Part 2

Now, I ask gentlemen to point me, in all or any of the periods under review, to the precedents of a refusal by Parliament to receive petitions. I invite them to turn over the histories of parliamentary proceeding, and cite me the examples of petitions being thrust out of the House of Commons or of Lords, at the instant of presentation, on the ground that the prayer of the petition ought not to be granted. Will they do it? Can they do it? Is it not perfectly notorious, on the contrary, that every subject is freely admitted to be heard in his petition, provided it be respectful in terms, even although he pray expressly for a downright revolution in the government, as did the thousands of petitioners who thus carried through, in our own time, the great measure of parliamentary reform? And shall the People in republican America, with its written constitution for the protection of the public rights, and by a body of strictly limited powers,--shall the People here be forbidden to do that which they may freely do in the monarchy of England, having no guaranties for the public liberty except laws and prescriptive usages, all of them confessedly at the will of an omnipotent Parliament? Forbid it, reason! Forbid it, justice! Forbid it, liberty! Forbid it the beatified spirits of the revolutionary sages, who watch in heaven over the destinies of the Republic!

Aye, but, say gentlemen, if such things are not done by the representatives of the People in monarchical England, they have been done by their representatives in democratic America. We are told of precedents at home. What are those precedents?

To begin, I throw aside, as wholly inapplicable to the question, or at least as evasive of it, the case of petitions refused on account of disrespectful language towards the persons or the body petitioned. Those constitute a standing exception, independent of the merits of the subject.

The proceedings of this House in 1790, in reference to petitions on the matter of the slave trade, and of slavery in the States, have been cited. It has been said that those petitions were not received. That is a mistake, as any gentleman may satisfy himself by recurrence to the journals of the House. The petitions were received, committed, and debated on report, as I shall have occasion hereafter to state at length.

One other case is cited, that of the petition of Vicente Pazos, agent of New Granada, which, in the year 1818, the House refused to receive. But the printed debates of that day show clearly the ground of rejection. Mr. Forsyth moved that it be not received. "He stated that, as the petitioner was the agent of a foreign power, and applied to Congress as an appellate power over the Executive, he thought it improper that he should be thus heard." And the question was decided upon this single point. I heartily approve the remarks then made by a distinguished statesman, now no more, who at that time represented Massachusetts on this floor.

Mr. Mills, of Massachusetts, said that "the right of petition was a sacred one, and belonged equally to the meanest and the greatest citizen in the nation; and if such a petition as this, implicating the conduct of the Executive, had been presented from the meanest citizen, he would receive it; and if it complained of grievances without pointing out redress, it would be the duty of the House to give the proper redness; but it was to our own citizens only he would turn this listening ear. What right had a foreign subject to petition this House?"

Sir, I have incidentally touched upon the argument of precedents, and shown how untenable it is; but I care not if there were a thousand precedents of refusal to receive petitions. Such a fact, if it existed, would not abate my zeal on this point, or shift, in the minutest degree, my position. Upon the Constitution, upon the pre-existing legal rights of the People, as understood in this country and in England, I have argued that this House is bound to revive the Petition under debate. It is impossible, in my mind, to distinguish between the refusal to receive a petition, or its summary rejection by some general order, and the denial of the right of petition. I have no such microscopic eye as to enable me to discern the point of difference between the two things. This procedure may be keeping the word to the ear, but it is breaking it to the sense: and I go upon general, abstract, original, fundamental principle, the great principle of democratic liberty, which is the foundation stone of this Republic. It is for the sacred and inalienable rights of the People that I here contend. I should regard the exclusion of petitions from the consideration of the House as a highhanded invasion of the imprescriptible rights of the Constituency of the country, of whom we are the representatives, not the dictators; and it is for that reason I take my stand against it on the very threshold.

