Part 10

With respect to the other complaint, that I did not write to Mr. Wyse an account of what had passed on the 9th of April, the simple reason why I did not was, that he was already in possession of instructions which were sufficient; that I could not have written till the 17th, and that on the 15th another arrangement was proposed, which provided an immediate settlement on the spot, and which therefore rendered any further reference to me by him out of the question. But it was said that if the French Government could have sent information to Baron Gros by the _Vauban_, why could not we have sent at the same time similar information to Mr. Wyse? Why, solely because we were in London, and the French Government was in Paris, and that if a steamer had been despatched by us from Portsmouth, it could not have got round to Athens so soon as a steamer despatched by the French Government from Marseilles or Toulon. But, as I have said, the convention of the 15th having been agreed to, all further reference to me by Mr. Wyse, was rendered unnecessary, because that convention was to be presented as an ultimatum to the Greek Government, by the British and French diplomatic agents.

And when it is said that those demands of ours on the Greek Government were so much repudiated by the Government of Russia and of France; and that by putting forward those claims we ran the risk of involving this country in a war with those Powers, I must be permitted to say, that, with respect to Russia, the despatch of Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunow, of the 19th of February, totally negatives that assertation. In that despatch, Count Nesselrode admits that he was aware as long ago as 1847, that our patience might be exhausted, and that we might have recourse to coercive measures against Greece to enforce our claims; and he says, moreover, that if lately, when we determined to enforce our claims, we had asked Russia to give us her assistance, she would have endeavored to persuade the Greek Government to come to an amicable settlement with us; and if the efforts of Russia to that effect had been unsuccessful, Russia could not then have expected that we should indefinitely postpone coercive measures out of deference to her.

With respect to France, the much-talked-of convention of the 19th of April was to be recommended by France to Greece in a way which made its acceptance pretty certain; and in that convention there was at once full acknowledgment of the principle of all our demands, and of the amount which we thought it just and right to require. I am sorry that the convention did not arrive before the other settlement took place, but that was not the fault of our negotiator. It was not he who put an end to Baron Gros’ functions, but Baron Gros himself. Baron Gros formally and officially withdrew from the negotiation, and that by a written communication, not addressed to Mr. Wyse alone, but to the Greek Government also.

But it is said he was willing to retract it, and that on the 24th of April he wrote to Mr. Wyse to say: “Send me back my note, and I will give you back yours.” Now, to this Mr. Wyse said:

“I cannot exactly do what you wish, but I have another proposal to make to you. You ask me to refer to England, and to maintain the _status quo_ till I get an answer; but to keep the Greek vessels in custody till that answer arrives would subject Greek commerce to great inconvenience. Instead of this, I propose that if the Greek Government will send me 180,000 drachmas with a letter that that sum is in satisfaction of all our claims excepting M. Pacifico’s claim on account of the loss of his Portuguese documents, I will----”

Do--what? Refer home? No. Continue the _status quo_? No.

“I will immediately release all the Greek merchant vessels. I will only retain the few Government vessels as a pledge, leaving the wording of the apology in the case of the _Fantôme_, and the compensation for the loss sustained by M. Pacifico by the destruction of his Portuguese documents, to be settled by future discussion.”

The effect of that arrangement would have been, that the points on which Mr. Wyse and Baron Gros differed would have been left open for future discussion; that coercive measures, as far as Greek commerce was concerned, would have been entirely suspended; the convention of London, of the 19th of April, would have arrived in time; but the Greek Government indeed would, by that convention, have had to pay probably a larger sum than the 180,000 drachmas. But what was Baron Gros’ answer to that? He said, on the 24th, “I have withdrawn from the negotiation, and I cannot therefore officially transmit to the Greek Government your proposal.” Therefore it was not merely by his official notes of the 22d April to Mr. Wyse and M. Londos, that Baron Gros withdrew from the negotiation, for he repeated his withdrawal, in answer to this proposition; but he intimated, in a private letter, that he had made it known to the Greek Government. “To-morrow the 25th,” he said, “I believe you will have, before five o’clock of the afternoon, your letter and your money.”

