Chapter 17

THE RESOLUTION OF THE REQUIRED ACTION INTO DETAILED OPERATIONS

(The Second Step--The Solution of Subsidiary Problems)

The problem of the second step may be stated in question form as follows: "What action should I take for the attainment of my objective as selected in the first step?"

[Sidenote: For convenience a tabular form, inserted in the appendix, page 224, gives page references to the principal subdivisions of this Chapter.]

Having arrived at his basic Decision, the commander, if he wishes to put it into effect, will proceed to formulate a plan of action which can be cast into the forms of directives for execution. In making such a plan, he provides for operations in the detail proper for his situation. He thereby expands the general plan, indicated in or developed from his basic Decision, into a complete plan which can readily be placed in the Order Form (Chapter VIII) as a directive or directives for the guidance of his subordinates.

The procedure involved in formulating such a detailed plan of action has been described previously in general terms (Chapter V). The method of determining the salient features of the operations required has also been discussed (in Section III of Chapter IV). Therefore, these matters are not repeated at this point.

The problems distinctive of this procedure (the second step, as described in Chapter V) are subsidiary problems, in the sense that the incentive for their solution arises by reason of a decision already made by the commander, i.e., the basic Decision, and because they are problems which the commander recognizes are to be solved by himself and not by his subordinates.

Assumptions. The commander's plan has been derived from an estimate of the situation based on the best information available to him. Complete and accurate information is frequently lacking; hence, many military plans consider contingencies which, to make a plan possible, have been accepted in the estimate as assumptions.

The word assumption, when used to denote a basis for a plan, signifies "the taking of something for granted". It does not mean a conjecture, guess, or probability. The proposed action, resulting from a decision made under an assumption, is designed to be taken only upon the disclosure of the truth of the assumption. The fact that the assumption upon which the plan is based may prove false indicates the advisability of developing several plans based upon various sets of assumptions.

It would be erroneous to believe that all contingencies can be foreseen, and to be content with a particular set of plans, all of which may prove to be wrong. It is not to be expected that a plan based upon assumptions will, in all respects, be suitable for use in an actual situation. For example, it will seldom occur that an elaborate Battle Plan, based upon assumptions as to the various types, dispositions, and strengths of forces present, the weather conditions, and the intent of the enemy, can be used without changes.

On the other hand, a plan for the sortie of a fleet from a harbor under assumptions that high visibility exists, that airplanes can operate, and that hostile submarines will be the only force in opposition, may frequently be found entirely applicable to the actual situation, or so nearly so as to require only slight modification. It is possible so to standardize such plans that only minor variables need be indicated when the plan is to be used.

The visualization of valid and useful assumptions frequently makes the most serious demands on professional knowledge and judgment.

Alternative Plans. The word "alternative" is generally applied to contingent plans intended to accomplish a common task, but developed from varying sets of assumptions. "A choice between several" is the meaning of the word as here used. When such choice becomes necessary in a situation not yet clarified, that plan will be selected which has been derived from the set of assumptions considered by the commander as most likely to be correct. The selected plan is usually called the plan or the "accepted plan", and the other plans, coming from other less likely but still possible sets of assumptions, are called Alternative Plan No. 1, Alternative Plan No. 2, etc.

Naval tactical situations particularly lend themselves to the drawing up of alternative plans in advance. There are numerous general categories of such tactical plans. Among these the Battle Plan is of paramount concern. Others include plans for sortie, entrance, defense while cruising, etc. In each category, alternative plans may be developed, based on various sets of assumptions.

Alternative plans evolved in advance of detailed information may be found useful as a general basis for action. Circumstances may prove to be different from those previously visualized. The correct procedure is to keep the plans up to date, testing them, by the latest information, in a Running Estimate (Chapter IX). The commander will thus have a foundation for sound decision in the circumstances which actually arise.

Still another use of alternative plans merits consideration. Early coordinated action during actual operations may be demanded although neither time nor the information available has permitted a detailed estimate. If the commander has drawn up, in advance, plans based on assumptions as to conditions that conceivably might exist, he will be better able to appreciate the situations which actually arise. He can thus direct the necessary action with more rapidity and understanding than if completely unprepared because of lack of planning. If he informs his subordinates of his proposed action under certain assumed conditions, he will facilitate cooperation, because better mutual understanding will exist. The advance alternative plans here discussed are not necessarily confined to problems confronting a commander during actual war operations. They may profitably be drawn up in peace, and may be the basis of training exercises.

Application of the Essential Elements of a Favorable Military Operation

In the solution of the problems distinctive of the second step, the commander starts with a consideration of the salient features of a favorably progressing military operation. This procedure is appropriate because any series of these problems, considered as a whole, pertains to the single problem of determining the most effective operation, or series of operations, for carrying his basic Decision into effect. If the action contemplated in the basic Decision is of such a nature as to call for successive included efforts in more than one stage, the commander limits his consideration, should he find such restriction advisable on sound grounds, to the operation or operations included in the first stage.

* * * * *

On this basis, the commander considers, first, the feature of correct physical objectives. He has first to determine what his correct physical objectives will be.

