Part 20
What is here said by Plato is beautifully unfolded by Olymipiodorus, in his MS. Commentary on the Gorgias, as follows:—“Euripides (in Phryxo) says, that to live is to die, and to die to live. For the soul coming hither, as she imparts life to the body, so she partakes [through this] of a certain privation of life; but this is an evil. When separated, therefore, from the body, she lives in reality: for she dies here, through participating a privation of life, because the body becomes the source of evils. And hence it is necessary to subdue the body.
“But the meaning of the Pythagoric fable, which is here introduced by Plato, is this: We are said to be dead, because, as we have before observed, we partake of a privation of life. The sepulchre which we carry about with us is, as Plato himself explains it, the body. But Hades is the unapparent, because we are situated in obscurity, the soul being in a state of servitude to the body. The tubs are the desires; whether they are so called from our hastening to fill them, as if they were tubs, or from desire persuading us that it is beautiful. The initiated, therefore, _i.e._ those that have a perfect knowledge, pour into the entire tub: for these have their tub full; or, in other words, have perfect virtue. But the uninitiated, viz. those that possess nothing perfect, have perforated tubs. For those that are in a state of servitude to desire always wish to fill it, and are more inflamed; and on this account they have perforated tubs, as being never full. But the sieve is the rational soul mingled with the irrational. For the [rational] soul is called a circle, because it seeks itself, and is itself sought; finds itself, and is itself found. But the irrational soul imitates a right line, since it does not revert to itself like a circle. So far, therefore, as the sieve is circular, it is an image of the rational soul; but, as it is placed under the right lines formed from the holes, it is assumed for the irrational soul. Right lines, therefore, are in the middle of the cavities. Hence, by the sieve, Plato signifies the rational in subjection to the irrational soul. But the water is the flux of nature: for, as Heraclitus says, _moisture is the death of the soul_.”
In this extract the intelligent reader will easily perceive that the occult signification of the _tubs_ is more scientifically unfolded by Olympiodorus than by Porphyry.
[143] In the original, και τας μεν, θεοις τε και τοις αγαθοις προσηκουσας. But after αγαθοις, I have no doubt we should insert δαιμοσι.
[144] Phorcys is one among the ennead of Gods who, according to Plato in the Timæus, fabricate generation. Of this deity, Proclus observes, “that as the Jupiter in this ennead causes the unapparent divisions and separation of forms made by Saturn to become apparent, and as Rhea calls them forth into motion and generation; so Phorcys inserts them in matter, produces sensible natures, and adorns the visible essence, in order that there may not only be divisions of productive principles [or forms] in natures and in souls, and in intellectual essences prior to these; _but likewise in sensibles. For this is the peculiarity of fabrication._”
[145] “The anger of the Gods,” says Proclus, “is not an indication of any passion in them, but demonstrates our inaptitude to participate of their illuminations.”
AUXILIARIES TO THE PERCEPTION OF INTELLIGIBLE NATURES.
SECTION I.
1. Every body is in place; but nothing essentially incorporeal, or any thing of this kind, has any locality.
2. Things essentially incorporeal, because they are more excellent than all body and place, are every where, not with interval, but impartibly.
3. Things essentially incorporeal, are not locally present with bodies, but are present with them when they please; by verging towards them so far as they are naturally adapted so to verge. They are not, however, present with them locally, but through habitude, proximity, and alliance.
4. Things essentially incorporeal, are not present with bodies, by hypostasis and essence; for they are not mingled with bodies. But they impart a certain power which is proximate to bodies, through verging towards them. For tendency constitutes a certain secondary power proximate to bodies.
5. Soul, indeed, is a certain medium between an impartible essence, and an essence which is divisible about bodies. But intellect is an impartible essence alone. And qualities and material forms are divisible about bodies.
6. Not every thing[146] which acts on another, effects that which it does effect by approximation and contact; but those natures which effect any thing by approximation and contact, use approximation accidentally.
7. The soul is bound to the body by a conversion to the corporeal passions; and is again liberated by becoming impassive to the body.
8. That which nature binds, nature also dissolves: and that which the soul binds, the soul likewise dissolves. Nature, indeed, bound the body to the soul; but the soul binds herself to the body. Nature, therefore, liberates the body from the soul; but the soul liberates herself from the body.
9. Hence there is a twofold death; the one, indeed, universally known, in which the body is liberated from the soul; but the other peculiar to philosophers, in which the soul is liberated from the body. Nor does the one[147] entirely follow the other.
