Representative British Orations Volume 4 (of 4) With Introductions and Explanatory Notes
Part 7
As a boy, he is described as being notable for vivacity and energy; and, although undoubtedly hastened by family and connections, his early entry into public life was due in some measure to his own talents. Thus, before he was twenty-four, he had twice stood unsuccessfully for member for the University of Cambridge. His first election to Parliament came in June, 1807, from Newton, Isle of Wight. A few months later, Palmerston made his maiden speech, in favor of the expedition against Copenhagen, having previously, by family interest, been appointed a Junior Lord of the Admiralty. The speech attracted immediate attention; and the public was not surprised when, in 1809, the young man of twenty-five was offered so great a post as the Chancellorship of the Exchequer. There were doubtless few rising men who would have had a similar self-control; but Lord Palmerston modestly and wisely declined the sudden elevation, and, instead, elected to be Secretary at War, a kind of bursar to the army, in which comparatively obscure position he passed nearly twenty years. His next advancement--to the Secretaryship for Foreign Affairs--marks his entrance into his real element. From now on the years were those of preparation; little by little he built himself toward the Premiership. From 1830, then, until his occupancy of the highest office an English subject may hold, Palmerston was almost constantly in office, constantly, too, a figure to be reckoned with. At last, in 1855, as a crown to his ripe years and manifold experience, came the Premiership, which was to occupy the last decade of his life. Until very near the end, he may be said to have upheld firmly the high responsibilities of the office. Hardly suspected to be seriously ill by the public, he died October 18, 1865, within two days of his eighty-first year, of gout, the statesman’s disease.
The career of Lord Palmerston is typically an English and an aristocratic one. Nothing could be farther removed from the democratic ideal of the “self-made man.” Palmerston, so to speak, was born into success; and he was able to retain and to extend his birthright. In democracies like the United States, and in constitutional monarchies like England, it is not always that the man showered with fortune’s gifts makes public life at once his amusement and his profession. In the former state, such an one is the least likely of persons to raise an influential voice in Congress; in the latter, the man often drifts into the channels of sport or society. That the higher path has been essayed by so many well-born Englishmen is more than creditable: this fact lies close at the foundations of the British Empire.
We have said that through all the ramifications of the higher English life and politics Lord Palmerston was ever a pervasive figure. He could remember games of chess he had played, as a young man, with the unfortunate Queen Caroline: the year Byron published his first poems was the year of his entrance to Parliament; and he died as the American Confederacy flickered out in ashes. Through all these years, as a statesman he had preserved much the same character. Foreign Affairs were his chief interest: his conception of their administration practically never swerved from the theory of a militant, unsleeping England--an England at times, perhaps, apt to be blustering and overbearing, but an England frankly devoted to its higher self-interests and to what, from an English point of view, was indubitably the good of the world. His position toward home affairs is hard to describe. So far as he was identified with local divisions he was a Conservative with a strong tinge of Liberal doctrine. Abroad, the tinge of Liberalism and the sympathies with Continental rebellions against absolute monarchy due to it, caused Palmerston to be regarded as almost a revolutionary. In truth, so far as England was concerned, he was profoundly in love with the _status quo_: the uprisings abroad, he considered, were only the restless gropings of the peoples towards a realization of the English system of government. In hardly any sense was his policy constructive. As Mr. McCarthy remarks, in his brilliant estimate, great national crises he was at no time--perhaps happily--called on to meet. It was ever his way to follow, not direct the great impulses of public opinion that swept through Parliament. The same authority neatly sums him up in saying, “His policy was necessarily shifting, uncertain, and inconsistent; for he moulded it always on the supposed interests of England as they showed themselves to his eyes at the time.” In a word, he was an astute server of the hour; and the hour requited him with more than the usual success. Such a person is obviously not nicely scrupulous in matters of the _haute-politique_. The qualities of indomitable self-confidence, lightning decision, and immediate execution which he carried to the Foreign Office were the direct cause of the one inglorious episode of his life. To state it colloquially, Palmerston was inclined as Foreign Secretary to run the external relations of England on his own hook. His impatience would not allow him to hold despatches, in all cases, for the Queen’s approval; and he soon fell under her grave displeasure. The formally polite warnings of the Court were not heeded by the eager Secretary. Just at the moment of the Don Pacifico triumph, Lord Palmerston was dismissed from office by royal request. He bore the slight bravely. In England such a man could not be kept down; but the incident is rare in the modern history of Court and Cabinet.
Except in the show speech of the Don Pacifico debate, Palmerston was rarely eloquent. He was humorous, flippant, almost slangy in phrase; and his favorite style was one of banter. Personally, his manner was distinguished by no particular stateliness of bearing--he seems to have been generally liked.
Mr. McCarthy hesitates to call him a great man. But it is likely that he will be remembered as one richly endowed by circumstance who was equal to his fate.
LORD PALMERSTON.
ON THE CASE OF DON PACIFICO: HOUSE OF COMMONS, JUNE 25, 1850.
The case of Don Pacifico, which led to the following masterpiece of Lord Palmerston’s eloquence, is an example of how in the relations of states small matters may at a touch loom large and involve great issues. The collection of a bill of damages for household furniture, a mere entry in the vast budget of British governmental business, is seen to assume a serious, or, if one remembers the pedestrian character of the details, a tragi-comic import when it is known that on the event hung the chance of an European war.
Now the case, reduced to its bare details, is as follows: Don Pacifico, a Jew of Gibraltar, and a British subject, had taken up his residence at Athens, where, in the spring of 1847, he comes out of obscurity into momentary international fame, becomes with his petty affairs almost a _casus belli_ between two great Powers, and then sinks to oblivion again. In the new kingdom of Greece, then only since a score of years galvanized into a nation by the protective agencies of France, Russia, and Great Britain, foreigners and their rights had met with no nice consideration at the hands of King Otho and his officials. Certain Ionian subjects of the Queen had suffered insult or damages; a midshipman of H. M. S. _Fantôme_, landing by night at Patras, had been forthwith arrested; and England had already reasonable right to complain, when the case of Don Pacifico permitted her, in Lord Palmerston’s opinion, no longer to hesitate.
On April 4, 1847, during the celebration of the Greek Easter, certain riotous Athenians, prohibited that year from indulging in one feature of the _fête_,--the hanging of Judas Iscariot in effigy,--and consequently enraged at Jews in general, made an attack upon the modest house of Don Pacifico. It was alleged at the time that sons of the Minister of War were among the mob; it is agreed that both house and furnishings were ruined. The establishment, we have said, was modest; but, although the Jew filed an extraordinary bill of claims (one bedstead he valued at £150), the principle involved was such that the incident could not be ignored by an English foreign secretary. Thus the matter at once became the subject of the most strenuous diplomatic correspondence; but Greece being like Turkey one of the countries of “To-morrow,” nearly three years dragged away without satisfaction for Don Pacifico, until at last, with patience exhausted, Lord Palmerston sent the following instructions to the British Minister at Athens:
“F. O., December 3, 1849.
“MY DEAR WYSE:
“I have desired the Admiralty to instruct Sir William Parker to take Athens on his way back from the Dardanelles, and to support you in bringing at last to a satisfactory ending the settlement of our various claims upon the Greek Government. You will, of course, in conjunction with him, persevere in the _suaviter in modo_ as long as is consistent with our dignity and honor, and I measure that time by days--perhaps by some very small number of hours. If, however, the Greek Government does not strike, Parker must do so.”
The fleet arrived at the Piræus promptly, proclaimed a blockade, and seized some Greek vessels, both national and merchant. It was at this moment that the first element of danger entered into the incident. Of the already imperfect “Concert” which had installed the kingdom of Hellas, Russia became at once uneasy at the aggressive steps of Lord Palmerston; but France, the third party, aflame with jealousy and distrust, from now on almost made the Greek cause her own. Ostensibly, however, she came forward with proposals of arbitration; and England saw it her affair to accept the good offices, at the Greek Court, of Baron Gros. The arbiter nevertheless, soon finding the British and the Franco-Greek positions incompatible, gave up his task; the blockade, with seizure of vessels, was renewed; and it was in the minds of men that once more would England and France stand face to face. Meanwhile Greece seemed to have become flurried at her situation as the focus of events, and at last submitted to Palmerston’s pressure, under the following terms: a letter of apology to be presented for the _Fantôme_ incident; an indemnity of 180,000 _drachmai_ to be paid for damages to Don Pacifico and others; no compensation to be received by her for detention of vessels, which should then be released.
