92]
[92] _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 33, p. 69.
One who fought on the Boer side reports as follows in regard to the British advance by rushes: “The men rose gradually and hesitatingly. This gave the attentively watching enemy time to pour a well directed fire upon the last men who arose. Thus even short rushes made by long lines became generally too costly to be executed. Smaller groups, on the other hand, were able to move with startling rapidity. * * * Every sudden interruption of the firing that might attract the enemy’s attention should therefore be carefully avoided, but, as a rule, this is possible only when the advancing units are small.”
The British Regulations of 1896 prescribe rushes of 30-40 m., and those published immediately after the war (1902) prescribe rushes of 70-90 m., but the rush is to continue only while the surprise of the enemy lasts.
Russo-Japanese War.
In the Japanese army, the 5th Infantry Division employed short, and very short, rushes by preference, while other divisions of the 1st Army as a rule preferred long rushes. From an English work we obtain the following data in regard to the length of rushes and the expenditure of ammunition per rifle during halts between consecutive rushes in the engagement on the Shiliho on October 12th, 1904, at ranges beginning with 1,000 m.
From the table it appears that after gaining the superiority of fire, beginning with the fifth rush, at about 625 m. from the enemy, the length of the rushes increased; the last 400 m. were covered in one rush as the enemy withdrew from his position.
1st rush 132 m., about 30 rounds of ammunition per rifle 2nd „ 58 „ „ 15 „ „ „ „ „ 3rd „ 63 „ „ 15 „ „ „ „ „ 4th „ 61 „ „ 15 „ „ „ „ „ 5th „ 75 „ „ 15 „ „ „ „ „ 6th „ 151 „ „ 5 „ „ „ „ „ 7th „ 400 „ ----------------------------------------------- 940 m., about 95 rounds of ammunition per rifle
If we assume that three shots per minute were fired from each rifle, it follows that the attack consumed approximately 40-45 minutes.
Provisions of the Various Regulations Relative to the Advance by Rushes.
=Germany.= (Pars. 188, 189 and 337 I. D. R.). To advance by rushes, the following commands are given: (Such) =Platoon (section, squad) Rush!... Rise!... March! March!= At the command =Rush!= the skirmishers finish loading, lock pieces, close cartridge boxes, and prepare to rise. Skirmishers lying prone take the piece in the left hand, lean on the right, and draw the right knee as close to the body as possible without thereby raising the body from the ground. After a brief pause, during which these preparations are made, the platoon commander jumps up and at the same time commands: =Rise!... March! March!= At this command the skirmishers jump up and rush forward. The length of the rush will rarely exceed 80 m. (Par. 337 German I. D. R.). While rushes should, as a rule, be as long as possible, short rushes, which are designed to leave the enemy no time for firing, should also be practiced. The principal thing is that skirmishers rise promptly and simultaneously and that they rush forward rapidly. The rush is terminated by the command “_Position_”; the sight setting is changed when necessary and fire opened without further preliminaries. Frequently the new firing position may be indicated before the rush is made.
=Austria.= Rushes are as a rule made by platoons. “The length of the rushes depends upon the character of the ground and the tactical situation, as well as upon the physical condition of the men. They serve as an expedient for reaching the next firing position.”
=France.= Rushes are made, without fixed rules, from cover to cover (_par bonds successifs_).
=England.= (Regulations dated 1896): Originally the regulations prescribed rushes 30-40 m. long, but, as a matter of fact, their length was actually increased to 60 and 100 m. during the first engagements of the South African war, in cases where the fire of the enemy was not especially heavy. The regulations of 1905, recently published, state: “Rushes over open ground should not exceed 80-100 yards (_i.e._, 70-90 m.) and will, in fact, rarely reach this length. At decisive ranges, _i.e._, under 540 m., they should be short enough to afford the enemy no opportunity to pour a well-directed fire on the skirmishers. When cover is available the advance is made from cover to cover.” At another place the regulations state: “On open ground and within effective range, long lines of skirmishers, rising simultaneously, will suffer heavy losses even when making short rushes; the sudden movement of smaller units may take the enemy unawares, so that for a time at least well aimed fire is avoided. The rush is continued only while the surprise of the enemy lasts. The shorter the range, the smaller the advancing units will have to be, and the shorter the length of the rushes.”
All preparations for a rush must be made as unostentatiously as possible. The units following in rear should, whenever possible, advance beyond the leading unit which is lying down and firing. When an advance by rushes in units is impossible, individuals may run or crawl forward.
=Italy.= Long rushes, at least with platoons, otherwise with companies, are used as a rule, so long as the hostile fire permits. When the intensity of the hostile fire increases, or after the organizations have become mixed, rushes can no longer be made by entire units but only by squads or like fractions. These leave the main line and endeavor to reach the next cover at a rapid run, or if cover be lacking, throw themselves down in order to open fire again at the shorter range thus gained. As a rule, the leading echelons open fire at once from their new positions so as to facilitate the advance of the others, unless special circumstances make it advisable to delay the firing until all the other units have reached a good position and are able to direct an effective fire upon the enemy.
=Japan.= Rushes are made according to German pattern, their maximum length being 100, their minimum 30-40 m. Rushes are not made by units smaller than a platoon.
=Russia.= Rushes are made by individual men, by groups, by sections, and by platoons. The length of the rushes is not indicated. When sections advance by rushes the platoon commander indicates the section which is to advance first, and also the order in which the others are to follow. The Russian regulations are the only ones which prescribe a “movement to the rear by rushes,” at a run.
Frequently, when the men are very much fatigued, when advancing over plowed ground and through extensive grain fields, an advance by rushes will be impossible. Whether =fire while in motion= ought to be employed in this case should be determined. A preliminary condition for its employment is, however, that the enemy’s fire has been subdued or that he has been forced under cover. To advance against an unshaken enemy with fire while in motion must lead to the annihilation of the attacking force. While the defender scores only 12.8% hits against advancing skirmishers at 700 m., the attacker scores only 1.6% to 3.5% hits against head and breast targets. With such a discrepancy in fire effect, the attack, if employing fire while in motion, is bound to collapse, unless it has already gained a superiority of fire prior to the advance. It is unfortunate that fire while in motion is frequently employed when inappropriate during drills. The danger of men wounding each other and of the advance hesitating because the officers are not in front of the line is not to be underestimated. On the other hand, the advantages of eliminating the difficulties of inducing the men to rise, of the troops leaving their losses behind, of stragglers being more easily detected, and of keeping the entire hostile line under fire, cannot be denied. In war this method of advance will frequently result without orders while advancing to the charge after the defender has been driven under cover. (In Russia this mode of advance is prescribed).
During experiments in field firing, held in Austria by a force advancing from 1,400 to 600 paces, with an expenditure of an equal number of rounds of ammunition in each experiment, the following results were obtained:
Regulation attack: Fire while in motion: Time 26 min. 28 seconds 18 min. 40 seconds Fire pauses 12 „ 18 „ 7 „ 40 „
Attacker against the defender: Percentage of hits 7 16.7 Defender against the attacker: Percentage of hits 9.2 33.
Percentage of hits obtained during the execution of the attack from 1,400 to 100 paces:
Attacker 22.7 20. Defender 32.2 51.2
There is no model advance within the zone of effective infantry fire. All expedients, whether they be sneaking or crawling, long or short rushes, or fire while in motion, are of equal value, if the force, kept well in hand by the leader, is thereby brought closer to the enemy. Every opportunity to gain a foot of ground to the front, offered by flanking fire or fire directed at the enemy over the heads of the advancing force, must be utilized. The effect of our own artillery fire should also be attentively followed with a view to advancing when the hostile skirmishers have sought refuge under cover to escape our shrapnel.
Examples of the Employment of Fire While in Motion.
The successful attack made by the 1st Turco Regiment at =Wörth=.[93]
[93] V. BOGUSLAWSKI, _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 50_, p. 212.
This attack was made against disordered and exhausted troops which lacked officers and reserves. The attack was finally repulsed by Prussian artillery and the IInd Battalion of the 58th Infantry.
The attempted sortie of the Turks on December 10th, 1877.[94]
[94] Springer, VI, p. 204.
The attack, made in superior force and supported by artillery, was successful in that the Russian intrenchments and rifle pits were taken. With the arrival of Russian reinforcements, which advanced against front and flank of the Turks, the situation was reversed.
The attack made by Vinoy’s Corps on September 30th, 1870, against the VIth Army Corps in =l’Hay= and =Chevilly=: “The defender’s coolness and confidence in victory grew with this ineffective fire of the attack, and finally the dead were piled up in heaps by the steady volleys delivered by him at short ranges (300-400 paces).”[95]
[95] V. SCHLICHTING, _Taktische und strategische Grundsätze_, 1, p. 71.
Examples of the Employment of Rushes.
1. Attack on =Le Bourget=, on October 30th, 1870.[96]
[96] HOHENLOHE, _Briefe über Infanterie_, p. 80.
KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 10, p. 43.
Two battalions of the _Kaiser Franz_ Guard Grenadier Regiment had to advance from Dugny against the enemy in the northwest edge of Le Bourget over 1,500 m. of very open terrain, covered only with high potato crops. The battalions were formed in two lines with two companies entirely deployed in the first line, and the battalion reserves in rear of the center of the line with files at extended intervals. The second line was formed similarly. The two companies in the firing line advanced at first without firing, by rushes of about 300 m. each, made by alternate companies, each moving forward beyond the point where the other had halted. When effective range was reached one company opened rapid fire while the other moved forward by long rushes. The companies in rear followed in a similar manner. The tall potato bushes partly concealed the lines while lying down. In this manner the two battalions reached the outskirts of the village almost without being checked, the defender having withdrawn to the interior of the village.
The losses of the two battalions, while advancing by rushes, were insignificant.
The regimental commander, bearing in mind the lessons gained at St. Privat, had drilled the regiment beforehand in this mode of attack.
2. Attack on Redout No. 2, at =Scheinovo=, on January 9th, 1878.
The attack by Skobeleff’s Division, consisting of four battalions (_Drushines_) of Bulgarians, and the _Ugla_, _Vladimir_, and _Kasan_ Regiments, was to be made under cover of the fire of two rifle battalions armed with Berdan rifles, and of a provisional battalion of the _Ugla_ Regiment armed with captured Turkish rifles. The only artillery available consisted of a mountain battery, while the Turks were able to bring twenty guns into action.
The Turkish rifle fire began at about 1,000-1,200 m., but the Russian firing lines continued the advance with shouldered arms. Only when the losses increased noticeably did they advance by rushes, _without firing_, from 750 to about 500 m. where they opened fire. The rushes were made by the entire firing line; the supports, with files at extended intervals, did not follow until the firing line had thrown itself down.
After the firing had lasted for some time, the Ugla Regiment, from the reserve, was formed in three lines, each consisting of one battalion, each battalion again into two lines with 350 m. distance between lines (total depth of the column about 1,800 m.). From 900 m. on, the advance was made by rushes, the entire force inclining to the right front. While covered by the fire of the skirmishers of the firing line in front, the length of the rushes was 100-150 m. At 250 m. from the enemy, the leading line, extending the line of the Bulgarian and Rifle Battalions, was able to open fire and, after about thirty minutes, when it was clearly apparent that the Turks were evacuating the work, the regiment began the assault, which was successful.
Of the troops in the first line, the 11th Rifle Battalion lost 11 officers and 422 men; the 9th Rifle Battalion, 5 officers and 269 men; the original strength of each being about 800 men. Expenditure of ammunition: 11th Rifle Battalion, 120 rounds per rifle.
The Ugla Regiment, which advanced in close order after the defender’s fire had been silenced, lost only nine officers and 391 men. The Kasan Regiment, which followed the Ugla Regiment, participated in the assault on the second Turkish position. The Turkish fire had abated to such an extent that the battalions were able to advance in rear of one another, each in two lines with distances of only 35 m. between lines; the intervals between companies were 15 m., and those between files were extended. Losses: four officers and 76 men. Expenditure of ammunition: 12 rounds per rifle.[97]
[97] KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den Russich-Türkischen Krieg_, III, pp. 168-186.
