Chapter 10

YOUNG AMERICA

When Douglas reached Chicago, immediately after the adjournment of Congress, he found the city in an uproar. The strong anti-slavery sentiment of the community had been outraged by the Fugitive Slave Law. Reflecting the popular indignation, the Common Council had adopted resolutions condemning the act as a violation of the Constitution and a transgression of the laws of God. Those senators and representatives who voted for the bill, or "who basely sneaked away from their seats and thereby evaded the question," were stigmatized as "fit only to be ranked with the traitors, Benedict Arnold and Judas Iscariot." This was indeed a sorry home-coming for one who believed himself entitled to honors.

Learning that a mass-meeting was about to indorse the action of the city fathers, Douglas determined to face his detractors and meet their charges. Entering the hall while the meeting was in progress, he mounted the platform, and announced that on the following evening he would publicly defend all the measures of adjustment. He was greeted with hisses and jeers for his pains; but in the end he had the satisfaction of securing an adjournment until his defense had been heard.

It was infinitely to his credit that when he confronted a hostile audience on the next evening, he stooped to no cheap devices to divert resentment, but sought to approve his course to the sober intelligence of his hearers.[370] It is doubtful if the Fugitive Slave Law ever found a more skillful defender. The spirit in which he met his critics was admirably calculated to disarm prejudice. Come and let us reason together, was his plea. Without any attempt to ignore the most obnoxious parts of the act, he passed directly to the discussion of the clauses which apparently denied the writ of _habeas corpus_ and trial by jury to the fugitive from service. He reminded his hearers that this act was supplementary to the Act of 1793. No one had found fault with the earlier act because it had denied these rights. Both acts, in fact, were silent on these points; yet in neither case was silence to be construed as a denial of constitutional obligations. On the contrary, they must be assumed to continue in full force under the act. Misapprehension arose in these matters, because the recovery of the fugitive slave was not viewed as a process of extradition. The act provided for the return of the alleged slave to the State from which he had fled. Trial of the facts by jury would then follow under the laws of the State, just as the fugitive from justice would be tried in the State where the alleged crime had been committed. The testimony before the original court making the requisition, would necessarily be _ex parte_, as in the case of the escaped criminal; but this did not prevent a fair trial on return of the fugitive. Regarding the question of establishing the identity of the apprehended person with the fugitive described in the record, Douglas asserted that the terms of the act required proof satisfactory to the judge or commissioner, and not merely the presentment of the record. "Other and further evidence" might be insisted upon.

At various times Douglas was interrupted by questions which were obviously contrived to embarrass him. To all such he replied courteously and with engaging frankness. "Why was it," asked one of these troublesome questioners, "that the law provided for a fee of ten dollars if the commissioner decided in favor of the claimant, and for a fee of only five dollars if he decided otherwise? Was this not in the nature of an inducement, a bribe?" "I presume," said Douglas, "that the reason was that he would have more labor to perform. If, after hearing the testimony, the commissioner decided in favor of the claimant, the law made it his duty to prepare and authenticate the necessary papers to authorize him to carry the fugitive home; but if he decided against him, he had no such labor to perform."

After all, as Douglas said good-naturedly, all these objections were predicated on a reluctance to return a slave to his master under any circumstances. Did his hearers realize, he insisted, that refusal to do so was a violation of the Constitution? And were they willing to shatter the Union because of this feeling? At this point he was again interrupted by an individual, who wished to know if the provisions of the Constitution were not in violation of the law of God. "The divine law," responded Douglas, "does not prescribe the form of government under which we shall live, and the character of our political and civil institutions. Revelation has not furnished us with a constitution--a code of international law--and a system of civil and municipal jurisprudence." If this Constitution were to be repudiated, he begged to know, "who is to be the prophet to reveal the will of God, and establish a theocracy for us?"

At the conclusion of his speech, Douglas offered a series of resolutions expressing the obligation of all good citizens to maintain the Constitution and all laws duly enacted by Congress in pursuance of the Constitution. With a remarkable revulsion of feeling, the audience indorsed these sentiments without a dissenting voice, and subsequently repudiated in express terms the resolutions of the Common Council.[371] The triumph of Douglas was complete. It was one of those rare instances where the current of popular resentment is not only deflected, but actually reversed, by the determination and eloquence of one man.

