Chapter 45
Siege of Richmond and Petersburg--Capture and Re-capture of Fort Stedman, and Capture of Part of the Enemy's First Line in Front of Petersburg by Keifer's Brigade, March 25, 1865--Battle of Five Forks, April 1st--Assault and Taking of Confederate Works on the Union Left, April 2d--Surrender of Richmond and Petersburg, April 3d--President Lincoln's Visit to Petersburg and Richmond, and His Death
The Sixth Corps, as we have seen, returned from its memorable campaign in Maryland and the Shenandoah Valley to the front of Petersburg about December 5, 1864. It relieved a portion of the Fifth Corps. The right of my brigade rested on the Weldon Railroad, extending to the left to include Forts Wadsworth and Keene. On the night of the 9th, with other troops, the brigade went on an expedition to Hatcher's Run, returning the next day. Again the Sixth Corps constructed winter quarters. The brigade was moved, February 9, 1865, to the extreme left of the army, near the Squirrel Level road, where it took up a position including Forts Welch, Gregg, and Fisher, of which the first two were unfinished and the last named was barely commenced. The brigade completed the construction of these forts. Colonel McClennan, with the 138th Pennsylvania, also occupied Fort Dushane on the rear line.
The brigade, a third time for the winter, constructed quarters.
Discipline in the army continued in all its severity. During my entire service but one instance occurred where I was required to execute a Union soldier of my command. Private James L. Hicks, of the 67th Pennsylvania, a boy nineteen years old, was found guilty of desertion. He had deserted to go to Philadelphia, his home, in company with a soldier of another command, much his senior, who had forged a furlough for himself and Hicks. Both were arrested, returned to the army, and convicted and sentenced to be shot. General Meade ordered me to execute the sentence as to Hicks, February 10, 1865. The man who was largely responsible for Hicks' desertion succeeded, through friends, in inducing President Lincoln to commute his sentence to imprisonment at the Dry Tortugas. I was aware of efforts being made to have Hicks' sentence likewise commuted, and I tried to reach the President with communications asking the same leniency for Hicks. So certain was I that Lincoln had or would reprieve Hicks that I failed to have him shot on the day named. Some officious persons reported my dereliction to Meade, who thereupon (with some censure) ordered me to shoot Hicks on the next day, and to report in person the fact of the shooting. This order I was obliged to obey. The brigade was drawn up on three sides of a square, with ranks opened facing each other, and in the centre of the fourth and open side a grave was dug and a coffin was placed beside it. The condemned soldier was marched between the ranks of the command, preceded by a drum and fife band, playing the "dead-march," and then was taken to the coffin, where he was blindfolded and required to stand in front of six men armed with rifles, five only of which were loaded with ball. At the command "_Fire!_" from a designated officer, the guns were discharged and poor Hicks fell dead. He was placed in the coffin and forthwith buried. On the same day word came that Lincoln had pardoned Hicks.
Wright's corps became the left of the besieging army, and all the troops were constantly on the alert, never less than one tenth of them on guard or in the trenches.
The several corps of the Army of the Potomac were then commanded as follows: Second, by General A. A. Humphreys; Fifth, by General G. K. Warren; Sixth, by General H. G. Wright; the Ninth, by General J. G. Parke. The last named was on the right and in part south of the Appomattox. The Army of the James was north of Richmond and the James, commanded by General B. F. Butler, until relieved, on the request of General Grant, January 8, 1865, when General E. O. C. Ord succeeded him.
The army under Grant had been engaged since June, 1864, besieging Richmond and Petersburg with no signal success. It had, however, held the main army of the Confederacy closely within intrenchments where it could do little harm, and was difficult to provide with supplies. Prior to this siege the Army of the Potomac had met the enemy, save at Gettysburg, on his chosen battle-fields, and in its forward movements had been forced to attack breastworks, assail the enemy in mountain passes or gaps, force the crossings of deep rivers, always guarding long lines of communications over which supplies must be brought, and it was at all times the body-guard of the Capital--Washington.
