CHAPTER VII

SOME CRITICISMS

If we inquire what was thought at home of the failure at Spion Kop after the high hopes which the advent of Sir Charles Warren in Natal had raised, we must look back for a moment to the beginning of the operations and note the great interest with which the news from Natal was day by day eagerly read by the public. The excitement caused by the second attempt of Sir Redvers Buller to relieve Ladysmith by a turning movement to the left of Potgieter’s Drift was greatly increased when his telegram, dated 23rd January, 6.30 P.M., was received, stating that General Warren held the position he had gained two days before, and that ‘an attempt will be made to-night to seize Spion Kop, the Salient which forms the left of the enemy’s position facing Trichard’s Drift and divides it from the position facing Potgieter’s.’

The public remained in suspense until the announcement came that Spion Kop had been captured and that Warren considered it tenable. Then there were loud rejoicings everywhere, too soon, alas, disturbed by sinister rumours of failure, coming in some mysterious way from the Continental Press, and then the brief telegram of 25th January: ‘Warren’s garrison, I am sorry to say, I find this morning had in the night abandoned Spion Kop’; followed subsequently by another exonerating Colonel Thorneycroft from all blame.

The position in consequence thus presented itself to the public: The attack on Spion Kop had for some unknown reason proved a failure, and the relief of Ladysmith had been thereby indefinitely postponed. Somebody was to blame. Sir Redvers Buller said Warren’s garrison had abandoned Spion Kop, but he exonerated Thorneycroft. The natural inference was that Warren was the man to be hanged. Then came the reaction, and the fickle public turned to rend the unsuccessful Generals. This state of feeling was not improved by the publication, after many weeks’ delay, of the despatches in which Sir Redvers Buller throws the whole blame upon Sir Charles Warren, and not only exonerates Thorneycroft but considers that he saved the situation; in which also Lord Roberts is of opinion that Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft’s assumption of responsibility and authority was needless, unwarrantable, and wholly inexcusable; that Sir Charles Warren should have visited Spion Kop during the afternoon or evening; that ‘there was a want of organisation and system which acted most unfavourably on the defence’; and that the failure of the attempt to relieve Ladysmith was probably in part due to errors of judgment and want of administrative capacity on the part of Sir Charles Warren; but that it must also be ascribed to Sir Redvers Buller’s disinclination to assert his authority.

With the dismay felt at the folly of the Government in making such a wanton exhibition to the world of the shortcomings of our commanders in the field there was mingled a grim satisfaction that in censuring all concerned the public disappointment was avenged. Lord Roberts had administered a rough sort of justice. There had been a failure, and all the leading actors in the business were blamed; but the one who came off worst was Sir Charles Warren. Sir Redvers Buller had thrown the blame on Sir Charles Warren, but had supported Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft. No one spoke for Sir Charles Warren, who was not allowed to speak for himself. Consequently the critics took up the parable, and Sir Charles Warren was blamed for everything that occurred.

We doubt very much whether, if Spion Kop had been held and the relief of Ladysmith had followed, we should have heard much of the criticism that has been freely used; its seizure would have been regarded as a brilliant tactical success, as indeed it was regarded at the time, and it is only necessary to point to the English newspapers and the letters of the Press correspondents before the abandonment was known to show this.

Now a tactical operation cannot be right or wrong merely because some subsequent action makes it futile. We have the evidence of the Boers that they considered Spion Kop the key of the position and that, had it been held, Ladysmith would probably have been won. Surely, then, the blame of failure should not be thrown upon the General who ordered it to be taken, but on the officer who abandoned it without sufficient reason and without consulting him.

Mr. Oppenheim has written a defence of this officer in the ‘Nineteenth Century,’ in which he says that Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft had to come to some decision, and that he had held on all day hoping for the presence or intervention of a superior officer. But Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft was himself a brigadier-general commanding the colonels in command of two brigades, and the only use he made of this position was to force them to withdraw; while Major-General Coke, his superior officer, was on the summit from half-past three to half-past six, and Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft does not appear to have made any effort to get instructions from him or to refer to him before ordering a retirement at dark.

Mr. Oppenheim states that Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft did not know that stores of ammunition, water, food, &c., were on their way up; but this is no excuse, because, if he had gone to his proper post of command, he would have known it; but he stuck to his own corps, and never really exercised the command until he decided to retire. He also states that all agreed it was impossible to hold the hill. But Colonel Hill and Major-General Coke evidently did not agree. Colonel Hill had made preparations for intrenching, and knew where the tools and sandbags were, although Colonel Thorneycroft did not.

Two great faults were committed on the summit of Spion Kop, for neither of which can Sir Charles Warren be held responsible. The one was the position of the intrenchments, with regard to which Sir Charles Warren had given special instructions. There are two methods adopted for intrenching a hill when attacked by an advancing force. The usual method is to intrench the crest nearest to the enemy, but this involves moving across the top of the hill without cover. The other method is to intrench the crest farthest away from the enemy in the first place, as this gives complete security to the attack, neither rifle nor shell fire being able to touch it, and when opportunity offers, after artillery cannonading, or at night, to advance to the other crest nearest the enemy and intrench there; but at Spion Kop, owing perhaps to the fog, neither one nor the other method was adopted, the trenches were placed in the middle of the plateau, and, as made, were not of much use--too little earth was thrown up, and a little earth will not resist a Mauser bullet. If earth is used it must be in considerable quantity, and there was not much available. There were, however, plenty of stones, with which the Boers soon construct their cover. Badly-made trenches placed in an absolutely wrong and a most exposed position, contrary to Sir Charles Warren’s instructions, constituted the first fault.

The second fault committed on the summit was crowding line upon line to give the firing line moral support. The result was carnage. The officers commanding brigades and Colonel Thorneycroft clamoured for reinforcements to give this moral support. Major-General Coke several times checked the upward move of reinforcements, but in the end gave way to urgent messages and let them go on until by 3.30 P.M. the small summit was crowded with five battalions besides details. Sir Redvers Buller, Sir Charles Warren, Major-Generals Coke and Lyttelton, and Colonel àCourt all thought two battalions on the top sufficient.

Both these faults were due to want of proper training of both officers and men.

We shall now consider Sir Redvers Buller’s despatches and memorandum of 30th January 1900 in some detail, and make some very adverse criticisms. It is with reluctance that we do so, but it must be remembered that Sir Redvers has no one but himself to blame that these despatches are before the public. It was his own doing that they saw the light in the first instance, and it is equally his own doing that the portions omitted in the first instance have lately been published too. It is only, therefore, in justice to Sir Charles Warren, who has not been allowed to reply, that we examine these despatches critically.

It will not be forgotten that a despatch written a month earlier on the Zoutspan Drift action was perused by critics at home with amazement and perplexity. The easy insouciance with which the late Adjutant-General of the Forces, who for seven years had been primarily responsible for the training of the officers and men of the army, referred to their want of training when tried in the field, it was felt, could not easily be surpassed.

‘I suppose,’ he wrote, ‘our officers will learn the value of scouting in time, but in spite of all one can say, up to this our men seem to blunder into the middle of the enemy, and suffer accordingly.’

But his despatches of 30th January throw this one into the shade in their complete detachment from all responsibility, and recall, more than anything else, the reports of an umpire at peace manœuvres, which praise this side and blame that, with the comfortable assurance that the writer is an independent observer, on whom no one can turn the tables.

In the first of the two despatches of 30th January Sir Redvers Buller gives no indication, as we have already pointed out, of what he intended Sir Charles Warren to do when he sent him across the Tugela. He merely regrets that an expedition, which he thinks should have succeeded, failed, and refers to Sir Charles Warren’s despatch for particulars. The only comment on Sir Charles Warren’s dispositions was that he had ‘mixed up all the brigades, and the positions he held were dangerously insecure.’

In the second despatch, while maintaining the same attitude of irresponsibility, he adopts the _rôle_ of the captious critic. He objects to Sir Charles Warren’s statement that three and a-half days’ supplies were insufficient to advance by the left through Acton Homes, because, he says, he had promised to keep--and was actually keeping--Sir Charles filled up. As if this in any way affected the amount of provisions he could carry with him when once he had cleared the position in front and moved forward and away from the Tugela.

From this trivial and futile criticism Sir Redvers jumps suddenly to 23rd January, on which day, he says, he went over to see Sir Charles Warren and pointed out that he had no further report, and no intimation of the special arrangements foreshadowed in a telegram from him on the 19th. It might from this be supposed that since the 19th Sir Redvers had had no communication with Sir Charles Warren, was getting anxious, and thought it time after four days’ silence to inquire what he was doing; it would hardly occur to any one that he was in constant telegraphic communication with Warren, and that he had been with him both on the 21st and the 22nd of the month.

What were the special arrangements referred to in Sir Charles Warren’s letter of the 19th, and why is it suggested that they were kept, so to speak, up his sleeve, until his Commander could stand it no longer?

‘On January 20th,’ said Sir Redvers Buller in his telegraphic despatch of 27th January, ‘Sir Charles Warren, as I have reported, drove back the enemy and obtained possession of the southern crests of the higher tableland, which extends from the line Acton Homes-Honger’s Poort to the Western Ladysmith Hills.’ We may conclude, therefore, that on the 20th Sir Charles Warren was too fully occupied to telegraph what were the special arrangements he had mentioned in his telegram of the night before. On the 21st Sir Redvers Buller saw him and was able to discuss the matter verbally with him, and if he did not do so surely it was his own fault, as he might very easily have asked him anything he wanted to know.

These special arrangements were apparently three:

(1) Continual bombardment; then

(2) To advance on both sides of an arête or gully, outflanking the enemy on either side as he advanced; and finally

(3) To proceed without wagons when he had driven the enemy out.

They resulted, as we have seen, from the reconnaissances of the 18th, which impressed Sir Charles Warren with the difficulties of any advance with fifteen miles of wagons. He therefore proposed to keep the wagons at Venter’s Laager until he was able to advance, and then send them back across the river. There was no great secret about these proposals. With the first and second Sir Redvers apparently concurred, and with the third he did not. If he thought Sir Charles had anything else in view, why did he not ask him?

Sir Redvers Buller, in his despatch of 30th January, then goes on to say that he further pointed out to Sir Charles Warren ‘that for four days he had kept his men continuously exposed to shell and rifle fire, perched on the edge of an almost precipitous hill, that the position admitted of no second line and the supports were massed close behind the firing line in indefensible formations, and that a panic or sudden charge might send the whole lot in disorder down the hill at any moment. I said it was too dangerous a situation to be prolonged, and that he must either attack, or I should withdraw his force. I advocated, as I had previously done, an advance from his left.’