There were two groups of irreconcilables to whom such appeals were unavailing--radical Abolitionists at the North and Southern Rights advocates. Not even the eloquence of Webster could make willing slave-catchers of the anti-slavery folk of Massachusetts. The rescue of the negro Shadrach, an alleged fugitive slave, provoked intense excitement, not only in New England but in Washington. The incident was deemed sufficiently ominous to warrant a proclamation by the President, counseling all good citizens to uphold the law. Southern statesmen of the radical type saw abundant evidence in this episode of a deliberate purpose at the North not to enforce the essential features of the compromise. Both Whig and Democratic leaders, with few exceptions, roundly denounced all attempts to nullify the Fugitive Slave Law.[372] None was more vehement than Douglas. He could not regard this Boston rescue as a trivial incident. He believed that there was an organization in many States to evade the law. It was in the nature of a conspiracy against the government. The ring-leaders were Abolitionists, who were exciting the negroes to excesses. He was utterly at a loss to understand how senators, who had sworn to obey and defend the Constitution, could countenance these palpable violations of law.[373]

In spite of similar untoward incidents, the vast majority of people in the country North and South were acquiescing little by little in the settlement reached by the compromise measures. There was an evident disposition on the part of both Whig and Democratic leaders to drop the slavery issue. When Senator Sumner proposed a repeal of the Fugitive Slave Act, Douglas deprecated any attempt to "fan the flames of discord that have so recently divided this great people,"[374] intimating that Sumner's speech was intended to "operate upon the presidential election." It ill became the Senator from Illinois to indulge in such taunts, for no one, it may safely be said, was calculating his own political chances more intently. "Things look well," he had written to a friend, referring to his chances of securing the nomination, "and the prospect is brightening every day. All that is necessary now to insure success is that the northwest should unite and speak out."[375]

When the Democrats of Illinois proposed Douglas's name for the presidency in 1848, no one was disposed to take the suggestion seriously, outside the immediate circle of his friends. To graybeards there was something almost humorous in the suggestion that five years of service in Congress gave a young man of thirty-five a claim to consideration! Within three short years, however, the situation had changed materially. Older aspirants for the chief magistracy were forced, with no little alarm, to acknowledge the rise of a really formidable rival. By midsummer of 1851, competent observers thought that Douglas had the best chance of winning the Democratic nomination. In the judgment of certain Whig editors, he was the strongest man. It was significant of his growing favor, that certain Democrats of the city and county of New York tendered him a banquet, in honor of his distinguished services to the party and his devotion to the Union during the past two years.

Politicians of both parties shared the conviction that unless the Whigs could get together,--which was unlikely,--a nomination at the hands of a national Democratic convention was equivalent to an election. Consequently there were many candidates in the field. The preliminary canvass promised to be eager. It was indeed well under way long before Congress assembled in December, and it continued actively during the session. "The business of the session," wrote one observer in a cynical frame of mind, "will consist mainly in the manoeuvres, intrigues, and competitions for the next Presidency." Events justified the prediction. "A politician does not sneeze without reference to the Presidency," observed the same writer, some weeks after the beginning of the session. "Congress does little else but intrigue for the respective candidates."[376]

Prospective candidates who sat in Congress had at least this advantage, over their outside competitors,--they could keep themselves in the public eye by making themselves conspicuous in debate. But the wisdom of such devices was questionable. Those who could not point with confident pride to their record, wisely chose to remain non-committal on matters of personal history. Douglas was one of those who courted publicity. Perhaps as a young man pitted against older rivals, he felt that he had everything to gain thereby and not much to lose. The irrepressible Foote of Mississippi gave all his colleagues a chance to mar their reputations, by injecting into the deliberations of the Senate a discussion of the finality of the compromise measures.[377] It speedily appeared that fidelity to the settlement of 1850, from the Southern point of view, consisted in strict adherence to the Fugitive Slave Act.[378] This was the touchstone by which Southern statesmen proposed to test their Northern colleagues. Prudence whispered silence into many an ear; but Douglas for one refused to heed her admonitions. Within three weeks after the session began, he was on his feet defending the consistency of his course, with an apparent ingenuousness which carried conviction to the larger audience who read, but did not hear, his declaration of political faith.

Two features of this speech commended it to Democrats: its recognition of the finality of the compromise, and its insistence upon the necessity of banishing the slavery question from politics. "The Democratic party," he asseverated, "is as good a Union party as I want, and I wish to preserve its principles and its organization, and to triumph upon its old issues. I desire no new tests--no interpolations into the old creed."[379] For his part, he was resolved never to speak again upon the slavery question in the halls of Congress.

But this was after all a negative programme. Could a campaign be successfully fought without other weapons than the well-worn blunderbusses in the Democratic arsenal? This was a do-nothing policy, difficult to reconcile with the enthusiastic liberalism which Young America was supposed to cherish. Yet Douglas gauged the situation accurately. The bulk of the party wished a return to power more than anything else. To this end, they were willing to toot for old issues and preserve the old party alignment. For four years, the Democratic office-hunters had not tasted of the loaves and fishes within the gift of the executive. They expected liberality in conduct, if not liberalism in creed, from their next President. Douglas shared this political hunger. He had always been a believer in rotation in office, and an exponent of that unhappy, American practice of using public office as the spoil of party victory. In this very session, he put himself on record against permanence in office for the clerks of the Senate, holding that such positions should fall vacant at stated intervals.[380]

