Part 7

I understand lastly, that seeing each single motion perform’d in that part of the _Brain_, which _immediately affects_ the _mind_, excites therein only one sort of _sense_, nothing could be contrived more conveniently in this case, than that, of all those _Senses_ which it can cause, it should cause that which _cheifly_, and most _frequently_ conduces to the _conservation_ of an _healthful Man_; And experience witnesses, that to this very _end_ all our _senses_ are given us by _Nature_; and therefore nothing can be found therein, which does not abundantly testifie the _Power_ and _Goodness_ of _God_. Thus for Example, when the Nerves of the Feet are violently and more than ordinarily moved, that motion of them being propagated through the _Medulla Spinalis_ of the Back to the inward parts of the Brain, there it signifies to the mind, that something or other is to be felt, and what is this but Pain, as if it were in the Foot, by which the Mind is excited to use its indeavours for removing the Cause, as being hurtful to the Foot. But the _Nature_ of _Man_ might have been so _order’d_ by _God_, that That same motion in the Brain should represent to the mind any other thing, _viz._ either it self as ’tis in the Brain, or it self as it is in the Foot, or in any of the other forementioned intermediate parts, or lastly any other thing whatsoever; but none of these would have so much conduced to the _Conservation_ of the _Body_. In the like manner when we want drink, from thence arises a certain _dryness_ in the _Throat_, which moves the Nerves thereof, and by their means the inward parts of the Brain, and this motion _affects_ the _mind_ with the _sense_ of _thirst_; because that in this case nothing is more requisite for us to know, then that we _want drink_ for the _Preservation_ of our _Health_. So of the Rest.

From all which ’tis manifest, that (notwithstanding the _infinite Goodness_ of God) ’tis impossible but the _Nature_ of _Man_ as he consists of a _mind_ and _body_ should be _deceivable_. For if any cause should excite (not in the Foot but) in the Brain it self, or in any other part through which the Nerves are continued from the Foot to the Brain, that _self same_ motion, which uses to arise from the Foot being troubled, the _Pain_ would be felt _as in the Foot_, and the _sense_ would be _naturally_ deceived; for ’tis consonant to Reason (seeing that That same motion of the Brain alwayes represents to the mind that same sense, and it oftner proceeds from a cause _hurtful_ to the _Foot_, than from any other) I say ’tis reasonable, that it should make known to the _mind_ the Pain of the _Foot_, rather than of any other _part_. And so if a _dryness_ of _Throat_ arises (not as ’tis used from the _necessity_ of _drink_ for the _conservation_ of the _Body_, but) from an _unusual Cause_, as it happens in a _Dropsie_, ’tis far better that it should _then deceive us_; then that it should _alwayes deceive_ us when the _Body_ is in _Health_, and so of the Rest.

And this consideration helps me very much, not only to _understand_ the _Errors_ to which my _Nature_ is subject, but also to _correct_ and _avoid_ them. For seeing I know that all my _Senses_ do oftener inform me _falsly_ than _truely_ in those things which conduce to the _Bodies advantage_; and seeing I can use (almost alwayes) more of them than one to _Examine_ the same thing, as also I can use _memory_, which joyns present and past things together, and my _understanding_ also, which hath already discovered to me all the _causes_ of my _Errors_, I ought no longer to fear, that what my _Senses_ daily represent to me should be false. But especially those _extravagant Doubts_ of my First Meditation are to be turn’d off as ridiculous; and perticularly the _chief_ of them, _viz_. That * of not _distinguishing Sleep_ from _Waking_, for now I plainly discover a great _difference_, between them, for my _Dreams_ are never _conjoyned_ by my _memory_ with the other _actions_ of _my life_, as whatever happens to me _awake_ is; and certainly if (while I were awake) any person should suddenly appear to me, and presently disappear (as in _Dreams_) so that I could not tell _from whence_ he came or _where_ he went, I should rather esteem it a _Spectre_ or _Apparition feign’d_ in my Brain, then a _true Man_; but when such things occur, as I distinctly know from _whence_, _where_, and _when_ they come, and I _conjoyn_ the _perception_ of them by my _memory_ with the other _Accidents_ of my _life_, I am _certain_ they are represented to me _waking_ and not _asleep_, neither ought I in the least to doubt of their _Truth_, if after I have called up all my _senses_, _memory_, and _understanding_ to their _Examination_ I find nothing in any of them, that clashes with other truths; For _God_ not being a _Deceiver_, it follows, that In such things I am not _deceived_. But because the _urgency_ of _Action_ in the common _occurrences_ of _Affairs_ will not alwayes allow time for such an _accurate examination_, I must confess that _Mans life_ is _subject_ to many _Errors_ about _perticulars_, so that the _infirmity_ of our _Nature_ must be _acknowledged_ by Us.