One has really to call to mind that it is Sir Charles Warren’s commanding officer who gives utterance to these observations, that he personally saw the troops under Warren cross the Tugela, that he issued to them the ‘no turning back’ order, that he addressed General Woodgate’s Brigade when it had crossed and gave that General instructions as to his attack, that from day to day he telegraphed home encouraging accounts of the operations being carried out, that he made no sign of disapproval, that he was in telegraphic communication with Sir Charles Warren all the time and many messages passed to and fro, that on three days out of the four--viz. on the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd--he was personally present with the force and the dispositions of the troops were made subject to his approval, that he had himself given directions how the howitzers were to be disposed, and that in his telegraphic despatch of 27th January, when all was over, he had stated that ‘the actual position held was perfectly tenable but did not lend itself to advance.’ It was surely unfair to himself as well as to Sir Charles Warren to make out that for four days the troops remained in one position, and that a dangerous one.

But if the dispositions were those of Sir Charles Warren, and he alone was responsible for them, did they merit the disapproval with which his chief stigmatises them? Is not the attack of a hill, whose top is exposed to the enemy’s artillery fire and affords barely any cover, best undertaken by seizing and holding the near crest line--in other words, ‘perching on its edge’? If the attack intrench this near crest, their reserves can remain lower down under cover; any shell fire which does not hit the trench passes harmlessly over; reliefs, also, can be safely carried out, and supplies of ammunition, water, and food brought up to the firing line without exposure.

As we have already observed, and perhaps may be permitted to repeat in this connection, had Sir Charles Warren’s instructions been carried out at Spion Kop--and probably the fog made it difficult to do so--his firing line would have been on the outer edge of the hill, that farthest from the enemy, and not on the plateau, and what better position could it have had? A small body could have held it, which could have been relieved from time to time, and at nightfall the other crest nearest to the enemy could have been seized and intrenched. Then again reserves massed behind a hill are not in so bad a position as Sir Redvers Buller’s despatch would imply, and when he speaks of the danger of a possible sudden charge of the Boers driving the whole lot of our men in disorder down the hill, he does not appear to appreciate the distinctive qualities either of the foe or of our own men. What would Tommy Atkins have more warmly welcomed, or the Boers have more disliked, than a contest at close quarters with cold steel?

Unfortunately, the feeble intrenchments which were constructed on Spion Kop were too far advanced on the plateau of the hill, so that the approach to them from the edge of the hill was exposed to the shell and rifle fire of the enemy, and, equally unfortunately, neither mountain battery nor naval guns were sent over by Sir Redvers Buller in time to be of use in opposing the Boer fire.

In a previous chapter we noted that no sign of dissatisfaction with Sir Charles Warren’s conduct appeared in any of Sir Redvers Buller’s telegrams during the operations, and if these telegrams are compared with the despatches they will be found to be glaringly inconsistent.

We find, further, that while in large matters, such as the attack from the left, in which the strategy of the Commander-in-Chief might be involved, Sir Redvers Buller contented himself with advocating the course he preferred, and abstained from giving any order for its adoption, in comparatively small matters, which would more obviously lie within the province of the subordinate commander to determine, he, on several occasions, caused his own views to be carried out. Thus he substituted Major-General Woodgate for Major-General Coke in the command of the column for the assault of Spion Kop, because the one was able to climb better than the other; and he nominated over the heads of experienced colonels Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft, a young and inexperienced major of a year’s standing, holding the local rank of lieut.-colonel, to command on Spion Kop after Major-General Woodgate was wounded, because he was a good hard-fighting man. Neither physical strength and ability to climb nor the gallantry of a fighting man are, however, the main qualifications of a commander, and these efforts of the Commander-in-Chief to assert himself in minor matters had, it would seem, something to say to the failure of the enterprise.

That Sir Redvers Buller should endeavour to justify the retirement of Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft is not difficult to understand; that he should attempt to do so at the expense of his second-in-command is inexplicable. It was only human nature that he should wish to support the action of the gallant young officer, specially selected by himself to command over the head of his seniors, who had fought like a lion and had kept up the spirit of his men in depressing circumstances.

But had the same warm and generous sentiment animated him towards his second-in-command he could not have supported the retirement by disparaging the work done by Sir Charles Warren, and by belittling or ignoring altogether the efforts he had made to enable the garrison of Spion Kop to hold on to the position.

Probably the unkindest cut of all, though no doubt the result of thoughtlessness, was Sir Redvers Buller’s telegram of 25th January: ‘Warren’s garrison, I am sorry to say, I find this morning had in the night abandoned Spion Kop.’ He might have said ‘Thorneycroft’s garrison,’ and he could well have afforded to say ‘my garrison,’ but this would have been to abandon the _rôle_ of the irresponsible critic.

So also he declined to hold any investigation into the circumstances of the withdrawal as proposed by Sir Charles Warren. He says in his despatch:

‘I have not thought it necessary to order any investigation. If at sundown the defence of the summit had been taken regularly in hand, intrenchments laid out, gun emplacements prepared, the dead removed, the wounded collected, and, in fact, the whole place brought under regular military command, and careful arrangements made for the supply of water and food to the scattered fighting line, the hills would have been held, I am sure.

‘But no arrangements were made. General Coke appears to have been ordered away just as he would have been useful, and no one succeeded him; those on the top were ignorant of the fact that guns were coming up, and generally there was a want of organisation and system that acted most unfavourably upon the defence.’

Such a string of inconsistencies and erroneous statements only shows that not only did Sir Redvers Buller not think it necessary to order an official investigation, but that he did not even think it necessary before writing his despatch to take the trouble to ascertain the facts for himself.

_At sundown_, before any defence could be taken regularly in hand, the abandonment had not only been decided upon by Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft, but the preparations for retirement were actually commenced. This he might have gathered from Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft’s report, in which he says: ‘When night began to close in I determined to take some steps,’ &c., and there must have been other reports, which have not been published, before him from which he could have known the precise time when the retirement was arranged.

After categorically enumerating the various arrangements that should have been made at nightfall in order to hold the position on the following day, Sir Redvers Buller writes: ‘But no arrangements were made.’ He does not say who should have made them, or who should have carried them out, but the inference from what he says is that as ‘General Coke appears to have been ordered away just as he would have been useful,’ he considers that Major-General Coke should have made them.

But Major-General Coke did not receive the order to go and see Sir Charles Warren until 9.30 P.M., some three hours after nightfall, and after the order for withdrawal had been given.

In refutation of Sir Redvers Buller’s assertion that no arrangements were made, in face of all the reports he had before him, some of which have been published, showing what arrangements were made, let us see if it can be ascertained what actually was done.

PRECAUTIONS TAKEN AND ARRANGEMENTS MADE

_Hospital and Ambulance Work._--A field hospital was established at Wright’s farm and all the available ambulance and stretcher bearers were assembled at the foot of Spion Kop ready for action. Mr. Winston Spencer Churchill says that in ascending Spion Kop on the afternoon of 24th January he passed through the ambulance village. Every available stretcher belonging to every brigade was in use on Spion Kop.

It may be here observed that the casualties of Spion Kop itself were not so great as at Colenso, although, if the whole week’s fighting is considered, they were greater.

_Food._--The troops went up Spion Kop with one day’s rations in hand, and during the day the regimental wagons were collected at the foot, within 600 feet of the summit. So that the troops on Spion Kop were quite as near their food as they had been at Three Tree Hill.

_Ammunition._--Mr. Winston S. Churchill relates how he found a man dragging down a box of ammunition all by himself. There was plenty of ammunition on the summit at sunset, and it was unfortunate that Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft did not ascertain this.

Sir Charles Warren, in his despatch of 1st February 1900 (Blue Book, p. 76), states that the Dorset Regiment carried down a large quantity of ammunition in the dark, which otherwise would have fallen into the hands of the enemy.

_Water Supply._--Majors H. N. Sargent and E. J. Williams were in charge of the water supply, and their reports of 28th January have been published. The former says:

‘All the available pack mules which could be procured, viz. 25, were utilised in carrying biscuit tins filled with water up the hill, the tins being refilled from water carts placed at the foot of Spion Kop. Each tin contained 8½ to 9 gallons of water. An officer was placed in charge of the water carts, and had a plentiful supply of spare tins, in addition to those carried by the mules. The mules were divided into two sections, each under an officer. These two sections of mules conveyed to the troops up the hill at each trip 425 gallons of water.

‘The water supply was kept going continuously during the day and late at night, with the exception of one break, caused by an order being given for one section of mules to bring up ammunition. In addition to the water conveyed on mules, there was a spring at the top of the hill under Royal Engineers’ charge, which yielded a fair supply. I superintended generally the water supply myself, and made frequent inquiries as to whether the troops were getting sufficient quantity on top of the hill, and was told they were.’

Major Williams states that he took twelve mules with water to the trees near the top of the hill, arriving there about noon, and established a water depôt there; that the mules made a second trip, and were then taken for ammunition; that the Royal Engineers successfully dug for water at a place three quarters of the way up the hill, that it was thick but fairly plentiful; that from 3 P.M. to 8 P.M. he impressed more mules and continued to hurry up water to the water depôt, while men were also sent up with filled water bottles for distribution to the fighting line. At 8 P.M. it was too dark for the mules to work, and although several fell over the cliff in getting up, there were at that time several full boxes of water at different spots on the hill. He also says that supplies of all kinds were plentiful at the foot of the hill.

Colonel A. W. Morris, Assistant Adjutant-General, who accompanied Major-General Coke up Spion Kop, saw the water depôt supply by the trees--some twenty tins of water. He says in his report of 28th January:

‘Personally, I do not think the men were suffering very badly from want of water. I consider that under the circumstances nothing could have been better than the very difficult arrangements made for water supply: it was not plentiful, but sufficient for the purpose required.’

It seems clear from the above that there was a larger supply of water on Spion Kop than there was at any other hill action in Natal.

_Guns._--Major-General Coke attempted to take up a machine gun, but unfortunately it overturned. The mountain guns, the only guns that Sir Redvers Buller could spare for the summit of Spion Kop, were, it is believed, at Frere; at any rate, they were not in any way in Sir Charles Warren’s command and did not arrive at the foot of Spion Kop until 7.30 P.M. and then the men required rest. Shortly before noon on the 24th Sir Redvers Buller offered to send over two naval guns from Potgieter’s Drift, an offer which Sir Charles Warren accepted. They arrived at Spion Kop long after dark.

At 4 P.M. Sir Charles Warren sent Captain Hanwell, R.A., up Spion Kop to arrange about placing these naval guns, and had Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft been properly exercising command he should have learnt all about the guns from this officer. Slides were made in the morning in the hillside in case the naval guns should arrive, and 3-inch cable was got ready for hauling them up. These guns could have been got up, but even if they had been placed on the slopes they would have knocked out the pom-poms.