The Confederate Army under Lee, when the last campaign opened, was strongly fortified from the James River above Richmond, extending around on the north to the James below Richmond; thence to and across the Appomattox; thence south of Petersburg extending in an unbroken line westward to the vicinity of Hatcher's Run, with interior lines of works and forts for use in case the outer line was forced. Longstreet commanded north of the James. Generals R. S. Ewell, R. H. Anderson, A. P. Hill, and John B. Gordon commanded corps of the Army of Northern Virginia south of Petersburg and the James, the whole under Lee. At the last, Ewell commanded in Richmond and its immediate defences. The Confederates had water-batteries and naval forces on the James immediately below Richmond. Their forts and connecting breastworks had been laid out and constructed by skilled engineers, on a gigantic scale, with months, and, in some places, years of labor. On most of the main line there were enclosed field-forts, a distance of a quarter to a half mile apart, connected by strong earthworks and some masonry, the whole having deep ditches in front, the approaches to which were covered by _abattis_ composed of pickets sunk deep in the ground close together, the exposed ends sharpened, and placed at an angle of about forty- five degrees, the points of the pickets about the height of a man's face. There were in place _chevaux-de-frise_ and other obstructions. These fortifications could not be battered down by artillery; they had to be scaled. They contained many guns ranging from 6 to 200- pounders, all well manned. The Union lines conformed, generally, to the Confederate lines and were near to them, but, being the outer, were necessarily the longer. Richmond and Petersburg were twenty miles apart. The Union works were substantially of the same structure and strength as the Confederate.
Forts Welch, Gregg, and Fisher, and connecting works, held by six of my regiments, formed a loop on the extreme left, to prevent a flank attack. These forts were about nine miles from City Point, Grant's headquarters. In the centre of the loop was a high observation tower.( 1) In our front the Confederates had an outer line of works to cover their pickets, and we had a similar one to protect ours. The main lines were, generally, in easy cannon range, in most places within musket range, and the pickets of the two armies were, for the most part, in speaking distance, and the men often indulged in talking, for pastime. Except in rare instances the sentinels did not fire on each other by day, but sometimes at night firing was kept up by the Confederates at intervals to prevent desertion. During the last months of the siege, circulars were issued by Grant offering to pay deserters for arms, accoutrements, and any other military supplies they would bring with them, and to give them safe conduct north. The circulars were gotten into the enemy's lines by various devices, chief among which was, by flying kits at night when the wind blew in the right direction, to the tail of which the circulars were attached. When the kites were over the Confederate lines the strings were cut, thus causing them to fall where the soldiers might find them.( 2) So friendly were the soldiers of the two armies that by common consent the timber between the lines was divided and cut and carried away for fuel. Petersburg was in plain view, to the northeast, from my headquarters. In front of my line an event took place which brought about the speedy overthrow of the Confederacy.
With Sherman moving triumphantly northward through the Carolinas the time was at hand for the final campaign of the Army of the Potomac. President Lincoln and General Grant were each anxious that army should, without the direct aid of the Western army, overcome and destroy the Army of Northern Virginia, which it had fought during so many years with varying success.( 3)
Grant issued orders, March 24, 1865, for a general movement, to commence the 29th; the objective of the movement to be the Confederate Army as soon as it could be forced out of the fortifications.
At the time Grant was writing these orders, Lee was planning an assault to break the Union lines, hoping he might gain some material success and thereby prevent an aggressive campaign against him. General Gordon, accordingly, at early dawn, March 25th, assaulted Fort Stedman, and, by a surprise, captured it and a portion of our line adjacent to it; but Union troops, from the right and left, assailed and recaptured the works and about four thousand of Gordon's command, the Union loss in killed, wounded, and captured being about twenty-five hundred. This daring attack, instead of delaying, precipitated the preparatory work of opening the campaign. About 1 P.M. I received an order to send two regiments to my advanced line with orders to charge and carry the outer line of the enemy. The latter was strongly intrenched and held by a large number of men, besides being close under the guns of the Confederate main works. The 110th and 122d Ohio were moved outside the forts, and Colonel Otho H. Binkley was ordered to take command of both regiments and the picket guard. He charged the enemy, but being unsupported on the flanks and being exposed to a fierce fire from guns in the enemy's main works, was forced to retire after suffering considerable loss. I protested, vehemently, against the renewal of the attack with so small a force. General Wright thereupon ordered me to assemble the number of men necessary to insure success, take charge of them in person, and make the desired capture. I added to the Ohio regiments mentioned the 67th Pennsylvania, portions of the 6th Maryland and 126th Ohio, and a battalion of the 9th New York Heavy Artillery, and under a severe fire, at 3 P.M., without halting or firing, charged over the enemy's first intrenched line, capturing over two hundred prisoners. Notwithstanding a heavy artillery fire concentrated upon us the captured works were held. Our loss was severe and hardly compensated for by the number of the enemy killed and captured. For my part in this affair I was complimented by Meade in general orders.
