Part 5
Nor have I Reason to Complain that he has given me a _Will_ larger then my _Understanding_: for seeing the _Will_ Consists in _one_ thing only, and as it were in an _Indivisible_ (viz. to _Will_, or _not to Will_) it seems contrary to its nature that it should be _less_ then ’tis; and certainly by how much the _Greater_ it is, so much the more _Thankful_ I ought to be to _him_; that Gave it me.
Neither can I Complain that God _concurrs_ with me in the Production of those _Voluntary Actions_ or _Judgements_ in which I am _deceived_: for those _Acts_ as they _depend_ on _God_ are altogether _True_ and _Good_; and I am in some measure _more perfect_ in that I can _so Act_, then if I could _not_: for that _Privation_, in which the _Ratio Formalis_ of _Falshood_ and _Sin_ consists, wants not the _Concourse_ of _God_; For it is _not A Thing_, and having respect to him as its _Cause_, ought not to be called _Privation_, but _Negation_; for certainly ’tis no _Imperfection_ in _God_, that he has given me a _freedome_ of _Assenting_ or _not Assenting_ to some things, the _clear_ and _distinct_ Knowledge whereof he has not _Imparted_ to my _Understanding_; but certainly ’tis an _Imperfection_ in me, that I _abuse_ this _liberty_, and _pass_ my _Judgement_ on those things which I do _not Rightly_ Understand.
Yet I see that ’tis Possible with _God_ to effect that (tho I should remain _Free_, and of a _Finite Knowledge_) I should _never Err_, that is, if he had endowed my _Understanding_ with a _clear_ and _distinct_ Knowledge of all things whereof I should ever have an _Occasion_ of _deliberating_; or if he had only so firmly fix’d in my Mind, that I should never forget, this, _That I must never Judge of a thing which I do not clearly and distinctly Understand_; Either of which things had _God_ done, I easily perceive that _I_ (as consider’d in my self) should be _more perfect_ then now I am, yet nevertheless I cannot deny but that there _may be a greater perfection_ in the _whole Universe_ of Things, for that some of its parts are Obnoxious to _Errors_, and some not, then if they were all _alike_. And I have no Reason to Complain, that it has pleased God, that I should _Act_ on the _Stage_ of this _World_ a _Part_ not the _chief_ and _most perfect_ of all; Or that I should not be able to abstain from _Error_ in the _first way_ above specifi’d, which depends upon the _Evident Knowledge_ of those things whereof _I deliberate_; Yet that I may abstain from _Error_ by the _other means_ abovemention’d, which depends only on this, _That I Judge not of any Thing, the truth whereof is not Evident._ For tho I have experienced in my self this _Infirmity_, that I cannot _always_ be intent upon _one_ and the _same_ Knowledge, yet _I_ may by a _continued_ and _often repeated_ Meditation bring this to pass, that as often as _I_ have use of this Rule _I_ may Remember it, by which means I may Get (as it were) an _habit_ of _not erring_.
In which thing seeing, the _greatest_ and _chief perfection_ of _Man_ consists, _I_ repute my self to have gain’d much by this days _Meditation_, for that therein _I_ have discover’d the _Cause_ of _Error_, _and Falshood_; which certainly can be no other then what _I_ have now Declared; for whenever in Passing my Judgement, _I_ bridle my _Will_ so that it extend it self _only_ to those things which I _clearly_ and _distinctly_ perceive, it is impossible that I can _Err_. For doubtless All _clear_ and _distinct_ Perception is _something_, and therefore cannot _proceed_ from _Nothing_, but must necessarily have _God_ for its _Author_ (_God_, I say, Who is _infinitely Perfect_, and who _cannot Deceive_) and therefore it Must be _True_.
Nor have I this Day learnt only what I must _beware off_ that I be not _deceived_, but also what I must _Do_ to Discover _Truth_, for _That_ I shall certainly find, if I fully Apply my self to those things _only_, which I _perfectly_ understand; and if I distinguish between those and what I apprehend but _confusedly_ and _obscurely_; Both which hereafter I shall endeavour.
