Part 4

From Mr. Hardy to Mr. De la Mare may seem a large transition, though readers of Mr. De la Mare’s later work will agree that there are interesting resemblances--in _Who’s That_ and in other poems in _The Veil_ where Mr. De la Mare is notably less himself than when writing at his best. In his best poetry, in _The Pigs and the Charcoal Burner_, in _John Mouldy_, no intimation of the contemporary situation sounds. He is writing of, and from, a world which knows nothing of these difficulties, a world of pure phantasy for which the distinction between knowledge and feeling has not yet dawned. When in other poems, more reflective, in _The Tryst_, for example, Mr. De la Mare does seem to be directly facing the indifference of the universe towards “poor mortal longingness” a curious thing happens. His utterance, in spite of his words, becomes not at all a recognition of this indifference, but voices instead an impulse to turn away, to forget it, to seek shelter in the warmth of his own familiar thickets of dream, not to stay out in the wind. His rhythm, that indescribable personal note which clings to all his best poetry, is a lulling rhythm, an anodyne, an opiate, it gives sleep and visions, phantasmagoria; but it does not give _vision_, it does not awaken. Even when he most appears to be contemplating the fate of the modern, “whom the words of the wise have made sad,” the drift of his verse is still “seeking after that sweet golden clime” where the mental traveller’s journey _begins_.

There is one exception to this charge (for in a sense it is an adverse criticism, though not one to be pressed except against a great poet), there is one poem in which there is no such reluctance to bear the blast--_The Mad Prince’s Song_ in _Peacock Pie_. But here the spirit of the poem, the impulse which gives it life, comes from a poet who more than most refused to take shelter; _The Mad Prince’s Song_ derives from _Hamlet_.

Mr. Yeats and Mr. Lawrence present two further ways of dodging those difficulties which come from being born into this generation rather than into some earlier age. Mr. De la Mare takes shelter in the dream-world of the child, Mr. Yeats retires into black velvet curtains and the visions of the Hermetist, and Mr. Lawrence makes a magnificent attempt to reconstruct in himself the mentality of the Bushman. There are other modes of escape open to the poet. Mr. Blundell, to name one other poet only, goes into the country, but few people follow him there in his spirit, whereas Mr. Yeats and Mr. Lawrence, whether they are widely read or not, do represent tendencies among the defeated which are only too easily observable.

Mr. Yeats’ work from the beginning was a repudiation of the most active contemporary interests. But at first the poet of _The Wanderings of Usheen_, _The Stolen Child_, and _Innisfree_ turned away from contemporary civilization in favour of a world which he knew perfectly, the world of folk-lore as it is accepted, neither with belief nor disbelief, by the peasant. Folk-lore and the Irish landscape, its winds, woods, waters, islets, and seagulls, and for a while an unusually simple and direct kind of love poetry in which he became something more than a minor poet, these were his refuge. Later, after a drawn battle with the drama, he made a more violent repudiation, not merely of current civilization but of life itself, in favour of a supernatural world. But the world of the ‘eternal moods,’ of supernal essences and immortal beings is not, like the Irish peasant stories and the Irish landscape, part of his natural and familiar experience. Now he turns to a world of symbolic phantasmagoria about which he is desperately uncertain. He is uncertain because he has adopted as a technique of inspiration the use of trance, of dissociated phases of consciousness, and the revelations given in these dissociated states are insufficiently connected with normal experience. This, in part, explains the weakness of Mr. Yeats’ transcendental poetry. A deliberate reversal of the natural relations of thought and feeling is the rest of the explanation. Mr. Yeats takes certain feelings--feelings of conviction attaching to certain visions--as evidence for the thoughts which he supposes his visions to symbolize. To Mr. Yeats the value of _The Phases of the Moon_ lies not in any attitudes which it arouses or embodies but in the doctrine which for an initiate it promulgates.

The resort to trance, and the effort to discover a new world-picture to replace that given by science are the two most significant points for our purpose in Mr. Yeats’ work. A third might be the singularly bitter contempt for the generality of mankind which occasionally appears.