It turned out that the section of works taken was more important to us than first estimated.
Sheridan, with his cavalry, having recently arrived from the Shenandoah Valley _via_ the White House, moved to the left on the 29th of March in the direction of Dinwiddie Court-House, where he encountered a considerable force. A battle ensued on the 30th and 31st, in which Sheridan with his cavalry, in part dismounted, fought some of the best cavalry and infantry of Lee's army, the former commanded by Fitzhugh Lee and the latter by Pickett of Gettysburg fame. By using temporary barricades, Sheridan, though outnumbered, repulsed the attacks of Fitz Lee and Pickett, and at nightfall of the 31st was in possession of the Court-House.
In consequence of incessant rain for two days Grant, from his headquarters, then on Gravelly Run, issued orders the evening of the 30th to suspend all further movements until the roads should dry up; but he was visited by Sheridan and persuaded to continue the campaign. Sheridan asked that the Sixth Corps should be ordered to follow and support him.( 4) He claimed this corps had served under him in the Valley and its officers were well known to him. His request was not acceded to, as other work was already assigned to Wright. Grant ordered Meade to send the Fifth Corps under General G. K. Warren to reinforce Sheridan. Meade was directed to "_urge Warren not to stop for anything_." Sheridan, April 1st, determined to press the enemy, regardless of bad roads and his isolated position. Pickett and Fitz Lee, heavily reinforced from Lee's main army, concentrated in front of Five Forks, where they intrenched.
Warren was ordered to push rapidly on the left of the enemy. Sheridan promptly opened battle, but he was hard pressed throughout the day. Warren, for some not satisfactorily explained cause, did not arrive on the field and bring his three infantry divisions into action until late in the day, but yet in time to strike the enemy on his left and rear, as had been planned. Just at night a combined assault of all arms completely overthrew Pickett and Fitz Lee, taking six of their guns, thirteen battle-flags, and nearly six thousand prisoners. The Confederates who escaped were cut off from the remainder of Lee's army and thrown back on the upper Appomattox.
Warren, in the full flush of the victory, was, by Sheridan, with Grant's previous authority, relieved on the battle-field from the command of his corps for the alleged dilatory march to the relief of the imperilled cavalry. Warren had long commanded the Fifth Corps, and was beloved by it. But the fates of war were inexorable. The removal of Warren was perhaps unjust, in the light of the previous conduct of the war. He had not been insubordinate. He had imbibed the notion too often theretofore acted on, that in the execution of an important order, even when other movements depended on it, the subordinate officer could properly exercise his own discretion as to the time and manner of its execution. Warren was a skilled engineer officer and held too closely in an emergency to purely scientific principles. He had none of Sheridan's precipitancy, and did not believe in violating, under any circumstances, principles of war taught by the books. Before a subsequent court of inquiry Warren produced what appeared to be overwhelming testimony from experienced and distinguished officers of the army to the effect that he had moved his corps to Five Forks with the energy and celerity usually exhibited by an officer of ordinary skill and ability.
Sheridan was called as a witness before the same court, and when interrogated, corroborated the other officers' testimony, adding, that it was not an officer of _ordinary_ skill and ability that was required to meet an emergency when a battle was on, but one of _extraordinary_ skill and ability; that officers of the former class were plenty, but they were not fit to command an army corps in time of battle. Sheridan wanted an officer like Desaix, who, by putting his ear to the ground, heard the thunder of the guns at Marengo, though far off, and marched to their sound without awaiting orders, and to the relief of Napoleon, arriving in time to turn defeat into victory, though losing his own life. Warren had many friends and sympathizers, but he died many years after the war of a broken heart.