10. We do not understand similarly in all things, but in a manner adapted to the essence of each. For intellectual objects we understand intellectually; but those that pertain to soul rationally. We apprehend plants spermatically; but bodies idolically [_i.e._ as images]; and that which is above all these, super-intellectually and super-essentially[148].
11. Incorporeal hypostases, in descending, are distributed into parts, and multiplied about individuals with a diminution of power; but when they ascend by their energies beyond bodies, they become united, and proceed into a simultaneous subsistence, through exuberance of power.
12. The homonymous is not in bodies only, but life also is among the number of things which have a multifarious subsistence. For the life of a plant is different from that of an animated being; the life of an intellectual essence differs from that of the nature which is beyond intellect; and the psychical differs from the intellectual life. For these natures live, though nothing which proceeds from, possesses a life similar to them.
13. Every thing which generates by its very essence, generates that which is inferior to itself[149]; and every thing generated, is naturally converted to its generator. Of generating natures, however, some are not at all converted to the beings which they generate; but others are partly converted to them, and partly not; and others are only converted to their progeny, but are not converted to themselves.
14. Every thing generated, possesses from that which is different from itself the cause of its generation, since nothing is produced without a cause. Such generated natures, however, as have their existence through composition, these are on this account corruptible. But such as, being simple and incomposite, possess their existence in a simplicity of hypostasis, these being indissoluble, are, indeed, incorruptible; yet they are said to be generated, not as if they were composites, but as being suspended from a certain cause. Bodies, therefore, are in a twofold respect generated; as being suspended from a certain producing cause; and as being composites. But soul and intellect are only generated as being suspended from a cause, and not as composites. Hence bodies are generated, dissoluble and corruptible; but soul and intellect are unbegotten, as being without composition, and on this account indissoluble and incorruptible; yet they are generated so far as they are suspended from a cause.
15. Intellect is not the principle of all things; for intellect is many things; but, prior to _the many_, it is necessary that there should be _the one_. It is evident, however, that intellect is many things. For it always understands its conceptions, which are not one, but many; and which are not any thing else than itself. If, therefore, it is the same with its conceptions, but they are many, intellect also will be many things. But that it is the same with intelligibles [or the objects of its intellection], may be thus demonstrated. For, if there is any thing which intellect surveys, it will either survey this thing as contained in itself, or as placed in something else. And that intellect, indeed, contemplates or surveys, is evident. For, in conjunction with intellection, or intellectual perception, it will be intellect; but if you deprive it of intellection, you will destroy its essence. It is necessary, therefore, that, directing our attention to the properties of knowledge, we should investigate the perception of intellect. All the gnostic powers, then, which we contain, are universally sense, imagination, and intellect[150]. The power, however, which employs sense, surveys by projecting itself to externals, not being united to the objects which it surveys, but only receiving an impression of, by exerting its energies upon them. When, therefore, the eye sees a visible object, it is impossible that it should become the same with that which it perceives: for it would not see if there was not an interval between it and the object of its perception. And, after the same manner, that which is touched, if it was the same with that by which it is touched, would perish. From which it is evident that sense, and that which employs sense, must always tend to an external object, in order to apprehend something sensible. In like manner also, the phantasy, or imagination, always tends to something external, and by this extension of itself, gives subsistence to, or prepares an image; its extension to what is external, indicating that the object of its perception is a resemblance of something external. And such, indeed, is the apprehension of these two powers; neither of which verging to, and being collected into itself, perceives either a sensible or insensible form.
In intellect, however, the apprehension of its objects does not subsist after this manner, but is effected by converging to, and surveying itself. For by departing from itself, in order to survey its own energies, and become the eye of them, and the sight of essences, it will not understand any thing. Hence, as sense is to that which is sensible, so is intellect to that which is intelligible. Sense, however, by, extending itself to externals, finds that which is sensible situated in matter; but intellect surveys the intelligible, by being collected into itself, and not extended outwardly[151]. On this account some are of opinion, that the hypostasis of intellect differs from that of the phantasy only in name. For the phantasy, in the rational animal, appeared to them to be intelligence. As these men, however, suspended all things from matter and a corporeal nature, it follows that they should also suspend from these intellect. But our intellect surveys both bodies and other essences. Hence it apprehends them situated somewhere. But as the proper objects of intellect have a subsistence out of matter, they will be no where[152] [locally]. It is evident, therefore, that intellectual natures are to be conjoined with intelligence. But if intellectual natures are in intellect, it follows that intellect, when it understands intelligibles, surveys both the intelligible and itself; and that proceeding into itself, it perceives intellectually, because it proceeds into intelligibles. If, however, intellect understands many things, and not one thing only, intellect also will necessarily be many. But _the one_ subsists prior to the many; so that it is necessary that _the one_ should be prior to intellect.
