Part 5

CARTA DE FRANᵒ. DRAQUE A PEDRO SUAREZ CORONEL, governador de Puerto rico;

Entendiendo ser Vsᵃ Cavallero prinçipal y soldado escrivo esta breve dando a entender como siempre en todas las ocasiones que semean offreçido con la naçion Española, la e tratado con mucha honora y clemençia, dando libertad a sus personas no apocos mas a muchos, ansi que al tiempo que nuestra gente puso fuego a las fragatas se salvaron ciertos Españoles en la furia del fuego no haçiendo le agravio despues de vençidos sin muy buena guerra.

Por ellos e savido como la capitana de Don Pedro Tello prendio un navichuelo de nuestra armada adonde avia 25 Yngleses, o mas haçiendo con ellos buen tratamiento y guerra limpia. Quedo en el propio ser que solia, mas aviendo otra cosa, forçosamente hase lo que jamas en mi cupo; mas como ay en esa ciudad soldados y cavalleros no dudo del buen suçeso de nuestra gente, dandoles libertad por virtud de buena guerra, lo qual espero y ansi are lo propio; en todo quedo al serviçio de Vsᵃ, salvo la causa que ay de por medio de la capitana de la sacra Magᵈ de la Reyna de Yngalaterra misᵃ: a 23 Nobiembre de 1595 estilo de Yngalaterra.

FRANᵒ. DRAQUE.

Por relaçion que el dho contramaestre y demas marineros que ocho dias andubieron con el enemigo, se supo que salieron de alli la buelta del sur o del susudueste, y que yban a Sancto Domingo y de alli a Panama, porque deçian que yban adonde avia mucho oro y plata, y ansi se deja entender por las muchas lanchas que llevaron pertrechos de guerra. Estos çertificaron la muerte de Juan Aquines y el sentimiento que por el se hiço y el mucho daño que los enemigos reçivieron, tanto que pasandolos un dia de la capitana a otro galeon, allaron casi la gente del toda herida y maltratada, y que se quejaban del daño que las piedras que les tiraron de las fragatas les hiço, y que fue tanto el mal que el otro dia de la pelea Franᵒ. Draque hiço consejo sobre si segundaria, no hallo ninguno que fuese de su pareçer, y mas por averles dhos estes hombres que era mucha la fuerça que teniamos mas de la que a sido; y que el Draque se quedo esbentado quando supo la poca gente que se hallo en las fragatas la noche del fuego, y se tiraba de las barbas por no aver tomado la plata y la tierra, no se dejando ver aquellos dos dias, quejandose de Juan Aquines que no quiso que vineran tras las fragatas de la ysla de Guadalupe luego que supo que le avian cojido el navio y venian a puerto rico, dando a entender que no tubieramos lugar de fortificarmos como se hiço en los ocho dias que se tardaron en aprestar sus lanchas y en haçer agua. Todo lo a ordenado Dios a quien se debe dar muchas graçias, pues mediante su labor de mas de aver alcançado una victoria tel, con tan poca gente como de nuestra parte hubo resistiendo la fuerça de una armada tan poderosa, defendiendo la tierra y dos millones de plata, a su Magestad selea seguido notables serviçios y a los particulares bien general.

Lo primero, que por lo que sea entendido el enemigo traya fin de sustentar esta fuerça y fuera le facil con poca costa, porque los cosarios que andan en esto de todas naçiones seacojieran a ella y ellos ayudara a defenderla, y fuera menester armar muy de proposito para bolverse la a ganar, por ser el serviçio del puerto fuerte y de donde mas daño pueden haçer a yslotas y costas que todo lo tiene a sotavento.

Lo segundo, que a este enemigo, que asta oy nadie lea echo resistençia en la mar, aqui se le rompio la caveça, pues como esta dho, una de las dos que governaban murio y 400 personas y hubo muchos heridos.

Lo 3, que se escaparon dos millones de plata y oro y granas con que la Reyna podia armar y entretenerse por mas ynquietar nos.

