Chapter 18

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1860

Deeds of violence are the inevitable precursors of an approaching war. They are so many expressions of that estrangement which is at the root of all sectional conflicts. The raid of John Brown upon Harper's Ferry, like his earlier lawless acts in Kansas, was less the crime of an individual than the manifestation of a deep social unrest. Occurring on the eve of a momentous presidential election, it threw doubts upon the finality of any appeal to the ballot. The antagonism between North and South was such as to make an appeal to arms seem a probable last resort. The political question of the year 1860 was whether the law-abiding habit of the American people and the traditional mode of effecting changes in governmental policy, would be strong enough to withstand the primitive instinct to decide the question of right by an appeal to might. To actors in the drama the question assumed this simple, concrete form: could the national Democratic party maintain its integrity and achieve another victory over parties which were distinctly sectional?

The passions aroused by the Harper's Ferry episode had no time to cool before Congress met. They were again inflamed by the indorsement of Helper's "Impending Crisis" by influential Republicans. As the author was a poor white of North Carolina who hated slavery and desired to prove that the institution was inimical to the interests of his class, the book was regarded by slave-holders as an incendiary publication, conceived in the same spirit as John Brown's raid. The contest for the Speakership of the House turned upon the attitude of candidates toward this book. At the North "The Impending Crisis" had great vogue, passing through many editions. All events seemed to conspire to prevent sobriety of judgment and moderation in speech.

From a legislative point of view, this exciting session of Congress was barren of results. The paramount consideration was the approaching party conventions. What principles and policies would control the action of the Democratic convention at Charleston, depended very largely upon who should control the great body of delegates. Early in January various State conventions in the Northwest expressed their choice. Illinois took the lead with a series of resolutions which rang clear and true on all the cardinal points of the Douglas creed.[810] Within the next sixty days every State in the greater Northwest had chosen delegates to the national Democratic convention, pledged to support the nomination of Stephen A. Douglas.[811] It was with the knowledge, then, that he spoke for the Democracy of the Northwest that Douglas took issue with those Southern senators who plumed themselves on their party orthodoxy.

In a debate which was precipitated by a resolution of Senator Pugh, the old sores were rent open. Senator Davis of Mississippi was particularly irritating in his allusions to the Freeport, and other recent, heresies of the Senator from Illinois. In the give and take which followed, Douglas was beset behind and before. But his fighting blood was up and he promised to return blow for blow, with interest. Let every man make his assault, and when all were through, he would "fire into the lump."[812] "I am not seeking a nomination," he declared, "I am willing to take one provided I can assume it on principles that I believe to be sound; but in the event of your making a platform that I could not conscientiously execute in good faith if I were elected, I will not stand upon it and be a candidate." For his part he would like to know "who it is that has the right to say who is in the party and who not?" He believed that he was backed by two-thirds of the Democracy of the United States. Did one-third of the Democratic party propose to read out the remaining two-thirds? "I have no grievances, but I have no concessions. I have no abandonment of position or principle; no recantation to make to any man or body of men on earth."[813]

Some days later Douglas made it equally clear that he had no recantation to make for the sake of Republican support. Speaking of the need of some measure by which the States might be protected against acts of violence like the Harper's Ferry affair, he roundly denounced that outrage as "the natural, logical, inevitable result of the doctrines and teachings of the Republican party, as explained and enforced in their platform, their partisan presses, their pamphlets and books, and especially in the speeches of their leaders in and out of Congress."[814] True, they disavowed the _act_ of John Brown, but they should also repudiate and denounce the doctrines and teachings which produced the act. Fraternal peace was possible only upon "that good old golden principle which teaches all men to mind their own business and let their neighbors' alone." When men so act, the Union can endure forever as the fathers made it, composed of free and slave States.[815] "Then the senator is really indifferent to slavery, as he is reported to have said?" queried Fessenden. "Sir," replied Douglas, "I hold the doctrine that a statesman will adapt his laws to the wants, conditions, and interests of the people to be governed by them. Slavery may be very essential in one climate and totally useless in another. If I were a citizen of Louisiana I would vote for retaining and maintaining slavery, because I believe the good of the people would require it. As a citizen of Illinois I am utterly opposed to it, because our interests would not be promoted by it."[816]

The lines upon which the Charleston convention would divide, were sharply drawn by a series of resolutions presented to the Senate by Jefferson Davis. They were intended to serve as an ultimatum, and they were so understood by Northern Democrats. They were deliberately wrought out in conference as the final expression of Southern conviction. In explicit language the right of either Congress or a territorial legislature to impair the constitutional right of property in slaves, was denied. In case of unfriendly legislation, it was declared to be the duty of Congress to provide adequate protection to slave property. Popular sovereignty was completely discarded by the assertion that the people of a Territory might pass upon the question of slavery only when they formed a State constitution.[817]

As the delegates to the Democratic convention began to gather in the latter part of April, the center of political interest shifted from Washington to Charleston. Here the battle between the factions was to be fought out, but without the presence of the real leaders. The advantages of organization were with the Douglas men. The delegations from the Northwest were devoted, heart and soul, to their chief. As they passed through the capital on their journey to the South, they gathered around him with noisy demonstrations of affection; and when they continued on their way, they were more determined than ever to secure his nomination.[818] From the South, too, every Douglas man who was likely to carry weight in his community, was brought to Charleston to labor among the Ultras of his section.[819] The Douglas headquarters in Hibernian Hall bore witness to the business-like way in which his candidacy was being promoted. Not the least striking feature within the committee rooms was the ample supply of Sheahan's _Life of Stephen A. Douglas_, fresh from the press.[820]