But had Douglas no policy peculiarly his own, to qualify him for the leadership of his party? Distrustful Whigs accused him of being willing to offer Cuba for the support of the South.[381] Indeed, he made no secret of his desire to acquire the Pearl of the Antilles. Still, this was not the sort of issue which it was well to drag into a presidential campaign. Like all the other aspirants for the presidency, Douglas made what capital he could out of the visit of Kossuth and the question of intervention in behalf of Hungary. When the matter fell under discussion in the Senate, Douglas formulated what he considered should be the policy of the government:

"I hold that the principle laid down by Governor Kossuth as the basis of his action--that each State has a right to dispose of her own destiny, and regulate her internal affairs in her own way, without the intervention of any foreign power--is an axiom in the laws of nations which every State ought to recognize and respect.... It is equally clear to my mind, that any violation of this principle by one nation, intervening for the purpose of destroying the liberties of another, is such an infraction of the international code as would authorize any State to interpose, which should conceive that it had sufficient interest in the question to become the vindicator of the laws of nations."[382]

Cass had said much the same thing, but with less virility. Douglas scored on his rival in this speech: first, when he declared with a bit of Chauvinism, "I do not deem it material whether the reception of Governor Kossuth give offence to the crowned heads of Europe, provided it does not violate the law of nations, and give just _cause_ of offence"; and again, scorning the suggestion of an alliance with England, "The peculiar position of our country requires that we should have an _American policy_ in our foreign relations, based upon the principles of our own government, and adapted to the spirit of the age."[383] There was a stalwart conviction in these utterances which gave promise of confident, masterful leadership. These are qualities which the people of this great democracy have always prized, but rarely discovered, in their Presidents.

It was at this moment in the canvass that the promoters of Douglas's candidacy made a false move. Taking advantage of the popular demonstration over Kossuth and the momentary diversion of public attention from the slavery question to foreign politics, they sought to thrust Douglas upon the Democratic party as the exponent of a progressive foreign policy. They presumed to speak in behalf of "Young America," as against "Old Fogyism." Seizing upon the _Democratic Review_ as their organ, these progressives launched their boom by a sensational article in the January number, entitled "Eighteen-Fifty-Two and the Presidency." Beginning with an arraignment of "Webster's un-American foreign policy, the writer,--or writers,--called upon honest men to put an end to this "Quaker policy." "The time has come for strong, sturdy, clear-headed and honest men to act; and the Republic must have them, should it be compelled, as the colonies were in 1776, to drag the hero of the time out of a hole in a wild forest, [_sic_] whether in Virginia or the illimitable West." To inaugurate such an era, the presidential chair must be filled by a man, not of the last generation, but of this. He must not be "trammeled with ideas belonging to an anterior era, or a man of merely local fame and local affections, but a statesman who can bring young blood, young ideas, and young hearts to the councils of the Republic. He must not be a mere general, a mere lawyer, a mere wire-puller. "Your beaten horse, whether he ran for a previous presidential cup as first or second," will not do. He must be 'a tried civilian, not a second and third rate general.' "Withal, a practical statesman, not to be discomfited in argument, or led wild by theory, but one who has already, in the councils and tribunals of the nation, reared his front to the dismay of the shallow conservative, to the exposure of the humanitarian incendiary, and the discomfiture of the antiquated rhetorician."

If anyone was so dense as not to recognize the portrait here painted, he had only to turn to an article entitled "Intervention," to find the name of the hero who was to usher in the new era. The author of this paper finds his sentiments so nearly identical with those of Stephen A. Douglas, that he resorts to copious extracts from his speech delivered in the Senate on the welcome of Kossuth, "entertaining no doubt that the American people, the _democracy_ of the country will endorse these doctrines by an overwhelming majority." Still another article in this formidable broadside from the editors of the _Democratic Review_, deprecated Foote's efforts to thrust the slavery issue again upon Congress, and expressed the pious wish that Southern delegates might join with Northern in the Baltimore convention, to nominate a candidate who would in future "evince the most profound ignorance as to the topographical bearing of that line of discord known as 'Mason and Dixon's.'"

If all this was really the work of Douglas's friends,--and it is more than likely,--he had reason to pray to be delivered from them. At best the whole manoeuvre was clumsily planned and wretchedly executed; it probably did him irreparable harm. His strength was not sufficient to confront all his rivals; yet the almost inevitable consequence of the odious comparisons in the _Review_ was combinations against him. The leading article gave mortal offense in quarters where he stood most in need of support.[384] Douglas was quick to detect the blunder and appreciate its dangers to his prospects. His friends now began sedulously to spread the report that the article was a ruse of the enemy, for the especial purpose of spoiling his chances at Baltimore. It was alleged that proof sheets had been found in the possession of a gentleman in Washington, who was known to be hostile to Douglas.[385] Few believed this story: the explanation was too far-fetched. Nevertheless, one of Douglas's intimates subsequently declared, on the floor of the House, that the Judge was not responsible for anything that appeared in the _Review_, that he had no interest in or control over the magazine, and that he knew nothing about the January number until he saw it in print.[386]