This determination may or may not present a perplexity. Frequently, the procedure of the first step (Chapter VI) will have plainly indicated one or more, perhaps all, of the physical objectives involved. In some cases, also, the basic Decision will have plainly pointed out the action to be taken, and with respect to what physical objectives. In these instances, the commander may, with little further analysis or none, set down the operations which he considers necessary or desirable with respect to these physical objectives.

In other cases, however, the action indicated in the Decision, though plainly indicating the commander's intent--that is, his calculated line of endeavor--may not have designated the numerous physical objectives as to which his effort is to be exerted. For example, the Decision "to interrupt enemy trade on the southern maritime routes" is quite clear, but what are the numerous exertions of force required, and with relation to what physical objectives? Immediately there is a perplexity. Guided by the analysis made in his previous estimate of the situation, the commander now determines what the physical objectives are, action as to which will contribute to the accomplishment of the effort. The sum total of the actions taken against these physical objectives is properly equivalent to the accomplishment of the action indicated in his Decision. He may not be able at this time to determine all of the correct physical objectives, but he can determine certain correct ones (for the method, see Section III of Chapter IV).

The correct physical objectives having been determined, so far as can be done at this time, the commander studies each thoroughly, developing the possibilities of certain effective actions (operations) with reference thereto. For instance, in the case of a commander who has been ordered to "interrupt enemy trade on the southern maritime routes", he might develop one operation "to bomb enemy facilities at Port X", and another "to capture or destroy enemy shipping along trade routes" (with an indication of the routes involved).

The operations thus developed are now listed in a definite sequence, in order to provide a proper basis for the further procedure. The commander may find it desirable to state them in their order of importance. Sometimes, however, it may be found advantageous to list the operations in chronological sequence, i.e., in the order of their execution. This point is further discussed hereafter (pages 166 and 192). The commander is at liberty, of course, to use either method according to its helpfulness in enabling him to visualize the elements of his problem.

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The commander now considers the second feature: advantageous relative positions. He may already occupy an advantageous geographical location or locations (see pages 64 (bottom) and 65 (top)), or he may desire to improve his positions in certain respects. An advantageous position might be between the enemy and his base, in order to deny it to him. Another advantageous position might be to windward of the enemy, for the purpose of making a destroyer attack under the protection of a smoke screen.

The commander now reconsiders, from the viewpoint of "advantageous relative positions", the operations deduced with respect to "correct physical objectives". As a result of this reconsideration, he may find that certain of these operations may be retained without change, whereas others may require modification.

Suppose, for example, that two of the operations listed are those noted above, viz:

"To bomb enemy facilities at Port X", and

"To capture or destroy enemy shipping along trade routes between the ---- parallels of north latitude and the ---- meridians of west longitude."

From the viewpoint of relative position, it may appear that the first operation is not affected seriously, if at all. Therefore, this operation may be left unchanged. However, the second operation may be definitely affected by relative position, because the best method of interrupting enemy trade may be to employ raiding forces in focal areas. Therefore this operation might be altered to the form, "to capture or destroy enemy trade by raiding focal areas" (with a designation of the areas).

The commander's study is now likely to suggest operations which were not apparent when the analysis was confined to the correct physical objectives, alone. New physical objectives may appear to require attention. If so, all such new operations are added to the list compiled.

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The commander may now study his list of operations, compiled to this point, from the standpoint of the third feature, proper apportionment of fighting strength. However, if the commander considers such apportionment now, his subsequent study of the fourth element--"adequate freedom of action"--may develop a need for further operations which will in turn call for a re-analysis as to his apportionment of fighting strength. Therefore, for purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that the commander now defers consideration of such apportionment, and that he proceeds at this point to study measures for ensuring adequate freedom of action.

This study requires consideration of such matters as training, morale, surprise, secrecy, cooperation, intelligence, logistics, and provisions (communications, location of the commander, and the like) for effective exercise of command. (See page 76). The commander exercises his judgment as to the degree of detail in which such matters should be treated, according to the nature of his problems.

If any such subject--for example, communications--involves the development of a subsidiary plan (page 168), the measures noted in connection with the formulation of the basic plan may be stated along broad lines, such as: "To provide for effective communications." Any specific matters of considerable importance may also be included,--for example, as to secrecy with respect to the use of communications. Other details may then be deferred until the commander takes up the necessary subsidiary plan. Otherwise, all pertinent operations in connection with these measures are naturally noted at this point.

Certain of these measures for freedom of action are now to be discussed in some detail because of their important bearing on basic plans.

In certain operations contemplated by the commander, there may be a requirement for additional training, sometimes of a special nature. This may be true, for instance, if an operation involves the landing of an expeditionary force. Conditions permitting, the commander will naturally desire to make provision for training exercises. If time or other conditions do not permit necessary training, he may find it desirable to modify his plans accordingly. The salient features of a subsidiary training problem are discussed hereafter (page 176), and may well be considered at this point in developing the basic plan.

The commander may already have noted, in considering operations suggested by his previous study of the situation, a need for certain action as to security, secrecy, and intelligence. Any additional operations of this nature, not previously noted, may well be incorporated at this point.