In contrast with these examples of long rushes, almost every obstinate engagement with an unshaken enemy showed that “every step forward” had to be literally gained by the impulse imparted by the arrival of small, fresh detachments, that the rushes often faltered after only 20-30 paces, and that frequently nothing remained but to work forward individually. (See pp. 76 and 87 _supra_.)
The frontal attacks made at =Wörth=, at the Roten Berg at =Spicheren=, opposite =Flavigny=, on August 16th, 1870, and opposite the gravel pits of =Point du Jour=, on August 18th, 1870, etc.
In the Russo-Turkish war, the engagement at the mills north of =Lovtcha=, the fight for the possession of the Green Hill ridges south of =Plevna=, and the fight during the advance from the west and southwest against the large work of =Gorni Dubniac=, show how rushes, repeatedly attempted at short ranges, faltered after only a few paces. “On a signal given by Ljapunov, which was to be repeated by all the officers, the men were to rush forward immediately. Just before the movement began, the Turks opened the usual incessant fire, and the simultaneous advance of so many squads was of course absolutely impossible. The rushes were, therefore, always made by groups of 2-3 men. These groups would rise, one in this company, one in that, run forward a few steps, and then throw themselves down again.”[98]
[98] PUSYREWSKI, _Die russische Garde im Kriege, 1877-78_, p. 127.
The attacks on =Railway Hill= and on =Hart’s Hill= (February 1900), on the =Tugela=, show an endeavor to advance at first by long rushes, then by rushes gradually diminishing in length, the infantry finally working itself forward by twos and threes for the purpose of reaching the last firing position from which the final assault could be made.[99]
[99] _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 34/35, pp. 129, 139. _The Times History of the War in South Africa_, III, p. 539.
(c) Reinforcing the Firing Line.
If the fire power of the firing line is to be maintained after heavy losses, or the intensity of its fire is to be augmented, or when it finally is to receive the impulse for making a further advance, it must be reinforced. (Pars. 226, 227 and 341 German I. D. R.). This may be done by prolonging the line (platoons abreast at well defined intervals), or, when space is lacking and after losses have occurred, by putting men in the intervals (_i.e._, increasing the density of the line and filling it up). When the firing line is prolonged, tactical units are not broken up, and this facilitates fire control. Whenever practicable, the firing line should be reinforced by prolonging it, although the other method, that of placing men in the intervals and gaps of the firing line, is more frequently used and more practical because the arrival of fresh men and the replacement of incapacitated officers occasioned thereby renews the strength of the firing line (replenishment of ammunition). The breaking up of platoons is unavoidable, and on that account platoon and squad leaders should be trained in time of peace to form new units at once so that control is not lost. In order to prevent the mixing of units, so far as this is possible, and to keep the firing line filled up with skirmishers, even during an engagement entailing heavy losses, it is indispensable that the fighting front should be limited, that of a company in attack to 150, in defense to about 200 m. The unit designated to reinforce the firing line endeavors to approach that line under cover, forms skirmish line at any rate before leaving the last cover and advances by rushes, or, if directly in rear of the firing line and under a heavy fire, even by crawling.
=Austria.= Both modes of reinforcing the firing line, that of prolonging it, and that of filling the intervals and gaps, are used. When prolonging the line the reinforcement may remain abreast of the firing line. During an attack efforts should, however, be made to advance beyond the firing line--“to overreach it.” The other method, that of filling up the line, is in attack, as a rule, to be used for the purpose of carrying the line forward, the rush to be made as soon as the reinforcement reaches the firing line. Signals are prescribed for prolonging the line without advancing beyond it, for reinforcing that line and advancing beyond it, and for filling it up and carrying it forward in a rush.
(d) Closing Up. Assembling. Re-Forming.
(Pars. 211-214 and 230-232 German I. D. R.).
The most effective method of preventing a mixing of organizations in action is for all units constantly to endeavor to close in toward their leaders, filling gaps as soon as casualties have occurred. Squads which have sustained heavy losses unite with adjoining ones under a common leader. This closing in can, as a rule, be executed only while in motion. It must be effected gradually and the intervals ordered should be maintained. Crowding of every description increases losses and causes dangerous gaps along the entire front.
If in the course of an engagement, the purpose of the action and the situation make it no longer desirable to retain an extended order formation, each leader, from the squad leader upward, must assemble his unit at once and place himself and it at the disposal of the commander of the next higher unit. Formed bodies must be created quickly and held well in hand by their leaders, without awaiting specific orders to that effect.
The troops must be assembled very quietly and always facing the enemy.
The original organizations are not re-formed until the command “Fall in” is given. (Pars. 214 and 232 German I. D. R.).
10. SUPPORTS.
(Pars. 222-228 and 341 German I. D. R.).
The limited front assigned to an organization necessitates, in the first place, a division into firing line and retained fractions. At the decisive stage of a fight every available man must, without question, be in the first line.
Italy. Supports are not to be used when they cannot be maintained at a less distance from the firing line than that separating the latter from the enemy.
It is the duty of supports to reinforce and extend the firing line, to cover the flanks (par. 222 German I. D. R.), to act as a reserve, and, in case of necessity, as a rallying force upon which the firing line can fall back. The presence of supports increases confidence in attack, and the power of resistance in defense. Supports enable a leader to influence the action, to give a firing line that has been checked the impetus necessary to carry it forward, and to affect the action by sending reinforcements to points where he wishes to gain an advantage. The support follows that part of the firing line which, in all probability, will need its assistance; if part of the same organization as the firing line, it follows in rear of the center, otherwise in rear of a wing. In a company advancing alone over covered terrain, it will sometimes be necessary to place small supports in rear of both flanks. Firing lines can perhaps advance for some time under hostile fire, whether they move by twos, by squads, or by platoons, but the power necessary for pushing home the attack must be imparted to them from the rear; otherwise the energy of the attack will spend itself. The necessity of having supports in rear of the firing line is clearly illustrated in the very instructive engagement at Wagon Hill in front of Ladysmith (6th January 1900). In this fight all attempts to push the firing line forward failed, and the necessary impetus for the decisive advance was not given until fresh supports were fed into the firing line.[100]
[100] _The Times History of the War in South Africa_, III, p. 200.
In hilly country the supports can fire over the heads of the skirmishers in front of them without neglecting their proper functions. (Switzerland and England). Such opportunities should not be overlooked, as they increase the volume of fire.
Distances depend upon the object to be attained by the action and upon the terrain.
When a decision is sought, distances should be decreased in the course of the action. When this is the case, the leaders of all grades should be animated by but one desire, that of being in front in order to participate in gaining the victory. The duration of the crisis of an action is usually brief, and in a very few rapidly passing moments the leader must decide what to do with the troops remaining available.
When an immediate decision is not sought, it is advisable to increase distances in order to keep the echelons held back in rear from coming under fire. In any case, the distance between supports and firing line should be less than the distance between firing line and enemy. In an attack, supports should be close enough to the firing line to prevent, by timely interference, a retrograde movement of the latter. On the defensive, on account of the difficulty of bringing up supports for the purpose of repulsing an assault, they will usually be placed a short distance immediately in rear of or within the firing line (intrenched) at the points where they are to be employed.
During an attack, whenever the lines in rear cannot be kept out of hostile fire, care must nevertheless be taken that two echelons be not simultaneously struck by a cone of infantry fire or by one and the same shrapnel. The distance between echelons is therefore increased to more than 300 m., and should not be reduced until the decisive stage of the combat approaches.
In open country, supports held too close to the firing line will soon cease to exist as such. When kept in close order, their losses would be so great that the boldest men would join the firing line and the less courageous would hunt cover. Everything depends upon the manner in which supports are led forward, especially during that part of the advance immediately preceding their junction with the firing line. In this lies the whole art of fighting in deep formations. Covered terrain permits distances to be reduced. The commander should be particularly careful not to let this advantage escape him, since on such terrain it is more frequently necessary promptly to reinforce the firing line.
The commander of the support must constantly observe the movements and successes of the firing line in order that he may be able to reinforce it in the most advantageous manner. Whenever he is obliged to split up his command during a movement to the front, he should endeavor to reunite it at the first opportunity.
The support should closely adapt its movements to those of the firing line. When a part of the firing line makes a rush, the support halts for the moment, and then runs forward to the next cover, simultaneously with the next advancing unit of the firing line, and covered by the fire of the skirmishers in front. “To make a rush at the same time as the firing line was impossible, because, as soon as the latter rose, the Turks opened a murderous fire. Whenever the firing line threw itself down and returned the fire, that of the enemy became noticeably weaker.”[101]
[101] _Report of Lieutenant Borsov_, in KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_, III, p. 183.
The supports follow the firing line in single or double rank, in column of twos or squads, in skirmish line or in line of squads, in quick time or by rushes; it may also be advisable to deviate temporarily from the direction of advance. Columns having a narrow front, so long as they are not open to attack from a flank, are able to withstand long range infantry fire. (Par. 224 German I. D. R.). On coming to a halt, it is advisable to return to close order formation; at any rate, the leader must get his command again entirely under control.
Supports in Rear of the Firing Line or Not?
Up to a few years ago (1894), the French battalion was divided into firing line and companies of the second line. The Japanese, also, often placed entire companies in the firing line, which could not be quickly enough reinforced by the companies of the second line, because these were held too far in rear. At any rate, supports are of advantage during the first deployment before the situation is clear.
The following arguments are advanced against the employment of supports:
1. _The supports following the firing line suffer losses, without, as a rule, being able to participate in the action._ This argument is not well founded, since the criticism made with reference to supports is equally applicable to companies in the second line. That supports threw themselves into the firing line in the Franco-German war, in the belief that they were needlessly suffering losses, was due to the fact that they followed the firing line too closely.
Supports following the firing line closely (250-300 m.) can reach the firing line quickly and can easily find cover on account of the small angle of fall of modern bullets. Besides, the knowledge that supports are immediately in rear, the moral factor, should not be underestimated.
2. _The supports may be commanded by inexperienced leaders, who will not always act with the good judgment the situation demands and will fail to seize the right moment for advancing._ (This can perhaps never be avoided).
3. _Pushing the supports into the firing line tends to mix units, makes control more difficult, and impairs the efficacy of fire._ These criticisms are not applicable to a company, for it is in any case impossible for the company commander to control the fire; this is the business of platoon commanders.
The advantages of supports are, that they increase the number of targets offered the hostile artillery; that, by reason of their small size, they can utilize every accident of the ground; that they can be kept close enough to the firing line to reinforce it in case of sudden emergency; and that they allow companies in the second line to be kept farther to the rear. A battalion, when part of a larger force, need not keep formed bodies as supports; but a few platoons, following the firing line in close order on the flanks, are an advantage. The drawbacks of the _petits paquets_ would appear only if every company were to preserve a support up to the decisive stage of the action.
11. COMPARISON BETWEEN CLOSE AND EXTENDED ORDER.
In =close order= the men are placed so close together that they can be led by word of command and directly influenced by their officers. The position of the individual soldier is fixed; the men on either side of him interfere with his utilizing cover or his weapon. On terrain devoid of cover, close order formations present such large targets to infantry fire, that their employment, when exposed to the unsubdued fire of the enemy, is impossible and must lead to annihilation. Thus the hostile fire compels the most extended deployment.[102]
[102] Even during the Franco-German war it was impossible to employ close order formations in the first line, when opposed by an unshaken enemy, although this was still prescribed by the regulations. Whenever this was attempted tremendous losses resulted. In the battle of Vionville the 5th and 8th Companies of the 35th Füsilier-Regiment, formed into a half-battalion, and following the other companies of the battalion, which were pushed forward as the first line, suffered in five minutes a loss of 9 officers and 150 men (out of a total of about 400 men) from infantry fire at 1000 to 1200 m. “The impression produced was so overpowering that the commands for extending and deploying could not be executed at all and that the half-battalion had to be withdrawn in rear of the cemetery where it was assembled by the three officers still remaining.” _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 35_, p. 23.
