Part 23

Hence, if all things are instantaneously perceived by it, its perceptions have nothing to do with the past and the future, but subsist in an indivisible untemporal _now_; so that the simultaneous, both according to multitude, and according to temporal interval, are present with intellect. Hence, too, all things subsist in it according to one, and in one, without interval, and without time. But if this be the case, there is nothing discursive or transitive in its intellections, and consequently they are without motion. Hence, they are energies according to one, subsisting in one, and without increase or mutation, or any transition. If, however, the multitude subsists according to one, and the energy is collected together at once, and without time, an essence of this kind must necessarily always subsist in [an intelligible] one. But this is eternity. Hence, eternity is present with intellect. That nature, however, which does not perceive intellectually according to one, and in one, but transitively, and with motion, so that in understanding it leaves one thing and apprehends another, divides and proceeds discursively,—this nature [which is soul] subsists in conjunction with time. For with a motion of this kind, the future and the past are consubsistent. But soul, changing its conceptions, passes from one thing to another; not that the prior conceptions depart, and the posterior accede in their place, but there is, as it were, a transition of the former, though they remain in the soul, and the latter accede, as if from some other place. They do not, however, accede in reality from another place; but they appear to do so in consequence of the self-motion of the soul, and through her eye being directed to a survey of the different forms which she contains, and which have the relation of parts to her whole essence. For she resembles a fountain not flowing outwardly, but circularly scattering its streams into itself. With the motion, therefore, of soul, time is consubsistent; but eternity is consubsistent with the permanency of intellect in itself[182]. It is not, however, divided from intellect in the same manner as time is from soul; because in intellect the consubsistent essences are united. But that which is perpetually moved, is the source of a false opinion of eternity, through the immeasurable extent of its motion producing a conception of eternity. And that which abides [in one,] is falsely conceived to be the same with that which is [perpetually] moved. For that which is perpetually moved, evolves the time of itself in the same manner as _the now_ of itself, and multiplies it, according to a temporal progression. Hence, some have apprehended that time is to be surveyed in permanency no less than in motion; and that eternity, as we have said, is infinite time; just as if each of these imparted its own properties to the other; time, which is always moved, adumbrating eternity by the perpetuity of itself, and the sameness of its motion; and eternity, through being established in sameness of energy, becoming similar to time, by the permanency of itself arising from energy. In sensibles, however, the time of one thing is distinct from that of another. Thus, for instance, there is one time of the sun, and another of the moon, one time of the morning-star, and another of each of the planets. Hence, also, there is a different year of different planets. The year, likewise, which comprehends these times, terminates as in a summit in the motion of the soul [of the universe,] according to the imitation of which the celestial orbs are moved. The motion of this soul, however, being of a different nature from that of the planets, the time of the former also is different from that of the latter. For the latter subsists with interval, and is distinguished from the former by local motions and transitions.

FOOTNOTES:

[146] In the original, Ου το ποιουν εις αλλο, πελασει και αφῃ ποιει, α ποιει· κ.τ.λ. But it is evident, from the sense of the whole passage, that, for Ου το ποιουν, we should read, Ου παν το ποιουν, κ.τ.λ.

[147] The article ο is wanting here in the original before ετερος.

[148] Knowledge subsists conformably to the nature by which it is possessed, and not conformably to the thing known. Hence it is either better than, or co-ordinate with, or inferior to the object of knowledge. Thus the rational soul has a knowledge of sensibles, which is superior to sensibles; but it knows itself with a co-ordinate knowledge; and its knowledge of divinity is inferior to the object of knowledge. Porphyry, therefore, is not correct in what he here says. This dogma respecting the conformity of knowledge to that which knows, rather than to the thing known, originated from the divine Iamblichus, as we are informed by Ammonius in his commentary on Aristotle’s treatise De Interpretatione, and is adopted by Proclus (in Parmenid.). Boetius likewise employs it in his reasoning in lib. v. about the prescience of divinity. None of his commentators, however, have noticed the source from whence it was derived.

[149] Because here the generator is that _primarily_ which the thing generated is _secondarily_. See my translation of Proclus’s Theological Elements.

[150] Porphyry here summarily comprehends the rational gnostic powers of the soul in intellect, because, being rational, they are expansions of intellect properly so called. But these powers, beginning from the lowest, are _opinion_, _dianoia_, and the summit of dianoia, which summit is the intellect of the human soul, and is that power, by the light of which we perceive the truth of axioms, it being intuitive perception. _Dianoia_ is the discursive energy of reason; or it is that power which reasons scientifically, deriving the principles of its reasoning from intellect. And _opinion_ is that power which knows _that_ a thing is, but is ignorant of the cause of it, or _why_ it is.

