Part 33

VALIDITY: of thought, 7, 8; relation to genesis, 14, 15; test, 17, 18; defines content of thought, 24; problem of, Study IV; Lotze's dilemma regarding, 71-85; of bare object of thought, 72-6; of activity of thought, 76-82; of product of thought, 82-5; (see Objectivity, Reality, Truth).

VALUE: Lotze's distinction of, from existence, 28, 29; view criticised, 31, 41, 45; organized, of experience, 42-8; determined in and by a logical process, 233; nature of consciousness of, 273, 333-5; function of consciousness of, 335-7; properly mediate and functional in character, 338-40.

VALUATION (see also Ethical judgment, Economic judgment): includes only ethical and economic types of judgment, 227, 236, 338-40; general account of process of, 272, 295; reconstructive of self as well as of reality, 312.

VENN, JOHN: origin of hypothesis, 169.

"WARRANT": consciousness of, accompanies purely factual as well as valuational judgment processes, 276, 277; the constitutive feature of survey of factual conditions, 278, 279.

WELTON, J.: origin of hypothesis, 171.

WHEWELL, WILLIAM, 163; view of sensations and ideas, 164, 165; of induction, 165; a certain agreement between him and Mill, 166.

WIESER, F. VON, 335 note 2.

WILL: as related to thought, 366 note; (see Activity, End, Purpose).

WUNDT, W.: view of judgment, 147; view of mathematical induction, 173; formation and proof of hypothesis, 177 ff.; distinction between supposition and hypothesis, 178 ff.

"WRONG" (see "Bad").

XENOPHANES: his logical position, 216.

ZENO: his dialectic, 214.

FOOTNOTES

[1] _Logic_ (translation, Oxford, 1888), Vol. I, pp. 10, 11. Italics mine.

[2] See ANGELL, "The Relations of Structural and Functional Psychology to Philosophy," _The Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago_, Vol. III (1903), Part II, pp. 61-6, 70-72.

[3] See _Philosophical Review_, Vol. XI, pp. 117-20.

[4] See statements regarding the psychological and the logical in _The Child and the Curriculum_, pp. 28, 29.

[5] LOTZE, _Logic_ (translation, Oxford, 1888), Vol. I, p. 2. For the preceding exposition see Vol. I, pp. 1, 2, 13, 14, 37, 38; also _Microkosmus_, Book V, chap. 4.

[6] LOTZE, _Logic_, Vol. I, pp. 6, 7.

[7] LOTZE, _Logic_ (translation, Oxford, 1888), Vol. I, p. 25.

[8] _Ibid._, Vol. I, p. 36.

[9] _Ibid._

[10] _Microkosmus_, Book V, chap. 4.

[11] _Logic_, Vol. II, p. 235; see the whole discussion, §§ 325 through 327.

[12] The emphasis here is upon the term "existences," and in its plural form. Doubtless the distinction of some experiences as belonging to me, as mine in a peculiarly intimate way, from others as chiefly concerning other persons, or as having to do with things, is an early one. But this is a distinction of _concern_, of value. The distinction referred to above is that of making an _object_, or presentation, out of this felt type of value, and thereby breaking it up into distinct "events," etc., with their own laws of inner connection. This is the work of psychological analysis. Upon the whole matter of the psychical I am glad to refer to PROFESSOR GEORGE H. MEAD'S article entitled "The Definition of the Psychical," Vol. III, Part II, of _The Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago_.

[13] We have a most acute and valuable criticism of Lotze from this point of view in PROFESSOR HENRY JONES, _Philosophy of Lotze_, 1895. My specific criticisms agree in the main with his, and I am glad to acknowledge my indebtedness. But I cannot agree in the belief that the business of thought is to qualify reality as such; its occupation appears to me to be determining the reconstruction of some aspect or portion of reality, and to fall within the course of reality itself; being, indeed, the characteristic medium of its activity. And I cannot agree that reality as such, with increasing fulness of knowledge, presents itself as a thought-system, though, as just indicated, I have no doubt that reality appears as thought-specifications or values, just as it does as affectional and æsthetic and the rest of them.