In cases where troops appeared in close order each losses were not at all exceptional.
On August 18th, 1870, the Füsilier-Battalion of the 85th Infantry, advancing from Vernéville, at first in double column, then in half-battalion column, to within 400 paces of the enemy, lost 12 officers, 32 non-commissioned officers, and 437 men killed and wounded (52%) in 20 minutes by the cross-fire of hostile artillery and mitrailleuse batteries. At 800 paces from the enemy the fragments of the battalion were assembled in three platoons. _Gen. St. W._, II, p. 724. _Der 18. August_, p. 152.
The success of the bayonet attack made by the 9th Company of the 29th Infantry at St. Quentin may be explained by the inferiority of the opponent. _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 29_, p. 499.
In =extended order= the soldier’s position is not definitely fixed; he is not required to keep his body in a prescribed position, nor is he expected to handle his rifle by the numbers as in the manual. Instead, judgment, agility, courage, confidence in himself, skill in handling his weapon and in taking full advantage of the accidents of the ground, as well as unremitting attention to his leader, are demanded of the skirmisher.
The difficulties of troop leading are, moreover, increased by the noise and other disorganizing influences of the fight, especially in broken or wooded country. Whether an organization is thoroughly trained and disciplined is best shown in extended order fighting, for, as the direct control of the leader on his command decreases, the demands made on the initiative of the individual soldier increase out of all proportion. It is at any rate more practical to develop this initiative than to try to prevent the disorganizing effect of combat by restricting the personal freedom of the individual soldier.
In order to keep troops well in hand and to deploy them quickly in any direction, it is requisite that close order formations be retained as long as the terrain and the hostile fire permit. After an action, in order to make a renewed employment of the troops possible, they must be assembled in close order without regard to the previously existing organization.
In night combats, in actions against cavalry not supported by other arms, in putting down rebellions, and frequently in colonial wars[103] as well, the importance of close order formations increases when the troops show a disposition to get out of hand.
[103] The British _Infantry Training_ contains special regulations governing “savage warfare,” in which close order battalion formations are explicitly given the preference (order in echelon, square).
In extended order, infantry can most easily surmount obstacles, cross difficult terrain, and take the fullest advantage of the accidents of the ground, as cover against hostile fire and as rifle rests. In extended order, infantry is, moreover, able to develop its fire power most effectively, while at the same time offering the smallest possible targets to the hostile projectiles. Thus the _skirmish line_ is the principal combat formation of infantry; by means of it a combat is initiated and carried through to the end.
Close order is best adapted for establishing discipline in the simplest and most rapid manner by means of drill. At Jena the Prussian battalions were not defeated because of their drill, but because they were poorly led. What function drill had fulfilled at that time is pretty well illustrated by the heavy losses sustained by the Prussian infantry and by the fact that, although placed in a situation to which they were entirely unaccustomed, the troops retained their steadiness. No properly led army has been able to dispense with drill in developing its discipline. In the days of linear and column tactics the ultimate object of training was the leading of battalions in close order, in magnificent array, against the enemy. By means of drill a passive discipline was to be created in which intelligence played no part whatever. We know with what energy the army of the First Napoleon was drilled according to the wholly superannuated regulations of linear tactics in the camp at Boulogne and during the brief pauses between campaigns. A well drilled organization has ever, when well led, proved equal to the occasion.[104] The electrifying word of command is an important factor in assisting an organization accustomed to it to overcome difficult situations. No leader will voluntarily dispense with this aid. When Austrian shells struck the company of Count Finkenstein during the advance against the Shipwald, that officer halted his command, brought it to shoulder arms and did not continue the movement until order had been completely restored.
[104] Compare herewith _Der 18. August_, p. 463, in regard to the importance of discipline in the execution of the attack on St. Privat.
General v. Blume considers drill and skirmish training two distinct methods by means of which efficient soldiers may be created. To quote: “In this connection the most perfect results would undoubtedly be attained by efficient drill and thorough skirmish training.” Where both these methods cannot be coördinated, training in extended order fighting should take precedence. General v. d. Goltz raises the objection that this might perhaps produce skirmishers, but not soldiers, _i.e._, _men whose devotion to duty surpasses their fear of death_. General v. d. Goltz is right in demanding combat drill. In this term he includes the painstaking execution of all those accomplishments which the skirmisher needs in action and which he should be able to use correctly and quickly without lengthy deliberation. To this category belong rapid loading and setting of the sight, good pointing in any position, accurate aiming, cool firing, quick locking of the piece, prompt jumping up for the advance, taking advantage of accidents of the ground in lying down for the purpose of heightening the fire effect, crawling forward with or without firing, etc., etc. Since all these things must be practiced individually, and since many of them do not permit of simultaneous execution by an entire unit, we usually speak of combat training instead of combat drill, without, however, intending any other meaning.
“Drill is always mechanical. The instructor can make the skirmisher load quickly and carefully, can cause him to take the position of aim, just as he drills the correct execution of present arms and the rise preparatory to advancing by rushes. Training is directed at the mentality of the man, it makes him independent and allows him to exercise initiative, even when he is no longer directly under his superior officers’ influence, and when, in a critical hour, he is no longer able to follow their example.
“Drill and training are both justified, each in its appropriate sphere; the scope of both is closely defined and neither one could be dispensed with. ‘Drill’ assists in creating the ‘soldier,’ because it develops the characteristics which must be required of a ‘soldier’: Endurance in surmounting hardships and dangers, unquestioning subordination of his will to that of the leader, tenacity and trustworthiness, skill in handling his weapon and in utilizing the ground. The addition of training will, of course, increase the value of this ‘soldier’ very considerably.
“Training alone will never attain this object. To arouse and develop the man’s intellect may make him a good skirmisher, a skillful member of a patrol, but for battle he remains incomplete, since his awakened mental powers have not been made available by the disciplining drill. His energies are not governed by a higher will. Nothing can give us the assurance that he may not fail at the most decisive moment. He is no soldier.”[105]
[105] V. D. GOLTZ, _Zur Gefechtsausbildung_, p. 26.
The French, for reasons inherent in their character, discard this drill and seek to replace it by developing the moral factors: “Moral powers are the mightiest pillars of success. Honor and patriotism fill troops with the noblest devotion. The spirit of self-sacrifice and the determination to win ensure success; discipline and steadiness guarantee the influence of the leaders and the coöperation of all the elements.”[106]
[106] _Introduction to the French Infantry Drill Regulations_.
“However, when necessity demands the creation of new organizations--whether militia, volunteers, or _gardes mobiles_,--it is a great mistake to expect everything from moral factors; even though hatred of the enemy, enthusiasm for the fatherland, the republic or for glory, rise to the highest pitch. ‘Victory or death’ is the watchword when marching out--but neither is quickly attainable; weeks and months of the severest hardships, exhausting marches, wet and hungry bivouacs must first be endured. Very soon the intoxication of enthusiasm is gone and reality weighs heavily on the sobered men. Finally the enemy is confronted. But he is not to be annihilated at once by a rapid assault--not at all; the advance is made very slowly and the highest enthusiasm is given ample time to evaporate during the many hours in which death is constantly faced.” LAYMAN.
For enthusiasm, we would substitute faithful, unselfish performance of duty, and unquestioning subordination of the will of the individual to that of the leader. To be sure, on days of success enthusiasm will suffice, but not when everything around us begins to waver and to yield. The importance of drill, which cannot be replaced by anything else, does not become apparent until all enthusiasm disappears, until the leader becomes conscious of the specter of panic which stalks by the side of enthusiasm.
“Discipline,” says Archduke John in his well-known work _Drill or Training_, “must not be confounded with the snappy drill of troops, and can, moreover, not be attained by means of it. The straightjacket has never yet cured one insane person; the soul cannot be disciplined through the body. One must work from the inside and not from the outside. It is of little value if the outer annular rings of a tree are beautiful and regular; it will rot and die in spite of its deceptive appearance; if its heart is not healthy, the first storm may bring it down. The inner man must look beautiful; firmness and steadiness are needed within; the marching tread of feet on the drill ground plain are of no moment; the beat of the heart filled with the spirit of self-sacrifice is the important factor.”
It is well known that Emperor William I. changed the title of the brochure _Drill or Training_, written by Archduke John, to _Drill and Training_. Training necessitates a good corps of instructors and a great deal of time, whereas drill will accomplish in a shorter time results which are not so enduring. It is again presupposed that the recruits are willing to be trained, otherwise all efforts are unavailing. The question whether the individual man can be influenced sufficiently in a two years’ service period to overcome even sentiments inimical to the state, instilled in him by friends or relatives, can only be answered by the next war. To answer this question at the present time would be premature; but one thing is certain: the sharp word of command, the whole influence of a well-organized body of troops, will sweep along even the reluctant in the hour of danger.
The importance of the tactical formations which at one time constituted minor tactics has doubtlessly decreased; unfavorable formations, in so far as they increase or reduce losses, increase or restrict one’s fire effect, can be offset by the fighting efficiency of the soldier and by proper leading. The unfortunate termination of the battle of Jena for the Prussian arms, as already mentioned, bears no relation to drill as such. The formations in themselves were not at fault, for linear tactics scored the greatest successes in the Peninsular war and at Waterloo; and at the Katzbach, Prussian battalions of Borke’s Brigade in line overran the French columns. Within certain limits, numerical inferiority and lack of fighting efficiency can be offset by leadership. But numbers and fighting efficiency will always remain the decisive factors for success.
The victory of Spicheren was due primarily to the troops and not to leadership. This is likewise true of Wörth. The lion’s share in the victory of Vionville is certainly due to the fighting efficiency of the gallant Brandenburgers. Finally, at St. Privat, the crisis produced by the commanders was successfully overcome only by the tenacity of the troops, who maintained their positions for hours under the most destructive hostile fire.
Increased demands must at present be made upon the combat training of the soldier. The combat requires enterprising, self-sacrificing, cold-blooded men who are imbued with the spirit of the reckless offensive. “The combat requires thinking leaders, _trained to rely upon themselves_, and _skirmishers having initiative_.” (Par. 2 German I. D. R.). “Judgment, self-confidence and boldness must be aroused and continually developed in the young soldier.” (Par. 144 German I. D. R.). “The aim of all exercises should be to develop the soldier into a self-thinking and conscientiously working skirmisher.” (Par. 158 German I. D. R.). “All training should be directed toward producing self-reliance in leaders and in the individual skirmisher.” (Par. 251 German I. D. R.). “The infantry must nourish the desire for taking the offensive; its actions must be guided by the one thought, _forward, at the enemy, no matter what the cost_.” (Par. 265 German I. D. R.). “The continuous desire to press forward and the endeavor to surpass all other units must animate all parts of the attacking force.” (Par. 327 German I. D. R.). “It should be a point of honor with skirmishers not to allow the supports to overtake them earlier than the moment of penetrating the enemy’s position.” (Par. 348 German I. D. R.). “Those who fall must be left behind. These sacrifices should not lead to an abatement of the pursuit any more than the losses sustained in the previous fight caused the renunciation of the purpose of the combat.” (Par. 424 German I. D. R.). “A commander who is ever willing to shoulder responsibility will not shrink from throwing troops into the fight _regardless of consequences_ even when the outcome of the battle is doubtful.” (Par. 304 German I. D. R.).