_FINIS._

ADVERTISEMENT CONCERNING THE OBJECTIONS.

Among seven Parcels of Objections made by Divers Learned Persons against these Meditations, I have made choise of the Third in the Latine Copy, as being Penn’d by _Thomas Hobbs_ of _Malmesbury_, a Man famously known to the World abroad, but especially to his own the English Nation; and therefore ’tis likely that what comes from Him may be more acceptable to his Countrymen, then what proceeds from a Stranger; and as the strength of a Fortification is never better known then by a Forcible Resistance, so fares it with these _Meditations_ which stand unshaken by the Violent Opposition of so Potent an Enemy. And yet it must be Confess’d that the Force of these Objections and Cogency of the Arguments cannot be well apprehended by those who are not versed in other Pieces of Mr. _Hobbs_’s Philosophy, especially His Book _De Corpore_ and _De Homine_, The former whereof I am sure is Translated into English, and therefore not Impertinently refer’d to Here in a Discourse to English Readers. And this is the Reason that makes the Great _Des-Cartes_ pass over many of these Objections so slightly, Who certainly would have Undermined the whole Fabrick of the _Hobbian Philosophy_ had he but known upon What Foundations it was Built.

OBJECTIONS

Made against the Foregoing

MEDITATIONS,

BY THE FAMOUS

_THOMAS HOBBS_

Of MALMESBURY,

WITH

_DES-CARTES’S_

ANSWERS.

OBJECT. I.

_Against the First Meditation: Of things Doubtful._

’Tis evident enough from What has been said in this Meditation, that there is no _sign_ by Which we may Distinguish our _Dreams_ from _True Sense_ and _Waking_, and therefore that those _Phantasmes_ which we have waking and from our Senses are not accidents inhering in Outward Objects, neither do they Prove that such outward Objects do Exist; and therefore if we trust our Senses without any other Ground, we may well doubt whether any Thing _Be_ or _Not_. We therefore acknowledge the Truth of this Meditation. But Because _Plato_ and other Antient Philosophers argued for the same _incertainty_ in sensible Things, and because ’tis commonly Observed by the Vulgar that ’tis hard to Distinguish Sleep from Waking, I would not have the most excellent Author of such new Thoughts put forth so antique Notions.

ANSWER.

Those Reasons of Doubt which by this Philosopher are admitted as _true_, were proposed by Me only as _Probable_, and I made use of them not that I may vend them as _new_, but partly that I may prepare the Minds of my Readers for the Consideration of Intellectual Things, wherein they seem’d to me very necessary; And partly that thereby I may shew how firm those Truths are, which hereafter I lay down, seeing they cannot be Weaken’d by these Metaphysical Doubts: So, that I never designed to gain any Honor by repeating them, but I think I could no more omit them, then a Writer in Physick can pass over the Description of a Disease, Whose Cure he intends to Teach.

OBJECT. II.

_Against the Second Meditation: Of the Nature of Mans Mind._

I _am a Thinking Thing_. ’Tis True; for because I _think_ or have a _Phantasme_ (whether I am _awake_ or _asleep_) it follows that _I am Thinking_, for _I Think_ and _I am Thinking_ signifie the same Thing. Because _I Think_, it follows That _I am_, for whatever _Thinks_ cannot be _Nothing_. But when he Adds, _That is_, _a Mind_, _a Soul_, _an Understanding_, _Reason_, I question his Argumentation; for it does not seem a Right Consequence to say, _I am a Thinking Thing_, therefore _I am a Thought_, neither, _I am an Understanding Thing_, therefore _I am the Understanding_. For in the same manner I may Conclude, _I am a Walking Thing_, therefore _I am the Walking it self_.

Wherefore _D.Cartes_ Concludes that an _Understanding Thing_ and _Intellection_ (which is the _Act_ of an Understanding Thing) are the same; or at least that an _Understanding Thing_ and the _Intellect_ (which is the _Power_ of an Understanding Thing) are the same; And yet all Philosophers distinguish the _subject_ from its _Faculties_ and _Acts_, that is, from its _Properties_ and _Essence_, for the _Thing it self_ is one thing, and its _Essence_ is an other. It may be therefore that a _Thinking Thing_ is the _Subject_ of a _Mind_, _Reason_, or _Understanding_, and therefor it may be a _Corporeal Thing_, the Contrary Whereof is here _Assumed_ and not _Proved_; and yet this _Inference_ is the _Foundation_ of that Conclusion which _D.Cartes_ would Establish.

