Part 5

During and after the war, Japan’s business groups had come of age. They were no longer subordinate to the other ruling forces in the state. Japan’s effort to overtake the West, as we noticed, had led to a close tie-up between government and industry. This relationship had made it easy for Japan’s great business houses to become monopolies. From the beginning they had united banking, trade and industry under one roof. Post-war developments, such as the financial crisis of 1927, had carried the process of financial concentration beyond even what was characteristic of Western countries. By this time half-a-dozen of Japan’s huge family combines, such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi, dominated Japanese economy. They had become one of the most powerful financial ruling groups in the world.

BUT INDUSTRY DEPENDS ON FOREIGN TRADE

And here we have to point out the striking paradox in Japan’s new economic society. It was still largely agricultural. In 1925 more than half the people were dependent on agriculture for their livelihood. But the peasants were too poor to buy the typical consumption goods (automobiles, for example) that were staples in the home markets of Western countries. Thus it was impossible for Japan to develop modern factory industries turning out _all_ lines of consumption goods. Only in cotton textiles, with their special export market, and in shipbuilding and metallurgy, serving the army and navy, were large-scale factories practical. In 1928 the greater part of Japan’s manufactured goods was produced in industrial units employing ten, five or even fewer workers. Firms like Mitsui and Mitsubishi, however, contracted for the output of these small-scale industrial units and then sold it, often in foreign markets.

Thus Japan, although she had made great strides in some lines of industry, had become dangerously dependent on international trade. After 1929, with the onset of the world depression, the difficulties of this situation were plain to see. Quotas and tariffs barred even Japan’s low-priced goods. Old sores rankled, particularly those affecting immigration. The Exclusion Act, passed by the American Congress over the President’s disapproval in 1924, cut the deepest. In fact, it undid most of the good effects of the generous aid America gave Japan after the earthquake in 1923.

THE LIBERALS TAKE A HAND

These post-war years, especially after 1921, witnessed a brief flowering of parliamentary democracy in Japan. None of the architects of the Constitution, least of all Ito, had foreseen this possibility. Yet in the late ’twenties it seemed as if the Cabinet might win unchallenged power, that party government would reign supreme, and that the House of Representatives would become the true seat of authority.

This change came about quite naturally, through the increasing influence of the great business houses. By 1925 the industrialists and the bankers, or their representatives, held many of the leading offices which the clansmen had formerly made their own. They held the presidency of the Privy Council, and the key posts in the Imperial Household Ministry. They were influential in the House of Peers, in the bureaucracy and even in the Army and Navy. Generals and admirals could actually be found to support the policies of party governments. All the Elder Statesmen except Prince Saionji had died. And even he, being related to the Sumitomo banking house, was in sympathy with the capitalist outlook. As Prince Saionji was the Emperor’s chief adviser on the choice of a new Premier, he occupied the most strategic position in the state. In the 1925-31 period, on his nomination, six consecutive governments were formed by party Premiers holding majorities in the Diet’s lower house.

POLITICAL PARTIES

Party influence, increasing with the growth of capitalism in Japan, reached its height during these years. At an earlier period the clan bureaucrats had manipulated the parties to suit themselves--usually with little difficulty. But as time passed, the parties formed closer and closer ties with the great business houses. Mitsubishi interests were linked with the Minseito party, Mitsui with the Seiyukai party. The Election Law was gradually amended, increasing the number of voters, until in 1925 manhood suffrage was adopted. This change forced Diet members to spend large sums in electioneering, and made them more dependent on capitalist support. Consequently, it strengthened the capitalists’ control over the Minseito and the Seiyukai. At the same time it made possible the rise of labor and left-wing parties, which began to win Diet seats.

