Part 1

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RUSSIA'S PART IN THE WORLD WAR

by

COLONEL C. M. SHUMSKY-SOLOMONOV

Published by the Russian Information Bureau in the U. S. Woolworth Building New York City

Copyright 1920 by Russian Information Bureau New York

Introduction

The author of this pamphlet, Colonel C. M. Shumsky-Solomonov, is an officer of the Russian Army, a distinguished soldier and an authority on military problems. Col. Shumsky-Solomonov was one of the defenders of Port Arthur during the Russo-Japanese War, and as a military expert of the Petrograd daily, "Birjeviya Viedomosti", he was well known not only in Russia but also throughout Europe.

The purpose of this pamphlet is to present Russia's part in the recent War. Russia at present lies in seas of blood and tears because of her enormous sacrifices in the struggle against Prussian militarism. The nightmare of Bolshevism was able to overtake Russia because she was exhausted by three years of active participation in the War, during which her casualties reached 12,000,000, and her economic life became overstrained and partially destroyed. Russia's present pitiful condition is the result of her self-sacrificing services to humanity.

According to the data quoted by Col. Shumsky-Solomonov, of the 12,000,000 Russian casualties in the recent War, not less than 3,000,000 were in dead. "Russia's losses," says Col. Shumsky-Solomonov, "are more than twice those of France, four-five times those of England, and more than thirty-five times those of America. Russia's losses are more than twice the total strength of the British Army, and three-four times all the forces mustered by the United States. The number of Russia's casualties is larger than the total population of any of the following European countries: Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Portugal, Belgium, Holland or the Balkan States."

If Russia had not sacrificed 3,000,000 of her best youth, now sleeping on the battle-fields of Europe, a Prussian bayonet would now be ruling the world. As Col. Shumsky-Solomonov points out, the great role played by Russia in the recent struggle "became apparent at the very beginning of the War, in the important aid she rendered in frustrating the initial and most dangerous plan of the Germans, by her early offensive in aid of the Allies. Russia, having diverted against herself the entire Austrian army and part of the German, at the time of the battle on the Marne, through her offensive in East Prussia and Galicia, deprived the enemy of the opportunity to realize the fundamental idea of Moltke's plan to fling 'all forces into France.'"

"At the following attempt of the enemy to find a decision in France, to break through to Calais, at Ypres," says Col. Shumsky-Solomonov, "Russia, by the blows she delivered in Galicia, at Warsaw and in East Prussia, contributed to the early termination of this second offensive in France, so dangerous to England, and compelled the Germans for more than a year to abstain from their main operations on the main decisive front of the War--in France.

"In 1915 Russia, having shouldered alone the whole burden of the struggle against Germany, Austria and Turkey, although forced to abandon Poland, still gave the Allies the opportunity to prepare throughout a whole year for the coming German offensive at Verdun. In 1916 Russia, thanks to the Brusilov offensive, saved Italy at that critical moment when the Austrians, through their successful offensive from Tyrol, in the rear of the Italians, threatened to cut off a considerable portion of the Italian Army, at the same time menacing Venice. Together with this, Russia by this offensive greatly facilitated the operations of the Allies on the Somme, and was instrumental in the final clearing of the Verdun forts.

"In the same year Russia took upon herself the blows of Mackensen's and Falkenhayn's armies, which had invaded Roumania, stopped the further advance of the Germans, and undertook the defense of a considerable stretch of the Roumanian front."

In the beginning of the War, in August, 1914, there were, in addition to the Austrian Army, only 14 German divisions engaged on the Russian front. During the first Russian advance into Eastern Prussia, the German General Staff was obliged, on the eve of the battle of the Marne, to transfer 6 additional divisions to the Eastern front. The number of German divisions engaged on the Russian front grew continuously, and in October, 1914, there were 25 divisions, in November--33 divisions, in December--43 divisions, and in January, 1915,--53 German divisions on the Russian front. The role played by Russia and the services the Russian Armies rendered in the struggle against Prussian Imperialism can be seen further from the fact that during the spring of 1917 there were 162 German and Austrian divisions engaged on the Russian front alone, while on all the other Allied fronts together there were 205 German and Austrian divisions.[1]

To this it must be added that Russia entered the War unprepared for a modern struggle. As Col. Shumsky-Solomonov points out, "The Russian Army consisted of millions, but bayonets and guns it had only for one-tenth of its number." General Brusilov once said: "Our soldiers had no shells with which to blast their way across barbed-wire entanglements before an attack; so it was necessary for them to break down the wires with their own bodies and thus to form a bridge for the next attacking column." In the fall of 1917 the Russian Armies collapsed after months of intensive German and Bolshevist propaganda, but this cannot minimize the great heroism of the Russian soldiers during the first three years of the War, heroism without which the alliance of the democratic nations would never have been able to defeat the Prussian militarism.

