Part 10

That the labour question throughout South Africa, and especially as it affects the mining industry, is among the more difficult problems of the future, most persons are aware. It is said that in five years' time 320,000 natives will be required at Johannesburg to work the mines, irrespective of enormous domestic requirements there. To this total we must add the hundreds of thousands needed for industrial and household work throughout South Africa. It is estimated that in five years' time there will be no more than 600,000 working Kaffirs south of the Zambesi. It is obvious that under the most favourable computation the supply is certain to continue to be totally inadequate to the demand. This is the more apparent when it is remembered, that it is only possible to get a small proportion of able-bodied Kaffirs to work at all, and that the average service of these willing ones is not more than four months a year, taking one year with another. Doubtless the new laws as to capitation tax, and the modifications in the direction of greater stringency in the hut tax, alterations which must have the effect of reducing the economic evil of polygamy, will effect some amelioration in the conditions now obtaining. But the lowering of wages and the prohibition of the liquor sale have retarded the immediate supply. I have had to listen before now to arguments in favour of the unrestricted sale of liquor to the natives, and in advocacy of establishing drinking booths from one end to the other of the Rand. This would be as suicidal, politically and socially, and in the long run as uneconomic a policy as could well be devised, to say nothing as to its cynical immorality. Of course, when schemes of organisation are perfected, and labour is largely drawn from Central Africa, the employers will enjoy some measure of relief; but in the end, unless relief comes from that highly debatable source--the importation of coolie labour--the prejudice against white labour in Africa will have to break down: a way out, I am sure, always provided the whites can be differentiated and segregated from the blacks, which cannot but be fraught with results of lasting benefit to the country, in procuring for it a solid substratum of Caucasian settlers who will become the industrial backbone of the country. The indirect advantages of such an innovation cannot be reaped, however, if schemes of heavy taxation are to be sanctioned. The margin between loss and profit in working most of the mines--they are what are called in city slang "low-grade propositions"--is so small, that a slight increase even in the price of labour would often make mining unprofitable.

The employment of white labour would have the effect of disabusing the minds of the natives of the growing conviction that they are necessary to our well-being and existence. The truth is not so far short of this; but we must not make it apparent: we must try to make it less true than it is. During the war the native, spoiled by the military, did not gain respect for the Englishman. He is a shrewd fellow, and although our arms were victorious in the end, he cherished no delusions. Man for man, he has seen for himself how much more effective as a fighter the Boer was than the Briton. Enjoying special advantages--his knowledge of the country and his control over the Kaffirs--the Boer was enabled to make the best use of his superior marksmanship, tactics, and mobility; with the result that it was easy for him to inflict much greater damage on his opponents than that opponent, with all his courage and spirit, could inflict in return. The native has seen our men lying in ghastly, mutilated masses. He has seen few such spectacles on the Boer side. The native is no sentimentalist. He is much like a prevalent type of modern young woman--fond of laughing, enjoyment, gew-gaws and sweets, while viewing everything from the standpoint of self-interest. In brief, despite his jollity he is as hard as nails. It is perfectly right that we should show him some consideration as the descendant of tribes who conquered the land some century or so earlier than we conquered it; for, except so far as being an inhabitant of the continent is concerned, it is absurd to talk of the existing South African tribes as aborigines. But if the "nigger" will not work, he must in the long run give place to men who will, to British and Continental labourers and to other British subjects--the coolies of India, for instance--men who will work, and who are now starving, or are on the brink of starvation, for the want of it. That this step is not to be taken lightly I am free to admit. It is fraught with grave difficulties and dangers--political, economic, and ethnical--considerations which are by no means to be minimised even if for a larger good--South Africa cannot be allowed to languish for lack of labour--they will have to be ignored.

