Part 21

All this is most natural, and just what we should expect from high-minded, gallant fellows. But it is entirely unwarranted. I utterly abhor the swivel-chair slacker who got some safe job in order to avoid doing his duty at the front. But for the hundreds of thousands of young Americans in the ranks or with commissions who did everything they could to get in the firing lines, and who through no fault of theirs failed, I have precisely the same feeling that I have for the men who took part in the most dangerous work. General Leonard Wood, in his recent capital address, has taught the right lesson to these men. He was dismissing to their homes the men whom he had trained with his usual, extraordinary capacity to fit them for work overseas, and he dwelt to them upon the fact that the all-important point was that they should remember that it was not the position they achieved, but the eager readiness to do duty in whatever position they were given that really counted. General Wood has himself been treated with the most cruel injustice in this war, yet he has rendered signal service in bringing before Congress our military needs, and, above all, in training scores of thousands of our best fighting men. When he was denied, from the very meanest motives, the chance to fill a distinguished position, instead of sulking he devoted all of his energy to doing the best he could in the positions to which he was assigned. In consequence he comes out of the war as one of those who most materially helped to win it. What is true of him in a big place is true of every other soldier, whether in a big or little place. The hardest task was for the men who were denied the chance of glory, and if they did this hard task well and served faithfully wherever they were assigned, they have exactly the same right for pride in their participation in the Great War as any of the gallant fellows who have come back maimed or crippled from the front. All alike have made the rest of us forever their debtors, and to all alike we pay the same meed of loyal admiration and respect.

THE BRITISH NAVY, THE FRENCH ARMY, AND AMERICAN COMMON SENSE

DECEMBER 17, 1918

The first essential in an alliance is loyalty. The first effort of an enemy to an alliance is to produce disloyalty to one another among the Allies. To any man who knows anything of history these facts are of bromidic triteness. But the Administration, as usual, stands in urgent need of learning the elements of fair play and common sense.

It was announced from the peace ship that President Wilson was going to work for the reduction of naval armaments and for a form of naval agreement which, if it had existed four years ago, would have meant Germany’s victory and the subjugation of not only Germany’s foes, but of all neutrals like ourselves. At the same time over here the representatives of the Administration are demanding a navy bigger than that of Great Britain. The only possible interpretation of these facts is that the Administration proposes to threaten Great Britain with having to get in a neck-and-neck competition with America to build the greatest navy in the world, and to do this as a bluff so as to make for Great Britain’s adherence to Mr. Wilson’s exceedingly nebulous ideas.

Under these conditions the American people should, with common sense, look at what their own needs are and at what the needs of their allies are. Sooner or later any programme will have to be tested by its results, and even if the United States started to emulate Great Britain’s navy, the enthusiasm to do so would vanish when it appeared that there was no earthly interest of ours to be served by the action.

In winning the present war very many instrumentalities have been necessary. On the whole the four most important in their order have been: (1) the French army; (2) the British navy; (3) the British army; (4) the Italian army. Our own gallant army and navy did exceedingly well, but came in so late that the part they played, taking the four and a half years as a whole, does not entitle them to rank with the instrumentalities given above.

Great Britain is an island, separated from the huge military commonwealths of Europe by very narrow seas, and separated from her own greatest colonies by all the greatest oceans. To her, supremacy in the navy is a matter of life and death. America ought to have a first-class navy, but if she did not have a ship she might yet secure herself from any invasion. But Great Britain’s empire would not last one week, and she could not make herself safe at home one week if her navy lost its supremacy. Incidentally to saving herself, the British navy has rendered incalculable service to us during the last four and one-half years, and for the last thirty years has been a shield to the United States. Great Britain is not a military power in the sense that any of the nations of continental Europe, or indeed of Asia, are military powers. She had almost as much difficulty in developing her army in this war as we had in developing our army. Her army is no more of a threat to other peoples than ours is. Therefore, we Americans find ourselves, as regards the British navy, in this position, that it is of vital consequence to Great Britain to have the greatest navy in the world; it is emphatically not of any consequence to us to have as big a navy as Great Britain, for we are not in the slightest danger from Great Britain, and under all ordinary circumstances the British navy can be counted upon as a help to the United States and never as a menace. Under such circumstances to set ourselves to work to build a navy in rivalry to Great Britain’s, and above all to do this as a political bluff, is worse than silly.

Our own navy should be ample to protect our own coasts and to maintain the Monroe Doctrine. There are in Europe and Asia several great military commonwealths, each one of which will in all probability always possess a far more formidable army than ours, even though, as I earnestly hope, we adopt some development of universal military training on the lines of the Swiss system. Therefore, it is of the highest consequence that our navy should be second to that of Great Britain.