Now, was Mr. Wyse in a hurry to resume coercive measures? Did he catch at the first moment at which he might have been authorized to resume hostilities? Far from it. He waited from the 22d to the 24th, and from the 24th till five o’clock in the afternoon of the 25th, and it was not till after that hour had passed, at which Baron Gros had led him to expect that he would receive from the Greek Government an acceptance of his conciliatory proposal; it was not till that hour had passed without any communication arriving, that he announced, through the British Consul, that the embargo would again be established.

It is plain, therefore, that Mr. Wyse did not put an end to Baron Gros’ functions, or show any impatience to renew coercive measures. Baron Gros himself put an end to his own functions, in spite of Mr. Wyse’s repeated entreaties that he would not do so; and when Baron Gros had formally withdrawn, Mr. Wyse, instead of at once resuming coercive measures, made another and a very conciliatory proposal; but Baron Gros’ answer to this was a renewed declaration that he had withdrawn from the negotiation, and that his official functions had ceased.

Since then, negotiations have taken place between the Governments of England and France, which, I am happy to say, have been brought at last to a satisfactory conclusion. We are ready to accept such parts of the proposed convention as are still applicable to what remains to be done. Having received and distributed to the claimants the 180,000 drachmas, we don’t insist upon the difference between the sum and the sum that was to be required by the convention. The apology written by M. Londos is retained, and cannot be returned to him, in order that instead of it, he may send us the one proposed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys. The only thing, therefore, that remains to be settled, is the investigation of the claims of M. Pacifico on account of the loss of his Portuguese documents. With regard to these claims, by arrangement of the 27th of April, a material security was given in the shape of a pecuniary deposit. The convention, of which I have drawn up the details, contained on that point a diplomatic guarantee, instead of a substantial guarantee; for it was a convention to be ratified by two sovereigns, providing that a commission of arbitration which should be named by three Governments to investigate was to be made not by a commission, but by the British and Greek Governments jointly. We are perfectly ready to substitute the one arrangement for the other, if the Greek Government choose to adopt it; but we do not intend to urge it upon them, if they do not. If they prefer the arrangement of the convention, we are prepared to conclude a convention to that effect, superseding the corresponding part of the arrangement which was concluded at Athens.

There is, however, one point in Mr. Wyse’s arrangement which was not included in the draft of the convention, because it applies to circumstances of which we were not aware at the time when the convention of London was framed. Mr. Wyse exacted an engagement on the part of the Government of Greece that they should not put forward, or support, if put forward by others, any claims for compensation arising from losses or injuries consequent upon the coercive measures to which we had recourse. The motive of Mr. Wyse for requiring that engagement was, that he understood the Government of Greece had been collecting and beating up for claims of that kind, which they meant to put forward to a very large amount. We attach no value to that engagement as bearing in any manner whatever upon the validity of any such claims. Such claims can have no just foundations whatever; and if they were put forward by the Greek Government our answer could only be, “These claims have no foundation in right or reason, and we utterly and entirely reject them.” But the value of that arrangement was, that by shutting the door against such claims, it prevented the Greek Government from raising discussions which might interrupt the good understanding and friendly relations between the two countries. The British Government are willing, instead of that engagement, to accept the good offices of the French Government, whose good offices with the Government of Greece under existing circumstances have some value, and who will advise the King of Greece not to put forward any such unfounded claims, and with that advice we shall be content.

Thus terminates all difference between the Governments of England and France in regard to these matters; and I believe that if it had not been for discussions which are now taking place in the French Assembly, the distinguished individual who represents the French Government at this Court, might have been present to hear the debate of to-night. So much, then, with regard to the affairs of Greece, and the course which we have pursued in regard to them; but there still remains the question of the far-famed islands of Sapienza and Cervi.

Now, with respect to these islands, my opinion is clear and decided. That opinion, as has been already stated this evening, is supported by the opinion of my predecessor in office, the Earl of Aberdeen, as appears by a despatch from him to Sir E. Lyons, which has been laid on the table. The case is simply this: There are certain islands on the coast of Greece, which originally belonged to Venice, and which, by the Treaty of 1800, between Russia and the Porte, were erected into a separate State.[14] The seven great islands and all the other islands, great and small, inhabited and uninhabited on the coast of Albania and of the Morea, were placed under feudal relations to Turkey; and were secured by the guarantee of Russia; and it was declared that the constitution which that State might give to itself should be communicated to, and be sanctioned by, the two protecting Powers. At that time the Morea and the other parts of Greece belonged to Turkey. In 1803 these islands made their constitution, which, I presume, was communicated to, and sanctioned by, the two protecting Powers; and in 1804, in execution of that constitution they made a municipal distribution of the smaller islands, allotting them respectively to the seven larger islands; and in a public decree, which I cannot doubt must have been made known both to Turkey and Russia, Sapienza aggregated to Zante, and Cervi to Cerigo.