There can many, indeed in most directions, the civil administration of the new colonies, so far as it has been provided, is highly creditable to Lord Milner and the able men associated with him. So excellent and so thorough is the work accomplished--in education, in replacing the machinery of the higher civil administration throughout the colonies--that, without hyperbole, it may be said to fill one with admiration and wonder. If one could always be sure of getting such a man as Joseph Chamberlain at the Colonial Office, and such a man as Alfred Milner as High Commissioner, one would be strongly in favour of retaining permanently as much power as possible in the hands of the holders of these two offices. But it is not possible to count upon a succession of such ministers. It is noteworthy, and I would especially emphasise the point in view of what is to follow, that the appointment of Lord Milner and Mr. Chamberlain to their respective offices may be said to have been in defiance of precedent. Since the institution of the Colonial Secretaryship half-a-century ago, ministers appointed to the office have almost invariably been noblemen of little or no importance. Again, Lord Milner's earliest career was not official. He was quite out of the groove in which the men who become colonial governors usually run. It is regrettable, that the success of these two statesmen does not give the Government heart of grace to put appointments in the new colonies more largely into the hands of men of proved initiative and originality--men who have not had any good which may have been in them strangled by red tape and flummery in the public offices. The complaint as to the appointments made in the Transvaal--appointments of untried striplings and callow fledglings from the universities, is doubtless exaggerated; but it is well to remember that putting power into the hands of the "curled darlings of the nation" was one of the chief causes, among many contributory causes, of the failure of Sir Theophilus Shepstone's policy; the reason why the annexation of the Transvaal, with the tacit consent and approval of the majority of its people, was subsequently repudiated by them.

However that may be, it is extremely regrettable that a country, possessing so many good men, men in every way indicated by their abilities and achievements as successful administrators _in posse_, is constantly at a deadlock for the lack of suitable public servants. I could mention spontaneously, without having time for reflection and for selection, a round dozen, probably a score, men of parts full of the sense of our imperial responsibilities, and certain to be able and zealous in the Empire's service: men accustomed to positions in which initiative and sound judgment are demanded of them, who, pining to be men of action, to play their part, however humble, in affairs of State, affairs of which they possess a firm grip, are condemned to enforced inactivity, buried away in country houses, or, let us say, wasting their energies in mere constructive synthesis or destructive criticism, for which, alas! no one is much the better. These men, the born administrators of our over-seas dominions, are lost to the Empire, because of the red-tape exclusiveness and jealousy of the ruling classes of this country.

I have been betrayed for the moment into an academic consideration, and let me say here that I sorrowfully endorse--I might add that in a large measure I have publicly anticipated--most of the strictures on our system of misgovernment, corruption, and panoplied vice set forth in the letters of that sturdy Africander signing himself by his true initials "P. S." Under these abuses we groan, and it is difficult to continue to hope that we shall escape from their tyranny, and rise again to that full manhood of our race asserted in the spacious days of Elizabeth, and again when Napoleon threatened our shores. Our grand old country is sinking deeper and deeper into the morass of spiritual and intellectual indifferentism, sordid materialism, and time-serving opportunism. One sees scant justification for optimism, unless, indeed, Judgment should descend upon us and beneficently scourge us back to our nobler past.

It is not, however, with these larger issues I am at this moment directly concerned. Despite the constant drains upon our best and most vital manhood the possession--protection and administration--of the most extensive empire of this or any age impose upon the United Kingdom, upon, that is to say, a small and no longer rapidly increasing nation, I do not believe that there would be any ground for the fear that we have annexed more territory than we can effectively administer, or that we have incurred greater responsibilities than we can sustain, if we had the presence of mind, the initiative and sense to utilise those latent sources of unexhausted supply we now wilfully neglect. The immediate bearing of these remarks reveals itself when the serious problem of the _personnel_ of the magistracy of the new colonies is mentioned. Every one knows that the landdrosts under the old régime, men for the most part rough and unlettered, were habitually underpaid and habitually corrupt. The inadequate salaries paid to these men are, it seems, now being continued to the new magistracy, and this despite the enormous increase in the cost of living, with the result that men of quite inferior parts are mainly available for the positions; while, when from stress of life and circumstance, men of the right stamp, men to whom Boer and Kaffir can look up as their natural superiors, chance to fill these offices, they are unable, by reason of their poverty, to live in a way or to comport themselves in a manner consistent with the dignity of their offices.

