Part 6

Wednesday the 22nd of the same month (November), at break of day, the enemy’s fleet was descried on the horizon, with twenty-three sail and a pinnace. The six queen’s galleons of eight hundred tons, and two ships of the same size, and the rest, vessels of three hundred tons and of one hundred and fifty and less, and forty launches, came sailing in close order. Immediately every one snatched up his arms and ran to his post with great alacrity, and well disposed for combat. There was but little wind, and so the fleet advanced but slowly till it entered the breeze. The pinnace came first and some boats with white signal-flags sounding the coast. One of them having come in front of the Boqueron battery, a gun was fired at it which made it stand off to sea, and they immediately hoisted other coloured flags and passed out; and in the afternoon the whole fleet came and cast anchor in front of the curtain of the Cabron, where no one had ever seen a ship ride before, nor was it known that there was good anchorage till after the departure of the enemy, when the general sent to have the place sounded, and from twenty to thirty fathoms clear water were found there. From what was learned, it appears to have been his intention to land a force under the fire of his artillery, imagining that he should find us unprepared, and seeing no reason to believe that such a step would meet with resistance; wherein he was mistaken.

The fleet having arrived in the place above-mentioned, our people fired at it several pieces of artillery from the Morrillo and the curtain of the Cabron, so that some of the shot took effect on them, for it was known afterwards, that they killed John Hawkins, the general of one of the squadrons, and two of the principal gentlemen who accompanied him, besides other people; and that they carried away the table at which Francis Drake was eating, the ball striking a gentleman who was with him, and who, it is known, will not escape.

The enemy perceiving how much loss he sustained from the shore, sent the pinnace with a pilot, a native of the islands and a mulatto by race, who is said to be practically well acquainted with these coasts, with five boats to the port, to reconnoitre it and to sound close to the mouth formed by the islet, which is called Goat Island, which lies towards the west; and when it was sounded, one of the boats returned with information to the fleet, which immediately weighed anchor, at five o’clock in the evening, without having fired a cannon or even a musket during all the whole time that it was there, and ran out to sea, where it stood off and on that night till the following day.

Thursday following, at eight o’clock in the morning, the whole fleet came and anchored on the windward side of the small island where they had been sounding the day before, close to the port; and this was another new anchorage not known hitherto, and having six fathoms over shoals, where a vessel might be easily lost in any bad weather. There the fleet anchored, the weather being favourable, and beyond the reach of our artillery; and the same evening two boats were sent to sound the shore by the river Bayamon as far as the Carivelo stockade, and to examine these shoals in order to see if it were possible to land a force in that quarter; and in one of the boats, which was covered closely with an awning, was Francis Drake, as was subsequently learned.

When Don Pedro Tello, who had charge of the port, saw the pains the enemy was taking, and perceived that an attack was about to be made that very night on the stockade of the Carivelo, by forcing it with boats, so as to land a body of men, he sent to the general to acquaint him with what was going on, and to ask for a reinforcement to resist such an attempt; and the general ordered that in the evening Captain Augustin de Candecho should proceed thither with thirty soldiers, and that at night there should be fifty soldiers under the command of the supercargo, Martin Vomero de Caamaño, with orders that if the enemy’s force should prove superior, he should retreat with his men in boats to the frigates, in which their forces were to be concentrated.

The same Thursday, 23rd, St. Clement’s day, at ten o’clock at night, when it was quite dark, the enemy commenced an attack on the port with twenty-five boats, each carrying fifty or sixty men well armed, with the view of burning the frigates, as was afterwards seen, and they all entered close up to the platform of the Rock [battery], ranging themselves under the fire of the artillery; and from what was learned afterwards, it appears that Francis Drake came in one of them to the mouth of the port to place the rest. Dark as it was, the boats were seen, and instantly the guns from the Rock and from the fort of Sta. Helena began to play as briskly as possible. Most of the boats attacked the Capitana, the Texeda frigate, setting fire to her at the bow, and throwing into her a quantity of fire-pots and shells, while ours succeeded in extinguishing the flames before they had done any damage, the fight being carried on with cannon, musquetry, and stones.