In spite of this untoward incident, Douglas made a formidable showing.[387] He was himself well pleased at the outlook. He wrote to a friend, "Prospects look well and are improving every day. If two or three western States will speak out in my favor the battle is over. Can anything be done in Iowa and Missouri? That is very important. If some one could go to Iowa, I think the convention in that State would instruct for me. In regard to our own State, I will say a word. Other States are appointing a large number of delegates to the convention, ... ought not our State to do the same thing so as to ensure the attendance of most of our leading politicians at Baltimore?... This large number would exert a great moral influence on the other delegates."[388]

Among the States which had led off in his favor was California; and it was a representative of California who first sounded the charge for Douglas's cohorts in the House. In any other place and at any other time, Marshall's exordium would have overshot the mark. Indeed, in indorsing the attack of the _Review_ on the old fogies in the party, he tore open wounds which it were best to let heal; but gauged by the prevailing standard of taste in politics, the speech was acceptable. It so far commended itself to the editors of the much-abused _Review_ that it appeared in the April number, under the caption "The Progress of Democracy vs. Old Fogy Retrograder."

To clear-headed outsiders, there was something factitious in this parade of enthusiasm for Douglas. "What most surprises one," wrote the correspondent of the New York _Tribune_, "is that these Congressmen, with beards and without; that verdant, flippant, smart detachment of Young America that has got into the House, propose to make a candidate for the Baltimore convention without consulting their masters, the people. With a few lively fellows in Congress and the aid of the _Democratic Review_, they fancy themselves equal to the achievement of a small job like this."[389] As the first of June approached, the older, experienced politicians grew confident that none of the prominent candidates could command a two-thirds vote in the convention. Some had foreseen this months beforehand and had been casting about for a compromise candidate. Their choice fell eventually upon General Franklin Pierce of New Hampshire. Friends were active in his behalf as early as April, and by June they had hatched their plot. It was not their plan to present his name to the convention at the outset, but to wait until the three prominent candidates (Cass, Douglas, and Buchanan) were disposed of. He was then to be put forward as an available, compromise candidate.[390]

Was Douglas cognizant of the situation? While his supporters did not abate their noisy demonstrations, there is some ground to believe that he did not share their optimistic spirit. At all events, in spite of his earlier injunctions, only eleven delegates from Illinois attended the convention, while Pennsylvania sent fifty-five, Tennessee twenty-seven, and Indiana thirty-nine. Had Douglas sent home the intimation that the game was up? The first ballot told the story of his defeat. Common rumor had predicted that a large part of the Northwest would support him. Only fifteen of his twenty votes came from that quarter, and eleven of these were cast by Illinois. It was said that the Indiana delegates would divert their strength to him, when they had cast one ballot for General Lane; but Indiana cast no votes for Douglas. Although his total vote rose to ninety-two and on the thirty-first ballot he received the highest vote of any of the candidates, there was never a moment when there was the slightest prospect of his winning the prize.[391]

On the thirty-fifth ballot occurred a diversion. Virginia cast fifteen votes for Franklin Pierce. The schemers had launched their project. But it was not until the forty-ninth ballot that they started the avalanche. Pierce then received all but six votes. Two Ohio delegates clung to Douglas to the bitter end. With the frank manliness which made men forget his less admirable qualities, Douglas dictated this dispatch to the convention: "I congratulate the Democratic party upon the nomination, and Illinois will give Franklin Pierce a larger majority than any other State in the Union,"--a promise which he was not able to redeem.

If Douglas had been disposed to work out his political prospects by mathematical computation, he would have arrived at some interesting conclusions from the balloting in the convention. Indeed, very probably he drew some deductions in his own intuitive way, without any adventitious aid. Of the three rivals, Cass received the most widely distributed vote, although Douglas received votes from as many States. While they drew votes from twenty-one States, Buchanan received votes from only fifteen. Cass and Douglas obtained their highest percentages of votes from the West; Buchanan found his strongest support in the South. Douglas and Cass received least support in the Middle States; Buchanan had no votes from the West. But while Cass had, on his highest total, thirty per centum of the whole vote of the Middle States, Douglas was relatively weak in the Middle States rather than in the South. On the basis of these figures, it is impossible to justify the statement that he could expect nothing in future from New England and Pennsylvania, but would look to the South for support for the presidency.[392] On the contrary, one would say that his strong New England following would act as an equipoise, preventing too great a dip toward the Southern end of the scales. Besides, Douglas's hold on his own constituents and the West was contingent upon the favor of the strong New England element in the Northwest. If this convention taught Douglas anything, it must have convinced him that narrow, sectional policies and undue favor to the South would never land him in the White House. To win the prize which he frankly coveted, he must grow in the national confidence, and not merely in the favor of a single section, however powerful.[393]

