Part 2

In addition, to insure that no picquet is overlooked by the rear-guard, a double sentry, with a paper showing the number of its picquet, should be placed in the roadway beneath the height occupied, and it is the duty of the picquet commander to keep in touch with this sentry post.

In this manner the roadway should be picquetted, until the locality is reached where the column is to halt, when the advanced guard commander should take the usual measures for the security of the camp, for safe-guarding the water supply, etc.

It has been suggested that an advanced guard should be divided into two portions, advanced guard, and the picquetting troops, each under a separate leader, the object being to free the advanced guard commander from the work of picquetting, so that his whole attention can be devoted to tactics. The advanced guard is to clear the hills, which are then to be occupied by picquets.

This system does not appear sound, for it necessitates two men doing the work of one, and, in practice, the advanced guard usually either meets with little or no resistance, or with such serious opposition that picquetting is in abeyance.

Each picquet, when it reaches the position selected by its leader, should intrench, taking especial care to provide head cover, so that the enemy may not be easily able to observe the moment of its final withdrawal.

Before the last troops of the main column have quitted camp, the rear-guard commander should have arranged his force in a series of successive positions, calculated to enable the units to mutually support one another's retirement, as well as to assist, if necessary, the withdrawal of picquets.

The guns should, for reasons already given, be kept well back, and this system of successive positions should be continued throughout the march.

It is, of course, understood that the main column keeps contact with, and regulates its march by that of the rear-guard.

It is sometimes advocated that the camp picquets should, before the column marches off, be relieved by the rear-guard, with the object of enabling the picquets to rejoin their units.

This arrangement does not appear advantageous. The troops detailed for the relief of the picquets will probably have to move out in darkness, and over an unknown area, and though, if the enemy advances during the relief, he will be opposed in double strength, should his attack be delivered later, units who do not know the ground will be placed in positions they will not be able to defend to the best advantage. Besides, the men composing the rear-guard, whose functions are in any case sufficiently arduous, will be involved in additional and unnecessary fatigue.

The withdrawal of picquets may be carried out on the following principles:--

When a picquet commander sees, or receives reports that the rear-guard is approaching, he should send the bulk of his picquet to a position, previously reconnoitred, on the lower slope of the hill, and in the direction of the line of march of the column, whence the retirement of the remainder can be covered by fire.

Whilst on the hill, and especially as the time for withdrawal approaches, the men of a picquet should be careful not to show themselves, in order that the enemy may not, by counting heads, be able to divine that retirement has been begun. Similarly, the men left on the hill to the last, should, above everything, avoid exposure.

When the picquet commander sees the rear-guard commander, who will usually be with the last troops, and whose presence will be shown by a flag, is opposite his post, he should give the signal for the evacuation of the hill top, on which the men should creep back, and as soon as they are below the sky line, run down the hill to a position beyond that of their covering party. The withdrawal should then be continued according to the accepted principles, until the whole picquet has reached the valley, when its leader should report to the rear-guard commander, receiving orders whether the picquet is to proceed to the main column, or to join the rear-guard.

The rear guard commander should have previously called in the road sentry post marking the locality held by the picquet, and the map furnished by the advanced guard will have been of assistance in identifying its position.

It is contended that the withdrawal of a picquet rests, except in special circumstances, entirely with the picquet leader. He is the man on the spot, and can best judge when the retirement should commence.

The rear-guard commander should rarely attempt to regulate the actions of the picquets, of whose situation he cannot have adequate knowledge, but should exercise general supervision, ready to afford assistance if required.

At times picquets may be able to support one another's movements, but, as a rule, a picquet will be too fully occupied with its own affairs to be able to render assistance to its neighbours.

The above outline of a withdrawal presupposes that hostile pressure is not unduly severe.

If the enemy venture to close with the rear-guard and picquets, it is submitted that an immediate counter-attack should be delivered, the main body being halted.

To lose so golden an opportunity of inflicting loss on a volatile foe seems on the one hand unwise, whilst, on the other, it is surely both undignified and demoralising to permit savages to hunt British regulars into camp.

The delivery of a counter-attack is accompanied by some risk, and its success will depend on the aptitude of the rear-guard commander for stratagem, for, if loss is to be inflicted, the enemy must, as a rule, be trapped.

Simple ruses which suggest themselves are, either to attempt to attract the tribesmen into the low ground by a bait of ammunition or transport animals, the cavalry, guns, and part of rear-guard, infantry being previously concealed in positions from which they can take advantage of any mistake the enemy may commit, and the retirement of picquets stopped, as soon as the attack is delivered. Or, two or more picquets, which have been previously reinforced by troops moving along concealed lines of advance to the hill tops, may feign retirement, and attack the tribesmen as they follow over the crest line.