If love of life and fear of death are overcome in a soldier by discipline, in an officer this must be brought about by a higher sense of duty and honor. On the battlefield the desire to live does not appear in a cultured person, as a rule, in its ordinary, undisguised form; it makes itself felt rather in the shape of tactical scruples, whether the leader would be justified in leading his subordinates to certain death, whether it would not be his duty to preserve the force entrusted to him for more important duty in the service of the fatherland, instead of sacrificing it uselessly. If, in addition, an officer has been allowed, in time of peace, to criticise, from the start, an order of his superior with reference to its feasibility, it may easily happen in the stern reality of actual war that a subordinate leader, neither especially courageous nor ambitious, succumbs to the seductive whisperings of his senses on the approach of danger and sees in caution the better part of valor. It is always suspicious if troops have become accustomed to consider insignificant losses, common to colonial wars, accompanied by great physical exertions, as indications of good leadership.[107] Great victories are, as a rule, invariably accompanied by great losses.
[107] In this connection and in regard to the British losses in South Africa, see my lecture: _Die Lehren des Burenkrieges_ (1904), p. 8, et seq. The behavior of Sir Redvers Buller at Colenso and Spionskop is interesting. See _The Times History of the War in South Africa_, III, pp. 234, 236, 297, 318.
III. THE POWER OF FIREARMS AND EXPEDIENTS FOR MINIMIZING LOSSES.
A. THE POWER OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
1. THE FIELD GUN.
The field artillery of all the states that need be considered is armed with a rapid-fire gun provided with shields and capable under peace conditions of firing as many as twenty shots per minute. Its caliber varies from 7.5 to 8.38 cm. (Germany, 7.7; France, 7.5; Russia, 7.62, and England, 8.38 cm., the last-named being an 18 pdr.). The German gun fires shrapnel weighing 6.85 kg. (the Russian, 6.5, and the French 7.25 kg.) and high explosive shell of approximately the same weight, with an initial velocity of 465 m. (the Russian 588 and the French 530 m.). The projectiles are burst through the action of combination fuzes (in Germany graduated to 5000, in France and Russia to 5500 m.). The projectiles have a maximum range of 8000 m., when percussion fuze is used. Canister has been replaced by shrapnel, which bursts approximately 200 m. in front of the gun when the fuze is set at zero. The German field artillery is also equipped with a light field howitzer, cal. 10.5 cm., which fires shrapnel weighing 12.8 kg. (time fuze ranging from 300 to 5600 m.) and shell weighing 15.7 kg. (time fuze ranging from 500 to 5600 m.). The Germans use heavy field howitzers (cal. 14.91 cm., firing shell that has an extreme range of 6870 m.) in the heavy artillery of the field army. France uses the 15.5 cm. Rimailho howitzer, England a 12.7 cm. howitzer and another long piece of 12 cm. caliber.
=Percussion shrapnel= is used for defense at short range, and in fire for adjustment; its effect depends upon the range and the nature of the ground. It is effective against troops lodged in tall timber. Masks, branches of trees, etc., frequently cause the premature burst of the projectiles.[108]
[108] Engagement of Azay (6th January, 1871). _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 20_. HOFFBAUER, _Deutsche Artillerie_, I, pp. 16 and 49. _Taktik_, VI, p. 42.
Percussion shrapnel is effective only when bursting immediately in front of the target (5-25 m. in front of it, depending upon the range). However, even in this case, the bullets often pass over low targets, such as skirmishers lying down, and low parapets afford sufficient protection. An adequate effect can be obtained only when the fire is directed on vertical targets. Soft ground, newly ploughed fields, terrain covered with snow or underbrush, small folds of the ground, or a rising slope, diminish the fire effect. When the angle of fall is 10 degrees or more (with the German piece at ranges of 3300 m. and over) half of the bullets penetrate the ground, the remainder ricochet and pass on at a greatly reduced velocity. The explosive or incendiary effect of shrapnel is insignificant owing to the smallness of the bursting charge. However, some incendiary effect is possible if the projectile strikes an easily inflammable target.[109]
[109] Consult _Taktik_, VI, p. 45, in regard to the incendiary effect of projectiles.
=Time shrapnel= (used in Germany up to 5000 m.) is fairly independent of the terrain, the burst being easily observed since the bullets are embedded in a “smoke-producing composition.” The extreme range at which this projectile can be employed is fixed by the facility of observing the fire and by the remaining velocity of the shrapnel bullets, both of which diminish as the range increases. Field guns, model ’96, may be effectively employed up to a range of 4000 m.; under 3000 m. their fire is so annihilating that decisive results are produced in a short time. (Par. 630 German F. S. R.). The use of the combination fuze, on account of its certainty of burst, either by time or percussion, permits the trajectory to be accurately determined in every case. This fuze also makes it possible to employ shrapnel against rapidly advancing targets, and in warding off a sudden attack at short range. The French Regulations give the width of the beaten zone of a single shrapnel as 20, that of two from the same piece as 25 m. The maximum depth of the beaten zone is 300 m. The angle of the cone of dispersion of the German shrapnel, model ’96, is 16 degrees at 2000 m. German shrapnel (model ’91) fired at a line of infantry did not strike lines following 250 m. in rear of the first, whereas in case of base charge shrapnel these lines would be safe only at 350-400 m. from the first line. The German shrapnel gives very good results when set to burst 30 to 150 m. in front of the target, the height of burst being regulated accordingly (approximately ¹⁄₃ of the whole number of hundreds of meters of the range). At ranges under 1500 m., an adequate fire effect may, however, be expected even when the fuze is set to burst the projectile 300 m. in front of the target. (Par. 30 German F. A. F. R.).
Shrapnel is most effective against skirmishers lying down from 1000 to 3000 m. when burst 28 to 22 m. short, and against standing skirmishers at the same ranges when burst 56 to 45 m. short. The two tables given below, borrowed from the work of Lieutenant-General Rohne on artillery tactics,[110] give an idea of the effect of a single time shrapnel, and of the effect per minute of shrapnel fire after adjusting upon the target:
======================+======================================= |When firing at the targets named (1 |skirmisher per m.) with time shrapnel, TARGETS. |mod. ’96, set to burst 50 m. short, the |following _hits per shrapnel_ may be |expected after the adjustment has been |effected: ----------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------- | 500 m.|1000 m.|2000 m.|3000 m.|4000 m. ----------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------- Skirmishers standing | 18.4 | 14.2 | 12.0 | 11.0 | 10.4 Skirmishers kneeling | 10.6 | 8.2 | 6.9 | 6.3 | 5.8 Skirmishers lying down| 6.4 | 4.9 | 4.1 | 3.8 | 3.5 Head targets | 3.5 | 2.7 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 1.9 ----------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
======================+======================================= |When firing at the targets named TARGETS. |(skirmish line with 1 skirmisher per |m.), under service conditions, with time |shrapnel, mod. ’96, set to burst 50-100 |m. short, the following hits per minute |may be expected on an average: ----------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------- | 500 m.|1000 m.|2000 m.|3000 m.|4000 m. ----------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------- Skirmishers standing | 364 | 202 | 109 | 46 | 14 Skirmishers kneeling | 210 | 117 | 63 | 27 | 8 Skirmishers lying down| 126 | 70 | 38 | 16 | 5 Head targets | 70 | 39 | 21 | 9 | 3 ----------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
[110] ROHNE, _Die Taktik der Feldartillerie_, Berlin, 2nd Edition, p. 9.
More than 80% of the men struck by fragments and bullets from shrapnel bursting within 100 m. are disabled. The penetration of shrapnel bullets is so great, at ranges under 2000 m., that when they strike bones or vital organs of horses, they produce instant incapacity for action. This is especially true when the interval of burst is less than 100 m. The effect of shrapnel directed against batteries provided with shields is insignificant. Time shrapnel is the principal projectile employed by artillery against animate objects, provided these are not located immediately in rear of parapets, within tall timber, or under bomb-proofs. This projectile is ineffective against such cover on account of the flatness of the trajectory and the sensitiveness of the fuze.
Shrapnel is to be supplemented by =shell= filled with explosive charge, model ’88, which has a great explosive effect at extreme ranges and in tall timber. (See pars. 159-160 German F. A. F. R., in regard to action against shielded batteries).
Percussion shell, on account of its very sensitive fuze, bursts on penetrating the shield, while percussion shrapnel goes entirely through the shield and bursts about ¹⁄₂ m. in rear of it.
Targets located immediately in rear of parapets or under light splinter proofs may be reached with time shell burst directly over or close in front of them. The depth of the beaten zone of this projectile is small, seldom exceeding 50 m., even when the fire is directed against targets in the open. About 75% of all the fragments are capable of inflicting disabling wounds when the interval of burst is short. The peculiar character of the projectile necessitates a very careful adjustment in range and in height of burst. The French _obus allongé_, a high explosive percussion shell (melinite charge; angle of the cone of dispersion exceeds 100 degrees) is employed only for the destruction of material objects.[111]
[111] When firing on animate objects, the beaten zone of this projectile does not exceed a space 50 m. wide and 20 m. deep, but the concussion of the explosion will undoubtedly be felt at a greater distance. The explosive effect of the projectile is equivalent to that of 30 kg. of powder. The explosion of the projectile produces a cone-shaped crater having a diameter of 2 and a depth of 0.50 m. Ten melinite shells per running meter are required to destroy a parapet 3 m. thick and 2.30 m. high.
The French projectile, on account of the fuze used, bursts only after it has pierced thin walls or shields.
2. THE LIGHT FIELD HOWITZER.
The realization that the power of resistance of a defender lodged in deep trenches, could not be broken by the fire of guns having a flat trajectory, led to the re-adoption of a gun capable of high angle fire, which had been eliminated from the field artillery upon the advent of rifled cannon.[112]
[112] After March, 1859, the artillery of a mobilized Prussian army corps consisted of three horse batteries, each armed with six 6-pounder guns and two 7-pounder howitzers; six foot batteries, each armed with eight 12-pounder guns; and three foot batteries, each armed with eight 7-pounder howitzers. Thus the artillery of an army corps numbered 30 howitzers and 66 guns.
For both flat trajectory and high angle fire, the light field howitzer, model ’98, employs shrapnel weighing 12.8 kg. (500 jacketed bullets, @ 10 g.; time fuze graduated from 300 to 5600 m.) and shell weighing 15.7 kg. (0.37 kg. explosive charge, model ’88; time fuze graduated from 500 to 5600 m.). As delay action fuzes are used, it is possible to utilize to the fullest extent the power of penetration of the projectile before it bursts.
A single shrapnel from a light field howitzer produces a greater number of hits, when the point of burst is favorably situated, than one fired from a field gun. However, the projectiles fired from the latter have a deeper beaten zone on account of the flatter trajectory of the piece, and a greater penetration owing to their greater remaining velocity. The German Artillery Firing Regulations (par. 30) consider the effect of both projectiles “very good” and of equal value at the principal ranges, when burst at a moderate distance (30 to 150 m.) from the target. The effect of shrapnel from the field gun and from the light field howitzer is considered adequate at ranges under 1500 m., when bursts are regulated to occur within 300 and 200 m., respectively, in front of the target. The superiority of the shrapnel fired from a field gun is due to the greater penetration of the jacketed bullets (a result of greater velocity of the projectile itself at the point of burst). But in this connection it is to be borne in mind that the effect of single shots only is here considered. The shrapnel fire of the field gun is considerably superior to that of the howitzer. This is due to the fact that the howitzer fires more slowly than the field gun and must expend twice the weight of ammunition to produce the same results. If, in addition, it is remembered that the field battery carries approximately 2¹⁄₂ times as many shrapnel as the light field howitzer battery, it is obvious that the fire of the former will be 2¹⁄₂ times as effective, against targets in the open, as that of the latter.
The superiority of the heavier projectile asserts itself when it becomes necessary to destroy material objects.