[14] Bradley's criticisms of rationalistic idealism should have made the force of this point reasonably familiar.

[15] The common statement that primitive man projects his own volitions, emotions, etc., into objects is but a back-handed way of expressing the truth that "objects," etc., have only gradually emerged from their life-matrix. Looking back, it is almost impossible to avoid the fallacy of supposing that somehow such objects were there first and were afterward emotionally appreciated.

[16] Of course, this very element may be the precarious, the ideal, and possibly fanciful of some other situation. But it is to change the historic into the absolute to conclude that therefore everything is uncertain, all at once, or as such. This gives metaphysical skepticism as distinct from the working skepticism which is an inherent factor in all reflection and scientific inquiry.

[17] But this is a slow progress within reflection. Plato, who was influential in bringing this general distinction to consciousness, still thought and wrote as if "image" were itself a queer sort of objective existence; it was only gradually that it was disposed of as psychical, or a phase of immediate experience.

[18] Of course, this means that what is excluded and so left behind in the problem of determination of _this_ objective content is regarded as psychical. With reference to other problems and aims this same psychic existence is initial, not survival. Released from its prior absorption in some unanalyzed experience it gains standing and momentum on its own account; _e. g._, the "personal equation" represents what is eliminated from a given astronomic time-determination as being purely subjective, or "source-of-error." But it is initiatory in reference to new modes of technique, re-readings of previous data--new considerations in psychology, even new socio-ethical judgments. Moreover, it remains a fact, and even a worthful fact, as a part of one's own "inner" experience, as an immediate _psychical reality_. That is to say, there is a region of _personal_ experience (mainly emotive or affectional) already recognized as a sphere of value. The "source of error" is disposed of by making it a _fact_ of this region. The recognition of falsity does not _originate_ the psychic (p. 38, note).

[19] Of course, this is a further reflective distinction. The plain man and the student do not determine the extraneous, irrelevant, and misleading matter as image in a _psychological_ sense, but only as _fanciful_ or fantastic. Only to the psychologist and for _his_ purpose does it break up into image and meaning.

[20] Bradley, more than any other writer, has seized upon this double antithesis, and used it first to condemn the logical as such, and then turned it around as the impartial condemnation of the psychical also. See _Appearance and Reality_. In chap. 15 he metes out condemnation to "thought" because it can never take in the psychical existence or reality which is present; in chap. 19, he passes similar judgment upon the "psychical" because it is brutally fragmentary. Other epistemological logicians have wrestled--or writhed--with this problem, but I believe Bradley's position is impregnable--from the standpoint of ready-made differences. When the antithesis is treated as part and lot of the process of defining the truth of a particular subject-matter, and thus as historic and relative, the case is quite otherwise.

[21] Vol. I, pp. 28-34.

[22] It is interesting to see how explicitly Lotze is compelled finally to differentiate two aspects in the antecedents of thoughts, one of which is necessary in order that there may be anything to call out thought (a lack, or problem); the other in order that when thought is evoked it may find data at hand--that is, material in shape to receive and respond to its exercise. "The manifold matter of ideas is brought before us, not only in the _systematic order of its qualitative relationships_, but in the rich _variety of local and temporal combinations_.... The _combinations of heterogeneous ideas_ ... forms the _problems_, in connection with which the efforts of thought to reduce coexistence to coherence will _subsequently_ be made. The _homogeneous or similar_ ideas, on the other hand, give occasion to separate, to connect, and to count their repetitions." (Vol. I, pp. 33, 34; italics mine.) Without the heterogeneous variety of the local and temporal juxtapositions there would be nothing to excite thought. Without the systematic arrangement of quality there would be nothing to meet thought and reward it for its efforts. The homogeneity of qualitative relationships, _in the pre-thought material_, gives the tools or instruments by which thought is enabled successfully to tackle the heterogeneity of collocations and conjunctions also found in the same material! One would suppose that when Lotze reached this point he might have been led to suspect that in this remarkable adjustment of thought-stimuli, thought-material, and thought-tools to one another, he must after all be dealing, not with something prior to the thought-function, but with the necessary elements in and of the thought-situation.

