Part 11

Now, the fault I find with those who are so fond of attacking me either here or elsewhere, in this country or in others, is that they try to bring down every question to a personal bearing. If they want to oppose the policy of England, they say, “Let us get rid of the man who happens to be the organ of that policy.” Why, it is like shooting a policeman. As long as England is England, as long as the English people are animated by the feelings and spirit and opinions which they possess, you may knock down twenty foreign Ministers one after another, but depend upon it no one will keep his place who does not act upon the same principles. When it falls to my duty, in pursuance of my functions, to oppose the policy of any Government, the immediate cry is, “Oh, it’s all spite against this man, or that man, Count This, or Prince That, that makes you do this.” So the Right Honorable Baronet says our object in 1847 was merely to get rid of Costa Cabral; and, he adds, Costa Cabral being now in office, our purpose has been defeated. Now, as regards mere personal considerations, we did not care who was Minister of Portugal; but we felt that there was in that country much popular excitement, that party was arrayed against party, class against class, that there were bitter animosities ready to break out, and we knew perfectly well that if a member of the Cabral faction, was, at that particular time, made Minister there would be a renewal of civil war; we accordingly excluded, not forever, but merely for a time, and until the Cortes should decide who was to have their confidence, and who should be Minister, all men of the extreme parties, whether of the Cabral faction or of the Junta faction. I, therefore, cannot admit the triumph which the Right Honorable Baronet thinks he has obtained at my expense, by the fact that Costa Cabral, in spite of our proceedings in 1847, is now, in 1850, Minister of Portugal.

Now come to Spain. It is perfectly true that the Right Honorable Baronet was not in office when the Additional Articles of 1835--additional to the Treaty of 1834--were concluded. But what was the Treaty of 1834--the Quadruple Treaty? It was a treaty to expel from the peninsula not Don Miguel only, but Don Carlos also, who was then at the head of the troops in Portugal; and, therefore, so far as the spirit and provisions of that Treaty of 1834 went, the Right Honorable Baronet cannot ride off by saying that it confined itself entirely to Portugal, and did not extend to interference with Spain. Don Carlos was at the time in Portugal, at the head of the troops, with the purpose of getting back into Spain; and, had Don Miguel been successful in Portugal, there is no doubt that Don Carlos would have availed himself of the circumstance to enforce his claims upon Spain. Don Carlos having been expelled from the Peninsula under the Treaty of 1834, came to London for a time, and then returned to Spain. Hostilities were resumed in Spain; and the Additional Articles of 1835 were then concluded, for the purpose of giving to the Queen of Spain assistance, to enable her to retain the Crown, and to expel Don Carlos from Spain.[18]

This was a case exactly similar to that of Portugal in the preceding year. We had no particular interest, in the abstract, in determining whether the Sovereign of Spain should be an infant princess, as Isabella then was, or a full-grown prince; the mere abstract question between Isabella and Carlos was one in regard to which we had nothing to stake, and which the then Government of England would probably not have thought it proper or useful to interfere with. Questions of succession to a Crown have, indeed, at all times been matters with which foreign Powers have concerned themselves; but it has only been when some distant interest has made it worth their while to do so. But in Spain, as in Portugal, the question was between arbitrary rule and constitutional and parliamentary government, and in relation to Spain, as well as to Portugal, we thought that the interests of England in every point of view, commercial and political, would be benefited by the establishment of constitutional government.

If England has any interest more than another with reference to Spain, it is that Spain should be independent, that Spain should be Spanish. Spain for the Spaniards, is the maxim upon which we proceed in our policy with regard to Spain. Much evil must ever come to this country from the fact of Spain being under the dictation of other Powers. It is eminently for our interest that when we have the misfortune to be in dispute or at war with any other Power, we should not, merely on that account and without any offence to or from Spain herself, be at war with Spain also. It is to our advantage that so long as we have given no offence to Spain, and she none to us, differences with other Powers should not involve us in war with her: and we considered that the independence of Spain was more likely to be secured by a Government controlled by a representative and national Assembly, than by a Government purely arbitrary, and consisting merely of the members who might form the Administration. Therefore, on the grounds of strict policy, independently of the general sympathy which animated the people as well as the Government of this country towards Spain at that time, we thought it our interest to take part with Isabella, and against the pretensions of Don Carlos. That policy was successful. The Carlist cause failed; the cause of the constitution prevailed. But it is said by the Right Honorable Baronet that General Narvaez is Minister of Spain. I cannot see in that any defeat of the policy of England; General Narvaez, indeed, is Minister of Spain, but the constitution has of late been more strictly observed than it was at the period to which the Right Honorable Baronet referred.

