Part 9

Wyndham, in 1733, on a motion calling for certain letters of instructions, argued for the necessity of giving such information to Parliament. He asked how could members of the House of Commons judge of the estimates to be laid before them as a provision for national safety if they did not know by what danger the nation was confronted. The motion, however, was rejected.

When Pelham was criticized in the House for not having informed Parliament of the preliminaries of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle he argued: “If Parliament should encroach upon the prerogative of the Crown, by assuming a right to make peace or war, and to inquire into foreign transactions under negotiation, our affairs will be reduced to a dangerous predicament; for no foreign State will negotiate with our ministers, or conclude any treaty with them, either political or commercial.” This is an argument often made in the eighteenth century to show the unwisdom of Parliamentary control. The change of ministers following party changes in the House, and the fact that the Foreign Minister would not by his own word be able to give complete assurances to foreign governments, were considered to put the British Government under a disadvantage in negotiations. It was therefore considered undesirable that negotiations should be submitted to the control and sanction of Parliament. Walpole had stated the matter in the following words:

“Therefore while our happy constitution remains entire, while the Parliament meets but once a year, and does not continue assembled above three or four months in the twelve, it is impossible for either House of Parliament to intermeddle, much less to prescribe to the Crown, in any affairs relating to peace or war, without exposing the nation to imminent danger.”

Throughout the nineteenth century Parliament interfered very little with the conduct of foreign affairs. The minister for foreign affairs or the premier would from time to time give information or make a systematic discourse on foreign affairs and it was understood that the House would be kept informed concerning the aims and tendencies of the Government’s foreign policy. Specific questions were asked by members but not frequently. The nature of the British system would have rendered unmeaning any struggle for control between the House and the Cabinet.

The manner of keeping Parliament and the public informed on foreign affairs was discussed. The Earl of Clarendon spoke of the practice of laying before Parliament official information in the _Blue Books_. He stated:

“I am perfectly certain there is always laid before Parliament a very fair and complete view of the transactions between this country and any other to which those papers may relate. I know that foreign Governments rather complain of our Blue Books, and to a certain extent they may curtail some of the communications that are made to our foreign Ministers, but I should be extremely sorry to see our system of publication of diplomatic papers in any way curtailed, or different from what it is; of course, there must always be care taken not to compromise individuals for the information they have given, but I believe it is an immense advantage to this country that our despatches and diplomatic transactions should be known, because if they have the approbation of Parliament and of the country, the Government then has the whole weight of public opinion in its favor, and it is that which gives such strength to our policy and to our opinions in foreign countries.”

That is a very statesmanlike presentation of the advantages of constant public knowledge of foreign policy in giving the government a secure base of intelligent support.

When dissatisfaction or doubt was felt by large numbers concerning the foreign policy of the government, as in 1857 and again in 1878 after the concealment of the Schuvalof agreement, complaint was frequently made in Parliament and in the press to the effect that Parliament on the one hand was not given a chance to acquire a complete knowledge of foreign policy, and on the other it was not sufficiently alert and active in using its opportunities for control. In 1886 the following resolution was moved:

“That in the opinion of this House it is not just or expedient to embark in war, contract engagements involving grave responsibilities for the nation, and add territories to the Empire, without the knowledge and consent of Parliament.”

Like other similar resolutions, it did not pass. Mr. Gladstone opposed it on the ground that the House of Commons under existing arrangements actually possessed all necessary power of control and that the passage of this resolution would mean simply that the House of Lords would share this power with it.

In 1885 when Earl Granville had objected to public criticism of negotiations which were still in progress between Russia and Great Britain regarding Afghanistan, Lord Salisbury made the following interesting and important statement with respect to the relations of foreign policies to public opinion, which in temper resembles that of Lord Clarendon cited above:

“The noble Earl seemed to me to lay down a doctrine which we cannot pass unnoticed, when he says it is the duty of an Opposition not to canvas or condemn the conduct of the Government, if by so doing it should have the effect of discouraging friends and allies in other parts of the world. That seems to be a very far-reaching doctrine, and one which it is impossible to assent to.... If we are of opinion that the course of public affairs is going ill, and that our Government has mismanaged, that faults are being committed and dangers are being incurred, we have no absolute Sovereign to whom we can appeal in order to correct the evil; our absolute Sovereign is the people of this country, and it is they, and they alone, who can bring a remedy to the mischief which is going on. You have a form of Government which in many points is purely democratic, and you must take it with the incidents which naturally adhere to it, and one of these incidents is publicity of deliberation. The Cabinet is the people, and their deliberations are conducted in the open field. If they are to be rightly informed, you must deal fully and frankly with the subjects which form the basis of their determination. It is, no doubt, a drawback so far as it goes, but it is a drawback you must face, and you cannot help it if Foreign Powers overhear, so to speak, the privileged communications between you and those by whose verdict you must stand. You cannot suppress the argument because somebody else outside hears it and you may be adversely affected by it....”

