Part 2

From this statement, drawn from the original correspondence, and from official documents, it is evident, that even in contemplation of hostilities, an event by no means certain, and which the British Government were so far from thinking probable, that they discouraged any measure of extraordinary expense to meet it, the Commander of the forces did, as far as rested with him, during the winter of 1811 and 1812, and for months prior to the declaration of war, make every preparation for defence, consistent with the means which he possessed. All the requisitions of Major-General Brock which the Commander of the forces had the power to grant, were promptly complied with; nor was the slightest intimation ever given by that invaluable officer, that any measure, either suggested by himself or which ought to have occurred to the Commander of the forces, for the preservation of the Upper Province, in the event of its being attacked, had been overlooked or neglected. The same vigilant foresight will be found to mark the conduct of Sir George Prevost in the Lower Province. One of the first measures of his government, in contemplation of war, was an application to the legislature of Lower Canada, in February, 1812, for an act to new model the militia laws, and which might enable him to call forth a proportion of the population into active service. Averse as the Canadians had hitherto been to grant any power of this description to former Governors, and repugnant as many of the clauses which it was intended to introduce into the bill, were to the habits and feelings of the people, such was the deserved popularity acquired by Sir George Prevost, from the conciliatory policy, which, as before stated, he had adopted towards the Canadians, immediately upon his arrival amongst them, that he obtained from the Legislature nearly all that he had required. Before the end of May, 1812, a sum exceeding 60,000_l._ was placed at his disposal for the militia service; and he was authorized to embody 2,000 Bachelors, between the age of eighteen and twenty-five years, for three months in the year; and in case of invasion, or imminent danger of it, to retain them for a year. In case of war, he was empowered to embody if necessary, the whole militia of the Province. Under that law, a force of 2,000 men, from the finest and most efficient class of the militia, was embodied on the 13th May, so to remain for three months, unless the then state of affairs should render it expedient to retain them longer. A corps of Canadian voltigeurs, under the command of Major De Salaberry, of the 60th regiment, consisting of between 300 and 400 men, had likewise, been raised and disciplined; and 400 recruits for the Glengarry Fencibles, had, before the 1st June, been assembled at Three Rivers, in Lower Canada. The advantages arising from thus embodying the militia prior to the war, were incalculable, and it may be confidently asserted, materially contributed to the preservation of the Canadas.

The American Government, deceived by the erroneous information which they had received respecting the disaffection of the Canadian population to Great Britain, had calculated upon meeting with considerable support from the people in their invasion of the Province. They had been told, and they believed, that the militia would not serve, or, if embodied, would be worse than useless. The embodying, arming, and training of 2,000 of the most active portion of the population, for several weeks before the war was declared, was a severe disappointment to the American Government; and was one of the causes of that determined resistance, which they afterwards experienced in every attempt to penetrate into that Province. This militia force also enabled the Commander of the forces to detach a larger portion of the regular troops, than he could otherwise have been justified in parting with, to the Upper Province; while, at the same time, it afforded him the means, on the breaking out of the war, of guarding the different passes and roads into Lower Canada, with a description of men perfectly well acquainted with the nature of the country, and with the mode of warfare necessary for its defence. The line of frontier in the Lower Province was thus most effectually guarded by Sir George Prevost's able disposition of this new force, together with the assistance of the regular troops; and every prudent precaution consistent with his means, and with the instructions he was constantly receiving from England, to avoid all unnecessary expense, was taken. The precautionary measures which were pursued upon this occasion, by the Commander of the forces, met with the full approbation of His Majesty's Government, expressed in a despatch from Lord Bathurst, of the 6th November, 1812, in which his Lordship informed Sir George Prevost, that "the preparations for defence which he had made upon _the first intimation_ of eventual hostility with America, and which he had since so vigorously continued, had met with the Prince Regent's entire approbation."

