Part 9

Then we came to the claim of M. Pacifico--a claim which has been the subject of much unworthy comment. Stories have been told, involving imputations on the character of M. Pacifico; I know nothing of the truth or falsehood of these stories. All I know is that M. Pacifico, after the time to which those stories relate, was appointed Portuguese Consul, first to Morocco and afterward to Athens. It is not likely that the Portuguese Government would select for appointments of that kind, a person whose character they did not believe to be above reproach. But I say, with those who have before had occasion to advert to the subject, that I don’t care what M. Pacifico’s character is. I do not, and cannot admit, that because a man may have acted amiss on some other occasion, and in some other matter, he is to be wronged with impunity by others.

The rights of a man depend on the merits of the particular case; and it is an abuse of argument to say that you are not to give redress to a man, because in some former transaction he may have done something which is questionable. Punish him if you will--punish him if he is guilty, but don’t pursue him as a Pariah through life.

What happened in this case? In the middle of the town of Athens, in a house which I must be allowed to say is not a wretched hovel, as some people have described it;--but it does not matter what it is, for whether a man’s home be a palace, or a cabin, the owner has a right to be there safe from injury--well, in a house which is not a wretched hovel, but which in the early days of King Otho was, I am told, the residence of the Count Armansperg, the Chief of the Regency--a house as good as the generality of those which existed in Athens before the sovereign ascended the throne--M. Pacifico, living in this house within forty yards of the great street, within a few minutes’ walk of a guardhouse where soldiers were stationed, was attacked by a mob. Fearing injury, when the mob began to assemble, he sent an intimation to the British Minister, who immediately informed the authorities. Application was made to the Greek Government for protection. No protection was afforded. The mob, in which were soldiers and _gens d’armes_, who, even if officers were not with them, ought, from a sense of duty, to have interfered and to have prevented plunder--the mob headed by the sons of the Minister of War, not children eight or ten years old, but older--that mob, for nearly two hours, employed themselves in gutting the house of an unoffending man, carrying away or destroying every single thing the house contained, and left it a perfect wreck.

Is not that a case in which a man is entitled to redress from somebody? I venture to think it is. I think that there is not a civilised country where a man subject to such grievous wrong, not to speak of the insults and injuries to the members of his family, would not justly expect redress from some quarter or other. Where was he to apply for redress at Athens? The Greek Government neglected its duty, and did not pursue judicial inquiries, or institute legal prosecutions as it might have done for the purpose of finding out and punishing some of the culprits. The sons of the Minister of War were pointed out to the Government as actors in the outrage. The Greek Government were told to “search a particular house; and that some part of M. Pacifico’s jewels would be found there.” They declined to prosecute the Minister’s sons, or to search the house. But, it is said, M. Pacifico should have applied to a court of law for redress. What was he to do? Was he to prosecute a mob of five hundred persons? Was he to prosecute them criminally, or in order to make them pay the value of his loss? Where was he to find his witnesses? Why, he and his family were hiding or flying, during the pillage, to avoid the personal outrages with which they were threatened. He states that his own life was saved by the help of an English friend. It was impossible, if he could have identified the leaders, to have prosecuted them with success.

But what satisfaction would it have been to M. Pacifico, to have succeeded in a criminal prosecution against the ringleaders of the assault? Would that have restored to him his property? He wanted redress, not revenge. A criminal prosecution was out of the question, to say nothing of the chances, if not the certainty, of failure, in a country where the tribunals are at the mercy of the advisers of the Crown, the judges being liable to be removed, and being often actually removed upon grounds of private and personal feeling. Was he to prosecute for damages? His action would have lain against individuals, and not, as in this country, against the hundred.[12] Suppose he had been able to prove that one particular man carried off one particular thing, or destroyed one particular article of furniture; what redress could he anticipate by a lawsuit, which, as his legal advisers told him, it would be vain for him to undertake? M. Pacifico truly said, “If the man I prosecute is rich, he is sure to be acquitted; if he is poor, he has nothing out of which to afford compensation if he is condemned.”

The Greek Government having neglected to give protection they were bound to extend, and having abstained from taking means to afford redress, this was a case in which we were justified in calling on the Greek Government for compensation for the losses, whatever they might be, which M. Pacifico had suffered. I think that claim was founded in justice. The amount we did not pretend to fix. If the Greek Government had admitted the principle of the claim, and had objected to the account sent in by M. Pacifico--if they had said, “This is too much, and we think a less sum sufficient,” that would have been a question open to discussion, and which our Ministers, Sir E. Lyons at first, or Mr. Wyse afterwards, would have been ready to have gone into, and no doubt some satisfactory arrangement might thus have been effected by the Greek Government. But the Greek Government denied altogether the principle of the claim. Therefore, when Mr. Wyse came to make the claim, he could not but demand that the claim should be settled, or be placed in train of settlement, and that within a definite period, as he fixed it, of twenty-four hours.