Recognized leader of the Douglas forces was Colonel Richardson of Illinois, a veteran in convention warfare, seasoned by years of congressional service and by long practice in managing men.[821] It was he who had led the Douglas cohorts in the Cincinnati convention. The memory of that defeat still rankled, and he was not disposed to yield to like contingencies. Indeed, the spirit of the delegates from the Northwest,--and they seemed likely to carry the other Northern delegates with them,--was offensively aggressive; and their demonstrations of enthusiasm assumed a minatory aspect, as they learned of the presence of Slidell, Bigler, and Bright, and witnessed the efforts of the administration to defeat the hero of the Lecompton fight.[822]

Those who observed the proceedings of the convention could not rid themselves of the impression that opposing parties were wrestling for control, so bitter and menacing was the interchange of opinion. It was matter of common report that the Southern delegations would withdraw if Douglas were nominated.[823] Equally ominous was the rumor that Richardson was authorized to withdraw the name of Douglas, if the platform adopted should advocate the protection of slavery in the Territories.[824] The temper of the convention was such as to preclude an amicable agreement, even if Douglas withdrew.

The advantages of compact organization and conscious purpose were apparent in the first days of the convention. At every point the Douglas men forced the fighting. On the second day, it was voted that where a delegation had not been instructed by a State convention how to give its vote, the individual delegates might vote as they pleased. This rule would work to the obvious advantage of Douglas.[825] On the third day, the convention refused to admit the contesting delegations from New York and Illinois, represented by Fernando Wood and Isaac Cook respectively.[826]

Meantime the committee on resolutions, composed of one delegate from each State, was in the throes of platform-making. Both factions had agreed to frame a platform before naming a candidate. But here, as in the convention, the possibility of amiable discussion and mutual concession was precluded. The Southern delegates voted in caucus to hold to the Davis resolutions; the Northern, with equal stubbornness, clung to the well-known principles of Douglas. On the fifth day of the convention, April 27th, the committee presented a majority report and two minority reports. The first was essentially an epitome of the Davis resolutions; the second reaffirmed the Cincinnati platform, at the same time pledging the party to abide by the decisions of the Supreme Court on those questions of constitutional law which should affect the rights of property in the States or Territories; and the third report simply reaffirmed the Cincinnati platform without additional resolutions.[827] The defense of the main minority report fell to Payne of Ohio. In a much more conciliatory spirit than Douglas men had hitherto shown, he assured the Southern members of the convention that every man who had signed the report felt that "upon the result of our deliberations and the action of this convention, in all human probability, depended the fate of the Democratic party and the destiny of the Union." The North was devoted to the principle of popular sovereignty, but "we ask nothing for the people of the territories but what the Constitution allows them."[828] The argument of Payne was cogent and commended itself warmly to Northern delegates; but it struck Southern ears as a tiresome reiteration of arguments drawn from premises which they could not admit.

It was Yancey of Alabama, chief among fire-eaters, who, in the afternoon of the same day, warmed the cockles of the Southern heart. Gifted with all the graces of Southern orators, he made an eloquent plea for Southern rights. Protection was what the South demanded: protection in their constitutional rights and in their sacred rights of property. The proposition contained in the minority report would ruin the South. "You acknowledged that slavery did not exist by the law of nature or by the law of God--that it only existed by State law; that it was wrong, but that you were not to blame. That was your position, and it was wrong. If you had taken the position directly that slavery was right, and therefore ought to be ... you would have triumphed, and anti-slavery would now have been dead in your midst.... I say it in no disrespect, but it is a logical argument that your admission that slavery is wrong has been the cause of all this discord."[829]

These words brought Senator Pugh to his feet. Wrought to a dangerous pitch of excitement, he thanked God that a bold and honest man from the South had at last spoken, and had told the whole of the Southern demands. The South demanded now nothing less than that Northern Democrats should declare slavery to be right. "Gentlemen of the South," he exclaimed, "you mistake us--you mistake us--we will not do it."[830] The convention adjourned before Pugh had finished; but in the evening he told the Southern delegates plainly that Northern Democrats were not children at the bidding of the South. If the gentlemen from the South could stay only on the terms they proposed, they must go. For once the hall was awed into quiet, for Senator Pugh stood close to Douglas and the fate of the party hung in the balance.[831]

Sunday intervened, but the situation remained unchanged. Gloom settled down upon the further deliberations of the convention. On Monday, the minority report (the Douglas platform) was adopted by a vote of 165 to 138. Thereupon the chairman of the Alabama delegation protested and announced the formal withdrawal of his State from the convention. The crisis had arrived. Mississippi, Louisiana, South Carolina, Florida, Texas, and Arkansas followed in succession, with valedictories which seemed directed less to the convention than to the Union. Indeed, more than one face blanched at the probable significance of this secession. Southerners of the Yancey following, however, were jubilant and had much to say about an independent Southern Republic.[832]

On the following day, what Yancey scornfully dubbed the "Rump Convention," proceeded to ballot, having first voted that two-thirds of the full vote of the convention should be necessary to nominate. On the first ballot, Douglas received 145-1/2, Hunter of Virginia 42, Guthrie of Kentucky 35-1/2; and the remaining thirty were divided among several candidates. As 202 votes were necessary for a choice, the hopelessness of the outlook was apparent to all. Nevertheless, the balloting continued, the vote of Douglas increasing on four ballots to 152-1/2. After the thirty-sixth ballot, he failed to command more than 151-1/2. In all, fifty-seven ballots were taken.[833] On the tenth day of the convention, it was voted to adjourn to meet at Baltimore, on the 18th of June.