An Artillery officer, Lieutenant Dooner, was also on Spion Kop all day telegraphing information to the Officer Commanding Royal Artillery as to the effect of his fire.

Two guns of the 19th Battery Royal Field Artillery were ordered up the hill to the lower slopes, and had just started when they were met by the retiring force and turned back. Lord Dundonald also had orders to take his machine gun up.

_Engineer Operations._--These seem to have been very complete. Lieut.-Colonel Wood and his Staff Officer, Lieut.-Colonel Sim and his Staff Officer, and the 17th Company of Royal Engineers were engaged about Spion Kop all the time, and the 37th Company, sent from Potgieter’s, arrived at midnight of 24th January.

During the 24th the whole of the picks, shovels, and sandbags in possession of the force were carried up to the summit of Spion Kop, and were there ready to be made use of at sundown. Colonel Hill knew where they were deposited; Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft apparently did not.

The 17th Company R.E. made the mule path and the gun slides, which were ready the one at noon, the others in the afternoon. This company and others were employed in developing the springs on the sides of Spion Kop, and also made a dam. In the afternoon a message was sent to the half of the 17th Company R.E. on the top of Spion Kop directing the officer in command to be ready to make entrenchments there at nightfall, and Colonel Sim was ordered to go up with a working party of the Somersetshire Regiment.

It is not too much, then, to say that so far as Sir Charles Warren was concerned everything was ready, and action would have been taken during the night in regard to all the points mentioned by Sir Redvers Buller had not the retirement prevented it.

Sir Redvers Buller was therefore mistaken when he wrote, ‘No arrangements were made.’ Arrangements _were_ made, as stated in Sir Charles Warren’s despatch and corroborated from so many sources. It _was_ known on the top of Spion Kop that the guns were to go up, but quite possibly Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft did not know it, as he did not place himself in a position to know anything but what was going on in the firing line, and at sundown, when everything should have been done and could have been done, he ordered the withdrawal.

And yet this is the one act which Sir Redvers Buller singles out for special commendation. Colonel Thorneycroft, he says, ‘saved the situation’ and ‘exercised a wise discretion.’

Now, no one will withhold from this officer the praise due to his gallantry, but his determination to retire from Spion Kop, in spite of the ‘No surrender’ order sent to Colonel Crofton, in spite of the protests of Colonel Hill, in spite of the remonstrances of other officers, and in spite of the explicit orders of Sir Charles Warren conveyed to him on the way down by Colonel Sim, was not so much an error of judgment as an assumption of responsibility which, had it been a determination to advance in spite of orders, might perhaps have been justified by success, but as a determination to retire was perfectly unjustifiable and led to the abrupt termination of an enterprise which had been boldly commenced by the seizure of the key of the position, and which, in the opinion of Lord Roberts, ought to have succeeded.

If, then, the chief blame for this failure must lie upon the officer who ordered and carried out the retirement from Spion Kop, the officer in chief command, who assumed so detached a position in his orders and despatches, and yet so constantly interfered when he should have given his second-in-command a free hand, seems to be rightly dealt with in the observations of Lord Roberts.

Had he furnished Sir Charles Warren with naval guns, with mountain guns, and with a balloon in time to be of use, and not on urgent request at the last moment; had he allowed Sir Charles Warren time to continue his bombardment and supplied him with longer-ranging guns, instead of urging him to attack on the threat of withdrawing the force; had he even, after the decision to attack Spion Kop, at once sent over the naval 12-prs. and another company of Royal Engineers to help to get them up at sundown, the story might have been different. But he did none of these things. He only appointed an inexperienced young officer to take command at the top of Spion Kop over all his seniors, and thinks that officer saved the situation by the wise discretion he exercised in abandoning the position he was chosen to defend.

If the memorandum ‘not necessarily for publication’ recently published does not, to our mind, add much to the blame Sir Redvers Buller had already thrown upon Sir Charles Warren, it certainly puts more definitely the opinion the senior had formed of his junior, and, in this light, should not have been concealed from the latter for two years; but, on the other hand, the memorandum tends to lessen our already waning confidence in Sir Redvers Buller.

The same sort of inconsistencies run through it that we have noticed in the despatches. Thus he says: ‘On the 19th he (Sir Charles Warren) attacked and gained a considerable advantage. On the 20th, instead of pursuing it, he divided his force and gave Clery a separate command.’ But there is no sort of agreement between this statement and the telegram he sent at 9.15 P.M. on the 20th, wherein he relates how Clery by judicious use of his artillery had fought his way up, capturing ridge after ridge for about three miles, and the troops were bivouacking on the ground he had gained.

So in the next sentence of the memorandum: ‘On the 21st I find that his (Warren’s) right was in advance of his left, and that the whole of his batteries, six, were crowded on one small position on his right, while his left was unprotected by artillery, and I had come out to tell him that the enemy on that flank had received a reinforcement of at least 2,500. I suggested a better distribution of his batteries, which he agreed to to some extent, but he would not advance his left.’ How is it possible to reconcile this statement with his telegram of 21st January, in which he said: ‘Warren has been engaged all day, chiefly on his left, which he has swung round about a couple of miles. The ground is very difficult, and, as the fighting is all the time up-hill, it is difficult exactly to say how much we gain, but I think we are making substantial progress’?

Finally his memorandum says: ‘On the 19th I ought to have assumed command myself; I saw that things were not going well--indeed, every one saw that. I blame myself now for not having done so.’ It was on the 19th that Warren made his flank march to Venter’s Laager, that he occupied the lower slopes of the Rangeworthy Hills, and that he reported the result of his reconnaissances. What was not going well? He had not been attacked, happily, in his flank march, he had decided that the road by Fair View to Groote Hoek must be the route--and, as we understand, Sir Redvers Buller says there can be no question that was the only route--and he had captured positions on the hills. Only a few paragraphs before in this same memorandum Sir Redvers Buller says that on the 19th Sir Charles Warren attacked and gained a considerable advantage. Is a considerable advantage indicative of things not going well? Instances of these apparent contradictions and inconsistencies in the actions, telegrams, and despatches of Sir Redvers Buller could be multiplied. What does it all mean? Why this sudden change of bearing towards his principal General? We cannot say; but there is the painful fact that after the abandonment of Spion Kop by the commander nominated by Sir Redvers Buller this change of attitude is evident on comparing the telegrams with the despatches.

In conclusion, whatever faults Sir Charles Warren may have exhibited, we can only say that the accusations made against him, and of which for months he was kept in ignorance, do not stand the investigation we have given them.

It has been stated in Parliament that in August 1900 Sir Charles Warren, on his return home, wrote his own answer to the accusations, of which he was then aware from the published despatches. Since then the Government has been worried by Sir Redvers Buller into publishing further accusations against Sir Charles Warren, who tells us, in his recent letter to the newspapers, that he has asked the Government in common justice to give his refutation the same publicity. At present the Government has decided not to publish it, in order that the personal controversy involved between two distinguished Generals may not be prolonged. But is this quite fair to Sir Charles Warren? Having made public all that is to be said against him, might he not be allowed to show that he can justify himself?

APPENDIX

_EXTRACTS FROM DESPATCHES_[8]

A

FROM FIELD-MARSHAL LORD ROBERTS TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR

Army Headquarters, South Africa, Camp, Dekiel Drift, Riet River: 13th February, 1900.

My Lord,--I have the honour to submit, for your Lordship’s information, despatches from General Sir Redvers Buller, describing the advance across the Tugela River on the 17th and 18th January, 1900, and the capture and evacuation of the Spion Kop position on the 23rd and 24th January, as well as certain minor operations between the 19th and 24th January on the right or eastern line of advance.

2. The plan of operations is not very clearly described in the despatches themselves, but it may be gathered from them and the accompanying documents themselves that the original intention was to cross the Tugela at or near Trichard’s Drift, and thence by following the road past ‘Fair View’ and ‘Acton Homes,’ to gain the open plain north of Spion Kop, the Boer position in front of Potgieter’s Drift being too strong to be taken by direct attack. The whole force, less one brigade, was placed under the orders of Sir Charles Warren, who, the day after he had crossed the Tugela, seems to have consulted his General and principal Staff Officers, and to have come to the conclusion that the flanking movement which Sir Redvers Buller had mentioned in his secret instructions was impracticable on account of the insufficiency of supplies. He accordingly decided to advance by the more direct road leading north-east, and branching off from a point east of ‘Three Tree Hill.’ The selection of this road necessitated the capture and retention of Spion Kop, but whether it would have been equally necessary to occupy Spion Kop, had the line of advance indicated by Sir Redvers Buller been followed, is not stated in the correspondence. As Sir Charles Warren considered it impossible to make the wide flanking movement which was recommended, if not actually prescribed, in his secret instructions, he should at once have acquainted Sir Redvers Buller with the course of action which he proposed to adopt. There is nothing to show whether he did so or not, but it seems only fair to Sir Charles Warren to point out that Sir Redvers Buller appears throughout to have been aware of what was happening. On several occasions he was present during the operations. He repeatedly gave advice to his subordinate commander, and on the day after the withdrawal from Spion Kop he resumed the chief command.

{{3. In his note[9] on Sir Charles Warren’s report, accompanying despatch of 30th January 1900,[10] Sir Redvers Buller expresses a very adverse opinion on the manner in which Sir Charles Warren carried out the instructions he had received. Without a knowledge of the country and circumstances it is difficult to say whether the delay, misdirection, and want of control, of which Sir Redvers Buller complains, were altogether avoidable; but, in any case, if he considered that his orders were not being properly given effect to, it appears to me that it was his duty to intervene as soon as he had reason to believe that the success of the operations was being endangered. This, indeed, is admitted by Sir Redvers Buller himself, whose explanation of his non-interference can hardly be accepted as adequate. A most important enterprise was being attempted, and no personal considerations should have deterred the officer in chief command from insisting on its being conducted in the manner which, in his opinion, would lead to the attainment of the object in view, with the least possible loss on our side.}}

As regards the withdrawal of the troops from the Spion Kop position, which, though occupied almost without opposition in the early morning of the 24th January, had to be held throughout the day under an extremely heavy fire, and the retention of which had become essential to the relief of Ladysmith, I regret that I am unable to concur with Sir Redvers Buller in thinking that Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft exercised a wise discretion in ordering the troops to retire. Even admitting that due preparations may not have been made for strengthening the position during the night, reorganising the defence, and bringing up artillery--in regard to which Sir Charles Warren’s report does not altogether bear out Sir Redvers Buller’s contention--admitting also that the senior officers on the summit of the hill might have been more promptly informed of the measures taken by Sir Charles Warren to support and reinforce them, I am of opinion that Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft’s assumption of responsibility and authority was wholly inexcusable. During the night the enemy’s fire, if it did not cease altogether, could not have been formidable, and, though lamp signalling was not possible at the time, owing to the supply of oil having failed, it would not have taken more than two or three hours at most for Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft to communicate by messenger with Major-General Coke or Sir Charles Warren, and to receive a reply. Major-General Coke appears to have left Spion Kop at 9.30 P.M. for the purpose of consulting with Sir Charles Warren, and up to that hour the idea of a withdrawal had not been entertained. Yet almost immediately after Major-General Coke’s departure Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft issued an order, without reference to superior authority, which upset the whole plan of operations, and rendered unavailing the sacrifices which had already been made to carry it into effect.

