Part 7

"One other question may be asked, 'What is the object of the Bond?' My reply is, its object, its only object, is expressed in sec. 2 of the General Constitution, which is worded as follows: 'The nearest object of the Bond is the formation of a South African Nationality by means of union and co-operation, as a preparation for the ultimate object, a united South Africa. The Bond tries to attain this object by constitutional means, giving to respective governments and legislatures all the support they are entitled to, and respecting everybody's rights.'" This was perfectly understood. It was a Dutch Nationality and a Dutch Republican South Africa that was aimed at, and the context fully proved this assertion when the vast majority of the Bond party fought against England, either as belligerents in the Republics or as rebels--active and passive--within the Cape Colony. Nine out of every ten ministers of the Dutch Reformed Church were rebels, according to the testimony of one of their own number--the Rev. Mr. Vlok of Piquetberg. In such circumstances it is impossible to come to any other conclusion than that the departure from the original, straightforward declaration of the aims of the Bond was nothing but a diplomatic effort to throw dust in the eyes of the enemy.

Certainly such a man as Mr. Cronwright Schreiner was in no way deceived by this attitude, as we find him saying in 1893[8] that the Africander Bond is anti-English in its aims; its officers and its language are Dutch, and it is striving to gain such power as absolutely to control the Cape Parliament. It had "paralysed our political life." "In fact," he goes on to say, "the Bond has sacrificed the welfare of the country for years to the selfish attainment of one object, namely, the supremacy of the Dutch-speaking inhabitants of the Cape Colony, regardless of the rights of others; the imagined good of an ignorant clique of the Dutch has been preferred to the good of the country. These men must not have power; they are wholly unfit to have it. The Bond is a body striving solely for its own benighted ends, and founded and conducted on race lines." This was a correct judgment passed from the English Cape Colony farmer's point of view; men who, quite unlike the pro-Boers in England, perfectly understood their subject by means of adequate evidence obtained on the spot, as well as by bitter personal experience.

Can anything be more significant than the following facts. The Hon. Mr. Bellingan, a Dutch member of the Legislative Council, in the session immediately previous to the war is reported by the _Cape Times_ to have said: "If the policy of annexation were adhered to, they (the Africanders) would take advantage of England's calamity;" while the Bond paper, _Ons Land_, reports the honourable member as saying that when the Queen came to die and storms burst over the empire the Africanders would not side with England if the Republics were annexed. Then the member himself, in a letter to the _Cape Times_, declared that what he said was: "He saw difficulty for the British Empire after the death of our beloved Queen. By giving the Republicans their independence England could reckon upon them as friends, but if the Republics were annexed she could not do so."

The Bond undoubtedly during many years prepared the materials for a conflagration. The great never-dying, ever-present aspiration was fully expressed in its motto, "Africa for the Africanders." It was nothing if not diplomatic, and professed very loudly a loyalty which showed itself in its true colours when the Bond party was in power just prior to the war. Then we find its aims exhibited by the Bond party in Parliament, backed up by the Bond Congress, fighting most strenuously against the absurdly lenient provisions of the Treason Bill.

As Mr. Theo. Schreiner aptly says, "Rebellion in fact is no rebellion in the eyes of the Bond so long as it be in accord with the Africander national ideal." The ministers of their political party allowed ammunition and guns to be carried to the Republics over the railways of the Colony in immense quantities, and the W. P. Schreiner ministry was split up rather than consent to the very mild punishment of deprivation of the franchise being inflicted on rebels. Then came the war, when a large majority of the Bond party were either active or passive rebels.

But no one more clearly points out the real objects of the Bond than Mr. Reitz, one of its original founders, and to the end one of its principal leaders. He does not hesitate to say in his brochure entitled "A Century of Wrong," largely circulated in more than one language over the continent of Europe:--

"May the hope which glowed in our hearts during 1880, and which buoyed us up during that struggle, burn on steadily. May it prove a beacon of light in our path, invincibly moving onwards through blood and through tears until it leads us to a real union of South Africa.... Whether the result be victory or death, liberty will assuredly rise in South Africa ... just as freedom dawned over the United States of America a little more than a century ago. Then from Zambesi to Simonstown it will be 'AFRICA FOR THE AFRICANDER.'"

