Chapter 10

_Critical Examination of Pyrrhonism_.

The distinct philosophical movement of which Pyrrho was the author bore his name for five centuries after his death. It had an acknowledged existence as a philosophical tendency, if indeed not a sect, for a great part of that time. Yet, when we carefully analyse the relation of Pyrrhonism, as presented to us by Sextus, to the teachings of Pyrrho himself, in so far as they can be known, we find many things in Pyrrhonism for which Pyrrho was not responsible.

The foundation elements of the movement, the spirit of Empirical doubt that lay underneath and caused its development in certain directions rather than others, are due to Pyrrho. The methods of the school, however, were very foreign to anything found in the life or teachings of Pyrrho. Pyrrho was eminently a moralist. He was also to a great degree an ascetic, and he lived his philosophy, giving it thus a positive side wanting in the Pyrrhonism presented to us by Sextus. Timon represents him as desiring to escape from the tedious philosophical discussions of his time--

[Greek: ô geron ô Purrhôn, pôs ê pothen ekdusin heures latreiês doxôn te kenophrosunês te sophistôn;]

and again he speaks of his modest and tranquil life--

[Greek: touto moi, ô Purrhôn, himeiretai êtor akousai pôs pot' anêr et' ageis panta meth' hêsuchiês mounos d'anthrôpoisi theou tropon hêgemoneueis ..... phêista meth' hêsuchiês aiei aphrontistôs kai akinêtôs kata tauta mê prosech' indalmois hêdulogou sophiês.][1]

Pyrrho wished more than anything else to live in peace, and his dislike of the Sophists[2] may well have made him try to avoid dialectic; while, on the contrary, in the Pyrrhonean School of later times discussion was one of the principal methods of contest, at least after the time of Agrippa. Pyrrhonism seems to have been originally a theory of life, like the philosophy of Socrates, to whom Pyrrho is often compared,[3] and Pyrrho, like Socrates, lived his philosophy. Our knowledge of Pyrrho is gained from Aristocles, Sextus Empiricus, and Diogenes, and from the Academic traditions given by Cicero. Diogenes gives us details of his life which he attributes to Antigonus of Carystius, who lived about the time of Pyrrho.[4] Pyrrho was a disciple and admirer of Democritus,[5] some of whose teachings bore a lasting influence over the subsequent development of Pyrrhonism. He accompanied Alexander the Great to India, where he remained as a member of his suite for some time, and the philosophical ideas of India were not without influence on his teachings. Oriental philosophy was not unknown in Greece long before the time of Pyrrho, but his personal contact with the Magi and the Gymnosophists of the far East, apparently impressed upon his mind teachings for which he was not unprepared by his previous study and natural disposition. In his indifference to worldly goods we find a strong trace of the Buddhistic teaching regarding the vanity of human life. He showed also a similar hopelessness in regard to the possibility of finding a satisfactory philosophy, or absolute truth. He evidently returned from India with the conviction that truth was not to be attained.[6]

[1] Diog. IX. 11, 65. Given from Mullach's edition of Timon by Brochard, _Pyrrhon et le Scepticism primitive_, p. 525.

[2] Diog. IX. 11, 69.

[3] Lewes _Op. cit._ p. 460.

[4] Diog. IX. 11, 62.

[5] Diog. IX. 11, 67.

[6] Compare Maccoll _Op. cit._

After the death of Alexander and Pyrrho's return to Greece, he lived quietly with his sister at Elis, and Diogenes says that he was consistent in his life, asserting and denying nothing, but in everything withholding his opinion, as nothing in itself is good or shameful, just or unjust.[1] He was not a victim of false pride, but sold animals in the market place, and, if necessary, washed the utensils himself.[2] He lived in equality of spirit, and practised his teachings with serenity. If one went out while he was talking he paid no attention, but went calmly on with his remarks.[3] He liked to live alone, and to travel alone, and on one occasion, being knocked about in a vessel by a storm at sea, he did not lose his imperturbability, but pointed to a swine calmly eating on board, and said that the wise man should have as much calmness of soul as that. He endured difficult surgical operations with indifference,[4] and when his friend Anaxarchus was once unfortunate enough to fall into a morass, he went calmly by without stopping to help him, for which consistency of conduct Anaxarchus afterwards praised him. There are two instances given by Diogenes when he lost control of himself; once in getting angry with his sister, and once in trying to save himself when chased by a dog. When accused of inconsistency, he said it was difficult to entirely give up one's humanity.[5] He was greatly venerated by the people among whom he lived, who made him high priest, and on his account exempted all philosophers from taxation,[6] and after his death erected a statue to his memory. These facts testify to his moral character, and also to fulfil the functions of high priest a certain amount of dogmatism must have been necessary.