[151] In the original, ει δε μη εξω εκτεινομενος; but for ει δε μη, it appears to me to be obviously necessary to read ουδε μη.

[152] In the original, εξω δε οντων υλης, ουδαμου αν ειη ταυτα; which Holstenius, wholly mistaking the meaning, most erroneously translates, “At si extra materiam sint, neutiquam id fieri poterit.” Farther on, Porphyry asserts, that God, intellect, and soul, are no where, according to corporeal locality.

[153] In the original, η μνημη ουκ εστι φαντασιων σωτηρια, αλλα των μελετηθεντων προβαλλεσθαι εκ νεας προβληματα. But for προβληματα, I read προλημματα. This power, by which Porphyry characterizes memory, is of a stable nature. And hence memory is _stability of knowledge_, in the same manner as immortality is _stability of life_, and eternity _stability of being_.

[154] See the notes on the 3d book of my translation of Aristotle’s treatise on the Soul, and also my translation of Plotinus on Felicity. “The phantasy,” says Olympiodorus (in Platonis Phæd.) “is an impediment to our intellectual conceptions; and hence, when we are agitated by the inspiring influence of Divinity, if the phantasy intervenes, the enthusiastic energy ceases: for enthusiasm and the phantasy are contrary to each other. Should it be asked, whether the soul is able to energize without the phantasy? we reply, that its perception of universals proves that it is able. It has perceptions, therefore, independent of the phantasy; at the same time, however, the phantasy attends it in its energies, just as a storm pursues him who sails on the sea.”

[155] The analogy of the soul to harmony, is more accurately unfolded as follows, by Olympiodorus, in his Commentary on the Phædo of Plato, than it is in this place by Porphyry: “Harmony has a triple subsistence. For it is either harmony itself, or it is that which is first harmonized, and which is such according to the whole of itself; or it is that which is secondarily harmonized, and which partially participates of harmony. The first of these must be assigned to intellect, the second to soul, and the third to body. This last, too, is corruptible, because it subsists in a subject; but the other two are incorruptible, because they are neither composites, nor dependent on a subject. Hence, the rational soul is analogous to a musician, but the animated body to harmonized chords; for the former has a subsistence separate, but the latter inseparable from the musical instrument.”

[156] What Porphyry here says about matter, is derived from the treatise of Plotinus, _On the Impassivity of Incorporeal Natures_, to my translation of which I refer the reader.

[157] See my translation of the before-mentioned treatise of Plotinus.

[158] For τα οντα here, I read τα αυτα.

[159] Hence, it is beautifully said in the Clavis of Hermes Trismegistus, “that the knowledge of _the good_ [or the supreme principle of things], is a divine silence, and the quiescence of all the senses.” See, also, on this subject, a most admirable extract from Damascius, περι αρχων, at the end of the 3d volume of my Plato.

[160] For that which is truly incorporeal, is _every where_ virtually, _i.e._ in power and efficacy, but is _no where_ locally.

[161] For μερισταις here, I read, μερικαις. For Porphyry is here speaking of essences which are opposed to _such as rank as wholes_, as is evident from the whole of this paragraph.

[162] The primary natures of which Porphyry is now speaking, are rational partial souls, such as ours; for the natures superior to these, are never converted to beings posterior to themselves.

[163] For αυτου, _isthic_, I read, αυτος.

[164] In the original, και ψυχη εν νῳ τε και θεῳ πανταχου, και ουδαμου εν σωματι, but it appears to me to be necessary to read, και ψυχη εν νῳ τε και θεῳ, και πανταχου και ουδαμου εν σωματι.

[165] και εν νῳ, is omitted in the original, but ought to be inserted, as is evident from the version of Holstenius.

[166] The irrational life is a thing of this kind, which is partly separable and partly inseparable from body. Hence, so far as it is inseparable from body, it partakes of the _every where_; but, so far as it is separable, of the _no where_.

[167] _i.e._ The animal spirit, or pneumatic soul, in which the rational soul suffers her punishments in Hades.

[168] _i.e._ That part of the soul which is the source of all-various desires.

[169] This philosophic apathy is not, as is stupidly supposed by most of the present day, insensibility, but a perfect subjugation of the passions to reason.

[170] The words και δικαιοσυνη, are omitted in the original. But it is evident from the treatise of Plotinus “On the Virtues,” that they ought to be inserted. For what Porphyry says in this Section about the virtues, is derived from that treatise.

[171] Instead of κατ’ αυτην, here it is necessary to read, κατ’ αισθησιν.