Security of his own plan, and secrecy therefor, are important considerations with reference to intelligence activities. The requirements as to intelligence and counter-intelligence features are primary considerations as to any plan. Such considerations involve the collection of information and its conversion into intelligence. The hampering of enemy intelligence activities is a related consideration.

The collection of useful information, and its denial to the enemy, call for a definite plan. When information has been collected, it is subjected to the processes (page 122) of analysis, evaluation, interpretation, and dissemination. Collection, to be consistently effective, calls for specific directives to, or requests on, the appropriate collecting agencies. Analysis determines the source of the information and the circumstances under which it was obtained. Evaluation determines its degree of reliability. Interpretation consists of drawing conclusions; when information thus takes the form of facts (so far as they can be ascertained) and of sound conclusions drawn therefrom, it becomes military (naval) intelligence. It is then disseminated to those concerned and is used in the solution of the commander's own problems.

The basis for collection of such data is the determination of the essential elements of information desired by the commander. The notation of these essential elements, for later incorporation in his directive(s), naturally constitutes a primary feature of his basic plan. The essential elements of information are frequently formulated as questions--e.g., Will the enemy do this? Is the enemy doing that? What are the principal topographic features of Y Island, with respect to so and so?

These questions cover the essential matters of perplexity as to enemy courses of action and as to the characteristics of the theater. Each enemy course of action, for example, may provide the basis for a question; or, if the scope of the problem has narrowed sufficiently, such question may deal with one of the enemy's possible operations, related to a course of action which he may be pursuing or is known to be pursuing.

On the basis of the essential elements of information, the commander provides for proper reconnaissance activities by the several collecting agencies under his command, or for appropriate requests to be made by him on other collecting agencies. A sound plan will always make adequate provision for such measures.

These subjects are treated in more detail in the later discussion (page 177) of intelligence problems.

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In connection with freedom of action, the commander will also make adequate provision for logistics support. In its unrestricted sense, the term "logistics" relates to the supply and movement of a military force, and to such related matters as the disposition and replacement of ineffective personnel. Logistics measures, as comprehended in the development of the basic plan, exclude movement primarily of a strategical or tactical nature, but include movement related primarily to supply and similar matters. This requirement gives rise to the necessity for logistics measures which may further call for operations such as to provide fuel oil and supplies at rendezvous X and Y, and tender facilities at port D. An incidental requirement will relate to movements of train ships. Hence, the commander formulates these, also, and includes them in his list of operations for later assignment as logistics tasks. (Page 166). Fuel oil may likewise be required at Port D, but if the commander knows that ample fuel oil is in store there, no operation to cover this feature is required of him.

The solution of logistics problems is further discussed hereafter (page 179).

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The commander has now, it may be presumed, evolved all of the operations that his analysis tells him are appropriate with respect to correct physical objectives, advantageous relative positions, and freedom of action. Therefore, he now studies all of these operations from the viewpoint of the remaining element--proper apportionment of fighting strength. This consideration involves, initially, a determination of what forces will be necessary to carry out the operations listed. The commander thereby determines the requirements, as to forces, for each such operation.

For example, the operation "to locate an enemy force" may require the use of several types of naval vessels and aircraft. The commander determines what method of search is best for the purposes of this specific operation; thereafter, he determines what forces are necessary to conduct the search. The procedure has previously been indicated (in the Principle of the Proper Means to be Made Available--page 34).

In this study the commander will often find it necessary to divide some of the more extensive operations into component parts, suitable for later assignment as tasks for subordinates. Fundamentally, there is no difference between an operation and a task, except that the latter includes also the idea of imposing on another person, or assigning to him, a definite amount of work or duty (page 84). At this stage, then, the commander deals with components suitable for performance by available weapons, in the usual units, or combinations of units, in which they are effective. Of course, when an operation meets this requirement without subdivision into components, it need not be subdivided.

These component parts are not yet actually tasks, because the commander does not plan to assign them at this time to any one for execution. However, the components are visualized as clearly, and are formulated as definitely, as is possible at this point. The requirement is that they be acts that available forces can perform.

The method of breaking down an operation into component parts is one of analysis and deduction. Having visualized the manner whereby the operation can contribute to the accomplishment of the effort, the commander has now to determine the means to be employed to this end. Experience and knowledge tell him what numbers and types of ships, aircraft, and other weapons, if properly employed, will attain the effect desired.

Each component part will indicate both the action and the physical objectives of the action. For each component, the commander estimates what forces are required. He knows the extent of the armed forces available, and he can, if his total force is adequate, adjust matters to allow each component a force capable of carrying it out.

For example, a component operation might call for a search by destroyers, but the commander might find that his destroyers were in such poor relative position as to prevent them from reaching the point of origin in time. Therefore he would be unable to conduct the search by using destroyers alone. He might now consider a search by aircraft. A study of this proposal might indicate that it could be carried out in part by aircraft, but that available aircraft were inadequate to carry it out in its entirety. In such event, consideration would be in order of the possibility of conducting this search by use of other forces also, e.g., submarines and cruisers.

In case the commander believes an indicated operation to be infeasible, he first restudies that operation to see whether he can modify it, without adversely affecting the accomplishment of the effort. He may even find that he can eliminate it by including its essential features in some other operation.