[1] Diog. IX. 11, 61, 62.

[2] Diog. IX. 11, 66.

[3] Diog. IX. 11, 63.

[4] Diog. IX. 11, 67.

[5] Diog. IX. 11, 66.

[6] Diog. IX. 11, 64.

According to Diogenes, "We cannot know," said Pyrrho, "what things are in themselves, either by sensation or by judgment, and, as we cannot distinguish the true from the false, therefore we should live impassively, and without an opinion." The term [Greek: epochê], so characteristic of Pyrrhonism, goes back, according to Diogenes, to the time of Pyrrho.[1] Nothing is, in itself, one thing more than another, but all experience is related to phenomena, and no knowledge is possible through the senses.[2] Pyrrho's aim was [Greek: ataraxia] and his life furnished a marked example of the spirit of indifference, for which the expression [Greek: apatheia] is better suited than the later one, [Greek: ataraxia]. The description of his life with his sister confirms this, where the term [Greek: adiaphoria] is used to describe his conduct.[3] He founded his Scepticism on the equivalence of opposing arguments.[4]

[1] Diog. IX. 11, 61.

[2] Diog. IX. 11, 61-62.

[3] Diog. IX. 11. 66.

[4] Diog. IX. 11. 106.

The picture given of Pyrrho by Cicero is entirely different from that of Diogenes, and contrasts decidedly with it.[1] Cicero knows Pyrrho as a severe moralist, not as a Sceptic. Both authors attribute to Pyrrho the doctrine of indifference and apathy, but, according to Cicero, Pyrrho taught of virtue, honesty, and the _summum bonum_, while Diogenes plainly tells us that he considered nothing as good in itself, "and of all things nothing as true."[2] Cicero does not once allude to Pyrrhonean doubt. We see on the one hand, in Cicero's idea of Pyrrho, the influence of the Academy, perhaps even of Antiochus himself,[3] which probably colored the representations given of Pyrrho; but, on the other hand, there is much in Diogenes' account of Pyrrho's life and teachings, and in the writings of Timon, which shows us the positive side of Pyrrho. Pyrrho, in denying the possibility of all knowledge, made that rather a motive for indifference in the relations of life, than the foundation thought of a philosophical system. His teaching has a decided ethical side, showing in that respect the strong influence of Democritus over him, who, like Pyrrho, made happiness to consist in a state of feeling.[4] The one motive of all of Pyrrho's teaching is a positive one, the desire for happiness.

[1] _De orat._ III, 62.

[2] Diog. IX. 11, 61.

[3] Compare Natorp _Op. cit._ p. 71.

[4] Zeller _Grundriss der Griechischen Phil._ p. 70.

The essence of Pyrrhonism as given by Timon is as follows:[1] Man desires to be happy. To realise his desire he must consider three things:

(i) What is the nature of things?

(ii) How should man conduct himself in relation to them?

(iii) What is the result to him of this relation?

The nature of things is unknown. Our relation to them must be one of suspension of judgment, without activity, desire, or belief,--that is, an entirely negative relation. The result is that state of having no opinion, called [Greek: epochê], which is followed in turn by [Greek: ataraxia].

[1] Aristocles _ap. Eusebium Praep. Ev._ XIV. 18.