[Sidenote: * _Places noted with this Asterick are the Passages of the foregoing Meditations here Objected against._]

In the same Meditation, on, * _I know that I am, I ask, What I am Whom I Thus Know, Certainly the Knowledge of Me precisely so taken depends not on those Things of whose Existence I am yet Ignorant_.

’Tis Certain the Knowledge of this Proposition _I am_, depends on this, _I think_ as he hath rightly inform’d us; but from whence have we the knowledge of this Proposition, _I think_? certainly from hence only, that we cannot conceive any _Act_ without its _subject_, as _dancing_ without a _Dancer_, _knowledge_, without a _Knower_, _thought_ without a _thinker_.

And from hence it seems to follow, that a _thinking Thing_ is a _Corporeal Thing_; for the _Subjects_ of all _Acts_ are understood only in a _Corporeal way_, or after the manner of _matter_, as he himself shews hereafter by the example of a piece of Wax, which changing its _colour_, _consistence_, _shape_, and other _Acts_ is yet known to continue the _same thing_, that is, the _same matter subject_ to so many _changes_. But I cannot conclude from another _thought_ that _I now think_; for tho a Man may _think_ that he _hath thought_ (which consists only in _memory_) yet ’tis altogether impossible for him to _think_ that he _now thinks_, or to _know_, that _he knows_, for the question may be put _infinitely_, how do you _know_ that you _know_, that you _know_, that you _know_? &c.

Wherefore seeing the Knowledge of this Proposition _I am_, depends on the knowledge of this _I think_, and the knowledge of this is from hence only, that we cannot separate _thought_ from _thinking matter_, it seems rather to follow, that a _thinking thing_ is _material_, than that ’tis _immaterial_.

ANSWER.

When I said, _That is a Mind_, _a Soul_, _an Understanding_, _Reason_, &c. I did not mean by these _names_ the _Faculties_ only, but the _things_ indow’d with those _Faculties_; and so ’tis alwayes understood by the two first names (_mind_ and _soul_) and very often so understood by the two last Names (_understanding_ and _Reason_) and this I have explain’d so often, and in so many places of these Meditations, that there is not the least occasion of questioning my meaning.

Neither is there any parity between _Walking_ and _Thought_, for _walking_ is used only for the _Act_ it self, but _thought_ is sometimes used for the _Act_, sometimes for the _Faculty_, and sometimes for the _thing_ it self, wherein the _Faculty_ resides.

Neither do I say, that the _understanding thing_ and _intellection_ are the same, or that the _understanding thing_ and the _intellect_ are the same, if the _intellect_ be taken for the _Faculty_, but only when ’tis taken for the _thing it self that understands_. Yet I willingly confess, that I have (as much as in me lay) made use of _abstracted words_ to signifie that _thing_ or _substance_, which I would have devested of all those things that belong not to it. Whereas contrarily this Philosopher uses the most _concrete Words_ to signifie this _thinking thing_, such as _subject_, _matter_, _Body_, &c. that he may not suffer it to be separated from _Body_.

Neither am I concern’d that His manner of joyning many things together may seem to some fitter for the discovery of Truth, than mine, wherein I separate as much as possibly each particular. But let us omit words and speak of things.

_It may be_ (sayes he) _that a Thinking thing is a corporeal thing, the contrary whereof is here assumed and not proved._ But herein he is mistaken, for I never _assumed_ the _contrary_, neither have I used it as a _Foundation_, for the rest of _my Superstructure_, but left it wholly _undetermin’d_ till the _sixth Meditation_, and in that ’tis proved.

Then he tells us rightly, _that we cannot conceive any Act without its subject_, as _thought_ without a _thinking thing_, for what _thinks_ cannot be _nothing_; but then he subjoyns without any Reason, and against the usual manner of speaking, and contrary to all Logick, _that hence it seem to follow, that a thinking thing is a corporeal Being_. Truly the _subjects_ of all _Acts_ are understood under the notion of _substance_, or if you please under the notion of _matter_ (that is to say of _metaphysical matter_) but not therefore under the notion of _Bodies_.

But Logicians and Commonly all Men are used to say, that there are some _Spiritual_, some _Corporeal_ substances. And by the Instance of Wax I only proved that _Colour_, _Consistence_, _Shape_, &c. appertain not to the _Ratio Formalis_ of the Wax; For in that Place I treated neither of the _Ratio Formalis_ of the _Mind_, neither of _Body_.

