Part 2

In the field of government the Japanese also imitated the T’ang system. They declared the land “nationalized”--or subject only to the Emperor’s control. They reorganized local government, putting Imperial officials in direct control, especially of tax revenues. In China such officials were chosen through an examination system, so examinations were introduced in Japan. The Emperor was now, in theory at least, the all-powerful head of the Japanese state.

BUT IT’S CHINA--“WITH A DIFFERENCE”

These reforms were not amateurish. They were based on a good knowledge of the principles and practices of the Chinese system. Yet in their pure Chinese form they worked against certain ingrained Japanese ideas, most of all the hereditary principle. So, from the beginning, the Japanese changed the Chinese system as they took it over. The changes may not have seemed great at the time, but they were really basic. Within a few centuries, the new institutions had produced an entirely different result in Japan. Only in form did they bear any resemblance to the institutions of China.

The clearest example of such changes is the way Japan’s statesmen treated the Chinese examination system. In China, at its best, this was a real civil service system. For centuries the path to public office lay through success in the examinations. Sons of great families undoubtedly had a better chance of succeeding, and bribery and favoritism were rife in decadent periods. But the “success story” of the Horatio Alger type fills Chinese literature. In not a few cases, the poor but brilliant Chinese youth passes the examinations with honors, and becomes a powerful and wealthy official.

THE ARISTOCRAT’S PLACE IN THE SUN

This system was altogether too democratic for Japan’s clan society, with its emphasis on aristocratic lineage. At the very outset it was drastically modified. Training schools were set up, but only nobles of a certain rank could enter them. These persons alone could take the examinations, and qualify for high office. After a time, even the examinations were discontinued. Important government posts soon became hereditary again. Lower posts in the provinces were usually taken by local leaders, instead of officers sent by the Imperial government. The higher provincial officials meanwhile stayed at court, and delegated their powers to personal followers in the various localities.

A similar development took place in the case of the land reforms. The land was “nationalized,” but it proved impossible to preserve the public domain. The great estates of the clan leaders were returned to them in payment for their official services, and then remained hereditary. Powerful individuals encroached on the public lands, or impoverished peasants escaped tax exactions by joining their lands to privately owned manors, and becoming serfs. In practice, the public domain was gradually taken over by private families, the court nobility or the great monasteries.

THE POWER BEHIND THE THRONE

As these private estates were usually tax-free, the Imperial government was soon deprived of its revenue. And so, as time went on, the Emperor became a mere figurehead. Elaborate state councils and ministries, patterned after those of China, became nothing more than ceremonial forms. Yet centralization was maintained for several centuries, with the great Fujiwara family as the real power behind the throne. This family held vast provincial estates, controlled many of the local officials, and dominated the court. By wedding the Imperial princes to Fujiwara ladies, it reduced the Emperors to puppets. The Fujiwara dictatorship ruled a much more intricate and cultured society than had existed in the early clan period. On the surface, this new society was Chinese; in fact, it was still run in the old Japanese way.

Changes there had been, however. The courtier had replaced the warrior. Instead of fighting clan chieftains, a bureaucracy of civilians now ruled. Buddhism had pervaded Japanese society from top to bottom. The teachings of Confucius had also been introduced from China. For a time the home-grown Shinto religion was overshadowed, and lay dormant. But it was not wholly eclipsed. The Emperor reigned, if he did not rule. Though the Shinto ritual, playing up the Emperor’s descent from the Sun Goddess, might be neglected, it was never lost. Japanese government was still theocratic (centering on a priest-king), even if a Fujiwara pulled the strings and bureaucrats played all the active roles.

IV. Japan Bars Her Door

We must now leap several centuries to about 1550, when the first Western traders and missionaries reached Japan.

The Japan of 1550 differed greatly from the Japan of the Fujiwara era we left behind us five or six centuries earlier. The Fujiwara power had passed away in the twelfth century. Its civilian government had grown weak. It could not even keep the peace. As disorder grew in the provinces, great independent lords surrounded themselves with military retainers on their private estates. A feudal society gradually emerged. In 1185 one of these feudal lords established his supremacy over the others, and soon obtained Imperial appointment as “Shogun,” or Generalissimo. The Emperor’s court still carried on at Kyoto, but political control passed increasingly to the Shoguns, who became military dictators. A military aristocracy--but a rapidly shifting one--dominated Japan. As new feudal lords grew in strength, they would challenge the Shogun’s authority and bitter civil wars would follow. Strife and disorder amounting to anarchy marked the century which preceded 1550.