The concealment of important obligations and the growing secrecy of diplomatic affairs during the first decade of the Twentieth Century brought on many expressions of dissatisfaction in the House of Commons. After the secret agreement concerning Morocco became known, Mr. John Dillon expressed himself as follows, in a speech in the House of Commons in September, 1911:

“I do not believe any representative assembly in the history of the world has ever been called upon to discuss a matter so vital and so far-reaching as that which the House of Commons has before it to-day to consider, and with so absolute a lack of information.... The House was summoned for this discussion to-day without any papers whatsoever.... We ought at all events to have had an account of diplomatic correspondence between the four great Powers intimately interested in the question of Morocco, as is customary to be given to the House of Commons on such an occasion. This would have enabled members of the House before the debate commenced, to form a really well-grounded judgment upon the whole matter. We have heard a good deal to-night of the secrecy of the Foreign policy of this country. It is no use attempting to deny it. Those of us who have been a long time in this House, and can remember the methods of the Foreign Office twenty-five years ago, know as a matter of fact, which cannot be successfully denied, that the Foreign Office policy has become during the last ten years progressively more secret every year. Until this present year this has gone on, when the intense pressure of Foreign Affairs and the danger of war has forced the hands of the Minister to give some time for the discussion of Foreign Office affairs. For ten years the Foreign policy of this country has been conducted behind an elaborate screen of secrecy. Some of us pointed out years ago that the secrecy of Foreign Affairs was the inevitable and logical result of that new departure which was heralded about ten years ago, and which we heard praised once more on the floor of this House to-night. I refer to what is known as the policy of the continuity of the Foreign policy of this country; of the withdrawal of the Foreign policy of this country from the sphere of party politics.”

At the same session Mr. Swift MacNeill expressed himself very strongly on the subject of withholding information from Parliament, in the following terms:

“From generation to generation, you have allowed treaties involving the highest international obligations--involving questions of peace and war--to be taken absolutely out of the hands of the House. It is no exaggeration to say, so far as international policy is concerned, you have rendered the House as little effectively powerful as any man walking over Westminster Bridge. Over and over again treaties involving matters of life and death, involving questions of first-class importance, have been ratified behind the back of Parliament.... The people themselves must be allowed to know all about this diplomacy and what it is. And there should be no secrecy in regard to high diplomatic statecraft about it. The House of Commons is sample judge of what is discreet and what is indiscreet, and it is a complete absurdity for others to treat us as children or for us to allow ourselves to be so treated in matters of such high international importance as those involving questions of peace and war.”

Sir Edward Grey in his reply stated that secrecy up to a certain point was necessary and that particularly the ratification of treaties could not be previously discussed. He then made the very significant remark that not until the House of Commons “was really free to devote itself to discussions of imperial affairs would it get control.” In other words as long as the House of Commons remains a body occupied primarily with domestic and local legislation it cannot spare the attention necessary for an effective control of foreign policy.

Early in 1914, evidence was taken by a select committee on House of Commons procedure. Mr. Balfour during these discussions rather emphasized the need of secrecy in dealing with foreign affairs. He thinks that such matters should not be aired too frequently in the House of Commons, because indiscreet speeches, which can be perfectly appraised in the House, may make bad blood when reported. Diplomatic conversations must be kept confidential if you are to work the European system at all. But though the House of Commons does not and cannot know the current details of international negotiations, it is not uninformed. This plainly is the language of a statesman to whom the idiosyncrasies of the European system are so familiar that they seem to be the only natural state of affairs. The statement is made from the point of view of the expert who rather resents any sort of interference on the part of the less well informed.