Sir, I am a republican; and I desire to see this House observe the principles of that democracy which is ever on the lips of its members, and which, I hope, is in their hearts, as I know and feel it is in mine, and mean it shall be in my conduct. This Republic was called into being, organized, and is upheld, by a great political doctrine. That doctrine is, that the People alone are supreme; that they are the fountains of power; that all magistrates are the delegated agents of the People, for the purposes limited and prescribed in their letters of appointment, and the general laws of the land; that the constituents of a member of this House have the right to give instructions to him individually; and that every individual one of the People has a right to be heard by petition on the floor of this House. These are among the things which I understand to constitute the principles of democracy: those general principles, which I learned in my boyhood with my catechism, in the bill of rights prefixed to the constitution of my own State; which, on maturer study, I have seen to be avowed more or less distinctly, in all the constitutions of this Republic, and of each of its constituent Republics; which I perceive to be defended and applauded in the writings of the great text authors of political science in modern times; and which after being for the first time practically exemplified in our own institutions, have gone forth over the universe, toppling down thrones, and raising up freemen, through all the nations of Christendom.

And whilst I feel impelled by such convictions to resist the summary rejection of this Petition upon principle, I am irresistibly led to the same conclusion by considerations of policy and expediency. I deny that such considerations should decide the question; but seeing they have been urged into it, I shall concede to them all due respect.

We have been told that the prayer of the Petition is for a thing which the Constitution does not permit to Congress, and so the petition itself should not be received. I ask of the House how it appears that we have no right by the Constitution to legislate upon the subject matter of the Petition? It may be so; and it may not. One member of the House has earnestly averred that it is; another that it is not. Which of them is right? I confess, for myself, that I cannot think it becomes the House to decide either way, upon the mere _ipse dixit_ of individual members. Besides, the Petition calls in question not only slavery, but also the _commerce in slaves_. And will any gentleman affirm that the slave trade of the District is among those holy things which Congress may not constitutionally handle? Is this District set apart by the Constitution, under whatever changes of opinion or fact the progress of civilization may introduce, to be unchangeably and forever a general slave market for the rest of the Union? I confess that I, again, am disappointed in that, among all the confident things said in denial of the constitutional powers of Congress in this matter, there has not been, so far as I remember, any systematic argument on the perfectly distinct branches of the double constitutional question involved in it, namely, the slave property, and the slave traffic, of this District. And what shall be said of our constitutional power in the purchased Territories, under the jurisdiction of the United States, to which some of these petitions apply? And what clause of the Constitution restricts the right of Petition to constitutional things? This House cannot grant beyond its powers; these are limited by the Constitution; but the People may petition for any thing; for the right of petition is, by the constitution, secured forever against any and every limitation or restriction.

But then it is said that the subject-matter of the Petition does not admit of debate; that the deliberate consideration of it, and the decision of it in the ordinary course of business, would be fraught with disastrous consequences to the peace of the South, and the general tranquillity of the Union. Deeming this argument of more weight than the other, I will give to it more careful attention; especially as, on this point, gentlemen have appealed with great force of language to the patriotic consideration of the North.

In the first place, I aver that I, and those with whom I have acted or voted, did not seek debate on this subject. We felt anxious, almost universally, to avoid it. The members from Massachusetts, at least, have not invited, and, until it had been under discussion among other gentlemen for a whole month, they scarcely participated in, the agitation of the subject in this House. We sat here week after Week, submitting, for the sake of public peace, to hear in silence the harshest reflections upon our constituents; and listening, with surprised curiosity, to the strangest legal and political heresies, uttered as confidently as if they were gospel truths communicated by divine inspiration. One of my colleagues (Mr. ADAMS) did, indeed, beseech gentlemen not to provoke him to a discussion of the subject; and thus it went on, untouched by us, until another of my colleagues (Mr. HOAR) could no longer abstain from the temperate defence of the Constitution and of his fellow-citizens.