On the other hand, it is only right to state that Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft appears to have behaved in a very gallant manner throughout the day, and it was doubtless due, in a great measure, to his exertions and example that the troops continued to hold the summit of the hill until directed to retire.

5. The conduct of Captain Phillips, Brigade-Major of the 10th Brigade, on the occasion in question, is deserving of high commendation. He did his best to rectify the mistake which was being made, but it was too late. Signalling communication was not re-established until 2.30 A.M. on the 25th January, and by that time the naval guns could not have reached the summit of the hill before daybreak. Major-General Coke did not return, and Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft had gone away. Moreover, most of the troops had begun to leave the hill, and the working parties, with the half company of Royal Engineers, had also withdrawn.

6. It is to be regretted that Sir Charles Warren did not himself visit Spion Kop during the afternoon or evening, knowing as he did that the state of affairs there was very critical, and that the loss of the position would involve the failure of the operations. He was, consequently, obliged to summon Major-General Coke to his headquarters in the evening in order that he might ascertain how matters were going on, and the command on Spion Kop thus devolved on Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft; but Major-General Coke was not aware of this. About midday, under instructions from Sir Redvers Buller, Sir Charles Warren had directed Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft to assume command on the summit of the hill, with the temporary rank of Brigadier-General, but this order was not communicated to Major-General Coke, who, until he left the position at 9.30 P.M., was under the impression that the command had devolved on Colonel Hill, as senior officer, after Colonel Crofton had been wounded. Omissions or mistakes of this nature may be trivial in themselves, yet may exercise an important influence on the course of events; and I think that Sir Redvers Buller is justified in remarking that ‘there was a want of organisation and system which acted most unfavourably on the defence.’

7. The attempt to relieve Ladysmith, described in these despatches, was well devised, and I agree with Sir Redvers Buller in thinking that it ought to have succeeded. That it failed may, in some measure, be due to the difficulties of the ground and the commanding positions held by the enemy--probably also to errors of judgment and want of administrative capacity on the part of Sir Charles Warren. But whatever faults Sir Charles Warren may have committed, the failure must also be ascribed to the disinclination of the officer in supreme command to assert his authority and see that what he thought best was done, and also to the unwarrantable and needless assumption of responsibility by a subordinate officer.

8. The gratifying feature in these despatches is the admirable behaviour of the troops throughout the operations.

I have the honour to be, My Lord,

Your Lordship’s most obedient Servant, ROBERTS, _Field-Marshal, Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa_.

B

FROM GENERAL SIR REDVERS BULLER TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR.

(_Through Field-Marshal Lord Roberts, G.C.B., Commander-in-Chief, Cape Town._)

Spearman’s Hill: 30th January, 1900.

Sir,--I have the honour to report that General Sir Charles Warren’s Division having arrived at Estcourt, less two battalions, 10th Brigade, which were left at the Cape, by the 7th January, it moved to Frere on the 9th.

{{I attach a copy of Natal Army Orders of the 8th January,[11] giving full particulars of the intended move and organisation of the force.}}

The column moved as ordered, but torrents of rain fell on the 9th, which filled all the spruits, and, indeed, rendered many of them impassable for many hours. To forward supply alone took 650 ox wagons, and as in the 16 miles from Frere to Springfield there were three places at which all the wagons had to be double spanned, and some required three spans, some idea may be formed of the difficulties, but these were all successfully overcome by the willing labours of the troops. {{I attach a statement of the supply trains.}}

The 4th Brigade reached Springfield on the 12th, in support of the mounted troops who had surprised and seized the important position of Spearman’s Hill, commanding Potgieter’s Drift, on the 11th.

By the 13th all troops were at Springfield and Spearman’s Hill, and supply was well forward.

On the 16th, a reserve of 17 days’ supply having been collected, General Sir C. Warren, in command of the 2nd Division, the 11th Brigade of the 5th Division, the Brigade Division Royal Field Artillery, 5th Division, and certain corps troops, including the Mounted Brigade, moved from Springfield to Trichard’s Drift, which is about six miles west of Potgieter’s.

{{I attach a copy of the orders[12] under which Sir C. Warren acted, and enclose his report of his operations (C).}}

On the night of the 23rd, General Warren attacked Spion Kop, which operation he has made the subject of a special report. On the morning of the 25th, finding that Spion Kop had been abandoned in the night, I decided to withdraw General Warren’s force; the troops had been continuously engaged for a week, in circumstances entailing considerable hardships, there had been very heavy losses on Spion Kop. General Warren’s dispositions had mixed up all the brigades, and the positions he held were dangerously insecure. I consequently assumed the command, commenced the withdrawal of the ox and heavy mule transport on the 25th; this was completed by midday the 26th; by double spanning the loaded ox wagons got over the drift at the rate of about eight per hour. The mule wagons went over the pontoon bridge, but all the mules had to be taken out and the vehicles passed over by hand. For about seven hours of the night the drift could not be used as it was dangerous in the dark, but the use of the pontoon went on day and night. In addition to machine guns, six batteries of Royal Field Artillery, and four howitzers, the following vehicles were passed: ox wagons, 232; 10-span mule wagons, 98; 6-span, 107; 4-span, 52; total, 489 vehicles. In addition to these, the ambulances were working backwards and forwards evacuating the sick and wounded.

By 2 P.M., the 26th, all the ox wagons were over, and by 11.30 P.M. all the mule transports were across and the bridge clear for the troops. By 4 A.M., the 27th, all the troops were over, and by 8 A.M. the pontoons were gone and all was clear. The troops had all reached their new camps by 10 A.M. The marches averaged for the mounted troops about 7 miles, and for the infantry and artillery an average of 5 miles.

Everything worked without a hitch, and the arrangements reflected great credit on the Staff of all degrees; but I must especially mention Major Irwin, R.E., and his men of the Pontoon Troop, who were untiring. When all men were over, the chesses of the pontoon bridge were so worn by the traffic that I do not think they would have lasted another half hour.

Thus ended an expedition which I think ought to have succeeded. We have {{suffered heavily (for casualty return, _see_ K), very heavy losses, and}} lost many whom we can ill spare; but, on the other hand, we have inflicted as great or greater losses upon the enemy than they have upon us, and they are, by all accounts, thoroughly disheartened; while our troops are, I am glad and proud to say, in excellent fettle.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient Servant, REDVERS BULLER, _General Officer Commanding_.

C

FROM LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR CHARLES WARREN TO THE CHIEF OF THE STAFF

Hatting’s Farm: 29th January, 1900.

Sir,--I have the honour to make the following report on the operations on the north side of the Tugela, west of Spion Kop, from the 17th to the 27th of January, 1900:--

1. On the 8th January field orders were published constituting the 10th Brigade of the 5th Division a Corps Brigade, and placing the 4th Brigade in the 5th Division. The 5th Division thus constituted marched from Frere on the 10th instant, arriving at Springfield on the 12th instant.

2. On the 15th January I received your secret instructions to command a force to proceed across the Tugela, near Trichardt’s Drift, to the west of Spion Kop, recommending me to proceed forward refusing my right (namely, Spion Kop), and bringing my left forward to gain the open plain north of Spion Kop. This move was to commence as soon as supplies were all in, and the 10th Brigade (except two companies) removed from Springfield Bridge to Spearman’s Hill.

3. I was provided with 4 days’ rations, with which I was to cross the Tugela, fight my way round to north of Spion Kop, and join your column opposite Potgieter’s.

4. On the 15th January I made the arrangements for getting supplies, and moved the 10th Brigade on the following day; and on the evening of the 16th January I left Springfield with a force under my command, which amounted to an Army Corps (less one brigade), and by a night march arrived at Trichardt’s Drift, and took possession of the hills on the south side of the Tugela.

5. On the 17th January I threw pontoon bridges across the Tugela, passed the infantry across by ponts, and captured the hills immediately commanding the drift on the north side with two brigades commanded by Generals Woodgate and Hart. The Commander-in-Chief was present during part of the day, and gave some verbal directions to General Woodgate.

The Mounted Brigade passed over principally by the drift, and went over the country as far as Acton Homes, and on the following day (18th) had a successful action with a small party of Boers, bringing in 31 prisoners.

During the night of the 17th, and day of the 18th, the whole of the wagons belonging to the force were brought across the Tugela, and the artillery were in position outside of Wright’s Farm.

6. On the 19th two brigades advanced, occupying the slopes of the adjoining hills on the right, and the wagons were successfully brought to Venter’s Spruit.

In the evening, after having examined the possible roads by which we could proceed, I assembled the General Officers and the Staff, and the Officer Commanding Royal Artillery, and Commanding Royal Engineer, and pointed out to them that of the two roads by which we could advance the eastern one, by Acton Homes, must be rejected, because time would not allow of it, and with this all concurred. I then pointed out that the only possible way of all getting through by the road north of Fair View would be by taking 3 or 4 days’ food in our haversacks, and sending all our wagons back across the Tugela; but before we could do this we must capture the position in front of us.

7. On the following day, 20th January, I placed two brigades and six batteries of artillery at the disposal of General Sir C. F. Clery, with instructions to attack the Boer positions by a series of outflanking movements (copy of instructions herewith[13]), and by the end of the day, after fighting for 12 hours, we were in possession of the whole part of hills, but found a strongly entrenched line on the comparatively flat country beyond us.

8. On the 21st the Boers displayed considerable activity on our left, and the Commander-in-Chief desired me to move two batteries from right to left. At a subsequent date, during the day, I found it impossible to proceed without howitzers, and telegraphed for four from Potgieter’s. These arrived early on the morning of the 22nd, and the Commander-in-Chief, arriving about the same time, directed me to place two of these howitzers on the left, two having already been placed on the right flank. I pointed out to the Commander-in-Chief that it would be impossible to get wagons through by the road leading past Fair View unless we first took Spion Kop, which lies within about 2,000 yards of the road. The Commander-in-Chief agreed that Spion Kop would have to be taken. Accordingly that evening orders were drawn up giving the necessary instructions to General Talbot Coke to take Spion Kop that night, but, owing to an absence of sufficient reconnaissance, he requested that the attack might be put off for a day.[14]

9. On the 23rd January the Commander-in-Chief came into camp, the attack on Spion Kop was decided upon, and Lieut.-Colonel àCourt, of the Headquarters Staff, was directed by the Commander-in-Chief to accompany General Woodgate, who was detailed to command the attacking column. The account of the capture of Spion Kop is given in another report.