[172] Conformably to this, as we have before observed, Aristotle says in the 7th Book of his Nicomachean Ethics, “that corporeal pleasures are remedies against pain, and that they fill up the indigence of nature, but perfect no energy of the rational soul.”

[173] In the original, αλλα το εκβεβηκος τον μεγιστον ογκον, εις το μεγιστον, και τον ελαχιστον εις το ελαχιστον, αμα λαβων, κ.τ.λ. This Holstenius most erroneously translates, “Verum id quod maximam molem intervallo maximo, et minimam minimo excedit simul sumens, &c.” For a truly incorporeal nature, such as that of which Porphyry is now speaking, has nothing to do with interval, and, therefore, does not by interval surpass either the greatest or the least corporeal mass; but is received transcendently by the greatest and the least magnitude.

[174] For διαληψεσιν, here, I read καταληψεσιν, and Holstenius also has in this place _comprehensionibus_.

[175] In the original, καθο εν τι των κατ’ αισθησιν συνεγνωσμενων; but it appears to me to be necessary, after καθο, to insert the words ουκ εστιν. For incorporeal being is not like some one of the things which are known by the senses, because no one of these is one, and, at the same time, all things. Holstenius did not perceive the necessity of this emendation, as is evident from his version of the passage.

[176] Immediately after this something is wanting in the original, (as is evident from the asterisks,) which, as it appears to me, no conjecture can appropriately supply.

[177] In the original, και δια τουτων παλιν τῃ πενιᾳ συνειναι, καιπερ παροντος αυτου; but for αυτου, I read πορου; as it appears to me that Porphyry is here alluding to what is said by Diotima, in the Banquet of Plato, concerning the parents of Love, viz. that they are _Poverty_ and _Porus_, or _Plenty_.

[178] See the Phædo of Plato. But something is here wanting in the original, as is evident not only from the asterisks, but from the want of connexion in the words themselves.

[179] _i.e._ They are not adapted to be the immediate causes of body, because they are perfectly separated from it. The original is, ηδη δε ην αλλα καταχρηστικως λεγομενα ασωματα, ου κατα στερησιν σωματος, κατα δε ολως μη πεφυκεναι γεννᾳν σωμα. Holstenius, not understanding what is here said by Porphyry, translates the words κατα δε ολως μη πεφυκεναι γεννᾳν σωμα, “sed quod nullum omnino corpus generare possunt.” For Porphyry, as is evident from what immediately follows, is here speaking of natures which are perfectly separated from bodies, and which are, therefore, not naturally adapted to be the immediate generators of them, not through any deficiency, but through transcendency of power.

[180] In the original, διο ουχι τοδε μεν εαυτου νοει, τοδε δε ου νοει, which Holstenius erroneously translates, “Ideoque non quidem unam sui partem intelligit, alteram vero non intelligit.” For Porphyry is not here speaking of intellect surveying its parts, but of its being _wholly_ intellective. This is evident from what immediately follows.

[181] The asterisks in the original denote something is wanting. Nevertheless, what immediately follows them, is evidently connected with what immediately precedes.

[182] See the fourth book of my translation of Proclus, on the Timæus of Plato, in which the nature of time and eternity is most admirably unfolded. See, also, my translation of Plotinus, on Eternity and Time. In these works, what both these divine men have said of eternity, and what the former has said of time, contains, as it appears to me, the _ne plus ultra_ of philosophical investigation on these most abstruse subjects.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

ON THE WANDERINGS OF ULYSSES.

In my History of the Restoration of the Platonic Theology [see Vol. II. of my Proclus on Euclid,] and in a note accompanying my translation of the treatise of Porphyry, on the Cave of the Nymphs, in that work, I attempted, from the hints afforded by Porphyry, and the work of an anonymous Greek writer, De Ulyxis Erroribus, to unfold the latent meaning of the wanderings of Ulysses, as narrated by Homer. But as, from my continued application to the philosophy of Plato for upwards of forty years, I now know much more of that philosophy than I then did, a period of thirty-five years having elapsed from that to the present time, I shall again attempt to explain those wanderings, rejecting some things, and retaining others which I had adopted before.

