Part 7
Captain Barclay's wants were particularly detailed by him to the Commander of the forces, in the only letter he addressed to him on the subject, dated Long Point, 16th July, 1813. The receipt of this letter was acknowledged by Sir George Prevost, on the 21st of the same month, he having the day before sent an extract from it, with a strong letter of representation upon the subject, to Lord Bathurst. In this letter to Captain Barclay, Sir George Prevost states, that he is fully aware of all that officer's difficulties, and that he should endeavour to relieve his wants, as far as was in his power, explaining to him the reasons which prevented him from so doing to the extent required. He repeats, also, what he had before said to General Procter, that Captain Barclay must endeavour to obtain his naval stores from the enemy, but that being satisfied that such a measure could not be effected without an addition to his present strength, he had strongly pressed upon Sir James Yeo the necessity of immediately sending forward to him a supply of petty officers and seamen, and that he (Sir J. Yeo), had assured the Commander of the forces that he would do so without delay: that he had also given positive directions for the remainder of the 41st regiment to be sent to General Procter, and hoped that the arrival of these reinforcements would afford the timely means of attempting something against the enemy's flotilla, before it should be in a state to venture out upon the Lake.--With this assurance from Sir James Yeo, that seamen and officers should be supplied to Captain Barclay, and in the hope that his repeated orders for the reinforcement of General Procter, with the remainder of the 41st regiment, had been complied with, Sir George Prevost might with justice point out to Captain Barclay the necessity of supplying his further wants from the enemy's resources,[61] more especially as General Procter had repeatedly declared that a supply of troops alone would be sufficient to enable him to succeed in an attack upon Presqu'isle.
Subsequent to Captain Barclay's letter to the Commander of the forces, of the 16th July, all further representations respecting the supply of seamen for Lake Erie, were made by General Procter, in his letters to Sir George Prevost. The several answers to these representations the Reviewer has not thought proper to notice, contenting himself with giving a partial and immaterial extract from Sir George Prevost's letter to General Procter, of the 22nd August, evidently for the purpose of introducing what he is pleased to term a _taunt_, but which was in fact neither designed as such by Sir George, nor so considered by the gallant Captain Barclay. After stating that General Procter had, in his letter of the 18th August, 1813, announced to the Commander of the forces, that the Detroit was launched, and that, if he had seamen, a few hours would place that district in security, the Reviewer adds, "but instead of replying to this application, with _an immediate reinforcement of seamen_, the Commander-in-chief answered it as usual, on the 22nd of August, with mere promises."
Without dwelling upon the Reviewer's error in supposing that Sir George Prevost, who had no control whatever over the seamen belonging to the squadron on Lake Ontario, who were exclusively under the orders of Sir James Yeo, could by any possibility immediately have sent forward to Captain Barclay the reinforcement of seamen required, we shall shew that Sir George Prevost's answer to the application was not one of _mere promises_, but that the reinforcement required, and which had been previously provided by him, was then actually on its way to its destination. Within two days after the date of the letter of the Commander of the forces to Captain Barclay before referred to, he acquainted General Procter that Sir James Yeo had assured him, that as many petty officers and seamen as could be spared, should be forwarded to Captain Barclay without delay, but that he, Sir George Prevost, much feared they would, as to numbers, fall short of his expectations. That he was, however, endeavouring to obtain a further supply from Quebec, which he meant should be exclusively appropriated for the service of Lake Erie. This letter, which was an answer to that of General Procter, of the date of 13th July,[62] referred to by the Reviewer, has been altogether suppressed by him, as well as the material fact that almost immediately after the letter of 13th July was written, General Procter relinquished the intended expedition against Presqu'isle, although 120 men of the 41st had been sent forward to Long Point, to be there taken on board by Captain Barclay for that purpose, and employed the whole of his disposable force in an unsuccessful expedition to Forts Meigs and Sandusky, by which proceeding that force was considerably diminished. In his answer of the 22d to General Procter's letter of the 18th August, before referred to, an extract from which is given in the note, Sir George Prevost expressed his opinion of that expedition, and stated the measures he was taking to remedy the inconveniences which might arise from it.