Neither is it pertinent to the business, that the Philosopher asserts, _That one Thought cannot be the subject of an other thought_, for Who besides Himself ever Imagin’d This? But that I may explain the matter in a few words, ’Tis certain that _Thought_ cannot be without a _Thinking Thing_, neither any _Act_ or any _Accident_ without a _substance_ wherein it resides. But seeing that we know not a _substance immediately by it self_, but by this alone, that ’tis the _subject_ of several _Acts_, it is very consonant to the commands of Reason and Custome, that we should call by _different names_ those _substances_, which we perceive are the _subjects_ of very _different Acts_ or _Accidents_, and that afterwards we should examine, whether those _different names_ signifie _different_ or _one_ and the _same_ thing. Now there are some _Acts_ which we call _corporeal_, as _magnitude_, _figure_, _motion_, and what ever else cannot be thought on without _local extension_, and the _substance_ wherein these reside we call _Body_; neither can it be imagin’d that ’tis one _substance_ which is the _subject_ of _Figure_, and another _substance_ which is the _subject_ of _local motion_, &c. Because all these _Acts_ agree under one common notion of _Extension_. Besides there are other _Acts_, which we call _cogitative_ or _thinking_, as _understanding_, _will_, _imagination_, _sense_, &c. All which agree under the common notion of _thought_, _perception_, or _Conscience_; And the _substance_ wherein they are, we say, is a _thinking thing_, or _mind_, or call it by whatever other name we please, so we do not confound it with _corporeal substance_, because _cogitative Acts_ have no affinity with _corporeal Acts_, and _thought_, which is the common _Ratio_ of _those_ is wholly different from _Extension_, which is the common _Ratio_ of _These_. But after we have formed two _distinct conceptions_ of these two _substances_, from what is said in the sixth Meditation, ’tis easie to know, whether they be _one_ and the _same_ or _different_.

OBJECT. III.

* _Which of them is it, that is distinct from my thought? which of them is it that can be separated from me?_

Some perhaps will answer this Question thus, I my self, who _think_ am distinct from my _thought_, and my _thought_ is _different_ from me (tho’ not _seperated_) as _dancing_ is _distinguished_ from the _Dancer_ (as before is noted.) But if _Des-Cartes_ will prove, that _he_ who _understands_ is the same with his _understanding_, we shall fall into the Scholastick expressions, the _understanding understands_, the _sight sees_, the _Will wills_, and then by an exact analogy, the Walking (or at least the _Faculty_ of walking) shall walk. All which are obscure, improper, and unworthy that perspicuity which is usual with the noble _Des-Cartes_.

ANSWER.

I do not deny, that _I_ who _think_ am _distinct_ from my _thought_, as a _thing_ is _distinguish’d_ from its _modus_ or _manner_; But when I ask, _which of them is it that is distinct from my thought_? this I understand of those various _modes_ of _thought_ there mention’d, and not of _substance_; and when I subjoyn, _which of them is it that can be separated from me_? I only signifie that all those _modes_ or _manners_ of _thinking_ reside in me, neither do I herein perceive what occasion of _doubt_ or _obscurity_ can be imagined.

OBJECT. IV.

* _It remains therefore for me to Confess that I cannot Imagine what this Wax is, but that I conceive in my mind What it is._

There is a great Difference between _Imagination_ (that is) having an _Idea_ of a Thing, and the _Conception of the Mind_ (that is) a _Concluding_ from _Reasoning_ that a thing _Is_ or _Exists_. But _Des-Cartes_ has not Declared to us in what they Differ. Besides, the Ancient Aristotelians have clearly deliver’d as a Doctrine, that _substance_ is not _perceived_ by _sense_ but is _Collected_ by _Ratiocination_.

But what shall we now say, if perhaps _Ratiocination_ be nothing Else but a _Copulation_ or _Concatenation_ of _Names_ or _Appellations_ by this Word _Is_? From whence ’twill follow that we _Collect_ by _Reasoning_ nothing _of_ or _concerning_ the _Nature_ of _Things_, but of the _names_ of _Things_, that is to say, we only discover whether or no we _joyn_ the _Names_ of _Things_ according to the _Agreements_ which at Pleasure we have made concerning their _significations_; if it be so (as so it may be) _Ratiocination_ will depend on _Words_, _Words_ on _Imagination_, and perhaps _Imagination_ as _also Sense_ on the _Motion_ of _Corporeal Parts_; and so the _Mind_ shall be nothing but _Motions_ in some Parts of an _Organical Body_.

ANSWER.

I have here Explain’d the Difference between _Imagination_, and the Meer _Conception_ of the _Mind_, by reckoning up in my Example of the Wax, what it is therein which we _Imagine_, and what it is that we _conceive_ in our _Mind_ only: but besides this, I have explained in an other Place How we _understand_ one way, and _Imagine_ an other way One and the same Thing, suppose a Pentagone or Five sided Figure.