Pledges aside, Douglas was bound to give vigorous aid to the party candidates. His term as senator was about to expire. His own fortunes were inseparably connected with those of his party in Illinois. The Washington _Union_ printed a list of his campaign engagements, remarking with evident satisfaction that Judge Douglas was "in the field with his armor on." His itinerary reached from Virginia to Arkansas, and from New York to the interior counties of his own State. Stray items from a speech in Richmond suggest the tenuous quality of these campaign utterances. It was quite clear to his mind that General Scott's acceptance of the Whig nomination could not have been written by that manly soldier, but by _Politician_ Scott under the control of _General_ Seward. Was it wise to convert a good general into a bad president? Could it be true that Scott had promised the entire patronage of his administration to the Whigs? Why, "there had never been a Democratic administration in this Union that did not retain at least one-third of their political opponents in office!"[394] And yet, when Pierce had been elected, Douglas could say publicly, without so much as a blush, that Democrats must now have the offices. "For every Whig removed there should be a competent Democrat put in his place ... The best men should be selected, and everybody knows that the best men voted for Pierce and King."[395]

The outcome of the elections in Illinois was gratifying save in one particular. In consequence of the redistricting of the State, the Whigs had increased the number of their representatives in Congress. But the re-election of Douglas was assured.[396] His hold upon his constituency was unshaken. With right good will he participated in the Democratic celebration at Washington. As an influential personage in Democratic councils he was called upon to sketch in broad lines what he deemed to be sound Democratic policy; but only a casual reference to Cuba redeemed his speech from the commonplace. "Whenever the people of Cuba show themselves worthy of freedom by asserting and maintaining independence, and apply for annexation, they ought to be annexed; whenever Spain is ready to sell Cuba, with the consent of its inhabitants, we ought to accept it on fair terms; and if Spain should transfer Cuba to England or any other European power, we should take and hold Cuba anyhow."[397]

Ambition and a buoyant optimism seemed likely to make Douglas more than ever a power in Democratic politics, when a personal bereavement changed the current of his life. His young wife whom he adored, the mother of his two boys, died shortly after the new year. For the moment he was overwhelmed; and when he again took his place in the Senate, his colleagues remarked in him a bitterness and acerbity of temper which was not wonted. One hostage that he had given to Fortune had been taken away, and a certain recklessness took possession of him. He grew careless in his personal habits, slovenly in his dress, disregardful of his associates, and if possible more vehemently partisan in his public utterances.

It was particularly regrettable that, while Douglas was passing through this domestic tragedy, he should have been drawn into a controversy relating to British claims in Central America. It was rumored that Great Britain, in apparent violation of the terms of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, had taken possession of certain islands in the Bay of Honduras and erected them into the colony of "the Bay Islands." On the heels of this rumor came news that aroused widespread indignation. A British man-of-war had fired upon an American steamer, which had refused to pay port dues on entering the harbor of Greytown. Over this city, strategically located at the mouth of the San Juan River, Great Britain exercised an ill-disguised control as part of the Mosquito protectorate.

In the midst of the excited debate which immediately followed in Congress, Cass astonished everybody by producing the memorandum which Bulwer had given Clayton just before the signing of the treaty.[398] In this remarkable note, the British ambassador stated that his government did not wish to be understood as renouncing its existing claims to Her Majesty's settlement at Honduras and "its dependencies." And Clayton seemed to have admitted the force of this reservation. For his part, Cass made haste to say, he wished the Senate distinctly to understand that when he had voted for the treaty, he believed Great Britain was thereby prevented from establishing any such dependency. His object--and he had supposed it to be the object of the treaty--was to sweep away all British claims to Central America.

Behind this imbroglio lay an intricate diplomatic history which can be here only briefly recapitulated. The interest of the United States in the Central American States dated from the discovery of gold in California. The value of the control of the means of transportation across the isthmus at Nicaragua became increasingly clear, as the gold seekers sought that route to the Pacific coast. In the latter days of his administration, President Polk had sent one Elijah Hise to cultivate friendly relations with the Central American States and to offset the paramount influence of Great Britain in that region. Great Britain was already in possession of the colony of Belize and was exercising an ill-defined protectorate over the Mosquito Indians on the eastern coast of Nicaragua. In his ardor to serve American interests, Hise exceeded his instructions and secured a treaty with Nicaragua, which gave to the United States exclusive privileges over the route of the proposed canal, on condition that the sovereignty of Nicaragua were guaranteed. The incoming Whig administration would have nothing to do with the Hise _entente_, preferring to dispatch its own agent to Central America. Though Squier succeeded in negotiating a more acceptable treaty, the new Secretary of State, Clayton, was disposed to come to an understanding with Great Britain. The outcome of these prolonged negotiations was the famous Clayton-Bulwer treaty, by which both countries agreed to further the construction of a ship canal across the isthmus through Nicaragua, and to guarantee its neutrality. Other countries were invited to join in securing the neutrality of this and other regions where canals might be constructed. Both Great Britain and the United States explicitly renounced any "dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito coast or any part of Central America."[399]

The opposition would have been something less than human, if they had not seized upon the occasion to discredit the outgoing administration. Cass had already introduced a resolution reaffirming the terms of the famous Monroe message respecting European colonization in America, and thus furnishing the pretext for partisan attacks upon Secretary of State Clayton. But Cass unwittingly exposed his own head to a sidelong blow from his Democratic rival from Illinois, who affected the rôle of Young America once more.