In March, 1918, it was moved in the House of Commons:

“That, in the opinion of this House, a Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs should be appointed, representative of all parties and groups in the House, in order that a regular channel of communication may be established between the Foreign Secretary and the House of Commons, which will afford him frequent opportunities of giving information on questions of Foreign policy and which, by allowing Members to acquaint themselves more fully with current international problems, will enable this House to exercise closer supervision over the general conduct of Foreign Affairs....”

Mr. Balfour expressed himself quite in length on this motion and further elaborated the ideas which he had put forward in 1914. In a speech delivered March 19th, he gave what is probably the most complete and persuasive exposition of the value of traditional methods in diplomacy:

“... A Foreign Office and a Diplomatic Service are great instruments for preventing, as far as can be prevented, and diminishing, even when you cannot prevent, friction between States which are, or which ought to be, friendly. How is the task of peace-maker--because that is largely the task which falls to diplomatists and to the Foreign Office, which controls diplomatists--to be pursued if you are to shout your grievances from the housetop whenever they occur? The only result is that you embitter public feeling, that the differences between the two States suddenly attain a magnitude they ought never to be allowed to approach, that the newspapers of the two countries agitate themselves, that the Parliaments of the two countries have their passions set on fire, and great crises arise, which may end, have ended sometimes, in international catastrophes.... Office officials, or officials of any Department,--to expend some of their energy in getting ready for cross-examination, you will really be destroying the public service. There is nothing on which I feel more strongly than that. They are not accustomed to it, and they ought not to be accustomed to it.... I do not hold the view that antique methods are pursued by diplomatists which no man of common sense adopts in the ordinary work of every-day life. On the contrary, the work of diplomacy is exactly the work which is done every day between two great firms, for instance, which have business relations, or between two great corporate entities which have interests diverging or interests in common. If you are a man of sense you do not create difficulties to begin with. You try to get over all these things without the embitterment which advertisement always brings with it. It is when you begin to press your case in public that antagonism arises. In private--in conversation which need not go beyond the walls of the room in which you are,--you can put your case as strongly as you like, and the gentleman with whom you are carrying on the discussion may put his case as strongly as he likes, and if good manners are observed and nothing but fair discussion takes place no soreness remains and no one is driven to ignore the strong points of his opponent’s case. Directly a controversy becomes public all that fair give-and-take becomes either difficult or impossible.... But if all you mean ... is that it is wrong for the nations of the world to find themselves hampered in their mutual relations by treaties of which those countries know nothing, that, I think, is an evil. I do not say that there have not been secret treaties which were inevitable; but I do say that, if they are necessary, they are a necessary evil. Please remember that two nations make a treaty together for their mutual advantage. Both are desirous of passing it. One nation says, ‘It is against our interest that this treaty should be made public at present.’ The other says, ‘We do not like being committed to any treaty the terms of which we cannot make public at once.’ Which is going to prevail?... It does not rest with any single Foreign Office, British or other. It is always an arrangement between two--possibly three or four, Foreign Offices. You cannot lay down--and I do not think you would be wise to lay down, an absolute rule that under no circumstances, and for no object, could you so far concede the point as to say that a treaty is to be made which is not to become public property. I am perfectly ready to admit that that is not a process which, to me, is a very agreeable one. To reduce secret treaties to the narrowest possible limits should, I think, be the object of every responsible statesman who has the control of foreign affairs. Beyond that I do not feel inclined to go. I do not see any signs of a grasp of the true realities of life in the Motion before us. You should have your control over those who manage your affairs, but it is not the kind of control which the honorable Member wishes to set up with his Committee of forty or fifty. It is quite a different control. You must know, broadly speaking, what the general lines of policy are, and I maintain that that is thoroughly known with regard to foreign affairs at this moment by every man in this House who takes the trouble to think. The general lines on which we are proceeding are thoroughly known.”

This argument brings out all the strong points of the system of secret diplomacy under the existing conditions of international politics, but it contains no hint that these conditions need improvement. They cannot, as a matter of fact, be improved until some strong nations, even at the risk of disadvantage to themselves, take the lead in placing diplomatic affairs on a broader basis.

XII

THE PUBLIC AND DIPLOMACY

In consequence of the startling developments in diplomacy which preceded and accompanied the great war, the relation of democracy to diplomacy has been earnestly discussed of late, particularly in Great Britain.