If stratagem fails, the column should halt and drive off the enemy, a proceeding which should be repeated until he is taught that to follow up British troops is neither profitable nor advantageous.

ATTACK AND DEFENCE.

Success in war depends in some degree on adaptation of tactics to local conditions, and it is therefore clear that, to attain rapid success against the inhabitants of the North Western Frontier, a knowledge of their tactics is required, and that, whilst the British aims are pursued with unswerving determination, their probable movements must be met and defeated.

The tribesmen, like most savages, are only really formidable when one is running away from them. They fight well in positions strongly fortified, and with flanks secure, but, being without the discipline or cohesion to meet envelopment, are much influenced by pressure against their flanks.

Pathans are fearful of artillery, and do not, as a rule, seriously resist a determined advance, preferring the easier and less dangerous enterprise of harassing the retirements which they believe are an inevitable corollary to forward movements; or of attacking isolated detachments, whose operations they have observed from their hill-tops.

They are suspicious of ambuscades, except when excited in pursuit, and are not prone to accept battle unless surprised.

Like other people, they shoot well when not themselves under effective fire, and, when shooting into a valley, where the strike of the bullet can be observed, their fire is accurate. On the other hand, owing to their relatively defective armament, and to lack of ammunition, tribal fire as a rule lacks volume.

The tribesmen skirmish well, and move quickly over their hills, but rarely, except when engaging a small force, or by night, attack in mass. On the other hand, they often crowd their defensive positions with men.

They are said to dislike being overlooked by their opponents, and therefore do not care to attack up hill, but will, at times, try to rush a detachment, with the object of capturing rifles and ammunition.

The fact that a proportion of the men possess only inferior fire-arms, renders possible resort to shock tactics, especially when roused to a pitch of fanaticism.

Pathans are partial to night operations, probably because they believe that there is little fear of interference after dark. Their enterprises are usually on a small scale, but night attacks in force, are possible. Their inadequate clothing, and the cold of the early morning, however, usually forces them to seek shelter as the night wears on.

From the above description it will be seen that British troops, so long as they observe the ordinary principles of war, have nothing to fear from the tribesmen. But it is to be remembered that, unless stratagem is intended, the offensive is the general rule in tribal warfare, for the enemy construes a defensive attitude as a sign of fear, and becomes correspondingly elated.

The composition of forces despatched on reconnaissance and minor punitive expeditions requires careful consideration. Columns composed of men drawn from many different infantry units are inherently weak, so that, in all operations, complete units, so far as they are required, should be employed, cavalry being added when local conditions are favourable. Artillery will generally be necessary, as well as a proportion of technical troops, but the strength of columns should, within limits of safety, be low, in order to insure mobility, and to encourage resistance. The military value of the enemy must not, however, be underestimated.

The main object of all operations is to quickly attain a decisive success. To this end the tribesmen must be induced to stand and fight with the purpose of inflicting casualties on them.

It is to be remembered that the enemy can, less easily than the British, afford losses, especially of arms. Commanders, without being prodigal of their men's lives, need not, therefore, be afraid of incurring casualties, especially when there is likelihood that the enemy will suffer loss to at least an equal extent. If the tribesmen's losses are heavy, those of the British troops will probably be considerably less. Close fighting is all to the advantage of trained soldiers.

As has been stated, the clansmen will rarely commit themselves to battle in conditions favourable to the British, unless they can be outwitted or surprised. Night operations may, therefore, frequently be necessary, having special regard to the fact that, from their hill tops, the enemy will overlook all manoeuvres. As the natives are not often abroad in the early morning, surprise, at dawn, will not present unusual difficulties.

The enveloping form of tactics, when the enemy is attacked both in front and flank, is as effective in tribal as in other warfare. But, owing to the topographical advantages enjoyed by the tribesmen, it will be necessary to hold them closely in frontal attack, and so distract their attention from outflanking movements. This may be possible, for they fight with confidence when behind cover. Mere frontal attack is likely to be at once costly and ineffective; hence, if neither envelopment, nor night operations, are practicable, resort may be had to such stratagems as a feigned retirement, or bait of transport animals, to tempt the Pathans from their hills.

Though the possibility of tribal counter-attack, by shock, must not be lost sight of, the British advantage in training and armament should enable a central general reserve to be dispensed with, the object being to so dispose the troops as to insure envelopment.

Good information and staff work, and a sound system of inter-communication, will, moreover, if all ranks are imbued with the spirit of mutual support, go far to insure success.