MEDITAT. V.
_~Of the Essence~ of Things ~Material~. And herein Again of ~God~. And that he does ~Exist~._
There are yet remaining many Things concerning _Gods Attributes_, and many things concerning the _nature_ of _my self_ or of my _Mind_, which ought to be searched into: but these perhaps I shall set upon at some other Opportunity. And at Present nothing seems to me more requisite (feeling I have discover’d what I must _avoid_, and what I must _Do_ for the _Attaining_ of _Truth_) then that I imploy my Endeavours to free my self from those doubts into which I have lately fallen, and that I try whether I can have any certainty of Material Things.
But before I enquire whether there be any such things _Really Existent without_ Me, I ought to consider the _Ideas_ of those things, as they are in my Thoughts and try which of them are _Distinct_, which _confused_.
In which search I find that I _distinctly imagine Quantity_, that which Philosophers commonly call _continued_, that is to say, the _Extension_ of that _Quantity_ or thing _continued_ into _Length_, _Breadth_, and _Thickness_, I can _count_ in it divers Parts, to which parts I can assign _Bigness_, _Figure_, _Position_, and _Local Motion_, to which _Local Motion_ I can assign _Duration_. Neither are only these _Generals_ plainly discover’d and known by Me, but also by attentive Consideration, I perceive Innumerable _particulars_ concerning the _Shapes_, _Number_, and _Motion_ of These Bodies; The _Truth_ whereof is so _evident_, and _agreeable_ to my _Nature_, that when I first discover’d them, I seemed not so much to have _Learnt_ any thing that is _new_, as to have only _remembred_ what I have known _before_, or only to have thought on those things which were in me _before_, tho this be the first time that I have examin’d them so _diligently_.
One thing there is worthy my Consideration, which is, that I find in my self innumerable _Ideas_ of certain things, which tho perhaps they _exist no where without_ Me, yet they cannot Be said to be _Nothing_; and tho they are _Thought_ upon by me at my _will_ and _pleasure_, yet they are not _made_ by _Me_, but have their own _True_ and _Immutable Natures_. As when, for example, * I _Imagine_ a _Triangle_, tho perhaps such a _Figure Exists no where_ out of my _Thoughts_, nor ever _will Exist_, yet the _Nature_ thereof is _determinate_, and its _Essence_ or Form is _Immutable_ and _Eternal_, which is neither _made_ by me, nor _depends_ on my mind, as appears for that many _properties_ may be _demonstrated_ of this Triangle, _viz._ That its three Angles are equal to two right ones, that to its Greatest Angle the Greatest side is subtended, and such like, which I now _clearly_ know whether _I will or not_, tho before _I_ never thought on them, when I _imagine_ a Triangle, and consequently they could not be invented by Me. And ’tis nothing to the purpose for me to say, that perhaps this _Idea_ of a Triangle came to me by the Organs of _sense_, because I have sometimes seen bodies of a _Triangular Shape_; for I can think of Innumerable other _Figures_, which I cannot suspect to have come in through my _senses_, and yet I can _Demonstrate_ various _properties_ of them, as well as of a _Triangle_, which certainly are all _true_, seeing I know them _clearly_, and therefore they are _something_, and not a meer _Nothing_, for ’tis Evident that _what is true is something_.
And now I have sufficiently Demonstrated, that _what I clearly perceive, is True_; And tho I had _not demonstrated_ it, yet such is the _Nature_ of my _Mind_, that I could not but give my _Assent_ to what I _so_ perceive, at least, as long as I _so_ perceive it; and I remember (heretofore when I most of all relied on _sensible Objects_) that I held those _Truths_ for the most _certain_ which I _evidently_ perceived, such as are concerning _Figures_, _Numbers_, with other parts of _Arithmetick_, and _Geometry_, as also whatever relates to _pure_ and _abstracted Mathematicks_.