Then the trend was reversed. By 1590, through the work of three great leaders--Nobunaga, Hideyoshi and Ieyasu--the country was unified again. In the brief period that followed--say, until 1625--Japan was confronted with a fateful question. Should it embark on a program of military and commercial expansion, similar to that which Western nations were just entering upon? For a time it seemed that the answer might be “yes.” In the end, it was “no.” And that “no” changed the whole course of Far Eastern and perhaps world history. In 1603 Ieyasu established the Tokugawa Shogunate, destined to rule Japan for more than 250 years. After 1616, under his successors, the seclusion policy was gradually adopted, and Japan was practically isolated from the outside world.

Was this choice inevitable? We cannot really tell. We do know that in the period just before she barred her door Japan was reaching outward toward full intercourse with the West.

REACHING OUTWARD

For the last thirty years of the sixteenth century were a dynamic period in Japanese history. An excess of energy in Japan seemed to match the urge for discovery and conquest that stirred the rising nations of Europe.

Japan’s domestic and foreign trade had been increasing at a rapid pace. Native industries had grown, and trade guilds had flourished. After 1550 this commercial development leaped forward. Sakai, a great trading center, became virtually a free city, ruled by its merchant princes. Nagasaki was opened to foreign trade in 1570, and soon developed into a thriving port. At this time, too, Japanese ships, often on piratical expeditions, were venturing into the waters of the Philippines and Siam. In groups and as individuals, Japanese emigrants were found at various ports in southeast Asia. Hideyoshi even conceived the project of conquering China, but after overrunning Korea in 1592-93, his armies (numbering 150,000 men) were defeated.

After 1550 missionaries and traders from Portugal, Spain, Holland and England came to Japan in growing numbers. The Japanese eagerly seized upon Western products and technical advances, notably in firearms and shipbuilding. These commercial contacts with the West modified Japan’s economy and stimulated her industrial development. For several decades Christianity, introduced by St. Francis Xavier in 1549-51, was welcomed. Some of the feudal lords became Christians. By 1617 there were some 300,000 Christian converts, or nearly as many as today.

JAPAN SENDS ENVOYS TO SPAIN

For a time, there was the possibility of even more extensive contacts between Tokugawa Japan and the West. Ieyasu, the first Tokugawa Shogun, deliberately sought to make Japan a great center of international trade. China, mindful of Hideyoshi’s Korean invasions, rebuffed him. He then turned to the West--that is, to Spain, then the richest trading nation of Europe. In 1610 Ieyasu concluded a commercial treaty with the Spanish governor of the Philippines. In 1610 and 1614 Japanese envoys crossed the Pacific and visited some of the Spanish possessions in America. Then they went on across the Atlantic. In Madrid the Japanese envoy had an audience with King Philip III on January 30, 1615; later, he saw the Pope at Rome. The Spanish king, however, influenced by the anti-Christian persecutions that had already occurred in Japan, rejected Ieyasu’s request for a treaty establishing trade relations with Spain and the Spanish-American possessions.

BUT FINALLY PULLS IN HER LINES

It was not until more than two centuries later that such an opportunity presented itself again. For soon after Ieyasu’s death in 1616, the policy of national seclusion was adopted.

Many factors led to this decision. The narrow intolerance of the missionaries, as well as conflicts between rival Jesuit and Franciscan orders, had created difficulties almost from the beginning of their stay in Japan. More important was the fear that estates of the Christian lords might become centers of rebellion, and thus lay Japan open to conquest by a foreign power. Persecution began under Hideyoshi, and after 1616 a series of anti-Christian edicts was issued. The Christian persecutions reached their height in 1622-24, although Christianity was not fully stamped out until 1638.

At this time Japanese were forbidden to go abroad, and the building of large sea-going vessels was also prohibited. All foreign traders and priests either left Japan or were expelled. A small Dutch trading center, restricted after 1641 to the islet patch of Deshima, was all that remained of the early period of intercourse with the West. By 1650 the policy of national seclusion, introduced by the Shoguns of the Tokugawa clan, was in full force. It was maintained until after the middle of the nineteenth century, or well into the modern era.

THE DUTCH OASIS ON DESHIMA

We should be on guard, however, against some common errors about this important period in Japan’s history. The term “hermit nation” must not be taken too literally. Seclusion was not complete. Through the Dutch settlement on Deshima, ideas from Europe filtered into Japan. A small group of Japanese scholars studied the Dutch language. In 1745 they prepared a Dutch-Japanese dictionary, and in 1774 a Dutch textbook on anatomy was translated. Of course, Japan did not keep abreast of Western technical progress during the Tokugawa epoch. But valuable beginnings were made, especially in language study, medicine, geography, map-making and military science.

Another common error associated with the idea of a “hermit nation” is that Tokugawa Japan remained static for two hundred years. In reality great internal changes occurred during this period, some of which were fundamental. By 1850 Japan was a very different country from what it had been in 1650.