The followers of Douglas left Charleston with wrath in their hearts. Chagrin and disappointment alternated with bitterness and resentment toward their Southern brethren. Moreover, contact with the South, so far from having lessened their latent distrust of its culture and institutions, had widened the gulf between the sections. Such speeches as that of Goulden of Georgia, who had boldly advocated the re-opening of the African slave-trade, saying coarsely that "the African slave-trade man is the Union man--the Christian man," caused a certain ethical revolt in the feelings of men, hitherto not particularly susceptible to moral appeals on the slavery question.[834] Added to all these cumulative grievances was the uncomfortable probability, that the next President was about to be nominated in the Republican convention at Chicago.

What were the feelings of the individual who had been such a divisive force in the Charleston convention? The country was not long left in doubt. Douglas was quite ready to comment upon the outcome; and it needed only the bitter arraignment of his theories by Davis, to bring him armed _cap-a-pie_ into the arena.

Aided by his friend Pugh, who read long extracts from letters and speeches, Douglas made a systematic review of Democratic principles and policy since 1848. His object, of course, was to demonstrate his own consistency, and at the same time to convict his critics of apostasy from the party creed. There was, inevitably, much tiresome repetition in all this. It was when he directed his remarks to the issues at Charleston that Douglas warmed to his subject. He refused to recognize the right of a caucus of the Senate or of the House, to prescribe new tests, to draft party platforms. That was a task reserved, under our political system, for national conventions, made up of delegates chosen by the people. Tried by the standard of the only Democratic organization competent to pronounce upon questions of party faith, he was no longer a heretic, no longer an outlaw from the Democratic party, no longer a rebel against the Democratic organization. "The party decided at Charleston also, by a majority of the whole electoral college, that I was the choice of the Democratic party of America for the Presidency of the United States, giving me a majority of fifty votes over all other candidates combined; and yet my Democracy is questioned!" "But," he added, and there is no reason to doubt his sincerity, "my friends who know me best know that I have no personal desire or wish for the nomination;... know that my name never would have been presented at Charleston, except for the attempt to proscribe me as a heretic, too unsound to be the chairman of a committee in this body, where I have held a seat for so many years without a suspicion resting on my political fidelity. I was forced to allow my name to go there in self-defense; and I will now say that had any gentleman, friend or foe, received a majority of that convention over me, the lightning would have carried a message withdrawing my name from the convention."[835]

Douglas was ready to acquit his colleagues in the Senate of a purpose to dissolve the Union, but he did not hesitate to assert that such principles as Yancey had advocated at Charleston would lead "directly and inevitably" to a dissolution of the Union. Why was the South so eager to repudiate the principle of non-intervention? By it they had converted New Mexico into slave Territory; by it, in all probability, they would extend slavery into the northern States of Mexico, when that region should be acquired. "Why," he asked, "are you not satisfied with these practical results? The only difference of opinion is on the judicial question, about which we agreed to differ--which we never did decide; because, under the Constitution, no tribunal on earth but the Supreme Court could decide it." To commit the Democratic party to intervention was to make the party sectional and to invite never-ceasing conflict. "Intervention, North or South, means disunion; non-intervention promises peace, fraternity, and perpetuity to the Union, and to all our cherished institutions."[836]

The challenge contained in these words was not permitted to pass unanswered. Davis replied with offensive references to the "swelling manner" and "egregious vanity" of the Senator from Illinois. He resented such dictation.[837] On the following day, May 17th, an exciting passage-at-arms occurred between these representatives of the Northwest and the Southwest. Douglas repeated his belief that disunion was the prompting motive which broke up the Charleston convention. Davis resented the insinuation, with fervent protestations of affection for the Union of the States. It was the Senator from Illinois, who, in his pursuit of power, had prevented unanimity, by trying to plant his theory upon the party. The South would have no more to do with the "rickety, double-construed platform" of 1856. "The fact is," said Davis, "I have a declining respect for platforms. I would sooner have an honest man on any sort of a rickety platform you could construct, than to have a man I did not trust on the best platform which could be made. A good platform and an honest man on it is what we want."[838] Douglas reminded his opponent sharply that the bolters at Charleston seceded, not on the candidate, but on the platform. "If the platform is not a matter of much consequence, why press that question to the disruption of the party? Why did you not tell us in the beginning of this debate that the whole fight was against the man, and not upon the platform?"[839]