After charging Sir George Prevost with negligence, in not preparing to meet the threatened hostilities, the Reviewer proceeds to hazard an opinion, that the occupation and fortifying of Coteau du Lac, and Isle aux Noix, which he terms the keys of Lower Canada, was a measure which Sir George Prevost ought to have adopted, in preference to all others; but which he entirely overlooked and neglected.[23] The fact is, that the occupation of Coteau du Lac, as is well known to every military man acquainted with the Canadas, could only be useful as against the enemy advancing from Lake Ontario, or the shores of the St. Lawrence, above Montreal. No such force could be expected to descend the river from the lake, so long as we had the command of it, as we undoubtedly had, not only at the commencement of the war, but for several months afterwards; and as little was it to be apprehended as collecting on the shores of the river. The information which the Commander of the forces was constantly receiving of the intended movements of the enemy, and of the real and immediate object of their attack, was too correct to leave him in any doubt as to their attempting the Lower Province in that direction, or to induce him to diminish the small means he possessed, for the defence of more important points, by the occupation of posts which at that period could afford him no additional security. Coteau du Lac, was not therefore occupied as a post, either before the war or for several months afterwards, but its real importance was neither overlooked nor disregarded, as the Reviewer has stated. It was examined and reported upon by different officers, sent to inspect the line of frontier extending from Lower Canada to Lake Ontario, immediately after the declaration of war, and particularly by Colonel Lethbridge, who was afterwards in command there. In possession of Kingston, and commanding the waters of the lake, and with the knowledge possessed by Sir George Prevost, of the force and designs of the enemy, no military man in the Canadas, would have thought it necessary, in the then state of affairs, that Coteau du Lac should be occupied. When subsequent events clearly shewed the intentions of the enemy to invade Lower Canada from Lake Ontario, and when the means of Sir George Prevost were better adapted for defending the whole line of that frontier, Coteau du Lac was _occupied and fortified_; and had it not been for the defeat which part of General Dearborn's army met with from Lieutenant-Colonel Morrison's division in descending the St. Lawrence, that post would have presented a formidable obstacle to the advance of the enemy.

The importance of Isle aux Noix, as a post, has been considerably lessened[24] since the defence of the Canadas by the French, in consequence of the facility with which Lower Canada may now be entered by the various routes which the intercourse between that Province and the United States has created. Isle aux Noix had long ceased to be either the only, or principal barrier between the two countries. The occupation of this post was not therefore deemed necessary as a precautionary measure before the war; nor was it until some time afterwards that Sir George Prevost was enabled to put it in a state of defence. As soon, however, as the reinforcements and supplies from England gave him the means of more effectually guarding all the avenues to the Lower Province, Isle aux Noix became the object of his consideration. In consequence of the condition in which it was then placed, and of the force stationed there, two armed schooners of the enemy fell into our possession, and laid the foundation of the marine which was afterwards formed for carrying forward the operations on Lake Champlain. There cannot be a stronger proof of the little importance which the enemy themselves attached to this post in the early part of the contest, than their never making the slightest attempt to obtain possession of it.

Having thus stated what Sir George Prevost did _not_ do, by way of preparation for the defence of the Canadas before the war, the Reviewer proceeds to point out what _was_ done by him after the commencement of hostilities. And here we find the same want of candour which distinguishes the remarks to which we have already adverted.[25]

In order to form a correct opinion of Sir George Prevost's conduct at this period, it will be necessary to advert to the system which he adopted on the commencement of the war, and to the motives which induced him to pursue it.

The declaration of war by the United States of America, it is well known, was finally carried in Congress, after long debate, and a most violent opposition, by a comparatively small majority. The northern and eastern states, whose interests, it was acknowledged, were most affected by the British orders in council, the ostensible and avowed cause of the war, were constantly and strenuously opposed to hostile measures. It was apparent to every person at all conversant with what was passing in the United States at this time, that a contest undertaken in opposition to the sentiments and wishes of so considerable a portion of the Union, and for an object which Great Britain might, without any sacrifice of national honor, so easily concede, as she was, in fact, about to do, at that very period, must necessarily be of short duration. This was the opinion entertained by the most sensible and well informed men in the northern and eastern states, as well as in the Canadas, and in that opinion Sir George Prevost concurred. It will likewise be seen, that the sentiments of His Majesty's Government on this head were in unison with those of the Commander of the forces. Under these circumstances, and with these impressions, it became the obvious policy of Sir George Prevost, upon the breaking out of the war, to avoid whatever might tend to widen the breach between the two countries, and to pursue a line of conduct, which, while it should effectually tend to defeat the object of the American Government in their attack upon the Canadas, should also serve still further to increase the dislike and opposition of the northern and eastern states, to those measures of aggression against the British Provinces, which they had constantly predicted would be attended with discomfiture and disgrace. In his adherence to this defensive system, Sir George Prevost was encouraged and supported, as it will speedily be shewn, not only by the approbation of the British Government, but likewise by the concurrence of those who were best qualified by their knowledge and situation to form a correct judgment on the propriety of the measures which he was pursuing. This policy was also the more necessary, in consequence of the inadequacy of the means possessed by the Commander of the forces to repel the threatened attack of the Americans at the commencement of the contest. The whole of the regular force at that time in the Canadas did not amount to 5,000 men; the law for embodying the militia had only been recently passed; and the population, which had been previously considered as not well affected, had neither been armed nor accustomed to discipline for many years. The military chest was exhausted, and there was little prospect, that for some months at least, considering the exertions which Great Britain was then called upon to make in Europe, any supplies either of men or money could be afforded for the defence of her Dominions in North America. These difficulties neither depressed nor discouraged the ardent and active spirit of Sir George Prevost. Although he fully coincided in opinion with that able and judicious officer Sir James Craig, that in the event of a war with America, Quebec should be the object of primary consideration; yet the defence of the whole line of frontier between the Canadas and the United States, occupied his early and serious consideration. That frontier comprehended a distance of more than 900 miles, every part of which he determined to dispute inch by inch, and to defend by every means in his power.