In anticipation of Sheridan's success, orders were issued for the Sixth Corps to assault Lee's main fortifications on Sunday morning, April 2d. The place selected for the assault was in front and a little to the left of Forts Fisher and Welch and directly opposite the intrenched line taken by me on March 25th.( 5) Other corps to the right of the Sixth were ordered to be ready to assault also. It was originally intended the troops should be formed in the quiet of the night, and that the assault should be made, as a surprise, at four o'clock in the morning. Grant, fearing that Lee, in the desperation of defeat at Five Forks, would strip his fortified lines of troops to overwhelm and destroy Sheridan, now fairly on Lee's right flank, at 10 P.M. on the night of the 1st ordered all his guns turned loose from the James to the Union left, to give the appearance of a readiness to do just what had been ordered to be done. This fire brought a return fire all along the lines. The night was dark and dismal, and the scene witnessed amid the deafening roar of cannon was indescribably wild and grand. Duty called some of us between the lines of cross-fire when the screaming shot and bursting shell from perhaps four hundred heavy guns passed over our heads. The world's war-history described no sublimer display. Being near the end of the Rebellion, the Confederacy, and the institution of slavery, it was a fitting closing scene. It was supposed that in consequence of this artillery duel, which lasted about two hours, the assault ordered would be abandoned, as a surprise was not possible. But at 12, midnight, the order came to take position for the attack. The Sixth Corps, in the gloom of the damp, chilly night, silently left its winter quarters and filed out to an allotted position within about two hundred yards of the mouths of the enemy's cannon, there to await the discharge of a gun from Fort Fisher, the signal for storming the works. There were no light hearts in the corps that night, but there were few faint ones. The soldiers of the corps knew the strength and character of the works to be assailed. They had watched their completion; they knew of the existence of the _abattis_ and the deep ditches to be passed, as well as the high ramparts to be scaled. The night added to the solemnity of the preparation for the bloody work.
The Second Division was formed on the right, the Third Division on the left, each in two lines of battle, about two hundred feet apart. The First Division (Wheaton's) was in echelon by brigades, in support on Getty's right.( 6) The corps was formed on ground lower than that on which the enemy's fortifications were constructed. There was an angle in the enemy's line in front of the corps as formed at which there was a large fort. Getty's division was to assault to the right and Seymour's to the left of this fort. My brigade was to assault between it and the fort about a third of a mile to its left. The connecting breastworks were strong, as has been explained, with a deep ditch and formidable _abattis_ in their front, and well manned and supplied with artillery. The enemy was alert and opened fire on us with artillery and musketry before we were completely formed, inflicting some loss. Long before the hour for the signal the corps was ready. Much preparation is necessary for a well delivered assault. Every officer should be personally instructed as to his particular duties, as commands can rarely be given after the troops are in motion. The pioneer corps with axe- men were required to accompany the head of the column, to cut down and remove obstructions and to aid the soldiers in crossing trenches and scaling the works. The _abattis_ was to be cut down or torn up, and, wherever possible, used in the ditches to provide means of crossing them.
A narrow opening, just wide enough for a wagon to pass through, was known to exist in the enemy's line in front of my brigade, though it was skillfully covered by a shoulder around it. The existence of this opening was discovered from the observation tower, and deserters told of it. I determined to take advantage of it, and therefore instructed Colonel Clifton K. Prentiss of the 6th Maryland when the time for the attack came to move his regiment by the flank rapidly through this opening without halting or firing, and when within, open on the Confederates behind the works, taking them in flank, and, if possible, drive them out and thus leave for our other troops little resistance in gaining an entrance over the ramparts.