Now therefore, if from this alone, _That I can frame the Idea of a Thing in my Mind_, it follows, _That whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive belonging to a thing_, does _Really belong to it_; Cannot I from hence draw an Argument to Prove the _Existence_ of a _God_? Certainly I find the _Idea_ of a _God_, or _infinitely perfect Being_, as _naturally_ in me, as the _Idea_ of any _Figure_, or _Number_; and I as _clearly_ and _distinctly_ understand that it appertains to his _Nature Always to Be_, as I know that what I can _demonstrate_ of a _Mathematical Figure_ or _Number_ belongs to the _Nature_ of that _Figure_ or _Number_: so that, tho all things which I have _Meditated_ upon these three or four days were not _true_, yet I may well be as _certain_ of the _Existence_ of a _God_, as I have hitherto been of _Mathematical Truths_.
_Doubt._ Yet this Argument at first sight appears not so _evident_, but looks rather like a _sophism_; for seeing I am used in all other things to _Distinguish Existence_ from _Essence_, I can easily perswade my self that the _Existence_ of _God_ may be _distinguish’d_ from his _Essence_, so that I may _Imagine God_ not to _Exist_.
_Solution._ But considering it more strictly, ’tis manifest, that the _Existence_ of _God_ can no more be _seperated_ from his _Essence_, then the _Equality_ of the _Three Angles_ to _two right ones_ can be _seperated_ from the _Essence_ of a _Triangle_, or then the _Idea_ of a _Mountain_ can be _without_ the _Idea_ of a _valley_; so that ’tis no less a _Repugnancy_ to think of a _God_ (that is, _A Being infinitely perfect_) who wants _Existence_ (that is, who wants a _Perfection_) then to think of a _Mountain_, to which there is _no Valley adjoyning_.
_Doubt._ But what if I cannot imagine _God_ but as _Existing_, or a _Mountain without a Vally_? yet supposing me to think of a _Mountain with a Vally_, it does not from thence follow, that there _Is a Mountain_ in the World; so supposing me to think of a _God_ as _Existing_, yet does it not follow that _God Really Exists_. For my _Thought imposes_ no _necessity_ on Things, and as I may imagine a _Winged Horse_, tho no _Horse_ has _Wings_, so I may imagine an _existing God_, tho no _God exist_.
_Solution._ ’Tis true the _Sophism_ seems to lie in this, yet tho I cannot conceive a _Mountain_ but with a _Vally_, it does not from hence follow, that a _Mountain_ or _Vally_ do _Exist_, but this will follow, that whether a _Mountain_ or a _Vally do_ or _do not Exist_, yet they cannot be _seperated_: so from hence that I cannot think of _God_ but as _Existing_, it follows that _Existence_ is _Inseperable_ from _God_, and therefore that he _Really Exists_; Not because my _Thought_ does all this, or _Imposes_ any _necessity_ on any Thing, but contrarily, because the _necessity_ of the thing it self (_viz._ of _Gods Existence_) _Determines_ me to _think_ thus; for ’tis not in my Power to think a _God_ without _Existence_ (that is, _A Being absolutely perfect_ without the _Cheif Perfection_) as it is in my Power to imagine a Horse either _with_ or _without Wings_.
_Doubt._ And here it cannot be said, that I am forced to suppose _God Existing_, after I have supposed him _endowed_ with all _Perfections_, seeing _Existence_ is one of them; but that my _First Position_ (_viz._ His _Absolute Perfection_) is not _necessary_. Thus, for example, ’tis not _necessary_ for me to think all _Quadrilateral Figures_ inscribed in a _Circle_; But supposing that I think _so_, I am then _necessitated_ to Confess a _Rhombe Inscribed_ therein, and yet this is evidently _False_.