[23] _Supra_, p. 30.

[24] For the identity of sensory experience with the point of greatest strain and stress in conflicting or tensional experience, see "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," _Psychological Review_, Vol. III, p. 57.

[25] For the "accessory" character of thought, see LOTZE, Vol. I, pp. 7, 25-7, 61, etc.

[26] BOSANQUET, _Logic_ (Vol. I, pp. 30-34), and Jones (_Philosophy of Lotze_, 1895, chap. 4) have called attention to a curious inconsistency in Lotzes's treatment of judgment. On one hand, the statement is as given above. Judgment grows out of conception in making explicit the determining relation of universal to its own particular, implied in conception. But, on the other hand, judgment grows not out of conception at all, but out of the question of determining connection in change. Lotze's nominal reason for this latter view is that the conceptual world is purely static; since the actual world is one of change, we need to pass upon what really goes together (is causal) in the change as distinct from such as are merely coincident. But, as Jones clearly shows, it is also connected with the fact that, while Lotze nominally asserts that judgment grows out of conception, he treats conception as the result of judgment since the first view makes judgment a mere explication of the content of an idea, and hence merely expository or analytic (in the Kantian sense) and so of more than doubtful applicability to reality. The affair is too large to discuss here, and I will content myself with referring to the oscillation between conflicting contents, and gradation of sensory qualities already discussed (p. 56, note). It is judgment which grows out of the former, because judgment is the whole situation as such; conception is referable to the latter because it _is_ one abstraction within the whole (the solution of possible meanings of the data) just as the datum is another. In truth, since the sensory datum is not absolute, but comes in a historical context, the qualities apprehended as constituting the datum simply define the locus of conflict in the entire situation. They are attributives of the contents-in-tension of the colliding things, not calm untroubled ultimates. On pp. 33 and 34 of Vol. I, Lotze recognizes (as we have just seen) that, as matter of fact, it is both sensory qualities in their systematic grading, or quantitative determinations (see Vol. I, p. 43, for the recognition of the necessary place of the quantitative in the true concept), _and_ the "rich variety of local and temporal combinations," that provoke thought and supply it with material. But, as usual, he treats this simply as a historical accident, not as furnishing the key to the whole matter. In fine, while the heterogeneous collocations and successions constitute the problematic element that stimulates thought, quantitative determination of the sensory quality furnishes one of the two chief means through which thought deals with the problem. It is a reduction of the original colliding contents to a form in which the effort at redintegration gets maximum efficiency. The concept, as ideal meaning, is of course the other partner to the transaction. It is getting the various possible meanings-of-the-data into such shape as to make them most useful in construing the data. The bearing of this upon the subject and predicate of judgment cannot be discussed here.

[27] See Vol. I, pp. 38, 59, 61, 105, 129, 197, for Lotze's treatment of these distinctions.

[28] Vol. I, p. 36; see also Vol. II, pp. 290, 291.

[29] Vol. II, p. 246; the same is reiterated in Vol. II, p. 250, where the question of origin is referred to as a corruption in logic. Certain psychical acts are necessary as "conditions and occasions" of logical operations, but the "deep gulf between psychical mechanism and thought remains unfilled."

[30] _Philosophy of Lotze_, chap. 3, "Thought and the Preliminary Process of Experience."

[31] Vol. I, p. 38.

[32] Vol. I, p. 13; last italics mine.

[33] Vol. I, p. 14; italics mine.

[34] See Vol. I, pp. 16-20. On p. 22 this work is declared to be not only the first, but the most indispensable of all thought's operations.

[35] Vol. I, p. 26.

[36] Vol. I, p. 35.