[63] After mentioning the reinforcements which he intended to send forward to General Procter, he informed him, that, of the three troop-ships which had arrived at Quebec with De Meuron's regiment, two had conveyed to Halifax 500 American prisoners of war, and the third, the Dover, had been laid up _in consequence of his having directed three-fourths of the officers and seamen to be landed and sent forward for the naval service on the Lakes_; and that he had the satisfaction to inform General Procter, that the first Lieutenant of that ship, with 50 or 60 seamen, were then at Kingston, from whence they were to be forwarded, without delay, to Amherstburgh. This circumstance Sir George Prevost requested might be made known to Captain Barclay. This portion of the letter, which so clearly shews the exertions Sir George Prevost had made, and was then making, to send a supply of seamen to Lake Erie, the Reviewer, with the whole letter before him, has thought proper to omit, and in lieu of it, to insert as the only reply given by Sir George Prevost to General Procter's request for further assistance, a passage in the letter[64] which was evidently meant as a compliment to the bravery of General Procter's troops, and an encouragement to him to persevere under the difficulties of his situation, assured, as he must have been, that every endeavour was making to relieve him. On the 26th August, four days after the date of the last letter, the Military Secretary informed General Procter that Colonel Talbot had been sent to the head of the Lake to await the arrival of the seamen mentioned in his letter of the 25th, and to forward them to Amherstburgh with all possible despatch. He was further informed, that 12 24lb. carronades for the new ship, the Detroit, were expected in the fleet at Burlington Bay, and General Procter was desired to request Captain Barclay, on his arrival at Long Point, to send off an express to the officer commanding at Burlington Heights, to say when he would be ready to receive them on board. In this letter, the Military Secretary, Captain Freer says, "His Excellency trusts, that upon the arrival of the seamen, Captain Barclay will be able to make his appearance on the Lake to meet the enemy."
From all that has been stated upon this subject, it must satisfactorily appear, that every exertion in the power of Sir George Prevost was made by him to supply the wants of Captain Barclay and the squadron, both with seamen and stores, and that at the very period when the action was fought, more men were on their way to him.
The truth of the Reviewer's assertion, that the conduct of Sir George Prevost contributed to the destruction of our marine on Lake Erie, will be best ascertained by a reference to Captain Barclay himself; and the following letter from that officer to the present Sir George Prevost, will clearly shew how unwarrantably the character of the Commander of the forces in the Canadas has been attacked on this occasion.
"_Edinburgh, 14th January, 1823._
"Sir,
"I have had the honor to receive a letter from Miss Prevost, acquainting me that the family of the late Lieut.-General Sir George Prevost are preparing a pamphlet, in vindication of his memory and conduct, so ungenerously and cruelly aspersed in the Quarterly Review for October, 1822, and appealing to me for the truth or falsehood of that portion of the article, which attributes the defeat and capture of His Majesty's squadron on Lake Erie, then under my command, to the imbecility of his conduct, and general inattention to our necessities.
"I most deeply lament that an article so ungenerous and severe, should have been written, when the object of its hostility has been so long in his grave, which must not only lacerate most deeply the feelings of his family, but which also tends to open again a controversy which I had hoped was at rest.
"Agitated, however, as the question again is, by this anonymous publication; appealed to as I am for its truth or falsehood, I declare that as far as relates to Lake Erie, nothing can be more false and groundless. So contrary indeed is the fact, that I can say, the only communication which was made by me direct to the Commander of the forces, and which I was only induced to make by the extreme urgency of the case, was answered by his ordering a reinforcement of seamen from Quebec, and which I am confident would have been larger, _had it been possible to have waited_ for them.
"It is also but justice in me to declare, that I ever considered his peremptory order[65] to risk a battle, (which, however, did not arrive till after the battle was over,) arose from his firm conviction of the paramount necessity of a strenuous exertion on the part of the navy for the preservation of the post, and from a generous desire on his part, to share with me the responsibility of a measure so hazardous, should the issue prove unsuccessful.
I have the honor to be, Sir,
Your most obedient servant, R. H. BARCLAY.
"_Sir George Prevost, Bart. Oriel College, Oxford._"
The subjoined extract of a letter from Sir James Yeo to Sir George Prevost, will also shew that the Naval Commander on the Lakes entertained a very different opinion on this subject from the Reviewer.
"_Kingston, 23d March, 1814._
"Dear Sir,
"I have had the honor of your Excellency's letter of the 14th inst.
"It is impossible any person can be more truly sensible of your Excellency's unremitting attention and assiduity to every thing connected with the naval department in this country than myself, &c.
* * * * *
I have the honour to remain, With the highest respect, Dear Sir, Your Excellency's Most obedient servant, JAMES LUCAS YEO."