If the commander finds that his forces are inadequate for the accomplishment of an effort in one stage, but that they are adequate for its accomplishment in successive stages, he may draw a conclusion as to which of the operations he can carry out first. On this basis, he may proceed with the formulation of tasks to include these operations, leaving the remainder to a future time (see page 56).

It may be that all operations set down cannot be accomplished by the forces available, but that they will be possible of accomplishment if other forces are provided. This knowledge, of the sum total of forces required for the action indicated in the Decision, is an essential. It is only by such a searching inquiry that the commander ensures that the operations resolved from the Decision will result in a full solution of his problem. Usually the forces available will be found adequate, because the superior who provided them gave consideration, on his part, to the requirements. However, if the forces available are not deemed adequate, the commander either modifies the operations, or restricts them, or subdivides them into parts for performance in succession by stages. In any such case, conditions permitting, he makes constructive representations, together with a report of the facts, to his superior (see page 103).

Testing for Suitability, Feasibility, and Acceptability.

Each of the operations finally deemed necessary or desirable is now tested as to its suitability, its feasibility, and its acceptability as to consequences. The considerations involved have been explained previously (Section III of Chapter IV) and are therefore not repeated here.

The testing process will eliminate those operations found not suitable, feasible, or acceptable.

In addition, the tests may lead to the elimination of operations which, while both suitable and feasible, do not contribute enough toward the accomplishment of the effort to warrant their retention. For example, among the operations listed might be one to capture X island and one to capture Y island, both suitable and feasible. The commander, having analyzed these proposals, might conclude that the capture of Y island would not constitute a sufficient contribution to warrant its adoption as an operation at this time. Therefore, he might omit this operation, or he might defer it to a later stage.

A feasible operation may similarly be rejected or deferred out of preference for another which can more readily be accomplished.

The tests may also reveal important facts as to the relative consequences with respect to costs. For example, two operations might both be acceptable as to this factor, but one might be less acceptable than the other. Accordingly, the less acceptable operation might be omitted, or might be deferred for the time being.

Upon the completion of the tests, all operations retained are listed for further development.

The Formulation of Tasks

The correct resolution of the Decision into the detailed operations required is further ensured by the visualization of these operations as tasks. Tasks so formulated (page 162), become a basis for the preparation of directives.

To prepare a plan as a basis for directives, or for use as such, the commander first finds it desirable to formulate and assemble the various tasks. The tasks are formulated as a result of his study of (1) those operations which do not require to be broken down, and which may now be rewritten as tasks, and of (2) the component parts of the more extensive operations (See page 162, bottom).

Each of the tasks, as now listed, is tested for suitability, for feasibility, and for acceptability with respect to the consequences as to costs. In view of the fact that the operations have all been thoroughly tested, this process now becomes not a formal analysis but merely a check.

The Organization of Task Forces and Task Groups

The commander now classifies the tasks on the basis of their suitability for accomplishment by appropriate task forces or subdivisions thereof, i.e., task groups. In so doing he endeavors to avoid forming any more classifications than are necessary for the accomplishment of the full effort.

Note: In the remainder of this work, the term Task Group, except as may otherwise be indicated, will be understood in the inclusive sense of either "task force" or "task group".

Tasks are assigned to task groups on the basis of such factors as the nature and geographical location of physical objectives, the existing disposition of the several units, their capabilities, and their freedom of action. The last-named may be the determinant, and, because of the importance of such considerations, tasks which would otherwise fall to one group might be assigned to another. Features influencing a change might include lack of training of the personnel available in the first group, or the special qualifications of a particular commander, or a justified desire to adhere to a previously determined permanent task organization.

Logistics tasks, i.e., those requiring operations for placing logistics measures in effect, require the same careful consideration as do combat tasks. (See page 162).

Certain tasks apply to all of the task groups, or pertain to the general conduct of the common effort. Among such may be provision for security, for unity among the subdivisions, and for intelligence activities (page 160). In order to avoid repetition, these tasks are assembled in one group.

The commander analyzes the requirements of fighting strength for each task group. He then, from the means available to him, assigns the necessary strength to each group, making adjustment between the theoretical requirements and the actual strength available.

He is familiar with the types of vessels and aircraft constituting his command, and with their military characteristics; with the capabilities and cooperative qualities of his commanders; with the degree of training of his various units; and with the geographical location of physical objectives. He recognizes that each task requires adequate strength for its accomplishment. Because these requirements have been thoroughly considered during the study of the effective apportionment of fighting strength, he is able to make adjustments as necessary.

The commander now fully organizes each classification of tasks and its corresponding task group by naming the task group (or task force), by making notation of its composition and of the rank and name of its commander, and then by listing the tasks of each group. The principal task (or tasks) may be listed first, the other tasks following in the order of their importance. If preferred, the sequence of tasks may be chronological. Also, either major or minor tasks may be listed chronologically. (See pages 158 and 192).

If the chronological sequence of tasks is utilized, that fact, in order to avoid confusion, is clearly indicated.

Thus organized, the whole plan can be transferred almost bodily into the Order Form (Chapter VIII).