Lo 4, que con averse entretenido en estas yslas asta los 3 de Diçiembre, dio tiempo a que sepuedan aver prevenido los lugares sospechosos con los avisos que esta dho sedespacharon a Sancto Domingo y a la avana, y destos los avian tenido en Cartagena y nueba espana con que podemos esperar seguridad.

Lo ultimo, y no demenos consideraçion es el animo y reputaçion que los nuestros an cobrado, reconoçiendo el poco valor de los enemigos, y por el contrario la opinion que ellos an perdido, en que consiste mucha parte de los buenos o malos subçesos, y pues desta se siguen tantos viénes, su Magestad debe haçer merced a los que en el se allaron para que los que estan a la mira se animen a servirle en semeyantes ocasiones.

Pasada esta como esta dho, y aviendo el general tenido aviso que el enemigo yba adelante, y que los vastimentos eran pocos por averse gastado muchos en esta ocasion, y ser la miseria desta ysla tal que no se podian proveer otros, y que combenia abreviar la partida de sudespacho, y ordeno que con suma presteça se recojiese el artilleria de los puestos de tierra y se embarcase la plata en los fragatas, y con ellas y con un navio y un patache en que se embarco parte de la gente y artilleria de las dos fragatas perdidas y de la capitana de tierra firme, partio de puerto rico con buen tiempo a los 20 de Diçiembre de 1595.

INSTRUCCION que dio Franᵒ. Draque, al capitan del navio Françes, uno de los de su armada que se le tomo en la ysla de Guadalupe.

La instrucçion y orden que a de tener toda la armada que sale del puerto de Plemua desde 29 de Agosto de 1595 años.

1. Primeramente es para servir a Dios y tener esta orden dos veçes aldia y sino fuese alguna ocasion no poder mas.

2. Lo segundo aveis de tener gran cuidado de tener compania y venir a hablar a vuestro Almirante dos veçes aldia, y quando no pudieredes mas de una vez, lo haçed cada dia y tened gran cuidado de la orden que vos sera dada de guardarla y tener siempre estar en compania como el tiempo ordenare.

3. Y si fuese algun navio o patache per tempestad de tiempo o per otra ocasion que hubiese y se apartase de la compania anos de allar primeramente en la ysla de Bayona de Galicia y alli estara la armada aguardando asta que el tiempo provea otra cosa y nos allareis, y de alli sino nos allaredes, yreis a Puerto Sancto y nos aguardareis alli tres dias, y sino fueremos alli, tomareis el camino para la ysla de Guadalupe, una ysla pequena de la vanda del nordeste çerca de la Dominica, en la qual estaremos tres dias y dejaremos alguna sinal para que sepais donde nosotros fueremos el qual sera para puerto rico; alli estaremos diez dias.

4. Si en este camino tubieremos algun viento contrario e tempestad de noche, aveis de amaynar todas los belas asta la mañana, sino vieredes que una almiranta aga bela y ansi areis vosotros lo mismo.

5. Y si el tiempo volviese de noche alguna contrariedad de vento contrario, vuestra almiranta pondra dos lanternas, una de vajo de otra de statura de un hombre, para que os vais regiendo por ellas.

6. Y si todos nosotros amaynasemos de noche por alguna ocasion de tempestad y fuese neçesario haçer vela esa noche, aveis de ençender antes que nosotros echemos vela una sola lanterna con lumbre en popa y otra en la gavia del trinquete.

7. No tendreis ninguna lumbre en ningun navio sino solamente la lumbre que estubiese en la aguia, y este con gran cuydado que no pareçia, fuera de la Almiranta y por los ocasiones que pueden venir del fuego, no aveis de traer ninguna candela ni lumbre entorno del navio sino fuese con lanterna, y ni mas ni menos aveis de tener gran cuidado con el fuego de la coçina.

8. Ningun navio baral ni patache no vaya delante de la Almirante de noche y particularmente en tiempo de fortuna de tempestad ni se ponga de vajo de los navios grandes pasando de una parte a otra.

9. Y si algun navio de la flota por desgraçia perdiese algun arbol mayor o verga o alguna bomba o otro aparejo alguno de importançia, tiraran una v dos pieças conforme a la necesitad que tubiese para que los otros navios le socorran con brevedad, y que ningun navio se aparte della asta que se socorra, conforme a la necesitad que se tubiese.