Commanders, especially of small forces, should remember that hesitation will be quickly observed by the enemy, but a bold front, and ready stratagem, will soon cause him to lose heart.

When a post or isolated detachment requires assistance, aid can often be most rapidly and effectively given by application of such indirect pressure as will tend to divert the enemy's attention.

In minor tactics, whilst taking every advantage of the cover afforded by features of ground, troops must beware of seeking shelter in hollows or nullahs, places which will, assuredly, have been marked by the enemy's riflemen, so that their occupation will rarely escape punishment.

In attack, infantry units, whilst securing their flanks, should advance up salients, taking care to afford one another mutual fire assistance. Supports and local reserves should be pushed as near to the firing line as the shape of the ground will permit; but, at times, reserves may be able to effectively support the troops in front by covering fire, from suitable positions, behind, or on the flanks of, the line of advance.

Fire should be reserved until units have closed on the enemy, the object being to prevent the early evacuation of a position, after having caused a few casualties at long range.

As the enemy's fire, though likely to be accurate, will probably lack volume, resort need not be had to widely extended formations.

To gain ground, and when assaulting, the procedure outlined in the training manuals requires no modification.

Artillery should be handled with discretion, and should be on its guard against the tendency to open fire whenever a target is seen. Its aim should be not to evict, but to hold the enemy to his sangars, and to inflict loss when he retreats.

The steep forward slopes of hills will enable fire to be continued until the infantry has closed on the tribesmen, but oblique, rather than frontal fire should be employed.

It is, of course, important to insure close inter-communication between infantry and artillery.

In tribal, as in other warfare, unless the enemy is completely enveloped, efficient pursuit is necessary to set the seal on victory. Pursuit can, at first, probably be best undertaken by the enveloping wings, artillery co-operating to head the enemy off in the required direction, whilst the cavalry press forward.

A portion of the artillery should, therefore, move with the outflanking wings, keeping as near as possible to the firing line.

Pathans, familiar with the country, and confident that they have everything to gain, and but little to lose by such tactics, favour the harassing of troops as they withdraw from heights, or along valleys. Though it may be taken as a maxim that there will be no pursuit if the enemy has, in any recent fighting, been adequately punished, the conditions may have been such that casualties could not be inflicted.

In these circumstances, the clansmen must surely not be permitted to embarrass the British movements, and must be convinced that pursuit is both dangerous and unprofitable.

Mere counter-attack, when the enemy is not surprised, is likely to lead to no advantage, but a few skilfully laid ambushes will soon discourage his zeal for pursuit. Should he, however, persist in following up the troops, counter-attack should at once be made, and the retirement discontinued. The enemy, it is to be remembered, will, as a rule, offer the greatest opportunity of inflicting loss when he follows up a retirement, and, in such operations, the aim must be rather to cause than to avoid casualties.

All withdrawals should be pre-arranged and systematic, flanks being securely held, and the principle of mutual support observed. But formalism must be avoided, and procedure must never be permitted to become so stereotyped that the enemy will be able to confidently anticipate the movements of the troops.

Men must beware of entering nullahs, or depressions of any kind, until the further edge has been secured; and, when on a hill top, the provision of such cover as will conceal the head-dress is of importance.

Transport animals should be clear of the fighting troops before retirement is begun.

If the object is to slip away from the enemy, the retirement should be made at a time when movement is not expected.

When a valley is to be swept in course of punitive operations, an adequate force should be left to secure the entrance, if the column is to leave by this route.

Troops, as has already been suggested, should, in respect of ammunition, food, and warm coats, be independent of transport animals, and it should be understood that units are always to be prepared to remain for the night away from camp. The men should be trained to economise water, which is often scarce across the border.

Ammunition and rifles being the main objects of tribal ambition, special care should be taken to prevent them from falling into the enemy's hands.

Against the North West Frontier clans, the offensive, as usual, is normally the best defensive, but it may sometimes happen that small British forces are temporarily obliged to act on the defensive.

In such circumstances, it is to be expected that the enemy will adopt the tactics, common amongst savages, of seeking the flanks of the troops, both to avoid fire, and to obtain the advantages of enfilade. It follows, then, that defensive measures should include all round protection, whilst a relatively large reserve should be kept ready to attack the hostile levies, as soon as any portion comes within charging distance.

Experience tends to prove that a compact body of even a section, if well entrenched and supplied with ammunition, has nothing to fear from Pathans, especially when the British leader is animated by the proper spirit of timely offensive.

CAMPS.