Application of the Fundamental Military Principle to the Determination of Objectives Embodied in Tasks

In formulating tasks for the several task groups, the commander has now visualized, for each such group, an objective (or objectives) for the subordinate to attain. In selecting these objectives, the commander has placed himself, mentally, in the subordinate's situation, visualizing the problem which the subordinate is to solve. On this basis the commander has apportioned the strength needed for the attainment of the objectives assigned to his subordinates. This procedure, of evident importance, is frequently one of considerable difficulty, because a higher commander, lacking detailed information of the situation which may confront a subordinate cannot always anticipate all the obstacles to the latter's success.

In formulating tasks, and in apportioning strength, by the procedure already described, the commander has applied the Fundamental Military Principle. Now, to ensure the practical adjustment of means to ends (page 66), the commander reviews the process in the light of that Principle, so that he may be assured that he has selected a correct objective (or objectives) for each subordinate. By using the tests indicated in the Principle, the commander confirms the suitability of each objective so selected, satisfies himself of its feasibility of attainment, and assures himself that the costs involved will be acceptable. If these requirements cannot be so satisfied, necessary adjustments are in order.

These tests may frequently be of a routine nature, by reason of the previous painstaking tests of the several operations involved. However, such final tests cannot be omitted without incurring the danger of selecting incorrect objectives for subordinates to attain.

The Assembly of Measures for Freedom of Action

Having completed the classification of his tasks, the commander next assembles the measures determined upon as necessary for ensuring adequate freedom of action.

When the subject matter is not too bulky, these measures are incorporated in their proper place in the basic plan. Otherwise, instructions as to these matters will be issued as annexes.

The various measures are assembled under the classification shown below:

(a) Measures required for security, for cooperation, and for intelligence activities.

(b) Measures for logistics support. These cover provision for procurement and replenishment of supplies, disposition and replacement of ineffective personnel, satisfactory material maintenance, sanitation, battle casualties, and the like.

(c) Measures for the exercise of command. These include provision for communications, location of rendezvous, zone time to be used, and the location of the commander.

This classification corresponds to that used in the Order Form (page 193). Experience has indicated that such a classification facilitates the transmission of instructions to subordinate commanders.

If desired, the material which will be required to be incorporated in paragraph (1) of the Order Form (see pages 190, 191, 219 and 221) may be also assembled at this point.

The Preparation of Subsidiary Plans

As previously noted (page 106), certain subsidiary problems require the preparation of subsidiary plans to be included with the directive as annexes. In broad strategical estimates, the solution of such subsidiary problems involves a vast amount of mental effort; even in restricted estimates, these problems may require most intensive thought. It is therefore appropriate at this point to discuss, in some detail, the nature of these subsidiary problems.

During the solution of his basic problem and later, during the process of evolving his basic plan, the commander may become aware of the need for further action of a supporting nature with respect to his basic mission, distinct from that which he intends to assign as tasks to subordinate commanders. If the nature of this action involves perplexity, he will be confronted with new problems to be solved. When he recognizes that such problems exist and are to be solved by himself, this awareness is a recognition of the incentive.

For example, one of these problems may involve a battle in which the entire force will participate, or perhaps a sortie requiring coordination of the several subdivisions of his force. Others will be concerned with measures recognized as necessary for ensuring freedom of action.

These problems give rise to the subsidiary plans previously referred to (page 106). They are not necessarily subsidiary in importance; even the Battle Plan, the basis for the culmination of tactical effort, may result from the solution of a subsidiary problem. The word "subsidiary", as here used, merely indicates that the problem has its origin in the commander's own Decision.

When the incentive is thus recognized during the solution of the basic problem or during the second step, the commander solves these new problems, and includes their solutions as a part of the directives prepared for the carrying out of the basic plan. As will be seen later (Chapter VIII), there is a prescribed place for such solutions in the usual form in which directives are issued. Often, however, because of extent and bulk, these solutions are included with the directives as annexes.

The commander will desire to provide for all contingencies, but he can rarely, during the planning stage, see completely into the future, so as to foretell all pertinent events which may befall. During the unfolding of events, therefore, unforeseen subsidiary problems will probably arise. Whether visualized during planning, or encountered during the execution of the plan, these problems have the same relationship with the basic problem. Reference is later made (Chapter IX) to subsidiary problems which arise during the action.

Subsidiary problems, according to their nature in each case, may be solved by the procedure distinctive of the first step or by that distinctive of the second. In many instances either may be applicable, the choice being a matter of convenience.

Battle Plans, for example, can demonstrably be formulated by the use of either procedure. Thus, a Decision "to destroy the enemy in a daylight fleet engagement" may be used as the basis for an Estimate of the Situation, by the procedure distinctive of the first step, in order to reach a decision as to the plan, in outline, for the contemplated engagement. However, the same result can also be attained through the procedure distinctive of the second step, with the basic Decision as the point of departure.