With regard to the naval action on Lake Erie, we shall only observe, that it certainly was not lost from the want of skill or courage on the part of the officers and men of our squadron. The decided superiority of the enemy in their weight of metal and seamen, gave them an advantage which the bravest efforts of our squadron, directed and encouraged by the distinguished gallantry and conduct of their Commander, were insufficient to resist. The causes of the disastrous result of that action are best told, in the words of the sentence of the Court-martial upon Captain Barclay and his officers, which will be found in the Appendix.[66] The situation of General Procter was such, after this disaster, as to render it indispensable for him to take the most prompt and energetic measures for withdrawing his troops from posts which were no longer tenable, and to join the main body of the army on the Niagara frontier, to whose force he knew his men would prove a seasonable and powerful accession. Upon this disastrous retreat it is unnecessary to dwell. It must, however, be remarked, that from the sentence of the Court-martial upon General Procter, and the subsequent remarks upon that sentence by order of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, it certainly appears that General Procter did not avail himself, with sufficient energy and activity of the period which elapsed between the loss of our fleet and the action at the Moravian village, to effect the important object of retiring with his troops to a place of safety.
However meritorious had been the conduct of General Procter, and of the troops serving under him previous to his retreat from Amherstburgh, it was not possible for Sir George Prevost to avoid noticing in the public orders, which announced to the army the capture of the greater part of those troops at the Moravian town, what appeared to him the disgraceful circumstances with which the affair had been attended. Although General Procter might feel hurt by the reflections thus passed upon his conduct, yet the Commander of the forces, in consideration of his former services, was unwilling to make that conduct the subject of public investigation, until His Majesty's Government, to whom General Procter's explanation had been submitted, should determine upon the course to be pursued. It was in obedience to their orders that General Procter was at length put upon his trial.[67]
That the charges against General Procter could only rest upon the events of the retreat which he was accused of misconducting, and that "a long period of arduous services and neglected representations"[68] could form _no part of such charges_, must be obvious to the lowest capacity. General Procter had, of course, the opportunity of availing himself of those services before the Court-martial, and that he did so the nature of the sentence would lead us to suppose. But it surely cannot be inferred from the opinion of the Court, that Sir George Prevost had any other motive in preferring the charges, than the good of the service, and obedience to the commands of his superiors. Whether, under these circumstances, and with the knowledge of Sir George Prevost's military life, which the Reviewer must have possessed, he is justified in making the gross insinuation with which he concludes his strictures on this subject, will be left to the candid reader to determine.
The greater part of the troops under General Procter having been captured, General Vincent was compelled immediately to retreat to Burlington Heights, a measure which the information received by that officer of the extent of General Procter's loss, and the probable immediate advance of the enemy, seemed to render indispensable.
The first intelligence received of General Procter's defeat was through a Staff-Adjutant, who had escaped from the field of battle, and who, by exaggerated accounts of this disaster, and of the consequences to be expected from it, spread terror and dismay through the country as he passed rapidly along to Kingston, where he arrived on the 12th October. In the mean time, General Vincent, whom these reports had reached, and who had also on the 8th received from General Procter intelligence of the action, had begun his retreat from the four-mile creek, and had halted at the twelve-mile creek, when a communication from Colonel Young, at Burlington, induced him immediately to fall back upon that place as a post where he might with less difficulty maintain himself if attacked, and where he might wait for instructions from General de Rottenburg, the officer commanding in Upper Canada.
General de Rottenburg, who was on his way from York to Kingston, when the intelligence of General Procter's defeat overtook him on the road, immediately sent to General Vincent, directing him, in his despatch of the 10th October, if he did not consider himself sufficiently strong to hold out against the superior force of the enemy, to destroy the stores, &c. and to fall back on Kingston. These directions, it is to be observed, were given under the impression created by the Staff-Adjutant's account, which, in a very short time was discovered to be greatly exaggerated; and it appears from General Vincent's letter to General de Rottenburg, previous to the receipt of the despatch last mentioned, as well as from the one in answer to it, that he had no immediate intention of retreating from the position he then occupied, although he thought circumstances might afterwards render such a measure necessary. In the mean time the same exaggerated accounts of the action at the Moravian village, which had been carried to Kingston, having been received at Montreal by the Commander of the forces, together with General de Rottenburg's despatches, communicating the orders he had sent to General Vincent in consequence of that intelligence, Sir George Prevost in his letter to General de Rottenburg of the 18th October, approved of those orders, and directed them to be carried into execution.