The Right Honorable Baronet finds fault with a certain despatch which, in July, 1846 after the change of Ministry in this country, I wrote to Sir Henry, then Mr. Bulwer, at Madrid; and the Right Honorable Baronet says: “Here is an instance, not only of the interference of the noble Viscount, but of the manner and tone he uses.” Now, as to manner and tone, there have been certain communications made to other British Ministers by persons in whom the Right Honorable Baronet has confidence, which are certainly couched in terms which may possibly admit of the application of some of those phrases which the Right Honorable Baronet has applied to me. There was a certain despatch, for example, addressed by the Earl of Aberdeen to Sir Edmund Lyons, our Minister at Athens, which has already been read elsewhere, and which I have got a copy of here, and which I think is a very curious specimen of the manner in which the most mild and uninterfering of Foreign Ministers can, when he so likes, deal with the internal arrangement of other Governments.

Everybody knows who Sir Richard Church is; a most distinguished soldier, who fought nobly in the cause of Greek independence, and for a long time was properly respected and honored by the Greek Government. But, in 1843, he was supposed to sympathize with the party who extorted the constitution from the King. I believe that what he then did, was a great service to the King; and that he was very instrumental in saving King Otho from dangers to which he would otherwise have been exposed; but, however, in 1844, he incurred the displeasure of the King, and he was removed from the appointment of Inspector-General of the Greek forces, which he had held; and he was succeeded by General Grivas, a person whose conduct, as it appears from the despatch in question, had not been altogether free from imputations of disloyalty. Well, here are the instructions given on the subject to Sir Edmund Lyons, by the Minister who never interfered with the internal affairs of other countries, and especially with their purely domestic matters:

“Sir--Her Majesty’s Government have learned with deep concern the dismissal of Sir Richard Church from the post of Inspector-General of the Greek Army, which post he had so honorably and successfully filled for many years.”

Perhaps so far it was natural for the English Government to regret the dismissal of a meritorious English officer.

“Their regret is increased by finding that General Grivas, who so recently engaged in open rebellion against the Throne, has been appointed to succeed him.”

As to this point, one would have thought the King of Greece was himself the best judge.

“Her Majesty’s Government do not propose to interfere in the matter; since, however unjust the deprivation of General Church may have been, and however injudicious the elevation of his successor, these acts were certainly within the competence of the Greek Government.”

This is very handsome and candid.

“But,” continues the non-interfering Minister, “though her Majesty’s Government abstain from interfering, they deem it an imperative duty on their part--considering the position in which Great Britain stands with regard to Greece, as a creating and guaranteeing Power, to express--”

They do not interfere-- “to express in the strongest terms their sense of the injustice done to Sir Richard Church, one of the best, most disinterested, and most efficient supporters of Greek independence, by an abrupt and ungracious dismissal, unaccompanied by any word of commendation or acknowledgment of his great services to Greece, and also their sense of the excess of imprudence and impolicy exhibited in the appointment to one of the most responsible offices under the Crown of a man whose recent conduct has shown him to be an enemy to the Throne, and a deliberate perverter of order and discipline.”

This was written by the Minister who never interfered with the internal arrangements of other Powers.

“Her Majesty’s Government,” continues this mild despatch, “consider themselves fully warranted by the overt acts of General Grivas himself, in instructing you to make known these sentiments distinctly in their name to the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs as well as to the King himself--as well as to the King himself, should a favorable opportunity present itself and at the same time to warn His Majesty seriously--seriously and solemnly of the danger to which he will expose his country and his Throne by a perseverance in so fatal a line of policy as that which he has lately pursued.”

The writer of this despatch condemns me for my despatch of the 19th of July, 1846, addressed to Sir Henry Bulwer--a despatch which was not to be communicated to the Sovereign; and the concluding paragraph of which the Right Honorable Baronet might as well have read, when he read the other portion of it, because after stating to Sir Henry Bulwer that, having just come into office, we thought it was essential that we should explain to him the views we entertained as to the position of Spain, and as to the conduct of the Spanish Government, the despatch concluded with the following passage:

“It was certainly not for the purpose of subjecting the Spanish nation to a grinding tyranny, that Great Britain entered into the engagements of the quadruple alliance of 1835, and gave, in pursuance of the stipulations of that treaty, that active assistance, which contributed so materially to the expulsion of Don Carlos from Spain. But her Majesty’s Government are so sensible of the inconvenience of interfering, even by friendly advice, in the internal affairs of independent States, that I have to abstain from giving you instructions to make any representations whatever to the Spanish Ministers on these matters. But, though you will, of course, take care to express on no occasion on these subjects sentiments different from those which I have thus explained to you; and although you will be careful not to express those sentiments in any manner or upon any occasion so as to be likely to create, increase, or encourage discontent, yet you need not conceal from any of those persons who may have the power of remedying the existing evils, the fact that such opinions are entertained by the British Government.”