The doctrinal problem arises again, but in a clearer form with Mr. Lawrence. But here (Mr. Yeats’ promised treatise on the states of the soul has not yet appeared) we have the advantage of an elaborate prose exposition, _Phantasia of the Unconscious_, of the positions which so many of the poems advocate. It is not unfair to put the matter in this way, since there is little doubt possible that the bulk of Mr. Lawrence’s published verse is prose, scientific prose too, jottings, in fact, from a psychologist’s notebook, with a commentary interspersed. Due allowance being made for the extreme psychological interest of these observations, there remains the task of explaining how the poet who wrote the _Ballad of Another Ophelia_ and _Aware_, and, above all, _The White Peacock_, should have wandered, through his own zeal misdirected, so far from the paths which once appeared to be his alone to open.

Mr. Lawrence’s revolt against civilization seems to have been originally spontaneous, an emotional revulsion free from _ad hoc_ beliefs. It sprang directly from experience. He came to abhor all the attitudes men adopt, not through the direct prompting of their instincts, but because of the supposed nature of the objects to which they are directed. The conventions, the idealizations, which come between man and man and between man and woman, which often queer the pitch for the natural responses, seemed to him the source of all evil. Part of his revolt was certainly justified. These idealizations--representative examples are the dogma of the equality of man and the doctrine that Love is primarily sympathy--are beliefs illicitly interpolated in order to support and strengthen attitudes in the manner discussed at length above. And Mr. Lawrence’s original rejection of a morality not self-supporting but based upon beliefs, makes his work an admirable illustration of my main thesis. But two simple and avoidable mistakes deprived his revolt of the greater part of its value. He overlooked the fact that such beliefs commonly arise because the attitudes they support are already existent. He assumed that a bad basis for an attitude meant a bad attitude. In general, it does mean a forced attitude, but that is another matter. Secondly, he tried to cure the disease by introducing other beliefs of his own manufacture in place of the conventional beliefs and in support of very different attitudes.

The genesis of these beliefs is extremely interesting as an illustration of primitive mentality. Since the attitudes on which he fell back are those of a very early stage of human development, it is not surprising that the means by which he has supported them should be of the same era, or that the world-picture which he has worked out should be similar to that described in _The Golden Bough_. The mental process at work is schematically as follows: First, undergo an intense emotion, located with unusual definiteness in the body, which can be described as “a feeling _as though_ the solar plexus were connected by a current of dark passional energy with another person.” Those whose emotions tend to be localised will be familiar with such feelings. The second step is to say “I must trust my feelings.” The third is to call the feeling an intuition. The last is to say “_I know_ that my solar plexus is, etc.” By this means we arrive at indubitable knowledge that the sun’s energy is recruited from the life on the earth and that the astronomers are wrong in what they say about the moon, and so on.

The illicit steps in the argument are not quite so evident as they appear to be in this analysis. To distinguish an intuition _of_ an emotion from an intuition _by_ it is not always easy, nor is a description of an emotion always in practice distinguishable from an emotion. Certainly we must trust our feelings--in the sense of acting upon them. We have nothing else to trust. And to confuse this trusting with believing an emotive description of them is a mistake which all traditional codes of morality encourage us to commit.

The significance of such similar disasters in the work of poets so unlike and yet so greatly gifted as Mr. Yeats and Mr. Lawrence is noteworthy. For each the traditional scaffolding of conventional beliefs has proved unsatisfying, unworkable as a basis for their attitudes. Each has sought, in very different directions it is true, a new set of beliefs as a remedy. For neither has the world-picture of science seemed a possible substitute. And neither seems to have envisaged the possibility of a poetry which is independent of all beliefs, probably because, however much they differ, both are very serious poets. A great deal of poetry can, of course, be written for which total independence of all beliefs is an easy matter. But it is never poetry of the more important kind, because the temptation to introduce beliefs is a sign and measure of the importance of the attitudes involved. At present it is not primarily religious beliefs, in the stricter sense of the word, which are most likely to be concerned. Emphases alter surprisingly. University societies founded fifteen years ago, for example, to discuss religion, are usually found to be discussing sex to-day. And serious love poetry, which is independent of beliefs of one kind or another, traditional or eccentric, is extremely rare.

Yet the necessity for independence is increasing. This is not to say that traditional poetry, into which beliefs readily enter, is becoming obsolete; it is merely becoming more and more difficult to approach without confusion; it demands a greater imaginative effort, a greater purity in the reader.

We must distinguish here, however. There are many feelings and attitudes which, though in the past supported by beliefs now untenable, can survive their removal because they have other, more natural, supports and spring directly from the necessities of existence. To the extent to which they have been undistorted by the beliefs which have gathered round them they will remain as before. But there are other attitudes which are very largely the product of belief and have no other support. These will lapse if the changes here forecasted continue. With their disappearance some forms of poetry--much minor devotional verse, for example--will become obsolete. And with the unravelling of the intellect _versus_ emotion entanglement, there will be cases where even literature to which immense value has been assigned--the speculative portions of the work of Dostoevsky may be instanced--will lose much of its interest, except for the history of the mind. It was because he belonged to our age that Dostoevsky had to wrestle so terribly in these toils. A poet to-day, whose integrity is equal to that of the greater poets of the past, is inevitably plagued by the problem of thought and feeling as poets have never been plagued before.

A pioneer in modern research upon the origins of culture was asked recently whether his work had any bearing upon religion. He replied that it had, but that at present he was engaged merely in ‘getting the guns into position.’ The same answer might be given with regard to the probable consequences of recent progress in psychology, not only for religion but for the whole fabric of our traditional beliefs about ourselves. In many quarters there is a tendency to suppose that the series of attacks upon received ideas which began, shall we say, with Galileo and rose to a climax with Darwinism, has over-reached itself with Einstein and Eddington, and that the battle is now due to die down. This view seems to be too optimistic. The most dangerous of the sciences is only now beginning to come into action. I am thinking less of Psycho-analysis or of Behaviourism than of the whole subject which includes them. It is very probable that the Hindenburg Line to which the defence of our traditions retired as a result of the onslaughts of the last century will be blown up in the near future. If this should happen a mental chaos such as man has never experienced may be expected. We shall then be thrown back, as Matthew Arnold foresaw, upon poetry. It is capable of saving us; it is a perfectly possible means of overcoming chaos. But whether man is capable of the reorientation required, whether he can loosen in time the entanglement with belief which now takes from poetry half its power and would then take all, is another question, and too large for the scope of this essay.

Footnotes

[1] The view of the mind-body problem assumed here is defended and maintained with references to the contemporary authorities who hold it, in _The Meaning of Psychology_ by C. K. Ogden, Chapter II. (London, Kegan Paul; New York, Harpers; 1926.)

[2] For a further discussion of attitudes see the author’s _Principles of Literary Criticism_, Chapter XV (International Library of Psychology).

[3] See _The Foundations of Aesthetics_, by C. K. Ogden, James Wood and the author, pp. 74 ff. for a description of such experience.

[4] _I.e._ thoughts which are both true and evidenced, in the narrower, stricter senses. For a discussion of some relevant senses of ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’ see _Principles of Literary Criticism_, Chapters xxxiii and xxxiv.

[5] On this point the study of the child’s questions included in _The Language and Thought of the Child_ by J. Piaget (Kegan Paul, 1926), is illuminating.

[6] The remarks of Wittgenstein (_Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus_, 6.5, 6.52), which superficially resemble this, should be consulted, if only to show how important the _context_ of a statement may be; for what is said above should lead not towards but away from all forms of mysticism.

[7] For an account of the various senses of truth and of the ways in which they may be distinguished in discussion cf. _The Meaning of Meaning_, by C. K. Ogden and the author, Chapters VII and X.

[8] To those familiar with Mr. Eliot’s _The Waste Land_, my indebtedness to it at this point will be evident. He seems to me by this poem, to have performed two considerable services for this generation. He has given a perfect emotive description of a state of mind which is probably inevitable for a while to all meditative people. Secondly, by effecting a complete severance between his poetry and _all_ beliefs, and this without any weakening of the poetry, he has realised what might otherwise have remained largely a speculative possibility, and has shown the way to the only solution of these difficulties. “In the destructive element immerse. That is the way.”

Transcriber’s Note

_Underscores_ represent italics in plain text.

This book was published as part of the series “Psyche Miniatures: General Series #1”, from “Psyche: An Illustrated Quarterly Review of General and Applied Psychology”. Related front matter and back matter, which lists the series’ titles and contributors, is not included here.

Later reprints of this book improved on the typesetting or editing of this edition. The following quirks are original to this edition and not transcription errors: the use of both single and double quotation marks; and sentences that seem to lack appropriate commas. Some commas have been added when present in the 1926 American edition (W. W. Norton); for example, “a new order based on conciliation[+,] not on attempted suppression”.

The book cover image was made by the transcriber and is placed in the public domain.