Part 13

We are now called upon to go into Committee on a Bill which has never been read a second time.[23] The two halves of it have been read, each of them a second time, but the whole measure we have never until this moment had before. The first half this House was induced--or shall I say coerced?--into reading a second time without knowledge of the other part. The second half was really hurried on so fast to a second reading--only an interval of a week being given to master all its complicated details--that I, for one, was quite unable to take part in the discussion on the second reading for want of time to make up my mind as to an opinion by which I should be willing to stand. I hope, therefore, the House will allow me, even at this stage, to question the principle of the measure. What is that principle? I must apologize to the House for the monotonous nature of my complaints, which are, I think, justified by the uniform nature of the provocation I receive. That provocation is that the Government keeps continually bringing in measures, attacking, as it seems to me, the very vital and fundamental institutions of the country, and purposely abstains from telling us the principle of those measures. I made the same complaint, I am sorry to say, against the Chancellor of the Exchequer on that Franchise Bill. I make it again now. The Chancellor of the Exchequer in introducing the Redistribution Bill said that the Government was not desirous of innovation--that is to say, they went upon no principle. Their principle, he said, was the same as the principle of every Redistribution Bill. Now, that appears to me to be impossible, because Redistribution Bills may be divided into two classes. There is one, the great Reform Bill,--the only successful Redistribution Bill that any one ever heard of,--and then there are the four which succeeded it, and which all failed from one cause or another.[24] The principle of the Reform Bill was one thing, and the principle of the four bills which followed it was another. The principle of the Reform Bill was, no doubt, disfranchisement. The feeling of the country at that time was that the deliberations of this House were overruled, and the public opinion of the country stifled by an enormous number of small boroughs under the patronage of noblemen and persons of property. That state of things was considered a public nuisance, and one which it was desirable to abate, and hence the principle of the Reform Bill was disfranchisement, and 141 members were taken away from the small boroughs. The Government proposition was to reduce the number of the House of Commons by fifty, because they were very anxious to get rid of these members, and they had no means which appeared suitable of filling up the vacancies they had created. It was only on an amendment carried against the Government that it was determined not to diminish the number of members in this House. But has that been the principle of any subsequent Reform Bill? I think not; it has been quite the contrary. It has been the principle of enfranchisement; and of disfranchisement only so far as may be necessary in order to fill up the places which require enfranchisement. As I have shown the House, there are two different principles, and the Right Honorable Gentleman does not tell me which is his, but says the principle is that of all other Redistribution Bills. This puts me in mind of the story of a lady who wrote to a friend to ask how she was to receive a particular lover, and the answer was, “As you receive all your other lovers.” Well, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer will not tell us what the principle of his measure is, I must, I am sorry to say, with the same monotony of treatment, try to puzzle it out for myself; for it seems to me preposterous to consider the Bill without the guiding thought of those who constructed it. There is one principle of redistribution upon which it clearly ought not to be founded, and that is the principle of abstract right to equality of representation. The principle of equal electoral districts is not the principle upon which a Redistribution Bill ought to be based. To adopt such a principle would be to make us the slaves of numbers--very good servants, but very bad masters. I do not suppose we are generally eager to see the time

“When each fair burgh, numerically free, Returns its Members by the Rule of Three.”