After 1925 the Cabinets formed by the Minseito and Seiyukai parties began to have to account directly to their majorities in the House of Representatives for what they did. Parliamentary government was by no means fully established, however. An adverse vote in the lower house did not, as a rule, overthrow these Cabinets. More often they fell because of backstage maneuvers in the Privy Council or the House of Peers. Nor were their leaders and policies always liberal. For a time General Baron Tanaka was president of the Seiyukai. He represented the aggressive, militarist wing of the Choshu clan. The Seiyukai Cabinet of 1927-29, formed under his Premiership, carried out a “positive policy” of military intervention in China. Tanaka had to be a party leader in order to become Premier. But his policy showed the strength of old tendencies, even in a generally liberal era.

On the other hand, the succeeding Minseito Cabinet (1929-31) was the strongest and most liberal party government which has ever held office in Japan. It came the nearest to establishing democracy there. It also had to meet the first onslaught of the military-fascist forces that have since become so powerful. In the story of Japan’s political development, it thus represents a critical turning point of unusual significance.

SWAN SONG OF THE JAPANESE LIBERALS

The Minseito Cabinet of 1929-31 was liberal, but by no means radical. It was, in reality, a government of “big business.” Its liberalism stood out mainly in its moderate foreign policy, which contrasted sharply with Tanaka’s earlier aggressive moves. It was headed by distinguished leaders: Hamaguchi (Premier), Shidehara (Foreign Minister) and Inouye (Finance Minister).

This Cabinet labored, however, under a fatal handicap, similar to that which confronted President Hoover in our own country. For it entered office in July 1929, at the height of the post-war boom. The Wall Street crash, and the spreading world depression, immediately followed. The swift change in economic conditions during its period in office had much to do with its final overthrow.

Hamaguchi and his Cabinet aides began with a great victory on the issue of the London Naval Treaty of 1930. This treaty extended limitations to cruisers and destroyers, as well as capital ships. The army and navy die-hards opposed it bitterly. The people and the press supported the Cabinet’s fight for it. On October 1, 1930 the Privy Council ratified the treaty. The Cabinet and the people had won.

For the moment it seemed as if the Cabinet had brought the army and navy under control. Real democracy seemed possible. But the triumph was short-lived. It was the swan song of parliamentary government in Japan. In November 1930 Premier Hamaguchi was shot by an assassin; eight months later he died from his wounds. His loss seriously weakened the Cabinet, and cut down its chance of success on new issues which were developing.

THE DEPRESSION STRIKES JAPAN

By the end of 1930 the depression had struck Japan with full force. It laid the Cabinet open to attack by the rising military-fascist forces.

The most serious consequences of the depression were felt in Japan’s foreign trade. In 1929 Japan’s export-import trade stood at 4,365 million yen. In 1930 it fell to 3,016 million, and in 1931 to 2,383 million. In two years Japan’s trade was cut nearly in half. Even at that period, few Western countries suffered such a rapid and severe contraction of their foreign trade.

The effects of this decline on Japan’s economy were catastrophic. Agriculture and industry were both hard hit. The income from rice and silk declined until there was actual famine in some rural districts. Industrial unemployment mounted to three million, higher than ever before in Japan. The middle-class professionals and wage-earners suffered wage cuts, or were thrown out of work. There was general social unrest, and Marxist doctrines won a wide acceptance. Strikes in industry, and tenant conflicts in rural areas, became commonplace.

In the light of these conditions, the weaknesses of Japan’s economy stood out in bold relief. Fully half the home market consisted of poverty-stricken peasants. To put the rural population back on its feet and enable it to buy the products of industry, drastic social reforms, such as rent reductions and debt moratoria for the farmers, were obviously needed. Neither the landowners nor the great business houses were prepared to embark on such a “new deal.” The army had a different solution--aggressive expansion abroad and military-fascist repression at home.

This army program led to a finish fight with the Minseito Cabinet. And the army leaders fought--and won--their campaign in Manchuria.