It was in pursuance of the defensive line of policy which had been so wisely determined upon, as well with reference to his own resources, and the character of the enemy with whom he had to contend, as to the views and instructions of the British Government, that the Commander of the forces immediately after the commencement of the war, gave general instructions to those in command under him, to abstain from any unnecessary and uncalled for act of hostility upon the American territory. Notwithstanding these general instructions, much was of course left to the discretion of those who received them, in availing themselves of any fair opportunity of retaliating upon the enemy the aggressive warfare they might attempt, by attacking, wherever it might be done with any reasonable prospect of success, the contiguous forts and possessions of the Americans.

The private letter of 31st March, 1812, to Major-General Brock, from which an extract has already been made, evidently shews, that Sir George Prevost never meant to restrain the officers in command under him from acting upon the offensive, whenever circumstances were such as would justify their departure from the defensive system. Of these circumstances they were the best judges. That this was the light in which Sir George Prevost's instructions were viewed by Major-General Brock, appears by the following extract from a letter addressed by him to the Commander of the forces, on the 3rd July, 1812, at which time he was fully aware of the defensive line of policy which had been adopted:

"The account received, first through a mercantile channel, and soon after repeated from various quarters, of war having been declared by the United States against Great Britain, would have justified, in my opinion, offensive operations. But the reflexion, that at Detroit and St. Joseph's, the weak state of the garrisons would prevent the Commanders from attempting any essential service connected in any degree with their future security, and that my only means of annoyance on this communication, was limited to the reduction of Fort Niagara, which could be battered at any future period, I relinquished my original intentions, and attended only to defensive measures."

That Captain Roberts, the commanding officer at Fort St. Joseph's, acted from a sense of this discretion thus entrusted to him, there cannot be a doubt, as in his official letter to the Adjutant-General, announcing the capture of Michilimachinac, he does not allude in the slightest degree to his having acted contrary to his orders. The approval of his conduct in general orders is likewise a convincing proof that Sir George Prevost considered that he had acted up to the spirit of his instructions whatever they might have been, and that he had used a sound discretion respecting them.

It however clearly appears by the above letter, that Captain Roberts acted altogether from the orders he received from Major-General Brock, who was fully aware, as it has been already shewn, of the sentiments of Sir George Prevost, and who did not hesitate to give Captain Roberts the discretionary order, which led to the attack and capture of the fort.

It will be seen from the preceding pages, that the approaching hostilities with America had been the subject of frequent communication between Sir George Prevost and Major-General Brock, for several months _prior to the commencement_ of the war; and that, in more than one letter to which reference has been made, the precautions necessary to be taken, and the system and line of defence to be adopted in the event of war, had been clearly and distinctly pointed out. Possessed then, as Sir George Prevost knew General Brock to be, of his sentiments on this subject, and aware that he would receive from the North West company, from whom he had himself derived the information, the earliest intelligence of the actual declaration of war, an immediate further communication of his sentiments was unnecessary. On the day, however, on which the intelligence of that event reached Quebec, the 25th June, 1812, a letter was despatched to Major-General Brock from the Adjutant-General, communicating the information; and as soon as the important arrangements respecting the Lower Province, and particularly those for the defence of Quebec had been completed, Sir George Prevost proceeded to Montreal. Upon his receiving at that place a despatch from Mr. Foster, our late minister at Washington, with an official notification of the war, he immediately afterwards, (on 7th July,) and within a fortnight after the first intelligence of it had reached him at Quebec, sent off his first despatch to Major-General Brock. This was followed by another on the 10th of the same month by Colonel Lethbridge, who was sent to take the command at Kingston; and in both these letters every instruction and information which Sir George Prevost's situation afforded, or enabled him to give, were sent to the Major-General. That these despatches did not reach General Brock until the 29th of the month was owing to circumstances over which Sir George Prevost had no control. It must be observed, however, that General Brock received the despatches several days before he set off to join the army opposed to General Hull, although the Reviewer[26] gives his readers to understand that it did not arrive until after General Hull's capture.