In the interval between the Charleston and the Baltimore conventions, the Davis resolutions were pressed to a vote in the Senate, with the purpose of shaping party opinion. They passed by votes which gave a deceptive appearance of Democratic unanimity. Only Senator Pugh parted company with his Democratic colleagues on the crucial resolution; yet he represented the popular opinion at the North.[840] The futility of these resolutions, so far as practical results were concerned, was demonstrated by the adoption of Clingman's resolution, that the existing condition of the Territories did not require the intervention of Congress for the protection of property in slaves.[841] In other words, the South was insisting upon rights which were barren of practical significance. Slave-holders were insisting upon the right to carry their slaves where local conditions were unfavorable, and where therefore they had no intention of going.[842]

The nomination of Lincoln rather than Seward, at the Republican convention in Chicago, was a bitter disappointment to those who felt that the latter was the real leader of the party of moral ideas, and that the rail-splitter was simply an "available" candidate.[843] But Douglas, with keener insight into the character of Lincoln, said to a group of Republicans at the Capitol, "Gentlemen, you have nominated a very able and a very honest man."[844] For the candidate of the new Constitutional Union party, which had rallied the politically unattached of various opinions in a convention at Baltimore, Douglas had no such words of praise, though he recognized John Bell as a Unionist above suspicion and as an estimable gentleman.

These nominations rendered it still less prudent for Northern Democrats to accept a candidate with stronger Southern leanings than Douglas. No Northern Democrat could carry the Northern States on a Southern platform; and no Southern Democrat would accept a nomination on the Douglas platform. Unless some middle ground could be found,--and the debates in the Senate had disclosed none,--the Democrats of the North were bound to adhere to Douglas as their first and only choice in the Baltimore convention.

When the delegates reassembled in Baltimore, the factional quarrel had lost none of its bitterness. Almost immediately the convention fell foul of a complicated problem of organization. Some of the original delegates, who had withdrawn at Charleston, desired to be re-admitted. From some States there were contesting delegations, notably from Louisiana and Alabama, where the Douglas men had rallied in force. Those anti-Douglas delegates who were still members of the convention, made every effort to re-admit the delegations hostile to him. The action of the convention turned upon the vote of the New York delegation, which would be cast solidly either for or against the admission of the contesting delegations. For three days the fate of Douglas was in the hands of these thirty-five New Yorkers, in whom the disposition to bargain was not wanting.[845] It was at this juncture that Douglas wrote to Dean Richmond, the _Deus ex machina_ in the delegation,[846] "If my enemies are determined to divide and destroy the Democratic party, and perhaps the country, rather than see me elected, and if the unity of the party can be preserved, and its ascendancy perpetuated by dropping my name and uniting upon some reliable non-intervention and Union-loving Democrat, I beseech you, in consultation with my friends, to pursue that course which will save the country, without regard to my individual interests. I mean all this letter implies. Consult freely and act boldly for the right."[847]

It was precisely the "if's" in this letter that gave the New Yorkers most concern. Where was the candidate who possessed these qualifications and who would be acceptable to the South? On the fifth day of the convention, the contesting Douglas delegations were admitted. The die was cast. A portion of the Virginia delegation then withdrew, and their example was followed by nearly all the delegates from North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky and Maryland. If the first withdrawal at Charleston presaged the secession of the cotton States from the Union, this pointed to the eventual secession of the border States.

On June 23d, the convention proceeded to ballot. Douglas received 173-1/2 votes; Guthrie 10; and Breckinridge 5; scattering 3. On the second ballot, Douglas received all but thirteen votes; whereupon it was moved and carried unanimously with a tremendous shout that Douglas, having received "two-thirds of all votes given in this convention," should be the nominee of the party.[848] Colonel Richardson then begged leave to have the Secretary read a letter from Senator Douglas. He had carried it in his pocket for three days, but the course of the bolters, he said, had prevented him from using it.[849] The letter was of the same tenor as that written to Dean Richmond. There is little likelihood that an earlier acquaintance with its contents would have changed the course of events, since so long as the platform stood unaltered, the choice of Douglas was a logical and practical necessity. Douglas and the platform were one and inseparable.

Meantime the bolters completed their destructive work by organizing a separate convention in Baltimore, by adopting the report of the majority in the Charleston convention as their platform, and by nominating John C. Breckinridge as their candidate for the presidency. Lane of Oregon was named for the second place on the ticket for much the same reason that Fitzpatrick of Alabama, and subsequently Herschel V. Johnson of Georgia, was put upon the Douglas ticket. Both factions desired to demonstrate that they were national Democrats, with adherents in all sections. In his letter of acceptance Douglas rang the changes on the sectional character of the doctrine of intervention either for or against slavery. "If the power and duty of Federal interference is to be conceded, two hostile sectional parties must be the inevitable result--the one inflaming the passions and ambitions of the North, the other of the South."[850] Indeed, his best,--his only,--chance of success lay in his power to appeal to conservative, Union-loving men, North and South. This was the secret purpose of his frequent references to Clay and Webster, who were invoked as supporters of "the essential, living principle of 1850"; _i.e._ his own doctrine of non-intervention by Congress with slavery in the Territories. But the Constitutional Union party was quite as likely to attract the remnant of the old Whig party of Clay and Webster.