It is impossible to convey in cold print the biting sarcasm, the vindictive bitterness, and the reckless disregard of justice, with which Douglas spoke on February 14th. He sneered at this new profession of the Monroe Doctrine. Why keep repeating this talk about a policy which the United States has almost invariably repudiated in fact? Witness the Oregon treaty! "With an avowed policy, of thirty years' standing that no future European colonization is to be permitted in America--affirmed when there was no opportunity for enforcing it, and abandoned whenever a case was presented for carrying it into practical effect--is it now proposed to beat another retreat under cover of terrible threats of awful consequences when the offense shall be repeated? '_Henceforth_' no 'future' European colony is to be planted in America '_with our consent!_' It is gratifying to learn that the United States are never going to 'consent' to the repudiation of the Monroe doctrine again. No more Clayton and Bulwer treaties; no more British 'alliances' in Central America, New Granada, or Mexico; no more resolutions of oblivion to protect 'existing rights!' Let England tremble, and Europe take warning, if the offense is repeated. 'Should the attempt be made,' says the resolution, 'it will leave the United States _free to adopt_ such measures as an independent nation may justly adopt in defense of its rights and honor.' Are not the United States now _free_ to adopt such measures as an independent nation may _justly adopt_ in defense of its _rights and honor_? Have we not given the notice? Is not thirty years sufficient notice?"[400]

He taunted Clayton with having suppressed the Hise treaty, which secured exclusive privileges for the United States over the canal route, in order to form a partnership with England and other monarchical powers of Europe. "Exclusive privileges" were sacrificed to lay the foundation of an alliance by which European intervention in American affairs was recognized as a right!

It was generally known that Douglas had opposed the Clayton-Bulwer treaty;[401] but the particular ground of his opposition had been only surmised. Deeming the injunction of secrecy removed, he now emphatically registered his protest against the whole policy of pledging the faith of the Republic, not to do what in the future our interests, duty, and even safety, might compel us to do. The time might come when the United States would wish to possess some portion of Central America. Moreover, the agreement not to fortify any part of that region was not reciprocal, so long as Great Britain held Jamaica and commanded the entrance to the canal. He had always regarded the terms of the British protectorate over the Mosquito coast as equivocal; but the insuperable objection to the treaty was the European partnership to which the United States was pledged. The two parties not only contracted to extend their protection to any other practicable communications across the isthmus, whether by canal or railway, but invited all other powers to become parties to these provisions. What was the purport of this agreement, if it did not recognize the right of European powers to intervene in American affairs; what then became of the vaunted Monroe Doctrine?

To the undiplomatic mind of Douglas, our proper course was as clear as day. Insist upon the withdrawal of Great Britain from the Bay Islands! "If we act with becoming discretion and firmness, I have no apprehension that the enforcement of our rights will lead to hostilities." And then let the United States free itself from entangling alliances by annulling the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.[402] Surely this was simplicity itself.

The return of Clayton to the Senate, in the special session of March, brought the accused before his accusers. An acrimonious debate followed, in the course of which Douglas was forced to state his own position more explicitly. He took his stand upon the Hise treaty. Had the exclusive control of the canal been given into our hands, and the canal thrown open to the commerce of all nations upon our own terms, we would have had a right which would have been ample security for every nation under heaven to keep peace with the United States. "We could have fortified that canal at each end, and in time of war could have closed it against our enemies." But, suggested Clayton, European powers would never have consented to such exclusive control. "Well, Sir," said Douglas, "I do not know that they would have consented: but of one thing I am certain I would never have asked their consent."[403] And such was the temper of Young America that this sledge hammer diplomacy was heartily admired.

It was in behalf of Young America again, that Douglas gave free rein to his vision of national destiny. Disclaiming any immediate wish for tropical expansion in the direction of either Mexico or Central America, he yet contended that no man could foresee the limits of the Republic. "You may make as many treaties as you please to fetter the limits of this giant Republic, and she will burst them all from her, and her course will be onward to a limit which I will not venture to prescribe." Why, then, pledge our faith never to annex any more of Mexico or any portion of Central America?[404]

For this characteristic Chauvinism Douglas paid the inevitable penalty. Clayton promptly ridiculed this attitude. "He is fond of boasting ... that we are a _giant_ Republic; and the Senator himself is said to be a 'little giant;' yes, sir, quite a _giant_, and everything that he talks about in these latter days is gigantic. He has become so magnificent of late, that he cannot consent to enter into a partnership on equal terms with any nation on earth--not he! He must have the exclusive right in himself and our noble selves!"[405]

It was inevitable, too, that Douglas should provoke resentment on his own side of the chamber. Cass was piqued by his slurs upon Old Fogyism and by his trenchant criticism of the policy of reasserting the Monroe Doctrine. Badger spoke for the other side of the house, when he declared that Douglas spoke "with a disregard to justice and fairness which I have seldom seen him exhibit." It is lamentably true that Douglas exhibited his least admirable qualities on such occasions. Hatred for Great Britain was bred in his bones. Possibly it was part of his inheritance from that grandfather who had fought the Britishers in the wars of the Revolution. Possibly, too, he had heard as a boy, in his native Vermont village, tales of British perfidy in the recent war of 1812. At all events, he was utterly incapable of anything but bitter animosity toward Great Britain. This unreasoning prejudice blinded his judgment in matters of diplomacy, and vitiated his utterances on questions of foreign policy.