10. Y si algun navio de la flota perdiese su curso y topase con otro algun navio, la señal sera que içaran y amaynaran la vela de gavia tres veçes y ansi ara la otra para que se conosca.

11. No aveis de consentir jugar en el navio naypos ni dados por muchas ocasiones que suelen suçeder de pendençias.

12. Aveis de tener grandissimo cuydado de conservar los bastimentos, conforme a vuestra discreçion asta que reçivais otra orden de lo que aveis de hacer.

13. Lo ultimo para que agais mejor compañia, vereis una lumbre en la popa Almiranta una o dos veçes.

FRANᵒ. DRAQUE.

FOOTNOTES

[1] For hallado, as _Avana_ (above) for Havana, _an_ (lower down) for han, _avito_ for habito, &c.

[2] This ought, probably, to be 3000.

AN ACCOUNT OF WHAT TOOK PLACE AT SAN JUAN DE PUERTO RICO, IN THE INDIES, WITH THE ENGLISH FLEET UNDER THE COMMAND OF FRANCIS DRAKE AND JOHN HAWKINS, ON THE 23RD NOVEMBER 1595.

(_The Translation of the preceding document._)

General Sancho Pardo y Osorio having taken his departure from the Havana for Spain on the 10th March of this year, in command of the Capitana of the main-land fleet, under convoy of the armed fleet of Don Francisco de Coloma, and having, in the course of the gale which blew in the chops of the Channel on the 15th of the same month, in latitude 23° 30´, found himself without a main-mast, and with tiller broken, while the ship, leaking much, and separated from the others, was no longer in a condition to prosecute the voyage, for the purpose of saving the lives of the three hundred people who were on board, as well as two millions of gold and silver belonging to His Majesty and to private individuals; with the advice and consent of the supercargo, Martin Vomero de Caamaño, and of the pilots and other persons of most experience on board, made for Puerto Rico, where he arrived, by a miracle, on the 9th April, and there he landed the bullion, and deposited it in the fortress of the town. The aforesaid general despatched immediately first and second advices to His Majesty, making known his arrival, in order that instructions might be sent to him as to what he should do. And it appears that Divine Providence (to whom many thanks are due), for its secret ends, permitted the orders, which might have come beforehand, to arrive just at the time to save not only the bullion, but the island itself, and perhaps all the Indies, as will be seen further on.

A few days after the aforesaid letters were despatched, the governor of this island, Colonel Pedro Suares, received those of His Majesty, whereby he was informed that a great fleet was fitting out in England for the purpose of seizing on this island in the course of the winter, as it was thought that at that season the inhabitants would be less upon their guard. When the general and the aforesaid supercargo learned the contents of these despatches, they joined in consultation with the governor and Francisco Cid, captain of the infantry of this garrison; and having taken into consideration and discussed the precautionary measures which ought to be adopted for the safety of the place and of His Majesty’s treasure, in order that, if the enemy should come, it might be out of his power to make himself master of the whole, they all agreed on reconnoitering the positions and accessible points from which the enemy might approach, so as to throw people ashore; and also that the general should give orders for planting some of the guns of his ship in the positions which he judged best, and for laying the vessel athwart the channel of the port, so that she might be sunk on the arrival of the enemy, and thus bar the entrance; as this was the quarter where there seemed most likelihood of attack and most risk, and where it was necessary to keep the people well on the watch. These arrangements being made, the general remained in expectation of His Majesty’s order to proceed on his voyage.