Douglas began his campaign in excellent spirits. His only regret was that he had been placed in a position where he had to look on and see a fight without taking a hand in it.[851] The New York _Times_, whose editor followed the campaign of Douglas with the keenest interest, without indorsing him, frankly conceded that popular sovereignty had a very strong hold upon the instinct of nine-tenths of the American people.[852] Douglas wrote to his Illinois confidant in high spirits after the ratification meeting in New York.[853] Conceding South Carolina and possibly Mississippi to Breckinridge, and the border slave States to Bell, he expressed the firm conviction that he would carry the rest of the Southern States and enough free States to be elected by the people. Richardson had just returned from New England, equally confident that Douglas would carry Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Connecticut. If the election should go to the House of Representatives, Douglas calculated that Lincoln, Bell, and he would be the three candidates. In any event, he was sure that Breckinridge and Lane had "no show." He enjoined his friends everywhere to treat the Bell and Everett men in a friendly way and to cultivate good relations with them, "for they are Union men." But, he added, "we can have no partnership with the Bolters." "Now organize and rally in Illinois and the Northwest. The chances in our favor are immense in the East. Organize the State!"

Buoyed up by these sanguine expectations, Douglas undertook a tour through New England, not to make stump speeches, he declared, but to visit and enhearten his followers. Yet at every point on the way to Boston, he was greeted with enthusiasm; and whenever time permitted he responded with brief allusions to the political situation. As the guest of Harvard University, at the alumni dinner, he was called upon to speak--not, to be sure, as a candidate for the presidency, but as one high in the councils of the nation, and as a generous contributor to the founding of an educational institution in Chicago.[854] A visit to Bunker Hill suggested the great principle for which our Revolutionary fathers fought and for which all good Democrats were now contending.[855] At Springfield, too, he harked back to the Revolution and to the beginnings of the great struggle for control of domestic concerns.[856]

Along the route from Boston to Saratoga, he was given ovations, and his diffidence about making stump speeches lessened perceptibly.[857] At Troy, he made a political speech in his own vigorous style, remarking apologetically that if he did not return home soon, he would "get to making stump speeches before he knew it."[858] Passing through Vermont, he visited the grave of his father and the scenes of his childhood; and here and there, as he told the people of Concord with a twinkle in his eye, he spoke "a little just for exercise." Providence recalled the memory of Roger Williams and the principles for which he suffered--principles so nearly akin to those for which Democrats to-day were laboring. By this time the true nature of this pilgrimage was apparent to everybody. It was the first time in our history that a presidential candidate had taken the stump in his own behalf. There was bitter criticism on the part of those who regretted the departure from decorous precedent.[859] When Douglas reached Newport for a brief sojourn, the expectation was generally entertained that he would continue in retirement for the remainder of the campaign.

Except for this anomaly of a candidate canvassing in his own behalf, the campaign was devoid of exciting incidents. The personal canvass of Douglas was indeed almost the only thing that kept the campaign from being dull and spiritless.[860] Republican politicians were somewhat at a loss to understand why he should manoeuvre in a section devoted beyond question to Lincoln. Indeed, a man far less keen than Douglas would have taken note of the popular current in New England. Why, then, this expenditure of time and effort! In all probability Douglas gauged the situation correctly. He is said to have conceded frankly that Lincoln would be elected.[861] His contest was less with Republicans and Constitutional Unionists now, than with the followers of Breckinridge. He hoped to effect a reorganization of the Democratic party by crushing the disunion elements within it. With this end in view he could not permit the organization to go to pieces in the North. A listless campaign on his part would not only give the election to Lincoln, but leave his own followers to wander leaderless into other organizations. For the sake of discipline and future success, he rallied Northern Democrats for a battle that was already lost.[862]

Well assured that Lincoln would be elected, Douglas determined to go South and prepare the minds of the people for the inevitable.[863] The language of Southern leaders had grown steadily more menacing as the probability of Republican success increased. It was now proclaimed from the house-tops that the cotton States would secede, if Lincoln were elected. Republicans might set these threats down as Southern gasconade, but Douglas knew the animus of the secessionists better than they.[864] This determination of Douglas was warmly applauded where it was understood.[865] Indeed, that purpose was dictated now alike by politics and patriotism.

On August 25th, Douglas spoke at Norfolk, Virginia. In the course of his address, an elector on the Breckinridge ticket interrupted him with two questions. Though taken somewhat by surprise, Douglas with unerring sagacity detected the purpose of his interrogator and answered circumstantially.[866] "First, If Abraham Lincoln be elected President of the United States, will the Southern States be justified in seceding from the Union?" "To this I emphatically answer no. The election of a man to the presidency by the American people in conformity with the Constitution of the United States _would not justify any attempt at dissolving this glorious confederacy_." "Second, If they secede from the Union upon the inauguration of Abraham Lincoln, before an overt act against their constitutional rights, will you advise or vindicate resistance to the decision!" "I answer emphatically, that it is the duty of the President of the United States and of all others in authority under him, to enforce the laws of the United States, passed by Congress and as the Courts expound them; and I, as in duty bound by my oath of fidelity to the Constitution, _would do all in my power to aid the government of the United States in maintaining the supremacy of the laws against all resistance to them, come from whatever quarter it might_.... I hold that the Constitution has a remedy for every grievance that may arise within the limits of the Union.... The mere inauguration of a President of the United States, whose political opinions were, in my judgment, hostile to the Constitution and safety of the Union, without an overt act on his part, without striking a blow at our institutions or our rights, is not such a grievance as would justify revolution or secession." But for the disunionists at the South, Douglas went on to say, "I would have beaten Lincoln in every State but Vermont and Massachusetts. As it is I think I will beat him in almost all of them yet."[867] And now these disunionists come forward and ask aid in dissolving the Union. "I tell them 'no--never on earth!'"