The analogy with the case of the French army is complete. If the French army had not been able to hold the German army and be the chief factor in the German military overthrow, the British navy could not have averted Germany’s complete victory. Great Britain is separated by the narrow seas from the military powers of continental Europe. We are separated from them by the width of the ocean. Under the circumstances, it is sheer impertinence for either American or English statesmen to tell France, or, for that matter Italy, what ought to be done in abolishing armaments or abandoning universal service or anything of the kind. The interest of France and Italy in the matter is vital. The interest of England and America is partly secondary. If we have well-thought-out arguments to put before the French, put them before them, but treat France as having the vital interest in the matter, and therefore the final say-so as far as we are concerned. And when France has determined what the needs of the future demand, so far as her military preparedness is concerned, and when Italy has made a similar determination, and our other allies likewise, back them up. It is not the business of America to tell Great Britain what she should do with her navy. It is not the business of either America or England to tell France what she should do with her army. The plain American common sense of the situation is that we should recognize our immense debt to the British navy and the French army, and stand by Britain in what she decides her vital needs demand so far as her navy is concerned, and stand by France in the position she takes as to what the situation demands so far as her army is concerned.

LET US HAVE STRAIGHTFORWARD SPEAKING

DECEMBER 24, 1918

Senator Lodge in his admirable speech has given the reasons why at least five of the famous fourteen points should not be considered in the peace negotiations proper. But the special merit of Senator Lodge’s statement lies in the fact that it is straightforward and clear. There is no need of a key to find out what he means. The men who represent, or assume to represent, the United States at the Peace Conference, should be equally clear with our allies and our enemies and also with the American people. Above all things we need some straightforward statement as to just what is proposed and as to just why it is proposed.

Take, for example, the very extraordinary conflict between that one of the fourteen points in which the Administration has demanded practically complete disarmament and the action of the Administration at the same moment demanding that we shall build the biggest navy in the world. Either one course or the other must necessarily be improper. In such a matter we especially need a straightforward statement of reasons and principles.

The worst thing we could do would be to build a spite navy, a navy built not to meet our own needs, but to spite some one else. I am speaking purely as an American. No man in this country who is both intelligent or informed has the slightest fear that Great Britain will ever invade us or try to go to war with us. The British navy is not in the slightest degree a menace to us. I can go a little further than this. There is in Great Britain a large pacifist and defeatist party which behaves exactly like our own pacifists, pro-Germans, Germanized Socialists, defeatists, and Bolsheviki. If this party had its way and Great Britain abandoned its fleet, I should feel, so far from the United States being freed from the necessity of building up a fleet, that it behooved us to build a much stronger one than is at present necessary. Our need is not as great as that of the vast scattered British Empire, for our domains are pretty much in a ring fence. We ought not to undertake the task of policing Europe, Asia, and Northern Africa. Neither ought we to permit any interference with the Monroe Doctrine or any attempt by Europe or Asia to police America. Mexico is our Balkan Peninsula. Some day we will have to deal with it. All the coasts and islands which in any way approach the Panama Canal must be dealt with by this Nation, and by this Nation alone, in accordance with the Monroe Doctrine. With this object in view our navy should be second to that of Great Britain and superior to that of any other power--and if Great Britain chooses to abolish its navy it would mean that we ought to build a larger navy than is now necessary.

A SQUARE DEAL FOR THE MEN AT THE FRONT

DECEMBER 25, 1918

We should show our respect for the men at the front by more than mere adulation. They are the Americans who have done most and suffered most for this country. It was announced in the press that in many cases they and the families they have left behind have not for months received their full pay. This is an outrage. All civil officials are paid. The Secretary of War is paid, and he ought not to touch a dollar of his salary and no high official should touch a dollar of his salary until the enlisted men and junior officers are paid every cent that is owing to them, and this payment should be prompt. There is literally no excuse for even so much as three days’ delay in the payment.

Moreover, these men, at great cost to themselves in paying everything including, in fifty or sixty thousand cases, their lives, have gone to the front at a wage from one half to one fifth as great as that their companions who stayed behind have received during the same period. They enlisted to do a specific job. They made the sacrifice in order to do that job. We on our side should see that just as soon as the job is done the men are taken home, allowed to leave the army, and begin earning their livelihood and take care of the wives and children that the married ones among them have left behind.

Recently in the public press there have appeared various artless and chatty statements from the State, War, and Navy departments that our men might be kept in Europe to do general police work and might not be brought back here until the summer of 1920. There are three types of soldiers on the other side. There are the Regular Army men, who have entered the Regular Army as a profession, and to whom it is a matter of indifference whether they stay in Europe, come back here, go to the Philippines, or do anything else. That is a small proportion of our force on the other side. The bulk are divided between volunteers, who enlisted in the National Guard or sometimes in the regular regiments to fight this war through, and the drafted men who were put into the army under a law designed to meet this war and this war only. Not one in ten of the volunteers would have dreamed of volunteering to do police work in European squabbles. Not ten Congressmen would have voted for the Draft Law if it was to force selective men to do police duty after the war was over. All these men went in to fight this war through to a finish and then to come home. It is not a square deal to follow any other course as regards them. The minute that peace comes every American soldier on the other side should be brought home as speedily as possible save, of course, the regulars who make the Regular Army their life profession, and any other man who chose to volunteer to go over, or who can with entire propriety be used for gathering up the loose ends. The American fighting man at the front has given this country a square deal during the war. Now let the country give him a square deal by letting him get out of the army and go to his home as soon as the war is finished. The Red Cross has done wonderful work in taking care of the dependents of these men pending settlement by the Government, but the Government should not be content to rely on any outside organization to make up its own shortcomings.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS[2]