The seeming lack of development was most evident in the Tokugawa political system. Its broad outlines did not, in fact, change very much. The Emperor and his court were kept secluded at Kyoto. The real center of government lay in Tokyo, where the Shoguns and their ministers ruled. Most of the land was owned by the Tokugawa family and the great feudal lords (_daimyo_) closely associated with it. About three-eighths, however, was owned by the “outer lords,” such as Choshu and Satsuma. These “outer lords” were viewed as potential rebels, and were denied posts in the central administration. All of the feudal lords had to spend certain months in attendance on the Shogun at Tokyo, and had to leave their families there as hostages when they went back to their own lands.

FOUR CLASSES OF SOCIETY

Efforts were made to draw strict class lines. The feudal lords and their military retainers, or _samurai_, held the highest rank. The farmers came next, but they were severely taxed and harshly treated. The townspeople were looked upon as the lowest class of all. A _samurai_ had the right to cut down a merchant with his sword, but very early in the Tokugawa period he learned to respect the power of the merchant’s purse.

Yet all measures to preserve a rigid centralized feudalism, and to maintain Tokugawa rule, proved futile. Halfway through the period serious economic problems began to appear. By 1850 the whole system was on the verge of collapse.

THE SHOGUNS FAIL TO CONTROL THE MERCHANTS

In their attempts to prevent change, the Shoguns were unable to master one basic element in their society--trade and industry. Even before the Tokugawa regime was established, as we have seen, Japan’s commerce had already grown sizable. Foreign trade was then cut off. But internal trade, stimulated by a long period of peace, continued to develop. New luxury goods of many varieties were produced, and industry prospered. The merchant class in the cities grew wealthy and powerful. Large business houses, including the present Mitsui firm, were founded. Money, instead of rice, became the medium of exchange. The transition to a money economy was gradual, but it worked a revolution in Japanese society.

Incomes of the _daimyo_ and _samurai_ were in rice. The rice had to be changed into money, and great exchange marts--similar to our modern commodity exchanges--grew up in Osaka. The rice brokers “rigged” prices. Dizzy price fluctuations occurred. The feudal lords and their _samurai_ fell into debt to the rice brokers and the money lenders. Government intervention did not help matters. The Shogunate either debased the coinage, or tried vainly to control prices by decree. The farmers suffered most of all--from the change to money, from the price fluctuations, and from still heavier taxes when the feudal lords became indebted to the merchants. After 1725 the number of farmers declined; after 1750 peasant uprisings were frequent.

AND FACE A RISING REVOLT

In other ways, too, loyalty to the Shogunate was undermined. The luxury of the towns stimulated a type of life quite the opposite from that inspired by the Spartan ethical code, called Bushido, of the _samurai_. Rich townspeople craved amusement--and painting, the drama, and the novel flourished. No laws could prevent the _samurai_ from being drawn to this life, nor could executing a more than usually lavish merchant or usurer turn back the tide of the new age.

Other intellectual currents were more acutely dangerous to the Shogunate. Ancient history, literature and religion were studied, and there was a revival of interest in Shintoism. From these historical and literary schools there grew a political movement, aimed at restoring the Emperor to his former place as ruler of the nation.

Thus, by the middle of the nineteenth century, the country was ripe for revolt. In the background lay the misery and distress of the farmer. But the active promoters of this revolutionary overthrow of the Shogunate were discontented groups within the ruling class. Four of these groups banded together to bring about the Restoration: (1) the “outer lords” of Choshu, Satsuma and the other western fiefs; (2) the lesser _samurai_, ambitious and energetic; (3) the merchants, who desired removal of feudal restrictions on their business activities; and (4) the court nobles of ancient lineage who still clung to the Emperor at Kyoto. This was a powerful coalition, and sooner or later it would undoubtedly have brought down the Shogunate through its own strength. As it happened, pressure on Japan from Western nations came to its aid and hastened the outbreak of the revolt that was brewing inside the country.

V. How the Door Was Opened

By the nineteenth century, a new flood of Western influence was sweeping into the Far East. As in the age of exploration and discovery, the West was knocking at the door.

In those earlier days, we must remember, the West had had little to offer in the way of progress. In fact, in the arts and in the graces of civilized life, the East could have given pointers to the West. But now the West came strong in the might of the industrial revolution. Master of machine technique, it was turning out manufactured products in larger and larger quantities. It was extending international trade by leaps and bounds. It was seeking new markets and sources of raw materials throughout the world. And the most powerful of the Western countries were staking out colonies wherever they could.

A PERIOD OF TRANSITION

1853 to 1868 were the years of transition for Japan. They were crowded with events that laid the cornerstone of the modern Japanese Empire.

Two broad trends were uppermost during these years. First, there was the coming of the Western powers with their demand for diplomatic relations, trade and intercourse--in a word, for the end of the seclusion policy and the opening of Japan’s door. Of course, the Shogun, as the ruling power, had the job of dealing with the Western nations. Too weak to resist, he had to give way. And his enemies at home seized on this opportunity to discredit him. The second main trend, therefore, was the sharpening of Japan’s internal conflict.