A Bond object-lesson was really to be seen in a practical manner in the South African Republic under the rule of Dutch Africanders. There indeed the Transvaal portion of Africa was clearly ruled for one section of the population--the Africander--to the utter exclusion of the rights of the English population largely in a majority within Johannesburg. There was an election system leading to the corrupt and unjust rule of Boer Raads and a Boer oligarchy. Protection, Concessions, the Master and Servants Acts were all managed in accordance with Africander ideas. Bond views of native policy were carried out in such a way that no coloured person however civilised could vote, nor hold title to fixed property nor trade freely, nor even marry as white people might. All this found encouragement in the Cape Colony, and eventually the absurd fiction of Boers fighting for liberty in the Transvaal was proclaimed as a fact over all Europe, although literally they commenced a war in which they felt sure of success for the purpose of subverting liberty and obtaining complete freedom to carry on government by a section of the people purely for the interests of a section--the Africanders--ignoring altogether equal rights for all other men.

When we consider clearly and definitely all the facts, remember that history repeats itself and that the Africanders are profoundly tenacious of their political opinions and have proved themselves to be a people who are able to wait, can we not see at once how desirable it is to suspend temporarily the constitution of the Cape Colony? The body politic requires a physician. No one better understands the subject or is more competent to prescribe than Lord Milner. Why do we not take his advice? Nothing is more significant than the fact that in the Cape Colony two years ago heated parliamentary debates and a violent political agitation, following immediately upon the suppression of the first rebellion, were in their turn succeeded by a second rebellion more ruinous than the former one.

In asking for suspension there is no idea of defection from the principle of responsible government. The Imperial system requires local independence, and in due course this will be extended to all parts of South Africa. A necessary interregnum is required for purposes of true liberty and sound rule, in order that breakdown may be prevented and true constitutionalism take the place of the tyranny of any section of the population. The Imperial Government is no step-mother, and the federation of Southern Africa will doubtless be on similar lines to those of the Canadian Dominion. Certainly no system will be forced upon the people contrary to their wishes, but the resurrection of Bond power in the Cape Colony would absolutely prevent any well-considered and statesmanlike plan, in which all men would receive fair play utterly regardless of race extraction. In fact the British and the Africander Bond theories are diametrically opposed. The first makes every civilised man equal from the Zambesi to Cape Town, the other specially and always means "Africa for the Africanders."

Heated discussions in Parliament, and the intense excitement connected with contested elections, cannot but accentuate race hatred in the Cape Colony. Surely South Africa should have a rest. As in the Transvaal and in the Orange Colony, so at the Cape, the great healer, time, ought to be allowed to do its work.

But perhaps the strongest, because the most practical, argument in favour of "suspension" is based upon the fact that a re-distribution Act is absolutely necessary if fair play is to be bestowed on all nationalities, and the reign of the Bond be not allowed to again become supreme. The suspensionists are really fighting for liberty against the rule of a section. Their motto is that of the Union Jack--"Equal rights for all"--whereas, as we know, the Africanders will in the future, as in the past, demand "Africa for the Africanders." No delusion is greater than to imagine that they will change their purpose. Their plan is to adhere to their principles, consolidate their party, and wait for an opportunity. After spending more than two hundred millions of money, and much more than this--40,000 noble lives--for the sake of upholding British supremacy in Southern Africa, nothing should be done even to risk a recurrence of the trouble. This certainly was the opinion of Lord Milner, and of the great majority of the British people in the Cape Colony. The advice now referred to was not taken, and history must record the result.

The real aims and objects of the Bond are as decipherable to-day as they were three years or ten years ago. The people who belong to it are thoroughly tenacious of these opinions, and to do them justice, make no pretence of having changed them. At the Paarl the popular General Botha has just declared that they are not vanquished, retain their traditions, and will yet conquer. They look with unutterable scorn on the men who joined the National Scouts, and entertain feelings of coldness and dislike for those who did not join the enemy either actively or passively. In the great Dutch Church of Cape Town, the Republican Generals received an unanimous ovation, and were carried shoulder high, in triumph, from the edifice. The truth is that the Bond exists, remains extremely powerful, and is only waiting and watching for an opportunity.

British rule is now comparatively easy both in the Transvaal and Orange Colonies. Effective progress is being made under the rule of wise and firm Governments; but it is in the Cape Colony, where a treacherous and powerful enemy is allowed to plot with impunity, that the real danger to British Imperial interests lies.