[1]The problem of philosophy is here proposed very nearly in the terms of Kant, but not with the positive motive, like that of the great philosopher of Germany, of evolving a system to present the truth. Yet the importance of these questions shows the originality of Pyrrho. The earnestness of Pyrrho is further shown by an example given by Diogenes. Once on being found talking to himself alone, he said, when asked the reason, that he was meditating how to become a good man ([Greek: chrêstos]),[2] thus showing an entirely different spirit from anything found in Sextus' books. The explanation of his life and teachings is to be found largely in his own disposition. Such an attitude of indifference must belong to a placid nature, and cannot be entirely the result of a philosophical system, and, while it can be aimed at, it can never be perfectly imitated. One of his disciples recognised this, and said that it was necessary to have the disposition of Pyrrho in order to hold his doctrines.[3] Diogenes tells us that he was the first to advance any formulae of Scepticism,[4] but they must have been very elementary, as Pyrrho himself wrote nothing. We find no trace of formulated Tropes in Pyrrho's teachings, yet it is probable that he indicated some of the contradictions in sensation, and possibly the Tropes in some rudimentary form. Of the large number of sceptical formulae, or [Greek: phônai], the three which seem to have the oldest connection with Scepticism are the [Greek: antilogia], the [Greek: ouden horizô], and the [Greek: ou mallon].[5] We know from Diogenes that Protagoras is the authority for saying that in regard to everything there are two opposing arguments.[6] The saying "to determine nothing" is quoted from Timon's _Python_ by Diogenes,[7] and the other two mentioned are also attributed to him by Aristocles.[8] We have also in the [Greek: ou mallon] a direct connection with Democritus, although the difference in the meaning which he attributed to it is shown by Sextus.[9] So while the expression is the same, the explanation of it given by Pyrrho must have been different. It would seem probable that Pyrrho used all of these three sayings, from the account of Diogenes, and that even then they gave rise to the accusation of the Dogmatics, that simply by possessing such sayings the Sceptics dogmatised,[10] for the refutation of this used by Sextus occurs in the old account of the sayings, namely, that these formulae include also themselves in the meaning, as a cathartic removes itself together with other harmful objects.[11]

[1] Compare Maccoll _Op. cit._ p. 21.

[2] Diog. IX. 11, 64.

[3] Diog. IX. 11, 70, 64.

[4] Diog. IX. 11, 69; IX. 11, 61.

[5] _Hyp._ I. 202; Diog. IX. 8, 51; _Photius_ Bekker's ed. 280 H.

[6] _Photius_ Bekker's ed. 280 H.

[7] _Hyp._ I. 197; Diog. IX. 11, 76.

[8] _Aristocles ap. Eusebium, Praep. Ev._ XIV. 18.

[9] _Hyp._ I. 213.

[10] Diog. IX. 11, 68-76.

[11] Diog. IX. 11, 76; _Hyp._ I. 206.

In comparing the later Pyrrhonism with the teachings of Pyrrho, we would sharply contrast the moral attitude of the two. With Pyrrho equilibrium of soul was a means to be applied to his positive theory of life; with the later Pyrrhoneans it was the end to be attained. We would attribute, however, the empirical tendency shown during the whole history of Pyrrhonism to Pyrrho as its originator. He was an empirical philosopher, and the result of his influence in this respect, as seen in the subsequent development of the school, stands in marked contrast to the dialectic spirit of the Academic Scepsis. The empiricism of the school is shown in its scientific lore, in the fact that so many of the Sceptics were physicians, and in the character of the ten Tropes of [Greek: epochê]. We may safely affirm that the foundation principles of Pyrrhonism are due to Pyrrho, and the originality which gave the school its power. The elaborated arguments, however, and the details of its formulae belong to later times.