16. Memory is not the conservation of imaginations, but the power of calling forth _de novo_ those conceptions which had previously occupied the attention of the mind[153].
17. Soul, indeed, contains the reasons [or forms] of all things, but energizes according to them, either being called forth to this energy by something else, or converting itself to them inwardly. And when called forth by something else, it introduces, as it were, the senses to externals, but when it enters into itself, it becomes occupied with intellectual conceptions. Hence some one may say, that neither the senses, nor intellectual perceptions, are without the phantasy; so that, as in the animal, the senses are not without the passive affection of the sensitive organs, in like manner intellections are not without the phantasy. Perhaps, however, it may be said, in answer to this, that, as an impression in the sensitive organ is the concomitant of the sensitive animal, so analogously a phantasm is the concomitant of the intellection of the soul in man, considered as an animal[154].
18. Soul is an essence without magnitude, immaterial, incorruptible, possessing its existence in life, and having life from itself.
19. The passivity of bodies is different from that of incorporeal natures. For the passivity of bodies is attended with mutation; but the adaptations and passions of the soul are energies; yet they are by no means similar to the calefactions and frigefactions of bodies. Hence, if the passivity of bodies is accompanied by mutation, it must be said that all incorporeal natures are impassive. For the essences which are separated from matter and bodies, are what they are in energy. But those things which approximate to matter and bodies, are themselves, indeed, impassive; but the natures in which they are surveyed are passive. For when the animal perceives sensibly, the soul [_i.e._ the rational soul] appears to be similar to separate harmony[155], of itself moving the chords adapted to harmony; but the body is similar to the inseparable harmony in the chords, [_i.e._ to the harmony which cannot exist separate from the chords]. But the animal is the cause of the motion, because it is an animated being. It is, however, analogous to a musician, because it is harmonic; but the bodies which are struck through sensitive passion, are analogous to the harmonized chords of a musical instrument. For in this instance, also, separate harmony is not passively affected, but the chords. And the musician, indeed, moves according to the harmony which is in him; yet the chords would not be musically moved, even though the musician wished that they should, unless harmony ordered this to take place.
20. Incorporeal natures are not denominated like bodies, according to a participation in common of one and the same genus; but they derive their appellation from a mere privation with respect to bodies. Hence, nothing hinders some of them from having a subsistence as beings, but others as non-beings; some of them, from being prior to, and others posterior to bodies; some, from being separate, and others inseparable from bodies; some, from having a subsistence by themselves, but others from being indigent of things different from themselves, to their existence; some, from being the same through energies and self-motive lives, but others from subsisting together with lives, and energies of a certain quality. For they subsist according to a negation of the things which they are not, and not according to the affirmation of the things which they are.
21. The properties of matter, according to the ancients, are the following: It is incorporeal; for it is different from bodies. It is without life; for it is neither intellect nor soul, nor vital from itself [_i.e._ essentially]. It is also formless, variable, infinite, and powerless. Hence, it is neither being, nor yet non-being. Not that it is non-being like motion, but it is true non-being, the image and phantasm of bulk, because it is that which bulk primarily contains. It is likewise powerless, and the desire of subsistence, has stability, but not in permanency, and always appears in itself to be contrary. Hence, it is both small and great, more and less, deficient and exceeding. It is always becoming to be, or rising into existence; abides not, and yet is unable to fly away; and is the defect of all being. Hence, in whatever it announces itself to be, it deceives; and though it should appear to be great, it is nevertheless small. For it resembles a flying mockery, eluding all pursuit, and vanishing into non-entity. For its flight is not in place, but is effected by its desertion of real being. Hence, also, the images which are in it, are in an image more unreal than themselves; just as in a mirror, where the thing represented is in one place, and the representation of it in another. It likewise appears to be full, yet contains nothing, though it seems to possess all things[156].