At the same time they set fire to the Sta. Ysabel and Magdalena frigates, and to the Sancta Clara, which was extinguished; but the third time that the Magdalena frigate, of which Domingo de Ynsaurraga was captain, took fire, it was impossible to extinguish the flames, as the ship took fire at the stern and burned furiously; and all that could be done to maintain a footing on board, was done by the aforesaid captain and the people with him, until the ship was just burnt down and twelve men were killed by the enemy’s musquetry, besides as many more burnt. And the aforesaid captain made his escape by swimming through the midst of the boats and reached the frigate Sancta Ysabel, which was under the command of Captain Juan Flores de Rabanal in place of Captain Pedro de Guia, who had charge of a post on land, and there he lent his assistance in every manner possible. The battle lasted for an hour, the most obstinately contested that was ever seen, and the whole port was illumined by the burning frigate in a manner favourable for the rest, who could thus see to point our artillery and that of the forts, with which, and with the musquetry and the stones thrown from the frigate, they did such effect, that the enemy, after about an hour, during which the combat lasted, as I have said, retreated with the loss of nine or ten boats and more than four hundred men, besides many more wounded; while on our side, the only loss was that of the frigate and forty men killed or burnt, besides a few wounded by the musquetry. It was a fine sight to see how the frigates fought, and how capitally they were backed by the artillery of the forts, particularly that of Sta. Helena, which was in an advantageous position for playing on the boats.

Friday 24th. Considering that the enemy would assuredly repeat his attack at night, and endeavour to land his forces, the people on our side never ceased, from the dawn of day, to prepare for resistance, planting cannon at some passes on land, as was done, for example, in the whole of the Tejar, where the governor commanded, with Captain Marco Antonio and the people forming the company of guards. Captain Guia, who previously kept guard in the Morrillo, now took his station in the curtain of Sancta Catalina with fifty arquebusseers; in the curtain of the Friars, close to the fortress, were two other pieces with thirty soldiers, under the command of the supercargo, Martin Vomero, and on every side numerous trenches were dug and defences constructed, every one working spade in hand, and not a single negro to assist, for the people round about had sent off all their slaves to the mountain, with their effects and women, as soon as the enemy appeared.

However, about eight o’clock in the morning, as soon as the land breeze sprang up, the enemy’s fleet weighed and stood to sea, endeavouring to get to windward of the port, and continued on this course till evening; and Don Pedro Tello perceiving that the object was to run at once into the port, went ashore to explain to the general his apprehension that the enemy was about to bear down directly on the place: that the two ships which had been already sunk did not completely close up the entrance to it, and that it was expedient to sink two frigates in the part that still remained open, inasmuch as the complete barring of the entrance and the security of the port were quite as important as the two frigates, for many reasons, and for the good of His Majesty’s service.

General Sancho Pardo immediately held a council with the governor and other officers, and they decided that one frigate should be sunk in the channel, in case that a ship belonging to Pedro Sedeño, which was lying there laden with merchandise, and another of less size, should prove insufficient; that these should be sunk immediately, just as they were, as there was not time to unload them, and that the frigate should be sunk whenever Don Pedro thought proper.

At four o’clock in the afternoon the enemy came running down with the breeze towards the port, and Don Pedro Tello, believing that he was making directly for it, sank the two vessels of Sedeño and Juan Diaz de Sancta Aña, and also the Texeda frigate, without being able, owing to the short time allowed, to take out of them all the provisions and guns, although a part was saved; and thus the entrance of the channel was completely closed, and about vesper time the enemy came to anchor between the Rock and Goat island, where he had lain at anchor the night before.

The circumstance that the fleet anchored, and nearer than before to the port, tended to confirm the suspicion that the enemy meant to attempt that very night to finish the burning of the frigates, and to land people. Don Pedro Tello, therefore, with the consent of the governor, had the three frigates brought back to the interior of the port, and they were placed in the Tejar with a guard to secure them; but he had no fears about the landing of a force, seeing the spirit which animated our people, and that all the posts and landing-places were well entrenched and strengthened. The removal of the frigates took place at night, when the enemy could see nothing, and consequently the next morning he concluded that they had been all sunk. The night passed off quietly, without any effort on our part to shew that we were well on the watch.

Saturday the 25th, as soon as daylight appeared, the enemy sent seven or eight boats to reconnoitre the port, and all the shore as far as the Boqueron. These kept at a distance from land, beyond the reach of our guns; and about ten o’clock they returned to the fleet, which remained at anchor in the place above-mentioned.

The same day, about two o’clock in the afternoon, our caravel, which had gone to look out for the enemy eight days before, came in sight, and as soon as it was seen by our people, they fired a gun from the Boqueron to warn it to bear up without approaching the port; and some boats from the fleet followed it as far as the Playa de Cangrejos (crab ground), where it ran ashore, and part of the cavalry hastened forward to assist the crew; and Francisco Gonçalez, who was the pilot and captain of the caravel, scuttled her, to prevent the enemy’s carrying her off; and so the boats went away, and returned to the fleet without making a prize.