Now let the House, after comparing these two despatches, say whether it is from that quarter that we deserve the condemnation that has been passed upon us? “If I am worthy to be so treated I do not deserve to be so treated by you.”

But it is said, nevertheless, to me:

“You cannot be commonly courteous or civil, even in your reconciliations; your strong language led to a rupture of diplomatic relations with Spain, and, when matters have been arranged again, you have spoiled the grace and courtesy of the reconciliation by your manner of accepting an apology.”

I am told:

“You mentioned Sir Henry Bulwer, in your note, in reply to the apology of the Spanish Government, as the person whom you would have preferred to send to Madrid; and that was enough to disgust the Spanish Government and the Spanish people.”

No, at the time when the conduct of Sir Henry Bulwer became the subject of discussion in this House, there was not a man of any side who did not do him justice; and no one expressed himself more handsomely in regard to Sir Henry Bulwer than did the Right Honorable Baronet, the Member for Tamworth. Sir, it is not always fitting to tell diplomatic secrets to the House of Commons. Yet I am obliged, in vindication of myself, to do so on this occasion; and to tell the House, but of course in strict confidence, that those two notes--namely, the note of apology from the Spanish Government, and our note of answer, were mutually communicated to and approved by each Government beforehand. Yes, those notes were communicated confidentially and were agreed to by both Governments before they were officially interchanged.

However, sir, the Right Honorable Baronet, the Member for Ripon, says that these affairs of Spain were of long duration, and produced disastrous consequences, because they were followed by events of the greatest importance, as regards another country, namely, France. He says, that out of those Spanish quarrels and Spanish marriages, there arose differences between England and France, which led to no slighter catastrophe than the overthrow of the French monarchy. This is another instance of the fondness for narrowing down a great and national question to the smallness of personal difference. It was my dislike to M. Guizot, forsooth, arising out of these Spanish marriages, which overthrew his administration, and with it the throne of France! Why, sir, what will the French nation say when they hear this? They are a high-minded and high-spirited nation, full of the sense of their own dignity and honor--what will they say when they hear it stated that it was in the power of a British Minister to overthrow their Government, and their monarchy? Why, sir, it is a calumny on the French nation to suppose that the personal hatred of any foreigner to their Minister could have this effect. They are a brave, a generous, and a noble-minded people; and if they had thought that a foreign conspiracy had been formed against one of their Ministers--I say, that if the French people had thought that a knot of foreign conspirators were caballing against one of their Ministers, and caballing for no other reason than that he had upheld, as he conceived, the dignity and interests of his own country; and if they had thought that such a knot of foreign conspirators had coadjutors in their own land, why, I say that the French people, that brave, noble, and spirited nation, would have scorned the intrigues of such cabal, and would have clung the closer to, and have supported the more, the man against whom such a plot had been made. If, then the French people had thought that I, or any other Foreign Minister, was seeking to overthrow M. Guizot, their knowledge of such a design, so far from assisting the purpose, would have rendered him stronger than ever, in the post which he occupied. No, Sir, the French Minister and the French monarchy were overthrown by far different causes. And many a man, both in this country and elsewhere, would have done well to have read a better lesson from the events which then took place.

We had, indeed, a difference with the Government of France relative to the Spanish marriages.[19] I do not wish to open again questions that are gone by, or to remind the House or the country of the grounds of complaint which we had then, as I think, justly, against those who are no longer in power. But since I am pressed upon this matter, and as it is one count of the long indictment preferred against me, I must say, in my own defence, that the dissatisfaction which we felt was not groundless. I must say, too, that I formed my judgment from communications made to me by the noble Lord, (the Earl of Aberdeen), whom I succeeded in the office I hold--from statements from his own mouth, made to me in that interview which always take place between the Foreign Minister who goes out, and the Minister who comes in. I learned from that source, that promises had been made in regard to these marriages--not only by a Minister to a Minister, but between far higher personages--promises, the like of which, so far as I am aware of, have never before in the history of Europe been broken; and yet those promises were deliberately broken. If we felt dissatisfaction then at those marriages, that dissatisfaction was just and well-founded; and upon every ground of national interest and honor, we were entitled, nay, bound, to express it.