Coming now to the relation of Pyrrhonism to the Academy, the connection between the two is difficult to exactly determine, between the time of Pyrrho and that of Aenesidemus. Scepticism in the Academy was, however, never absolutely identical with Pyrrhonism, although at certain periods of the history of the Academy the difference was slight. We can trace throughout the evolution of doubt, as shown to us in Pyrrhonism, and in Academic Scepticism, the different results which followed the difference in origin of the two movements, and these differences followed according to general laws of development of thought. Arcesilaus, who introduced doubt into the Academy, claimed to return to the dialectic of Socrates, and suppressing the lectures,[1] which were the method of teaching in the later schools of philosophy, introduced discussions instead, as being more decidedly a Socratic method. Although, according to Sextus, he was the one leader of the Academy whose Scepticism most nearly approached that of Pyrrhonism,[2] yet underneath his whole teaching lay that dialectic principle so thoroughly in opposition to the empiricism of Pyrrho. The belief of Socrates and Plato in the existence of absolute truth never entirely lost its influence over the Academy, but was like a hidden germ, destined to reappear after Scepticism had passed away. It finally led the Academy back to Dogmatism, and prepared the way for the Eclecticism with which it disappeared from history.

[1] Compare Maccoll _Op. cit._ p. 36.

[2] _Hyp_. I. 232.

The history of Pyrrhonism and that of Academic Scepticism were for a time contemporaneous. The immediate follower of Pyrrho, Timon, called by Sextus the "prophet of Pyrrho,"[1] was a contemporary of Arcesilaus. That he did not consider the Scepticism of the Academy identical with Pyrrhonism is proved from the fact that he did not himself join the Academy, but was, on the contrary, far from doing so. That he regarded Arcesilaus as a Dogmatic is evident from his writings.[2] One day, on seeing the chief of the Academy approaching, he cried out, "What are you doing here among us who are free?"[3] After the death of Timon, the Pyrrhonean School had no representative till the time of Ptolemy of Cyrene,[4] and Greek Scepticism was represented by the Academy. That Pyrrho had a strong influence over Arcesilaus, the founder of the Middle Academy, is evident[5]; but there was also never a time when the Academy entirely broke away from all the teachings of Plato, even in their deepest doubt.[6] It is true that Arcesilaus removed, nominally as well as in spirit, some of the dialogues of Plato from the Academy, but only those that bore a dogmatic character, while those that presented a more decided Socratic mode of questioning without reaching any decided result, men regarded as authority for Scepticism.

[1] _Adv. Math._ I. 53.

[2] Diog. IV. 6, 33, 34.

[3] Diog. IX. 12, 114.

[4] Diog. IX. 12, 115.

[5] Diog. IV. 6, 33.

[6] Diog. IV. 6, 32.

Sextus does not deny that Arcesilaus was almost a Pyrrhonean, but he claims that his Pyrrhonism was only apparent, and not real, and was used as a cloak to hide his loyalty to the teachings of Plato.[1] As Ariston said of him,[2] "Plato before, Pyrrho behind, Diodorus in the middle." Sextus also characterises the method of Arcesilaus as dialectic,[3] and we know from Cicero that it was his pride to pretend to return to the dialectic of Socrates.

It is interesting to note that Sextus, in his refutation of the position that the Academy is the same as Pyrrhonism, takes up the entire development of Academic thought from the time of Plato till that of Antiochus, and does not limit the argument to Scepticism under Arcesilaus. The claim made by some that the two schools were the same, is stated by him,[4] and the word 'some' probably refers to members of both schools at different periods of their history. Sextus recognises three Academies, although he remarks that some make even a further division, calling that of Philo and Charmides, the fourth, and that of Antiochus and his followers, the fifth.

[1] _Hyp._ I. 234.

[2] Diog. IV. 6, 33.

[3] _Hyp._ I. 234.

[4] _Hyp._ I. 220.