At 4.40 A.M., while still dark, a gray light in the east being barely discernible, Fort Fisher boomed forth a single shot. All suspense here ended. Simultaneously the command, "_Forward_," was given by all our officers, and the storming column moved promptly; the advance line, with bayonets fixed, guns not loaded, the other line with guns loaded to be ready to fire, if necessary, to protect those in advance while passing the trenches. A few only of the officers were on horseback. The enemy opened with musketry and cannon, but the column went on, sweeping down the _abattis_, making use of it to aid in effecting a passage of the deep ditches and to gain a footing on the berme of the earthworks. Muskets and bayonets were also utilized by thrusting them into the banks of the ditches to enable the soldiers to climb from them. Men made ladders of themselves by standing one upon another, thus enabling their comrades to gain the parapets. The time occupied in the assault was short. Colonel Prentiss with his Marylanders penetrated the fortifications at the opening mentioned. They surprised the enemy by their presence and a flank fire, and, as anticipated, caused him to fall back. The storming bodies swarmed over the works, and the enemy immediately in their front were soon killed, wounded, captured, or dispersed. Ten pieces of artillery, three battle-flags, and General Heth's headquarters flag were trophies of my command. The Third Division gained an entrance first, owing to the shortness of the distance it had to pass over. Getty's division (Second), however, promptly obtained a foothold within the fortifications to the right of the angle, followed on its right closely by Wheaton's division. The fort at the salient angle was quickly evacuated, and the corps charged forward, taking possession of the enemy's camps. Some hand- to-hand fighting occurred on the ramparts of the fortifications and in the camps, in which valuable lives were lost. A Confederate soldier emerged from a tent, shot and killed Captain Henry H. Stevens (110th Ohio), and immediately offered to surrender. One week before a like incident occurred in my presence, where a Confederate officer shot, with a pistol, a Union soldier, then threw down his arms and proposed to surrender. Officers seldom restrained soldiers from avenging, on the spot, such cowardly and unsoldierly acts. Such incidents were, happily, very rare.
Though thus far the assault had been crowned with success, the greatest danger was still before us. Experience had taught that the fate which one week before befell Gordon at Fort Stedman was a common fate of troops who, in a necessarily broken state, gained an entrance inside of an energetic enemy's lines. Our position was not dissimilar to Gordon's after he had taken Fort Stedman. To our left was a strong, closed star-fort, well manned and supplied with cannon. It was impossible at once to restore order. Many of our men passed, without orders, far to the north, some as far as the Southside Railroad leading into Petersburg, which they began to tear up.
One important incident must be mentioned.
Corporal John W. Mouk (138th Pennsylvania), with one comrade, having penetrated in the early morning some distance in advance of our other troops, was met by a Confederate general officer, accompanied by his staff. The general demanded his surrender, whereupon the corporal fired and killed him. He proved to be Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill, then in command of Lee's right wing, and one of the ablest officers the Confederacy produced. The corporal and his comrade escaped, and Hill's staff bore his body away. It has been claimed the corporal deceived Hill by pretending to surrender until the General was in his power, then shot him. I investigated this incident at the time and became convinced the corporal practised no deception, and that his deliberate conduct--natural to him--led Hill and his staff to assume he intended to surrender.
But to return to the captured works. I entered them on horseback, with some of my staff, close after Colonel Prentiss. Up to this time no general orders had been given, save those promulgated prior to the assault. The ranks were much broken, regiments were intermingled, and excitement prevailed. I was charged with the duty of carrying the next fort to our left. The steady fire on us from this fort helped to recall the troops to a sense of danger. Day was just dawning. I ordered Major S. B. Larmoeaux (9th New York Heavy Artillery) to man such of the captured artillery as was available. He soon had four guns firing on the fort, under cover of which I ordered a general rush of the still disordered Union troops on the fort. This charge resulted in its capture with six more guns and a number of prisoners. The real danger was still not passed. It was soon discovered that a Confederate division was advancing on us from a camp to our left. As the men now in the captured fort were in a disorganized state I made, with the aid of other officers, every effort to withdraw the surplus men for the purpose of formation and to relieve it of a too crowded condition for defence. We also tried to man the guns of the fort. Before we were prepared the enemy was upon us in a counter charge, and the fort, with its guns, was lost, and some of our men were taken; the greater number, however, escaped to a position still within the captured lines. In this affair not many were killed or wounded. The final ordeal was now on us. From the fort again came shot, shell, and rifle-balls on our unprotected men. Under cover of the fire of the before-mentioned captured artillery (having, by that time, discovered an ample supply of ammunition) we succeeded in making a somewhat confused formation, and again charged the fort. The resistance was obstinate, but it was now light enough to distinguish friend from foe. Though of short duration, the most determined and bloody fight of the day took part on the ramparts of and in this fort, resulting in our again taking it, and with it its guns and most of the Confederate division. The brave Colonel Prentiss as he led a storming column over the parapet of the fort, was struck by a ball which carried away a part of his breast-bone immediately over his heart, exposing its action to view. He fell within the fort at the same moment the commander of the Confederate battery fell near him with what proved to be a mortal wound. These officers, lying side by side, their blood commingling on the ground, there recognized each other. They were brothers, and had not met for four years. They were cared for in the same hospitals, by the same surgeons and nurses, with the same tenderness, and in part by a Union chaplain, their brother. The Confederate, after suffering the amputation of a leg, died in Washington in June, 1865, and Colonel Prentiss died in Brooklyn, N. Y., the following August.