On the 13th November of this year, there arrived at this port, Don Pedro Tello de Guzman, with the five frigates of His Majesty, in order that General Sancho Pardo should embark in them His Majesty’s bullion, and so proceed to Spain, the post of Admiral of his fleet being filled by the aforesaid Pedro Tello, who, after having delivered his despatches, related to the aforesaid general, how, coming here in the course of his voyage, they had fallen in with two English ships at the island of Guadaloupe, which had parted company from the English fleet; and how his Admiral, Gonzalo Mendez de Canço, had captured one of them and sunk her, after taking the Englishmen out of her; and that he, the aforesaid Don Pedro, going in pursuit of the other vessel, discovered nine sail of the enemy’s fleet, and as soon as he descried them he tacked about and continued his voyage: and that the aforesaid English prisoners had stated that thereabouts, on the southern side of the island of Guadaloupe, the Queen of England’s fleet was lying at anchor and preparing launches; that it consisted of five-and-twenty ships, six of them Queen’s galleons of eight hundred tons burden, and two more of the same size belonging to private parties, the whole being divided into two squadrons, having for generals, Francis Drake and John Hawkins; the former, with his lieutenant in command on shore, Sir Thomas Baskerville, directing the course to be taken, and the proceedings on land; and that the armament amounted to three thousand infantry and ten thousand five hundred seamen well supplied with guns; and that they were coming direct to Puerto Rico, as appeared also from the instructions which were taken from the captain of the aforesaid English ship, in which he was ordered, in case he should part company from the fleet by any mischance, to proceed to Puerto Rico, where they would wait for him ten days, and after that, would leave orders for him where he was to go, without further revealing their intentions; and that in consequence of all this, the aforesaid Don Pedro came, fearing that the enemy might have preceded him and already got possession of the island; and since they had not yet come, he held it for certain that they would be down upon the port the next day; and accordingly it lay with the general to order his departure as it might seem expedient.

When the general, Sancho Pardo, heard the statement made by the aforesaid Don Pedro Tello and his admiral, Gonzalo Mendez; and inasmuch as that news reached him when he was confined to his bed by an illness under which he had been suffering some days, he sent word to the Bishop and to the Governor, requesting them to come to him to meet the captains of the frigates,—Marco Antonio Becerra, head of the company of fusileers; and Pedro de Guia, of the order of St. John; and Domingo de Ynsaurraga; Francisco Gomez, captain of this garrison; the supercargo, Martin Vomero de Caamaño, and Juan de la Vera, purser of the frigates. These having all met together in his house, the general laid before them and submitted for their consideration the account which he had of the enemy, and the best means that offered for the security of the island and the bullion, supposing that the enemy’s fleet was as great, and to be expected as soon as was said; and that the frigates absolutely required to have their rigging repaired and to take in wood and water, which, with embarking the bullion, would cause a delay of eight days at the least; and considering that, whether they were so occupied or not, the enemy by reason of the information which that other ship that was seen could give him, that these frigates were coming for the treasure, which was now known to be here, might hope to seize it on the passage, or to make himself master of the country and to fortify himself in it, with a view to the conquest of all the Indies, whence would ensue to His Majesty great injury and loss of reputation.

All were of one mind in thinking that the place ought to be strengthened with the guns and crews of the ships, and that the Capitana de Tierra Firme and another ship belonging to Pedro Milanes, should be sunk in the channel of the port, to shut the entrance, and that the bullion should not be moved from the fort until it was seen what turn affairs would take, as it appeared to be safer there, and in a position also, whence (if, for our sins, it should be so ordered) it might be more easily thrown into the sea, so that the enemy should not get it; and having thus resolved, they proceeded to carry into execution with great alacrity and zeal, night and day, every possible measure of defence.

General Sancho Pardo, as a person of great experience, and who had seen and examined the position and approaches of the place, assured Don Pedro Tello and the others who came with him, that the loss of the place was out of the question if our people were only willing to fight and do their duty, and that it was only necessary to take good care of the port, so as to prevent the enemy’s fleet running into it at once; and that, for that purpose, it were as well to sink the two ships which had been agreed on, and on top of them, the frigates with their bows towards the sea to bar the entrance, and that with this precaution the place was quite safe and also the treasure of His Majesty, who, herein, would be well served, and in whose name he called on them to attend to their several duties; and accordingly Don Pedro Tello took under his own charge the defence of the port.

The Bishop offered to say mass the next day, and to preach a sermon to the people, as he did in fact, exhorting them, in a Christian manner, to the service of God and of their king; and he persevered in the performance of this office night and day, visiting the posts where the people were stationed, placing a priest at each of them, and animating his hearers with much zeal.