[37] Vol. I, p. 36; see the strong statements already quoted, p. 30. What if this canon were applied in the first act of thought referred to above: the original objectification which transforms the mere state into an abiding quality or meaning? Suppose, that is, it were said that the first objectifying act cannot make a substantial (or attached) quale out of a mere state of feeling; it must _find_ the distinction it makes there already! It is clear we should at once get a _regressus ad infinitum_. We here find Lotze face to face with this fundamental dilemma: thought either arbitrarily forces in its own distinctions, or else just repeats what is already there--is either falsifying or futile. This same contradiction, so far as it affects the impression, has already been discussed. See p. 31.

[38] Vol. I, p. 31.

[39] As we have already seen, the concept, the meaning as such, is always a factor or status in a reflective situation; it is always a predicate of judgment, in use in interpreting and developing the logical subject, or datum of perception. See Study VII, on the Hypothesis.

[40] ROYCE, in his _World and Individual_, Vol. I, chaps. 6 and 7, has criticised the conception of meaning as valid, but in a way which implies that there is a difference between validity and reality, in the sense that the meaning or content of the valid idea becomes real only when it is experienced in direct feeling. The above implies, of course, a difference between validity and reality, but finds the test of validity in exercise of the function of direction or control to which the idea makes pretension or claim. The same point of view would profoundly modify Royce's interpretation of what he terms "inner" and "outer" meaning. See MOORE, _The University of Chicago Decennial Publications_, Vol. III, on "Existence, Meaning, and Reality."

[41] Vol. II, pp. 257, 265 and in general Book III, chap. 4. It is significant that thought itself, appearing as an act of thinking over against its own content, is here treated as psychical. Even this explicit placing of thinking in the psychical sphere, along with sensations and the associative mechanism, does not, however, lead Lotze to reconsider his statement that the psychological problem is totally irrelevant and even corrupting as regards the logical. Consequently, as we see in the text, it only gives him one more difficulty to wrestle with: how a process which is _ex officio_ purely psychical and subjective can yet yield results which are valid, in a logical, to say nothing of an ontological, sense.

[42] Professor James's satisfaction in the contemplation of bare pluralism, of disconnection, of radical having-nothing-to-do-with-one-another, is a case in point. The satisfaction points to an æsthetic attitude in which the brute diversity becomes itself one interesting object; and thus unity asserts itself in its own denial. When discords are hard and stubborn, and intellectual and practical unification are far to seek, nothing is commoner than the device of securing the needed unity by recourse to an emotion which feeds on the very brute variety. Religion and art and romantic affection are full of examples.

[43] Lotze even goes so far in this connection as to say that the antithesis between our ideas and the objects to which they are directed is itself a part of the world of ideas (Vol. II, p. 192). Barring the phrase "world of _ideas_" (as against world of continuous experiencing) he need only have commenced at this point to have traveled straight and arrived somewhere. But it is absolutely impossible to hold both this view and that of the original independent existence of something given to and in thought and an independent existence of a thought-activity, thought-forms, and thought-contents.

[44] The criticism of Bosanquet's theory of the judgment offered in this paper is from the standpoint of the theory of the judgment developed by Professor John Dewey, in his lectures on "The Theory of Logic." While the chief interest of the paper, as the title implies, is critical, it has been necessary to devote a portion of it to the exposition of the point of view from which the criticism is made.--H. B. T.

[45] The references throughout this paper are to the pages of Vol. I of BERNARD BOSANQUET, _Logic or the Morphology of Knowledge_, Oxford, 1888.

[46] F. H. BRADLEY, _Principles of Logic_, p. 64.

[47] The difficulty, of course, is not a merely formal one, much less a verbal one. Instinctively we grant to Bosanquet his statement that reality is a continuous whole; we feel it almost captious to question his right to it. But why? Because the _content of judgment_ is continuous; judgment is always engaged with the determination of a related totality. But if all content is ideal, and judgment is just the application of this content to reality in virtue of an isolated contact, surely it begs the entire question to say that reality apart from the content applied is continuous, and then to use this assertion to justify the objective validity of the judgment--its element of permanent truth.