A. J. SACK _Director of the Russian Information Bureau in the U. S._

May 25, 1920.

Russia's Part in the World War

Was it Possible for Germany to Win the War?

In discussing Russia's role in the past World War, it is customary to cite the losses sustained by the Russian Army, losses numbering many millions. There is no doubt that Russia's sacrifices were great, and it is just as true that her losses were greater than those sustained by any of the other Allies. Nevertheless, these sacrifices are by far not the only standard of measurement of Russia's participation in this gigantic struggle. Russia's role must be gauged, first of all, by the efforts made by the Russian Army to blast the German war plans during the first years of the War, when neither America, nor Italy, nor Roumania were among the belligerents, and the British Army was still in the process of formation.

Russia's role must in addition be gauged by the efforts put forth by the Russian Army to save the situation at other critical moments of the War. And of such, we know, there were not a few until the Allies succeeded in gaining their victory over the stubborn and powerful enemy.

Lastly, and this is the main thing, the role played by the Russian Army must be considered also in this respect that the strenuous campaign waged by Russia, with her 180 millions of inhabitants, for three years against Germany, Austro-Hungary and Turkey, sapped the resources of the enemy and thereby made possible the delivery of the final blow. This weakening of the powers of the enemy by Russia was already bound at various stages of the War to facilitate correspondingly the various operations of the Allies. Therefore at the end of the War three years of effort on the part of Russia, which had devoured the enemy's forces, were destined to enable the Allies finally to crush the enemy. The final catastrophe of the Central Powers was the direct consequence of the offensive of the Allies in 1918, but Russia made possible this collapse to a considerable degree, having effected, in common with the others, the weakening of Germany, and having consumed during the three years of strenuous fighting countless reserves, forces and resources of the Central Powers.

Could Germany have won the war? A careful analysis of this question brings home the conviction that Germany was very close to victory, and that it required unusual straining of efforts on the part of France and Russia to prevent Germany from "winning out."

The plan of the old Field Marshal, Moltke, was far from worthless. It is a fact that it took from six weeks to two months to mobilize the armed forces of Russia, during which period Russia was unprepared for action. The population of Germany was 70 million and that of Austria-Hungary 52 million, a total of 122 million persons. During these two months of forced inaction those 122 millions of Teutons were faced only by 40 million Frenchmen, for Russia was not yet ready. A threefold superiority in numbers, in addition to an equal degree of military skill, technical equipment and culture, was bound to crush lone France.

It is true that for the complete realization of this scheme it was necessary that the Austrian Army, as well, involve France. This should have been anticipated, as military science does not admit of the division of forces. Just to the contrary, it demands "the concentration of all forces in the decisive hour and at the deciding point,"--in France, upon this particular occasion.

It may be said that Russia could have occupied Galicia and East Prussia had the Austrian Army left for France. Well, the fact is that both these provinces were occupied by Russia anyhow. But if in the first battle of the Marne, when the Germans felt the shortage of the two or three corps dispatched back into Prussia, they would have had these troops at their disposal in addition to half a million Austrians, Joffre's condition would have been rendered critical. The loss of the Marne would have been equivalent to the loss of the War by France, and, consequently, to the loss of the entire War.

The outcome was different. The concentrated attack upon France failed because of the fact that of the 104 German divisions and the 50 Austrian divisions only about 92 or 94 divisions were on the scene of action in France. The Russian Army, unprepared for action for another 40 days, nevertheless rushed into East Prussia in an impulse of self-sacrifice and received in addition the full strength of the blow from the Austro-Hungarian Army. This generous move on the part of Russia destroyed the Moltke plan and his basic idea "the concentration of _all forces_ against France", as a part of the German force had been diverted from that front. The plan collapsed, and the only actual chance which the Germans had of winning a victory was lost with it. Later, when Russia was prepared, when the English Army began to grow, and Italy, Roumania and America had abandoned their neutrality, Germany's chances for a final victory vanished.