When considering this important matter, the distinction between the _methods_ of diplomacy and diplomatic _policies_ should be borne in mind for the sake of clearness of thought. The development of public opinion, the disappearance of purely dynastic aims of state action, and the constantly broadening outlook of political life, have led to the elimination of most of the cruder methods of deception and intrigue. But two questions still remain: Should diplomatic negotiations be carried on in the public view, that is with constant and full information given to the public or parliament, on all important details? and, Should the diplomatic policy of a democratic government at all times be kept fully before the representative bodies, and the public?

Most discussions which favor the use of secret diplomacy, refer to the presumed necessity of confidential _methods_ of negotiation. But there are some publicists and statesmen who believe that the policy of foreign affairs itself can best be handled by responsible statesmen keeping their own counsel and giving to the public only a general adumbration of the trend of policy. These two questions are constantly mixed up in current discussion; and their absolute separation is indeed difficult. Thus, a strictly secret diplomatic policy will naturally accentuate the secrecy of the methods employed. Abstractly considered, it would be quite possible to have the foreign policy of a country determined by public action, and still to surround diplomatic negotiations with secrecy. But if the substance of the policy were definitely known in detail, the secrecy of methods would lose much of its effectiveness.

The use of such methods is defended from two points of view; from that of the trader who looks for a better bargain through not having given away his entire hand at the beginning; and from that of the builder who desires to work quietly without interruptions from an excitable public, who desires to avoid difficulties and smooth away contrasts which publicity would tend to exaggerate.

There is an _ex post facto_ publicity of diplomatic policy. If this is afforded as soon as a new situation has arisen or a new agreement has been created, some of the harm of secrecy is avoided. In such a case the statesmen, cabinet, or conference, practically give assurance that, if allowed to work quietly on a certain problem, they will produce a solution which will commend itself in general to the sense of equity of the nation or nations concerned; although the sum total of the arrangement may contain details which, considered by themselves, would be unacceptable and which might have interfered with the making of an accord, if unduly emphasized or given publicity during the negotiations.

Mr. Balfour in his speech of March 19, 1918, which has already been referred to, indeed speaks quite convincingly of the advantage of confidential relations and of secrecy in negotiations, but he goes so far as strongly to deprecate a demand for information on the part of Parliament. In that he certainly shows a measure of anti-democratic bias, as when he says, “Do not suppose that we can do the work better by having to explain it _to a lot of people who are not responsible_. That is not the way to get business properly done.” He therefore rejects the idea of a parliamentary committee of control in the matter of foreign relations. He agrees, however, that the existence of secret treaties is an evil, although he thinks that it may be at certain times necessary, because the associated treaty power may desire it. He is mildly deprecatory, at best.

Count Czernin, speaking to the Austrian delegations on June 24, 1918, concerning President Wilson’s fourteen points, stated that he has no objection to the introduction of the principle of “open covenants,” although he confesses that he does not know by what means effective adherence thereto can be assured. Concerning diplomatic negotiations, which he treats simply as a matter of business, he points out the advantages of secrecy from the point of view of trading. Moreover, if there were full publicity, the general public might passionately oppose every action involving any concession as a defeat. This would not be conducive to peaceable relations.

There are those who believe that the chief evils of secret diplomacy would be avoided if ample opportunity were given for discussion in representative assemblies, if there were a parliamentary committee keeping constantly in touch with the conduct of foreign relations, and if treaties and declarations of war could not be made without the consent of the national legislature. Some advocates of democratic control go so far as to reason that a decision to make war and thereby to order the shedding of human blood, should not be made without a national referendum vote.

On the other hand, those opposed to all publicity of diplomatic affairs argue that international policies cannot be determined in the market place. They hark back to DeTocqueville, who holds that as democracy cannot be expected to regulate the _details_ of an important undertaking, it is particularly unqualified to deal with international matters where secrecy, discretion, and patience are required. Followers of this opinion believe that the conduct of foreign affairs is best placed quite unreservedly in the hands of responsible statesmen, who have greater information, larger experience and more self-control than the average of humanity. They generally have in view the preservation of national interests, under conditions of peace if possible; they will not be inflamed by exciting incidents, but will keep these in proper subordination to the general plan. Such details, if made public, would easily lead to occurrences that would upset the results of wise planning. As Lord Cromer has said, it is such untoward chance incidents which cannot be controlled that are to be feared, rather than any deliberate plotting on the part of diplomats. Such responsible statesmen always remain accountable for the general results of their policy; they are conscious of the importance of their trust, and therefore are a safer repository of discretionary powers than a general committee.