Chapter 13

In pursuance of this fatal policy Alcibiades crossed over to Messene, and tried to win over that city to the side of Athens. Meeting with no success, he returned to Rhegium, and immediately afterwards he and one of his colleagues sailed with a force of sixty triremes to Naxos. Here the Athenians found a hearty welcome, but at Catana, which was then under the influence of Syracuse, their overtures were rejected, so they continued their voyage southwards, and made their camp for the night at the mouth of the river Terias. Starting early next day, they proceeded along the coast, and, crossing the bay of Thapsus, came in sight, for the first time, of their great enemy, Syracuse. The main body of the fleet remained in the offing, but ten triremes were sent forward to reconnoitre the Great Harbour, and get a nearer view of the fortifications. When the little squadron came within hearing of the walls, a herald proclaimed in a loud voice that any of the Leontines now present in Syracuse should leave the city without fear, and come over to their faithful kinsmen and allies, the Athenians. After this futile demonstration, better calculated; to excite laughter than terror, the reconnoitring triremes withdrew, and the whole fleet sailed back in the direction of Rhegium. On their return voyage the Athenians succeeded, by a lucky accident, in gaining the adherence of Catana, which henceforth became the head-quarters of the whole armament. Soon after they had effected this important change of station the Salaminian state trireme arrived with momentous news from Athens. We have seen what a panic of superstitious fear had been caused among the Athenians by the mutilation of the Hermae. Arrested for the moment by the all-absorbing interest of the Sicilian expedition, the excitement broke out with renewed violence after the departure of the fleet. The enemies of Alcibiades saw that the time was now ripe for bringing up against him the charge of violating the mysteries, and pressing for a judgment. A formal indictment was laid before the senate, and it was decided that he should come home and stand his trial. But it was necessary to proceed with caution, for Alcibiades was popular with the troops serving in Sicily; and it was possible that, if any violence were attempted against his person, they might break out into mutiny. Accordingly the captain of the Salaminian trireme was instructed to treat him with all respect, and allow him to return to Athens in his own vessel. On receiving the summons Alcibiades affected to obey, and set sail from Catana, with the state trireme in attendance. The two ships remained in company as far as Thurii, a Greek town of southern Italy, but there the great criminal disappeared, and after searching for him in vain the officers of the Salaminia were obliged to return to Athens without him. When the news of his flight was brought to Athens, he was arraigned in his absence, and condemned to death. But if his enemies supposed that they had heard the last of Alcibiades, they soon learnt how deeply they were mistaken.

V

The conduct of the campaign in Sicily was thus left in the feeble hands of Nicias; for though Lamachus nominally held an equal command, his poverty and political insignificance prevented him from holding the position to which his military talents entitled him. The few remaining weeks of summer were frittered away in trivial operations on the western coasts of the island, and then the Athenians withdrew into winter quarters at Catana. The predictions of Lamachus now began to be fulfilled: seeing that Nicias, with the vast force at his disposal, attempted nothing against them, the Syracusans began to despise their enemy, and thought of taking the offensive. Horsemen from Syracuse rode repeatedly up to the Athenian outposts at Catana, and tauntingly inquired if the Athenians had come to found a colony in Sicily. At last even Nicias felt that some display of activity was necessary to save himself from contempt. He had learnt from certain Syracusan exiles that there was a convenient place for landing troops, on the low-lying shore where the river Anapus flows into the Great Harbour. Here he determined to make a sudden descent, and in order to avoid disembarking in the face of an enemy, he contrived a stratagem to remove the whole Syracusan force out of reach. A citizen of Catana, who was attached to the Athenian interest, was sent with a message to the Syracusan generals, which held out a tempting prospect of gaining an easy and decisive advantage over the Athenian army. Professing to come from the partisans of Syracuse still remaining in Catana, he promised on their behalf that if the Syracusans made a sudden assault on the Athenian camp, their friends in Catana would simultaneously fall upon the Athenian troops, who were in the habit of deserting their quarters and straggling about the town, and set fire to their ships.

This plausible story found ready credence with the Syracusan generals, and they named a day on which they promised to appear in full force before the walls of Catana. When the time appointed drew near, they marched out with the whole Syracusan army, leaving the city to be garrisoned by their allies, and took up a position within easy reach of Catana. Thereupon Nicias, who was fully informed of their movements, embarked his troops by night, sailed down the coast past Syracuse, and entering the Great Harbour, came to land near the outlying suburb of Polichne, where stood the great temple of the Olympian Zeus. Here he planted a breastwork of palisades to defend his ships, and drew up his army on ground which offered many obstacles to the advance of the Syracusan cavalry. Then, having broken down the bridge over the Anapus, he waited for the enemy to appear.