That many in the Academy, and even outside of it, regarded Plato as a Sceptic, and an authority for subsequent Scepticism, we find both from Sextus and Diogenes.[1] As Lewes justly remarks, one could well find authority for Scepticism in the works of Plato, as indeed the Academicians did, but not when the sum total of his teachings was considered. The spirit of Plato's teachings was dogmatic, as Sextus most decidedly recognises, and as Aenesidemus and Menodotus[2] recognised before him.[3] Sextus himself shows us that Plato's idealism and ethical teachings can have nothing in common with Scepticism, for if he accepts the desirability of the virtuous life, and the existence of Providence, he dogmatises; and if he even regards them as probable, he gives preference to one set of ideas over another, and departs from the sceptical character. Sextus characterises the sceptical side of Plato's writings as mental gymnastics,[4] which do not authorise his being called a Sceptic, and affirms that Plato is not a Sceptic, since he prefers some unknown things to others in trustworthiness. The ethical difference underlying the teachings of the Academy and Pyrrhonism, Sextus was very quick to see, and although it is very probable that the part of the _Hypotyposes_ which defines the difference between the Academy and Pyrrhonism may be largely quoted from the introduction to Aenesidemus' works, yet Sextus certainly gives these statements the strong stamp of his approval. He condemns the Academy because of the theory that good and evil exist, or if this cannot be decidedly proved, yet that it is more probable that what is called good exists than the contrary.[5]

[1] _Hyp._ I. 221; Diog. IX. 11, 72.

[2] Bekker's edition of _Hyp._ I. 222.

[3] _Hyp._ I. 222.

[4] _Hyp._ I. 223.

[5] _Hyp_. I. 226.

The whole Academic teaching of probabilities contradicted the standpoint of the Sceptics--that our ideas are equal as regards trustworthiness and untrustworthiness,[1] for the Academicians declared that some ideas are probable and some improbable, and they make a difference even in those ideas that they call probable.

Sextus claims that there are three fundamental grounds of difference between Pyrrhonism and the Academy. The first is the doctrine of probability which the Academicians accept in regard to the superior trustworthiness of some ideas over others.[2] The second is the different way in which the two schools follow their teachers. The Pyrrhoneans follow without striving or strong effort, or even strong inclination, as a child follows his teacher, while the Academicians follow with sympathy and assent, as Carneades and Clitomachus affirm.[3] The third difference is in the aim, for the Academicians follow what is probable in life. The Sceptics follow nothing, but live according to laws, customs, and natural feelings undogmatically.[4]

The difference between the later teaching of the Academy and Pyrrhonism is evident, and Sextus treats of it briefly, as not requiring discussion,[5] as Philo taught that the nature of facts is incomprehensible, and Antiochus transferred the Stoa to the Academy. It is therefore evident, from the comparison which we have made, that we do not find in the Academy, with which Scepticism after the death of Timon was so long united, the exact continuance of Pyrrhonism. The philosophical enmity of the two contemporaries, Timon and Arcesilaus, the Academician who had most in common with Pyrrhonism, is an expression of the fundamental incompatibility between the two schools.

[1] _Hyp_. I. 227.

[2] _Hyp_. I. 229.

[3] _Hyp_. I. 230.

[4] _Hyp_. I. 231.

[5] _Hyp_. I. 235.

During all the chequered history of the Academy the dormant idealism was there, underlying the outward development. Although during the time of Arcesilaus and Carneades the difference was so slight as to seem a mere matter of form of expression, yet the different foundations on which the two schools stood was always recognisable. On the one hand there was the germ of idealism which was destined to awake to a new life, and on the other, the attempt at absolute negation which was to result in the final extinction of Pyrrhonism. We find in both, it is true, especially in the time of Arcesilaus, the aim of [Greek: epochê].[1] Both placed great weight on [Greek: isostheneia], or the equal value of opposing arguments.[2] The foundation of the [Greek: epochê] was, however, different in the two cases. Arcesilaus founded his on dialectic, while Pyrrho's was empirical.

[1] _Hyp._ I. 232.

[2] Diog. IX. 73; _Hyp._ II. 130; III. 65.