The same day, the governor and general despatched a barque with advices to St. Domingo, that the inhabitants of that island might set and keep themselves on the watch; so that if the enemy were to go there, as was heard and was written to the President, the information might be immediately forwarded to Cartagena and Sancta Maria.

All the people of the island were immediately mustered, and some of those belonging to the frigates were landed, being thought necessary for the defence of the posts. The whole amounted to ten thousand three hundred souls, of whom seven hundred were fighting men, besides the eight hundred belonging to the frigates and the Capitana of the main-land, and the rest of the garrison, and foreigners, including, also, fifty on horseback with lance and buckler; the whole of whom were distributed in the following manner:

In the curtain of the Morillo [battery], Captain Pedro de Guia, of the order of St. John, with a hundred and fifty soldiers 150

In the curtain of the Cabron, Alonso de Vargas with a hundred soldiers 100

At the bridge and Boqueron, Ensign Pedro Vazquez with a hundred and fifty soldiers 150

In the frigates, three hundred men under the command of Don Pedro Tello 300

At the mouth of the river Bayamon, Captain Otega with fifty soldiers 50 --- 750

The rest of the people occupied the Morro and the esplanade, under the command of Captain Marco Antonio de Veçerra and the governor, who led the cavalry; each of them to advance with his party to whatever point seemed to require his presence, or to stand in need of succour.

ARTILLERY PLANTED.

On the Morro [rock battery], twenty-seven very good brass guns 27

On the platform of the other Morro, five pieces 5

In St. Helena, four pieces 4

In the curtain of the Friars, close to the fortress, three pieces 3

In the curtain of St. Catharine, five pieces 5

In the Tejar [tile field], nine pieces 9

At the mouth of the river, two pieces 2

On the bridge and in a ship which was placed there, six pieces 6

On the Boqueron, four pieces 4

On the Cabron curtain, two pieces 2

On the curtain of the Morillo, three pieces 3 --- 70

Besides the frigates well armed, without which there were the aforesaid seventy pieces of cannon planted with good gunners at each post, and for chief commander of the forts of the Morro and the Morillo de Sta. Helena, the Admiral, Gonçalo Mendez de Canço.

On the 15th of the same month intelligence arrived from the governor of Canary, despatched to the governor of this island, to make it known that the enemy’s fleet had passed by the former place, and having landed some people for the purpose of watering, they had been forced to retreat with the loss of five-and-twenty men, and had gone off towards the Indies; and the same messenger stated, that in passing by the island of St. Martin, he had seen the armada, of five-and-twenty sail, lying at anchor.

Immediately, on the same day, the general, Sancho Pardo, sent the same despatch to the governor of the Havana, and wrote to him to forward the information to New Spain to General Pedro Melendez, who was on that coast with his fleet. These precautionary steps having been taken, and the people being all eager to combat the enemy, the general held a council, at which were present, Don Pedro Tello; the admiral, Gonçalo Mendez; and the captains, Marco Antonio Veçerra, Pedro de Guia, and Domingo de Ynsaurraga, with the supercargo Martin Vomero de Caamaño; and having taken into consideration whether it were expedient to embark the bullion in two of the frigates, so that if the enemy should place himself before the port, these being lighter, might effect their escape by night, the other three following them in the rear, in order that, if any attempt were made upon them, they might stay behind fighting while the two continued their voyage; it was decided by the majority of votes, that the bullion should not be removed from the place where it was lying, because the removal of it would tend to dispirit the people, who were fired with the thought of defending it: seeing their expectations foiled, they would be dispirited, and His Majesty would lose the place and his reputation, which was to be valued much more highly than the bullion: and what it behoved them to do, was to face the enemy, trusting in God for the victory. When the general saw how the majority inclined, he gave orders to Don Pedro Tello to get the frigates ready with all convenient despatch, that the bullion might be embarked whenever it was found expedient to do so; the enemy, it was supposed, would afford indications of his intentions, if he had such, of watching for it outside; and he directed that a caravel should cruise on the look out, about fifty leagues off the land. This was done accordingly, and the bullion remained as it was, which was the prudent course.