In the second place, I do devoutly believe that gentlemen misjudge, if they suppose that agitation out of doors is to be arrested by the quashing of these petitions on their very introduction to this House. With my whole heart I accord in the view of the subject taken some time since by an honorable gentleman from New York, (Mr. HUNT,) and which I know is taken by one of the wisest and most trusted of the statesmen of Virginia, now a member of the other branch of Congress. If there be any plausible reason for supposing that we have the right to legislate on the slave interests of the District, you cannot put down the investigation of the subject out of doors, by refusing to receive petitions. On the contrary, you give the petitioners new force and efficiency, by giving them a new cause of complaint and of excitement. Nor do you attain any thing, so far as this House is concerned; for, by shutting out petitions, you do not shut out debate; any member of the House can bring on debate any day, by moving some general resolution applicable to the subject. On the other hand, if it be so certain that Congress have no power in this matter, or having power, ought not to exercise it, then let the House establish those points in the usual way, by a deliberate report, elaborated in the closet, by a committee of the ablest men upon this floor, and considerately adopted by the House. The argument by which this course is withstood, goes upon a false assumption. It assumes for granted, that the People of the United States are not to be reasoned with; that their opinions can be put down by bold and broad assertions at this or the other end of the Capitol; and that they are not to be trusted with the facts and law of the case. Here, again, as I conceive, gentlemen forget that this government is a republican one, resting exclusively in the intelligence and virtue of the People. I, for one, am willing they should look into any of the clauses of the Constitution, and be fully informed of the merits of every question arising under it, never doubting that, in the end, their decision upon it will be just, true, and patriotic. Or is it that gentlemen are afraid to meet a proper scrutiny of the subject? Do they shrink from a fair and full examination of its merits or demerits?

Sir, allusion has been made, in an early stage of this debate, to the history of the excitement which once pervaded a considerable part of the country, in reference to the transportation of the mails on the Lord's day. It is undoubtedly a pregnant case, directly in point. But I have another case, yet more cogent and pertinent.

Within less than one year after the adoption of the Constitution, there came to Congress petitions, chiefly from New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, and especially from the Society of Friends, praying Congress to suppress the slave trade, and to interpose, in various ways, within the limits of the several States, in the melioration of the condition of the colored population of the South. I have examined the journals giving the record of the proceedings in this House; I have looked into the history of the times, to understand the grounds of the disposition then made of those petitions. In the outset, I will observe, that the debates on the subject present a remarkable parallel with what has taken place under my own eyes in this House. Messrs. Jackson, Baldwin, Tucker, Smith, and some other gentlemen from the South, insisted, as we now hear it insisted, that the petitions should be summarily rejected, without commitment. They alleged the same reasons; such as unconstitutional object, and pernicious effects of the discussion upon the interests of the slaveholding States. One gentleman did, I believe, what I suppose would hardly be done at this day, entering into an elaborate vindication of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. But there was one most eminent and most patriotic member of that House, a man as calm in judging as he was deliberate in acting; who had himself been instrumental among the first in laying the foundation of this Union; who since then has successively filled the highest stations which the laws of his country acknowledge; and who yet lives, in a venerable old age, to receive the admiration of his countrymen, and to enjoy the rare felicity of surviving, as it were, a witness of the honors bestowed upon him by posterity. _Sero redeat in coelum._ Long may it be ere he depart from among us, to take his place among the great and glorious of other times. Sir, the House well anticipate that I have in my eye JAMES MADISON the younger, who stood forth to pour upon the troubled waves of that day the oil of peace and gladness. God grant there may yet be found among his patriotic countryman, some good and great man--a better and a greater there cannot be--now to perform the self-same office for the Republic.

At that crisis, in the very greenness of the immature youth of the Constitution, when it was least able to bear the shock of sectional collision, Mr. Madison, Southerner as he was, steadily opposed his friends from the South and successfully advocated the commitment of the petitions. I submit to the House his speech, as I find it very briefly reported in the newspapers of that day.

"Mr. Madison observed, that it was his opinion yesterday that the best way to proceed in this business was to commit the memorial without any debate on the subject. From what has taken place, he was more convinced of the propriety of the idea. But, as the business has engaged the attention of many members, he would offer a few observations for the consideration of the House. He then entered into a critical review of the circumstances respecting the adoption of the constitution, the ideas upon the limitation of the power of Congress to interfere in the regulation of the commerce in slaves, and showing that they undoubted were not precluded from interposing in their importation, and generally to regulate the mode in which every species of business shall be transacted. He adverted to the Western country, and the cession of Georgia, in which Congress have certainly the power to regulate the subject of slavery, which shows that gentlemen are mistaken in supposing that Congress cannot constitutionally interfere in the business in any degree whatever. He was in favor of committing the petitions, and justified the measure by repeated precedents in the proceedings of the House."