The Pyrrhonean believed that ideas give us no knowledge of the outer world; the Academic Sceptic believed that we cannot distinguish between true and false ideas, so such knowledge is impossible. The Pyrrhonean denied that truth could exist in ideas because of their contradictory nature, and consequently the existence of all truth, [Greek: mêden einai tê alêtheia epi pantôn].[1] The Academic Sceptic granted that the truth was possibly contained in ideas, but affirmed that it could never be known to us. The Pyrrhoneans prided themselves on still being seekers, for although ordinary ideas are too contradictory to give knowledge of the outer world, they did not deny that such knowledge might be possible, but simply suspended the judgment regarding it. To the Pyrrhonean the result corresponded to the method. All ideas thus far known revealed nothing of the truth, therefore he still sought. The Academician tried logically to prove that the truth is impossible to find. It is the relation of the dialectician to the empiricist, and the two varieties of Scepticism are explained by their difference in origin. In Pyrrhonism there was no constructive element. In the Academic Scepsis such an element was found throughout all its history in the theory of Probability. Arcesilaus himself laid great stress upon this doctrine, which Sextus carefully shows us[2] is utterly inconsistent with Pyrrhonism. Arcesilaus plainly teaches that, having suspended one's judgment in regard to matters of knowledge, one should control his choices, his refusals, and his actions by the probable.[3]

[1] Diog. IX. 11, 61.

[2] _Hyp._ I. 229.

[3] Compare Maccoll _Op. cit._ 39.

After Antiochus introduced Eclecticism into the Academy, Pyrrhonism was the only representative of Greek Scepticism, and it flourished for over two centuries after our era, and then also disappeared, no more to exist as a regular philosophical school.

Having considered at length the essence of Pyrrhonism as presented by Sextus Empiricus, it now remains to briefly note the characteristics that formed its strength and weakness, and the causes of its final downfall. Herbart says that every philosopher is a Sceptic in the beginning, but every Sceptic remains always in the beginning. This remark may well be applied to Pyrrhonism. We find in its teachings many fundamental philosophical truths which might have formed the beginning of great philosophical progress, but which were never developed to any positive results. The teachings of Pyrrhonism were some of them well fitted to prepare the way to idealism. The great idea of the relativity of _Vorstellungen_ is made very prominent by the ten Tropes of [Greek: epochê]. Aenesidemus, in his eight Tropes against aetiology, shows the absurdity of the doctrine of causality when upheld on materialistic grounds. That was to him final, [Greek: epei ouk estai aition.] He could not divine that although the result which he presented was logical, it only led to a higher truth. It was reserved for the greatest of modern philosophers to reveal to the world that causality is a condition, and a necessary condition, of thought. When Aenesidemus proved by his seventh Trope that causality is subjective, he regarded it as fatal to the doctrine; yet this conclusion was a marked step in advance in critical philosophy, although Aenesidemus could not himself see it in all its bearings. The great difference between Aenesidemus and Kant is the difference between the materialist and the believer in subjective reality. Both agreed in the unknown nature of the _Ding an sich_, but this was to the Pyrrhonist the end of all his philosophy; to Kant, however, the beginning.

Pyrrhonism has rendered, notwithstanding its points of fatal weakness, marked service to the world in science, philosophy, ethics, and religion. It quickened scientific thought by emphasising empirical methods of investigation, and by criticising all results founded without sufficient data upon false hypotheses. If, instead of denying the possibility of all science because of the want of a criterion of the truth of phenomena, the Pyrrhonists had comprehended the possibility of a science of phenomena, they might have led the world in scientific progress.[1] Their service to philosophy lay in the stimulus to thought that their frequent attacks on dogmatic beliefs occasioned. Pyrrhonism brought together all the most prominent theories of the old schools of philosophy to test their weakness and expose their contradictions, and this very process of criticism often demonstrated the power of the truth which they contained.

Sextus Empiricus was often charged by the Church Fathers with corrupting religious belief, and yet the greatest service which Pyrrhonism has rendered the world was in religious and ethical lines. This service did not, naturally, consist in destroying belief in absolute truth, as the Sceptic professed to do, but in preparing the way to find it. The bold attacks of Scepticism on all truth led men to investigate ethical and religious teachings, to examine the grounds of their belief, and to put in practical use the right of reason and free discussion.