Widely quoted, this bold defiance of disunion made a profound impression through the South. At Raleigh, North Carolina, Douglas entered into collusion with a friend, in order to have the questions repeated.[868] And again he stated his attitude in unequivocal language. "I am in favor of executing, in good faith, every clause and provision of the Constitution, and of protecting every right under it, and then hanging every man who takes up arms against it. Yes, my friends, I would hang every man higher than Haman who would attempt to resist by force the execution of any provision of the Constitution which our fathers made and bequeathed to us."[869]

He touched many hearts when he reminded his hearers that in the great Northwest, Northerners and Southerners met and married, bequeathing the choice gifts of both sections to their children. "When their children grow up, the child of the same parents has a grandfather in North Carolina and another in Vermont, and that child does not like to hear either of those States abused.... He will never consent that this Union shall be dissolved so that he will be compelled to obtain a passport and get it _viséd_ to enter a foreign land to visit the graves of his ancestors. You cannot sever this Union unless you cut the heart strings that bind father to son, daughter to mother, and brother to sister, in all our new States and territories." And the heart of the speaker went out to his kindred and his boys, who were almost within hearing of his voice. "I love my children," he exclaimed, "but I do not desire to see them survive this Union."

At Richmond, Douglas received an ovation which recalled the days when Clay was the idol of the Whigs;[870] but as he journeyed northward he felt more and more the hostility of Breckinridge men, and marked the disposition of many of his own supporters to strike an alliance with them. Unhesitatingly he threw the weight of his personal influence against fusion. At Baltimore, he averred that while Breckinridge was not a disunionist, every disunionist was a Breckinridge man.[871] And at Reading, he said, "For one, I can never fuse, and never will fuse with a man who tells me that the Democratic creed is a dogma, contrary to reason and to the Constitution.... I have fought twenty-seven pitched battles, since I entered public life, and never yet traded with nominations or surrendered to treachery."[872] With equal pertinacity he refused to countenance any attempts at fusion in North Carolina.[873] Even more explicitly he declared against fusion in a speech at Erie: "No Democrat can, without dishonor, and a forfeiture of self-respect and principle, fuse with anybody who is in favor of intervention, either for or against slavery.... As Democrats we can never fuse either with Northern Abolitionists or Southern Bolters and Secessionists."[874]

In spite of these protests and admonitions, Douglas men in several of the doubtful States entered into more or less definite agreement with the supporters of Breckinridge. The pressure put upon him in New York by those to whom he was indebted for his nomination, was almost too strong to be resisted. Yet he withstood all entreaties, even to maintain a discreet silence and let events take their course. Hostile newspapers expressed his sentiments when they represented him as opposed to fusion, "all the way from Maine to California."[875] "Douglas either must have lost his craft as a politician," commented Raymond, in the editorial columns of the _Times_, "or be credited with steadfast convictions."[876]

Adverse comment on Douglas's personal canvass had now ceased. Wise men recognized that he was preparing the public mind for a crisis, as no one else could. He set his face westward, speaking at numerous points.[877] Continuous speaking had now begun to tell upon him. At Cincinnati, he was so hoarse that he could not address the crowds which had gathered to greet him, but he persisted in speaking on the following day at Indianapolis. He paused in Chicago only long enough to give a public address, and then passed on into Iowa.[878] Among his own people he unbosomed himself as he had not done before in all these weeks of incessant public speaking. "I am no alarmist. I believe that this country is in more danger now than at any other moment since I have known anything of public life. It is not personal ambition that has induced me to take the stump this year. I say to you who know me, that the presidency has no charms for me. I do not believe that it is my interest as an ambitious man, to be President this year if I could. But I do love this Union. There is no sacrifice on earth that I would not make to preserve it."[879]

While Douglas was in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, he received a dispatch from his friend, Forney, announcing that the Republicans had carried Pennsylvania in the October State election. Similar intelligence came from Indiana. The outcome in November was thus clearly foreshadowed. Recognizing the inevitable, Douglas turned to his Secretary with the laconic words, "Mr. Lincoln is the next President. We must try to save the Union. I will go South."[880] He at once made appointments to speak in Tennessee, Alabama, and Georgia, as soon as he should have met his Western engagements. His friends marvelled at his powers of endurance. For weeks he had been speaking from hotel balconies, from the platform of railroad coaches, and in halls to monster mass-meetings.[881] Not infrequently he spoke twice and thrice a day, for days together. It was often said that he possessed the constitution of the United States; and he caught up the jest with delight, remarking that he believed he had. Small wonder if much that he said was trivial and unworthy of his attention;[882] in and through all his utterance, nevertheless, coursed the passionate current of his love for the Union, transfiguring all that was paltry and commonplace. From Iowa he passed into Wisconsin and Michigan, finally entering upon his Southern mission at St. Louis, October 19th. "I am not here to-night," he told his auditors, with a shade of weariness in his voice, "to ask your votes for the presidency. I am not one of those who believe that I have any more personal interest in the presidency than any other good citizen in America. I am here to make an appeal to you in behalf of the Union and the peace of the country."[883]