Our hard fighting and bloody work for the day ended with the struggle just described. We, a little later, with others of the corps, swept to the left to the vicinity of Hatcher's Run, carrying everything before us. We then, with the other divisions of the corps, turned back towards Petersburg, reaching an inner line of works by 10 A.M.
General Parke with the Ninth Corps made a vigorous assault in front of Fort Sedgwick near the Jerusalem plank-road at the same time the Sixth made its assault, and with some success, but failed to gain a permanent footing inside of the enemy's main fortifications. The Sixth Corps alone made a secure lodgment within Lee's lines. It made a rift in the Confederacy.
The army then believed the end of the war was near, but blood enough had not yet been spilled to destroy human slavery.
General Ord, who had been transferred from the front of Richmond, met and drove back some troops on Hatcher's Run, and Sheridan advanced from Five Forks to the Appomattox, thence, uniting with Ord, proceeded down it towards Petersburg. The left of Grant's army was thrown across the Southside Railroad to the Appomattox above Petersburg, and some isolated inner forts were taken, and the enemy was crowded into his last line in the suburbs of Petersburg. Grant ordered a general assault to be made at 6 A.M. of the 3d. Thus far, since the general movement commenced, Lee had lost about 12,000 prisoners and about 50 guns. The killed and wounded were not proportionately great. Lee had been forced to withdraw Longstreet from north of Richmond, leaving his lines there very slimly defended.( 7) General Weitzel had been left with a division north of the James to threaten Richmond. Lee, early on the 2d, realized the critical situation, and at 10.30 of that memorable Sabbath morning wired Mr. Breckinridge, Secretary of War, at Richmond:
"I see no prospect of doing more than holding our position here until night. I am not certain I can do that. If I can I shall withdraw to-night north of the Appomattox, and, if possible, it will be better to withdraw the whole line to-night from James River. I advise that all preparations be made for leaving Richmond to- night. I will advise you later according to circumstances."
This was handed to Mr. Davis while at church. He arose quietly and retired, but the portent of the message was soon known and caused great consternation among the inhabitants of the Confederate Capital. For almost four years Richmond had been the defiant centre of the rebellion. Now it was to be abandoned on less than twelve hours' notice.
Jefferson Davis wired Lee:
"The Secretary of War has shown me your dispatch. To move to-night will cause the loss of many valuables, both for the want of time to pack and of transportation. Arrangements are progressing, and unless you otherwise advise the start will be made."
Lee responded:
"I think it absolutely necessary that we should abandon our position to-night. I have given all the necessary orders on the subject to the troops, and the operation, though difficult, I hope will be performed successfully. I have directed General Stevens to send an officer to your Excellency to explain the routes to you by which the troops will be moved to Amelia Court-House, and furnish you with a guide and any assistance you may require for yourself."( 8)
Richmond and Petersburg were evacuated the night of April 2d. The troops in and around the two cities commenced to retire at 8 P.M., and were directed to concentrate at Amelia Court-House, about sixty miles distant, where Lee had ordered supplies for his army to be collected. Ewell withdrew the troops north of Richmond and the marines from the James. There was insufficient transportation for the archives and other valuables of the several departments of the Confederacy, to say nothing of other public and private property. Army supplies had to be destroyed or abandoned. A panic seized the city, and in burning some public stores it took fire in two places, and but for the arrival, about 8 A.M. of the 3d, of Union troops from Weitzel's command, it would have burned down. Petersburg suffered little in the evacuation. Its mayor and council surrendered it about 4 A.M. of the 3d. The besieging army, so long striving for its possession, was not permitted to enter it.
