Part 12

[8] Vide accounts of the capture of St. Lucie and Tobago, from the Annual Register, Appendix, No. VI.

[9] Vide extracts from letters, Appendix, No. VII.

[10] Vide Appendix, No. VIII.

[11] Vide account of this expedition from the Annual Register, Appendix, No. IX. Also the public despatches and letters, No. X.

[12] Vide letter from H. R. H. the Duke of York to the Earl of Camden, Appendix, No. XI.

[13] Vide Appendix, No. XII.

[14] Vide the resolutions, Appendix, No. XIII.

[15] Vide the resolutions, and the letter of the chairman general Prevost, Appendix, No. XIV.

[16] Vide the resolutions, Appendix, No. XV.

[17] Vide extract from the Dominica Journal, Appendix No. XVI.

[18] Vide the public despatches, and letters from Lord Castlereagh, Appendix, No. XVII.

[19] Vide the addresses and answer, Appendix, No. XVIII.

[20] Vide Appendix, No. XIX.

[21] Vide Appendix, No. XX.

[22] Vide Review, page 413.

[23] Vide Quarterly Review, p. 413.

[24] Review, p. 413.

[25] Review, p. 413.

[26] Review, p. 414.

[27] Ibid. p. 413.

[28] Ibid. p. 409.

[29] Review, p. 410.

[30] Review, p. 411.

[31] Review, p. 411.

[32] Review, p. 414.

[33] Review, p. 411.

[34] Review, p. 414.

[35] Review, p. 415.

[36] Review, p. 413.

[37] Review, p. 418.

[38] Review, p. 414.

[39] Ibid. p. 415.

[40] Review, p. 415.

[41] Review, p. 415.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Review, pp. 415, 416.

[44] Review, p. 412.

[45] Vide the Addresses in the Appendix, No. XXI.

[46] Review, p. 417.

[47] Review, p. 411.

[48] Review, pp. 418, 419, 420.

[49] Vide the Report in the Appendix, No. XXII.

[50] Review, p. 419.

[51] Review, p. 418.

[52] Review, p. 420.

[53] There cannot be a stronger contradiction to the Reviewer's assertion, that the order to retreat was precipitate, than the fact which was known to every officer engaged in the expedition, that after the last assault, and before any order was given for the retreat or re-embarkation of the troops, a flag of truce was sent into the town, with a summons for the surrender of the place, and that some time necessarily elapsed before a refusal was received to that demand. It was not until after the return of the officer with that refusal, and when all hope of the co-operation of the fleet had been relinquished, the artillery still not having been landed, that the order was given for the re-embarkation of the troops.

[54] Review, p. 419.

[55] Vide Appendix, No. XXIII.

[56] Review, p. 425.

[57] Vide Review, p. 426.

[58] Review, p. 427.

[59] Review, p. 425.

[60] Review, p. 427.

[61] Review, p. 427.

[62] Review, p. 427.

[63] "I have had the honor to receive your letters of the 9th and 18th inst. The first I received at York on my way to the centre division, and I cannot refrain from expressing my regret at your having allowed the clamour of the Indian warriors to induce you to commit a part of your force in an unequal and hopeless combat.

"You cannot be ignorant of the limited nature of the force at my disposal for the defence of our extensive frontier, and ought, therefore, not to count too largely upon my disposition to strengthen the right division."

[64] Review, p. 428.

[65] The order here alluded to by Capt. Barclay, is contained in a letter from the Adjutant-General, Col. Baynes, to General Procter, dated the 18th Sept. 1813, nine days after the naval action had taken place, and before the account of it had reached Sir George Prevost. This letter was written in contemplation of the necessity of General Procter retiring from Amherstburgh, in consequence of the difficulties of his situation, in which case it was thought advisable that an action should be risked.

[66] Vide Appendix, No. XXIV.

[67] Vide the Proceedings of the Court-martial, Appendix, No. XXV.

[68] Review, p. 432.

[69] Review, pp. 433, 434.

[70] Ibid, pp. 438, 439.

[71] Vide General Orders, Appendix, No. XXVI.

[72] Review, p. 440.