The extraordinary thing about this internal conflict in Japan was this. The groups opposing the Shogunate were revolutionaries: they rejected the existing system and fought for a new one. They sought progress for Japan--and progress meant opening the country to Western influence. Yet in their struggle with the Shoguns they were all against the foreigner. The reason is not far to seek. Anti-foreign demonstrations provided a handy weapon for attacking and discrediting the Shogunate. As we shall see later on, when it had served its purpose, this weapon was dropped.

But, meanwhile, let us look a little more closely at the two broad trends we have mentioned. Let us see first how, by a series of steps taken between 1853 and 1867, Japan’s door was gradually opened.

THE “UNEQUAL” TREATIES

What happened to Japan in her relations with the Western powers at this time had previously happened to China. For a long time there had been a closely regulated Western trade at Canton. During the early nineteenth century this trade had steadily expanded. China’s last-minute efforts to keep real control in her own hands were unsuccessful. The Anglo-Chinese war of 1839-42, and further conflicts in 1857-60, ended China’s seclusion and forced the Manchu authorities to treat with the Western powers on terms of diplomatic equality. The treaties signed at this time--later called the “unequal” treaties--actually established China’s _in_equality. Not only were new ports opened to Western trade. But a fixed schedule of Chinese tariff dues, usually not exceeding 5 per cent, was also enforced. In addition, Western nationals were exempted from trial under Chinese law. Instead, they were to be tried in courts set up by their own consuls in China. This was the system known as “extraterritoriality.”

These events in China did not pass unnoticed in Japan. Many of the Japanese leaders, despite the Shogunate’s policy of isolation, were aware of what was happening in China. They began to be alarmed over Japan’s future, fearing that the Western powers would soon be knocking at Japan’s door. And sure enough, very soon they were.

COMMODORE PERRY BRINGS A LETTER

The visits of Commodore Perry’s squadron to Japan in 1853 and 1854, bearing President Fillmore’s letter asking for the opening of trade relations, were the prelude. Commodore Perry secured the first treaty, on March 31, 1854. More important was the commercial treaty (July 29, 1858) negotiated by Townsend Harris, first American Minister to Japan. This treaty opened five Japanese ports to Americans for trade and residence, and--like the treaties with China--provided for a fixed tariff schedule and extraterritoriality. It was the model for similar agreements, also concluded in 1858, with England, France, Russia and Holland. All of these treaties were signed by the Shogun, but not by the Emperor. Later, as the Emperor’s power grew, the opposition sought to prevent application of the treaties on the ground that the Emperor had not ratified them. In November 1865, however, an Allied naval demonstration off Osaka forced the Emperor to give his signature. Finally, in June 1866, a tariff convention set 5 per cent as the duty on practically all imports and exports.

We shall have to return to these treaties a little later. For soon after the Restoration of the Emperor, they became a galling yoke to the Japanese. The tariff and extraterritorial provisions, in particular, were resented as shackles on the full exercise of Japan’s sovereignty. Three long decades were to pass before Japan gained enough strength, toward the close of the century, to revise these unequal treaties.

THE INTERNAL STRUGGLE IN JAPAN

At the time the treaties were negotiated, however, the issue was not one of equality. The issue was whether there should be any treaties at all. For many Japanese wanted no opening of Japan’s door. After the first treaties, nevertheless, a growing number of Westerners began to live in the ports opened to foreigners. The cry to “expel the foreigner” was then raised. Coupled with this slogan was the challenging demand to “revere the Emperor”--a direct call to revolution against the Shogun. The whole country was aroused. It seethed with internal strife and dissension, with plots and counter-plots, and even with armed conflict.

The anti-foreign movement was merely the spark that set off a bonfire that had been long in the making. By 1850 the Shogunate was nearly bankrupt. The feudal lords, or _daimyo_, were in the same position. Most of their landed property was mortgaged to the merchant-bankers--the rising capitalist class. Thousands of _samurai_ were poverty-stricken. The condition of the peasantry, taxed more and more heavily to pay for the debts of the feudal lords, was desperate. Even the wealthy merchants, irked by feudal restrictions and the social and political inferiority that was forced upon them, were dissatisfied. The demand for change was growing broader and deeper.

SUPPORTERS OF THE EMPEROR

In Kyoto the Emperor had become the center of an active and determined political movement. Its platform--anti-foreign and anti-Tokugawa--called for the restoration of the Imperial power. The court nobles and a growing number of the _samurai_ and feudal lords supported it. Wealthy merchant-banker families, such as the Mitsui house, provided it with cash. Above all, the movement was eventually backed by a coalition of the western clans, notably those of Choshu and Satsuma. The part these clans played, both in the Restoration movement and in the later Imperial government, was decisive.

THE ROLE OF THE WESTERN CLANS