Thus, in the face of Greek delay and of probable French intrigue, Palmerston had gained his real point. But with it the second perilous moment arrived. In France the action of Greece was learned with a mixture of dismay and _Chauvinisme_; in England the Opposition saw its opening. The French Ambassador, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, was actually recalled; and it did not seem that war could be averted. Under these circumstances, on June 17, 1850, Lord Stanley introduced in the House of Lords this resolution of censure:
“That while the House fully recognizes the right and duty of the Government to secure to her Majesty’s subjects residing in foreign states the full protection of the laws of these states, it regrets to find, by the correspondence recently laid upon the table by her Majesty’s command, that various claims against the Greek Government, doubtful in point of justice or exaggerated in amount, have been enforced by coercive measures directed against the commerce and people of Greece, and calculated to endanger the continuance of our friendly relations with other Powers.”
Which was carried by a majority of 37.
The Government’s answer was the counter-resolution introduced by Mr. Roebuck in the Commons, June 24th:
“That the principles on which the foreign policy of her Majesty’s Government have been regulated have been such as were calculated to maintain the honor and dignity of this country; and in times of unexampled difficulty, to preserve peace between England and the various nations of the world.”
The debate that followed is described as having been one of the most brilliant of the century--covering a period of five nights and engaging the most vigorous speakers then in the House. On the second night, Lord Palmerston rose, about to deliver the remarkable effort of his life. Speaking for nearly five hours and without MS., he held the continuous attention of both parties. Other speeches followed; but it seems certain that this was the pronouncement that led the Commons, in division on the fifth night, to declare for the Palmerston policy by a majority of 46.
The effect on the country, on the foreign Powers, and on Lord Palmerston’s personal prestige was signal. Viewed internationally the whole affair between France and England had been a game of bluff; and, by the agency of Lord Palmerston, the English bluff had won. In due time France returned her Ambassador to St. James; and all was as before.
As to the speech, there is no doubt but that it must be regarded as one of the most emphatic expositions extant of the aggressive theory of foreign policy--of what many would call the Jingo idea. Contemporary opinion--even of the Opposition--we know to have been moved by such stalwart doctrines, so manfully laid down; for even Sir Robert Peel is quoted as saying, “It has made us all proud of him.” Palmerston himself writes to a friend: “The attack on our foreign policy has been rightly understood by everybody, as the shot fired by a foreign conspiracy, aided and abetted by a domestic intrigue; and the parties have so entirely failed in the purpose, that instead of expelling and overthrowing me with disgrace, as they intended and hoped to do, they have rendered me for the present the most popular minister that for a very long course of time has held my office.”
Strong words--but not overweening for one whose conduct of his country’s interests had won for him from Lord John Russell a title of which any Premier might be proud,--“Lord Palmerston, a Minister of England.”
SIR:
Anxious as many members are to deliver their sentiments upon this most important question, yet I am sure they will feel that it is due myself, that it is due to this House, that it is due to the country, that I should not permit the second night of this debate to close without having stated to the House my views upon the matters in question and my conduct, for which I have been called to account.
When I say that this is an important question, I say it in the fullest expression of the term. It is a matter which concerns not merely the tenure of office by one individual, or even by a government; it is a question that involves principles of national policy, and the deepest interests as well as the honor and dignity of England. I cannot think that the course which has been pursued, and by which this question has assumed its present shape, is becoming those by whose act it has been brought under the discussion of Parliament, or such as fitting the gravity and the importance of the matters which they have thus led this House and the other House of Parliament to discuss. For if that party in this country imagine that they are strong enough to carry the Government by storm, and take possession of the citadel of office; or if, without intending to measure their strength with that of their opponents, they conceive that there are matters of such gravity connected with the conduct of the Government, that it becomes their duty to call upon Parliament solemnly to record its disapprobation of what has passed, I think that either in the one case or in the other, that party ought not to have been contented with obtaining the expression of the opinion of the House of Lords, but they ought to have sent down their resolution for the consent and concurrence of this House; or, at least, those who act with them in political co-operation here, should themselves have proposed to this House to come to a similar resolution. But, be the road what it may, we have come to the same end; and the House is substantially considering whether they will adopt the resolution of the House of Lords, or the resolution which has been submitted to them by my honorable and learned friend, the Member for Sheffield.