Whether M. Pacifico’s statement of his claim was exaggerated or not, the demand was not for any particular amount of money. An investigation might have been instituted, which those who acted for us were prepared to enter into, fairly, dispassionately, and justly.

M. Pacifico having, from year to year, been treated either with answers wholly unsatisfactory, or with a positive refusal, or with pertinacious silence, it came at last to this, either that his demand was to be abandoned altogether, or that, in pursuance of the notice we had given the Greek Government a year or two before, we were to proceed to use our own means of enforcing the claim. “Oh! but,” it is said, “what an ungenerous proceeding to employ so large a force against so small a power!” Does the smallness of a country justify the magnitude of its evil acts? Is it held that if your subjects suffer violence, outrage, plunder, in a country which is small and weak, you are to tell them when they apply for redress, that the country is so weak and so small that we cannot ask it for compensation? Their answer would be, that the weakness and smallness of the country make it so much the more easy to obtain redress. “No,” it is said, “generosity is to be the rule.” We are to be generous to those who have been ungenerous to you; and we cannot give you redress because we have such ample and easy means of procuring it.

Well, then, was there anything so uncourteous in sending, to back our demands, a force which should make it manifest to all the world that resistance was out of the question? Why, it seems to me, on the contrary, that it was more consistent with the honor and dignity of the Government on whom we made those demands, that there should be placed before their eyes a force, which it would be vain to resist, and before which it would be no indignity to yield. If we had sent merely a frigate and a sloop of war, or any force with which it was possible their forces might have matched, we should have placed them in a more undignified position by asking them to yield to so small a demonstration. Therefore, so far from thinking that the amount of the force which happened to be on the spot was any aggravation of what was called the indignity of our demand, it seems to me that the Greek Government, on the contrary, ought rather to have considered it as diminishing the humiliation, whatever it might be, of being obliged to give at last to compulsion, that which had been so long refused to entreaty.

Well, then, however, did we, in the application of that force, either depart from established usage, or do anything that was unnecessarily pressing on the innocent and unoffending population of Greece? I say the innocent and unoffending population, because it was against the Government, and not against the nation, that our claim for redress was directed. The courses that may be pursued in cases where wrong is done by one Government towards the subjects of another are various. One is what is commonly called “reprisals”; that is, the seizing something of value, and holding it in deposit until your demands are complied with; or, if you fail in that and don’t choose to resort to other methods, applying that which you have seized, as a compensation for the wrong sustained. That is one method. Another is the modified application of war--such as a blockade--a measure frequently adopted by the governments of maritime states when they demand redress for injuries. Last come actual hostilities. Many instances of such measures have been quoted in this debate as having been adopted by the governments of other countries, especially by the French Government, when they have had a demand to make for injuries sustained by their subjects; and, by the by, when people complain of the peremptory manner in which our demand was made, and the shortness of the time allowed for consideration, I wish to call to the recollection of the Honorable Gentlemen what was done by the French squadron no longer ago than 1848.

There was an insurrection at Naples, in May, 1848. The great street of the town was filled with barricades, and the troops had to force those barricades. To do that, they were obliged to occupy the houses right and left, in order to turn those defences; and as they forced one house after another, and passed on from house to house, they neglected to leave any guards behind them. They were followed by the Lazzaroni,[13] and the houses were plundered. Some French people whose shops were thus rifled, complained to the French Minister, and to the French Admiral--there being then a French squadron before the port at Naples. The French Admiral, Admiral Baudin, quite cut out Sir W. Parker, and being applied to by those French citizens, he sails up the bay, lays his ships broadside to, in front of the palace, and writes a note to the Government to say, that he has been called on by his countrymen to protect them; and he adds--that letter being dated half-past one on the 17th of May--that unless by three o’clock of that very day he obtains a satisfactory assurance--a satisfactory assurance that his countrymen shall be efficiently protected, reserving, he says, for future discussion their claims for compensation--but--

“Unless in one hour and a half I get, on board this ship, a satisfactory assurance that they shall be efficiently protected, I shall land the crews of my fleet, and will take care of them myself.”

Well, then, I say that Sir W. Parker acted with the greatest moderation in enforcing our demands. He began with reprisals, not with a blockade, wishing to avoid all unnecessary interruption to the commerce of other countries. But he made reprisals in a way which I believe has not often been adopted. The Government was the offending party, and he took possession of vessels belonging to the Government. Now, that is not the usual plan, and for very good reasons.