Replying to Clayton, he said contemptuously, "I do not sympathize with that feeling which the Senator expressed yesterday, that it was a pity to have a difference with a nation so friendly to us as England. Sir, I do not see the evidence of her friendship. It is not in the nature of things that she can be our friend. It is impossible that she can love us. I do not blame her for not loving us. Sir, we have wounded her vanity and humbled her pride. She can never forgive us."[406]

And when Senator Butler rebuked him for this animosity, reminding him that England was after all our mother country, to whom we were under deeper obligations than to any other, Douglas retorted, "She is and ever has been a cruel and unnatural mother." Yes, he remembered the illustrious names of Hampden, Sidney, and others; but he remembered also that "the same England which gave them birth, and should have felt a mother's pride and love in their virtues and services, persecuted her noble sons to the dungeon and the scaffold." "He speaks in terms of delight and gratitude of the copious and refreshing streams which English literature and science are pouring into our country and diffusing throughout the land. Is he not aware that nearly every English book circulated and read in this country contains lurking and insidious slanders and libels upon the character of our people and the institutions and policy of our Government?"[407]

For Europe in general, Douglas had hardly more reverence. With a positiveness which in such matters is sure proof of provincialism, he said, "Europe is antiquated, decrepit, tottering on the verge of dissolution. When you visit her, the objects which enlist your highest admiration are the relics of past greatness; the broken columns erected to departed power. It is one vast graveyard, where you find here a tomb indicating the burial of the arts; there a monument marking the spot where liberty expired; another to the memory of a great man, whose place has never been filled. The choicest products of her classic soil consist in relics, which remain as sad memorials of departed glory and fallen greatness! They bring up the memories of the dead, but inspire no hope for the living! Here everything is fresh, blooming, expanding and advancing."[408]

And yet, soon after Congress adjourned, he set out to visit this vast graveyard. It was even announced that he proposed to spend five or six months in studying the different governments of Europe. Doubtless he regarded this study as of negative value chiefly. From the observation of relics of departed grandeur, a live American would derive many a valuable lesson. His immediate destination was the country against which he had but just thundered. Small wonder if a cordial welcome did not await him. His admiring biographer records with pride that he was not presented to Queen Victoria, though the opportunity was afforded.[409] It appears that this stalwart Democrat would not so far demean himself as to adopt the conventional court dress for the occasion. He would not stoop even to adopt the compromise costume of Ambassador Buchanan, and add to the plain dress of an American citizen, a short sword which would distinguish him from the court lackeys.

At St. Petersburg, his objections to court dress were more sympathetically received. Count Nesselrode, who found this uncompromising American possessed of redeeming qualities, put himself to no little trouble to arrange an interview with the Czar. Douglas was finally put under the escort of Baron Stoeckle, who was a member of the Russian embassy at Washington, and conducted to the field where the Czar was reviewing the army. Mounted upon a charger of huge dimensions, the diminutive Douglas was brought into the presence of the Czar of all the Russias.[410] It is said that Douglas was the only American who witnessed these manoeuvres; but Douglas afterward confessed, with a laugh at his own expense, that the most conspicuous feature of the occasion for him was the ominous evolutions of his horse's ears, for he was too short of limb and too inexperienced a horseman to derive any satisfaction from the military pageant.[411]

We are assured by his devoted biographer, Sheahan, that Douglas personally examined _all_ the public institutions of the capital during his two weeks' stay in St. Petersburg; and that he sought a thorough knowledge of the manners, laws, and government of that city and the Empire.[412] No doubt, with his nimble perception he saw much in this brief sojourn, for Russia had always interested him greatly, and he had read its history with more than wonted care.[413] He was not content to follow merely the beaten track in central and western Europe; but he visited also the Southeast where rumors of war were abroad. From St. Petersburg, he passed by carriage through the interior to the Crimea and to Sebastopol, soon to be the storm centre of war. In the marts of Syria and Asia Minor, he witnessed the contact of Orient and Occident. In the Balkan peninsula he caught fugitive glimpses of the rule of the unspeakable Turk.[414]

No man with the quick apperceptive powers of Douglas could remain wholly untouched by the sights and sounds that crowd upon even the careless traveler in the East; yet such experiences are not formative in the character of a man of forty. Douglas was still Douglas, still American, still Western to the core, when he set foot on native soil in late October. He was not a larger man either morally or intellectually; but he had acquired a fund of information which made him a readier, and possibly a wiser, man. And then, too, he was refreshed in body and mind. More than ever he was bold, alert, persistent, and resourceful. In his compact, massive frame, were stored indomitable pluck and energy; and in his heart the spirit of ambition stirred mightily.