Scepticism was the antecedent of freedom of conscience and rational criticism,[2] and the absolute right of scientific thought. The Sceptics, however, reaped none of the benefits of their own system. They remained, as it were, always on the threshold of possible progress. With the keys to great discoveries in their hands, the doors of philosophical and scientific advancement were for ever closed to them by the limitations of their own system. The inherent weakness of Pyrrhonism lay in its psychological inconsistency and in its negative character. I think that we may safely say that Pyrrhonism was the most consistent system of Scepticism ever offered to the world, and yet it proves most decidedly that complete Scepticism is psychologically impossible. A man may give up his belief in one set of ideas, and, if they are ideas that are popularly accepted, he will be called a Sceptic, as was the case with Hume. He must, however, replace these ideas by others equally positive, and then he is no longer a Sceptic, but a Dogmatic, for he believes in something.

[1] Compare Lewes _Op. cit._ p. 463.

[2] Compare Chaignet _Op. cit._ p. 460.

We have shown that the greatest thinkers of Pyrrhonism, Pyrrho, Aenesidemus, and Agrippa, were not examples of absolute Scepticism, and although Sextus Empiricus realised what consistency demanded in this respect, and affirmed on almost every page that he was asserting nothing, yet there is not a paragraph of his books in which he does not, after all, dogmatise on some subject. Complete Scepticism is contrary to the fundamental laws of language, as all use of verbs involves some affirmation. The Pyrrhonists realised this, and therefore some of them wrote nothing, like Pyrrho, their leader, and others advocated [Greek: aphasia][1] as one of the doctrines of their system.

[1] _Hyp._ I. 192.

The very aim of Pyrrhonism was an inconsistent one. [Greek: Ataraxia] was only another name for happiness, and in one instance, even, is given as [Greek: hêdonê], and thus, in spite of themselves, the Sceptics introduced a theory of happiness. Pyrrho, like others of his time, sought the highest good, and thought that he had found it in [Greek: ataraxia], the peace of mind that appears in other systems of philosophy in other forms. The difference of aim between the Pyrrhonists, Stoics, and Epicureans was more apparent than real. To them all philosophy was a path to lead to happiness. The method of Pyrrhonism was, however, negative. Its strength consisted in its attacks on Dogmatism, and not in any positive aim of its own, for its positive side could not be recognised according to its own doctrines. Therefore there was no real development in Pyrrhonism, for a negative thought cannot be developed.

We find, accordingly, from the time of Pyrrho to Sextus, no growth in breadth of philosophical outlook, only improvement in methods. Philosophical activity can never have doubt as its aim, as that would form, as we have shown, a psychological contradiction. The true essence of Pyrrhonism was passivity, but passivity can never lead to progress. Much of the polemical work of Pyrrhonism prepared the way for scientific progress by providing a vast store of scientific data, but progress was to the Pyrrhonists impossible. They sounded their own scientific death-knell by declaring the impossibility of science, and putting an end to all theories.

The life of all scientific and philosophic progress is in the attempt to find the hidden truth. To the Sceptic there was no truth, and there could be no progress. As progress is a law in the evolution of the human race, so Scepticism as a philosophy could never be a permanent growth, any more than asceticism in religion can be a lasting influence. Both of them are only outgrowths. As the foundation principles of Scepticism were opposed to anything like real growth, it was a system that could never originate anything. Pyrrho taught from the beginning that the Sceptic must live according to law and custom; not, however, because one law or custom is better than another in itself, but simply for the sake of peace. This basis of action was itself a death-blow to all reform in social or political life. It was a selfish, negative way of seeking what was, after all, a positive thing, the [Greek: ataraxia] that the Sceptic desired. Life with the Pyrrhonist was phenomenal, and not phenomenal simply in regard to the outer world, but also subjectively, and no absolute knowledge of the subjective life or of personal existence was possible.

The cause of the downfall of Pyrrhonism lay in the fact that it had nothing to offer to humanity in the place of what it had destroyed. It made no appeal to human sympathies, and ignored all the highest motives to human action. The especial materialistic standpoint from which Pyrrhonism judged all that pertains to knowledge and life shut out the ideal, and all possibility of absolute truth. It was an expression of the philosophic decadence of the age when it flourished, and although it possessed some philosophic worth, yet it bore in itself the causes of its decay.

PYRRHONIC SKETCHES

BY

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS.