Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812. Volume 1
Chapter 5
THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS
Limitations on American action through deficient sea power 283
Warfare against commerce considered 284
Its financial and political effects 285
Its military bearing 285
Distinction between military and commercial blockade 286
Commercial blockade identical in essence with commerce-destroying by cruisers 287
Recognition of this by Napoleon 287
Commerce destruction by blockade the weapon of the stronger navy; by cruisers, of the weaker 288
Inefficiency of the American Government shown in the want of naval preparation 289
Conditions in the army even worse 290
Jefferson's sanguine expectations 291
Propriety of the invasion of Canada discussed 292
The United States, weak on the seaboard, relatively strong towards Canada 295
Function of the seaboard in the war; defensive 296
Offensive opportunity essential to any scheme of defence 298
Application of this principle; in general, and to 1812 298
Conditions on the Canada frontier, favoring the offensive by the United States 300
Importance of the Great Lakes to military operations 301
Over-confidence of Americans 303
Corresponding apprehension of British officers 304
Decisive points on the line between the countries 305
Importance of the Indians as an element in the situation 306
Proper offensive policy of the United States 307
Natural advantages favoring the United States 309
The land frontier the proper scene of American offensive action 310
Seaboard conditions, for offence and defence 311