And yet, though few persons stand up for the principle of equality of representation, I cannot escape the conclusion that it has had a good deal to do with the matter, and that the Government will find it exceedingly difficult to point out what other principle than that of a sort of approximation towards numerical equality has guided them. For if it be not a principle of _a priori_ rights, it must be some good to the State, some improvement of the House, or the Government, some practical good in some way. Now, the House has had the advantage of hearing the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and the Chancellor for the Duchy of Lancaster, and I ask if any of these Right Honorable Gentlemen has pointed out any good of any practical nature whatever to be expected from the Bill. I set myself, therefore, according to my old method, to try and puzzle out what ought to be the principle of a Bill for the Redistribution of Seats. In the first place, I should like to be shown some practical evil to be remedied, but I give that up in despair, for I have so often asked for it and failed to obtain it that I am quite sure I shall not have it on this occasion. But it seems to me a reasonable view of a Redistribution Bill that it should make this House more fully and perfectly than it is at present a reflection of the opinion of the country. That, I think, is a fair ground to start from. We have suffered in many respects from the arbitrary division of these two measures, and in none more than this--that the arguments for the Redistribution of Seats has been transferred to this Bill for enlarging the franchise. For, although it is quite true that a Bill for the Redistribution of Seats should aim at making Parliament a mirror of the country, it is also true that there can be nothing more inappropriate than the argument when applied to the enlargement of the franchise. For to pass a Bill which puts the power in a majority of the boroughs into the hands of the working classes is not to make this House a faithful reflection of the opinion of the country, but is to make it an inversion of that opinion by giving political power into the hands of those who have very little social power of any kind. But that principle applies, to a certain extent, to a Redistribution Bill, and from that point I take my departure. Any one who makes an examination as to the nature of the deficiency will see whether this House fails in any considerable degree to reflect the opinion of the country. I confess I have found it exceedingly difficult to discover in what respects it fails to do so. I have, indeed, observed some tendency of a kind which, if we are to have a Redistribution Bill, ought to be corrected. I think there is a visible tendency to too great a uniformity and monotony of representation. I think there is a danger that we may become too much like each other--that we may become merely the multiple of one number. That is a danger which has occurred to thinking men, and I think it very desirable that in a Redistribution Bill we should find a remedy if possible for the tendency to this level of monotony, and perhaps mediocrity. I think another great object we must have in view in a Redistribution Bill should be enfranchisement; and by that I mean not the aggregation of fresh members to large constituencies, and by the enfranchisement of such constituencies the giving more variety and life to the representation of the country, and thus making the House what the country is--a collection of infinite variety of all sorts of pursuits and habits. I think the second advantage is that, by making fresh constituencies by fresh enfranchisements, you do the most efficient thing you can do towards moderating the frightful, enormous, and increasing expense of elections. This is one of the greatest evils of our present system. I am not speaking of the illegitimate expenses of elections, but of the legitimate expenses. We had a paper laid upon our tables this morning giving an account of the expenses of elections from “S” downwards. I take the first few large boroughs, and I will read the expenses. The expense of election for Stafford is £5400; Stoke-upon-Trent, £6200; Sunderland, £5000; and Westminster, £12,000. These are the aggregate expenses of all the candidates. I take them as they come, without picking and choosing. I wish to call particular attention to the case of Westminster, not for the purpose of saying anything disagreeable to my honorable friend (Mr. J. Stuart Mill), for we know he was elected in a burst--I will say a well-directed burst--of popular enthusiasm. That was honorable to him and honorable to them, and I have no doubt that in the course of the election all that could be done by industry and enthusiasm was accomplished--gratuitously; and I am sure that my honorable friend did not contribute in any way to swell any unreasonable election expenses. His election ought to have been gratuitous, but mark what it cost--£2302. I believe it did not cost him 6_d._ He refused to contribute anything, and it was very much to the honor of his constituents that they brought him in gratuitously. But look to the state of our election practices when such an outburst of popular feeling could not be given effect to without that enormous sacrifice of money. I will now call attention to two or three counties. This subject has not been sufficiently dwelt upon, but it bears materially upon the question before us to-night. I will take the southern division of Derbyshire. The election cost £8500, and this is the cheapest I shall read. The northern division of Durham cost £14,620, and the southern division, £11,000. South Essex cost £10,000. West Kent cost £12,000; South Lancashire, £17,000; South Shropshire, £12,000; North Staffordshire, £14,000; North Warwickshire, £10,000; South Warwickshire, £13,000; North Wiltshire, £13,000; South Wiltshire, £12,000; and the North Riding of Yorkshire, £27,000--all legitimate expenses, but by no means the whole expense. Now, I ask the House how it is possible that the institutions of this country can endure if this kind of thing is to go on and increase. Do not suppose for a moment that this is favorable to anything aristocratic. It is quite the contrary. It is favorable to a plutocracy working upon a democracy. Think of the persons excluded by such a system! You want rank, wealth, good connections, and gentleman-like demeanor, but you also want sterling talent and ability for the business of the country, and how can you expect it when no man can stand who is not prepared to pay a considerable proportion of such frightful expenses? I think I am not wrong in saying that another object of the Redistribution Bill might very well be to diminish the expense of elections by diminishing the size of the electoral districts. These are the objects which I picture to myself ought to be aimed at by a Redistribution Bill. It should aim at variety and economy, and should look upon its disfranchisement as a means of enfranchisement. And now, having done with that, I will just approach the Bill, and having trespassed inordinately on former occasions upon the time of the House, I will now only allude to two points. One is the grouping, and the other is adding the third member to counties and boroughs.[25] This word “group” is very pretty and picturesque. It reminds one of Watteau and Wouvermans--of a group of young ladies, of pretty children, of tulips, or anything else of that kind. But it really is a word of most disagreeable significance when analyzed, because it means disfranchising a borough and in a very uncomfortable manner re-enfranchising it. It means disfranchising the integer and re-enfranchising and replacing it by exceedingly vulgar fractions. Well, now, I ask myself, why do we disfranchise and why do we enfranchise? I do not speak now of the eight members got by taking the second member from boroughs, but of the forty-one got by grouping--by disfranchisement and enfranchisement. And I ask, in the first place, why disfranchise these small boroughs? I have heard no answer to this from the Government. All that was attempted was said by the Chancellor of the Exchequer--that he had in 1859 advocated the maintenance of small boroughs on the ground that they admitted young men of talent to that House, but that he found on examination that they did not admit young men of talent; and, therefore, he ceased to advocate the retention of small boroughs. My Right Honorable friend is possibly satisfied with his own reasoning. He answered his own argument to his own satisfaction; but what I wanted to hear is not only that the argument he used seven years ago had ceased to have any influence on his own mind, but what the argument is which has induced the Government to disfranchise the boroughs. Of this, he said not a single syllable. I know my own position too well to offer anything in favor of small boroughs. That would not come with a good grace from me, but I have a duty to perform to some of my constituents. They are not all ambitious of the honors of martyrdom. So I will give a very good argument in favor of small boroughs. What is the character of the House of Commons?