[73] Vide Extracts in the Appendix, No. XXVII.

[74] Review, p. 441.

[75] Review, pp. 440, 441.

[76] Review, p. 441.

[77] Review, p. 442.

[78] Ibid. p. 443.

[79] Review, p. 443.

[80] Ibid.

[81] As a confirmation of this statement, the reader is referred to an extract from a Letter addressed by Major-General Kempt to Sir George Prevost upon the subject of the intended attack on Sackett's Harbour, of which General Kempt was to have taken the personal command. Appendix, No. XXVIII.

[82] The extract from a letter addressed by Sir James Yeo, to Sir George Prevost, given in the Appendix, No. XXIX. will shew his opinion of the manner in which the Lake Champlain Squadron was manned.

[83] The following is the Reviewer's mode of stating this:--"Had the Commander-in-Chief suffered these works to be assaulted _as was eagerly proposed to him_ on the same evening, there is no question but they must have fallen with scarcely an effort before a single brigade."--p. 445.

[84] Vide the whole of this Correspondence in the Appendix, No. XXX.

[85] This statement and those of the General and other officers, subsequently referred to, all of which are under the hand, and many of them attested by the oaths of the parties, contain the facts relative to the expedition against Plattsburg, to which those officers would have been ready to depose before a Court-Martial.

[86] Review, p. 446.

[87] Review, p. 446.

[88] In the celebrated action between our fleet, commanded by Lord Howe, and that of the French, on the 1st of June, 1794, whilst they were in sight of each other, and preparing for action, the order was given for our men to go to breakfast. See Brenton's Naval History, vol. i. p. 272-307.

[89] Review, p. 448.

[90] Notwithstanding the opinion entertained by Sir George Prevost and the army regarding the probable fall of Plattsburg, it must be recollected that failure was possible, and that nearly at this very period we had been disappointed in our attempts both upon Baltimore and New Orleans. The opinion of the Americans themselves upon this subject, will be found well expressed in an extract from a Burlington paper (State of Vermont) of that period, given in the Appendix, No. XXXI.

[91] Review, p. 447.

[92] Review, p. 448.

[93] Vide Appendix, No. XXXII.

[94] A further confirmation of the favourable sentiments entertained in Canada, on the subject of Sir George Prevost's conduct and services, during the war, will be found in the extracts given in the Appendix, No. XXXIII. from Christie's Memoirs of the Administration of the Government of Lower Canada, and Bouchette's Topographical Account of that Province.

[95] Sir G. Prevost's family, at the time of his decease, consisted of his widow and three children, viz. the present Sir George Prevost and two daughters. He likewise left two brothers, Major-General Wm. Prevost, late Lieutenant-Colonel of the 67th regiment, and James Prevost, Esq. Post-Captain in the Royal Navy. A monument to the memory of her husband was erected by Lady Prevost in Winchester Cathedral, with the inscription which will be found in the Appendix, No. XXXIV.

[96] The motives by which Sir George Prevost was actuated, upon this occasion, are forcibly expressed in his private despatch to Lord Bathurst, given in the Appendix, No. XXXV.

[97] Lady Prevost was the eldest daughter of Major-General Phipps, of the Royal Engineers.

[98] A few copies of the statements above referred to, which first appeared in the Courier of 13th Nov. 1822, were printed and distributed, under the title of "A brief Reply to the Calumnies of the last Quarterly Review, against the military character and reputation of the late Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, Bart."

POSTSCRIPT.

Since the foregoing sheets were sent to press, some observations have appeared in the British Critic, for May, 1823, upon the Civil Administration of Sir George Prevost, in Canada, which may perhaps be thought to require a brief notice. The writer of the remarks in question, after premising that the military conduct of the late Commander of the forces in the Canadas has been _sufficiently exposed_ in another Journal, (the Quarterly Review) proceeds to assert, "that his domestic management of the Colony was no less censurable. That finding that the Canadian party gave him most trouble, his object was to obtain a temporary popularity for his own administration, and a peaceable residence for himself, by every possible species and degree of weak concession, which he dignified with the name of conciliation. That the Catholic Bishop being at the head of the party, was honoured with a seat in the Legislative Council, received a pension of 1,500_l_. per annum, which he still enjoys, and was either overtly or tacitly confirmed in all the usurpations of power and of Government property, (about 40,000_l._ per annum,) upon which he had ventured, whilst discouragement and _insult_ (a term of which the Critic informs his readers he does not repent) were heaped upon the Protestant Bishop and his Clergy, and upon the Loyal Members of both houses, and that the just remonstrances of his Lordship in defence of the rights of his Church, and which it was his first duty to protect, were represented at home as the dictates of party spirit and political feeling."