Vessels belonging to governments are armed. They may feel it to be their duty to defend themselves. To seize armed vessels would probably lead to bloodshed; and reprisals are generally effected by seizing merchant vessels belonging to the country on whom the demand is made. But, the disparity of force being so great on this occasion, Sir W. Parker began by seizing the few armed vessels belonging to the state. He then gave the Government time to reflect upon that demonstration. It was not attended to. Even then he did not immediately proceed to make reprisals upon merchant vessels. He first laid an embargo upon them. He gave notice that he had placed a lien upon them, and that they must not quit their ports. That failed; then he took merchant vessels, but only a limited number, and placed them under the custody of his fleet, avoiding to subject commerce in general to any greater degree of restraint than was unavoidably necessary for the execution of his instructions. It has been said, that we seized upon fishing-boats, and interrupted the coasting trade. I don’t believe that. On the contrary, I believe that the embargo did not extend to fishing-boats, or to vessels of small tonnage employed in the coasting trade of the country.

Well, sir, in that state of things, the French Government offered us their good offices and mediation. We readily and cheerfully accepted their good offices. We accepted them by a note of the 12th of February, which has been laid on the table, and in which we distinctly stated the grounds and conditions on which, and the extent to which, those good offices were accepted.

There could be no mistake between the English and French Governments upon that point. We took as our precedent the course that was pursued in the sulphur questions at Naples, when M. Thiers was Minister. In that case, we stated that reprisals would be suspended the moment any French Minister on the spot declared himself authorized to negotiate. In the said present case we went further, and said, that the moment the good offices of France were officially offered and officially accepted, we would send out instructions that the further making of reprisals should be suspended. In both cases we said we could not release the ships that had been detained, because by so doing we should give up the security which we held in our hands against the offending Government.

It has been stated that a misunderstanding arose between the Governments of France and England, in the course of the mediation, good offices, or whatever it may be called. I cannot say that there was any misunderstanding between M. Drouyn de Lhuys and myself, because it will be seen from his own despatches laid before the French Chamber, that he clearly understood the conditions on which the good offices of France were accepted. He repeatedly states that England gives up none of her demands--that is to say, that she gives up none of the principles of her demands; and that the only questions which the French negotiator is competent to discuss are those which did not involve the negation of the principles of our demands. Well, what were those questions? They were only the amount of money to be given to Mr. Finlay and to M. Pacifico, but not the question whether those gentlemen were to receive anything or nothing.

Then the question arose between us, what were the circumstances under which the good offices were to cease, and coercive measures were to be resumed; and it was distinctly understood on my part, as well as on that of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that Mr. Wyse was not to take upon himself to determine when Baron Gros’s mission had failed; and that it was only when Baron Gros should have announced that his mission had ceased, that Mr. Wyse was to resume coercive measures. It was further agreed between us, and especially on the 9th of April, that if a difference of opinion arose between Baron Gros and Mr. Wyse, on those points which Baron Gros was competent to discuss, Mr. Wyse was not to stand absolutely on his difference, and that if he did not find it possible to give way, he was, instead of saying, “Now, Baron Gros, your mission is at an end,” to refer home for further instructions. It is said that it was wrong of me not to have sent out to Mr. Wyse information of that understanding, come to on the 9th of April with M. Drouyn de Lhuys. Well, but in the first place I had already sent to Mr. Wyse, on the 25th of March, instructions which, if acted on in the spirit in which they were written, would render such a reference home altogether unnecessary. And they did render such reference home altogether unnecessary; because at last, when Baron Gros and Mr. Wyse came to the point of difference as to the amount of money to be paid, and Baron Gros said, “I would counsel the Government of Greece to pay 150,000 drachmas,” while Mr. Wyse said he was ready to accept 180,000 drachmas, Mr. Wyse at last, much more prudently than if he had referred this difference home, and had exposed Greek commerce to the restraint to which a continuance of the _status quo_ would have subjected it for a whole month, said, “I will, if other things are agreed to, come down to your amount--I will waive my opinion, and accept the sum you are willing to recommend the Greek Government to give.” Therefore, practically, I say, and in the result, the case did not arise to which those instructions could have applied.