[48] There is good reason for believing that Mr. Bosanquet escapes, in his own mind, the difficulty by the term "correspondence." "The name stands for these elements in the idea which _correspond_ in the separate worlds;" we may even be accused of injustice in confusing this correspondence with bare identity of existence. But if one idea corresponds to another in the sense of referring to it, what is this but the fact to be explained--how an existence can refer beyond itself?

[49] This conclusion is clearly recognized by BRADLEY, _Appearance and Reality_, chap. 4.

[50] It would be suggestive to inquire in what sense conscious thought claims to know. Is it a general claim which thought _qua_ thought puts forth, or is it the claim of the content of some particular thought? The former, of course, is a mere pious aspiration having no reference to specific validity or truth; the latter is precisely the problem under consideration.

[51] Bosanquet would seem to have followed Lotze in this insertion of a world of "meanings" intermediate between the individual idea as such and the real object as such. See the criticism already passed, pp. 93-5.

[52] Or, the situation as questioned is itself a fact, and a perfectly determinate (though not determined) one. See pp. 38, 50.

[53] Of course, the distinction between the process of arriving as temporal, and the essential relation of subject and predicate as eternal, harks back to the notion of judgment as the process by which "we" reproduce, or make real for ourselves, a reality already real within itself. And it involves just the same difficulties. The relation of subject and predicate--this simultaneous distinction and mutual reference--has meaning only in an act of adjustment, of attempt to control, within which we distribute our conditions. When the act is completed, the relation of subject and predicate, as subject and predicate, quite disappears. An eternal relation of the two is meaningless; we might as well talk of an eternal reaching for the same distant object by the same hand. In such conceptions, we have only grasped a momentary phase of a situation, isolated it, and set it up as an entity. Significant results would be reached by considering the "synthetic" character (in the Kantian sense) of judgment from this point of view. All modern logicians agree that judgment must be ampliative, must extend knowledge; that a "trifling proposition" is no judgment at all. What does this mean save that judgment is developmental, transitive, in effect and purport? And yet these same writers conceive of Reality as a _finished system of content in a complete and unchangeable single Judgment_! It is impossible to evade the contradiction save by recognizing that since it is the business of judgment to transform, its test (or Truth) is successful performance of the particular transformation it has set itself, and that transformation is temporal.

[54] It is worth considering whether this may not be the reality of Royce's distinction between outer and inner meaning. An anticipation of experience is the working prerequisite of the control which will realize the idea, _i. e._, the experience anticipated. One is no more "inner" or "outer" than the other.

[55] _Logik_, p. 304.

[56] DE MORGAN, _Budget of Paradoxes_, pp. 55, 56; quoted by WELTON, _Logic_, Vol. II, p. 60.

[57] Advanced grammarians treat this matter in a way which should be instructive to logicians. The hypothesis, says SWEET (§ 295 of _A New English Grammar, Logical and Historical_, Oxford, 1892), suggests an affirmation or negation "as objects of thought." "In fact, we often say _supposing_ (that is, 'thinking') _it is true_, instead of _if it is true_." In a word, the hypothetical judgment as such puts explicitly before us the content of thought, of the predicate or hypothesis; and in so far is a moment in judgment rather than adequate judgment itself.

[58] This carries with it, of course, the notion that "sensation" and "image" are not distinct psychical existences in themselves, but are distinguished logical forces.

[59] Concerning the strict correlativity of subject and predicate, data and hypothesis, see p. 34.

[60] _Novum Organum_, Vol. I, p. 61.

[61] Newton's "Rules for Philosophizing" (_Principia_, Book III) are as follows:

Rule I. "No more causes of natural things are to be admitted than such as are both true, and sufficient to explain the phenomena of those things."

Rule II. "Natural effects of the same kind are to be referred as far as possible to the same causes."

Rule III. "Those qualities of bodies that can neither be increased nor diminished in intensity, and which are found to belong to all bodies within reach of our experiments are to be regarded as qualities of all bodies whatever."

Rule IV. "In experimental philosophy propositions collected by induction from phenomena are to be regarded either as accurately true or very nearly true notwithstanding any contrary hypothesis, till other phenomena occur, by which they are made more accurate or are rendered subject to exceptions."