The shell fired from pieces having a flat trajectory is employed against troops immediately behind cover. The shell is burst immediately in front of, over, or in rear of the target, which is thus struck by splinters from above. The more nearly perpendicular the splinters strike the target, and the greater their number and weight, the greater will be the effect produced. The angle of the cone of dispersion is about 200 degrees; with appropriate points of burst, fragments weighing 15 g. (80%) incapacitate for action. In curved fire, at ranges beyond 2100 m., shell with delay action fuze is capable of penetrating the splinter proof cover usually employed in the field. At ranges under 2100 m. its angle of fall is too small to make an adequate effect certain.
3. THE HEAVY FIELD HOWITZER.
The heavy field howitzer employs shell weighing 39.5 kg., containing an explosive charge of 0.85 g., and fitted with a percussion fuze either with or without delay action. This shell is designed to penetrate the roofs of splinter proofs. An earth covering 5-6 m. thick is necessary to afford protection against these projectiles. At 3000 m. a 15 cm. shell produces a crater 1 m. deep and 2.4 to 3.6 m. in diameter, _i.e._, 2 cu. m. (in made ground this crater is three times this size). The heavy field howitzer is a very effective weapon against shielded batteries. A single shell, owing to its lateral explosive effect, is capable of placing a whole battery temporarily out of action.
4. EXPEDIENTS FOR MINIMIZING THE EFFECT OF FIRE.
Movements of infantry under artillery fire are unavoidable when firing lines are to be reinforced and when troops intended for the decisive attack are to be pushed closer to the enemy. Formations calculated to minimize the effect of the hostile fire must be taken up in time, since it is not always possible to make use of cover. The efficacy of the fire depends upon the accurate determination of the range and height of burst (fire for adjustment) and upon the careful observation of the subsequent fire (fire for effect).[113] The effect of this fire is considerably increased when the opponent’s infantry, against whom the fire is directed, takes up unsuitable formations (particularly broad line formations). Infantry has frequently found it advantageous to advance in small detachments moving rapidly at irregular intervals in extended order.
[113] The color of uniforms exerts considerable influence on observation. According to experiments made in France, colors rank as follows as regards visibility: white (invisible at night), light blue, alizarine red, green, dark brown, gray, or yellowish brown. _Schweizer Zeitschrift für Artillerie und Genie_, 1896, I, p. 39. The following colors protect against heat, in the order named (in reverse order against cold): white, red, orange, yellow, green, blue, violet, black. The position of gray in the list depends upon the amount of white or black mixed with it.
(a) Increasing the Difficulties in the Adjustment of the Hostile Fire.
A battery requires about 0.8 minutes (5 to 6 rounds with percussion fuze) to secure adjustment at ranges up to 750 m. The time required for securing adjustment at the longer ranges is as follows:
At 800-1500 m., on low infantry targets, 1.5 min., 6-9 rounds with perc. fuze; At 1700-2250 m., on low infantry targets, 3.7 min., 11 rounds with perc. fuze; At 2000-3000 m., on artillery targets, 4.6 min., 11 rounds with perc. fuze;
Narrow columns moving to their right or left front are very unfavorable targets for artillery, as it is very difficult for a battery commander to determine the relative position of bursts on the flank of a column with respect to the leading element thereof. Such shots are frequently considered as over. Numerous small columns, which make it difficult to designate a target, increase the time required by the hostile artillery to secure adjustment.
Troops should not be posted in the vicinity of conspicuous objects, as, for example, trees, visible at a great distance.[114] Intrenchments that have just been thrown up should be made to look as nearly as possible like the surrounding country by covering them with snow, sod, or brush. It is made more difficult for the hostile artillery to secure adjustment, if our infantry changes position to the front or to a flank, if it moves rapidly or advances by rushes.
[114] The cutting down of a poplar at Königgrätz decreased the effect of the Austrian artillery fire, which, previous to this, had caused rather serious losses. _Geschichte des Regiments, Nr. 2_, p. 36. A similar effect was produced by tearing down a house at Lovtcha. KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_, I, p. 59.
It is easy, as a rule, for the artillery to adjust its fire upon masks, but difficult to determine the distance between mask and target. It is an advantage when masks are situated obliquely to a position. As masks (rows of trees) may cause the premature burst of projectiles having percussion fuzes, they should be at least 200 m. from the troops they are to =screen=.[115] When so situated they frequently afford better protection than actual intrenchments.
[115] Fight of some Prussian batteries against a French battery masked by chaussee trees at Weiszenburg. See HOFFBAUER, _Deutsche Artillerie_, I, pp. 13 and 49. The 4th Light and the 4th Heavy Batteries of the 10th Field Artillery (German) were able to maintain their position east of Mars-la-Tour, under the fire of superior hostile artillery, because they were screened by the trees and the embankment of the chaussee thirty paces in their front. _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschrift_, 25, p. 18.
The sustained bombardment of Schlosz Ladonchamps (situated on the Moselle flats north of Metz) with 12 cm. guns, which fired 200 shots per day from Oct. 9th to 10th, and 100 per day from Oct. 11th to 16th, 1870, was unsuccessful, because the percussion shells were ineffective. This will not be changed in the future by the adoption of high-explosive shells. According to DICK DE LONLAY, the garrison of the castle and its park lost only 5-10 men per day during this time. The defensibility of the castle was not impaired, although projectiles finally fell into the building itself during the sustained bombardment. According to the same author (IV, p. 556) 1,022 shells fell into the park and castle of Ladonchamps on October 7th, but only ten men were placed out of action.
(b) Minimizing the Effect of Fire.
Formations that increase the effect of artillery fire, as for example lines and columns, and positions in which a flank is refused, should be avoided. It is a good plan to increase the number of targets and to employ narrow columns (column of twos) that are not too deep. Supports must be far enough in rear (300-400 m.) to prevent two targets being struck by one and the same shrapnel.
Of the close order formations used in the Russo-Japanese war, platoons or sections in columns of squads or twos,[116] separated by a maximum interval of 50 paces, were indeed found more suitable under fire than line formations, but the losses were nevertheless very serious except where cover screened the advancing troops from view or afforded them actual protection.
[116] The advance against Beaumont and the height of Chancy during the battle of Beaumont. HOPFFGARTEN-HEIDLER, _Beaumont_, pp. 124 and 238. _Geschichte des Regiments, Nr. 93_, II, p. 97. At Gravelotte this formation was employed with advantage by the _Königin_ Regiment during its advance on Amanweiler, and later in the campaign during the assault on Le Bourget. _Geschichte des Regiments Königin_, pp. 9 and 132.
During the Franco-German war, line of platoons in columns of twos was found advantageous on several occasions.[117] This formation has the following disadvantages, however: it is very susceptible to flanking fire; the influence of the officers is principally restricted to the leading elements; intervals are easily lost and on that account it becomes more difficult to form line. It would seem to be better, therefore, to advance in line of platoons (or sections) in columns of squads, or, under flanking fire, in line of squads in columns of twos or files. In the last-named formation the intervals between squads are easily lost, however, and the company then becomes a dense skirmish line of from four to six ranks. To echelon the platoons slightly has very little value on account of the depth of the beaten zone of modern shrapnel.
[117] This formation is also well adapted for passing through woods. _Taktik_, VI, p. 108.
In attacks made during the latter part of the Russo-Japanese war, both belligerents finally made use of thin successive skirmish lines for advancing; these lines followed each other at 200-300 m. and united again on reaching cover.
5. THE RESULTS OBTAINED BY ARTILLERY AGAINST VARIOUS TARGETS.
_Germany._ According to computations made by Lieutenant-General Rohne,[118] the following hits may be expected from every time shrapnel, model ’96, when burst an average of 50 m. short of the targets named:
=====+=========+=========+======+================= Range|Standing.|Kneeling.|Prone.| Intrenched m. | | | |Skirmishers.[119] -----+---------+---------+------+----------------- 500| 18.4 | 10.6 | 6.4 | 3.5 1000| 14.2 | 8.2 | 4.9 | 2.4 2000| 12. | 6.9 | 4.1 | 2.3 3000| 11. | 6.3 | 3.8 | 2.1 4000| 10. | 5.8 | 3.5 | 1.9 -----+---------+---------+------+-----------------
[118] _Die Taktik der Feldartillerie_, p. 9 _et seq._
[119] One skirmish figure per meter.
The number of hits per minute obtained by a battery firing 50 shots at 500 m., 30 at 1000 m., 20 at 2000 m., 10 at 3000 m., and 4 at 4000 m., is as follows:
=====+=========+=========+======+================= Range|Standing.|Kneeling.|Prone.| Intrenched m. | | | |Skirmishers.[120] -----+---------+---------+------+----------------- 500| 364 | 210 | 126 | 70 1000| 202 | 117 | 70 | 39 2000| 109 | 63 | 38 | 21 3000| 46 | 27 | 16 | 9 4000| 14 | 8 | 5 | 3 -----+---------+---------+------+-----------------
[120] One skirmish figure per meter.
_France._[121] According to the French Field Artillery Regulations (footnote to par. 277), a gun firing time shrapnel covers effectively a front of 25 m., and a battery of four pieces, a front of 100 m. This intensity of fire, which is obtained when each piece fires one shot with proper corrector and range settings (the battery four shots) Aubrat calls “_Density 4_.” When _rafale_ fire (two shots per piece) is employed against a front of 100 m., with proper corrector setting, density 8 is obtained. When the front exceeds 100 m., the deflection of the pieces must be changed between successive shots (_tir avec fauchage_). To obtain density 8 against a front of 150 m., each piece must fire three shots, as prescribed in the regulations. When progressive fire (_tir progressif_) is employed, four different ranges are given, of which only one can be considered effective. When not sweeping, in this fire, each piece fires two shots, thus also obtaining a density of 8. A density of 1 always corresponds, therefore, to one round, fired, with proper corrector and range settings, against a front of 100 m. When a battery (four pieces) fires one salvo against a target having a front of 50 m., density 8 is obtained; by firing two salvos, density 16 is obtained.
[121] The following is taken from Lieutenant-General ROHNE’S essay on the work of Squadron Commander AUBRAT, _Les exercices de service en campagne_. The essay mentioned appeared in the December, 1907, number of _Artilleristische Monatsschriften_.
The _Commission d’études pratiques du tir_ has made a thorough investigation into the effect produced by shrapnel fire. The following table gives a general idea of the effect to be expected when firing against service targets (_i.e._, the percentage of figures one may expect to hit when employing fire of varying density):
==============================================+======================= | DENSITY. TARGETS. +-----+-----+-----+----- | 4 | 8 | 16 | 32 ----------------------------------------------+-----+-----+-----+----- | % | % | % | % Infantry skirmishers standing in the open, or | | | | a single rank line | 25 | 40 | 65 |---- | | | | Skirmishers lying down; gun crews under fire | | | | but protected by shields of the French type. | | | | Space between shields and ground not closed | 7.5| 15 | 25 | 40 | | | | Infantry lying down behind knapsacks; gun | | | | crews protected by shields. Space between | | | | shields and ground not closed | ----| 7.5 | 15 | 25 | | | | Infantry lying down behind their knapsacks, | | | | but not firing; gun crews protected by | | | | shields. Space between shields and ground | | | | closed so that bullets cannot pass through | ----| 0-2 | ----|---- ----------------------------------------------+-----+-----+-----+-----
A skirmish line 100 m. long, and lying down, would suffer a loss of 15% irrespective of its strength, from progressive fire (_tir progressif_; 32 rounds, density 8). If the interval between skirmishers in the open amounts to 1¹⁄₂ paces, for instance, the front would contain 62 skirmishers, and the resulting loss would amount to 9 men. If the men have placed their knapsacks in front of them, the loss would be reduced by half. A line of skirmishers of the same length and strength as the one considered above, would suffer a loss of 40%, or 25 men, when standing up or advancing. About 1¹⁄₂ minutes are required to fire one _tir progressif_, after adjustment has been secured. The same effect could be obtained in about 20 seconds by firing a _rafale_ of eight rounds, provided the battery has accurately adjusted its fire.