It was a courageous little party that left St. Louis for Memphis and the South. Mrs. Douglas was still with her husband, determined to share all the hardships that fell to his lot; and besides her, there was only James B. Sheridan, Douglas's devoted secretary and stenographer. The Southern press had threatened Douglas with personal violence, if he should dare to invade the South with his political heresies.[884] But Luther bound for Worms was not more indifferent to personal danger than this modern intransigeant. His conduct earned the hearty admiration of even Republican journals, for no one could now believe that he courted the South in his own behalf. Nor was there any foolish bravado in this adventure. He was thoroughly sobered by the imminence of disunion. When he read, in a newspaper devoted to his interests, that it was "the deep-seated fixed determination on the part of the leading Southern States to go out of the Union, peaceably and quietly," he knew that these words were no cheap rhetoric, for they were penned by a man of Northern birth and antecedents.[885]

The history of this Southern tour has never been written. It was the firm belief of Douglas that at least one attempt was made to wreck his train. At Montgomery, while addressing a public gathering, he was made the target for nameless missiles.[886] Yet none of these adventures were permitted to find their way into the Northern press. And only his intimates learned of them from his own lips after his return.

The news of Mr. Lincoln's election overtook Douglas in Mobile. He was in the office of the Mobile _Register_, one of the few newspapers which had held to him and his cause through thick and thin. It now became a question what policy the paper should pursue. The editor asked his associate to read aloud an article which he had just written, advocating a State convention to deliberate upon the course of Alabama in the approaching crisis. Douglas opposed its publication; but he was assured that the only way to manage the secession movement was to appear to go with it, and by electing men opposed to disunion, to control the convention. With his wonted sagacity, Douglas remarked that if they could not prevent the calling of a convention, they could hardly hope to control its action. But the editors determined to publish the article, "and Douglas returned to his hotel more hopeless than I had ever seen him before," wrote Sheridan.[887]

On his return to the North, Douglas spoke twice, at New Orleans and at Vicksburg, urging acquiescence in the result of the election.[888] He put the case most cogently in a letter to the business men of New Orleans, which was widely published. No one deplored the election of an Abolitionist as President more than he. Still, he could not find any just cause for dissolving the Federal Union in the mere election of any man to the presidency, in accordance with the Constitution. Those who apprehended that the new President would carry out the aggressive policy of his party, failed to observe that his party was in a minority. Even his appointments to office would have to be confirmed by a hostile Senate. Any invasion of constitutional rights would be resented in the North, as well as in the South. In short, the election of Mr. Lincoln could only serve as a pretext for those who purposed to break up the Union and to form a Southern Confederacy.[889]

On the face of the election returns, Douglas made a sorry showing; he had won the electoral vote of but a single State, Missouri, though three of the seven electoral votes of New Jersey fell to him as the result of fusion. Yet as the popular vote in the several States was ascertained, defeat wore the guise of a great personal triumph. Leader of a forlorn hope, he had yet received the suffrages of 1,376,957 citizens, only 489,495 less votes than Lincoln had polled. Of these 163,525 came from the South, while Lincoln received only 26,430, all from the border slave States. As compared with the vote of Breckinridge and Bell at the South, Douglas's vote was insignificant; but at the North, he ran far ahead of the combined vote of both.[890] It goes without saying that had Douglas secured the full Democratic vote in the free States, he would have pressed Lincoln hard in many quarters. From the national standpoint, the most significant aspect of the popular vote was the failure of Breckinridge to secure a majority in the slave States.[891] Union sentiment was still stronger than the secessionists had boasted. The next most significant fact in the history of the election was this: Abraham Lincoln had been elected to the presidency by the vote of a section which had given over a million votes to his rival, the leader of a faction of a disorganized party.

* * * * *

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 810: Flint, Douglas, pp. 205-207.]

[Footnote 811: _Ibid._, pp. 207-209.]

[Footnote 812: _Globe_, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 421.]

[Footnote 813: _Ibid._, pp. 424-425.]

[Footnote 814: _Ibid._, p. 553.]

[Footnote 815: _Globe_, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 554-555.]

[Footnote 816: _Ibid._, p. 559.]

[Footnote 817: _Globe_, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 658. For the final version, see p. 935.]

[Footnote 818: Halstead, Political Conventions of 1860, p. 59.]

[Footnote 819: _Ibid._, p. 29.]

[Footnote 820: _Ibid._, p. 5.]

[Footnote 821: _Ibid._, pp. 9 and 20.]

[Footnote 822: Halstead, Political Conventions of 1860, pp. 12-13.]

[Footnote 823: _Ibid._, p. 8.]

[Footnote 824: _Ibid._, p. 36.]

[Footnote 825: Especially in securing votes from the delegations of Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and New Jersey, where the influence of the administration was strong. Halstead, Political Conventions of 1860, pp. 25-28.]

[Footnote 826: Halstead, Political Conventions of 1860, p. 36.]

[Footnote 827: Stanwood, History of the Presidency, pp. 283-288.]