In the first place, it is necessary to observe, that Ulysses does not rank among the first heroic characters, or in other words, he was not one of those heroes who descend into the regions of mortality at certain periods, not only in compliance with that necessity through which all partial souls such as ours descend periodically, but also for the purpose of benefiting others, and leading them back to their pristine state of perfection. Hence, he was by no means such an exalted hero as Hercules, or Pythagoras, or Socrates, or Plato; for they largely benefited others; but he only benefited himself. For all his companions perished prior to his arrival at Ithaca. So that he was able to save himself, but not others. “Hence,” says Olympiodorus, in his MS. Scholia on the Gorgias of Plato, “it is said, that Ulysses wandered on the sea by the will of Neptune. For by this it is signified that the Odyssean life was neither terrestrial, nor yet celestial, but between these. Since, therefore, Neptune is the lord of the middle natures, on this account it is said, that Ulysses wandered through the will of Neptune, because he had a Neptunian allotment. Thus, also, theologists speak of the sons of Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, regarding the allotment of each. For we say, that he who has a divine and celestial polity, is the son of Jupiter; that he who has a terrestrial polity, is the son of Pluto; and he is the son of Neptune, whose polity or allotment is between these[183].” Hence Ulysses, from his Neptunian allotment, was a man who ranked among the middle class of characters that transcend the majority of mankind.

In the next place, in order to understand accurately the recondite meaning of the wanderings of Ulysses, it is requisite to know what the most divine and theological poet Homer indicates by the Trojan war in the Iliad. For Homer, by combining fiction with historical facts, has delivered to us some very occult, mystic, and valuable information, in those two admirable poems, the Iliad and Odyssey. Hence, by those who directed their attention to this recondite information, he was said, conformably to the tragical mode of speaking, which was usual with the most ancient writers, to have been blind, because, as Proclus observes[184], he separated himself from sensible beauty, and extended the intellect of his soul to invisible and true harmony. He was said, therefore, to be blind, because _that_ intellectual beauty to which he raised himself cannot be perceived by corporeal eyes. Thus, too, Orpheus is tragically said to have been lacerated in an all-various manner, because men of that age _partially_ participated of his mystic doctrine. The _principal part_ of it, however, was received by the Lesbians; and on this account, his _head_, when separated from his body, is said to have been carried to Lesbos. Hence, the Platonic Hermeas, conformably to this opinion of the occult meaning of the Iliad, beautifully explains as follows the Trojan war, in his Scholia on the Phædrus of Plato:

“By _Ilion_, we must understand the generated and material place, which is so denominated from _mud and matter_ (παρα την ιλυν και την υλην,) and in which there are war and sedition. But the Trojans are material forms, and all the lives which subsist about bodies. Hence, also, the Trojans are called _genuine_ (ιθαγενεις). For all the lives which subsist about bodies, and irrational[185] souls, are favourable and attentive to their proper matter. On the contrary, the Greeks are rational souls, coming from Greece, _i.e._ from the intelligible into matter. Hence, the Greeks are called _foreigners_ (επηλυδες,) and vanquish the Trojans, as being of a superior order. But they fight with each other about the image of Helen, as the poet says [about the image of Eneas].

Around the phantom Greeks and Trojans fight[186].

Helen signifying intelligible beauty, being a certain _vessel_ (ελενοη τις ουσα,) attracting to itself intellect. An efflux, therefore, of this intelligible beauty is imparted to matter through Venus; and about this efflux of beauty the Greeks fight with the Trojans [_i.e._ rational with irrational lives[187]]. And those, indeed, that oppose and vanquish matter, return to the intelligible world, which is their true country; but those who do not, as is the case with the multitude, are bound to matter. As, therefore, the prophet, in the tenth book of the Republic, previously to the descent of souls, announces to them how they may return [to their pristine felicity], according to periods of a thousand and ten thousand years; thus, also, Calchas predicts to the Greeks their return in ten years, the number ten being the symbol of a perfect period. And as, in the lives of souls, some are elevated through philosophy, others through the amatory art, and others through the royal and warlike disciplines; so with respect to the Greeks, some act with rectitude through prudence, but others through war or love, and their return is different [according to their different pursuits].”

The first obviously fabulous adventure, then, of Ulysses, is that of the Lotophagi, which Homer beautifully narrates, and whose narration Pope very elegantly translates as follows:

The trees around them all their fruit produce, Lotos the name, and dulcet is the juice[188]! (Thence call’d Lotophagi) which, whoso tastes, Insatiate riots in the sweet repasts, Nor other home, nor other care intends, But quits his house, his country, and his friends. The three we sent from off th’ enchanting ground We dragg’d reluctant, and by force we bound: The rest in haste forsook the pleasing shore, Or, the charm tasted, had return’d no more[189].

Plato, in the 8th book of his Republic, has admirably unfolded to us what the _lotos_ occultly indicates, viz. that it signifies “false and arrogant reasonings and opinions:” for daily experience shows that nothing is more enchanting and delicious than these to such as have made no solid proficiency in virtue, and who, like some of the companions of Ulysses, being fascinated by erroneous conceptions, consign their true country and true kindred to oblivion, and desire to live for ever lost in the intoxication of fallacious delight.