In the Transvaal, and indeed in South Africa generally, it behoves us to welcome all comers from Europe and America, not being adventurers or wastrels--all and sundry who can contribute to the good of the country and who are willing to become loyal citizens. It will be madness to attempt to build up a South African nation from these islands alone. England is a small country and the English are gradually ceasing--and this tendency is certain to increase--to rear large families. In the past, in our own land as well as in our realms beyond the seas, our chief glory has been in our genius in amalgamating different strains, bringing them all into the fold as patriotic Britons. The British Empire is now more than ever a crucible wherein metals, precious and base, may be wrought into a fine amalgam. Whether as a limb of a great and regenerated British Empire, and therein my individual hopes lie, or as a powerful republic on the pattern of the United States, there ought to be no question as to the future of South Africa. Mr. Chamberlain said again only the other day that the prosperity of South Africa in the not far distant future would doubtless exceed the dreams of the most sanguine visionary. So let it be. Many shrewd Americans are of the same mind. No doubt the immediate expansion in South Africa's import trade is due to military requirements, while the shrinkage of its export trade may be attributed mainly to the war having put a stop to the recovery and exportation of gold. The cost of living throughout South Africa, at present extraordinarily high, is certain to be reduced to more reasonable limits when the railways are permanently relieved from the control of the military. It must be remembered, too, that while a fair proportion of favoured individuals among the colonists have reaped huge harvests by the war, a far greater number have been crippled and ruined outright by it. It is not for me to deal with the problems of trade; but I may say that even should some scheme of the favoured-nation kind be extended to British imports by the South African Realm to be, that in itself would not serve, nor will the spirit of patriotic preference for British goods suffice to preserve the trade of South Africa for this country. The matter rests with our manufacturers, exporters, and their agents; and no one, not being a self-deceived egoist, can pretend that the more alert, adaptive, and modern methods of American and German houses are not certain, unless our countrymen turn over a new leaf, to prove too much for our LAISSEZ-FAIRE, self-sufficiency, and careless indifference.

In this matter the best men, be they English, German, or Yankee, will win. But this is a home rather than a South African question. In any case, we may expect soon to see a considerable influx of capitalists, farmers, and traders, and they cannot but give an impetus to South Africa's reviving fortunes, let political ineptitude do its worst. I have endeavoured to show wherein lie the chief obstacles to progress in the new colonies. In the old--Natal would in any case seem to have an era of immediate prosperity before her--the future is darkened by considerations all too apparent for the most optimistic or blind to overlook or ignore. The Africander Bond and the Dutch Reformed Church have not buried the hatchet. Throughout South Africa it is, of course, the duty of the loyal South African of British origin or British sympathies to endeavour to recognise at their best the many sterling qualities of the Dutch, and to forgive with what charity he may their besetting sins, condoning them as the resultants of environment and circumstance. It is also their duty to recognise that the past mistakes of Downing Street were chiefly due to lack of brain and thought, rather than to lack of heart, and to determine to work with all true patriots for the lasting good and welfare of South Africa.

Unhappily there is ample evidence to show that the Dutch Reformed Church and the Africander Bond are as active for evil as ever. How great is the terrorism exercised by the COMMISSIE VAN TOEZICHT (the Secret Council of the Bond) is illustrated to-day by the abject recantation of the Rev. Mr. Botha, a pastor who, having counselled his countrymen to submit to the inevitable and accept British rule as far back as September 1901, now stands in the white sheet of repentance, and abjectly craves to be forgiven for what he calls his temporary weakness and backsliding! Undoubtedly disloyalty to the British Empire throughout South Africa has its _fons et origo_ not in the Transvaal but at the Cape. For the moment the Bond lies low. It has gained everything it can hope to gain for the present. This the most superficial student of Cape politics can see. The problem of how to reconcile divergent elements at the Cape, and to make the Cape Dutch as loyal to the Empire as the French Canadians to-day, not that their loyalty is unimpeachable, is an extremely complicated one. At the Cape it is by no means merely a question of Dutch _versus_ English or of Town _versus_ Country. Many of the most active enemies of Great Britain are to be found in the houses of the old Dutch families inhabiting the suburban districts of Cape Town--Wynburg, Rondebosch, and so forth. It is also true that among those old Dutch families no more loyal subjects of the king are to be found. Unhappily English associations, close intercourse with Government House, intermarriage with English families, and education at our universities or at the Temple here, do not always ensure that the Dutch Africander will be loyal to Great Britain. Even more to be regretted is the fact that many colonists of pure British descent, birth even, are merely nominally loyal to the Imperial connection, if as much as that. Their loyalty is of the opportunist kind. Because of their hatred of the Dutch propaganda, and because they fear that the Dutch, if left to themselves, would become "top dog," they tolerate British institutions. We cannot blame them over much for this attitude, when we remember how miserably we have deserted our countrymen in the past; how we have left them to the tender mercies of the Dutch; how we have neglected their warnings and advice, and brought ruin and misery upon them because of our short-sightedness and stiff-neckedness.