Meanwhile the Syracusan generals had marched upon Catana, and finding that they had been duped, returned with all speed to the defence of their own city. After a long and fatiguing march, they came in view of the Athenian position, and drew up their forces for battle. But Nicias declined the challenge, and the day being now far advanced, they fell back and encamped for the night in the open field.

Next morning Nicias, acting with unusual vigour, drew up his army in two equal divisions, and leaving one half to defend the camp, and act as a reserve, with the other he advanced rapidly upon the enemy. The Syracusans, who had perhaps reckoned too much on the known indolence of Nicias, were taken by surprise. Their discipline was lax, and many of them had left their posts, and gone off into the town. Nevertheless, they met the attack with firmness: those who were on the spot hastened to assume their weapons, which they had laid aside, while the stragglers came running back, and took their stand wherever they saw a gap in the ranks. After some preliminary skirmishing between the light-armed troops, the heavy masses of the hoplites came to close quarters, and a fierce hand to hand struggle ensued. While the issue was still uncertain, a violent thunderstorm broke over the contending armies, and struck terror into the Syracusans, who regarded it as an omen of defeat. But the seasoned soldiers of Nicias saw nothing unusual in an autumn tempest, and perceiving the enemy to waver, they pressed their attack, and broke through the opposing lines. The whole Syracusan army now fell back upon Syracuse, but they retired without haste or disorder, and their retreat was covered by a numerous and efficient body of cavalry, so that their total loss amounted only to two hundred and sixty.

The victory thus remained with the Athenians; but the moral advantage was entirely on the side of the Syracusans. With an army composed of raw recruits, they had met the flower of the Athenian forces, trained by years of warfare, and led by experienced generals, in fair fight, and though attacked at a disadvantage, they had fought with spirit, and retreated with coolness and deliberation. They had good reason to be satisfied with the result of their first encounter with the invader, and they might well share the high and confident hopes expressed by their most eminent citizen, Hermocrates. Speaking at a general assembly, immediately after the battle, the great patriot congratulated his countrymen on the courage which they had displayed, and at the same time pointed out the necessity of improving their discipline and military organization. One important reform should be made at once; the number of the generals, which had hitherto been fifteen, should be greatly reduced, and those appointed to the supreme command should be given absolute power, so that they might act with secrecy and despatch. Further, let the whole adult male population be placed under arms, and kept in constant drill all through the winter. If these measures were vigorously carried out, they might successfully defy the Athenians to do their worst.

Acting on this advice, the Syracusans deposed the existing generals, and chose Hermocrates, with three others, to fill their place. The reform of the army was at once taken in hand, and ambassadors were sent to Corinth and Sparta to ask for aid. Corinth, as the mother-city of Syracuse, might well respond to the call, and it was hoped that the Spartans would be induced to declare open war on Athens, so as to compel the Athenians to withdraw their forces from Sicily, or at least prevent them from sending reinforcements.

Various defensive works were undertaken by the Syracusans during the winter. The most important of these was a new wall, extending from the northern sea to the Great Harbour, and taking in a wide space of ground, outside the old line of wall, to the west of the city. By thus increasing the area of Syracuse, they made it much more difficult for Nicias to draw his line of blockade, when the siege began in the following spring. They also constructed a fort, with a permanent garrison, to guard the temple of Zeus in the suburb of Polichne, and drove piles into the sea at all the landing-places of the Great Harbour.

Soon after the battle Nicias shifted his winter quarters to Naxos, and learning this the Syracusans marched in full force to Catana, laid waste the territory, and burnt the deserted huts of the Athenians. The insult was tamely endured, and shortly afterwards the ever-active Hermocrates had an opportunity of thwarting the Athenian intrigues among the Greek cities of Sicily. The scene of this diplomatic encounter was Camarina, a Dorian city which had hitherto wavered between its hatred of Syracuse and its fear of Athens. Early in the winter Athenian envoys appeared at Camarina with overtures of alliance, and Hermocrates was sent to represent the interests of Syracuse. Speaking first in the debate, Hermocrates set himself to unmask the designs of the Athenians, who, under the thin pretence of helping the Ionic cities of Sicily, had come (he said) to make a conquest of the whole island. The Ionians of Greece had long groaned under their yoke, and the same fate was in store for the Ionians of Sicily, if they allowed themselves to be beguiled by specious lies. The plea of friendship and goodwill might pass with the degenerate Greeks of Asia and the Aegaean, born to be cajoled and enslaved; but the Camariaeans were of the stout Dorian race, the hereditary foes of tyranny, too wise and too brave to lend themselves as tools to a bare-faced scheme of aggression. If not, let them beware: Syracuse was fighting in a righteous cause, and must prevail in the end; help was coming from Peloponnesus, and if the Camariaeans stood aloof, the day would come when they would regret their disloyalty.