Now, can any man suppose that, if Cervi and Sapienza had been part of the Turkish territory at that time, the Sultan would have allowed his vassals of the Ionian State to appropriate to themselves what belonged to him? or that Russia, who was still more vigilant, and was under engagement, by guarantee, to defend and maintain the territory of this Ionian State, would have permitted a proceeding, which on such a supposition, would have thrown on her the duty of defending for the Ionian State islands which belonged to Turkey? But these islands have always been considered by the British Government, ever since the Septinsular Republic was placed under the protection of England, as belonging to the Ionian State; and it is well known that officers quartered at Cerigo have been in the habit of going to Cervi for purposes of amusement, and that that island has always been held to be part of the Ionian territory.

The boundaries of Greece were settled by the Protocol of February, 1830, with the exception of an improvement in the northern frontier, which was afterwards arranged between the Three Powers and the Porte, and in the settlement of which we were assisted by an honorable and gallant friend of mine, the Member for Portarlington, who was employed in surveying that improved line. A map was attached to the Protocol of February, 1830, and a red line, of which we have heard much, was drawn upon that map to mark part of the boundary which, was established by the Protocol; but that red line was mentioned in the Protocol only as marking the northern boundary of Greece, east and west from sea to sea, and it did not apply to the islands. The islands which were to form part of the Greek State, were enumerated by name in the Protocol, and neither Cervi nor Sapienza were included in that enumeration.

It is, therefore, impossible to contend that the public acts which constituted the Kingdom of Greece included either of these islands within its territory. If, then, the Greek Government has taken possession of either of these two islands, it is the Greek Government that has intruded upon the territory of the Ionian State; and the British Government has not, by demanding the evacuation of those islands, wanted to intrude upon the territory of the Kingdom of Greece. But this question did not form part of the demands made by Mr. Wyse on the 15th of January. It is a separate question, and remains open for fair discussion between the Governments of Greece and England, and of England, France, and Russia.

Our applications about these islands had remained unnoticed by the Greek Government for ten years. It may be asked, then, why did we renew them at this particular time? Because the Greek Government committed last year an act of aggression on the island of Cervi which they had never committed before. A boat going between Cerigo and Zante with convicts was driven by stress of weather upon Cervi, when the convicts were liberated, and other acts were committed as if the island had been Greek territory. It became necessary, therefore, to call for an answer to our application, and if no answer was given, to take possession of the islands--an operation which could be performed by a boat’s crew, without involving any greater employment of force. But, as has already been stated, the Greek Government hearing that these islands were to be taken possession of, at last broke their ten years’ silence, and made a reply; and a discussion being thus opened, the forcible occupation was suspended. With respect to the Government of Russia, that Government was made aware so long ago as the beginning of last October, of the instructions we had given for the occupation of those islands.

Having disposed of the matter of Greece, I now come to the wider range which was taken last night by the Right Honorable Baronet, the Member for Ripon.[15] That Right Honorable Baronet took, I think, a proper view of the question before the House, because the resolution which has been proposed is not confined to one particular act of her Majesty’s Government with regard to foreign affairs, but does fully involve and open the consideration of all the topics to which the Right Honorable Gentleman adverted. I agree, however, with those honorable gentlemen who have contended that the resolution does not imply an absolute and entire approval of every act that has been done by the Government; and, indeed, it would be unreasonable to propose such a vote to the House: because it could hardly be expected that so large a number of men, possessing different degrees of information, holding different views, and not knowing exactly in all cases what have been the grounds upon which the Government have acted, though they may approve of the general principles which have guided the conduct of the Government, should implicitly approve of everything we may have done.