10. On the morning of the 25th January the Commander-in-Chief arrived, decided to retire the force, and assumed direct command. The whole of the wagons of the 5th Division were got down to the drift during the day, and were crossed over before 2 P.M. on the 26th January.

11. The arrangements for the retirement of the 5th Division were exceedingly well got out, and the retirement was made in good order during the night of the 26th, the whole of the troops crossing to the south side of the Tugela before daylight, and the wagons were packed, and the troops bivouacked near the spruit about 2 miles to the east of the pontoon bridges. About 10 P.M., previous to the retirement, heavy musketry was heard to the north of our position, which has been attributed to a Boer commando thinking we were going to make a night attack.

{{12. I append reports[15] from Lieut.-General Sir C. F. Clery, K.C.B., on the operations conducted by him on the 20th, 21st, and 22nd, also from Major-General Hildyard, C.B., for his operations on those dates.

13. I propose to forward as soon as possible a more detailed report of the movements of brigades and units, and acts of individuals.}}

C. WARREN, _Lieut.-General, Commanding 5th Division_.

D

SIR REDVERS BULLER’S MEMORANDUM ‘NOT NECESSARILY FOR PUBLICATION.’

{{Spearman’s Camp: 30th January, 1900.

Secretary of State,--In forwarding this report[16] I am constrained to make the following remarks, not necessarily for publication:

I had fully discussed my orders with General Warren before he started, and he appeared entirely to agree that the policy indicated of refusing the right and advancing the left was the right one. He never, though, attempted to carry it out. From the first there could be no question but that the only practicable road for his column was the one by Fair View. The problem was to get rid of the enemy who were holding it.

The arrival of the force at Trichard’s was a surprise to the enemy, who were not in strength. Sir C. Warren, instead of feeling for the enemy, elected to spend two whole days in passing his baggage. During this time the enemy received reinforcements and strengthened his position. On the 19th he attacked and gained a considerable advantage. On the 20th, instead of pursuing it, he divided his force, and gave General Clery a separate command.

On the 21st I find that his right was in advance of his left, and that the whole of his batteries, six, were crowded on one small position on his right, while his left was unprotected by artillery, and I had come out to tell him that the enemy on that flank had received a reinforcement of at least 2,500. I suggested a better distribution of his batteries, which he agreed to, to some extent, but he would not advance his left, and I found that he had divided his fighting line into three independent commands, independent of each other and apparently independent of him, as he told me he could not move any batteries without General Clery’s consent.

The days went on. I saw no attempt on the part of General Warren either to grapple with the situation or to command his force himself. By the 23rd I calculated that the enemy, who were about 600 strong on the 16th, were not less than 15,000, and General White confirmed this estimate. We had really lost our chance by Sir C. Warren’s slowness. He seems to me a man who can do well what he can do himself, but who cannot command, as he can use neither his Staff nor subordinates. I can never employ him again on an independent command.

On the 19th I ought to have assumed command myself; I saw that things were not going well--indeed, every one saw that. I blame myself now for not having done so. I did not, because I thought that if I did I should discredit General Warren in the estimation of the troops; and that if I were shot, and he had to withdraw across the Tugela, and they had lost confidence in him, the consequences might be very serious.

I must leave it to higher authority whether this argument was a sound one. Anyhow, I feel convinced that we had a good chance on the 17th, and that we lost it.

REDVERS BULLER, _General_.}}

E

FROM THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING, NATAL, TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR

(_By the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, Cape Town_)

Spearman’s Hill: 30th January, 1900.

Sir,--In forwarding Lieut.-General Sir C. Warren’s report on the capture and evacuation of Spion Kop, I have the honour to offer the following observations. {{The figures in my report refer to those in margin:--}}

1. Sir C. Warren is hardly correct in saying that he was only allowed 3½ days’ provisions. I had told him that transport for 3½ days would be sufficient burden to him, but that I would keep him filled up as he wanted it. That he was aware of this is shown by the following telegram which he sent on the day in question. It is the only report I had from Sir C. Warren:--

(Sent 7.54 P.M. Received 8.15 A.M.)

‘Left Flank: 19th January.

‘To Chief of the Staff,--I find there are only two roads by which we could possibly get from Trichard’s Drift to Potgieter’s, on the north of the Tugela--one by Acton Homes, the other by Fair View and Rosalie; the first I reject as too long, the second is a very difficult road for a large number of wagons, unless the enemy is thoroughly cleared out. I am, therefore, going to adopt some special arrangements which will involve my stay at Venter’s Laager for 2 or 3 days. I will send in for further supplies and report progress.

‘C. WARREN.’

The reply to this was that 3 days’ supply was being sent.

2. I went over to Sir C. Warren on the 23rd. I pointed out to him that I had no further report and no intimation of the special arrangements foreshadowed by this telegram of the 19th; that for four days he had kept his men continuously exposed to shell and rifle fire, perched on the edge of an almost precipitous hill; that the position admitted of no second line, and the supports were massed close behind the firing line in indefensible formations, and that a panic or a sudden charge might send the whole lot in disorder down the hill at any moment. I said it was too dangerous a situation to be prolonged, and that he must either attack or I should withdraw his force. I advocated, as I had previously done, an advance from his left. He said that he had the night before ordered General Coke to assault Spion Kop, but the latter had objected to undertaking a night attack on a position the road to which he had not reconnoitred, and added that he intended to assault Spion Kop that night.

3. I suggested that as General Coke was still lame from the effects of a lately broken leg, General Woodgate, who had two sound legs, was better adapted for mountain climbing.

4. As no heliograph could, on account of the fire, be kept on the east side of Spion Kop, messages for Sir C. Warren were received by our signallers at Spearman, and telegraphed to Sir C. Warren; thus I saw them before he did, as I was at the signal station. The telegram Sir C. Warren quotes did not give me confidence in its sender, and, at the moment, I could see that our men on the top had given way, and that efforts were being made to rally them. I telegraphed to Sir C. Warren: ‘Unless you put some really good hard-fighting man in command on the top you will lose the hill. I suggest Thorneycroft.’

{{5. This is a mistake. _See_ =A= in Sir C. Warren’s report. Colonel àCourt was sent down by General Woodgate almost as soon as he gained the summit.}}

6. I have not thought it necessary to order any investigation. If at sundown the defence of the summit had been taken regularly in hand, entrenchments laid out, gun emplacements prepared, the dead removed, the wounded collected, and, in fact, the whole place brought under regular military command, and careful arrangements made for the supply of water and food to the scattered fighting line, the hills would have been held, I am sure.

7. But no arrangements were made. General Coke appears to have been ordered away just as he would have been useful, and no one succeeded him; those on the top were ignorant of the fact that guns were coming up, and generally there was a want of organisation and system that acted most unfavourably on the defence.

It is admitted by all that Colonel Thorneycroft acted with the greatest gallantry throughout the day, and really saved the situation. Preparations for the second day’s defence should have been organised during the day, and have been commenced at nightfall.

As this was not done, I think Colonel Thorneycroft exercised a wise discretion.

Our losses, I regret to say, were very heavy, but the enemy admitted to our doctors that theirs were equally severe, and though we were not successful in retaining the position, the losses inflicted on the enemy and the attack generally have had a marked effect upon them.

I cannot close these remarks without bearing testimony to the gallant and admirable behaviour of the troops: the endurance shown by the Lancashire Fusiliers, the Middlesex Regiment, and Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry was admirable, while the efforts of the 2nd Battalion Scottish Rifles and 3rd Battalion King’s Royal Rifles were equally good, and the Royal Lancasters fought gallantly.

I am writing to catch the mail, and have not any particulars yet to enable me to report more fully on details.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient Servant, REDVERS BULLER.

F

REPORT BY LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR CHARLES WARREN, K.C.B., UPON THE CAPTURE AND SUBSEQUENT EVACUATION OF SPION KOP

_Capture and Evacuation of Spion Kop_

Chief of the Staff,--I make the operations against Spion Kop in a separate report, because they did not enter into my original plans.

Under the original instructions of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, of 15th January, 1900, I was to act as circumstances required, but, according to instructions, was generally to continue throughout refusing my right, and throwing my left forward until I gained the open plain north of Spion Kop.

[Sidenote: 1]

Upon the 19th of January, on arrival at Venter’s Laager, I assembled all the General Officers, Officers Commanding Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers of Divisions, and Staff Officers together. I pointed out to them that, with the three and a-half (3½) days’ provisions allowed, it was impossible to advance by the left road through Acton Homes. In this they unanimously concurred. I showed them that the only possible road was that going over Fair View through Rosalie, but I expressed my conviction that this could not be done unless we sent the whole of our transport back across the Tugela, and attempted to march through with our rations in our haversacks--without impedimenta.

The hills were cleared on the following day, and very strong entrenchments found behind them. The Commander-in-Chief was present on the 21st and 22nd January, and I pointed out the difficulties of marching along the road, accompanied by wagons, without first taking Spion Kop.

Accordingly, on the night of the 22nd, I ordered General Coke to occupy Spion Kop. He, however, desired that the occupation might be deferred for a day in order that he might make a reconnaissance with the Officers Commanding battalions to be sent there.

[Sidenote: 2]

On the 23rd January the Commander-in-Chief came into camp, and told me that there were two courses open--(1) to attack, or (2) to retire. I replied that I should prefer to attack Spion Kop to retiring, and showed the Commander-in-Chief my orders of the previous day.

[Sidenote: 3]

The Commander-in-Chief then desired that I should put General Woodgate in command of the expedition, and detailed Lieut.-Colonel àCourt to accompany him as Staff Officer.

The same evening General Woodgate proceeded with the Lancashire Fusiliers, the Royal Lancaster Regiment, a portion of Thorneycroft’s Horse, and half company Royal Engineers, supported by two companies of the Connaught Rangers and by the Imperial Light Infantry, the latter having just arrived by Trichardt’s Drift.

The attack and capture of Spion Kop was entirely successful. General Woodgate, having secured the summit on the 24th, reported that he had entrenched a position and hoped he was secure, but that the fog was too thick to permit him to see. The position was rushed without casualties, other than three men wounded.

[Sidenote: A]

Lieut.-Colonel àCourt came down in the morning and stated that everything was satisfactory and secure, and telegraphed to the Commander-in-Chief to that effect. Scarcely had he started on his return to headquarters when a heliogram arrived from Colonel Crofton (Royal Lancaster). The message was: ‘Reinforce at once, or all lost. General dead.’