Now, the resolution of the House of Lords involves the future as well as the past. It lays down for the future a principle of national policy which I consider totally incompatible with the interests, with the rights, with the honor, and with the dignity of the country; and at variance with the practice, not only of this, but of all other civilized countries in the world. Even the person who moved it was obliged essentially to modify it in his speech. But none of the modifications contained in the speech were introduced in the resolution adopted by the other House. The country is told that British subjects in foreign lands are entitled--for that is the meaning of the resolution--to nothing but the protection of the laws and the tribunals of the land in which they happen to reside. The country is told the British subjects abroad must not look to their own country for protection, but must trust to that indifferent justice which they may happen to receive at the hands of the government and tribunals of the country in which they may be.
The House of Lords has not said that this proposition is limited to constitutional countries. The House of Lords has not said that the proposition is inapplicable, not only to arbitrary and despotic countries, but even to constitutional countries where the courts of justice are not free; although these limitations are stated in the speech. The country is simply informed by the resolution, as it was adopted, that, so far as foreign nations are concerned, the future rule of the Government of England is to be, that, in all cases, and under all circumstances, British subjects are to have the protection only which the law and the tribunals of the land in which they happen to be may give them.
No! I deny that proposition; and I say it is doctrine on which no British Minister ever yet has acted, and on which the people of England never will suffer any British Minister to act. Do I mean to say that British subjects abroad are to be above the law, or are to be taken out of the scope of the laws of the land in which they live? I mean no such thing; I contend for no such principle. Undoubtedly, in the first instance, British subjects are bound to have recourse for redress to the means which the law of the land affords them, when that law is available for such a purpose. That is the opinion which the legal advisers of the Crown have given in numerous cases; and it is the opinion on which we have founded our replies to many applications for our interposition in favor of British subjects abroad.[9]
* * * * *
I say then, that if our subjects abroad have made complaints against individuals, or against the government of a foreign country, if the courts of law of that country can afford them redress, then, no doubt, to those courts of justice the British subject ought in the first instance to apply; and it is only on a denial of justice, or upon decisions manifestly unjust, that the British Government should be called upon to interfere. But there may be cases in which no confidence can be placed in the tribunals, those tribunals being, from their composition and nature, not of a character to inspire any hope of obtaining justice from them. It has been said, “We do not apply this rule to countries whose governments are arbitrary or despotic, because there the tribunals are under the control of the government, and justice cannot be had; and, moreover, it is not meant to be applied to nominally constitutional governments where the tribunals are corrupt.” But who is to be the judge, in such a case, whether the tribunals are corrupt or not? The British Government, or the Government of the state from which you demand justice?
I will take a transaction that occurred not long ago, as an instance of a case in which, I say, the people of England would not permit a British subject to be simply amenable to the tribunals of the foreign country in which he happened to be. I am not going to talk of the power of sending a man arbitrarily to Siberia; nor of a country the constitution of which vests despotic power in the hands of the sovereign. I will take a case which happened in Sicily, where, not long ago, a decree was passed that any man who was found with concealed arms in his possession should be brought before a court-martial, and, if found guilty, should be shot. Now, this happened. An innkeeper of Catania was brought before a court-martial, and accused under this law by some police officers, who stated that they had discovered in an open bin, in an open stable in his inn-yard, a knife which they denounced as a concealed weapon. Witnesses having been examined, the counsel for the prosecution stated that he gave up the case, as it was evident there was no proof that the knife belonged to the man, or that he was aware it was in the place where it was found. The counsel for the defendant said that such being the opinion of the counsel for the prosecution, it was unnecessary for him to go into the defence, and he left his client in the hands of the court. The court, however, nevertheless pronounced the man guilty of the charge brought against him, and the next morning the man was shot.
Now what would the English people have said if this had been done to a British subject? And yet everything done was the result of a law, and the man was found guilty of an offence by a tribunal of the country.
I say, then, that our doctrine is that, in the first instance, redress should be sought from the law courts of the country; but that in cases where redress cannot be so had--and those cases are many--to confine a British subject to that remedy only, would be to deprive him of the protection which he is entitled to receive.
Then the question arises, how does this rule apply to the demands we have made upon Greece? And here I must shortly remind the House of the origin of our relations with Greece, and of the condition of Greece; because those circumstances are elements that must enter into the consideration of the course we have pursued.