A solution also can be reached by a method which is, in effect, intermediate between the procedures of the first and second steps. For example, the basic (broad strategical) Decision noted above can be taken, in a detailed tactical Estimate, as the only suitable, feasible, and acceptable course of action. Then, in Section IV of the Estimate, a study of the more detailed operations involved can be developed into an outlined plan for the battle. Thus, a single course of action, expanded to include the outlined plan so developed, can then be adopted as the decision and can in turn be expanded by second-step methods into a detailed tactical plan.

On the grounds of simplicity, the procedure distinctive of the second step is preferable, when it is applicable to the particular problem. Therefore, when a subsidiary plan is to be developed directly from a basic Decision, this is frequently the better procedure. This comment is applicable not only to battle plans but also to other subsidiary plans such as sortie plans, entrance plans, and logistics plans. The commander may find it necessary, however, to expand the study of fighting strength made in Section I-B of the basic estimate, in order to obtain the detailed data needed for formulating the subsidiary plan.

In spite of the relative simplicity of the second-step method, cases occur where the procedure of the first step is nevertheless preferable. For example, a basic Decision making provision for a major campaign, divided into stages of some scope, may involve, as part of one of these stages, an operation to capture an island. Such an operation may itself require a considerable effort on the part of the whole force; yet the operation may be so specialized or localized, or both, with reference to the entire effort contemplated in the basic Decision, that the solution of this subsidiary problem can best be accomplished through the procedure distinctive of the first step.

The commander will therefore necessarily be the judge, in each case, as to the particular procedure to be adopted.

There are wide variations in the requirements of the Estimate Form, when used for the solution of subsidiary problems. This is natural because these problems vary widely in nature. They include, on the one hand, problems dealing directly with the conflict of armed forces, for which the Form is especially designed. On the other hand, these problems include those dealing with the factors related to freedom of action. To be suitable for this purpose, the Form requires modification in varying degrees. Certain examples are included in the latter part of this chapter (page 176 and following).

The application of the procedure of the first step to the solution of such subsidiary problems requires provision for deriving, in each case, a (subsidiary) mission appropriate to the problem. Of the two elements of the mission, the (subsidiary) purpose is first determined, because the (subsidiary) task will necessarily be suitable to the (subsidiary) purpose. These elements of the (subsidiary) mission may be obtained from one or more of the operations into which the basic Decision has been resolved. They may also be obtained from a preceding subsidiary problem, already solved.

In illustration of the preceding, discussion is first centered on a strategical problem of usual type, involving a subsidiary tactical problem calling for the detailed employment of weapons in a naval engagement. Other illustrations will deal with subsidiary problems relating to particular aspects of freedom of action.

In the first example it is supposed that the commander has already solved a basic problem of broad strategical scope, and has arrived at a Decision which contemplates an engagement. A further logical act of planning is now to develop a Battle Plan. Such development involves the solution of a subsidiary problem. In this case the commander is supposed to have found it desirable to solve this subsidiary problem by the procedure distinctive of the first step.

In this problem, the situation summarized is an imaginary one. It may eventuate either through the natural future developments of the situation existing at the time of the solution of the basic problem, or it may confront the commander during the execution of the plans derived from the Decision of that (basic) problem. The Battle Plan finally to be formulated will be for use under the conditions assumed in this situation.

The commander will desire to draw up a Battle Plan as a provision for the situation which he believes most likely to eventuate. However, as he cannot be certain that this situation will occur, he may also desire to assume other situations, i.e., prepare in advance for other contingencies. It is then necessary for him to solve several problems, each differing from the others in the assumptions (page 155) as to the form the situation may take. The summary of the situation therefore requires a brief statement of the conditions which are assumed. In addition, such parts of the basic problem may be included as are deemed pertinent to the new problem in hand.

In his new problem the purpose of the (subsidiary) mission may readily be obtained from the basic problem. Suppose the assigned task, motivating the estimate of the basic problem, to have been to "prevent enemy convoy from reaching destination". This, the motivating task of the basic problem, then becomes a suitable (subsidiary) purpose for the mission of the subsidiary problem.

For the mission of the subsidiary problem, a motivating task, suitable to the purpose thus determined, will be found in the Decision of the basic problem. Suppose the Decision in this case to have been "to destroy the enemy convoy". The task thus determined for the subsidiary problem becomes an assigned task in the sense that it is assigned by the commander to himself, instead of to a subordinate; however, it is also an assigned task in the sense that it has been indirectly assigned by the immediate superior, because it has been derived, in the basic estimate, from the motivating task which was directly assigned by the superior.

The two elements, of task and purpose, when linked together, enable the commander to visualize the appropriate effect desired, as the basis for his subsidiary estimate,--a procedure identical with that followed in a basic estimate. As in the latter, the commander can now formulate his subsidiary mission, as:--

(Task) To destroy the enemy convoy,

(Purpose) in order to prevent it from reaching its destination.

The mission of the subsidiary problem is thus seen to be identical with the basic Decision linked to the purpose of that Decision.

However, this is not always the case. A subsidiary problem may merely involve the execution by the commander, i.e., under his own immediate direction, of a designated part of his general plan. Or, such a problem may involve execution, by the commander, of one or more of the detailed operations for the accomplishment of his general plan or of a part thereof. The commander may also find it necessary to solve numerous subsidiary problems of relatively restricted scope pertaining either to his general plan or to a part thereof or to the detailed operations involved.