_Solution._ For tho I am not forced at any time to think of a _God_; yet as often as I cast my Thoughts on a _First_ and _Cheif Being_, and as it were bring forth out of the Treasury of my Mind an _Idea_ thereof, I must of necessity attribute thereto all Manner of _Perfections_, tho I do not at that time _count_ them over, or _Remark_ each single One; which _necessity_ is sufficient to make me hereafter (when I come to consider _Existence_ to be a _Perfection_) conclude _Rightly, That the First and Chief Being does Exist_. Thus, for example, I am not obliged at any time to imagine a _Triangle_, yet whenever I please to Consider of a _Right-lined Figure_ having only _three Angles_, I am then _necessitated_ to allow it all those _Requisites_ from which I may argue rightly, _That the Three Angles thereof are not Greater then Two Right Ones_, Tho upon the first consideration this came not into my Thought. But when I enquire what Figures may be _inscribed_ within a _Circle_, I am not at all _necessitated_ to think that all _Quadrilateral Figures_ are of that sort; neither can I possibly imagine this, whilst I admit of nothing, but what I _clearly_ and _distinctly_ Understand: and therefore there is a great Difference between these _False suppositions_, and _True natural Ideas_, the _first_ and _Chief_; whereof is that of a _God_; For by many wayes I understand _That_ not to be a _Fiction depending_ on my _Thought_, but an _Image_ of a _True_ and _Immutable Nature_; As first, because I can think of no other thing but _God_ to Whose _Essence Existence_ belongs. Next because I cannot Imagine _Two_ or _More Gods_, and supposing that he is _now_ only One, I may plainly perceive it _necessary_ for _Him_ to _Have been from Eternity_, and _will Be to Eternity_; And Lastly because I perceive many Other Things in _God_, Which I cannot _Change_, and from which I cannot _Detract_.
But whatever way of Argumentation I use, it comes All at last to this one Thing, That I am fully perswaded of the _Truth_ of those things only, which appear to me _clearly_ and _distinctly_. And tho some of those things, which I so perceive, are obvious to _every_ Man, and some are only discover’d by Those that search more _nighly_, and enquire more _carefully_, yet when such _truths_ are discover’d, they are esteem’d no less _certain_ than the Others. For Example, Tho it do not so easily appear, that in a Rightangled Triangle, the square of the Base is equal to the squares of the sides, as it appears, that the Base is suspended under its Largest Angle, yet the _first Proposition_ is _no less certainly_ believed when once ’tis perceived, then this _Last_.
Thus in Reference to _God_; certainly, unless I am overrun with _Prejudice_, or have my thoughts begirt on all sides with _sensible Objects_, I should acknowledge nothing _before_ or _easier_ then him; For what is more _self-evident_ then that there is a _Chief Being_, or then that a _God_ (to whose _essence alone Existence_ appertains) does _Exist_? And tho serious Consideration is required to perceive thus much, yet _Now_, I am not only equally _certain_ of it, as of what seems most _certain_, but I perceive also that the _Truth_ of other Things so _depends_ on it, that without it nothing can ever be _perfectly known_.