President Lincoln was at City Point when the movement of Grant's army commenced, and remained until Richmond and Petersburg fell. Grant, on the 2d, in anticipation of further success, suggested that the President visit him at the front next day. Mr. Lincoln accordingly met Grant in Petersburg the morning of its surrender and held an interview with him of an hour and a half. Secretary Stanton, learning that the President contemplated going to the front, wired from Washington on the morning of the 3d, protesting against his exposing "the nation to the consequence of any disaster to himself in the pursuit of a dangerous enemy like the rebel army."
The President answered from City Point at 5 P.M.:
"Yours received. Thanks for your caution, but I have already been to Petersburg. Staid with Grant an hour and a half and returned here. It is certain now that Richmond is in our hands, and I will go there to-morrow. I will take care of myself."( 9)
Mr. Lincoln made his entry into Richmond on the 4th (on foot from a boat), almost without personal protection, and excited the highest interest of the people, especially of the slaves, who looked upon and adored him as their savior. There were no bounds to their rejoicing. He, while there, in consultation with Judge J. A. Campbell and other former Confederate leaders, talked of plans of reconstruction, and went so far as to sanction the calling of the Confederate Legislature of Virginia together with a view to its withdrawing the Virginia troops from the army.(10)
He was in a generous mood, willing to concede much to secure a speedy restoration of the Union.
Mr. Campbell reports the President's position thus:
"His indispensable conditions are the restoration of the authority of the United States and the disbanding of the troops, and no receding on his part from his position on the slavery question as defined in his message in December and other official documents. All other questions to be settled on terms of sincere liberality. He says that to any State that will promptly accept these terms he will relinquish confiscation, except where third persons have acquired adverse interests."(11)
Abraham Lincoln returned from Richmond to Washington filled to overflowing with hope, joy, and thoughts of generous treatment of his rebellious countrymen. He, too, was soon to become a sacrifice in atonement for his nation's sins. He fell, at the apex of human glory, by the hands of a disloyal assassin, April 14, 1865.(12) The great and the humble friends of freedom, not only of his own country but of the world, wept. He had been permitted, however, to look through the opening portals of peace upon a restored Union with universal freedom, under one flag.
( 1) See map, and _Battles and Leaders of the War_, vol. iv., p. 538.
( 2) One enterprising Confederate managed to escape to our lines with a wagon and six mules from a party gathering wood. His outfit was valued at $1200.
( 3) Grant's _Memoirs_, vol. ii., p. 460.
( 4) _Memoirs of Sheridan_, vol. ii., pp. 145-7.
( 5) General Wright, speaking of this position in his report of the storming of the fortifications at Petersburg, says:
"It should here be remarked that, but for the success of the 25th ultimo, in which was carried the intrenched line of the enemy, though at a cost in men which at the time seemed hardly to have warranted the movement, the attack of the 2d inst. on the enemy's main lines could not have been successful. The position thus gained was an indispensable one to the operations on the main lines, by affording a place for the assembling of assaulting columns within striking distance of the enemy's main intrenchments." _War Records_, vol. xlvi., Part I., p. 903.
( 6) _War Records_, vol. xlvi., Part I., p. 954.
( 7) _Manassas to Appomattox_, pp. 603-5.
( 8) _War Records_, vol. xlvi., Part III., p. 1378.
( 9) _War Records_, vol. xlvi., Part III., p. 509.
(10) _Ibid_., pp. 612, 655-7, 724-5.
(11) _War Records_, vol. xlvi., Part III., p. 723.
(12) Abraham Lincoln, on the evening of March 14, 1865, attended Ford's Theatre in Washington in company with Mrs. Lincoln, Miss Harris, and Major Henry R. Rathbone (daughter and stepson of Senator Ira Harris of New York), and while in a private box (at 10 P.M.) was shot by John Wilkes Booth. The bullet entered his head on the left side, passed through the brain, and lodged behind the left eye. He was carried to a house across the street, where he died (never being conscious after the shot) at twenty-two minutes after seven the morning of April 15, 1865. Secretary Stanton, standing by him as his life went out, more than prophetically said: "_Now he belongs to the ages_."
An attempt was made the same night to assassinate Secretary Wm. H. Seward, which came near being successful. He was, also his son Frederick, terribly wounded and beaten.