In some of these cases the purpose of the subsidiary mission may be readily apparent. In others, its nature may become clear only after the application of considerable mental effort. In every case the determination of a proper (subsidiary) purpose involves visualization of a situation which the commander desires to bring about or to maintain. The (subsidiary) task, appropriate to the (subsidiary) purpose, will always necessarily be suitable to the latter. This task is then the motivating task for the solution of the particular subsidiary problem in hand. This will be the case whether the commander makes a simple mental solution or produces a more complex one in which the formal written estimate of the situation is employed. In the former instance, the brevity of the mental process tends to obscure this fact.

An example might occur in a situation where the commander has received an order to "Protect the base at A". It is then supposed that, after estimating the situation, he has reached the Decision "to deny the enemy the use of base sites within effective bombing range of A", the purpose of the Decision being, of course, "in order to protect the base at A". The action required might then be undertaken in two stages. The first stage might be confined to the area ABCD. If, then, all available base sites in this area, except Y island, were already securely in friendly hands, the commander would find it necessary to make provision for an operation to deny the use of this island to the enemy. If this operation is of such a nature that the commander desires to execute it under his own direct control, instead of assigning it to a subordinate, it presents a subsidiary problem which the commander, himself, has to solve.

The commander has now determined the necessity of solving a subsidiary problem relating to the accomplishment of a designated part of his general plan. He has also determined the necessity of solving another subsidiary problem presented by an operation pertaining to the first stage of the accomplishment of his general plan.

Each subsidiary problem requires an estimate of the situation although "the brevity of the mental process tends to obscure this fact" (page 172).

In making his basic estimate, the commander may have discovered the need for these subsidiary estimates. In this case, he may have included them in his estimate, as "estimates within the estimate" (page 83), in his analysis of the operations involved in the various courses of action which he considered. For instance, his basic Decision may have included the capture of Y island, and he may have covered this feature by a corollary to that Decision, as follows:

Corollary: As a first stage, to deny the enemy the use of available base sites in the area ABCD, by capturing Y island.

However, the commander may not discover the desirability or need of solving these subsidiary problems until the second step, when resolving the basic Decision into the detailed operations required. In this case, he might make due provision at that time for the operations involved in the subsidiary problems. The mental procedure would be the same in either event.

The commander may find, however, that he prefers to make a separate, subsidiary estimate with respect to the determination of the stages of his operation, including the details as to the performance of the first stage. In this case he finds a proper mission for his subsidiary estimate in the basic Decision, linked to its purpose. This mission would be as follows:--

(Task) To deny the enemy the use of base sites within effective bombing range of A,

(Purpose) in order to protect the base at A.

During the subsidiary estimate the commander may discover, in his study of the area ABCD, the necessity for an operation to deny Y island to the enemy, and may even go so far, in this study, as to decide on the capture of this island. The decision, settling on this area as the scene of the first stage of his effort, may then include provision for the capture of the island, as follows:

Decision: To deny the enemy the use of base sites in the area ABCD as a first stage toward denying him the use of all base sites within effective bombing range of the base at A.

Corollary: To capture Y island.

However, the commander may not take up the matter of denying Y island, specifically, to enemy use until he studies the detailed operations required for the accomplishment of the action involved in his first stage. In such event, he may make provision for the capture of the island in his subsidiary plan for the execution of the first stage. He may find, on the other hand, that he prefers to make a separate, subsidiary estimate as to this feature. If so, the mission for this subsidiary estimate would be identical with the decision (less the corollary, but plus the purpose of the estimate), i.e.,--

(Task) To deny the enemy the use of base sites within effective bombing range of the area ABCD as a first stage

(Purpose) toward denying him the use of all base sites within effective bombing range of the base at A.

During this estimate the commander considers the various courses of action whereby he can deny to the enemy all bases in the area of the first stage. Concluding that Y island is the only base site not securely in friendly hands, and that the best method of denying it to the enemy is to capture it himself, he reaches a decision as follows:

Decision: To capture Y island, in order to deny to the enemy the use of the only available base site in the area ABCD.

In each of the foregoing cases, the commander is said to have "deduced" the mission for his subsidiary problem. As has been demonstrated, the process of deduction is merely the application of the natural mental processes through the use of the estimate of the situation. Whether the estimate is formal or informal, detailed or brief, written or mental, is immaterial; in any case, the estimate results in a decision which provides, with its purpose, a proper mission for the succeeding problem which has been presented by solution of its predecessors.

In logical sequence, from problem to problem, the procedure outlined in the preceding discussion enables the commander to derive a correct mission for the problem involving the capture of Y Island. Clear visualization of such a subsidiary mission is frequently of great importance, and may be difficult unless the procedure has been carefully traced from each problem to the next. In this particular example, if the commander finds that the capture of Y Island is of such a specialized and localized nature (page 170) as to call for a formal estimate (as may frequently be the case in capturing a well-defended island base), he will be especially desirious of deriving a correct (subsidiary) mission as a basis for this estimate. In this instance a correct mission would be:--

(Task) To capture Y Island,

(Purpose) in order to deny to the enemy the use of the only available base site in the area ABCD.