There can be no doubt that Hermocrates was right in his view of the motive which brought the Athenians to Sicily, and the arguments of Euphemus, the advocate for Athens, who strove to confute him, will not bear examination. But the people of Camarina were in a difficult position; their city had suffered many things in the past at the hands of Syracuse, and they had reason to fear that her oppressions might be renewed, if she emerged triumphant from the present struggle. On the other hand, if the Athenians were victorious, they might forfeit their independence altogether. In this dilemma they determined to play a waiting game, and when the time came for action, to throw their weight on the winning side. For the present they answered that they chose to remain neutral.

The debate at Camarina, though interesting and instructive from the light which it throws on the passions and motives of the combatants, had little influence on the final issue of the war. But about the same time a scene was being enacted in another part of the Greek world, which led to most momentous consequences. Early in the winter the Syracusan envoys arrived at Corinth, and made an earnest appeal for help. The Corinthians were warmly attached to their famous colony, which had never wavered in its allegiance to the mother-city, and moreover they were the implacable enemies of Athens. They therefore took up the cause of Syracuse with enthusiasm, and they sent the envoys on to Sparta, accompanied by delegates of their own, to urge the immediate resumption of hostilities against Athens, and the sending of prompt aid to Sicily.

At Sparta they found an able and unscrupulous ally, the very last whom they had expected to meet there. This was the outlaw Alcibiades, who, after eluding the vigilance of the Athenian officers at Thurii, had crossed over in a merchant ship to Cyllene, the port of Elis. While staying there, he received an invitation from the Lacedaemonians to proceed to Sparta, and made his way thither, having first stipulated for a safe-conduct; for he dreaded the vengeance of the Spartans, to whom he had done much mischief by raising the coalition which led to the battle of Mantinea. So there he was, the guest of his old enemies, burning with all an exile's hatred, and ready to strike some deadly blow against the city which had cast him out.

At first the Spartans gave but a cool and qualified response to the application of the envoys from Corinth. They were prepared to lend moral support to the Syracusans, by sending an embassy to encourage them in their resistance, but of more substantial aid they said little or nothing. Now was the time for Alcibiades to play his part. He knew, far better than any of his hearers, all the vulnerable points of Athens, and had no scruple in using his knowledge for her ruin. Having obtained permission from the magistrates, he rose to address the Spartan assembly; and his speech is given at full length by the historian, who was himself an exile at the time, and may possibly have been present [Footnote: The suggestion is made by Grote.] on this important occasion.

The Spartans might smile when they heard this accomplished traitor professing friendship towards themselves, and zeal for their service; they might be disgusted at the flippant sophistries by which he strove to defend his unexampled villainy. But far different feelings must have been awakened, when he went on to unfold the gigantic scheme of conquest, to which, as he pretended, the invasion of Sicily was no more than a prelude. According to this statement, the Athenians intended, after subjugating the Greeks of Sicily, to turn their arms against the Italian Greeks, and finally to attack Carthage. If all these designs were successful, they would build a great number of new ships, taking their materials from the forests of Italy, raise a vast military force, both of Greeks and barbarians, and then return, backed by the whole power of the West, and draw a ring of war round Peloponnesus. With such resources they would be irresistible, and all Greece must inevitably fall under their sway.

"Such," continued Alcibiades, "is the secret history of the Sicilian expedition, which you have heard from the mouth of him who knows it best. Remember, then, that the issue before you concerns not Syracuse only, but Sparta also: for if Syracuse falls--and fall she must, if left without support--all Sicily will be under the heel of Athens; then will come the turn of Italy, and after that you will soon have the enemy at your own doors. Now learn what you must do, if you would avert all the evils which I have foretold. You must send a fleet to Sicily at once, with hoplites who can row the ships themselves, and serve in the army as soon as they land, and with them a Spartan commander, to organize the fighting men of Sicily, and compel those who are hanging back to do their duty. Such a man will be a host in himself, and will infuse new life and energy into the defence. Further, you must establish a fortified camp at Decelea, a position which commands the whole territory of Attica; for by so doing you will reduce Athens to a state of siege, and compel the whole male population to serve on garrison duty; you will deprive the Athenians of their revenues from the silver-mines at Laurium, and you will put new heart into the cities subject to Athens, and encourage them to withhold their tribute. Let these measures be carried out with promptitude and vigour, and you will soon reap your reward, in the humiliation of Athens, and the honour and gratitude of all Greece."