He also sent a similar message to headquarters. I immediately ordered General Coke to proceed to his assistance, and to take command of the troops. He started at once, and was accompanied by the Middlesex and Dorsetshire Regiments.

I replied to Colonel Crofton: ‘I am sending two battalions, and the Imperial Light Infantry are on their way up. You must hold on to the last. No surrender.’

This occurred about 10 A.M.

[Sidenote: 4]

Shortly afterwards I received a telegram from the Commander-in-Chief, ordering me to appoint Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft to the command of the summit. I accordingly had heliographed: ‘With the approval of the Commander-in-Chief, I place Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft in command of the summit, with the local rank of Brigadier-General.’

For some hours after this message I could get no information from the summit. It appears that the signallers and their apparatus were destroyed by the heavy fire.

I repeatedly asked for Colonel Thorneycroft to state his view of the situation. At 1.20 P.M. I heliographed to ascertain whether Colonel Thorneycroft had assumed command, and at the same time asked General Coke to give me his views on the situation on Spion Kop. Still getting no reply, I asked whether General Coke was there, and subsequently received his view of the situation (copy attached). He stated that, unless the artillery could silence the enemy’s guns, the men on the summit could not stand another complete day’s shelling, and that the situation was extremely critical.

At 6.30 P.M. I asked if he could keep two battalions on the summit, removing the remainder out of reach of shells; also whether two battalions would suffice to hold the summit. This was in accordance with a telegram on the subject sent me by the Commander-in-Chief. Later in the evening I made arrangements to send two (naval) 12-prs. and the Mountain Battery Royal Artillery to the summit, together with half company Royal Engineers (and working parties, two reliefs of 600 men each), to strengthen the entrenchments and provide shell covers for the men. I may here mention that the 17th Company Royal Engineers proceeded at the same time as General Woodgate’s force, and were employed until daylight upon the entrenchments, then upon road making and water supply.

Sandbags were sent up early on the 24th instant.

While Colonel Sim was, with this party, ascending the hill, he met Colonel Thorneycroft descending, having evacuated the position. {{For the remainder of the account of the proceedings I attach the reports made to me by Colonel Thorneycroft[17] and by General Coke,[18] together with reports on the supply of food and water rendered by officers thus engaged. The supply of ammunition was ample.}}

I wish to bring to notice that I heard from all but one expression of the admirable conduct and bravery shown by officers and men suffering under a withering artillery fire on the summit of the slopes, and also of those who, with so much endurance, persisted in carrying up water and food and ammunition to the troops during this day.

[Sidenote: 5]

During the day a Staff Officer of the Headquarters Staff was present on the summit, and reported direct to the Commander-in-Chief.

At sunset I considered that the position could be held next day, provided that guns could be mounted and effective shelter provided. Both of these conditions were about to be fulfilled, as already mentioned.

In the absence of General Coke, whom I ordered to come to report in person as to the situation, the evacuation took place under orders, given upon his own responsibility, by Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft. This occurred in the face of the vigorous protests of General Coke’s Brigade-Major, the Officer Commanding the Middlesex Regiment, and others.

[Sidenote: 6]

It is a matter for the Commander-in-Chief to decide whether there should be an investigation into the question of the unauthorised evacuation of Spion Kop.

CHARLES WARREN, _Lieut.-General_.

G

{{FROM LIEUT.-COLONEL A. W. THORNEYCROFT, THORNEYCROFT’S MOUNTED INFANTRY, COMMANDING ON SPION KOP, TO THE CHIEF STAFF OFFICER TO GENERAL SIR C. WARREN.

Camp, Trichard’s Drift: 26th January, 1900.

Sir,--On the night of the 23rd January, 1900, I rendezvoused with 18 Officers and 180 men, Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry, 2nd Bat. Lancashire Fusiliers, 2nd Bat. Royal Lancaster Regiment, and half company Royal Engineers, the whole under the command of General Woodgate. At 9 P.M. we started to march to the top of Spion Kop. I led the way with a small advanced party, crossed the dongas and advanced up the hill; on reaching the first plateau the force closed up in formation, and went on again. As the front broadened I got the Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry into line, right across the hill, and the remainder followed in successive lines up the last slope, when we were suddenly challenged. I had ordered the men to lie down when challenged; they did so. The Boers opened fire from magazines. When I thought that they had emptied their magazines I gave the order to charge; an officer on my left gave the order to charge also, and the whole line advanced at the double and carried the crest line at 4 A.M., when I halted and reformed the line. There were about ten men wounded altogether. Orders were immediately given by General Officer Commanding to form a trench and breastwork. There was a mist on the hill, and in the darkness and mist it was difficult to get the exact crest line for a good field of fire, and the boulders made it difficult to dig, but we made a rough trench and breastwork. At 4.30 a few Boers came up and began firing. The men lined the trench, but the picquets in front replied to the fire, and firing ceased for a time. The Boers then returned with strong reinforcements from their camp, which lay concealed in a hollow on the side of the hill, and which was obscured in the mist; we sent out men in front to enable them to get a better field of fire; with two lulls in the firing the mist rose about 8 A.M., when the rifle fire on both sides became heavy and the Boers opened fire from three guns and a Maxim-Nordenfelt. The shrapnel fire was very accurate and burst well, sweeping the whole plateau. General Woodgate was wounded early in the action and Colonel Blomfield assumed command, but he, too, was wounded. At this time I was directing the movements of the Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry, and sent out reinforcements to the firing line which was in advance of the trench; word was sent to me that General Sir C. Warren had heliographed that I was to assume command. I sent out more men to the flanks as the Boers were working round, and the replacing of casualties gradually absorbed all the men of the force. The firing became hotter on both sides, the Boers gradually advancing; twice the men charged out from the entrenchments in the centre and kept them back, but at length the entrenchment became the firing line in the centre (the left maintained their advanced position).

The Boers closed in on the right and centre. Some men of mixed regiments at right end of trench got up and put up their hands; three or four Boers came out and signalled their comrades to advance. I was the only officer in the trench on the left, and I got up and shouted to the leader of the Boers that I was the Commandant and that there was no surrender.

In order not to get mixed up in any discussion I called on all men to follow me, and retired to some rocks further back. The Boers opened a heavy fire on us. On reaching the rocks I saw a company of the Middlesex Regiment advancing, I collected them up to the rocks, and ordered all to advance again. This the men did, and we re-occupied the trench and crest line in front.

As the companies of the Middlesex arrived I pushed them on to reinforce, and was able to hold the whole line again. The men on the left of our defence, who were detached at some distance from the trench, had held their ground. The Imperial Light Infantry reinforced this part. The Boers then made a desperate endeavour to shell us out of the position, and the fire caused many casualties. The Scottish Rifles came up, and I pushed them up to the right and left flanks as they arrived. There was some discussion at this time as to who was in command, and the Officer Commanding Scottish Rifles said he would go and see General Talbot Coke, who was reported to be at the foot of the hill, to get orders. Up to this I had issued the orders, but as I only got a verbal message I did not understand that I had the temporary rank of Brigadier-General. I continued to direct operations while the Officer Commanding Scottish Rifles went to see General Talbot Coke. General Coke said that Colonel Hill was in command, but I could not find him. The heavy fire continued, and the Boers brought a gun and Maxim-Nordenfelt to bear on us from the east, thus sweeping the plateau from the east, north, and north-west, and enfilading our trenches. The men held on all along the line, notwithstanding the terrific fire which was brought to bear on them, as the enemy’s guns (which now numbered five and two Nordenfelts) were absolutely unmolested. When night began to close in I determined to take some steps, and a consultation was held. The Officer Commanding Scottish Rifles and Colonel Crofton were both of opinion that the hill was untenable. I entirely agreed with their view, and so I gave the order for the troops to withdraw on to the neck and ridge where the hospital was. It was now quite dark, and we went out to warn all to come in. The enemy still kept up a dropping fire. The regiments formed up near the neck, and marched off in formation, the Scottish Rifles forming the rear guard. I was obliged, owing to want of bearers, to leave a large number of wounded on the field.

In forming my decision as to retirement I was influenced by the following:--

1. The superiority of the Boer artillery, inasmuch as their guns were placed in such positions as to prevent our artillery fire being brought to bear on them from the lower slopes near camp, or indeed from any other place.

2. By my not knowing what steps were being taken to supply me in the morning with guns, other than the mountain battery which, in my opinion, could not have lived under the long-range fire of the Boer artillery, and their close-range rifle fire.

3. By the total absence of water and provisions.

4. By the difficulty of entrenching on the top of hill, to make trench in any way cover from artillery fire with the few spades at my disposal, the ground being so full of rocks.

5. Finally, I did not see how the hill could be held unless the Boer artillery was silenced, and this was impossible.

Lieutenant Winston Churchill arrived when the troops had been marched off.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient Servant, ALEC. THORNEYCROFT, _Lieut.-Colonel, Commanding Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry_.}}

H

{{REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL TALBOT COKE, OFFICER COMMANDING 10TH BRIGADE

_Attack on Spion Kop, 23rd, 24th, 25th January, 1900_

Pontoon Bridge: 25th January, 1900.

In accordance with your orders, General Woodgate assumed command of the column for the night attack, and settled his rendezvous near the Royal Engineer bivouac, for 7 P.M., 23rd instant. I bivouacked on the hill upon which the Connaught Rangers’ picquets are south of Three Tree Hill.

The first shots were fired at 3.40 A.M.

The valley between my position and Spion Kop, and also the top of that feature itself, was enveloped in mist until about 8 A.M., when it could be seen that our force held the schanzes on the summit. Shortly after it was seen to be exposed to a frontal fire from rifles, and to shell fire from its left front.

In accordance with orders communicated to me by you, to send a battalion to reinforce, a signal message was sent to the Imperial Light Infantry, which occupied a covering position towards Wright’s Farm, to proceed at once to support, moving by the right flank of the kop. The 2nd Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment was ordered to the place vacated by the Imperial Light Horse.

The position of Spion Kop was now seen to be exposed to a cross fire of artillery, and by your instructions I sent the Middlesex Regiment in support.

About 11.10 A.M., in consequence of the regrettable news about General Woodgate, at your order I proceeded to the kop myself. On arrival there, I found the track leading up very much congested, and, from information received, I formed the opinion that too many men were getting into the trenches and stone cover above, and becoming exposed to the artillery fire; I accordingly checked reinforcements. Soon after this, on my way up, an urgent message was received from Colonel Hill, who commanded at this time on the right, calling for reinforcements, as his line had actually fallen back before, and lost some prisoners to the Boers, who were pressing on in front. I accordingly sent up the rest of the Imperial Light Infantry available.