Those instructions, if they had reached Mr. Wyse, would not have applied to the difference which did arise between him and Baron Gros; for that difference was this--it turned upon the claims of M. Pacifico. Baron Gros, on the 16th of April, was willing to recommend to the Greek Government to take an engagement to investigate the claims of M. Pacifico, in regard to the destruction of his Portuguese documents; and to pay him whatever might be the amount which, upon investigation, he might prove to be entitled to on that account; and to make a deposit of 150,000 drachmas as a pledge for the good faith with which they would execute that engagement. The only difference between Baron Gros and Mr. Wyse upon that occasion was, that Baron Gros proposed that the deposit, which they had both agreed should consist of shares of the Bank of Athens, should be left in the Bank of Athens; whereas Mr. Wyse required that it should be deposited either in the Bank of England, or, if the Greek Government preferred it, in the Bank of France. That seemed to be a difference that might be easily settled. But, on the 22d of April, Baron Gros altered his opinion. He retracted his opinion upon that point, and stated that later information from Portugal had convinced him, that M. Pacifico’s claim, in reference to the destruction of his Portuguese documents, was wholly unfounded. Baron Gros said he would no longer consent to recommend the Greek Government to enter into any engagement to pay anything to M. Pacifico on that account. He would agree to an investigation, but only provided that Portugal, and not the Greek Government should pay what might turn out to be due. But this was a point which Baron Gros was not competent to discuss. This new view of his would have been a negation of the principle upon which one of our claims rested; and, there being a difference of that kind between Mr. Wyse and Baron Gros, Mr. Wyse had no occasion to refer for fresh instructions--for he had received detailed instructions from me in a despatch, dated the 25th of March, sufficient to guide his conduct upon that point.

Baron Gros then withdrew from the negotiation, and that withdrawal was officially communicated, not only to Mr. Wyse, but to the Greek Government also. On the 24th, however, he received a despatch from General Lahitte, giving an account of the conversation which had passed between me and M. Drouyn de Lhuys, on the 9th; an account, by the way, which was not quite accurate, because it made me say that if any difference arose between Baron Gros and Mr. Wyse, Mr. Wyse should refer home for instructions; whereas all that I agreed to was, that such reference should be made in the case of irreconcilable difference between them, as to the amount of money to be paid by the Greek Government for those claims in regard to which we had not specified fixed sums; that is to say, for Mr. Finlay’s land and for M. Pacifico’s losses of furniture and goods at Athens. Baron Gros then proposed to withdraw the note, by which he announced officially the cessation of his functions, and he asked that his draft of arrangement, together with Mr. Wyse’s draft, should be referred to London for decision.

An impression has gone abroad that on that occasion (the 24th), Baron Gros received, and communicated to Mr. Wyse, not merely an account of the conversation between me and M. Drouyn de Lhuys on the 9th of April, but an account of the essential basis and an announcement of the expected arrival of the draft of convention which had been proposed to me by M. Drouyn de Lhuys for the first time on the 15th, discussed on the 16th, agreed to on the 18th, and sent off on the 19th; and Mr. Wyse is greatly blamed by many persons, both here and in France, upon the assumption that, whereas Baron Gros had informed him, on the 24th of April, that the English and French Governments had come to an agreement as to the essential bases of the convention to be signed between England and Greece, and had moreover told him that the convention itself would shortly be received at Athens--yet nevertheless, with this knowledge of the facts, he renewed coercive measures, and compelled the Greek Government to yield to his own demands. This assertion, so far as Mr. Wyse is concerned, is positively untrue. It is totally and wholly untrue. He received no communication from Baron Gros on the 24th, and none earlier than the 2d of May, relative to the draft of the convention agreed upon in London. Whether Baron Gros received the information or not on the 24th by the _Vauban_, I leave to be settled between him and his Government. The explanations of General Lahitte would indeed lead to the inference that he did not.

The statement to which I refer was made by “our own correspondent” of the _Times_. I may say, in passing that one person who has spoken on this subject elsewhere, has had the substance of his speech claimed publicly by the _Morning Herald_ as a compilation from its leading articles; and another has obviously been more indebted to the _Times_ than to the blue books for the statements on which he has founded his assertions. But the correspondent of the _Times_ stated distinctly, and upon that statement public opinion in this country has been formed, that Baron Gros did inform Mr. Wise on the 24th, that he had received by the _Vauban_ a statement announcing the London convention, and that, in spite of that information, Mr. Wyse resumed coercive measures. I understand that the French Government say that this is an entire mistake; that no information respecting the convention could have been communicated to Mr. Wyse on the 24th, because Baron Gros did not receive any by the _Vauban_, which arrived on that day. The complaint, therefore, against Mr. Wyse, come from what quarter it may, and I have no doubt it was sincerely believed at the moment it was made, that complaint can no longer be maintained, and is withdrawn.