At these words of Alcibiades the sluggish Spartans took fire, and recognizing the importance of his advice they determined to follow the course which he had indicated. Gylippus, a Spartan of high rank, received orders to proceed at once to Syracuse, and assume the control of the war, and the Corinthians were directed to provide ships for the conveyance of troops. But after this brief display of energy the Spartans relapsed into their wonted torpor. Many months elapsed before Gylippus was able to embark for Sicily, and meanwhile important events had been occurring at the seat of war. We return, therefore, to the head-quarters of Nicias, which had once more been removed from Naxos to Catana.

VI

For the next year and a half [Footnote: Spring 414--autumn 413 B.C.] the scene of our narrative lies almost entirely in the immediate neighbourhood of Syracuse, so that it now becomes necessary to describe in some detail the site of that city, and the character of the adjacent country. Mention has already been made of the island of Ortygia, the site of the original colony, connected with the mainland of Sicily by a bridge or causeway. At the southern extremity of Ortygia there is a narrow strip of land, pointing like a finger towards the rocky peninsula of Plemmyrium; and between these two points lies the entrance to a spacious bay, already alluded to under the name of the Great Harbour. At the western end of the bay there is a long stretch of low, marshy ground, intersected by the little rivers Cyana and Anapus, and infested with fever during the heats of summer. On a rising ground, south of the Anapus, stood the suburb of Polichne, with its great temple, sacred to the Olympian Zeus. A little to the north of Ortygia the coast rises abruptly in a bold line of cliffs, facing eastwards, and forming the base of a triangular plateau, which slopes upwards from the sea, and gradually grows narrower until it ends in a point, called the hill of Euryelus. This plateau, which bore the name of Epipolae, is guarded on all its three sides by rocky precipices, only to be ascended at two or three places. Its eastern end, called Acheadina, from the wild pear-trees which once flourished there, was occupied by a new city, now included with Ortygia in the same wall of defence. Here were situated the famous stone-quarries, which afterwards acquired so tragic an interest from the sufferings of the captive Athenians; and southwards from this district the ground shelves gently to the shores of the Little Harbour, a sheltered inlet at the northern end of Ortygia.

At the opening of spring the operations against Syracuse began in good earnest. The first object of Nicias was to obtain possession of the heights of Epipolae, for since the construction of the new Syracusan wall it had become impossible for him to draw his line of blockade from the side of the Great Harbour. His preparations were already far advanced, when the Syracusan generals resolved to anticipate him, by occupying all the approaches to Epipolae. With this intention they issued an order for a full muster of troops in a meadow by the Anapus, and after a general review and inspection of arms they appointed a picked body of six hundred hoplites to guard the heights of Epipolae, and hold themselves ready for any other pressing service. But the precaution was taken too late. On the night before the review Nicias set sail with his whole army from Catana, and landed at a place called Leon, not more than six or seven furlongs from the northern side of Epipolae. The fleet then took up its station in the sheltered water behind the peninsula of Thapsus, while the land forces, advancing at a run, crossed the level ground, and then, breasting the ascent, gained the summit of Euryelus.

News of their approach presently reached the Syracusans, who were still mustered by the Anapus, and breaking off the review, they marched in haste towards Epipolae, hoping still to dislodge the Athenians from their position. But in their rapid advance over a distance of nearly three miles their ranks became disordered, and their attack was so straggling and ineffectual that they were easily repulsed, and driven back with considerable loss into the town. On the following day Nicias led his troops down the slope, and offered battle before the walls of Syracuse; but the challenge was declined, and the Syracusans remained within their defences, leaving the Athenians in undisputed possession of Epipolae.

After this important success the Athenian generals prepared at once to form the siege of Syracuse. They first constructed a fort at a place called Labdalum, on the northern verge of Epipolae, and near its western extremity, to serve as a safe depositary for their baggage and money. Then, taking up a position near the centre of Epipolae, they built a circular wall, covering a considerable space of ground, and defended on the side towards the city by an outer breastwork, a thousand feet long. This enclosure, which was called the Circle, was intended as a shelter for the men employed on construction of the blockading wall, which started from either side of the Circle, and was to be carried north and south until it reached the sea. The work made rapid progress, and greatly alarmed the Syracusans, who saw themselves in danger of being cut off from all hope of succour on the land side. Dismayed by this prospect, they resolved to make one more effort to drive the Athenians from their position, and marching out in full force, offered battle. Advancing in haste and disorder, they would certainly have suffered a crushing defeat, but for the prudent caution of their generals, who were so much impressed by the superior discipline of the Athenians, that they gave the order to retire, and led their troops back into the city, leaving only a detachment of horse to skirmish with the besiegers. But the Athenians had now an efficient force of cavalry, which had been raised by successive reinforcements to the number of six hundred and fifty men; and these, backed by a small force of infantry, soon drove the horsemen of Syracuse from the field.