Before I quit this subject, I must say that in my opinion the policy which we have pursued in regard to France has been consistent with the interests of this country, and has been characterized by an observance of the principles which the honorable and learned gentleman whose resolution we are discussing, thinks ought to govern our foreign policy, and which are calculated to preserve, as they have preserved, the peace of Europe. Our prompt acknowledgment in 1848 of the Government established in France, and the kindly relations which we have maintained with the successive chiefs of administration in that country, sufficiently show that we have been animated by a kindly feeling towards the French nation; and that in our opinion the maintenance of friendly relations with that country is not only consistent with our interests and our dignity, but also forms a firm foundation for the peace of Europe.

The Right Honorable Baronet, the Member for Ripon, has insinuated that the Marquess of Normandy, in the period immediately preceding the events of February, 1848, had been in too intimate connection with some of the persons whom he describes as the parties who overthrew the throne of France. I know not whom he means, but this I know, that the person with whom the Marquess of Normandy was perhaps in the most frequent communication, because he was an old and intimate friend, was Count Mole; and I have yet to learn that he is a man who was likely to do anything to overthrow, either intentionally or unintentionally, the monarchy of France. But, if that insinuation was meant to convey an imputation that the Marquess of Normandy had done anything, or had held any intercourse inconsistent with his position as the ambassador of a friendly Power, then I say that imputation is totally and entirely unfounded.

Well, sir, I leave the sunny plains of Castile, and the gay vineyards of France, and now I am taken to the mountains of Switzerland, as the place where I am to render a stricter account.[20]

* * * * *

With regard to our policy with respect to Italy, I utterly deny the charges that have been brought against us of having been the advocates, supporters, and encouragers of revolution. It has always been the fate of advocates of temperate reform and of constitutional improvement to be run at as the fomenters of revolution. It is the easiest mode of putting them down; it is the received formula. It is the established practice of those who are the advocates of arbitrary government to say, “Never mind real revolutionists; we know how to deal with them; your dangerous man is the moderate reformer; he is such a plausible man; the only way of getting rid of him is to set the world at him by calling him a revolutionist.”

Now, there are revolutionists of two kinds in this world. In the first place there are those violent, hot-headed, and unthinking men, who fly to arms, who overthrow established governments, and who recklessly without regard to consequences, and without measuring difficulties and comparing strength, deluge their country with blood, and draw down the greatest calamities on their fellow-countrymen. These are the revolutionists of one class. But there are revolutionists of another kind; blind-minded men, who, animated by antiquated prejudices, and daunted by ignorant apprehensions, dam up the current of human improvement, until the irresistible pressure of accumulated discontent breaks down the opposing barriers, and overthrows and levels to the earth those very institutions which a timely application of renovating means would have rendered strong and lasting. Such revolutionists as these are the men who call us revolutionists. It was not to make revolutions that the Earl of Minto[21] went to Italy, or that we, at the request of the Governments of Austria and Naples, offered our mediation between contending parties.

* * * * *

With respect to the questions which arose last Autumn about Turkey, no blame has been imputed to her Majesty’s Government for the course which we pursued on that occasion in answer to the appeal made by Turkey, to this country and to France, for moral and material assistance. On that point all parties agreed. It is a proud and honorable recollection which Englishmen may treasure up, that on any occasion like that, all party differences were merged in high and generous national feeling; and that men of all sides concurred in thinking, that the Government of the Queen would not have been justified in rejecting an appeal so made, on such a subject.

But it has been said that we ought to have confined our interference, at first, to sending a despatch, and that we should not have sent our fleet until we knew whether our despatches would produce the desired effect. That would have been a very imprudent and unwise course of proceeding. The agents of the two Imperial Governments at Constantinople had used most menacing language to the Porte; had demanded the surrender of the refugees in the most peremptory manner; and said, that if they did not receive a categorical answer within a limited time they would suspend diplomatic relations. In short, they intimated that a refusal of their demands might lead to war. We had no means at the time of knowing whether this violent and peremptory language was or was not authorized by the Courts of Russia and Austria, and whether those Governments were prepared to enforce by actual hostilities the threat so held out. It was impossible to say what might occur in the interval between the 6th and the 26th of October; between the day when the despatches of the British Government were sent off to St. Petersburgh and Vienna, and the day when, if it were necessary on the receipt of those answers to send a fleet, that fleet, sent only after the answers were received, could reach the place where its services might be required. The Government did what men of prudence would do, who mean to do that which they profess.[22]