How history repeats itself! When the fatuous policy of abandoning 35,000 square miles of excellent territory styled the Orange River Sovereignty was pursued in 1853, there was only one man in the House of Commons who opposed it,[9] and subsequent circumstances amply justified his judgment. In 1902, Mr. Chamberlain would have found it absolutely impossible to obtain a majority in the House of Commons favourable to suspension of the Cape Colony Constitution. What is now to be done? Our answer is, "Accept with loyalty the decision of the Government, and show by wise moderation that we are most desirous to be friends with our fellow-subjects of Dutch extraction. No recriminations nor abuse should proceed from our side. Nothing will please us better than to find the Bond abandoned and all men cordially uniting as one free people under the British flag. If this be not done--and masses of the people have already declared that it will not--we will have to fight the Bond again at elections, on public platforms, and in the press, as well as in Parliament. It would have been well for both nationalities if this could have been avoided, but this is now impossible."

LET GOD DEFEND THE RIGHT.

FOOTNOTES:

[3] See "From Boer to Boer and Englishman," by Paul M. Botha. London: Hugh Rees, 1901.

[4] See _Macmillan's Magazine_, May 1900.

[5] This is published in full in the _Weekly Times_ of December 1, 1899, and is fully referred to in Wilmot's "History of Our Own Times in South Africa." See also "The Truth about the Transvaal" and various other publications.

[6] See _Daily News_ of May 10, 1900.

[7] Reported in the _Times_ of May 24, 1900.

[8] Paper read at the Cradock Farmers' Association in October 1893.

[9] This was Mr. Norton. See the dramatic manner in which this is referred to in the second volume of "The Life of Sir Harry Smith."

RHODESIA

SOME PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS

BY E. F. KNIGHT

_Author of "Where Three Empires Meet"; "The Cruise of the 'Falcon,'" &c._

In all the long romantic story of the making of the British Empire, no episode more strongly appeals to the imagination than the foundation of Rhodesia. Well is it named Rhodesia; for the history of Great Britain's acquisitions on either side of the Zambesi, the 750,000 square miles of magnificent territories which lie under the sway of the British South Africa Company, is the history of the Englishman, Cecil John Rhodes: had it not been for whose foresight, statesmanship, untiring vigilance, determined but patient endeavour for years towards the accomplishment of his mighty schemes, the South African Plateau, with its gold-bearing reefs, its vast tracts of rich arable and pastoral lands, would have fallen into the hands of one or other of the foreign Powers which keenly contested with him its possession.

It is a trite saying that when the time is ripe for great doings on the part of a nation the necessary man invariably appears. It is a saying hardly warranted by fact, for many a golden opportunity have nations, Great Britain as often as others, lost because the right man was not forthcoming. Happily it has not been so in South Africa. It is almost certain that, had it not been for the accident of Mr. Rhodes seeking the South African shores for his health when a lad, the Germans and the Boers would have cut off the Cape Colony from all possibility of expansion to the north. Those Powers had even found their right men. The Transvaal had her stubborn Kruger; Germany had her shrewd and energetic agents and explorers preparing the way to annexation in different portions of the Dark Continent; while even Portugal had her D'Andrade, a man who displayed much of the spirit and enterprise of the Portuguese discoverers and conquerors of olden days. Cecil Rhodes took his place in South African affairs but just in time. The Transvaal War had been followed by a period of extraordinary apathy both in England and in the Cape Colony. No one seemed to care in the least what became of the territory lying beyond our then limits. At home men were sick of the very name of South Africa. Many would have gladly abandoned all our possessions about the Cape of Storms, and abdicated an Empire which seemed to bring us nothing but futile wars, disaster, and disgrace. It was at this critical period that Mr. Rhodes came to the front to save our supremacy in South Africa--too late, indeed, to save for us much that should have been ours; too late, for example, to secure our sovereignty over Namaqualand and Damaraland, territories which had been long recognised as being within Britain's sphere of influence, which formerly had been annexed to the Cape, but which latterly had been totally neglected both by the Imperial and Cape Governments, so that the watchful Germans were left at liberty, first to establish their trading missions, and finally to assert their sovereignty over those extensive regions.

The richness and beauty of the highlands, extending over an immense area both north and south of the Zambesi, had for many years been known to both English and Boer travellers. Mr. Rhodes, in his early days at Kimberley, met many an adventurous wanderer who had come from that wonderful region, and their glowing tales perhaps first inspired in him that ambitious dream of the creation of a great new British colony that should include all the finest country in South and Central Africa. As far back as 1882, having commenced to take an active part in Cape politics, Mr. Rhodes took the initial steps towards the attainment of the one absorbing purpose of his life.