It is the recognition of these facts that should prompt every impartial historian of the War to admit that the self-sacrifice of the unprepared Russian Army during the first days of the War played an enormous role in the only period when Germany had victory almost within her grasp. It is to be regretted that the extraordinary conditions which developed in Russia towards the end of the War are obscuring the true historic role of Russia in the sanguine World struggle. It is simple enough to understand that during the two or three years, while the British Army was still in the process of formation, and Italy, Roumania and America were neutral, the entire burden of fighting the Central Powers devolved upon the Armies of France and Russia. It is just as simple to understand that during that period, when the enemy was most powerful and undemoralized, when he was operating with his best troops, that the most difficult and responsible part of the problem had to be performed. It is just as easy--from an examination of the maps of the first three years of the War, maps which speak only of two principal fronts, the French and the Russian, and no other--to grasp the significance of the gigantic role played in this War by great Russia and the millions of sacrifices she consecrated to the common cause of the Allies. Sadly enough, this only correct criterion of Russia's historic role in the War is becoming more and more obscured from the public opinion of the world.

In the recently published memoirs of General Ludendorf, the defeated German military leader, in an endeavor to clear himself, attempts to slander the Russian Army and discredit all the great sacrifices and heroic efforts contributed by Russia to the Allied cause. Taking advantage of the scant familiarity of the general public with military matters, Ludendorf uses false data, cites wrong figures and consciously distorts the historic perspective of the War.

It is difficult to understand how a serious-minded military leader can stoop to employ, in a supposedly serious work, methods fit for the yellow press, such as accusing Russian generals of treason, etc., etc. These memoirs, as a whole, were met at the time of their publication by sharp and adverse criticism in the foreign, and even the German, press. Ludendorf's memoirs are especially misleading in the part describing the first Russian advance in East Prussia, the advance that played such a decisive role in the defeat which the Germans suffered on the Marne. It should never be forgotten that this event proved fatal and brought about the final defeat of the Germans in this sonov.[2]

Russia's Sacrifice

Ludendorf commences his recital of events on the Russian front with the statement that in 1914, in East Prussia, with a force of only two German corps, he destroyed 250,000 Russians--six army corps--under the command of General Samsonov, and that General Rennenkampf, who was only within two or three days' march from Samsonov, had designedly failed to aid Samsonov.

This statement by General Ludendorf is absolutely false from beginning to end. It can be very easily proven that Ludendorf attacked Samsonov not with two army corps, but with more than 240,000 German troops. With this army he attacked not 250,000 Russians, but only two Russian army corps, i. e., 80,000 men--the 1st and the 6th Russian Army Corps. Thus, Ludendorf had a force three times larger than his adversary.

It may be easily seen from this that while Ludendorf gives Samsonov twice as many men as he had in reality, he, at the same time, credits Rennenkampf with three times the number he actually had. His own force Ludendorf puts, on paper, at one-third of what he had in fact.

Rennenkampf knew nothing about the events on the Samsonov front until August 30, whereas the latter was surrounded on August 28. (See Gurko's book, "War and Revolution.")

The cause of the Russian defeat in that battle was not the "genius" of Ludendorf, but lay rather in the fact that the Russian Army, _in its eagerness to relieve Paris, advanced too quickly, with not fully mobilized and insufficient forces, and in two separate Armies_, coupled with the difficulty of reconnoitering and obtaining information about the enemy in a country where the entire population was in a state of armed belligerency. The death of Samsonov and of a part of his staff and the disruption of liaison were other causes.[3]

In her haste to aid her Allies, Russia risked much, and she lost a battle on account of the precariousness of the operation, insufficiency of forces and an unfortunate accident. But she succeeded in diverting several German corps from France, and the Russian blood shed at Tannenberg thus helped win the First Battle of the Marne.

It may thus be seen from the descriptions of the first battles in East Prussia that Ludendorf, for the sake of German martial glory and probably also for the glorification of his own role, makes use of a very primitive and naive expedient. He multiplies the number of Russian troops several times, and also diminishes his own forces several times. This creates the impression that Ludendorf with "inconsiderable" forces smashed the "many times larger" forces of the Russians. As a matter of fact, however, as we have seen, Ludendorf had in these engagements, 1½, 2, and sometimes even 3 times as many men as the Russians. How excessive this superiority of numbers was may be inferred from the fact that the Germans themselves went to France with but 1½ times as many men and that they considered this sufficient for a decisive victory over the French Army. However, no matter how much Ludendorf may distort the facts in his memoirs, he cannot refrain, albeit only by 2-3 words, from mentioning the strategical catastrophe which overtook Germany through the invasion of East Prussia by the Russian troops. Ludendorf himself admits that "_the transfer of the two army corps from the French front to Eastern Prussia had fatal consequences for Germany. The German advance on France was turned into a retreat._"

This admission from Ludendorf characterizes the importance of all the events of the first few weeks of the War and it contains an involuntary appreciation of the historic role and self-sacrificing efforts of Russia. The enemy, albeit indirectly, admits that Russian blood was not shed in vain on the fields of East Prussia; it was precisely for this reason that Germany was unable to win the War at the only moment at which she could ever have won, taking advantage of Russia's unpreparedness and the temporary isolation of France.