I now met Major Bayly, a Staff Officer, from the 4th Brigade, who informed me that an urgent message for help had been received from Colonel Crofton, who commanded on Spion Kop after General Woodgate was wounded. General Lyttelton had accordingly despatched the Scottish Rifles as an actual reinforcement, and a battalion of the King’s Royal Rifles against the hill to the north-west of Spion Kop. It was on the further slope of this hill that one of the Vickers-Maxim guns was placed. (This battalion worked its way some distance up the hill, but its action did not materially affect the situation.)

I now again received an urgent appeal for support, this time for the centre and left. I sent the Scottish Rifles.

I now had only as a reserve Bethune’s Mounted Infantry and the Dorsetshire Regiment. These I retained and they were not engaged at the actual front.

The shell fire was most galling, and was aimed not only at the summit, but at the crest of the spur leading up, along which reinforcements and parties bringing back wounded had to pass. The fire came--

1. From field guns firing shrapnel and common shell, situated, as I endeavoured to point out in a signal message to you, north-west of our position.

2. From a Vickers-Maxim, in about the same direction.

3. From a similar gun to the north-east.

All these were beyond the effective rifle fire, and our supporting artillery on and about Three Tree Hill and on the Dragoon’s Maxim position apparently could not see them; consequently they poured, unchecked, an uninterrupted cross fire on to our position from about 8 A.M. till dark--ten hours.

Losses were very heavy, owing to the numbers necessarily assembled to hold back the Boer frontal attack, established under cover, and in which they showed gallantry in pushing forward to our lines. Colonel Crofton was now reported wounded, and the command of the troops in front devolved on Colonel Hill, Commanding 10th Brigade.

So the situation continued until 6 P.M., when I wrote a report and despatched it to you by Colonel Morris, A.A.G. (I request that this document, to save labour, may be attached). I first showed this to Colonel Hill, and he concurred, even taking exception to my reference to a retirement. I had no doubt that the infantry, which had so gallantly held its own all day, would be able to continue to do so when the shell fire abated at nightfall.

I accordingly went back to my reserves, having personally handed over command at the summit to Colonel Hill.

About 9.30 P.M., in consequence of your orders, I left for your camp, leaving a Staff Officer (Captain Phillips) behind. The narrative must now be his.

About 11.30 P.M. this officer, who was sleeping, was awakened by the sound of men moving, and found a general retirement proceeding.

He allowed no one to pass after this, stopped the Scottish Rifles, and collected a large number of stragglers of the Dorset, Middlesex, and Imperial Light Infantry. Bethune’s Mounted Infantry and the bulk of the Dorsets remained in position as posted in support to the front line. The other corps had gone down the hill.

He then published memorandum attached,[19] to all commanders, except Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft, who had gone on; but they did not act upon it, urging that they had had distinct orders from Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft, who, as far as I knew, was only assisting Colonel Crofton in a portion of the front line, to retire.

We now held the spur to within about 300 yards of the summit, but the summit itself was evacuated. Signal communication could not be established at the moment, as the lamp which the signalling officer counted upon ran out of oil, and some time was lost in obtaining another.

About 1.30 A.M. a person, not by his speech an Englishman, was brought in on suspicion by a picquet. He made a statement to the effect that a naval gun would shortly be brought up, and requested that it might not be fired on. This was the first intimation of any naval gun coming to Spion Kop.

About 2.20 A.M. a naval officer reported that he had one 12-pr. gun below Spion Kop, near the donga on the west. He said he had orders to take this up to the summit. When asked whether he could do so before daylight, he said he could not. As it would be impossible to move the gun in any line after daybreak, on account of hostile fire, he was told to stand by in a place of safety. Signalling communication was now opened, and the attached message[20] sent.

As Captain Phillips got no instructions, about 2.30 A.M. he ordered vehicles back to a place of safety. All regimental wagons had been sent across by the Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General (B), 5th Division.

Shortly after 4 A.M., there still being no orders, and a mass of transport, small-arm ammunition carts, &c., at the donga, steps were taken to cover this passage, and, with the concurrence of the Officer Commanding Dorsetshire Regiment, and Officer Commanding Scottish Rifles, certain dispositions were made with the latter battalion and about half the former. The other half of the Dorsetshire Regiment were employed in carrying away a large number of boxes (about 80) of small-arm ammunition, brought back from the front and elsewhere.

The Imperial Light Infantry, Middlesex, and Thorneycroft’s had apparently gone home. Bethune’s were dismissed.

It was now light, and Boer ‘sniping’ commenced. Captain Phillips reported to me at the donga, about 4.45 A.M., when I was in possession of your order as to the pontoon crossing.

TALBOT COKE, _Major-General, Commanding Right Attack_.}}

K

{{CASUALTIES

+------------+----------------+-----------------+--------------------+ | | | Officers | Men | | Date | ---- +-----------------+--------------------+ | | |Killed |Killed | | | | Wounded | Wounded | | | | Missing| Missing| +------------+----------------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-------+------+ | January | | | | | | | | |17th to 20th| 5th Division | 1 | 12 | -- | 26 | 178 | -- | |20th | 2nd ” | -- | 8 | -- | 4 | 102 | 2 | |21st | 2nd ” | 1 | 8 | -- | 13 | 131 | 5 | |22nd | 2nd ” | -- | 1 | -- | 1 | 19 | 1 | |23rd | 2nd ” | -- | -- | -- | 1 | 14 | -- | |24th | 2nd ” | 1 | 1 | -- | 4 | 12 | -- | |24th | 5th ” | 21 | 22 | -- | 139 | 388 | 279 | |24th | 4th Brigade | 6 | 11 | 6 | 32 | 120 | 2 | |25th | 2nd Division | -- | -- | -- | -- | 10 | -- | |26th | 2nd ” | -- | -- | -- | -- | 3 | -- | |21st, 22nd, | 5th ” | -- | 1 | -- | 1 | 33 | -- | | 23rd, 25th,| | | | | | | | | 26th, 27th | +-----+-----+-----+-----+-------+------+ | | Totals | 30 | 64 | 6 | 221 | 1,010 | 289 | | | | \-----><-----/ | \------><--------/ | | | | 100 | 1,520 | |23rd |General Barton’s| | | | | | | | | force is not | | | | | | | | | included in | | | | | | | | | above. He lost | 1 | 1 | -- | 4 | 5 | 11 | |20th |Lost by General | | | | | | | | | Lyttelton, not | | | | | | | | | shown above | -- | 1 | -- | 2 | 13 | 1 | | | +-----+-----+-----+-----+-------+------+ | | | 1 | 2 | -- | 6 | 18 | 12 | | | | \-----><----/ | \------><-----/ | | | Grand Totals | 103 | 1,556 | |Losses on | | | | | | | | | 24th | | 28 | 34 | 6 | 175 | 520 | 281 | | (included | | \-----><-----/ | \-------><------/ | | above) | Totals | 68 | 976 | +------------+----------------+-----------------+--------------------+

There are said to have been 243 buried on Spion Kop, so no doubt many of those shown missing were killed.}}

INDEX

Abyssinia, 31

àCourt, Lieut.-Colonel, 117, 139, 140, 175, 215, 221, 224

Acton Homes, 72, 73, 77-81, 85-90, 93-97, 100, 110, 111, 120, 126, 165, 178, 179, 204, 213, 223

Admiralty, 27, 29, 30

Akaba, 26-28

Alcester, Lord, 29

Anderson, Lieut., 4

Arabi, 28

Arabia Petræa, 25, 32

Atkins, Mr. J. B., 84, 98

Bangor, N. Wales, 2

Barkly, Sir Henry, 12

Barton, Major-General, 237

Bastion Hill, 87, 99, 100, 107, 110, 111

Bayly, Major, 233

Baynes, Bishop, 83, 106

Bechuanaland, 2, 18-20, 32-35, 61

Belmont, 58

Berber, 39

Besant, Sir Walter, 4, 7

Biggarsberg, 164

Bloemfontein, 12

Bloemhof, 20

Blomfield, Colonel, 140, 229

Botha, General Louis, 167

Brand, President, 12, 13

Bridgnorth Grammar School, 2

British Association, 44

Buller, Sir Redvers, 55, 56, 60-62, 66-72, 74, 75, 78, 80-83, 85, 86, 95-99, 106, 108-117, 128, 136, 138, 142, 144, 147, 158, 159, 169-172, 175-180, 183-188, 192, 193, 195, 197-200, 203-209, 211, 215, 218, 222

Burleigh, Mr. Bennet, 85, 107, 137, 140, 157, 159

Burma, 46

Burton, Lieut., 28

Byng, Colonel, 107

Cairo, 40

Cambridge, Duke of, 14, 23, 30, 41

Cape Town, 12, 14, 35, 55, 60

Carlow, 2

Charrington, Lieut., 26, 27

Chatham, 2, 4, 24, 53

Chelmsford, Lord, 20

Cheltenham College, 3

Chief Commissioner of Police, 40, 41

Chieveley, 60, 63-66, 70, 78, 168

Childers, Right Hon. H. C. E., 40

Churchill, Mr. W. S., 80, 101, 107, 128, 155, 189, 231

Clarke, Sir Andrew, 32

Clery, Sir C. F., 62, 65-68, 84, 85, 103-106, 110, 135, 198, 215-218

Clydesdale, 88

Coke, Major-General Talbot, 112, 113, 116, 117, 135-137, 141-145, 148-151, 153, 154, 157, 173-175, 184, 187, 188, 192, 206, 207, 215, 220-227, 230, 232, 236

Colenso, 57, 60, 62, 66, 76, 79, 84, 90, 99, 100, 131, 189

Colesberg, 59

Colonial Office, 20

‘Contemporary Review,’ 119

Cornforth Hill, 18

Cradock, 12

Crimean War, 2

Crofton, Colonel, 140, 141, 143, 146, 152, 196, 208, 224, 225, 230, 233-235

Cronje, 162

Daniels Kuil, 17

Debe Nek, 16

Dekiel Drift, 203

Delagoa Bay, 14

Diamond Fields, 12

Diamond Fields Horse, 16, 17

Dooner, Lieut., 193

Doorn Kloof, 76, 77, 90

-- Kop, 63

Dordrecht, 15

Douglas, 59

Dover, 9

Drakensberg Mountains, 89, 98, 126

Dublin, 2

Dufferin, Lord, 39

Dundonald, Lord, 107

Durban, 56, 62

Egypt, 25, 27, 32

Election Address, 37, 38

Enfield, 10

Ermelo, 121

Eslin, 58

Estcourt, 62, 66

Everard, Dr., 120

Fair View, 77, 81, 86, 88, 92-95, 97, 101, 104, 110, 111, 199, 204, 214, 217, 219, 223