6. THE EFFECT OF SHRAPNEL BULLETS ON ANIMATE TARGETS.[122]
[122] BIRCHER, Colonel and Corps Surgeon of the Swiss IInd Army Corps, _Die Wirkung der Artillerie Geschosse_, Aarau, 1899. KÜTTNER, _Kriegschirurgische Erfahrungen aus dem südafrikanischen Kriege 1900_. Tübingen, 1900. HILDEBRAND, _Die Verwundungen durch die modernen Kriegsfeuerwaffen_. I (1905). BOHNE, _Über die Wirkung des Schrapnelschusses_, in _Militär-Wochenblatt_, No. 74, 1902.
The wounds produced by shrapnel bullets are similar to those caused by the lead bullets of the infantry weapons of the past. When the bullet strikes normally to the surface, it produces a wound circular at the point of impact and considerably enlarged at the point of exit; bones are frequently shattered; and the most serious effect is the introduction of foreign substances, such as pieces of cloth, particles of earth or sand, or of the material in which the bullet is embedded.
The effect of shrapnel bullets on animate targets depends upon the striking energy of the bullets (expressed by kgm.) and on their density, those of smaller cross-section having the greater penetration. The closer the point of burst is to the target, the greater the velocity, and, naturally, the effect.
Opinions differ as to the amount of “striking energy” necessary to put animate targets out of action. In France, an energy of at least 4.8 kgm. is considered necessary to disable human beings, and for horses an average of 19 kgm., while in Germany, an average energy of 8 kgm. is deemed sufficient. The 10 g. hardened lead bullet, having a diameter of 12.3 mm., retains this energy until its remaining velocity is only 120 m. At ranges up to 1500 m., over 80% of the men struck by fragments and bullets from shrapnel, bursting within 300 m. (and beyond this range from shrapnel bursting within 150 m.) are put out of action. (Par. 30 German F. A. F. R.). In comparison, artillery projectiles produce a greater number of fatal wounds than infantry projectiles.
It is worthy of note that the packed knapsack affords protection against all shrapnel bullets having a velocity of 100 m. and against half of those having a velocity of 200 m. The overcoat roll stops shrapnel bullets having a velocity of less than 250 m. The penetration of these bullets is so great, at ranges under 2000 m., that when they strike bones or vital organs of horses, they produce instant incapacity for action. This is especially true when the interval of burst is less than 100 m.
B. INFANTRY FIRE.[123]
[123] Lieutenant-General ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_. Colonel MINARELLI-FITZGERALD, Austrian Army, _Modernes Schieszwesen_, 1901.
The modern infantry rifle, cal. 6.5 to 8. mm., is a magazine arm employing steel jacketed, pointed bullets, arranged in clips. The adoption of automatic rifles is contemplated. In these rifles the recoil energy is utilized for throwing out empty shells and for placing a fresh cartridge into the chamber at the same time. The objections made to the adoption of such a rifle (complexity of the mechanism, danger of wasting ammunition) are similar to the reasons advanced against the adoption of breech-loading and magazine rifles. In addition to the increased rate of fire, the advantage of eliminating the effect of the recoil on the skirmisher must not be underestimated. Moreover, the elimination of the recoil makes a further increase in the initial velocity of the projectile possible.
The effect of infantry fire may be considered from two points of view, viz.: the effect on the enemy of a single projectile, and the effective hit in itself.
1. THE EFFECT OF A SINGLE PROJECTILE ON ANIMATE TARGETS.[124]
[124] See _Löbells Militärische Jahresberichte_, 1905, p. 475, and 1906, p. 412, which contain complete references to military literature. _Militär-Wochenblatt_, No. 1, 1906.
During the Russo-Japanese war the contending parties used the following small arms and projectiles:
======+=========+=======+=====+=====================+========= | Rifle. | Model | Cal.| PROJECTILE. |Initial | |(year).| |Description. |Weight.|Velocity. | | | mm. | | g. | m. ------+---------+-------+-----+-------------+-------+--------- Japan |{Arisaka | ’97 | 6.5 |Hardened lead| 10.5 | 715 |{Murata | ’94 | 8.0 |core with | 15.42 | 564 | | | |copper-nickel| | Russia| ---- | ’91 | 7.62|jacket. | 13.7 | 615 ------+---------+-------+-----+-------------+-------+---------
The ballistic qualities of the _Arisaka_ rifle were superior to those of the Russian arm, but the maiming effect of the two rifles was about equal. The striking energy of the projectiles was not sufficient in every case, however, to put a man out of action. The explosive effect produced by bullets striking interior organs and bones at short ranges (within 500 m.) was more evident in wounds made by the 8. mm. than by the _Arisaka_ rifle.[125]
[125] “The projectile that penetrates animal organisms displaces and consequently destroys the tissue fibers lying in its path. The projectile communicates a portion of its energy to the molecules struck, and these in turn transfer that energy to adjoining ones. The greater the velocity of the projectile at the moment of impact, the more rapid is this transfer of motion. Especially in organs filled with fluid are the molecules, like firm bodies, thrown with the greatest rapidity. This has a destructive effect which in the past has never been observed to be so extensive, and which gives the impression that the projectile has exploded in the body. In order to produce this effect a velocity of about 350 to 400 m. is required, which was, of course, not obtainable in rifles of older pattern, and was only possible in the immediate vicinity of the muzzle. Whenever the projectile strikes a marrow bone with great velocity it shatters it completely at the point of impact, and splinters it to a considerable extent, all because the bone is filled with a liquid substance.” ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, p. 69.
At mid ranges the wounds were generally of a mild character, unless produced by tumbling bullets.[126]
[126] See also _Ricochets_, p. 185 infra.
Experiments prove that a projectile will tumble if it encounters varying resistance (for example, if the projectile strikes an obstacle, even if that be only a twig) or if it penetrates materials of different density (for instance, if, in penetrating a body, it strikes first upon a fleshy part, then upon bones). In the last mentioned case the bullet will frequently tumble in the body. If a projectile be fired through a series of boards, placed at intervals, it will tumble in the second board, or if not there, then certainly in the third board. Projectiles which ricochet on the ground before penetrating a human body change their form more or less, according to the character of the ground on which they ricochet. As the jacket is frequently torn, thus exposing the leaden kernel, wounds may be produced which will equal those made by explosive bullets.
The striking energy of the projectile is sufficient to perforate two men at 1200 m. From experiments made with the _Lebel_ rifle on corpses, it appeared that the projectile passed clear through 5 bodies at 100 m., through 4 bodies at 400 m. (even when large bones were struck) and through 2 bodies at 1200 m.
In the Russo-Japanese war wounds were distributed as follows, on a basis of 100 hits: lower limbs, 39.5; upper limbs, 25.4; abdominal region, 16.5; chest, 15.5; spinal column, 15, and head, 11. Flesh wounds are generally slight. This is due to the fact that the hole made by the bullet is small, that the exterior flow of blood is insignificant, and that the wound rarely becomes infected. Projectiles remain in the body now much more rarely than in the past.
The central portion of marrow bones is frequently splintered by projectiles, while thicker flat bones (shoulder blades) are cleanly perforated.
Unless a tumbling bullet or a splinter of a bone penetrates the lungs, chest wounds appear in much more favorable forms than in past wars.[127]
[127] “A soldier of the 3rd East Siberian Regiment, who had been shot in the chest, for instance, subsequently walked to the nearest railway station, a distance of over 20 km., and felt fairly well except for a slight difficulty in breathing. A lance corporal of the 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, having received a similar wound, began his journey to the nearest railway station on a two-wheeled cart. The motion of the cart nauseated him to such an extent, however, that he preferred to complete the journey on foot, a distance of 30 km.” Dr. SELDOWITSCHI in _Wratsch_.
According to observations made in the Russo-Japanese war, wounds in joints healed without suppuration, the joint and its mobility being saved. Amputations were extremely rare, and the surgeon’s skill was, as a rule, seldom necessary in the treatment of shot wounds. Chest wounds were slight, and often many men walked a few _versts_ to the dressing station, some of them complaining of difficulty in breathing. As a rule, such wounds healed in fourteen days. Chest wounds were more serious when the heart or the large blood vessels were injured; but even in these cases cures were effected. Abdominal wounds were not so serious as in the past. Contrary to past experience, skull wounds, in which the projectile had passed entirely through the brain, were treated with fair success.
The campaigns in South Africa and Manchuria have amply demonstrated that wounds produced by jacketed bullets of small caliber are not so serious as those caused by 11 mm. projectiles. In addition, these campaigns have shown that a further decrease in caliber is undesirable from the tactician’s point of view, for a hit by no means affords the certainty, in every case, of putting a man, much less a horse, out of action.
Moreover, the wounded man is cured so quickly that in a short time he can again participate in action. The British report of losses for the battle of Paardeberg, on February 18th, 1900, contains the names of a great many men who were wounded at Magersfontain on December 11th, 1899. According to British statements, 40 men out of every 100, seriously wounded by steel jacketed bullets, could be returned to duty after 36 days of surgical treatment. Dr. Küttner estimates that of 154 men hit in the chest, 73 were able to return to duty with their organizations; while, out of 92 men wounded in the knee, only 28 could be sent back to duty. Wounds produced by the small caliber _Arisaka_ rifle during the Russo-Japanese war healed more rapidly than those caused by the Russian weapon. Flesh wounds of Japanese soldiers, for example, healed in ten days, those of Russian soldiers in four. The following observations were made on wounds produced by the Russian rifle: Within a week slight wounds were covered by a scab; after three weeks they were covered by fresh skin and a part of the wounded were then able to return to the front. The remainder, irrespective of the number of wounds received by any one individual, were ready for duty in seven months. Wounds in which bones were perforated without splintering, healed in four to six weeks, so that the men could return to duty within four or five months after receiving the wound. When bones were splintered the cure was, of course, considerably retarded.
The ballistic advantages of a small-caliber projectile (undesirable from the military surgeon’s point of view) have been obtained by the adoption of a pointed-nose bullet (called the “S” bullet in Germany and the “D” bullet in France).[128]
[128]
Rifle Rifle mod. ’88. mod. ’98; Lebel rifle; “S” bullet. “D” bullet. Caliber 7.9 mm. 7.9 mm. 8. mm. Weight of bullet 14.7 g. 10. g. 13.2 g. Initial velocity 640. m. 860. m. 730. m. Remaining velocity at 800 m. 270. m. 362. m. 377. m. Maximum ordinate of trajectory at 700 m. 3.80 m. 1.85 m. 2.10 m.
_Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1906, No. 53; _Vierteljahrshefte_, 1907. II, p. 281.
A further advantage of these bullets is that they produce serious wounds on account of their tendency to tumble. These wounds, while not inhuman, instantly disable the man struck, or, at any rate, postpone his recovery indefinitely.
=The Effect of “S” Bullets on Corpses.=
======================+==================================== | THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN Of the Total Number +--------+---------+-------------- of Men Hit | Fatally|Instantly|Incapacitated in Each Case. |injured.|disabled.|for some time. | % | % | % ----------------------+--------+---------+-------------- Flesh wounds 800 m | ---- | 36.4 | 27.3 ----------+ | | produced at 1350 m | ---- | 43.8 | 37.3 ----------------------+--------+---------+-------------- Bones struck 800 m | 20.3 | 79.2 | 75.0 ----------+ | | at 1350 m | 11.1 | 88.9 | 88.9 ----------------------|--------+---------+-------------- Average | 7.97 | 62.07 | 57.12 ----------------------+--------+---------+--------------
2. THE EFFECT OF “S” BULLETS ON MATERIALS.
The following thicknesses of dry pine are pierced by the “S” bullet (rifle model ’98) at the ranges given:
60 cm at 100 m. 80 cm at 400 m. 35 cm at 800 m. 10 cm at 1800 m.