This mission is identical with the decision, linked to its purpose, of the preceding subsidiary problem.

* * * * *

Subsidiary problems relating to training (page 160), when solved by the procedure distinctive of the first step, involve estimates of the situation very similar to those explained previously (Chapter VI).

Section I-A of such a training estimate will include a summary of the salient features of the existing situation, from the strategical or tactical viewpoint, together with a statement of the salient features of the operations to be carried out for which the projected training is designed. The incentive will be found in a previous decision calling for the operations which require the training to be given. The assigned objective will be the making of adequate provision for training appropriate to the projected operations. The (subsidiary) mission will be:--

(Task) to provide appropriate training,

(Purpose) in order to contribute to freedom of action during the operations contemplated. (In each particular case the operations contemplated will be indicated by proper phraseology in the mission or by reference to the preceding summary of the situation.)

Section I-B of a training estimate will take account of the training factors cited in the Estimate Form (Chapter VI) for a basic problem, but will specify details with respect to both own and enemy forces. This section will also cover existing facilities for training, as well as the characteristics of the theater which have now or may have a bearing on the training to be given.

Section II will discuss the various possible procedures for affording the appropriate training.

Section III will deal with any measures which may be adopted by the enemy (through actual attack, through propaganda, or any other methods) to hinder or prevent the desired training.

Section IV will be devoted to the selection of the best training procedure.

Section V will state the decision as to the essentials of the training to be given and as to the method of giving the training. The decision will be in such detail as to constitute a general plan, or a proper basis therefor, from which a detailed plan may be developed.

A detailed training plan, developed from the foregoing decision, will assemble the necessary information and assumptions, will state the general plan for training, and will prescribe the appropriate training tasks. It will also include any proper coordinating measures, make provision for the logistics of the training plan, and finally provide for the exercise of command and for supervision over the training.

A training plan may be briefed by annexing appropriate documents,--e.g., a program and a schedule. The commander will ordinarily issue a schedule for training to be given under his own supervision; he will usually issue a program for training to be given by his subordinates, who will in turn prepare their own schedules.

* * * * *

Subsidiary problems involving intelligence (page 160), when solved by the procedure distinctive of the first step, call for an intelligence estimate along the lines indicated, in general, in Chapter VI.

Section I-A of the Estimate will include a summary of the salient features of the present situation and of the contemplated strategical and tactical operations. The incentive, to be found in a previous decision of the commander, will be noted. The assigned objective will be the making of provision for adequate intelligence of the enemy and of the theater of operations. The mission will be:--

(Task) To make provision for adequate intelligence of the enemy and of the theater of operations,

(Purpose) in order to contribute to freedom of action in the operations contemplated.

Section I-B of the intelligence estimate will take account of the factors as to intelligence and as to related matters which are noted in the Estimate Form (Chapter VI) for a basic estimate.

Section II will consider the possible procedures for obtaining information, i.e., for its collection, including reports from collecting agencies.

Section III will consider the capabilities of the enemy as to counter-intelligence measures.

Section IV will compare the various procedures open for the collection of information and for reports thereof.

Section V will include a decision as to the essential elements of information desired. The decision will be in sufficient detail to serve as a general plan (or a basis therefor), to be developed into a detailed plan for obtaining information and for converting it into intelligence.

A detailed intelligence plan will include appropriate information and assumptions. It will state the general plan for obtaining intelligence. This statement will include the essential elements of information desired. The plan will include appropriate tasks for information-collecting agencies, with times and destinations for reports of information. The task for each collecting agency will be based on the general plan (above); such task will also be synchronized with the projected operations prescribed for such agency in current Operation Orders (Chapter VIII). The agency's inherent capabilities--its limitations as well as its powers--will be given due consideration. Requests to be made on collecting agencies not under the commander's control will be noted in the information (as to own forces) given in the plan (see above).

Logistics arrangements will include, for example, provisions for handling prisoners of war, the disposition of captured documents and other materials, and the supply of maps, charts, and photographs. Counter intelligence measures will be specified where applicable. These include such matters as censorship, press relations, camouflage, and propaganda. Finally, the plan will include provision for the rendition of routine and special reports, for special charts (or maps) accompanying or pertinent to such reports, and for any intelligence conferences.

The essential elements of information desired are frequently stated in question form. Each question deals with an enemy course of action or with one or more of the enemy operations pertaining to such a course (page 161).

The tasks assigned to collecting agencies, or the requests made on collecting agencies not under the commander's control, will call for information (negative, if desired, as well as positive) as to specific indications of the enemy's action--past, present, or intended--and of the characteristics of the theater as related thereto. The indications to be sought for and reported are carefully determined by the commander in expectation that information obtained as to such matters will enable him to draw conclusions which will answer the questions posed by the essential elements of information.

For example, essential elements of information, with corresponding indications, may be as follows:

Essential Elements Indications

1. Will the enemy patrol the a. Presence or absence of enemy trade route from A to B? forces (number and types of vessels) between meridians--and--, as far north as--and as far south as--.

b. Times enemy forces observed in area noted.