Seneca's Morals of a Happy Life, Benefits, Anger and Clemency
CHAPTER I.
OF BENEFITS IN GENERAL.
It is, perhaps, one of the most pernicious errors of a rash and inconsiderate life, the common ignorance of the world in the matter of exchanging _benefits_. And this arises from a mistake, partly in the person that we would oblige, and partly in the thing itself. To begin with the latter: βA benefit is a good office, done with intention and judgment;β that is to say, with a due regard to all the circumstances of _what_, _how_, _why_, _when_, _where_, _to whom_, _how much_, and the like; or otherwise: βIt is a voluntary and benevolent action that delights the giver in the comfort it brings to the receiver.β It will be hard to draw this subject, either into method or compass: the one, because of the infinite variety and complication of cases; the other, by reason of the large extent of it: for the whole business (almost) of mankind in society falls under this head; the duties of kings and subjects, husbands and wives, parents and children, masters and servants, natives and strangers, high and low, rich and poor, strong and weak, friends and enemies. The very meditation of it breeds good blood and generous thoughts; and instructs us in honor, humanity, friendship, piety, gratitude, prudence, and justice. In short, the art and skill of conferring benefits is, of all human duties, the most absolutely necessary to the well-being, both of reasonable nature, and of every individual; as the very cement of all communities, and the blessing of particulars. He that does good to another man does good also to himself; not only in the consequence, but in the very act of doing it; for the conscience of well-doing is an ample reward.
Of benefits in general, there are several sorts; as _necessary_, _profitable_, and _delightful_. Some things there are, without which we _cannot_ live; others without which we _ought not_ to live; and some, again, without which we _will not_ live. In the first rank are those which deliver us from capital dangers, or apprehensions of death: and the favor is rated according to the hazard; for the greater the extremity, the greater seems the obligation. The next is a case wherein we may indeed live, but we had better die; as in the question of liberty, modesty, and a good conscience. In the third place, follow those things which custom, use, affinity, and acquaintance, have made dear to us; as husbands, wives, children, friends, etc., which an honest man will preserve at his utmost peril. Of things profitable there is a large field, as money, honor, etc., to which might be added, matters of superfluity and pleasure. But we shall open a way to the circumstances of a benefit by some previous and more general deliberations upon the thing itself.