Although the generality of most of these remarks might seem to preclude the necessity of any reply to them, yet, as the writer, in descending to particular statements, displays a gross want of information, it becomes necessary to expose his misrepresentations, in order that his censures may be rightly appreciated.

The policy of Sir George Prevost towards the Canadians, was, as the foregoing pages will shew, adopted immediately upon his assuming his government, and could not therefore be the consequence of any trouble given him by the Canadian party, from whom, on the contrary, he invariably received the most cordial support. His object in that policy was to strengthen the hands of Government, and to avail himself, as he afterwards did, of the whole resources of the country, in case it should be attacked. But that any concession whatever was made by Sir George Prevost to effect that object is altogether untrue.

The Catholic Bishop, though his character and influence well entitled him to that distinction, was _not_ honoured with a seat in the Legislative Council during the government of Sir George Prevost, nor did he receive during that period a pension of 1,500_l._ per annum. In 1775, the British Government granted to the then Catholic Bishop a pension of 200_l._ per annum. In the year 1778, a further sum of 150_l._ per annum, was given to the same Bishop for the hire of the Episcopal Palace at Quebec, for public offices. These two sums were continued to the subsequent Bishops, and constituted the only income received by them from Government, until the arrival of Sir George Prevost in Canada. During his administration, His Majesty's Government was pleased to _increase_ that salary to the sum of 1,000_l._ per annum, in favour of M. de Plessis, the present Catholic Bishop, "as a testimony," to use the words of Lord Bathurst, in his despatch upon the subject, "of the sense which His Royal Highness the Prince Regent entertained of the loyalty, and good conduct of M. de Plessis, and of the other Catholic clergy of the Province."

The charge that Sir George Prevost either tacitly or overtly confirmed the Catholic bishop in all the usurpations of power and of government property, upon which he had ventured, is so obscurely worded, that it is difficult to give it a distinct answer. The privileges and possessions of the Catholic clergy were assured to them at the period when Canada became a British province, and the present Catholic bishop is not in possession of any property, nor does he exercise any power which his predecessors have not enjoyed since that period with the knowledge and concurrence of all former governors of the Province, and of His Majesty's Government. The "accustomed dues and rights" of the Catholic clergy of Canada, are formally secured to them by the act of 14 Geo. 3. c. 83, §. 5.

To the assertion, positive in proportion to its want of proof, that the Protestant Bishop and his clergy, and the loyal members of both Houses, were treated with insult, it will be merely necessary to answer, that Sir George Prevost was incapable of treating any person, much less those of a sacred character and profession, with indignity or insult--and a confident appeal is made to the Protestant clergy of Canada, and to the loyal members of both Houses, against an insinuation as base as it is groundless.

To the critic's charge of general mismanagement in the affairs of the Colony, a reply, if any were wanting, will, it is trusted, be found, in the foregoing pages; in the approbation of His Majesty's Government of the very policy which this writer so acrimoniously condemns, and in the highly flattering testimonials to the merits of Sir George Prevost's civil administration, which he received not only from the Canadians, but from the most respectable of the English inhabitants.

It is evident that the writer of the article in the British Critic has blindly adopted the prejudices and feelings of the Quarterly Reviewer towards Sir George Prevost, and as he appears to dwell with particular complacency upon the exposure which he imagines to have been made of that officer's military character, he is justly entitled to share in the disgrace which must attend his coadjutor's failure, and in the odium which will always attach to the anonymous traducer of departed merit.

APPENDIX.

No. I.

_Extract from Beatson's Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain, vol._ iv. _p._ 518-529.

Upon the first alarm of the enemy being on the coast, General Prevost exerted himself to the utmost, to increase and strengthen the fortifications of the town of Savannah; and was most ably seconded in his operations, by Captain James Moncrieffe of the engineers, and Captain Henry of the navy. Orders were sent to the Hon. Lieutenant-Colonel Maitland, who was posted with a considerable detachment of troops at Beaufort, and to Captain Christian, of his Majesty's ship Vigilant, to repair as soon as possible to Savannah, with the troops, ships, and galleys, then at Port Royal island. Unfortunately, the express with these orders was intercepted by some of the rebel patrols; and, previous to the arrival of a second messenger, the enemy had time to seize on the principal communications between the two places. This rendered the junction of that detachment with the garrison, upon which alone any hope of defending Savannah could be reasonably founded, a matter extremely precarious, difficult, and dangerous. Happily, however, the abilities of Colonel Maitland, and the zeal of the troops under his command, powerfully aided by the professional skill of Lieutenant Goldesborough, of the navy, who was thoroughly acquainted with the various creeks, inlets, and cuts, with which the interior navigation of this country abounds, overcame every obstacle in their way. The battery at Tybee was destroyed; the leading marks for the bar were cut down; and the little naval force there was held in readiness to run up the river Savannah, as soon as the French fleet were seen making for the mouth of it.

On the 9th, the whole of the French fleet anchored off the bar: and on the 10th, four frigates weighed and came to Tybee anchorage. M. d'Estaing had got from Charlestown, a large supply of small craft, into which he put his troops; and they proceeded into Ossabaw inlet, and made good the debarkation of their forces at Bowley, 13 miles from Savannah, under cover of four galleys. The French frigates prepared, at the same time, to advance up the river.

Captain Henry and the naval department were employed, from the 10th to the 13th, in conveying to Savannah part of the guns and ammunition of the Rose and Fowey, in vessels which General Prevost had sent down for that purpose. On the 13th, both frigates being much lightened, sailed over the Mud-flat to Five Fathom Hole, from which the remainder of their guns and ammunition were conveyed up to the town, which is only three miles distant. The Comet galley, Keppel brig, and some armed vessels, were so placed as to cover the passage of Colonel Maitland, with the forces under his command, from Port Royal, through Wallscut. On the 14th and 15th, the seamen completed the important business of landing the cannon and ammunition from the ships and small vessels: and they were appointed to the different batteries, under the command of Captains Henry, Brown, and Fisher, of the navy. Some masters of transports, and the master of a privateer, with their men,[99] made voluntary offers of their service; as did Mr. Manley; merchant of Jamaica. Their offers were accepted; and they had their posts assigned them. The marines were incorporated with the grenadiers of the 60th regiment.

On the 16th, the Compte d'Estaing sent a haughty letter to General Prevost, summoning him to surrender the place to his Most Christian Majesty: informing him, at the same time, that among the troops which he had the honour to command, was the detachment which had stormed the Hospital Hill at the Grenades. He begged leave to recal this to his memory; and assured him, that he gave him this notice from motives of humanity, in order to spare the shedding of human blood. General Prevost, on receiving this message, called a meeting of the Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, and Field-Officers in the garrison, who authorised him to say, that he declined surrendering on a general summons, without specific terms; but that, if such were proposed as he could with honour accept, he would then give his answer. This drew a reply from M. d'Estaing, in which he affirmed, that it was customary, not for besiegers, but for those who were besieged, to propose terms of capitulation; stated, that he had no objections to allow the General every indulgence consistent with his duty; and informed him that, as it was his intention next day to form a junction with the army of the United States of America, if his answer was not immediately ready, he must in future treat with General Lincoln and him. General Prevost, in return, demanded a cessation of hostilities for 24 hours; as a time absolutely necessary for deliberation, and for the discussion of various interests. Towards the evening of the 16th, the Compte d'Estaing returned an answer, in which he consented to this demand. The two armies joined on the 17th, and formed separate but contiguous encampments.

It was during this parley, that the detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Maitland, consisting of upwards of 1,000 men, arrived from Beaufort. The enemy well knew, how important it would be to their interests to prevent this junction; and for that purpose, had attempted an enterprise, which proved unsuccessful, by their pilots refusing to undertake to place the French frigates in the necessary stations, for enabling them to cut off Colonel Maitland's communication with Savannah. Of this circumstance the Colonel availed himself: and after undergoing immense fatigues, joined General Prevost in the evening of the 16th, with 500 men; and the remainder of his detachment arrived about noon the next day. As he found the enemy in possession of the ship-channel, the Colonel had been obliged to come round Dawfaskie, and land on the marshes; and after dragging his boats (empty) through a cut, got into the Savannah river above the French frigates, and from that came down to the town. A Council of War was held, in which it was determined to defend the place to the last extremity: and notice of this resolution was sent to the besieging Generals. To this M. d'Estaing returned an answer. Hostilities immediately recommenced: and the British tars could not refrain from giving three huzzas from their batteries. Both sides now exerted themselves with the utmost assiduity. When the town was first summoned, there were not above eight or ten guns mounted; but so indefatigable were the exertions of Captain Moncrieffe, the senior engineer in the place, in putting it in a proper state of defence, that, by adding the guns landed from the ships to those which were in store, he had, in the course of a few days, nearly 90 pieces of cannon ready to oppose to the enemy, as soon as their batteries should open. He had likewise erected many redoubts, batteries, and other works, to retard their progress. In all these operations, the soldiers and sailors, with the utmost cheerfulness, worked day and night in the face of hostile troops flushed with conquest: the enemy were greatly astonished at the activity of the garrison.

From the accounts given to M. d'Estaing, of the situation of things at Savannah, he considered his success against it as certain. He had made repeated declarations to the Americans, that, as the season of the year was so far advanced, he could not remain more than ten or fifteen days on shore, lest his fleet should be injured on such a dangerous coast. The reinforcement which the garrison had received, reduced the besiegers to the alternative of either storming or besieging the town of Savannah. The latter plan was adopted, and they took their measures accordingly.

As it was apprehended, that the enemy's ships might come too near the town, and annoy the rear of the British lines, Captain Moncrieffe had some fire-rafts prepared, and in readiness to act against them, if they should make the attempt. It was also judged expedient, in order effectually to prevent it, to sink a number of vessels to stop up the passage. As his Majesty's ship the Rose was in so very bad a condition, that, by the report of shipwrights lately employed to survey her, she could not swim above two months; as her guns, ammunition, and stores, had been landed; and as her weight would keep her across the channel, when lighter vessels might shift, owing to the rapidity of the current, and to the hardness of its sandy bottom, in which they could have little hold, Captain Henry selected her as a vessel proper to be sunk. The Savannah armed ship, and four transports, were also scuttled and sunk, and by these the channel was blocked up. Above the town several smaller vessels were sunk, and a boom was laid across the river, to prevent the enemy from sending down fire-rafts among the shipping, or landing troops in the British rear. Previous to the vessels being sunk, the Fowey, Keppel brig, Comet galley, and Germain provincial armed ship, were got up to the town: and the latter having guns, was placed off Yamairaw, to flank the lines. While the enemy's batteries were getting ready to play against the town, three French frigates advanced up the river to Mud-flat. One of them, having twelve-pounders, and two rebel galleys, carrying each two eighteen-pounders in their prows, anchored in Five Fathom Hole; from which one of the frigates sailed into the back river, with a design to cannonade the rear of the British lines. She fired a great number of shot; which, being at their utmost range, did no execution. The galleys advancing nearer, did some damage to the houses; but a few shot now and then from the river battery, made them keep a respectable distance.

Two sallies, one of them on the 24th; commanded by Major Graham, of the 16th regiment; and another on the 27th, commanded by Major M'Arthur, of the 71st regiment; were admirably well conducted, did the enemy considerable mischief, and killed and wounded a great many of their best troops, while the loss on our side was very inconsiderable; In the first sally, Major Graham artfully drew the enemy into a snare, by which the French and the rebels fired on each other, and had near 50 men killed before the mistake was discovered.