It is desirable for a column escorting a large baggage train--and this is essentially the predicament of civilised troops engaged in frontier mountain warfare--to be collected in camp before nightfall, otherwise the enemy may be given unduly favourable opportunities of employing harassing methods.

But it does not result that the situation of troops unable, for any cause, to reach camp, is at all desperate.

Strong and compact forces adopting the usual precautions, can probably, in many, if not in most cases, march in safety after nightfall, but small detachments and baggage can rarely do so without undue risk. These, then, should always park and intrench towards nightfall, wherever they may find themselves, when they will have little to fear, for experience, as has been stated, tends to show that even a section, securely intrenched, and with ample ammunition, can hold its own against heavy odds.

The form of camp, and the nature of the protection adopted, depend, as usual, on the topography, and on the character of the enemy.

A common method is to place transport, etc., within a perimeter occupied by the fighting troops, but this arrangement is by no means invariable, and it may be convenient to form two or more camps, or to separate transport from fighting troops.

The camp will, as a rule, be located in proximity to water, that is to say in a valley, and in such circumstances, if it can be sited well under one of the enclosing ranges of hills, protection from sniping will be afforded from this direction, though the overhanging heights must be securely held.

Sometimes a small basin is available for the bivouac, and in this case, the troops can, to a great extent, be secured from this favourite tribal device of firing into camp after nightfall.

As is the case in all war, the measures taken for the security of a camp include a system of picquets, and in frontier expeditions these are placed all round camp, either on the level, or on any commanding heights, within, at any rate, effective rifle range.

Picquets may be pushed even further forward, but when so situated, must be numerically strong, as they are liable to be rushed, though more for the sake of capturing their arms, than with the object of inflicting loss. No picquet should be of less strength than one section, all should be intrenched against attack from any direction. Their bearing from camp should also be taken, and they should be in signalling communication with the main body, so that assistance may be requested and despatched when necessary, or warning given of the approach of the enemy in force.

Bombs should be useful adjuncts to picquet defence, in case the enemy should succeed in forming a lodgment near the sangar.

Though a sedentary system of picquets may discover the presence of a large hostile body near camp, and may, in some degree, check sniping, the latter evil cannot, by this means, be completely prevented. Tribesmen, especially since they are aware that the British rarely risk troops, other than picquets, outside the perimeter, will often creep in and snipe from the area between the picquets and camp.

There seems, however, no valid reason why sniping should be passively tolerated, when it can probably be effectively combated by placing, in certain localities between the camp and picquets, small patrols of picked men, provided with grass shoes, whose duty will be to stalk and bayonet venturesome marauders.

Against this proposal it has been argued that the British, and especially the European soldiers, are unfit to cope, by night, with tribesmen, inured from childhood to move silently in darkness over rough ground. The contention is considered to be inadmissible, for though there is, and must be, risk in stalking snipers, picked British soldiers are surely now, as formerly, more than a match for Pathans, in all circumstances when the numbers are fairly even.

The form of intrenchment, if any, excavated round the bivouac, is conditioned by the character of the enemy.

If he is prone to adopt shock tactics, and to attempt to rush the camp under cover of darkness, a ditch to check his charge, backed by a parapet with head cover, will be the most favourable form of defence.

But if he is partial merely to harassing methods, such as firing into camp, the perimeter defences should be calculated to mitigate their effects, by providing, for all troops, trenches well traversed, and with parapets both to front and rear.

If both forms of attack are possible, parapets with trench and ditch should be made, the trench, or ditch, being first dug, according as a charge or sniping is most to be feared.

Naturally units protected by high ground on one or more flanks, need only make cover so as to secure themselves from the directions from which fire can be delivered.

Only infantry should hold the perimeter of a camp, machine guns being placed at the angles, and the defence of each confided to one unit, divided responsibility not being permissible.

Supports may, if necessary, be located in intrenchments behind the perimeter, and a homogeneous body of about half a battalion, allotted as reserve, and given a bivouac near that of the column commander.

In case of attack, the duty of cavalry soldiers is to stand to their horses, of artillery to man their guns. To neither, therefore, in normal circumstances, should a portion of the perimeter be confided, and both should be placed within its circumference.

At the same time, guns should be so disposed, in pits or epaulments, that they can sweep ground across which attack is most likely to be made; or they may be laid so as to search localities where tribesmen may collect prior to delivering an assault.

PROTECTION OF LINE OF COMMUNICATION.

The protection of a line of communication is secured by combination of passive and active measures, though the latter are of the greatest importance.

Passive measures include the provision of fortified staging posts, linked up by a series of road picquets, and supplemented by escorts to convoys. The active defence is by means of flying columns.