The above statement will afford a full and satisfactory answer to the misrepresentations of the Quarterly Reviewer,[27] and to the unwarrantable insinuation by which they are accompanied, if indeed any answer were wanting to assertions in which the writer has directly contradicted himself. The Reviewer states, "that Sir George Prevost sent no instructions whatever to General Brock for some weeks after he received intimation of the war:"--and further, "that he, General Brock, was only restrained from the measure of attacking Fort Niagara, _by the perplexity of his situation, in being left without orders_." It is singular that the writer should have forgotten, that only five pages before, he had stated[28] that "_on the receipt_ of the intelligence of the American declaration of war, Major-General Brock, who commanded the troops in the Upper Province _immediately_ despatched DISCRETIONARY orders to the British officer in charge of Fort St. Joseph's, to act either _offensively_ or otherwise against the enemy at Michilimachinac, as he should find advisable." If General Brock was justified in giving these discretionary orders to act offensively as circumstances might require, it follows that he must have considered a similar line of conduct open to himself; and yet, in the face of this statement, the Reviewer gravely endeavours to persuade his readers, that General Brock was in perplexity with regard to the measures which he should pursue.

The Reviewer's insinuation, that Sir G. Prevost sent no instructions to General Brock for some weeks after he received intimation of the war, with the intention of leaving that officer to act on his own responsibility, cannot be passed over in silence. It has been already proved, by incontrovertible facts, that the contemptible motives thus attributed to the Commander of the forces, could not possibly have existed in his mind; and the attempt to impute to him a conduct so dishonorable ought therefore to be marked with the severest reprobation. No two persons could more sincerely respect and esteem each other than these gallant and high-minded individuals. Sir George Prevost had early evinced his opinion of General Brock's merits and talents, in a private communication to him of the 22d Jan. 1812, several months before the war; and the reply of General Brock to that communication, was sufficient evidence of the sentiments he entertained towards the Commander, under whom he expressed himself to be so desirous of serving. Indeed, the utmost confidence and cordiality prevailed between these officers, as is amply manifested in the correspondence before referred to; and wherever a difference of opinion did exist, General Brock never hesitated to yield to what he expressed and considered the superior knowledge and experience of the Commander in Chief.

The conduct of Sir George Prevost in his communications with General Brock, after receiving intelligence of the war, was not attended with any of those consequences which the Reviewer has asserted. Upon this head General Brock's correspondence with the Commander of the forces is conclusive.

The first letter from that officer, after the receipt of the intelligence of the war, is dated the 3d July, at Fort George; the extract from which, already given, is a convincing proof, that whatever might have been his intention in moving from York to Fort George, he was not restrained from the measure of attacking Fort Niagara by any deficiency of instructions from the Commander of the Forces.

The next letter from General Brock is from Fort George, dated 12th July, and states that the enemy were constructing batteries at the different points of the frontier; that he was making exertions to counteract their views; and that the arrival, that morning, of the Royal George and the vessels under convoy, bringing various pieces of ordnance, would give him a decided superiority. Not a single word is said in this despatch of any wish or intention on the part of the Major-General to invade the American territory. Major-General Brock's next letter of the 20th July states, that the enemy had evidently diminished his force, and appeared to have no intention of making an immediate attack. This letter also communicated the intelligence of General Hull's invasion of the Province. It likewise contained details of General Brock's means of defensive warfare, and expressed some apprehension for the fate of the troops under his command, should the communication be cut off between Kingston and Montreal; which apprehension was entertained by him on the supposition, as he stated, that "the _slender means possessed by Sir G. Prevost would not admit of diminution, and consequently that he could not look for reinforcements_." The same letter acknowledged the receipt of the Adjutant General's communication from Quebec, of 25th June, of the declaration of war. In the succeeding despatch from General Brock to Sir G. Prevost, dated 26th July, from Fort George, that officer writes as follows: "I have not deemed it of sufficient importance to commence active operations on this line by an attack on Fort Niagara; it can be demolished, when found necessary, in half an hour, and _there my means of annoyance would cease. To enable the militia to acquire some degree of discipline, without interruption, is of far greater consequence than such a conquest_."