JANUARY 13, 1919

It is, of course, a serious misfortune that our people are not getting a clear idea of what is happening on the other side. For the moment the point as to which we are foggy is the League of Nations. We all of us earnestly desire such a league, only we wish to be sure that it will help and not hinder the cause of world peace and justice. There is not a young man in this country who has fought, or an old man who has seen those dear to him fight, who does not wish to minimize the chance of future war. But there is not a man of sense who does not know that in any such movement if too much is attempted the result is either failure or worse than failure.

The trouble with Mr. Wilson’s utterances, so far as they are reported, and the utterances of acquiescence in them by European statesmen, is that they are still absolutely in the stage of rhetoric precisely like the “fourteen points.” Some of the fourteen points will probably have to be construed as having a mischievous significance, a smaller number might be construed as being harmless, and one or two even as beneficial, but nobody knows what Mr. Wilson really means by them, and so all talk of adopting them as basis for a peace or a league is nonsense and, if the talker is intelligent, it is insincere nonsense to boot. So Mr. Wilson’s recent utterances give us absolutely no clue as to whether he really intends that at this moment we shall admit Germany, Russia,--with which, incidentally, we are still waging war,--Turkey, China, and Mexico into the League on full equality with ourselves. Mr. Taft has recently defined the purposes of the League and the limitations under which it would act, in a way that enables most of us to say we very heartily agree in principle with his theory and can, without doubt, come to an agreement on specific details.

Would it not be well to begin with the League which we actually have in existence, the League of the Allies who have fought through this great war? Let us at the peace table see that real justice is done as among these Allies, and that while the sternest reparation is demanded from our foes for such horrors as those committed in Belgium, Northern France, Armenia, and the sinking of the Lusitania, nothing should be done in the spirit of mere vengeance. Then let us agree to extend the privileges of the League, as rapidly as their conduct warrants it, to other nations, doubtless discriminating between those who would have a guiding part in the League and the weak nations who would be entitled to the privileges of membership, but who would not be entitled to a guiding voice in the councils. Let each nation reserve to itself and for its own decision, and let it clearly set forth questions which are non-justiciable. Let nothing be done that will interfere with our preparing for our own defense by introducing a system of universal obligatory military training modeled on the Swiss plan.

Finally make it perfectly clear that we do not intend to take a position of international Meddlesome Matty. The American people do not wish to go into an overseas war unless for a very great cause and where the issue is absolutely plain. Therefore, we do not wish to undertake the responsibility of sending our gallant young men to die in obscure fights in the Balkans or in Central Europe, or in a war we do not approve of. Moreover, the American people do not intend to give up the Monroe Doctrine. Let civilized Europe and Asia introduce some kind of police system in the weak and disorderly countries at their thresholds. But let the United States treat Mexico as our Balkan Peninsula and refuse to allow European or Asiatic powers to interfere on this continent in any way that implies permanent or semi-permanent possession. Every one of our allies will with delight grant this request if President Wilson chooses to make it, and it will be a great misfortune if it is not made.

I believe that such an effort made moderately and sanely, but sincerely and with utter scorn for words that are not made good by deeds, will be productive of real and lasting international good.

THE END

FOOTNOTES:

[2] This article on “The League of Nations” is the last contribution that Colonel Roosevelt prepared for The Star. It was dictated at his home in Oyster Bay, January 3, the Friday before his death. His secretary expected to take the typed copy to him for correction Monday. Instead she was called on the telephone early Monday morning and told of his death. A delay of several days naturally ensued, before the editorial reached the office of The Star.

In view of the immense moment of the issues before the Peace Conference, The Star had asked Colonel Roosevelt to give his countrymen the benefit of his discussion of the possibilities of a League of Nations as a preventive of war. He consented, although, as he wrote, he expected to follow this editorial with one “on what I regard as infinitely more important, namely, our business to prepare for our own self-defense.” That article, however, was never written.

This article, then, his final contribution to The Star, represents his matured judgment based on protracted discussion and correspondence. It is of peculiar importance as the last message of a man who, above every other American of his generation, combined high patriotism, practical sense, and a positive genius for international relations.

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Transcriber’s Notes

Obvious errors in punctuation have been fixed.

In the table of contents, “The Landsdowne Letter” changed to “The Lansdowne Letter”

Page 49: “which his precedessor” changed to “which his predecessor”

Page 54: “seeking a black animal” changed to “seeing a black animal”

Page 136: “New York Herold” changed to “New York Herald”