22. All passions subsist about the same thing as that about which corruption subsists; for the reception of passion is the path to corruption. And the thing that is the subject of passivity, is also the subject of corruption. Nothing incorporeal, however, is corrupted. But some of them either exist, or do not exist; so that they are not at all passive. For that which is passive, ought not to be a thing of this kind, but such as may be changed in quality, and corrupted by the properties of the things that enter into it, and cause it to be passive. For the change in quality of that which is inherent, is not casually effected. Neither, therefore, does matter suffer; for it is of itself without quality. Nor do the forms which enter into, and depart from it, suffer; but the passion subsists about the composite from matter and form, the very being of which consists in the union of the two. For this, in the contrary powers and qualities of the things which enter and produce passion, is seen to be the subject of them. On which account, also, those things, the life of which is externally derived, and does not subsist from themselves, are capable of suffering both the participation and the privation of life. But those beings whose existence consists in an impassive life, must necessarily possess a permanent life; just as a privation of life, so far as it is a privation of it, is attended with impassivity. As, therefore, to be changed and to suffer pertain to the composite from matter and form, and this is body, but matter is exempt from this; thus also, to live and to die, and to suffer through the participation of life and death, is beheld in the composite from soul and body. Nevertheless, this does not happen to the soul; because it is not a thing which consists of life and the privation of life, but consists of life alone. And it possesses this, because its essence is simple, and the reason [or form] of the soul is self-motive[157].
23. An intellectual essence is so similar in its parts, that the same[158] things exist both in a partial and an all-perfect intellect. In an universal intellect, however, partial natures subsist universally; but in a partial intellect, both universals and particulars subsist partially.
24. Of that essence, the existence of which is in life, and the passions of which are lives, the death also consists in a certain life, and not in a total privation of life; because, neither is the deprivation of life in this essence a passion, or a path which entirely leads to a non-vital subsistence.
25. In incorporeal lives, the progressions are effected while the lives themselves remain firm and stable, nothing pertaining to them being corrupted, or changed into the hypostasis of things subordinate to them. Hence, neither are the things to which they give subsistence produced with a certain corruption or mutation. Nor do these incorporeal lives subsist like generation, which participates of corruption and mutation. Hence, they are unbegotten and incorruptible, and on this account are unfolded into light without generation and incorruptibly.
26. Of that nature which is beyond intellect, many things are asserted through intellection, but it is surveyed by a cessation of intellectual energy better than with it[159]; just as with respect to one who is asleep, many things are asserted of him while he is in that state by those who are awake; but the proper knowledge and apprehension of his dormant condition, is only to be obtained through sleep. For the similar is known by the similar; because _all knowledge is an assimilation to the object of knowledge_.
27. With respect to that which is non-being, we either produce it, being ourselves separated from real being, or we have a preconception of it, as adhering to being. Hence, if we are separated from being, we have not an antecedent conception of the non-being which is above being, but our knowledge in this case is only that of a false passion, such as that which happens to a man when he departs from himself. For as a man may himself, and through himself, be truly elevated to the non-being which is above being, so, by departing from being, he is led to the non-being which is a falling off from being.
28. The hypostasis of body is no impediment whatever to that which is essentially incorporeal, so as to prevent it from being where, and in such a way, as it wishes to be. For as that which is without bulk is incomprehensible by body, and does not at all pertain to it, so that which has bulk cannot impede or obscure an incorporeal nature, but lies before it like a non-entity. Nor does that which is incorporeal pervade locally, when it wishes to pass from one thing to another; for place is consubsistent with bulk. Nor is it compressed by bodies. For that which in any way whatever is connected with bulk, may be compressed, and effect a transition locally; but that which is entirely without bulk and without magnitude, cannot be restrained by that which has bulk, and does not participate of local motion. Hence, by a certain disposition, it is found to be there, where it is inclined to be, being with respect to place every where and yet no where[160]. By _a certain disposition_, therefore, it is either above the heavens, or is contained in a certain part of the world. When, however, it is contained in a certain part of the world, it is not visible to the eyes, but the presence of it becomes manifest from its works.
29. It is necessary that an incorporeal nature, if it is contained in body, should not be enclosed in it like a wild beast in a den; (for no body is able thus to enclose and comprehend it), nor is it contained in body in the same way as a bladder contains something liquid, or wind; but it is requisite that it should give subsistence to certain powers which verge to what is external, through its union with body; by which powers, when it descends, it becomes complicated with body. Its conjunction, therefore, with body, is effected through an ineffable extension. Hence, nothing else binds it, but itself binds itself to body. Neither, therefore, is it liberated from the body, when the body is [mortally] wounded and corrupted, but it liberates itself, by turning itself from an adhering affection to the body.