I produce this speech, not for the purpose of adopting all its views, for some of them I confess are new to me, and such as I have not had time or means to investigate, but in order to show conclusively what Mr. Madison deemed wise and proper to be done in a contingency so precisely like the present. Accordingly, all the petitions were committed to a select committee; that committee made a report; the report was referred to a committee of the whole House, and discussed on four successive days; it was then reported to the House with amendments, and by the House ordered to be inscribed in its journals, and then laid on the table.

That report, as amended in committee, is in the following words: "The committee to whom were referred sundry memorials from the people called Quakers; and also a memorial from the Pennsylvania society for promoting the Abolition of slavery, submit the following report, (as amended in committee of the whole.)

"First, That the migration or importation of such persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, cannot be prohibited by Congress prior to the year 1808."

"Secondly, That Congress have no power to interfere in the emancipation of slaves, or in the treatment of them, within any of the States: it remaining with the several States alone to provide any regulation therein which humanity and true policy may require."

"Thirdly, That Congress have authority to restrain the citizens of the United States from carrying on the African slave trade, for the purpose of supplying foreigners with slaves, and of providing, by proper regulations for the humane treatment, during their passage, of slaves imported by the said citizens into the States admitting such importations."

"Fourthly, That Congress have also authority to prohibit foreigners from fitting out vessels in any part of the United States for transporting persons from Africa to any foreign port."

Now, I entreat the House to call to mind the effect of these proceedings. There was no insurrection, no servile war, no agitation in the South. Congress calmly and considerately examined the whole broad question, not of the slave trade only, but also of the slave interest. It decided how far it could go, and how far it would go. Its decision went forth to the world, and settled the questions involved in it, as it were, forever. Nearly fifty years have since elapsed, and I am not aware that the points then adjudged have at any time since been drawn into debate or controversy. And I do declare my solemn conviction, that if the House would now pursue the same course, and dispassionately determine what it can or cannot do, and make that determination known to the country in a respectful way, the result would be precisely the same in this vexed question of the District of Columbia.

Entertaining these opinions of the course to be pursued, I beg of gentlemen to look at the question, as I have done, in a calm review of facts and of principles. They deprecate all agitation unfriendly to the peace and reciprocal good-will of the different sections of the country. So do I, most heartily; and in my own humble sphere I have earnestly exerted myself to this end. And I do, unwillingly but decidedly, avow my conviction, derived from abundant personal observation, that it is not by the summary suppression of petitions, it is not by _Lynching_ this or any other petition, that tranquillity is to be restored, and harmony assured, either in the South or the North. And whilst I entreat of individual members of the House to regard this question in calmness, and conclude it in judgment, as they would any lesser question, I warn and adjure the House itself, as a constituent branch of this government, to beware lest, in deciding this general question of the right of petition, it overleap the bounds prescribed to it by the Constitution.

Men of Virginia, countrymen of Washington, of Patrick Henry, of Jefferson, and of Madison, will ye be true to your constitutional faith? Men of New York, will ye ride over the principles of the democracy ye profess? Men of the West, can ye prove recreant to the spirit of sturdy independence, which carried you beyond the mountains? Men of New England, I hold you to the doctrines of liberty which ye inherit from your Puritan forefathers. And if this House is to be scared, by whatever influences, from its duty, to receive and hear the petitions of the People, then I shall send my voice beyond the walls of this Capitol for redress. To the People I say, Your liberties are in danger; they, whom you have chosen to be your representatives, are untrue to their trust; come ye to the rescue; for the vindication of your right of petition, to you I appeal; to you, the People who sent us here, whose agents we are, to whom we shall return to render a reckoning of our stewardship, and who are the true and only sovereigns in this Republic.