The same Saturday, at night, the whole fleet made sail without being seen, and stood out to sea; and when we found in the morning that it had disappeared, people were sent by land westwards along the coast to ascertain whether it was seen or had passed that way, as was supposed, and was going to St. Domingo.

On Monday news arrived from Arracibo, fourteen leagues from this port, that the fleet had passed by on its course. The same day the general despatched another messenger to San German, who returned within six days with the information that the enemy’s fleet was lying in the Butiro de la Azucar on the other side of San German, and that they had landed five companies of pikemen and musqueteers, who were collecting supplies of meat, wood, and water, and made four boats in as many days to carry their supplies.

The general having received this intelligence, and thinking it likely that there might be some artifice in the enemy’s movements, who perhaps might be lying in wait hoping to catch the two frigates, or intending to return upon Puerto Rico when they should be gone and the place weakened, in order that he might seize it, and execute his design of fortifying himself in it, seriously deliberated as to what should be done, and determined that the frigates should not quit the port till it was known for certain that the enemy had passed Point de la Aguada; and that Captain Juan Flores de Rabanal should go seventy or eighty leagues to the north with a patache to look out, while the bullion was in the meantime embarking. In eight days he returned, without having seen anything.

The 9th of December intelligence was brought from San German that the enemy’s fleet had gone away southwards.

On the 11th of the same month there arrived at this place Lope Sanchez, boatswain of the Magdalena frigate, and four seamen of the same, who had been taken in the water by the enemy’s boats, the night the frigates were set on fire. These men had been put on shore in the Butiro de la Azucar, with a letter of Francis Drake to the governor here, of which the following is a copy:—

Letter of FRANCIS DRAKE to Colonel PEDRO SUAREZ, Governor of Puerto Rico.

“Understanding that your lordship is a gentleman of rank and a soldier, I write this letter to give you to understand that whenever I have had an opportunity of dealing with the Spanish nation, I have treated it with much honour and clemency, liberating the individuals belonging to it, not a few, but many in number. So, at the time when our people set fire to the frigates, certain Spaniards were saved from the fury of the flames, who, as conquered enemies, experienced from us no ill-treatment, but the usage of honourable war.

“From them it has been learned that the capitana of Don Pedro Tello took a small vessel of our fleet, having on board twenty-five Englishmen, or more, treating them well, and as might be expected in fair war. I myself still cherish my former sentiments; but having another affair, strong deeds are done, which never entered my mind. But as there are in this place soldiers and gentlemen, I have no doubt that my people will fare well, and will obtain their liberty for the sake of honourable war: this I hope, and shall do the like myself. I remain at your lordship’s service in all things, bating the cause which is to be maintained as that of the flag of her sacred Majesty the queen of England.

“FRANCIS DRAKE.

“The 23d November 1595, English style.”

From the information given by the aforesaid boatswain and the other seamen, who had gone with the enemy for eight days, it was ascertained that the latter had departed thence towards the S. or S.S.W., and that they were going to St. Domingo and thence to Panama, for they said that they were going where there was a quantity of gold and silver; and the same thing might also be inferred from the number of boats they took with them for an armament.

These men confirmed also the death of John Hawkins, and testified as to the regret occasioned thereby, as well as to the heavy loss which the enemy sustained. Thus, as a boat was passing one day from the flag-ship to one of the other galleons, it was struck, and nearly every man in it was wounded. They stated that the enemy complained much of the damage done by the stones thrown from the frigates; and that the loss was so great, that when Francis Drake held a council the day after the battle, to determine whether they should renew the attack, there was not one who agreed with him in favour of that proposition, especially as these men had told them that our force was much greater than it used to be; and that Drake was amazed when he learned how few people were on board of the frigates the night of the fire, and plucked his beard [with vexation] for not having taken the treasure and the place, not letting himself be seen those two days; complaining of John Hawkins, who did not allow them to pursue the three frigates from the island of Guadaloupe, as soon as it was known that they had taken the vessel and were making for Puerto Rico; intimating that in that case we should not have had the opportunity of fortifying the place, as was done in the eight days which they spent in the delay of preparing boats, and watering.

All this has been so ordered by God, to whom we owe many thanks, since by His means, besides obtaining such a victory, with so small a force as that which on our side resisted the efforts of so powerful an armament, in defence of the place and two millions of treasure, important services have resulted to his Majesty, and a general gain to private individuals.