* * * * *

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 370: The speech is given in part by Sheahan, Douglas, pp. 171 ff; and at greater length by Flint, Douglas, App., pp. 3 ff.]

[Footnote 371: Sheahan, Douglas, p. 186; Flint, Douglas, App., p. 30.]

[Footnote 372: _Globe,_31 Cong., 2 Sess., Debate of February 21 and 22, 1851.]

[Footnote 373: _Globe_, 31 Cong., 2 Sess., App., p. 312.]

[Footnote 374: _Globe_, 32 Cong., 1 Sess., App., p. 1120.]

[Footnote 375: MS. Letter dated December 30, 1851.]

[Footnote 376: Mann, Life of Horace Mann, pp. 351, 358, 362.]

[Footnote 377: Senator Foote introduced the subject December 2, 1851, by a resolution pronouncing the compromise measures a "definite adjustment and settlement."]

[Footnote 378: Rhodes, History of the United States, 1, p. 230.]

[Footnote 379: _Globe_, 32 Cong., 1 Sess., App., p. 68.]

[Footnote 380: _Globe_, 32 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 63. About this time he wrote to a friend, "I shall act on the rule of giving the offices to those who fight the battles."]

[Footnote 381: Mann, Life of Horace Mann, p. 354.]

[Footnote 382: _Globe_, 32 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 70.]

[Footnote 383: _Globe,_32 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 70-71.]

[Footnote 384: See speech by Breckinridge of Kentucky in _Globe_, 32 Cong., 1 Sess., App., pp. 299 ff.]

[Footnote 385: Pike, First Blows of the Civil War, p. 115.]

[Footnote 386: Statement by Richardson of Illinois in reply to J.C. Breckinridge of Kentucky, March 3, 1852. _Globe_, 32 Cong., 1 Sess., App., p. 302.]

[Footnote 387: "What with his Irish Organs, his Democratic reviews and an armful of other strings, each industriously pulled, he makes a formidable show." Pike, First Blows of the Civil War, p. 115.]

[Footnote 388: MS. Letter, February 25, 1852.]

[Footnote 389: Pike, First Blows of the Civil War, p. 118.]

[Footnote 390: Burke-Pierce Correspondence, printed in _American Historical Review_, X, pp. 110 ff. See also Stanwood, History of the Presidency, p. 248, and Rhodes, History of the United States, I, pp. 251-252.]

[Footnote 391: Proceedings of Democratic National Convention of 1852.]

[Footnote 392: See Rhodes, History of the United States, I, pp. 424-425.]

[Footnote 393: To attribute to Douglas, from this time on, as many writers have done, a purpose to pander to the South, is not only to discredit his political foresight, but to misunderstand his position in the Northwest and to ignore his reiterated assertions.]

[Footnote 394: Richmond _Enquirer_, quoted in Illinois _Register_, August 3, 1852.]

[Footnote 395: Illinois _State Register_, December 23, 1852.]

[Footnote 396: Washington _Union_, November 30, 1852. On a joint ballot of the legislature Douglas received 75 out of 95 votes. See Illinois _State Register_, January 5, 1853.]

[Footnote 397: Illinois _State Register_, December 23, 1852.]

[Footnote 398: Smith, Parties and Slavery, pp. 88-93.]

[Footnote 399: MacDonald, Select Documents of the History of the United States, No. 77.]

[Footnote 400: _Globe_, 32 Cong., 2 Sess., App., p. 170.]

[Footnote 401: Douglas declined to serve on the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, because he was opposed to the policy of the majority, so he afterward intimated. _Globe_, 32 Cong., 2 Sess., App., p. 268.]

[Footnote 402: _Globe_, 32 Cong., 2 Sess., App., p. 173.]

[Footnote 403: _Globe_, 32 Cong., Special Sess., p. 261.]

[Footnote 404: _Ibid._, p. 262.]

[Footnote 405: _Globe_, 32 Cong., Special Sess., p. 276.]

[Footnote 406: _Ibid._, p. 262.]

[Footnote 407: _Globe_, 32 Cong., Special Sess., p. 275.]

[Footnote 408: _Globe_, 32 Cong., Special Sess., p. 273.]

[Footnote 409: Sheahan, Douglas, pp. 443-444.]

[Footnote 410: Sheahan, Douglas, pp. 444-445.]

[Footnote 411: Major McConnell in the Transactions of the Illinois Historical Society, IV, p. 48; Linder, Early Bench and Bar of Illinois, pp. 80-82.]

[Footnote 412: Sheahan, Douglas, p. 444.]

[Footnote 413: Conversation with Judge R.M. Douglas.]

[Footnote 414: Washington _Union_, and Illinois _State Register_, May 26 and November 6, 1853.]