There is in _Ratiocination_ a _Conjunction_ not of _Words_, but of _Things signified_ by _Words_; And I much admire that the _Contrary_ could Possibly enter any Mans Thoughts; For Who ever doubted but that a _Frenchman_ and a _German_ may argue about the _same Things_, tho they use very _Differing Words_? and does not the Philosopher Disprove himself when he speaks of the _Agreements which at pleasure we have made about the significations of Words_? for if he grants that _something_ is _Signified_ by _Words_, Why will he not admit that our Ratiocinations are rather about this _something_, then about _Words_ only? and by the same Right that he concludes the _Mind_ to be a _Motion_, he may Conclude Also that the Earth is Heaven, or What else he Pleases.

OBJECT. V.

_Against the Third Meditation of God._

* _Some of These (viz. ~Humane Thoughts~) are as it were the Images of Things, and to these alone belongs properly the Name of an Idea, as when I Think on a Man, a Chimera, Heaven, an Angel, or God._

When I Think on a _Man_ I perceive an _Idea_ made up of _Figure_ and _Colour_, whereof I may _doubt_ whether it be the _Likeness_ of a _Man_ or not; and so when I think on _Heaven_. But when I think on a Chimera, I perceive an _Image_ or _Idea_, of which I may _doubt_ whether it be the _Likeness_ of any _Animal_ not only at present Existing, but possible to Exist, or that ever will Exist hereafter or not.

But thinking on an _Angel_, there is offer’d to my Mind sometimes the _Image_ of a _Flame_, sometimes the _Image_ of a _Pretty Little Boy_ with _Wings_, which I am certain has no _Likeness_ to an _Angel_, and therefore that it is not the _Idea_ of an _Angel_; But beleiving that there are some Creatures, Who do (as it were) wait upon God, and are Invisible, and Immaterial, upon the _Thing Believed_ or _supposed_ we Impose the _Name_ of _Angel_; Whereas the _Idea_, under which I Imagine an Angel, is compounded of the Ideas of sensible Things.

In the like manner at the Venerable Name of _God_, we have _no Image_ or _Idea_ of God, and therefore we are forbidden to _Worship God_ under any _Image_, least we should seem to _Conceive_ Him that is inconceivable.

Whereby it appears that we have no _Idea_ of _God_; but like one _born blind_, who being brought to the _Fire_, and perceiving himself to be _Warmed_, knows there is _something_ by which he is _warmed_ and Hearing it called _Fire_, he Concludes that _Fire Exists_, but yet knows not of what _shape_ or _Colour_ the Fire is, neither has he any _Image_ or _Idea_ thereof in his _Mind_.

So Man knowing that there must be some _Cause_ of his _Imaginations_ or _Ideas_, as also an other _cause before That_, and so _onwards_, he is brought at last to an _End_, or to a _supposal_ of some _Eternal Cause_, Which because it never _began_ to _Be_ cannot have any other _Cause before it_, and thence he Concludes that ’tis _necessary_ that some _Eternal Thing Exist_: and yet he has no _Idea_ which He can call the _Idea_ of this _Eternal Thing_, but he names this _Thing_, which he believes and acknowledges by the Name _God_.

But now _Des-Cartes_ proceeds from this Position, _That we have an Idea of God in our Mind_, to prove this Theoreme, _That God (that if an Almighty, Wise, Creatour of the World) Exists_, whereas he ought to have explain’d this _Idea_ of _God_ better, and he should have thence deduced not only his _Existence_, but also the _Creation_ of the World.

ANSWER.

Here the Philosopher will have the Word _Idea_ be only Understood for the _Images_ of _Material_ Things represented in a _Corporeal_ Phantasie, by which Position he may Easily Prove, that there can be no Proper _Idea_ of an _Angel_ or _God_. Whereas as I declare every Where, but especially in this Place, that I take the Name _Idea_ for whatever is immediately _perceived_ by the _Mind_, so that when I _Will_, or _Fear_, because at the same time I _perceive_ that I _Will_ or _Fear_, this very _Will_ or _Fear_ are reckon’d by me among the number of _Ideas_; And I have purposely made use of that Word, because It was usual with the Antient Philosophers to signifie the Manner of _Perceptions_ in the _Divine Mind_, altho neither we nor they acknowledge a Phantasie in _God_: and besides I had no fitter Word to express it by.

And I think I have sufficiently explain’d the _Idea_ of _God_ for those that will attend my meaning, but I can never do it fully enough for those that will Understand my Words otherwise then I intend them.