In the first place, as far as can be learned, it was the enemy’s intention to maintain this force, which he might easily do at small cost, for the pirates of all nations who frequent these seas, would gather about him, and would aid him in defending the position; and it would then be necessary to fit out an expedition expressly to retake the place, since the port has a decided advantage, and from thence much injury may be easily done to the islands and coasts which are to leeward.

In the second place, this enemy, who up to this time has never met with any resistance at sea, has here had his head broken; since, as has been related, one of the two leaders died, with four hundred of his followers, and a great many were wounded.

Thirdly, we have thus saved two millions worth of gold, silver, and cochineal, with which the queen might equip and maintain a force to give us further trouble.

Fourthly, the delaying of the enemy in these islands till the 3rd December, allowed time for warning those places for the safety of which fears might be entertained, by means of the despatches which were sent, as has been stated, to St. Domingo and the Havana, whence others were forwarded to Carthagena and New Spain, so that we may now hope that all is safe.

The last, and not the least consideration, is, the spirit which our people have shewn, and the renown which they have won, proving the inferiority of the enemy; and, on the other hand, the hold on opinion which the latter have lost, and in which consists to a great extent the secret of good or ill-success. And since the beneficial results of this affair are so many, his Majesty ought to return thanks to those who took part in it, in order that the lookers-on may be encouraged to serve him on like occasions.

This affair having passed over as here related, and the general having received information that the enemy was gone on, and that provisions were scarce, a quantity of them having been lost on this occasion, and the poverty of the island being such that the deficiency could not be made good, and that it was necessary for him to abridge his delay as much as possible, gave orders to collect the guns with the utmost despatch from the several posts on land, and to embark the treasure in the frigates; and with these, one ship, and a patache, in which were embarked part of the crews and artillery of the two lost frigates, he left Puerto Rico with good weather on the 20th December 1595.

The Instructions given by F. Drake to the captain of the Francis, one of the vessels of his fleet, which was taken at the island of Guadaloupe.

The Instruction and Order to be observed by the whole fleet, which departs from the port of Plymouth on the 29th August 1595.

1. In the first place, omit not divine worship, and let this order be observed twice a-day, unless no opportunity offers.

2. Secondly, great care must be taken to keep company and to come to speak with your admiral twice a-day; and if you cannot do it more than once, yet let it be done every day; and take great care to observe every order given you, and to be always in company, as the weather shall allow.

3. And should it happen that any ship or small vessel, through stress of weather or other cause that may be, parts company, they must look for us first of all in the island of Bayona, on the coast of Galicia, and the fleet will wait till it is time to proceed and you shall have found us; and thence, if you should not find us, you shall go to Puerto Sancto, and there you shall wait for us three days; and should we not be there, you shall make for the island of Guadaloupe (a small island near Dominica towards the north-east), where we will stay three days, and will leave some signal that you may know what course we shall have taken, which shall be for Puerto Rico; there we will stay ten days.

4. If in the course of this voyage you meet with any foul wind or bad weather, you must take in all sail at night till morning, unless you see that one of your admirals carries sail, in which case you shall do the same.

5. And if foul wind or bad weather should come on at night, your admiral will hang out two lanterns, one above the other, and the height of a man asunder, that you may steer by them.

6. And if we should all shorten sail over night on account of the weather, and it be necessary to make sail the same night, you must show, before we make sail, a single lantern with a light at the bow, and another at the fore-top.

7. You shall keep no light in any of the ships, but only the light in the binocle, and this with the greatest care that it be not seen, excepting the admiral’s ship; and to avoid the danger of fire, you must not bear about any candle or light in the ship, unless in a lantern; and neither more nor less, you must take the greatest care with the fire in the galley.

8. No vessel, square or cutter-rigged, should go ahead of the admiral at night, particularly in rough weather; or get under the lee of large vessels, in tacking from side to side.

9. And if any vessel of the fleet should lose, through mischance, a main-mast, or yard, or any of the water vessels, or anything else of importance, they shall fire one or two shots, according to the necessity of the case, that the other vessels may afford them speedy assistance; and take care that no vessel quit that which is in distress till the required succour be given.

10. Should any vessel of the fleet lose her course, and fall in with another of the fleet, the signal shall be to hoist and lower topsails three times; and the other vessel shall do the same for recognition.

11. You must not permit any gambling in the ship, with cards or dice, by reason of the numerous quarrels usually resulting from that practice.

12. You must take the greatest care to save the provisions, following your own discretion in this matter till you receive another order for your guidance.

13. Finally, in order that you may be better able to keep company, you shall see a light at the admiral’s stern once or twice.

FRANCIS DRAKE.

FINIS.

RICHARDS, PRINTER, 100, ST. MARTIN’S LANE.