Even now the British colonist has many substantial excuses for averring that loyalty does not pay. In view of these facts it behoves Great Britain to admit frankly her past errors and to resolve, if she means to retain her hold on South Africa, to order her footsteps differently in the future. It behoves Great Britain, if she would avoid future risks of triangular disloyalty and the grave disasters, local and international, which might supervene on another period of neglect and snubbing, to trust the men on the spot. It behoves her to govern South Africa firmly, consistently, and unemotionally; to have done with Majubanimity and all its works once and for all; all folly, such as paltering with the language and education questions, whereby the sentiments and interests of loyal British colonists are flouted and ignored. Great Britain must, however, do everything that she can consistently do to bring the two European races--English and Dutch--together. If she is to do this, if England is to retain a firm grip on South Africa, we must continue strong, let it be said rather we must renew our strength here in the centre of the Empire. Within the next half-century it is probable that the last ounce of gold will have been extracted from the Transvaal's deepest deep levels. Within half that time the impending struggle of the world Powers to establish themselves in unassailable positions will have taken place. Germany is forced by an inexorable law of self-preservation to find an outlet for her commerce and her people on the seas. Every thinking German, from the Kaiser downwards, tells us as much frankly. We can see it for ourselves. She must find employment, food, and raiment for her highly prolific people, for their own land is by no means rich in natural wealth. As to Africa, our hold on it depends entirely upon the strength of our national grip. If our hand is growing flabby and listless, and, alas! there are too many indications that such is the case; if France is to gain her ends in the Mediterranean; if sentimental views in regard to the natives are to prompt us to stand idly by while such organisations as the so-called Ethiopian Church of the United States working from the south, and the emissaries of a militant Mahommedanism from the north, conspire informally to undermine their loyalty, then our days in Africa are numbered. In the last event, our hold on that continent in general and South Africa in particular depends upon character, especially the character of our ruling classes. The possibilities of this country in Africa are magnificent; but the problems to be solved, if these possibilities are to be realised, must appal and finally overcome all but the stoutest of heart. The world, and South Africa with it, will fall to the nation which breeds and sustains the best men.

THE FUTURE OF THE MINING INDUSTRY

BY F. T. NORRIS

The future prosperity of South Africa mainly depends upon the development of her vast and indisputable gold wealth, for, albeit she possesses other resources in undoubtedly lavish abundance, the means for the utilisation of these latter are dependent, in a large measure, upon the effective exploitation of her auriferous reserves. This fact was explicitly stated by Sir David Barbour, the financial expert appointed by the Imperial Government to report in 1901 on the resources of the Transvaal, and that this impartial official opinion is echoed by all competent observers prior to and since his investigations only confirms its correctness. As to the magnitude to which the mining industries in the Transvaal may ultimately attain opinions differ, but, says this authority, and this view is confirmed by experts, it is certain that the production of gold will continue to increase largely for some years at least; that there will be a corresponding growth in the production of coal, and it is possible, and perhaps probable, that valuable mines of other minerals, and especially of diamonds, may be opened. He therefore opines that, from an economic point of view, the prospects of the future for a considerable period are quite satisfactory, and it is unnecessary to speculate as to what may ultimately happen.

Public opinion on the Rand is unanimous that absolutely vital questions for the mines' future are, for the moment, labour and taxation. A comprehensive and impartial view of the circumstances of the mines must force the conclusion that such contentions are perfectly sound. Naturally, however, the dimensions of the latter factor have less weight since the reduction of the customs tariff and the previous abolition of monopolies, and, with the pending solution of the question of dynamite, the mining industry is now not only in a vastly superior economic condition than it ever was, but has been placed in a position to sustain, not without some difficulty maybe at the outset, all the prospective burdens of projected Imperial taxation. In saying "not without difficulty," the crux of the present economic situation, as looked at by the leading and responsible section of the mining industry and competent individuals at large, is touched. For the judiciousness or otherwise of the immediately heavy incidence of the share of the cost of the war, which it may be contemplated to place on the Transvaal, is what causes the present misgivings; and, with the operative capacity of 1898 still some ten to fifteen months ahead, the immediate call for heavy contributions can only act as a drag upon progress. It is with this consideration in view that the Chamber of Mines, in a recent letter to Lord Milner, asked for a delay of five years before making a first payment, in order to allow time for the industry to recover its former level, and that other authorities have also entered their protests.