For tho my _nature_ be _such_, that during the time of my _Clear_ and _Distinct_ Perception, I cannot but believe it _true_; yet my _Nature_ is _such_ also, that I cannot fix the _Intention_ of my _Mind_ upon one and the same thing alwayes, so as to perceive it _clearly_, and the Remembrance of what _Judgement_ I have formerly made is often stirred up, when I cease attending to those reasons for which I passed such a Judgment, other Reasons may then be produced, which (if I did not _know God_) may easily _move_ me in my _Opinion_; and by this means I shall never attain to the _true_ and _certain Knowledge_ of any Thing, but _Wandring_ and _Unstable opinions_. So, for example, when I consider the Nature of a Triangle, it plainly appears to me (as understanding the Principles of Geometry) that its three Angles are equal to two right ones; And this I must of necessity think _True_ as long as I attend to the _Demonstration_ thereof; but as soon as ever I withdraw my Mind from the _Consideration_ of its _Proof_ (altho I remember that I have once _Clearly_ perceived it) yet perhaps I may _doubt_ of Its _Truth_, being as yet _Ignorant_ of a _God_; For I may perswade my self, that I am so framed by _Nature_, as to be _deceived_ in those things which I imagine my self to perceive most _evidently_, Especially when I recollect, that heretofore I have often accounted many things _True_ and _Certain_, which afterward upon other Reasons I have Judged as False. But when I perceive that there is a _God_; because at the same time I also Understand that all things _Depend_ on Him, and that he is not a _Deceiver_; and when from hence I Collect that all those Things which I _clearly_ and _distinctly_ perceive are _necessarily True_; tho I have no further Respects to those Reasons which induced me to believe it _True_, yet if I do but remember, that I have _once clearly_ and _distinctly_ perceived it, no Argument can be brought on the contrary, that shall make me _doubt_, but that I have _true_ and _certain_ Knowledge thereof; and not onely of that, but of all other _Truths_ also which I remember that I have _once Demonstrated_, such as are _Geometrical Propositions_ and the like.
What now can be _Objected_ against me? shall I say, that I am so made by _Nature_, as to be often _deceived_? No; For I now Know that I cannot be _deceived_ in those Things, which I _clearly_ Understand. Shall I say, that at other times I have esteem’d many Things _True_ and _Certain_, which afterwards I found to be _falsities_? No; for I perceived none of those things _clearly_ and _distinctly_, but being Ignorant of this _Rule_ of _Truth_, I took them up for Reasons, which Reasons I afterward found to be _Weak_. What then can be said? Shall, I say, (as lately I objected) that Perhaps I am _asleep_, and that what I now think of is no more _True_, then the _Dreams_ of People _asleep_? But this it self _moves_ not my Opinion; for certainly tho I were _asleep_, if any thing appear’d _evident_ to my Understanding, ’twould be _True_.
And Thus I Plainly see, that the _Certainty_ and _Truth_ of all _Science_ Depends on the _Knowledge_ of the _True God_, so that before I had _Known Him_, I did _Know nothing_; But now many things both of _God_ himself, and of other _Intellectual Things_, as also of _Corporeal nature_, which is the _Object_ of _Mathematicks_, may be _Plainly Known_ and _Certain_ to me.
MEDITAT. VI.
_~Of Corporeal Beings~, and Their ~Existence~: As Also of the Real Difference, Between ~Mind~ and ~Body~._
It now remains that I examine whether any _Corporeal Beings_ do _Exist_; And already I know that (as they are the _Object_ of _Pure Mathematicks_) they _May_ (at least) _Exist_, for I _clearly_ and _distinctly_ perceive them; and doubtless _God_ is _able_ to _make_, whatever I am _able_ to _perceive_, and I never Judged any thing to be _beyond_ his _Power_, but what was _Repugnant_ to a _distinct perception_. Moreover, such _Material Beings seem_ to _Exist_ from the _faculty_ of _Imagination_, which I find my self make use of, when I am conversant about them: for if I attentively Consider what _Imagination_ is, ’twill appear to be only _a certain Application of our Cognoscitive or knowing Faculty to a Body or Object that is before it_; and if it be _before it_, It must _Exist_.