Of fascinating interest is the story--a story for the most part yet untold to the world--of Cecil Rhodes' long struggle with the Boers and Portuguese who attempted to keep the Empire-builder out of the Promised Land, and of his frequent forestallings of further German expansion at our expense. The first, the most critical and anxious period of all, was occupied with the contest for the very gate of the country, the right-of-way to the north, which we were so nearly losing, and without which our advance would have been hopelessly barred. The only outlet to the north from the Cape Colony lay through Bechuanaland, a vast region that was divided into several independent native kingdoms, and hemmed in between the Germans, then advancing from the west, and the Transvaal Boers on the east. This gateway to the north has been likened to the neck of a bottle; the narrow neck which, once passed, opens out into the broad and precious Zambesia. Kruger, clever and obstinate, commenced his career of attempted expansion by seizing this neck with the intention of thus cutting us off completely from the north. It was his ambition to extend the Boer rule westward to the German line, eastward to Delagoa Bay and the Indian Ocean, and northwards over the steppes of Zambesia. Pretorius had declared that the Transvaal had no boundary on the west, unless it were the Atlantic Ocean. The first struggle therefore between Rhodes and Kruger was for this vital point of vantage, the neck. Had Kruger grasped it the British flag would never have floated on the northern plateau, the Boers and Germans would have joined hands--there had been a talk of a German Protectorate over the Transvaal--and theirs, not ours, would have been the splendid prize. And what is more, seeing what a vast conspiracy had been organised against us, we should probably have lost the Cape Colony itself: the foundations of our Empire would have been shaken. Immense was the threatening peril to which we shut our eyes. The Transvaal War had left the Cape Colonists in a distinctly anti-British frame of mind. Disgusted at the follies of the Imperial Government, even those of British blood sympathised with the Transvaal Boers, and had no objection to the north falling into the hands of the Dutch Republicans. Indeed, the general feeling at the Cape at that time appears to have been republican. Cecil Rhodes had not only to out-manoeuvre Germany, the Transvaal, and Portugal, but had also to overcome the opposition of colonial prejudice, and the complete indifference of the English to all affairs South African. He stood almost alone, and had to create a party for himself. Not only man of action, but diplomatist and opportunist in the best sense of the word, he played his game with wondrous skill, and succeeded at last in winning over the reluctant colonists to his views. The very Africander Bond became his ally for a time.

That struggle for the neck of Bechuanaland is an interesting story that cannot be told here. First Kruger attempted to establish himself in Mankoroane's territory. Mankoroane, to protect himself, offered to cede his country to the Cape Colony, which point-blank refused it. Rhodes, in 1882, went himself to the chieftain, and so arranged matters that the Imperial Government found itself compelled to take over the district. Thwarted at this point, Kruger attempted to cut us off further to the north, and sent his agents to establish the freebooting republics of Goshen and Stellaland. Again Rhodes checked him. Going himself to Stellaland, he persuaded the Boers in possession to accept the British flag on the condition that our Government ratified their titles to the land they had occupied. The Warren expedition, despatched at last in consequence of the strong representations of Rhodes and his far-seeing ally, Sir Hercules Robinson, the then High Commissioner, resulted in the expulsion of the Boer freebooters from Montsioa's country, where Mafeking now stands, and the extension of our protectorate over the whole of Bechuanaland. Then Rhodes arranged for the taking over of Khama's land, and the gateway to the north was won. Foiled again, and thus hemmed in on the west, the stubborn Kruger sent his very able agent Grobler to Lobengula to obtain from him a Matabele concession to the Transvaal. Rhodes found that it was hopeless to attempt to bring the Imperial Government to a sense of the danger of the position, so now, before it was too late, he had to act promptly for himself. He sent Maguire Thomson and Rudd to Lobengula to obtain a concession from him before Grobler had carried out his mission. They were successful; the Governor ratified the concession. Dr. Jameson and Dr. Harris went to Matabeleland to deliver to the king the stipulated arms and ammunition; and despite the bitter opposition of the Cape statesman and consistently anti-British Englishman, Mr. Merriman, the deed of concession was sealed, and its validity was recognised by the Government. And thus in 1888, after years of patient endeavour, Cecil Rhodes at last had made the way clear for the realisation of his mighty scheme.

The sinews of war had now to be found; and Rhodes, in anticipation, before the granting of the concession, had made his provisions. First he had brought about the amalgamation of the diamond-mining companies, and then, as head of the great De Beers Corporation with its rent-roll of four millions sterling a year, he, in 1887, effected the alteration of the De Beers Trust Deed by a liquidation of the Company, so as to give the De Beers directors power to apply the Company's funds to outside objects, that is, to the development of the North. Messrs. Barnato and Beit agreed to this on the condition of being made life governors, and ever since loyally co-operated with Rhodes in the execution of his scheme.