Ford, Commandant, 18

Forster, Right Hon. W. E., 32

Fort Canning, 48

French, Major-General, 59

Frere, 62-66, 76, 209, 212

Frere, Sir Bartle, 14, 192

Gaika War, 16, 23

Gatacre, Major-General, 57

Gibraltar, 2, 4, 133

Gill, Captain, 25-27

Gladstone, Rt. Hon. W. E., 28

Gomaperi, 18

Gordon, General C. G., 31

Goshenland, 33

Griqualand West, 2, 11-23, 25, 32

Grobelaar’s Kloof, 76

Groote Hoek, 81, 86-88, 90, 93, 94, 97, 111, 199

Grove, Sir George, 4

Guildford, 4

Hadendowa Arabs, 39

Hanwell, Captain, 193

Harrismith Pass, 79, 89, 98, 100

Hart, Major-General, 65, 72, 73, 84, 92, 105, 107, 108, 112, 218

Hatting’s Farm, 212, 215

Haydon, F. M., 4

-- S., 4

Haynes, Lieut., 28

Hewett, Sir W., 26

Hicks-Beach, Sir M., 23, 24

Hildyard, Major-General, 62, 65, 66, 74, 84, 107, 112, 215, 216

Hill, Colonel, 146, 149, 152, 153, 174, 194, 196, 208, 230, 233-235

Hongers Poort, 179

Hospital Sangar, 145, 152

Hughes, M. A., 1, 2

-- W., 2

Irwin, Major, 211

Isandhlwana, 19

Jamestown, 15

Jerusalem, 4, 7, 8, 9

Jubilee, Queen’s, 41

Kaal Kafirs, 17, 18

Kaffraria, 16

Kalahari Desert, 22

Keate-Award, 19

Kennedy, Quartermaster-Sergeant, 28

Khartoum, 31

Kimberley, 12, 14, 18-20, 56, 57, 163, 165

King William’s Town, 17

Kitchener, Lord, 60

Kruger, President, 33-36

Ladysmith, 55-57, 61, 62, 65-67, 69, 75, 77, 78, 80, 84, 88, 95-100, 107, 122, 123, 129, 160, 164, 168, 170-172, 179, 205, 208

Lancers Hill, 76, 77

Lanyon, Sir O., 12, 17, 18, 21, 22

Litako, 21

Llangwani, 131

Look-out Hill, 80

Lyttelton, Major-General, 73-75, 80, 83, 84, 143, 175, 233, 237

Mafeking, 36

Majesfontein, 57

Majuba, 33, 59

Manyering, 18

Matthews, Rt. Hon. H., 40, 42, 43

Maxwell, Dr. R., 119, 163

Methuen, Lord, 34, 56, 58, 60

Middle Drift, 73

Mitchell, Sir C., 50

Mobilisation, 47, 48

Modder River, 57, 60

Mokolokue’s Mountain, 19, 22

Moteto, 18

Monte Christo, 131

Morosi’s Mountain, 21

Morris, Colonel A. W., 192, 234

Moses Wells, 26

Mount Alice, 66, 77, 85, 120, 131

‘Murray’s Magazine,’ 42

Nakhl, 26, 28

Natal, 1, 55, 56, 61, 62, 70, 78, 85, 88, 101, 169, 192

‘National Review,’ 75, 124

New Forest Manœuvres, 53

Oliver’s Hoek, 89

Oppenheim, Mr., 173

Orange Free State, 11-14, 25, 57, 78, 88-90, 97, 98, 112

Orange River, 13, 23

Paarde Kloof, 18, 21

Pahang, 46

Palestine, 4, 32

Palmer, Professor, 25, 26, 28, 29, 31, 39

Perak, 46

Perie Bush, 16

Phillips, Captain, 153-157, 207, 235, 236

Pieters, 76, 102, 131

Pilcher, Colonel, 59

Platrand, 160

Police, 40, 41

Porrit’s Drift, 65

Port Elizabeth, 12

Potgieter’s Drift, 62, 65-68, 70, 73-78, 80-82, 84, 85, 87-90, 95-99, 107, 115, 125, 126, 143, 169, 193, 194, 204, 209, 210, 212, 214, 219

Pretoria, 14

Pretorius Farm, 63-65

Prince of Wales, 41

‘Punch,’ 42-44

Ramsay, Professor, 3

Ramsgate, 54

Rangeworthy Hills, 73, 79, 87, 91, 92, 96-102, 126, 129-132, 199

Red Sea Littoral, 39

Rhodes, Rt. Hon. Cecil, 15

Riet River, 203

Roberts, Field-Marshal Lord, 57, 60, 81, 86, 97, 117, 158, 171, 196, 203, 208, 209

Robinson, Sir Hercules, 34

Rooi Grond, 36

Rosalie, 81, 86, 94, 95, 97, 101, 219, 223

Salisbury, Lord, 41

Sargent, Major H. N., 190

Scratchley, Sir Peter, 10, 11

Sekukuni’s Town, 21

Selangor, 46

Seymour, Sir B., 29

Seyolo, 16

Sheerness, 52

Sheffield, 37

Shoeburyness, 9, 10

Siam, 46

Sim, Lieut.-Colonel, 155, 157, 194, 196, 226

Singapore, 44, 49

Skiet’s Drift, 68, 76, 82

Smith, Sir Cecil, 51

Spearman’s Hill, 66, 69, 71, 74, 75, 209, 212, 217, 219, 220

Spion Kop, 67, 68, 72, 77, 80-82, 84, 85, 87, 88, 90, 91, 93, 96, 98-101, 103, 104, 106, 107, 110-119, 123, 126, 129-135, 138, 139, 142-144, 147, 150, 156, 158-164, 167-174, 182-184, 186, 189, 190, 192-197, 200, 203-207, 210, 212, 214, 215, 219-227, 232-237

Springfield, 63-66, 69-72, 144, 209-213

Stanley, Colonel, 23

-- Dean, 5

Stellaland, 32

Stephenson, Captain, 29

Stormberg, 57

Straits Settlements, 44-47, 50

Suakin, 39, 40

Suez, 26, 29

Sugarloaf Hill, 87, 107

Syria, 25, 26

Tabi Ndoda, 16

Takoon, 18, 21

Tanglin, 48

‘Temple or the Tomb,’ 8

Thaba Njama, 120, 137, 165, 166

Thames District, 51, 52

Thorneycroft, Lieut.-Col. A. W., 136-138, 140, 142, 145-148, 150-158, 170-175, 184-189, 193-195, 205-207, 221-229, 231, 235, 236

Three Tree Hill, 104, 129, 132, 133, 138-141, 156, 189, 204, 232, 234

Tor, 27

Trafalgar Square, 40, 41

Transvaal, 32, 33, 36, 78, 90, 112, 119

Trichard’s Drift, 67, 69, 71, 72, 75, 78, 81, 85, 86, 90, 95, 100, 115, 150, 203, 210, 212, 213, 217, 219, 224, 227

Tugela, 1, 56, 62, 65-67, 69, 71, 72, 74-81, 87, 89, 92, 95, 99, 116, 118, 121, 125, 126, 132, 133, 159, 163, 164, 177, 178, 181, 203, 204, 212-216, 218, 219, 223

Underground Jerusalem, 5, 8

‘United Service Magazine,’ 123

Vaal Krantz, 76

-- River, 13, 17

Van Reenen’s Pass, 89, 113, 122, 165

Venter’s Laager, 73, 92, 93, 96, 180, 199, 219

-- Spruit, 93, 94, 125, 126, 128, 213

Villiers, Mr. J. E. de, 12

Waggon Drift, 84

Waltham Abbey, 10

Warren, Lieut.-General Sir C., Biographical Sketch, 1-54

Warren, Major-General Sir C., 1

-- Very Rev. John, 2

Waterboer, 11, 12

Weenen, 122

Wem Grammar School, 2

White, Sir George, 55, 56, 60, 218

Williams, Major E. J., 190, 191

Wilson, Captain Holmes, 130

-- Sir Charles, 4

Wolseley, Lord, 32

Wood, Lieut.-Colonel G. K., 150

Woodgate, Major-General, 72, 73, 84, 92, 116, 117, 135-141, 165, 181, 184, 185, 213, 215, 220, 221, 224, 226, 227, 229, 232, 233

Wright’s Farm, 72, 189, 213, 232

Zagazig, 27

Zanzibar, 14

Zoutspan Drift, 176

Zwart Kop, 77, 126

PRINTED BY SPOTTISWOODE AND CO. LTD., NEW-STREET SQUARE LONDON

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Warren was promoted to be Captain on 20th October 1869.

[2] 11th November 1882.

[3] See reproduction.

[4] See pages 67 to 69.

[5] Potgieter’s Drift.

[6] Called Three Tree Hill.

[7] ‘London to Ladysmith viâ Pretoria.’

[8] N.B.--Black marginal line indicates that portions so marked were not published with the despatches, 1900.

[9] See D.

[10] See C.

[11] See pages 62 to 66.

[12] See pages 67 to 69.

[13] See page 103.

[14]

{{Hatting’s Farm: 30th January, 1900.

The Chief of Staff,--With reference to my report on the operations on the Tugela, already forwarded, will you please attach the accompanying addition?

C. WARREN, _Lieut.-General, Commanding 5th Division_.

Hatting’s Farm: 30th January, 1900.

I omitted to state that during the afternoon of the 22nd the Commander-in-Chief proposed an attack upon the enemy’s position on our left flank that night. I summoned at once the General Officers available--namely, Generals Clery, Talbot Coke, and Hildyard. General Clery, who was in command of the left attack, did not consider it advisable to make this attack, because, if successful, it would commit us to taking the whole line of the enemy’s position, which he considered a hazardous proceeding, as we might not be able to hold it. In this I concurred, more particularly as it was evidently too late in the day to carry the operation out effectively.

C. WARREN, _Lieut.-General, Commanding 5th Division_.

I continually proposed to General Warren that he should attack the enemy’s right, which was _en l’air_ and not strong, and which it was part of the original programme to try and turn, but I never suggested doing this hurriedly or without adequate forethought and preparation.--R. B.}}

[15] See pages 104 and 105 for substance of Sir C. F. Clery’s Report. The Report of Major-General Hildyard is not reprinted.

[16] C.

[17] See G.

[18] See H.

[19] See page 154.

[20] See page 156.

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE

Section F in the Appendix is a reproduction of a Report by Sir Charles Warren and has several sidenotes in the margin. The Sidenote ‘A’ is referenced from section E. Sidenote ‘1’ appears twice in one paragraph but is shown only once in this etext.

Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within the text and consultation of external sources.

Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text, and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained.

Pg 120: ‘Thaba Mjama’ replaced by ‘Thaba Njama’.

Index: ‘Sarjent’ replaced by ‘Sargent’. Index: ‘Van Renen’ replaced by ‘Van Reenen’.