But that this may be made more _Plain_, I must first examine the _difference_ between _Imagination_, and _pure Intellection_, or _Understanding_. So, for example, when I _Imagine_ a Triangle, I do not only _Understand_ that it is a _figure comprehended_ by _three Lines_, but I also _behold_ with the _eye_ of my _mind_ those _three lines_ as it were _before Me_, and this is that which I call _imagination_. But if I convert my Thoughts to a _Chiliogone_, or _Figure consisting_ of a _Thousand Angles_, I know as well that this Is a _figure comprehended_ by a _Thousand sides_, as I know that a _Triangle_ is a _Figure Consisting_ of _three sides_; but I do not in the same Manner _Imagine_, or _behold_ as _present_ those _thousand sides_, as I do the _three sides_ of a _Triangle_. And tho at the time when I so think of a _Chiliogone_, I may _confusedly_ represent to my self some _Figure_ (because whenever I Think of a _Corporeal Object_, I am used to _Imagine_ some _Shape_ or other) yet ’tis evident that this _Representation_ is not a _Chiliogone_, because ’tis in nothing _different_ from what I should Represent to my self if I thought of a _Milion-angled figure_, or any other Figure of _More sides_; Neither does such a _Confused Representation_ help me in the least to know those _Properties_, by which a _Chiliogone_ differs from other _Polygones_ or _Manyangled Figures_. But if a Question be put concerning a _Pentagone_, I know I may _Understand its Shape_, as I _Understand_ the _Shape_, of a _Chiliogone_, without the help of _Imagination_, but I can also _imagine_ it, by applying the _Eye_ of my _Mind_ to its _Five sides_, and to the _Area_ or _space_ contained by Them; And herein I manifestly perceive that there is required a _peculiar sort_ of _Operation_ in the _Mind_ to _imagine_ a Thing, which I require not to _Understand_ a Thing; which _New Operation_ of the _Mind_ plainly shews the _difference_ between _imagination_ and _pure Intellection_.
Besides this, I Consider that this _Power_ of _Imagination_ which is in me (as it differs from the _Power_ of _Understanding_) does not appertain to the _Essence_ of _Me_, that is, of _my mind_, for tho I _wanted_ it, yet certainly I should be the _same He, that_ now _I am_: from whence it seems to follow, that it depends on something _different_ from _my self_; and I easily perceive that if any _Body_ whatever did _Exist_, to which my _Mind_ were so _conjoyn’d_, that it may Apply it self when it pleased to _Consider_, or (as it were) _Look_ into _this Body_; From hence, I say, I perceive _It may so be_, that by this very _Body_ I may _Imagine Corporeal Beings_: So that this _Manner_ of _Thinking_ differs from _pure Intellection_ only in this, that the _Mind_, when it _Understands_, does as it were turn _it self_, to _it self_, or _Reflect_ on it self, and _beholds_ some or other of those _Ideas_ which are in it self; But when it _Imagines_, it _Converts_ it self upon _Body_, and therein _beholds_ something Conformable to that _Idea_, which it hath _understood_, or _perceived_ by _Sense_.
But ’tis to be remembred, that I said, I easily conceive Imagination _May be_ so performed, supposing _Body_ to _Exist_. And because no so convenient manner of Explaining it offers it self, from thence I _probably_ guess, that _Body_ does _Exist_. But this I only say _probably_, for tho I should accurately search into all the Arguments drawn from the _distinct Idea_ of _Body_, which I find in my _Imagination_, yet I find none of them, from whence I may _necessarily_ conclude, _that Body does Exist_.
But I have been accustomed to _Imagine_ many other things besides that _Corporeal Nature_ which is the _Object_ of _pure Mathematicks_; such as are, _Colours_, _Sounds_, _Tasts_, _Pain_, &c. but none of these so _distinctly_. And because I perceive these better by _Sense_, from Which by the Help of the _Memory_ they come to the _Imagination_, that I may with the Greater advantage treat of them, I ought at the same time to Consider _Sence_, and to try whether from what I perceive by that way of _Thought_, which I call _Sense_, I can deduce any certain Argument for the _Existence_ of _Corporeal Beings_.
And first I will here reflect with my self, what those things were, which being perceived by _Sence_ I have heretofore thought _True_, and the _Reasons_ why I _so thought_: I will then enquire into the _Reasons_ for which I afterwards _doubted_ those things. And last of all I will consider what I _ought_ to _think_ of those Things at _Present_.
[Sidenote: _The Reasons why I Trusted my Senses._]