THE ARMY STRIKES IN MANCHURIA

The Minseito Cabinet had been trying to pursue a “friendly policy” toward China. Baron Shidehara, the Foreign Minister, wanted friendly relations with all countries. In this way he sought to foster Japan’s foreign trade, and thus solve Japan’s economic problems. But he could not control the army, especially after the depression had cut down trade and brought unrest to Japan.

During the summer of 1931 a series of “incidents” occurred in Manchuria, in which the hand of the military was plainly to be seen. At home in Japan the army used these incidents to arouse popular support for “positive” action in defense of supposedly threatened Japanese interests. General Minami, new War Minister in the Cabinet, openly supported this propaganda campaign. Baron Shidehara attempted to reach a peaceful settlement of the Manchurian issues. But in vain. On September 18, 1931--the historic date we mentioned at the beginning of this book--the army struck in Manchuria. The “Mukden incident”--alleged blowing up of a section of the South Manchuria Railway track--served as an excuse for the Japanese army to occupy the chief Manchurian cities.

This independent _coup d’état_ by the army dealt a fatal blow to the Minseito Cabinet. Baron Shidehara was forced into the position of apologizing for the army’s actions, though he must have heartily detested them. On December 11, 1931 the Cabinet resigned.

XI. The Shadow Deepens

The fall of the Minseito Cabinet marked the end of an era. The crisis of 1930-31 had unleashed new forces. And these forces were destined to mold Japan’s policy in the decade that followed.

At their head was the army. Not _all_ of the army leaders, however. At times the “army extremists” seemed to be only a small minority. Their power rose and fell. Yet they took command of Japan’s foreign policy, and gained more and more control over her domestic policy. And as time passed, their outlook was increasingly stamped on the army as a whole.

THE ARMY EXTREMISTS

Who were the army extremists? Names are not important, except as labels of a whole group. There has been no outstanding fascist leader in Japan, such as Mussolini in Italy or Hitler in Germany. It is enough for us to note that, in the 1930-32 period, the high army leadership centered in three generals--Araki, Muto and Mazaki. This trio was supported by a powerful group of “young officers,” such as Doihara and Itagaki, who have since become ranking generals.

These men were not from the old clan aristocracy. They came mostly from the lesser clans, or from the middle classes in town and village. They knew at first hand the sufferings of the farmers and the small tradesmen. Like Mussolini and Hitler, they claimed to be the friend of the common man. They bitterly denounced the “corrupt alliance” of the political parties and the capitalists.

All this was part of their fight for political control at home. They wanted a “national socialist” reformation in Japan. By this they meant that the army, under the Emperor, should run the government. They wanted the political parties suppressed and industry run by the state--all, as they said, for the benefit of the common man.

On the home front, the army extremists have had little success. None of their glowing promises of economic “reforms” has been carried out. In the foreign field, however, their program has been largely adopted. We must now see what their aims in foreign policy were.

THE DEMAND FOR “LIVING SPACE”

At the heart of the military-fascist program in Japan, just as in Germany and Italy, lay a demand for territorial expansion. The army extremists made careful plans for a series of bold moves. First, Manchuria and Mongolia were to be conquered, then China, then the rest of Asia. In the past decade we have seen this seemingly wild and visionary program translated into reality to an extraordinary degree. In fact, the actual course of Japan’s foreign policy has followed it very closely.

With territorial expansion was linked an economic idea--that of regional self-sufficiency, or the “bloc economy.” In 1931, Manchuria was called Japan’s “economic life-line.” In 1932-33 the watchword was the “Japan-Manchoukuo economic bloc.” After 1937 the demand was for a “Japan-China-Manchoukuo bloc.” Finally, the slogan today is for a “Greater East Asia,” to include the rich territories of Indo-China, Malaya, the East Indies and the Philippines.

What the army leaders were chiefly seeking through this program was to overcome Japan’s dependence on the international market. They were proposing a basic alternative to Shidehara’s plan for the peaceful development of international trade. In 1930-31 they had seen Japan’s foreign trade suddenly collapse, plunging the country into an economic crisis. They were determined that this should not happen again. The answer, they felt, lay in extending Japan’s political control over a vast region. The markets and raw materials of such an area, they thought, would make Japan economically independent of the rest of the world.