[Footnote 828: Rhodes, History of the United States, II, p. 446.]

[Footnote 829: _Ibid._, p. 448.]

[Footnote 830: Halstead, Political Conventions of 1860, p. 49.]

[Footnote 831: _Ibid._, p. 50.]

[Footnote 832: _Ibid._, pp. 74-75.]

[Footnote 833: Proceedings of the National Democratic Convention, pp. 46-53.]

[Footnote 834: Halstead, Political Conventions of 1860, p. 78.]

[Footnote 835: _Globe_, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., App., p. 313.]

[Footnote 836: _Ibid._, p. 316.]

[Footnote 837: _Globe_, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 2120.]

[Footnote 838: _Globe_, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 2155.]

[Footnote 839: _Ibid._, p. 2156.]

[Footnote 840: Rhodes, History of the United States, II, p. 456.]

[Footnote 841: _Globe_, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 2344.]

[Footnote 842: See Wise, Life of Henry A. Wise, pp. 264-265.]

[Footnote 843: Rhodes, History of the United States, II, p. 472.]

[Footnote 844: _Ibid._, p. 472.]

[Footnote 845: Halstead, Political Conventions of 1860, pp. 227-228.]

[Footnote 846: _Ibid._, pp. 194-195.]

[Footnote 847: The letter was written at Washington, June 22d, at 9:30 a.m.]

[Footnote 848: Stanwood, History of the Presidency, p. 286; Halstead, Political Conventions of 1860, p. 211.]

[Footnote 849: Halstead, p. 216.]

[Footnote 850: Flint, Douglas, pp. 213-215.]

[Footnote 851: New York _Times_, July 3, 1860.]

[Footnote 852: _Ibid._, June 26.]

[Footnote 853: MS. letter, Douglas to C.H. Lanphier, July 5, 1860. He wrote in a similar vein to a friend in Missouri, July 4, 1860.]

[Footnote 854: New York _Times_, July 20, 1860.]

[Footnote 855: _Ibid._, July 21.]

[Footnote 856: _Ibid._, July 21.]

[Footnote 857: _Ibid._, July 24.]

[Footnote 858: _Ibid._, July 28.]

[Footnote 859: New York _Times_, July. 24.]

[Footnote 860: Rhodes, History of the United States, II, pp. 482-483.]

[Footnote 861: Wilson, Slave Power in America, II, p. 699.]

[Footnote 862: This was the view of a well-informed correspondent of the New York _Times_, August 10, 14, 16, 1860. From this point of view, Douglas's tour through Maine in August takes on special significance.]

[Footnote 863: Wilson, Slave Power in America, II, 699.]

[Footnote 864: Rhodes, History of the United States, II, pp. 487, 489.]

[Footnote 865: New York _Times_, August 16, 1860.]

[Footnote 866: _Ibid._, August 29, 1860.]

[Footnote 867: This can hardly be regarded as a sober opinion. Clingman had become convinced by conversation with Douglas that he was not making the canvass in his own behalf, but in order to weaken and divide the South, so as to aid Lincoln. Clingman, Speeches and Writings, p. 513.]

[Footnote 868: Clingman, Speeches and Writings, p. 513.]

[Footnote 869: North Carolina _Standard_, September 5, 1860.]

[Footnote 870: Correspondent to New York _Times_, September 5, 1860.]

[Footnote 871: _Ibid._, September 7, 1860.]

[Footnote 872: New York _Tribune_, September 10, 1860. Greeley did Douglas an injustice when he accused him of courting votes by favoring a protective tariff in Pennsylvania. The misapprehension was doubtless due to a garbled associated press dispatch.]

[Footnote 873: Clingman, Speeches and Writings, p. 513.]

[Footnote 874: New York _Times_, September 27, 1860.]

[Footnote 875: New York _Times_, September 13, 1860.]

[Footnote 876: _Ibid._]

[Footnote 877: His movements were still followed by the New York _Times_, which printed his list of appointments.]

[Footnote 878: Chicago _Times_ and _Herald_, October 9, 1860.]

[Footnote 879: Chicago _Times and Herald_, October 6, 1860.]

[Footnote 880: Wilson, Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America, II, p. 700; see also Forney's Eulogy of Douglas, 1861.]

[Footnote 881: Rhodes, History of the United States, II, p. 493.]

[Footnote 882: _Ibid._]

[Footnote 883: Chicago _Times and Herald_, October 24, 1860.]

[Footnote 884: Philadelphia _Press_, October 29, 1860.]

[Footnote 885: Savannah (Ga.) _Express_, quoted by Chicago _Times and Herald_, October 25, 1860.]

[Footnote 886: There was a bare reference to the Montgomery incident in the Chicago _Times and Herald_, November 12, 1860.]

[Footnote 887: Wilson, Slave Power in America, II, p. 700.]

[Footnote 888: Chicago _Times and Herald_, November 13, 1860; Philadelphia _Press_, November 28, 1860.]

[Footnote 889: Chicago _Times and Herald_, November 19, 1860.]

[Footnote 890: Stanwood, History of the Presidency, p. 297.]

[Footnote 891: Douglas and Bell polled 135,057 votes more than Breckinridge; see Greeley, American Conflict, I, p. 328.]