On the 18th October, the very day on which this last despatch was dated, General de Rottenburg informed Sir George Prevost, by letter, that the Staff-Adjutant's account, by which he had been induced to give the directions to General Vincent to retreat to York, preparatory to falling back on Kingston, was false and scandalous. As soon as it was thus ascertained at head-quarters at Montreal, what the real nature of General Procter's disaster was, the Commander of the forces having also reason to believe, from the information transmitted to him by General de Rottenburg, that the enemy had designs upon York from Sackett's Harbour, instructions, dated the 29th October, were sent to that officer, directing him to prevent General Vincent's further retreat, and to order him to occupy both Burlington and York with the force under his command. The orders, which were accordingly sent from General de Rottenburg to General Vincent to that effect on the 1st November, were received by him on the 4th, and he in consequence remained in the position he then occupied at Burlington Heights, which undoubtedly led afterwards to the recovery of the Niagara frontier.
From the above correspondence it incontrovertibly appears, that the orders transmitted from the Commander of the forces, through General de Rottenburg to Major-General Vincent, were the real and only cause of that officer's _not retreating_ to York, and of his continuing to hold his position at Burlington; which, as appears by his own letter of the 27th October, before referred to, he was preparing to leave on the 1st November.
Sir George Prevost's orders to General Vincent, to fall back upon Kingston, had not reached him on the 23rd October; previous to which, his orders to retreat had been discretionary. On the 27th he was preparing to obey them, and on the 4th of November he received orders to remain where he was.
There cannot, therefore, be a doubt of the gross incorrectness of all the Reviewer's statements,[69] of the repeated peremptory orders to retreat; of the advice which the firmness of General Procter and others had induced them to give General Vincent to disobey those orders, and of his being persuaded upon their responsibility to adopt it.
It was, in fact, the prompt and decided measures of Sir George Prevost, as soon as the truth, with regard to General Procter's defeat, was made known to him, that alone prevented General Vincent from continuing his retreat, and that led to those offensive operations which followed shortly afterwards on the Niagara frontier, and which, notwithstanding the attempt made by the Reviewer to give the sole credit of them to General Vincent and Colonel Murray, originated in the instructions which the former officer had received from General de Rottenburg, then commanding in Upper Canada. Even the attack upon Fort Niagara had previously been pressed upon the consideration of Major-Generals de Rottenburg and Sheaffe, by the Commander of the forces, as desirable, whenever circumstances might render such a measure practicable.
In summing up the events of the campaign of 1813, the Reviewer observes,[70] "that on the British side, the occurrences of the year, on the part of the _subordinate commanders_ and troops, presented a brilliant series of achievements, the greater number of which were rendered nugatory or imperfect in result, from the absence of all energy, talent, and enterprise, in their Commander-in-Chief."
In support of this opinion, which is sufficiently singular, considering what the Reviewer has himself stated to have been the result of the campaign, he adds, that the successes obtained by General Vincent and Colonel Harvey, by General Procter, Colonel Murray, and Lieutenant-Colonel Morrison, were ALL obtained either against the positive commands of Sir George Prevost, or without any instructions from him; and that in the only measure which could be ascribed to him, he endeavoured to wrest the merit from Lieut.-Colonel De Salaberry, because he happened to arrive when the enemy were beaten.
The following observations will afford a full answer to this unfounded and disgraceful attack upon the character and reputation of Sir George Prevost. The brilliant affair at Stoney Creek, under Major-General Vincent and Colonel Harvey, and the equally successful operation on the Michigan frontier, when General Procter defeated the forces of Winchester and Clay, arose out of the circumstances of the moment, of which those officers immediately, with great judgment and gallantry, availed themselves. There could, therefore, be no time for communication with the Commander of the forces, and consequently the operations in question could not have taken place in direct opposition to commands which were never received. With regard to the general instructions under which the subordinate Commanders acted, it has already been shewn that General Procter had discretionary orders from Sir George Prevost to act on the defensive or otherwise, as circumstances might require; so likewise had General Vincent; and the marked approbation expressed, both in general orders, and in the despatches to the Secretary of State announcing these events, is a further strong proof that the conduct of those officers was in perfect accordance with the orders and instructions which they had received from the Commander of the forces. Colonel Murray's expedition against Plattsburg was, as appears by the despatch to Lord Bathurst, of the 1st August, 1813, planned altogether by Sir George Prevost, who had previously endeavoured to place our marine on the Richelieu, which had been increased by the capture of the two schooners from the enemy, on a respectable footing; first, by the appointment of Captain Pring to the naval command there, and subsequently by obtaining the services of Captain Everard, and the officers and seamen of the Wasp sloop of war, then lately arrived at Quebec from Halifax, to man these vessels and the gun-boats. Colonel Murray was the officer particularly selected by Sir George Prevost to command on this expedition, from the opinion he entertained of his zeal and energy. The event amply justified his expectations, and this enterprise, undertaken by the orders and under the instructions of the Commander of the forces, was in every respect successful.