WEIGHTING THE SCALES

The army extremists were not the only ones to share these views. They had supporters in the bureaucracy, even in the highest positions. Many naval officers also supported them, although the navy as a whole was more conservative than the army. And, despite their anti-capitalist propaganda, they had close relations with some business groups who hoped to profit from the expansion program.

Though the military-fascist leaders did not succeed in organizing a unified mass fascist party, they wielded extraordinary powers. They influenced public opinion through the Ex-Servicemen’s Association, with its three million members. They also had a host of reactionary societies to work through. Some of them were dignified patriotic societies, with members from the highest ranks of Japanese society. Others went in for espionage, strike-breaking, or outright terrorism. Finally, the army had its special powers under the Constitution, such as dictating the choice of War Minister, and going direct to the Emperor over the head of the Premier.

To all these powers the extremists now added two special techniques and used them for all they were worth. One was resorting directly to military action, without waiting for authorization from the Cabinet. Underlings in the field could plot “incidents” which committed their superior officers and the government to certain courses of action. The Manchurian occupation was largely brought about in this way.

The second technique was terrorism, or direct action, against political opponents at home. Public opinion in Japan does not automatically condemn assassination, especially if it appears to have been inspired by patriotic or disinterested motives. The list of distinguished Japanese who have been assassinated is very long--Okubo, Ito, Hara (the first commoner to become Premier), Hamaguchi, to mention a few. Since 1931 many others have been added to this list, and their deaths have all helped the military-fascists to rise to power.

AGAINST THE ARMY?

On the surface it has often seemed that the capitalists were the chief opponents of the army extremists in the political struggle of the past decade. This is only partly true. These two groups have been the strongest political forces in Japan. They have both sought to win the bureaucrats and public opinion to their side. On the other hand, they are in agreement on many points.

For the capitalists, as well as the military, are interested in territorial expansion, and have taken advantage of its results in China. Many of them favored the Manchurian invasion, because they saw that it would give the widespread social discontent in Japan a safe outlet. But at the same time, the capitalists tend to be more cautious than the army leaders in foreign policy. They do not want to take risks, or to plunge recklessly into a big war if the chances of success are slight.

Even on the home front, there is an area of agreement between the army extremists and the business men. Both wish to maintain their ruling position against the threat of social revolution. The Minseito government took measures to stamp out revolutionary groups as early as 1929-30. There is full agreement on regimentation of this kind. But the capitalists have bitterly opposed the army’s efforts to take over _all_ political power, or to seize control of their business enterprises.

Keeping these general tendencies in mind, we can now turn to a consideration of the events of the past decade.

THE EXTREMISTS TAKE DIRECT ACTION

The “Mukden incident” of September 18, 1931 marked the halfway point in the sharp political struggle which was then convulsing Japan. Its violent phase lasted for eight months longer, until May 15, 1932.

We have already seen the first result of this struggle--the overthrow of the Minseito Cabinet. The Seiyukai party took up the reins of power in mid-December 1931. It proved to be the last one-party government to hold office during that decade. Inukai, its Premier, was a moderate; so also was Takahashi, the aged Finance Minister. General Araki, symbol and titular leader of the army extremists, was the Minister of War.

Not content with having forced a change of Cabinet, the extremists still pressed the attack on party government. Inouye, Finance Minister in the previous Minseito Cabinet, was assassinated on February 9, and Baron Dan, head of the Mitsui interests, was shot on March 5. Both were victims of the Blood Brotherhood League, organized to use terrorism against the “corrupt political parties, slaves of the capitalists.” More plots followed. Then, on May 15, 1932, Premier Inukai in turn was assassinated. His death was the climax of an outbreak supported by high army officers, who had planned to seize control of the government.