In sand and earth the penetration of the “S” bullet amounts to 90 cm. According to experiments, 3 mm. steel plates were pierced at 350 m., while hay stacks afforded protection when 4 m. thick; when of less thickness, the latter caused bullets to tumble. Embankments of frozen snow 1 m. thick, of packed snow 2 m. thick, and of loose snow 3 m. thick, were not pierced even at 250 m.
IV. THE EMPLOYMENT OF INFANTRY FIRE.
Infantry fire may produce either a stunning and paralyzing effect on the hostile forces, or it may gradually exhaust, wear out, and consume them. The fire will have a stunning and paralyzing effect when it is suddenly concentrated upon a narrow front, thereby producing fear and terror, provided actual losses are added to this moral effect.
On the other hand, the fire will gradually exhaust, wear out, and destroy the hostile forces when it is distributed for a prolonged period over an extended front. In this case the material losses suffered and the exhaustion of his physical energies may force the conviction on the enemy that he has no longer a chance to gain the victory. This conviction will cause a suspension of all his energies and consequently of his determination to fight.
At =Modder River= (28th November, 1899) the Boers opened fire on the British at 1000 m., although they had intended to hold their fire until the British arrived within 300 m. of the position.[129]
[129] General MINARELLI-FITZGERALD, _Die Gefechte in Natal und der Kap-Kolonie_, 1899.
The miscarriage of the contemplated sudden burst of fire resulted in a fire fight, which tended to destroy gradually the physical and moral powers of the British. The Boers, however, gave this gradually destroying fire a paralyzing effect by concentrating it suddenly and continuously on tactically important targets that were comparatively easy to hit. Minarelli makes the following comments on the attack made by the British 9th Brigade and Brigade of Guards at =Modder River=: “All further attempts to induce the Guards to advance had to be abandoned. For hours they lay on the dearly bought ground under a blistering African sun, utilizing as cover every ant hill, every tuft of grass, on the apparently deserted battlefield, and being morally certain that to get up would draw a deadly hail of shot.” In regard to the fight of the 9th Brigade, the same author states: “Meantime the 9th Brigade fared no better. It had in part been able to get a little closer to the enemy (550 to 900 m.), but was then unable to advance farther. The actual losses were very small in the ten-hour fight, amounting only to seven per cent. The Highland Brigade, surprised at =Magersfontain=, fared still worse. The fight growing out of the surprise lasted almost ten hours. At the short range at which this action was fought, the Boer method of fire (_i.e._, to fire only when an enemy raised himself to get better aim, and then to employ only an effective concentrated fire) necessarily produced a depressing effect.”
In order that such a fire effect may be obtained, it is necessary that the individual soldier combine coolness and presence of mind with good marksmanship, and that company, platoon and squad leaders maintain fire control and fire direction.
1. FIRE DISCIPLINE.
Fire discipline is indispensable to fire control and fire direction. It embraces the conscientious execution of all orders and signals, as well as the scrupulous observation of all regulations bearing on the handling of the rifle and on combat in general. Fire discipline must be maintained even though the fire control and fire direction exercised by the leaders is imperfect or ceases entirely in the course of the action.
=Fire discipline= requires:
Perseverance under hostile fire, even when that fire cannot be returned; constant attention to the orders of the leaders, and careful observation of the enemy. It requires further, taking advantage of the ground; care in setting the sight and in delivery of fire; an increase of fire by individuals whenever the targets become more favorable, and a cessation of fire when the enemy disappears; finally, economy of ammunition.
The decision is prepared by the fire of infantry, supported by machine guns, field, and heavy artillery. The fire of troops pushed to within short range of the hostile position will in many cases suffice to induce the enemy to give way, so that the assault encounters nothing but evacuated or feebly defended works. The Boer war and the Russo-Japanese war demonstrate that determined troops will hold a position until the attacker has massed sufficient troops to charge, or at least until he threatens to attack with the bayonet. Examples: Terrayama, on October 11th, 1904. Assault made by the 2nd Division on March 1st, 1905, at Mukden, on Redouts 17 and 18.
Training in bayonet fencing has by no means lost importance, irrespective of the fact as to whether or not bayonets will ever be crossed in future. “Bayonet fencing is one of the most important means of strengthening the moral force of the individual soldier; of developing in him energy, initiative, and courage for making a dashing advance.”[130]
[130] _Introduction to German Bayonet Fencing Regulations._
Since the armament of the different armies is almost the same, good individual marksmanship, coolness, fire control and fire direction, and firmly rooted fire discipline, are the deciding factors in an action in which two equal skirmish lines contend for the superiority of fire.
2. FIRE CONTROL AND FIRE DIRECTION.
The principal object of fire control and fire direction is to bring about a superiority of fire at the decisive point by suddenly concentrating the fire of a large number of rifles upon it. This is the only way in which a moral effect may be produced on the troops against whom the fire is directed, while, at the same time, their losses attain such proportions as to become unbearable. At mid and long ranges, the efficacy of fire depends more on fire control and fire direction than upon good individual marksmanship.[131] Whenever the appropriate rear sight elevation is not used, the densest portion of the cone of dispersion will not strike the target, and the chances of its hitting the target diminish as the error in estimating the range and the standard of excellence of the marksmanship increase.
[131] See ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, 3rd Edition, p. 85. “The importance of the line shot (_i.e._, a hit on the vertical stripe through the center of the German bull’s-eye target) in the marksmanship training of the soldier should by no means be underestimated, but rather appreciated at its true value. The line shot forms the basis of known distance firing, just as the latter forms the basis of field firing. Instruction in line shooting (_i.e._, hitting the vertical stripe of the German bull’s-eye target) becomes a moral factor of the highest value in field firing. It cannot be denied, however, that the importance of the line shot, as such, decreases with the range. Likewise all attempts to transfer the zone of the line shot from short to long ranges have completely failed.” Captain KRAUSE, _Die Gestaltung der Geschoszgarbe der Infanterie_, Berlin, 1904, p. 1.
Fire control and fire direction lie in the hands of platoon commanders,[132] who regulate the fire as their judgment dictates. Fire control and direction embrace: the opening and cessation of fire; the designation of a target and of the elevation to be used; the kind of fire and its distribution; the number of rounds to be fired, and the observation of the effect of the fire. As a rule, the fire will be distributed over the whole front, but portions of the hostile line that are not clearly visible should by no means be neglected (distribution of fire). Regulations prescribing the scope of authority of individual leaders are not considered desirable. The platoon commander possesses in his squad leaders a medium for communicating with his platoon. (Pars. 162-165 German I. D. R.). The movements of the skirmishers, the correct _comprehension of the target_, the _distribution of fire_, the _rate of fire_, and the _employment of the terrain to the best advantage_, are regulated through the squad leaders. The lack of thoroughly drilled coöperation on the part of squad leaders inevitably results, as might be expected, in a so-called “skirmish mob.” The platoon commander cannot communicate directly with every individual man of his platoon, but he can control his platoon through his eight squad leaders, who, by reason of their position in the line, can exert the proper influence on their skirmishers.[133]
[132] The _Belgian Firing Regulations_ require that the officer directing and controlling the fire fight be able to determine: 1. The time necessary to produce a certain effect with a given number of rifles; 2. The number of rounds necessary to produce a certain effect in a given period of time; 3. Whether a given target justifies the expenditure of ammunition in view of the situation or the efficacy of the fire. The requirements of the _Italian Firing Regulations_ are similar.
[133] Austria: The position of the platoon leader is not so definitely fixed as in Germany; neither is it prescribed that squad leaders participate in the firing. In skirmish line fire control and fire direction are to remain as long as possible in the hands of the company commander. The battalion commander is charged with concentrating and distributing the fire; with reinforcing, at the proper time, the companies in the firing line; and with replenishing the ammunition. At long ranges he designates the companies that are to fire, and also the position from which fire is to be opened.
The squad leaders are charged with _constantly supervising_ the setting of sights; the distribution, the careful delivery, and the rate of fire; and the expenditure of ammunition.
_The squad leaders participate in the firing only_ when their duties as leaders permit; and this will frequently be the case in a prolonged engagement in the same position, especially at short ranges. These remarks apply also to the range finders.
In Italy and Switzerland the squad leaders participate in the firing when the whole platoon is engaged in a fire fight. The advantage of thus gaining a few better shots for the firing line is more than offset by the more careful supervision of the skirmishers as is required in Germany, France and Austria. The platoon leader unaided is in no position to supervise the proper use of the rifle and the expenditure of ammunition; his subordinates must assist him. It is also desirable to relieve the company commander from the actual duty of fire direction and fire control. The company commander is responsible for leading the company on the battlefield; this does not preclude his thoroughly supervising his platoons and observing the effect of their fire.
“Whenever the company commander is in the firing line, he selects and designates the target and gives orders for opening fire. He announces the range found by the range finders and observes the effect of the fire. Aside from this, he leaves fire control and fire direction to his platoon commanders, and interferes only when he desires to concentrate the fire of several platoons, or of the whole company, on a certain target, or when he observes something that has escaped the notice of the platoon commanders.” (Par. 216 German I. D. R.).
In the course of an action, fire control and fire direction will frequently be imperfect, whether this be due to the loss of the leaders, or to the difficulty of hearing commands in the noise of the combat. To provide for such contingencies, the skirmishers must be taught that, in the absence of fire control and fire direction, they may fire (_not that they must fire_) at all targets within 600 m.; that between 600 and 1200 m., they should fire at tall and wide targets only; and that, at ranges over 1000 m., as a rule, they should not fire at all.
In the pamphlet entitled, _Actual Experiences in the Russo-Japanese War_, p. 11, et seq., Captain SOLOVIEV, 34th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, 1st Siberian Corps, states: “* * * There was an almost ungovernable tendency among the men, as soon as they had thrown themselves down, to open fire without orders; paying attention neither to the target designated, nor to setting their sights.
“This haste is, first of all, brought about by the desire of drowning the consciousness of danger by means of increased activity. * * * It is simply impossible to control and direct the fire when the men have not been carefully trained. The din of battle, the explosion of hostile projectiles, and the thunder of our own artillery make such a deafening roar that one can scarcely hear one’s own voice. The long firing lines make it extraordinarily difficult to transmit orders; even squad commanders can not make themselves understood. Volley firing must therefore be dispensed with.
“Only whistle signals, if repeated by all non-commissioned officers, can be heard; but the men must be trained to obey the whistle signal. With strictness and application much can be accomplished in this direction; it may even be possible to stop the firing along the whole length of the deployed company in the hottest phases of the fight.
“The difficulties of fire control and fire direction increase in proportion to the intensity of the hostile fire and the proximity of the enemy, especially on the defensive. The men get more and more restless, their nervous tension increases, the danger seems nearer and greater. In such a moment the leader must make every effort to keep his men in hand, and prevent the firing from degenerating into a wild blazing away at nothing. This is always a sign that the leader has lost control of his troops.
“The greatest obstacle to good fire control and fire direction is the nervousness that usually pervades troops which are not accustomed to active service. Only thorough peace training and strict fire discipline ensure the maintenance of order in battle and give the fire the necessary efficacy. * * * The more laborious the struggle, the more embittered the fight, the greater the losses, the more fatigue and nervous strain gain the upper hand, the greater and more important the role which the officer has to play. The success of the 200 men under his command depends entirely upon the company commander. The war in the Far East might well be called the war of company commanders. The soldiers watch their leader constantly and attentively. Two hundred lives depend upon his bearing, his determination, firmness, and personal bravery. The men judge the situation, the imminence of danger, success and failure, by the conduct of their leader. The authority of an officer may rise to great heights, but it may also sink very low. To show depression or faint-heartedness is fatal; the feeling of despondency is at once communicated to the men, the leader loses control of his command, and the mischief is done.