In conclusion, we must also point out that from a formal standpoint Russia was not bound to fling herself into a risky operation in East Prussia. The Russian Army, like any other Army, was bound to take the field actively only after the completion of her mobilization, and this early assistance was still less her duty as she herself was at the time invaded by Austrian forces.

But Russia regarded her alliance with France from a higher standpoint than mere formal obligations. The justice of History--not the "history" of Ludendorf--will in its own time record how far Russia stood from egotistic politics and egotistic strategy during those tragic days of August and September, 1914, when the German masses, smashing every obstacle in their path, moved through northern France on Paris.

The German Defeat at Warsaw

The battle of Ypres, the determined operations of the Germans for the capture of Calais, is the other critical moment in the history of the World War, when Russia once more brought heavy sacrifices to the common cause of the Allies. Ludendorf, in describing these difficult days for the Germans, again makes use, we regret to say, of the same unsavory expedient he used in describing the first engagements in East Prussia.

Thus, for instance, he asserts that when he was defeated in October, 1914, at Warsaw, the Russians had 1,200,000 men,[4] while he had only one German army--the 9th--and one Austrian army--the 1st. As a matter of fact, the Russians were opposed, on the entire front, by five Austrian armies and two German armies--the 8th and the 9th--by more than 70 divisions approximating about 1,200,000 men. The Russians, having left only a small force to oppose four Austrian armies, fell with their three armies upon two enemy armies, one German and one Austrian, near Warsaw. With a numerical superiority of one and a quarter to one the Russians defeated the Germans, and threw them back across the whole of Poland to Posen. The Germans saved themselves on that occasion only by destroying the railroads back of them and by burning the bridges.

The significance of the operations at Warsaw and in Galicia in October, and beyond Warsaw in November, 1914, is to be seen from Ludendorf's own story. Referring to a conversation he had with General Falkenhayn, who at that time was the main leader of all German Army operations, he writes in his memoirs: "At the end of October, 1914, General von Falkenhayn summoned me to Berlin.... _Gen. von Falkenhayn spoke hopefully of the attack near Ypres_, and wanted to defer further decisions."

But already in the beginning of November, i. e., a few days after this conversation, the operations of the Russian Armies in Galicia, the Posen territory, and on the East Prussian front, greatly diminished the hopefulness of Falkenhayn and _compelled him to slacken the pressure against the Allies at Ypres and to transfer large forces from France to the Russian front--to the detriment of the offensive against Ypres_. Ludendorf himself figures these reinforcements which arrived from France in the middle of November, and, consequently, must have left there in the beginning of November, at 225,000 men. There were 4 corps with 2 infantry divisions, which Ludendorf figures at 225,000 men. Besides, Ludendorf mentions right here the arrival of Richthofen's Cavalry Corps, Hollen's Cavalry Corps, the 2nd and 4th Cavalry Divisions. Still earlier Ludendorf mentions that the newly formed 25th Reserve Corps and the 15th Reserve Corps were dispatched to East Prussia. And finally, in still another place, we can find in Ludendorf's account a number of other new divisions which had been sent to the Russian front instead of to Ypres.

In this manner it is easy to see, from the data furnished by Ludendorf himself, that, "hopeful" at the end of October for the success of the attack on Ypres, Falkenhayn found it necessary to dispatch from France 300,000 additional soldiers to the Russian front, aside from the reserves taken from the interior of Germany, which forces would also have been welcome to the Germans during the fateful days at Ypres. While the frontal attacks on Ypres, attended by considerable casualties, demanded the presence of large German reserves, these reserves were the very ones which were swallowed up entirely by the Russian operations in the East, at Warsaw, Galicia and East Prussia.

If the firmness of the Allies held back the Germans at Ypres and prevented them from breaking through to Calais, the Russian Army also played an important part in this strategic situation--compelling the Germans to abandon the operation at Ypres much earlier than the Germans and Falkenhayn had figured. But not in this alone was the role of Russia apparent in the trying days of October and November, 1914. Not only did Russia force the Germans to transfer 300,000 soldiers to the East, and to abandon early the operations in France, but she also compelled the Germans, by her operations in 1914, _to abandon for more than a year all large offensives in the West_. This is attested not only by the facts (as is well known, from the end of 1914 up to February, 1916, the Germans did not start any offensive in France), but by Ludendorf himself, notwithstanding all his endeavors to discredit the Russian Army.