“It is a character of extreme diversity of representation. Elections by great bodies, agricultural, commercial, or manufacturing, in our counties and great cities are balanced by the right of election in boroughs of small or moderate population, which are thus admitted to fill up the defects and complete the fulness of our representation.”

I need not say that I am reading from the work of a Prime Minister.[26] Not only that, but he republished it in the spring of last year, and in that edition this passage is not there. But he published a second and more popular edition in the autumn, and in the autumn of last year he inserted the passage I am now reading. The Prime Minister differs from the Chancellor of the Duchy, for he seems fonder of illustration than argument:

“For instance, Mr. Thomas Baring” (he goes on to say) “from his commercial eminence, from his high character, from his world-wide position, ought to be a member of the House of Commons. His political opinions, and nothing but his political opinions, prevent his being the fittest person to be a member for the City of London.”

It would have been better to have said, “his political opinions prevent his being a member for the City of London,” without saying they prevent his being “the fittest person,” which is invidious.

“But the borough of Huntingdon, with 2654 inhabitants and 393 registered voters, elects him willingly.”

Next he instances my Right Honorable friend, the Secretary of State for the Home Department; but, as he happily stands aside and looks upon the troubles of the small boroughs as the gods of Lucretius did upon the troubles of mankind, I will not read all the pretty things the Prime Minister says of him. Then we come next to the Attorney-General:

“Sir Roundell Palmer is, _omnium consensu_, well qualified to enlighten the House of Commons on any question of municipal or international law, and to expound the true theory and practice of law reform. He could not stand for Westminster or Middlesex, for Lancashire or Yorkshire, with much chance for success.”

The House will observe that that was written last autumn. If it had been written this morning, I think very possibly the Prime Minister might have cancelled these words, and said, “that honorable and learned gentleman would have stood for one of those large constituencies with every prospect of success.” Now, is it credible, is it possible to conceive, that the writer of these words should actually be the Premier of the Government which, not six months after these illustrations were given, has introduced this new Reform Bill to group and disfranchise the very boroughs he thus instanced? Well, there is a little more:

“Dr. Temple says, in a letter to the _Daily News_, ‘I know that when Emerson was in England he regretted to me that all the more cultivated classes in America _abstained from politics because they felt themselves hopelessly swamped_.’”

These last words were given in italics, the only construction I can put upon which is that the noble Lord thought if many of these small boroughs were disfranchised the persons he desires to see in this House would not come here, else I do not see what is the application of the passage. He goes on to say:

“It is very rare to find a man of literary taste and cultivated understanding expose himself to the rough reception of the election of a large city.”

There is a compliment to many of the noble Lord’s most ardent supporters. But he continues:

“The small boroughs, by returning men of knowledge acquired in the study, and of temper moderated in the intercourse of refined society--”

Where the members for large boroughs never go, I suppose--

“restore the balance which Marylebone and Manchester, if left even with the £10 franchise undisputed masters of the field, would radically disturb.”

Whether that means to disturb from the roots or to disturb from radicalism, I do not know.

“But besides this advantage, they act with the counties in giving that due influence to property without which our House of Commons would very inadequately represent the nation, and thus make it feasible to admit the householders of our large towns to an extent which would otherwise be inequitable, and possibly lead to injurious results.”

So that the proposal of the noble Lord’s Government, coupled as it is with the disfranchisement of these small boroughs, is in his opinion inequitable certainly, and possibly likely to lead to injurious results. He goes on:

“These are the reasons why, in my opinion, after abolishing 141 seats by the Reform Act, it is not expedient that the smaller boroughs be extinguished by any further large process of enfranchisement. The last Reform Bill of Lord Palmerston’s Government went quite far enough in this direction.”