CONQUEST IN MANCHURIA

After this affair, things quieted down a little at home. But the extremists had meanwhile had their way in the sphere of foreign policy. Japanese troops had spread over most of Manchuria. In February the Japanese attack on Shanghai had occurred. In March the “independent” state of Manchoukuo was established. Far from being independent, it was really the plaything of Japan’s army extremists who had planned the “Mukden incident.”

Another year passed before the Manchurian issues were fully ironed out. In September 1932 the Japanese government formally recognized Manchoukuo. Early in 1933, on basis of the Lytton Report, the League of Nations passed judgment on Japan. The army at once moved again in Manchuria. In March 1933 Japanese troops occupied Jehol province, and added it to Manchoukuo. In May these troops advanced to the gates of Peiping and Tientsin, and enforced “demilitarization” of the region immediately south of the Great Wall of China. Meanwhile, Japan had withdrawn from the League of Nations. For the time, her conquest of Manchuria had been made good in her own eyes, if not in the eyes of the world.

PEACEFUL INTERLUDE (1933-35)

The period from the middle of 1933 to the end of 1935 was “peaceful” only by contrast with the years before and after. The contrast is sufficiently striking, however, to justify our using the term.

Two strong Cabinets, headed in turn by Admirals Saito and Okada, old-line naval administrators opposed to extremism, governed Japan during these years. The Saito Cabinet had entered office in May 1932, after the death of Inukai. Party men held only a few of the lesser Ministries. Nevertheless, the Cabinet was in the main moderate. The key Finance Ministry, in particular, was in the capable hands of Takahashi, who allowed only limited increases in the defense budgets. Early in 1934 the fiery Araki resigned from the War Ministry. Araki’s successor carried out a partial “purge” of the army extremists.

KEEPING THE ARMY QUIET

There were several reasons for this moderate trend. For one thing, foreign trade had turned upwards in 1932, and by 1935 Japan was again enjoying a trade boom which soon overcame the worst effects of the economic crisis and tended to calm the political waters.

In the second place, the army extremists were kept busy with their experiment in Manchoukuo, where they were trying to realize their goal of “state socialism.” They were building strategic railways, and fostering the growth of Manchurian industry. They met with opposition from business interests at home, and found it hard to raise sufficient capital for their projects in Manchuria. In order to secure greater influence over these economic questions, the extremists forced the establishment inside the Cabinet of a Manchoukuo Affairs Board. Here the army was in the saddle. And the extremists did secure enough capital for their projects to provoke the wise old Takahashi into issuing a warning that Japan’s finances could not stand such a large and continuing investment drain to Manchoukuo.

On the whole, however, the army men were disappointed with the economic results in Manchoukuo. By 1935 they were trying to bring North China into their Manchurian realm, and thus enlarge their economic bloc. In November 1935 Doihara, the “Lawrence of Manchuria,” tried to detach five of the northern provinces from Chinese control. The extremists also planned these moves as part of an effort to strengthen their position at home. For there they were being steadily pushed into the background.

DYING FLICKERS OF DEMOCRACY

Plots were still being hatched within Japan, even during this “peaceful” period. But the moderates were reasserting their control. They kept the high posts in the Privy Council and the Imperial Household Ministry. The Cabinet was firmly set for a moderate course. Even the parties’ strength was reviving. The climax of this trend came with the general election of February 1936. For the voting showed that the people had swung decisively away from the extremists. Japan’s labor party elected eighteen Diet members, while three left-wing proletarians won Diet seats. It was thought that a new Cabinet, with much greater party influence, might now be formed.

But the extremists were unwilling to admit defeat. Their answer came in the military uprising of February 26, 1936--known in Japan as the “2-26” affair.

THE “2-26” UPRISING

The direct participants in this historic revolt were some 1,400 troops, with their lower officers. No upper officers openly joined them. Yet the insurgents had contact with the highest army quarters. And General Mazaki, an outstanding army extremist, was kept under detention for a year after the outbreak.