The Right Honorable Baronet was justified in taking that larger range into which he expatiated last night; but I must be allowed to set him right as to the first point upon which he touched. He stated what was quite true, that when he was a member of Earl Grey’s administration, he concurred with me in many acts of foreign policy of which I was the organ, which involved very active interposition in the affairs of other countries. He instanced the negotiations in regard to Belgium, and its separation from Holland. He has done justice to the views which guarded the Government of that day, in their opinion that the independence of Belgium would be a measure advantageous to the peace, present and future, of Europe. But, then, he says, that case was different from the acts of the present Government, because every step in that affair was taken with the concurrence of all the five Powers who were parties to the negotiation, The Right Honorable Baronet said that there were, to be sure, some things which went beyond mere negotiation; there was the siege of Antwerp, and the embargo laid by us upon Dutch ships. He had concurred, he said, in both measures; but were those measures steps taken with the full consent of all five Powers? Were those acts measures of such description that they rendered it quite impossible that the friendly relations of this country with other Powers could be disturbed thereby? The Right Honorable Baronet must, I am sure, recollect that Austria, Russia, and Prussia dissented from those measures; that in consequence thereof they withdrew for a time from the conference, and that a Prussian army was collected near the banks of the Meuse, the presence of which rendered it necessary for the French to send a very large force to Antwerp, much more than was required for the mere siege of the citadel, and also to have a reserve ready in case of need. I know very well that when people are out of office their memory is not so quick and retentive as to things which happened while they were in power as it would have been if they had remained in; but on this point the Right Honorable Baronet made an important mistake, especially as bearing upon the particular question now before the House.

I agree with the Right Honorable Baronet that, in regard to the affairs of Belgium, the Government of England came to a wise determination. I think that the arrangement which in 1815 had been thought conducive to the peace of Europe, and by which, through the union of Belgium with Holland, a Power of some consideration was to be formed in that particular part of Europe, interposed between Germany on one side and France on the other--I think that that arrangement, which originally, by those who framed it, was, and not without reason, expected to prove advantageous to the peace of Europe, had, by the course of events, turned out to have a contrary tendency. The people of Belgium and of Holland evidently could not coalesce; and if certain Powers of Europe had combined at that moment to compel a reunion between these separated portions of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, I doubt whether the reunion could have been effected without the immediate explosion of a war in Europe of the greatest magnitude; and I am quite sure that if it had been effected, it could not have lasted, and the foundation must have been laid thereby of future and inevitable disturbance. We carried out our opinion upon that point to a practical result.

It is not to be disguised, at this time of day, that our opinion on that matter was not shared by Austria, Russia, and Prussia. They would much rather have seen the two countries reunited; and if that reunion was at that time impossible, they would have been glad of an arrangement which might have tended to render a reunion thereafter more easy. This was not breach of faith on their part; they acted, I am bound to say, with great good faith and honor in the whole transaction; but they had that opinion which differed from the opinion of England and France. Nevertheless, our arrangements prevailed; and was that, now, an instance of a policy which deserves the censure and condemnation of Parliament and of the country?

I remember of being taunted in this House by being told of my “little experimental Belgium monarchy.” It was predicted that the experiment would not succeed; it was said that there was no national feeling among the Belgians; that they would, on the first opportunity, throw themselves into the arms of their nearest neighbor; that we were only laying the foundation of another change; and that our arrangement was only “a transition state.” Why, if ever there was an experiment--call it so if you will--that fully and completely succeeded, the erection of Belgium into an independent State was that experiment. In times when almost all the other countries in Europe have been convulsed from top to bottom, Belgium has remained undisturbed. The people have shown the most admirable devotion and attachment to their sovereign; the sovereign the greatest confidence in, and love for, his people; the nation has made rapid advances in industry and in the arts, in everything which distinguishes a civilized state; all this reflects the greatest honor upon the Belgian people; and they have, moreover, acquired a spirit and sentiment of nationality which entitles them to the respect of every other country in the world. I say, then, that so far as we were concerned in effecting that arrangement, I think that is a case to which we can refer with pride and satisfaction, and in regard to which we can justly claim the approbation of Parliament and of the country. But it was not altogether without encountering difficulty, not only in other countries, but at home, that we were able to bring that long negotiation to a successful issue.[16]

Then the Right Honorable Baronet says, that he was also a party to another operation which differed in some degree from pure and mere diplomatic intervention--the interference of this country in the affairs of Portugal by the Quadruple Treaty of 1834.[17]

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