“In battle, more than anywhere else, the officer must be a commander and rule with an iron hand. Nowhere does discipline play as great a role as in action. Woe to the troops who have not in time of peace become thoroughly disciplined, to whom discipline has not become second nature! They will pay dearly for this deficiency in war.
“I have observed that in the most critical situations a resolute shout, in a correspondingly imperious tone, had a marvelously quieting effect upon the men. It is likewise advisable to make, here and there, a remark concerning routine duty. For example: ‘Why have the sights not been set in that platoon? Platoon commander, see at once that it is done.’ Because the commander is angry, and notices neglect, everything goes well, so the men reason, and no danger need be apprehended. The men quiet down, forget the whistling of the bullets, set their sights carefully, point their pieces properly, and aim again.”
3. SELECTION OF THE LINE TO BE OCCUPIED.
While a good field of fire is indispensable for reaping the maximum benefit from the power of our rifles, the tactical situation is the determining factor in the choice of a position. The requirements as to a field of fire and the use to be made of it will vary, depending upon whether it is desired to avoid an engagement at short range (delaying action) or whether a decision is to be sought (decisive action). In the first case a free field of fire at short ranges may be dispensed with.
Cover may be used only to the extent that it does not interfere with constant observation of the enemy. It is not permissible to hide entirely behind cover, unless expressly ordered in each case. To rise from behind cover, for the purpose of firing, and to disappear subsequently behind that cover for loading, is out of the question in the firing line. This is physically impossible and much less attainable for psychological reasons; in addition, the skirmisher will present a much larger target than when lying down. When portions of the firing line cannot see the target during an attack, the platoon commander should consider this a hint, either to gain a better position farther to the front, or to suspend his fire temporarily. (Par. 190 German I. D. R.). In defense, in a similar case, cross fire would frequently be the proper expedient. The attacker will often see nothing except the heads of the skirmishers who must fire kneeling in order to sweep the foreground, while these men will present targets of half a man’s height to his bullets. Since smokeless powder is employed, it is important to select positions that cannot easily be found by the enemy. Positions in which the skirmishers are silhouetted against the sky line should be avoided whenever possible. Faintly illuminated targets, or those lying in the shade, are not fired on at all, according to all experience, while the fire is above all else directed against sharply outlined targets. The leaders must take to cover also, for in many cases single officers standing upright draw attention to the position. The extent of the position must be commensurate with the strength of the force; too dense a line reduces the efficacy of fire and increases the losses, while, on the other hand, too dispersed a force increases the difficulties of fire control and fire direction.
4. THE STRENGTH OF THE FIRING LINE.
This depends upon the purpose of the action. Although a thin firing line may be employed when the situation is still in doubt (protection against surprise), it must be strong when the superiority of fire is to be attained. If the firing line is made too weak, we are condemned to fight a superior force continuously with an inferior one because we have voluntarily sacrificed the advantage of our numerical superiority. On the defensive, as soon as the direction of the hostile attack develops, the firing line is made as strong as seems necessary for holding the position. In a delaying action, however, we should endeavor to place as few men in action as possible; and to compensate for the lack of rifles by an increased expenditure of ammunition. All firing is done from the prone position, in so far as the ground permits. The French attempt to regulate the volume of fire by prescribing the number of rifles to be employed instead of designating the kind of fire to be used.
In Switzerland and England,[134] it is recommended that supports use “Fire of position” where the terrain is suitable (hilly country). The German Infantry Drill Regulations (par. 340) contain a similar provision. When the supports cannot see the firing line on account of the conformation of the ground, this fire is not likely to endanger the latter.
[134] _Infantry Training_, 1905, p. 132, par. 2; p. 134, pars. 1, 2; p. 136, par. 6; p. 155, par. 1. See p. 154, infra.
5. ASCERTAINING RANGES.
(Pars. 78-98, 190 and 191 German I. F. R.).
Efficacy of fire depends upon a knowledge of the range. An imperfect knowledge of the range may be compensated for by the flatness of the trajectory of the individual rifle and by the favorable conformation of the ground in respect to the cone of dispersion. In collective fire, at mid and long ranges, each rear sight graduation commands a beaten zone approximately 100 m. deep--good aim, proper elevation, and careful firing being presupposed. The nearer the target is to the densest portion of the cone of dispersion, the greater the efficacy of the fire.
The following results were obtained in Italian firing tests in which 100 skirmishers fired at a plate 1 m. high and 30 m. wide with the 6.5 mm. rifle:
=====================+======================+======================= | MEASURED RANGE. | ESTIMATED RANGE. +----------+-----------+----------+------------ | Slow fire| Rapid fire| Slow fire|Rapid fire | [135] | [135] | [135] | [135] |Percentage|Percentage |Percentage|Percentage | of hits. | of hits. | of hits. | of hits. ---------------------+----------+-----------+----------+------------ At 500 m. | 21.5 | 15.8 | 14.8 | 11.3 At 1000 m. | 11.1 | 8.1 | 6.5 | 5.3 At 1500 m. | 5. | 3.4 | 2.6 | 2.2 Average results at-- | | | | Ranges under 1000 m. | 18.2 | 13.6 | 12.1 | 9.3 Ranges over 1000 m. | 7.1 | 5.1 | 3.2 | 3.2 ---------------------+----------+-----------+----------+------------
[135] Slow fire four shots, rapid fire fourteen shots, per minute.
Beyond 600 m., an error in the range exerts a greater influence upon the efficacy of fire than does the marksmanship of the skirmishers.[136] When an improper elevation has been selected, the efficacy of the fire decreases as the compactness of the “cone of dispersion” increases; in other words, the efficacy of the fire decreases as the excellence of the marksmanship of the men and their coolness in the face of the enemy increase. (See pp. 170 and 171, infra).
[136] ROHNE, _Das Gefechtsmäszige Abteilungsschieszen der Infanterie_, p. 13.
The following expedients for ascertaining ranges may be mentioned:
(_a_) Pacing and galloping;
(_b_) Estimating distances on the ground by eye (by comparison with known distances; by estimating part of the distance);
(_c_) Firing trial volleys (ranging);
(_d_) Taking the range from a map of large scale or obtaining it directly from infantry or artillery already engaged;
(_e_) Measuring the range directly on the ground.
Pacing (employed in Russia, France, and Austria) gives inaccurate results. There is a difference between the number of paces a man takes per 100 m., on a chaussee and in a ploughed field. Length of pace depends upon the character and slope of the ground.[137] In pacing over varied ground, a man follows the slope line while the projectile follows an airline. Therefore it would seem that pacing is only practicable at short ranges when the enemy is not near. The same is true of galloping over the distance. (The length of a horse’s jump at a gallop is on an average 3 m.).
[137] Professor RZIHA ascertained the following diminution of the length of a pace at different degrees of slope:
_Descending_ slope, degrees. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Length of pace in cm. 77 70 62 56 50 45 30 Number of paces per 100 m. 129 143 161 179 200 222 333
_Ascending_ slope, degrees. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Length of pace in cm. 77 74 72 70 67 60 50 Number of paces per 100 m. 120 135 138 143 148 166 200
According to Major CZERNY, Austrian Army (_Treffwahrscheinlichkeit_, in _Streffleur_, 1906, II), the error may be as much as 16 per cent of the range.
In estimates made by individual men, the error amounts approximately to one-eighth (12.5%) of the range;[138] this may be corrected by taking the mean of a considerable number of estimates, or by employing combined sights at ranges over 1000 m. (the difference between rear sight elevations being 100 to 200 m.), thus increasing the depth of the beaten zone. The accuracy of the resulting fire is influenced by local and atmospheric conditions. (Par. 80 German I. F. R.). Estimates usually fall short of the correct distance when made in bright sunlight; in clear atmosphere; when the sun is in rear of the man estimating; when made over uniform surfaces; over water; when the target is set off by a bright background; when made over rolling ground, especially when the several depressions cannot be seen. On the other hand, estimates frequently exceed the correct range when made in a flickering light; against a dark background; against the sun; when the sky is overcast; during foggy weather; in the dusk; in woods; and against an enemy who is only partially visible. According to the Swiss Firing Regulations (1906) estimates made from a height downward are usually too short, and those made from low ground up, too great.
[138] Lieutenant-General ROHNE, _Das Gefechtsmäszige Abteilungsschieszen der Infanterie_, 4th Edition, p. 12.
The following statement is taken from a report made at the British Musketry School at Hythe (5th Nov., 1905). In a great number of estimates under 700 yards (630 m.) the results given below were obtained:
--------Error-------- Greater Correct ±50 yards ±100 yards errors Officers of the Regular Army 15 49 20 14% Officers of Militia and Volunteers 20 44 22 20%
France: Officers made errors of 20% at the beginning of the period of instruction, 12% at its close; rank and file of the Regular Army and non-commissioned officers of the Reserve made errors of 30%.
In action, under the influence of danger, estimates are usually short.[139] Peace training proves that the skill of the majority of soldiers in estimating distances can be improved only up to a certain point.
[139] The advance of the IInd Battalion of the 2nd Hessian Regiment on August 18th, 1870, from the Bols de la Cusse against the height northwest of Amanweiler: “The companies, who supposed the enemy to be much nearer” (the actual range was 1,100 to 1,200 m.), “advanced, cheering, and were received with mitrailleuse, shell, and rifle fire (from hill 1,030) which swept the railroad line.” HESSERT.
Battle of Plevna, September 11th, 1877. Debouchment from corn fields: “The distance still to be crossed before the Turkish works were reached was underestimated. One company cheered when at a distance of 900 to 1,000 paces from the hostile works: the other troops took up the cry and rushed forward at a run.” KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_.
=Germany.= All the men are practiced in estimating distances up to 800 m. Officers, non-commissioned officers and suitable men (range finders) are to be trained in quickly and accurately estimating mid ranges, and practiced in ascertaining long ranges. (Par. 78 German I. F. R.).
“Even a skillful range finder, if he is conscientious, can do no more than give a minimum and a maximum estimate of what he considers the range to be. The ranges must be communicated to the men accordingly. The differences between maximum and minimum estimates should be as follows: At ranges up to and including 500 m., 100 m. (for example: 350-450, or 500-600 m.); between 500 and including 1000 m., 200 m.; over 1000 m., 300 m.”
=Italy.= Subalterns are, as a general rule, charged with estimating the ranges. Non-commissioned officers must be able to estimate ranges up to 1000 m. All non-commissioned officers as well as suitable privates participate in estimating distance drill, which is conducted by an officer in each battalion. The results are recorded in a book. The following is the classification:
Excellent range finders: Those whose error rarely exceeds 50 and never 100 m.
Good range finders: Those whose error does not exceed 100 m., and in exceptional cases 150 m.
Fair range finders: Those whose normal error does not exceed 150 and never 200 m.
Poor range finders: Those whose error exceeds 200 m.
The =Russians= estimate only short ranges, as a rule; the longer ranges are determined by means of range finding instruments. In the first year of their service all the men are drilled in estimating ranges from 400 to 800 paces; officers and twenty specially selected men from each company up to 3000 paces. The latter (both officers and men) are to make at least 36 estimates in nine days. (Par. 190 Russian I. F. R.). The result is considered good when the error in the estimate does not exceed the figure given below at the ranges named:
Range in paces. Error in paces. Percentage of error. 400 to 1000 paces 50 or 12.5 to 5 % 1000 „ 2000 „ 100 „ 10 „ 5 „ 2000 „ 3000 „ 200 „ 10 „ 6.6„
The Russian range finding instrument (_Souchier_) is used by officers and specially trained non-commissioned officers; errors in determining ranges are not to exceed a maximum of 2-3 per cent.
In =Switzerland= recruits are trained to estimate distances up to 600 m. and specially skilled men up to 1500 m.; all non-commissioned officers estimate ranges up to 1000 m. and officers up to 1500